Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Collier v. Astrue (No. 06-1343)
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IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
CLAIRE G. COLLIER,
Petitioner,
U.
JO ANNE B. BARNHART,
Respondent.
On PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES CourRT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
RICHARD F. Hans
Counsel of Record
THACHER ProrrFitt & Woon LLP
Two Financial Center
New York, NY 10281
(212) 912-7400
JOHN VUKELJ
DLA Piper US LLP
1251 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10020
(212) 335-4500
Counsel for Petitioner
CCUNSEL PRESS
(800) 274-3321 + (800) 359-6859
i
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
A provision of the Social Security Act and its
accompanying regulations, known together as the
“20/40 Rule,” provide that an applicant for Social
Security Disability Insurance (“SSDI”) above the age
of 31 must have worked 20 of the previous 40 quarters
(i.e., five of the last ten years) to qualify for SSDI.
42 U.S.C. § 423(c)(1); 20 C.F.R. § 404.130(b).
Qualifying for SSDI is a prerequisite for being eligible
for Medicare if the applicant is under 65. 42 U.S.C.
§ 426(b).
1. Does the 20/40 Rule, which renders most
women who leave the work force to raise their
children ineligible for SSDI, invidiously discriminate
against mothers and thereby violate equal protection
under the Fifth Amendment?
2. Does the 20/40 Rule’s formula for determining
eligibility for SSDI violate due process under the
Fifth Amendment where the formula is arbitrary and
results in most women who leave the work force to
raise their children being rendered ineligible for
Social Security Disability Insurance?
li
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING
The petitioner is Claire G. Collier, who lives in
Stamford, Connecticut with her husband and three
children.
The respondent is Jo Anne B. Barnhart,
Commissioner of the United States Social Security
Administration.
Th
TABLE OF CONTENTS
QUESTIONS PRESENEED 2. cceesicssses
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING .........
WARS OP CAPPUR o e itv eve een
TARE OF APPEND 6 i ccicicccucvens
Ot SERRE MAT cen cesadvwevesees ener
BS Se ear re rope emmaereaR neers
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY
PROVISIONS INVOLVED .............
SIATEMENT OF THE CASE .........20..
A. Pactual Background ........ 22sec.
S. Procedural Mistery 5... ce vcc cnn’
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE
ee RE 3s hk ile oe ea ex
I. THE 20/40 RULE DENIES WOMEN
EQUAL PROTECTION UNDER THE
PEP STE AILPMENT, cede cence:
A. The 20/40 Rule Has A Disparate
And Disproportionate Impact On
WR es ech bee ae ees
Page
1]
12
iv
Contents
B. The 20/40 Rule Invidiously
Discriminates Against Women
Because It Is Predicated On Women
Of Child-Bearing Age Leaving The
oo er ere eee
II. THE 20/40 RULE VIOLATES MRS.
COLLIER’S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS
UNDER THE FIFTH AMENDMENT.
2 2 2S eS Oe: So 2S. OC SS OOO tO aS 2-8 SF Re Se Fee
Page
15
TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES
CASES
Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 97 S. Ct.
WUT oa ce hoes ow ewe ewe te eas
Collier v. Barnhart, 473 F.3d 444 (2d Cir.
ee eae el
er eee
Ellis v. Apfel, 147 F.3d 139 (2d Cir. 1998) ...
Harvell v. Chater, 87 F.3d 371 (9th Cir. 1996)
Pe re BO iO OP ee OO Be Se € EOS Sa 2 6 8 ee OS. 8
Hesse v. Harris, No. 78 C 5176, 1980 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 10122 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 31, 1980) ....
Hurvich v. Califano, 457 F. Supp. 760 (N.D.
Se NE i 9 05h 6 binds ncn dae ee
Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78, 92 S. Ct.
pS EE oh A Riageepiarniens pe aeeiect Meg ney nice eer akc hei re:
Tuttle v. Secretary of Health, Education &
Welfare, 504 F.2d 61 (10th Cir. 1974) .....
Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975)
Page
lz, IS
IS, 2a
11
20
EDA LE ke TROL EN ee EN LE ee 17, 18, 25
Winger v. Barnhart, 320 F. Supp. 2d 741
te 6S ic eR eas
20, 21
vi
Cited Authorities
Page
STATUTES
PRP RROEED Nc kot adineserecenedes 1
( Roe (ae | > PEPE e REECE TT CR ete passim
gtk eet Co |) Beemer rari i, 2, 12
WETS BI koa ve ee eden goees coe: i, 6, 11
REGULATIONS
a ec POE Ge es neewceieiaciusgees i, 23
LEGISLATIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE
MATERIALS
145 Conc. Rec. § $5587 (May 19, 1999) ..... 23
The Future of Aging: Hearing before the S.
Spec. Comm. on Aging, 109th Cong.
(February 3, 2005) (statement of Douglas
Holtz-Eakin, Director of Cong. Budget
RS ee a Sawn kd be ae Se des 19
H.R. Rep. No. 76-278 (1939) .............. 18
H.R. Rep. No. 106-1019 (2000) ............ 22
vil
Cited Authorities
Page
Revised Medical Criteria for Evaluating
Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis, 68 Fed. Reg.
Dh OU PE ile CAO nv e's cc vacvviass 23
S. Rep. No. 83-1987 (1954), reprinted in 1954
Rie UE oo oo ee ea 17, 25
SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, PUBLICATION
No. 05-10127, ICN 480067, Wuat Every
WoMAN SHOULD KNow: SoctAL SECURITY AND
Topay’s Woman (April 2003) ............. 15
Social Security Improvements for Women,
Seniors, and Working Americans: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Social Security of
the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 107th Cong.
(February 28, 2002) (testimony of Jo Anne
Barnhart, Comm’r of Social Security
FOES 5 soca eee a 16
OTHER AUTHORITIES
Matthew H. Hawes, So No Damn Politician
Can Ever Scrap It: The Constitutional
Protection of Social Security Benefits,
65 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 865, 877 (2004) ....... 18
Samuel Issacharoff & Elyse Rosenblum,
Women & the Workplace: Accommodating the
Demands of Pregnancy, 94 Co.um. L. Rev.
BE UT LEONE hc Kab ooh eee eke ee as 13
vill
Cited Authorities
Jerry A. Jacobs & Janice Fanning Madden,
Mommies & Daddies on the Fast Track:
Success of Parents in Demanding
Professions, 596 ANNALS Am. AcaD. POL. &
Soc. Sci. 246, 250 (2004). 00 0 eee
Olivia S. Mitchell & John W. R. Phillips,
Eligibility for Social Security Disability
Insurance (Univ. of Mich. Retirement
Research Ctr., Working Paper WP 2001-011,
RO 2 SSS eee
Page
13
ix
TABLE OF APPENDICES
Page
Appendix A — Opinion Of The United States
Court Of Appeals For The Second Circuit
greene senuery 4.2007 ............85. la
Appendix B — Ruling On Plaintiff's Objections
To The Magistrate Judge’s Recommended
Ruling Of The United States District Court
For The District Of Connecticut Filed July
ee an sy a'viw Ose we 10a
Appendix C — Recommended Ruling Of The
United States District Court For The
District Of Connecticut Dated And Filed
April 25, 2006
1
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Claire G. Collier respectfully petitions for a writ
of certiorari to review the judgment of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in this
case.
OPINIONS BELOW
The Opinion of the Court of Appeals is reported
at 473 F.3d 444 and is reprinted in the Appendix to
the Petition (“Pet. App.”) at la. The District Court's
opinion is reprinted at Pet. App. 10a and is not
otherwise published. The unreported recommended
ruling by the Magistrate Judge in the District Court
is reprinted at Pet. App. 32a and is not otherwise
published.
JURISDICTION
The Court of Appeals entered its judgment on
January 4, 2007. This Court has jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY
PROVISIONS INVOLVED
The Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution provides, in pertinent part:
No person shall ... be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of
law....
»
2
Section 223(c)(1) of the Social Security Act (the
“20/40 Rule”), 42 U.S.C. § 423 (c) (1), provides, in
pertinent part:
An individual shall be insured for disability
insurance benefits in any month if —
(A) he would have been a fully
insured individual (as defined in
section 414 of this title) had he
attained age 62 and filed
application for benefits under
section 402(a) of this title on the
first day of such month, and
(B) (i) he had not less than
20 quarters of coverage during the
40-quarter period which ends with
the quarter in which such month
occurred, or
(ii) if such month ends before
the quarter in which he attains (or
would attain) age 31, not less than
one-half (and not less than 6) of the
quarters during the period ending
with the quarter in which such
month occurred and beginning
after he attained the age of 21 were
quarters of coverage, or (if the
number of quarters in such period
is less than 12) not less than 6 of
the quarters in the 12-quarter
period ending with such quarter
were quarters of coverage, or
3
(iii) in the case of an individual
(not otherwise insured under
clause (i)) who, by reason of section
416(i)(3)(B)(ii) of this title, had a
prior period of disability that
began during a period before the
quarter in which he or she attained
age 31, not less than one-half of the
quarters beginning after such
individual attained age 21 and
ending with the quarter in which
such month occurs are quarters of
coverage, or (if the number of
quarters in such period is less than
12) not less than 6 of the quarters
in the 12-quarter period ending
with such quarter are quarters of
coverage....
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The crux of this case is the suitability of the
20/40 Rule of the Social Security Act for determining
women’s eligibility for Medicare benefits. Adopted
in 1954, the 20/40 Rule relies on a formula the intent
and impact of which is to deny SSDI and Medicare
benefits to a disproportionate number of women after
they have contributed substantial amounts to both
funds through tax payments.
A. Factual Background
1. Mrs. Collier is a 44-year-old mother of three
children, ages 12, 10, and 9. She and her husband
William had their first child, Kieran, in September
1994; their second child, Bridget, in May 1996; and
their third child, Leah, in July 1997.
4
2. Mrs. Collier worked continuously from 1979
through August 1994; she did not stop working until
she was eight months pregnant with her first child.
At ail times during her employment from 1979
through 1994, Mrs. Collier paid Social Security and
Medicare taxes, and her various employers paid
Social Security and Medicare taxes on her behalf. In
total, Mrs. Collier and her employers contributed a
total of almost $40,000 in Social Security taxes and
almost $10,000 in Medicare taxes on her behalf. From
2000 through 2002, Mrs. Collier performed part time
work as a teacher's aide an J was an active volunteer
at the school her children were attending. She and
her employers paid Social Security and Medicare
taxes on her behalf in 2000 and 2002.
3. In the spring of 2003, Mrs. Collier started
feeling strange physical sensations, including
twitching in her arms and cramping in her calves.
When the symptoms persisted and gradually
worsened, Mrs. Collier visited her doctor who in turn
referred her to a series of specialists. One by one,
her doctors eliminated the potential ailments. With
the list of possibilities shrinking, Mrs. Collier found
herself praying for cancer, anything treatable,
instead of something worse. By the fall of 2003, Mrs.
Collier's worst fear was confirmed; she was diagnosed
with amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (“ALS”), commonly
known as Lou Gehrig's Disease.
4. ALS is a progressively and rapidly debilitating
and devastating neuromuscular disease characterized
by a rapid degeneration of the nerve cells of the brain
and spinal cord, leading to the wasting of muscles,
paralysis and eventual death. Within three years of
diagnosis, ALS victims typically lose movement in every
a
muscle in their body, become unable to speak, and
lose the ability to swallow or breathe without complex
machinery. Certain augmenting breathing devices
may be employed in the short term to assist an
individual with ALS. However, the period of
effectiveness of such devices is limited. Eventually,
an individual with ALS is on a ventilator and feeding
tube, requiring round-the-clock medical supervision.
Barring a medical breakthrough, artificial life
support or divine intervention, most ALS victims will
die within five years of the onset of symptoms.
Present treatment is aimed at symptomatic relief,
prevention of complications, and maintenance of
optimal function and quality of life. There is no
known cure.
9. ALS treatment imposes a crushing economic
burden. As a result of her ALS symptoms, Mrs.
Collier has been unable to secure or perform gainful
or otherwise substantial employment. To date, Mrs.
Collier and her family have incurred and continue
to incur substantial, catastrophic costs in her
treatment and the maintenance of her condition,
having expended more than $500,000 within almost
three years. These expenditures include, but are not
limited to: (a) a specially designed hospital bed
costing $9,712.40; (b) a custom-fitted strap-on vest
to help Mrs. Collier breathe and break up and expel
mucous through her respiratory system, costing
approximately $16,000; (c) home modifications
costing over $150,000 to allow for movement of
Mrs. Collier in her home; (d) $200,000 in costs to
reallocate and modify the Colliers’s existing home
living space following the home modifications; (e) a
unique, customized wheelchair costing $24,877.40;
(f) a specially modified van to transport Mrs. Collier
6
in her customized wheelchair costing $54,184; and
(g) special leg braces and splints costing over $500
each. Mrs. Collier's current monthly care
expenditures include: (a) between $1,000 and $2,000
per month for various medications; (b) doctor
prescribed physical therapy costing over $800 per
month; (c) over $800 in costs for in-home massage
therapy; and (d) approximately $6,000 a month for
around-the-clock home healthcare. Her home
healthcare costs have only continued to spiral out of
control and it is anticipated that her nursing costs
alone this calendar year will exceed $500,000.
Furthermore, Mrs. Collier's local municipality has
required that all modifications to her home, which
are necessary to accommodate her wheelchair and
inability to climb stairs, comply with the Americans
with Disabilities Act. The added costs of compliance
are substantial.
6. Following her diagnosis, doctors told Mrs.
Collier that Medicare should offset much of the
catastrophic costs. Mrs. Collier later learned,
however, that because she was not yet 62, in order
to receive Medicare benefits she had to establish
qualification to receive Social Security disability
benefits. 42 U.S.C. § 426(b).
B. Procedural History
1. Mrs. Collier applied for SSDI in January 2004.
On February 1, 2004, the Social Security
Administration (“SSA”) denied Mrs. Collier’s SSDI
application on the grounds that she had insufficient
recent work credits to qualify. The following
month, in March 2004, Mrs. Collier applied for
reconsideration of the SSA's initial denial of Social
7
Security disability benefits. Nearly six months later,
in September 2004, the SSA denied her request for
reconsideration.
In accordance with the requirement that she
exhaust all administrative remedies, Mrs. Collier
requested and appeared at a hearing before an
Administrative Law Judge on March 14, 2005. Ina
ruling dated June 10, 2005, the Administrative Law
Judge denied Mrs. Colliér’s claim and held that she
“was not under a disability as defined in the Social
Security Act, at any time through the date of this
decision.” (quoted in part in Pet. App., at 36a n.6.)
The Administrative Law Judge added:
It is clear that ALS has taken a great toll
on [Mrs. Collier's] physical and mental
health, and on her family and finances.
[Mrs. Collier] has fought courageously
against the disease and has done
everything possible to continue in her role
as a wife and mother. Her personal story is
compelling, and her ongoing efforts to raise
her children despite the disease merit
admiration.
By letter dated June 17, 2005, Mrs. Collier
requested permission from the SSA to file an
expedited appeal of the Administrative Law Judge’s
decision. On August 25, 2005, the SSA’s Appeals
Council denied her request for review, thereby
exhausting Mrs. Collier’s administrative remedies.
2. On October 28, 2005, Mrs. Collier filed a
complaint against the Commissioner in the United
States District Court for the District of Connecticut.
8
Pursuant to a court order, on January 26, 2006,
Mrs. Collier moved for summary judgment seeking
an order ruling that the 20/40 Rule is
unconstitutional. On February 22, 2006, the
Commissioner cross-moved for an order affirming the
decision of the SSA. On April 25, 2006, Magistrate
Judge Joan Glazer Margolis issued a recommended
ruling denying Mrs. Collier’s motion for summary
judgment and affirming the decision of the
Commissioner. (Pet. App., at 32a.) On July 17, 2006,
the District Court approved and adopted the
recommended ruling, offering three bases in support
of its ruling. (Pet. App., at 10a.)
First, the District Court confirmed the SSA's
determination that Mrs. Collier was not fully insured *
and, therefore, not eligible for disability benefits
under the 20/40 Rule of the Social Security Act,
notwithstanding her extensive work history and
considerable contributions to the Social Security and
Medicare systems.
Second, although it found compelling a number
of studies cited by Mrs. Collier that indicate that the
20/40 Rule consistently excludes women from
collecting benefits after they have made substantial
contributions to the Social Security and Medicare
systems, che District Court nonetheless held that the
20/40 Rule of the Social Security Act does not violate
Mrs. Collier’s Equal Protection rights under the Fifth
Amendment. The District Court accepted the
Commissioner's assertion that the 20/40 Rule serves
the “legitimate goals of creating a self-sufficient
socia! security system and seeks to provide
protections for workers in the economy.” (Pet. App.,
at 3a-4a).
9
Third, the District Court denied Mrs. Collier's
Due Process claim, holding that the 20/40 Rule is
rationally related to Congress's alleged intent to
create a self-supporting Social Security system. The
Court rejected Mrs. Collier's arguments that the
20/40 Rule undermines Congress's overarching intent
that the Social Security system provide for “the
family as a unit” and that the 20/40 Rule conflicts
with recent efforts by Congress and the Social
Security Administration to provide easier access to
Social Security and Medicare benefits to ALS victims.
3. On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed the
District Court's ruling. (Pet. App., at 1a.) Denying
the Equal Protection claim, the court found
“persuasive” and “compelling” evidence on the record
that the 20/40 Rule disparately impacts women’s
eligibility for SSDI, but it found no evidence that
Congress was motivated by an “invidious
discriminatory purpose” in enacting the 20/40 Rule.
Accordingly, the court held that the 20/40 Rule
satisfies the rational review test. Denying the
substantive Due Process claim, the court held that
the classification created by the 20/40 Rule was not
“patently arbitrary.” The court also held that there
was no evidence of a procedural Due Process
violation.
At oral argument, the Second Circuit referred to
Mrs. Collier's plight as “a matter of human tragedy”
and noted that Mrs. Collier has advocated for
legislative reform of the 20/40 Rule. The Court noted
that Senator Christopher J. Dodd and Representative
Christopher Shays have introduced the “Claire
Collier Social Security Disability Insurance Fairness
Act,” which would make the 20/40 Rule inapplicable
‘in the case of a disabled individual suffering from a
covered terminal illness.”
10
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION
The constitutionality of the 20/40 Rule is an
important question of federal law that has not, and
should be, settled by this Court. It impacts untold
numbers of unknowing families in which mothers had
once worked and contributed to the Social Security
system only to be left without government aid
precisely in their greatest moment of need. Surely,
such a cruel result should not be imposed by the
nation’s Social Security laws or endorsed by this
Court.
There is no valid or legitimate government
objective served by denying terminally ill individuals
access to Medicare simply because they do not first
qualify for SSDI. The courts below have focused on
what they have found to be the legitimate objectives
of creating barriers to access to SSDI. Yet none have
ever articulated a legitimate objective for applying
that same barrier to access for the terminally ill to
Medicare. The laws already carve out exceptions for
certain illnesses, such as blindness and end-stage
renal disease, allowing such persons access to
Medicare without first qualifying for SSDI. What
legitimate government interest is served by
permitting access to some, but then restricting access
to Medicare for those whose terminal condition is
beyond question? As it stands, the law leaves women
who have contributed significantly to the Social
Security system and who leave the workforce to bear
and raise their children without assistance in those
harrowing times they most need the societal safety
net of Medicare.
11
Moreover, drawing an arbitrary 20/40 line does
not lend legitimacy to the government’s claim that
the system is designed to be self-supporting. What
the law does, however, is single out women who, after
paying Social Security and Medicare taxes for years,
choose to stop for a time to raise their children. In
the case of Mrs. Collier, the 20/40 Rule creates a
system in which she would have been eligible for
benefits if she had been diagnosed with ALS five
years earlier. The law therefore imposes a patently
arbitrary and defenseless classification, without
rational justification. Such a law violates Mrs.
Collier's rights to equal protection and due process
under the Fifth Amendment.
I. THE 20/40 RULE DENIES WOMEN
EQUAL PROTECTION UNDER THE FIFTH
AMENDMENT.
The denial of benefits to Mrs. Collier
unconstitutionally discriminates against her and any
other women who, after materially contributing to
the Social Security and Medicare Trust Funds, elect
to stay at home and engage in raising their children.
A statutory classification in the area of social
welfare violates Equal Protection if it is not rationally
based, and it must “not engage in invidious
discrimination.” Ellis v. Apfel, 147 F.3d 139, 144 (2d
Cir. 1998); Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78, 81.
92 S. Ct. 254 (1971). Under the current rules
governing Medicare, a person under the age of 65
diagnosed with ALS is entitled to Medicare benefits
only if eligible for and entitled to receive SSDI
benefits. 42 U.S"C. § 426 (b). SSDI, in turn, is
available to an individual making a disability claim
iz
who has been employed at least 20 out of the
40 quarters preceding the quarter in which the
applicant's disability occurs. 42 U.S.C. § 423 (a) (1),
(c)(1); Harvell v. Chater, 87 F.3d 371, 372 (9th Cir.
1996) (denying challenge to the 20/40 Rule where the
plaintiff had not contributed Social Security taxes
in 31 years because he was a federal employee and,
as such, was entitled to a retirement pension under
a separate federal mandate).
A. The 20/40 Rule Has A Disparate And
Disproportionate Impact On Women.
A law violates the Equal Protection clause where
the discriminatory effects of a “facially neutral”
action bear a close relationship to a purported “non-
invidious purpose.” See, e.g., De La Cruz v. Tormey,
582 F.2d 45, 51-53 (9th Cir. 1978) (holding that
community colleges’ failure to establish childcare
facilities violated equal protection rights of women
because it resulted in a substantial number of women
being denied educational opportunities on an unequal
basis). In De La Cruz, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals held that:
[aJs with facial discriminations, decisions
or actions which, while in form
nondiscriminatory, produce effects which
weigh adversely and disproportionately
upon the members of a particular protected
group of individuals, may require
explanation in terms of non-invidious
purpose.
Id. at 50.
13
The courts below found compelling various
Studies and statistics that demonstrate the disparate
and disproportional impact of the 20/40 Rule. Studies
have shown that “women with professional degrees
are out of the labor force at a rate about three times
that of their male counterparts and they
overwhelmingly cite family responsibilities as the
reason.”' In its effect, therefore, the 20/40 Rule
penalizes women between the ages of 31 and 41 who
Stay at home to care for their children and thus are
unable to work at least five of the previous ten years,
notwithstanding prior work history. See, e.g., De La
Cruz, 582 F.2d at 51-53 (holding that community
colleges’ failure to establish childcare facilities
violated equal protection rights of women because it
resulted in a substantial number of women being
denied educational opportunities on an unequal
basis).
For example, an applicant age 31 who worked
from age 21 through 26 and paid into Social Security
and Medicare for five years would be entitled to SSDI
and Medicare benefits under the 20/40 Rule.
Conversely, an applicant age 41, such as the Plaintiff
here when she was diagnosed with ALS, having
' Jerry A. Jacobs & Janice Fanning Madden, Mommies
& Daddies on the Fast Track: Success of Parents in
Demanding Professions, 596 ANNALS Am. ACAD. Pot. & Soc.
Sci. 246, 250 (2004). Another study “revealed surprising
Similarity in the wage profiles of single males and single
females, but found that with time and marriage (with
childbirth presumably strongly correlated with both the
passage of time and marital status), the wage patterns
diverged as a result of the discontinuous labor force
participation of women.” Samuel Issacharoff & Elyse
Rosenblum, Women & the Workplace: Accommodating the
Demands of Pregnancy, 94 Covum. L. Rev. 2154, 2160 (1994).
14
worked and thus contributed to Social Security and
Medicare from age 18 through 34 (a-period of
seyenteen years), would not be eligible for SSDI
or Medicare. Thus, it is clear that the recency
requirements imposed by the 20/40 Rule become more
onerous with age, ironically making it more — not
less — difficult to receive Medicare or SSDI benefits
the closer one is to the respective qualifying ages of
62 or 65.
Several studies further demonstrate the
disparate and discriminatory impact of the 20/40
Rule and its recency requirements. Rates of SSDI
coverage for women in their 30's and early 40's are
nearly 20% lower than that for men of comparable
age. Not only are women less likely to be insured,
but married women in particular are 10% less likely
to be covered than single women. In sum, the current
studies have found that “[flamily structure seems to
play an important role in the insured status of women
but has little effect for men. It appears that marriage
and childbearing, in this cohort of workers at least,
make women more susceptible to losing [disability]
insurance coverage than men.”’ Accordingly, the
recency requirements of the Social Security disability
laws represent a substantial barrier to Medicare
eligibility for women who take time off from the
workforce in order to care for and raise their children.
The result is the removal of Medicare's social safety
net out from under Mrs. Collier and all women
charged by society with the responsibility of bearing,
nurturing and caring for our children.
2 Olivia S. Mitchell & John W. R. Phillips, Eligibility
for Social Security Disability Insurance 11 (Univ, of Mich.
Retirement Research Ctr., Working Paper WP 2001-011,
2001), available at http://www.mrrc.isr.umich.edu/
publications/papers/pdf/wp01 1.pdf.
15
B. The 20/40 Rule Invidiously Discriminates
Against Women Because It Is Predicated
On Women Of Child-Bearing Age Leaving
The Workforce.
Despite the 20/40 Rule’s undisputed discriminatory
effect on women, the courts below held that the purpose
behind the 20/40 Rule is not invidious because the
purported primary purpose behind the Rule is to
maintain a “self-sufficient” Social Security system. The
SSA's public representations, however, reveal that the
Social Security Act contemplates and relies upon the
fact that women between the ages of 31 and 41 years of
age will leave the workforce to have and raise children
after having contributed Social Security and Medicare
taxes. In an April 2003 Electronic Booklet entitled
“What Every Woman Should Know: Social Security and
Today’s Woman,” the SSA stated:
Although some women choose lifetime
careers outside the home, many women work
for a few years, leave the labor force to raise
their children, and then return to work. Some
women choose not to work outside their
homes. They usually are covered by Social
Security through their husbands’ work and
can receive benefits when he retires, becomes
disabled or dies,
See SociaL SEcuRITY ADMINISTRATION, PUBLICATION No.
05-10127, ICN 480067, WHat Every Woman SHOULD
Know: SociaAL SecurITY AND Topay’s WomMAN (April
2003), available at http://www.ssa.gov/pubs/
10127.html. Furthermore, on February 28, 2002,
Commissioner Barnhart testified on Social Security
reform efforts before the Subcommittee on Social
Security, Ways and Means Committee and noted that
16
“women tend to have shorter careers, and, when they
do work, earn less than men,” and she advocated
“incremental changes ... targeted to address
concerns affecting ... women... (which) deal with
time limits in the law that are no longer appropriate
or that should allow exceptions.” See Social Security
Improvements for Women, Seniors, and Working
Americans: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Social
Security of the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 107th
Cong. (February 28, 2002) (testimony of Jo Anne
Barnhart, Comm’r of Social Security Admin.)
available at http://www.ssa.gov/legislation/
testimony_022802.html. With respect to these time
limits, Commissioner Barnhart recognized that “for
the women affected, these changes would make a
substantial difference in their economic security.” Id.
Despite the Commissioner's recommendations, the
20/40 Rule in fact fails to recognize the contributions
of women who have worked and contributed
substantially to the Social Security and Medicare
programs prior to becoming homemakers. And by the
SSA's own admission, the 20/40 Rule acts to render
women dependent on their husbands’ Social Security
benefits. Accordingly, the Commissioner's and SSA's
statements reveal that the 20/40 Rule does not
promote a “self-supporting” system at all. Instead, it
relies on the tax contributions from women who will
be incapable of fulfilling the Rule’s recency
requirements and, thereby, may never collect under
the system. In consideration of its impact and its
purpose, the 20/40 Rule should be held
unconstitutional for denying Mrs. Collier equal
protection in violation of the Fifth Amendment to
the United States Constitution.
17
The courts below rejected Mrs. Collier's claim
that the 20/40 Rule, in having a disparate and
discriminatory impact on women, undercuts the
primary purpose behind the Rule: to protect and
provide for the family. Instead, the lower courts opted
to perpetuate the myths advanced by the SSA that
the Social Security system is “self-supporting” and
designed to “‘afford protection to working members
of the nation’s economy.” Even if the Social Security
system were “self-supporting,” which it is not, its
Status as such necessarily depends on the assurance
that its female contributors ultimately will leave the
work force and be precluded from obtaining benefits.
Furthermore, the alleged goal of “afford[ing]
protection to the working members of the nation’s
economy” is similarly untenable considering that
someone like Mrs. Collier, who worked and
contributed to the system for fifteen consecutive
years before having her children, has been left
without Social Security benefits. Indeed, the 20/40
Rule undermines the Social Security system's
overarching goal of supporting families in times of
need.
The primary goal of the Social Security system
is to create “[a] basic program of contributory old-
age and survivors insurance (to provide for) the
economic security of American families.” S. Rep. No.
83-1987, at 1 (1954), as reprinted in 1954
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3710, 3710. This Court has recognized
and upheld Congress's clear intent, repeatedly
holding that the amendments to the Social Security
Act of 1939 were designed “‘to afford more adequate
protection to the family as a unit.” Weinberger v.
Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 643-44 (1975) (quoting H.R.
18
Rep. No. 76-278, at 7 (1939)) (emphasis added); see
also Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 209, 97 S.
Ct. 1021 (1977) (“Social Security is designed . . . for
the protection of the family’ ....”) (quoting
Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. at 654 (Powell, J., concurring));
Hurvich v. Califano, 457 F. Supp. 760, 763 (N.D. Cal.
1978) (“The purpose behind § 402 (g), as revealed by
its legislative history, is to provide children who have
lost a parent with the personal attention of the other
parent by enabling the survivor to stay at home and
care for the children.”). The 20/40 Rule bears no
rational relationship to this goal. In fact, the Rule
cuts against the stated objective, since it discourages
women from leaving the work force to fulfill the
demands of motherhood.
As any contributor to the Social Security system
can attest, the notion that the Social Security Act
creates a “self-supporting” system strains credulity.
It has been noted that “[d]espite being advertised as
a self-perpetuating social insurance plan, the Social
Security system has been at risk since its inception.”*
Legislators have preferred “to maintain a ‘self-
supporting’ system — at least in common expectation.”*
Moreover, recent reports expose the fiction of a
self-sustaining system. Efforts to reform the Social
Security system, as a means of averting an impending
3 Matthew H. Hawes, So No Damn Politician Can Ever
Scrap It: The Constitutional Protection of Social Security
Benefits, 65 U. Pit. L. Rev. 865, 877 (2004) (“[T]he founders
knew the program would not remain solvent and estimated
that government contributions would be necessary as early
as 1967 in order to stave off the plan's collapse.”)
4 Id. at pp. 877-78 (emphasis added).
19
collapse, have received the highest attention from
the government and the news media. The Director
of the Congressional Budget Office (“CBO”) recently
reported that the Social Security program “cannot
be sustained without continual — and substantial —
injections of funds from the rest of the budget.”®
The CBO has predicted that “under current law .. .
the Social Security trust funds would become
exhausted in 2052; after that, the Social Security
Administration would lack the authority to pay full
benefits and, without Congressional action, outlays
would be limited to annual revenues, which would
be 22 percent lower than scheduled costs.”6
The record is wholly deficient of any proof that
the SSDI program is practically self-sufficient, nor
does it proffer any documentary evidence or
Statistical analysis that the 20/40 Rule in fact
Supports a goal of self-sufficiency or that the
eradication of the 20/40 Rule would materially
undermine that goal. Indeed, the SSA has offered no
evidence that the requirement of twenty quarters of
coverage furthers the goal of self-sufficiency any more
than would 15, 10 or even 5.
° The Future of Aging: Hearing before the S. Spec.
Comm. on Aging, 109th Cong. 4 (February 3, 2005)
(statement of Douglas Holtz-Eakin, Director of Cong. Budget
Office) (“What is not sustainable is continuing to provide
the present level of scheduled benefits (those based on the
benefit formulas that exist today) given the present
financing. Under current formulas, outlays for scheduled
benefits are projected to exceed available revenues
indefinitely after about 2020.”)
* Id: at p. 7.
20
Lower courts in various jurisdictions have
addressed the constitutionality of the 20/40 Rule, but
they are distinguishable because none of them have
addressed the Rule’s disparate impact on women or,
in particular, mothers who have made significant
contributions to Social Security before leaving the
workforce to bear and raise children. For example,
in Tuttle v. Secretary of Health, Education & Welfare,
the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the
appellant’s claim that the 20/40 Rule created an
unconstitutional classification based on earnings. 504
F.2d 61, 63 (10th Cir. 1974). In Harvell v. Chater,
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the
appellant's claim that the 20/40 Rule violated his due
process rights because he was fully-insured under
the statute but not under the recency requirements
of the 20/40 Rule. 87 F.3d 371, 372-73 (9th Cir. 1996)
(agreeing with the Tenth Circuit's holding and
rationale in Tuttle). Similarly, in Hesse v. Harris, a
nearly 30-year-old decision from the Northern
District of Illinois, the plaintiff challenged the
constitutionality of the 20/40 Rule after she was
denied disability benefits for failing to meet the
requirement of “one covered quarter per calendar
year.” No. 78 C 5176, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10122,
at *2 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 31, 1980). The court rejected the
plaintiff's claim that the 20/40 Rule created an
improper classification based on age because
individuals over 31 years had to meet the two-fold
test of the 20/40 Rule. Id. at *1-2.
Winger v. Barnhart is distinguishable as well.
There the United States District Court for the
Central District of Illinois declined to hold that the
constitutional rights of a husband and son of a
deceased homemaker were violated by the
21
Commissioner’s denial of survivor's Social Security
benefits based on the fact that the decedent had not
worked a sufficient amount of time. The decedent
cleared the first hurdle under the 20/40 Rule because
she had not worked a sufficient number of continuous
quarters. 320 F. Supp. 2d 741, 743 (C.D. Ill. 2004).
Here, Ms. Collier had worked and been fully insured
for years. Significantly, the Winger court indicated
that the plaintiffs burden of proof in challenging
the constitutionality of the 20/40 Rule is not
insurmountable. The court stated that the plaintiffs
had “failled] to identify any of the goals of the Social
Security system, or demonstrate how the quarters of
coverage system is incapable of achieving those
goals.” Id. at 746. Here, Mrs. Collier has presented,
and the District Court accepted, studies and data
demonstrating the 20/40 Rule's failure to achieve the
purported goals of self-sufficiency and protecting
workers. Moreover, as discussed supra, the 20/40
Rule is not rationally related to the overarching
purpose of supporting families but instead undercuts
that purpose.
In light of the foregoing, the 20/40 Rule should
be held unconstitutional for denying Mrs. Collier
equal protection in violation of the Fifth Amendment
to the United States Constitution.
Il. THE 20/40 RULE VIOLATES MRS.
COLLIER’S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS
UNDER THE FIFTH AMENDMENT.
Mrs. Collier and her family receive no Social
Security or Medicare assistance as a result of the
20/40 Rule, notwithstanding the fact that Mrs.
Collier and her employers paid nearly $50,000 in
22
Social Security and Medicare taxes during the 18
calendar years in which she was employed. This
result is unjust and cruel, and it runs contrary to
the policies underlying the Social Security and
Medicare systems in general and, in particular, as
they have been amended to otherwise specifically
accommodate victims of ALS.
For example, the ALS Treatment and Assistance
Act of 2000 waived Medicare's two-year waiting
period for ALS patients so that an individual
diagnosed with the disease would be entitled. to
receive Medicare benefits the very same month that
he or she is entitled to receive disability benefits. In
amending the Medicare statute, the House of
Representatives recognized that “ALS often
progresses at a rate that would make Medicare
coverage ineffective for this population if individuals
were forced to wait 24 months. This provision would
ensure individuals with ALS would be able to access
medical treatment through Medicare immediately."
H.R. Rep. No. 106-1019, at 36 (2000) (emphasis
added). The Senate's record of debate similarly
reflects that chamber’s acute concern for those
stricken with ALS:
Despite the short life expectancy of three
to five years, ALS patients must endure a
two year waiting period in order to receive*
Medicare services. Forcing ALS patients to
wait until the final months of their illness
defies common sense and human decency.
* * *
The immediacy of symptoms in ALS
patients and extremely short life
——.)
*:
a
23
expectancy illustrate the need to extend the
waiver for ALS. In addition, many ALS
victims have had productive lives and will
have paid into the Social Security system
well before the onset of ALS.
145 Conc. Rec. § $5587 (May 19, 1999) (statement of
Sen. Torricelli) (emphasis added).
In 2003, the SSA amended its regulations to
revise the criteria in the Listing of Impairments used
to evaluate ALS and added ALS to its “list of special
impairment categories.” The amendments allow the
SSA to make findings of presumptive disability with
respect to claims involving ALS. 20 C.F.R. Part 404.
Citing the 2000 amendments to the Medicare waiting
_ period and following Congress’s lead, the SSA stated
that “[t]hese rules will help people who are disabled
with ALS to qualify for Medicare sooner.”
We have decided that the simplest and fastest
way to process claims of individuals with ALS
without sacrificing the quality of our disability
determinations and decisions is to revise the listing
to provided that anyone who shows that he or she
has ALS, established by clinical and laboratory
findings, will be found disabled.
Revised Medical Criteria for Evaluating
Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis, 68 Fed. Reg. 51,689
(Aug. 28, 2003) (emphasis added). In issuing its final
rules, the SSA waived the Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking procedures calling for a 30-day notice
and comment period “because use of notice-and-
comment rulemaking procedures would be contrary
to the public interest. In light of the serious
24
consequences caused by ALS, ultimately, we find that
almost all people who apply for disability benefits
based on the condition are disabled.” 68 Fed. Reg.
51,692.’
The “public interest” to which the SSA referred,
and the changes in the rules “reflect{ing] ...
Congress’ judgment,” were expressed in the earlier
modifications to the Medicare waiting period rules:
The changes we are making in these rules
will also help to implement Congress’
judgment that individuals who are disabled
under title II of the Act based on ALS
should also receive immediate entitlement
to Medicare rather than having to wait 24
months. It is critical that we issue these
rules as soon as possible so that more people
can qualify as quickly as possible for
Medicare benefits and other services.
68 Fed. Reg. 51,692 (emphasis added). So keen was
the recognized public interest that the SSA also
“dispens[ed] with the 30-day delay in the effective
date of a substantive rule” as otherwise required by
law. That is, the rule changes were “effective upon
publication.” Id.
’ The SSA went so far as to boast that in calendar year
2002 it had granted 1,324 of 1,384 SSDI applications by those
stricken with ALS on initial review and then had granted
80% of the remaining applications on reconsideration. By
computation, this would appear to mean that only 12 of 1,384
applications were denied. It offers no further explanation
as to why it denied those applications or whether any of
those individuals were similarly situated with Mrs. Collier.
See 68 Fed. Reg. 51,691.
25
The instant action reveals that rather than serve
the statute’s underlying goals, the 20/40 Rule
undermines Congress's explicit, overarching intent
that Social Security and Medicare provide assistance
to families in need, and, in particular, to ALS victims
and their families. See S. Rep. No. 83-1987, at 1, as
reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3710, 3710 (1954):
H.R. Rep. No. 76-278 at 7 (1939); Goldfarb, 430 U.S.
at 209; Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. at 643; and Hurvich,
457 F. Supp. at 764. The SSA’s own “Social Security
Statement,” which is mailed periodically to Mrs.
Collier and every other contributor to Social Security,
highlights this very point by falsely making
promising proclamations, such as:
* “Social Security is for people of all ages
¢ “It's here to help you when you need it
most.”
* “Social Security may help you if you
become disabled — even at a young age.”
* “It is possible for a young person who
has worked and paid Social Security
taxes in as few as two years to become
eligible for disability benefits.”
These statements suggest the reader’s entitlement
— indeed her property interest ~ in the benefits of
Social Security. They create a false hope for the
reader because the 20/40 Rule operates to render
these promises meaningless, denying Mrs. Collier
due process by removing, without any reasonable or
rational basis, any possibility of achieving those
26
goals. Accordingly, the 20/40 Rule should be held
unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, the petition for
writ of certiorari should be granted.
Respectfully submitted,
RICHARD F. HANS
Counsel of Record
THACHER ProrFitr & Woop LLP
Two Financial Center
New York, NY 10281
(212) 912-7400
JOHN VUKELJ
DLA Pirer US LLP
1251 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10020
(212) 335-4500
Counsel for Petitioner
APPENDIX
la
APPENDIX A — OPINION OF THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
SECOND CIRCUIT DECIDED
JANUARY 4, 2007
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
SECOND CIRCUIT
August Term, 2006
Argued: December 12, 2006
Decided: January 4, 2007
Docket No. 06-3644-cv
CLAIRE G. COLLIER,
Petitioner,
sail oc
Jo ANNE B. BarNuarr,
| Respondent.
Before: FEINBERG, KATZMANN, Circuit Judges and
PauLey, District Judge.*
PER CURIAM:
We are called upon to address a matter of human
tragedy. Petitioner Claire Collier has amyotrophic
lateral sclerosis (ALS), more commonly known as Lou
" The Honorable William H. Pauley III, of the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York,
sitting by designation.
2a
Appendix A
Gehrig's disease. She has suffered greatly from this
disease and, in addition to the physical pain, the
financial cost has been staggering. However, we are
compelled to conclude that the statute which guides
this Court’s review denies Collier Social Security
Disability Insurance (S SDI) and Medicare benefits
because she does not have the required recent work
history. Moreover, because petitioner cannot make
out a constitutional challenge to the recent work
history requirement, we must AFFIRM the district
court's adoption of the Magistrate Judge's
recommendation to deny petitioner’s motion for
summary judgment and grant respondent's motion
to affirm the denial of Social Security Disability
Insurance benefits to petitioner. We recognize the
difficulty petitioner has faced because of the eligibility
rules and, recognizing that we have no license to alter
the legislative scheme, note that a legislative solution
to petitioner’s concern may be appropriate.
I.
In the fall of 2003, Collier was diagnosed with
ALS. Since then Collier and her family have expended
more than $500,000 on special equipment and medical
care. To alleviate some of this financial burden, in
January 2004, petitioner applied for Social Security
Disability Insurance (SSDI), as that is the
prerequisite for Medicare eligibility for those under
65. 42 U.S.C. § 426(b).
The Social Security Administration denied
Collier’s application on February 1, 2004, as she had
insufficient recent work history to qualify for benefits.
3a
Appendix A
Specifically, the statute requires that.an applicant above
the age of 31 must have worked twenty of the previous
forty quarters (i.e., five of the last ten years) to qualify
for SSDI (“the 20/40 Rule”). 42 U.S.C. § 423(c)(1);
20 C.F.R. § 404.130(b). It is undisputed that Collier did
not have a recent work history as she left the paid
workforce in 1994, upon the birth of her first child.
Collier continued to be a stay-at-home mother through
the birth of her second and third children; she states
that “she always intended to return to the workforce,”
but wanted “to be a full-time mother while her children
were young.’ For fifteen consecutive years beforehand,
however, from 1979 through 1994, petitioner had
worked outside the home and, during that time, she
and her employers contributed over $40,000 in Social
Security and Medicare taxes.
After the initial denial, petitioner sought
additional review within the Social Security
Administration and her application was denied. She
then filed suit in the District of Connecticut. In her
October 28, 2005 complaint she argued that her
rights to due process and equal protection were
violated as the 20/40 rule discriminated against
women, who are more likely to leave the workforce to
parent full-time. Collier moved for summary
judgment on January 26, 2006, and, on February 22.
2006, the government cross-moved for an affirmance
of the agency's order. Magistrate Judge Joan Glazer
Margolis, on April 25, 2006, issued a Report &
Recommendation, recommending denial of Collier's
motion and affirmance of the underlying decision. The
District Court adopted this ruling on July 17, 2006,
finding that the 20/40 Rule survives rational basis
review because it serves the legitimate goals of
4a
Appendix A
ensuring that the Social Security system is self-
sufficient and limiting disability benefits to those
dependent on employment income.
II.
We review the constitutionality of a federal
statutory provision de novo. See Muller v. Costello,
187 F.3d 298, 307 (2d Cir.1999).
For those under 65, Medicare eligibility is set out
in 42 U.S.C. § 426(b). Section 426 provides that:
“every individual who ... is entitled to, and has for 24
calendar months been entitled to, ... disability
insurance benefits under section 423 of this title. . .
shall be entitled to hospital insurance benefits.”
Section 423 provides that an individual 31 or older
“shall be insured for disability insurance benefits in
any month if. . . he had not less than 20 quarters of
coverage during the 40-quarter period which ends
with the quarter in which such month occurred.” Id.
§ 423(c)(i). Similarly, the regulations provide that if
an applicant is 31 or older, not blind, and has not
suffered a period of disability before age 31, that
applicant “must meet the 20/40 requirement.” 20
C.F.R. § 404.130. It is undisputed that Collier did not
meet this statutory requirement.
The law is clear as to Collier's burden in claiming
an Equal Protection Clause violation:
When a statute gender-neutral on its face
is challenged on the ground that its effects
upon women are disproportionally adverse,
a twofold inquiry is . .. appropriate. The first
Sa
Appendix A
question is whether the statutory
Classification is ... indeed neutral in the
sense that it is not gender-based. If the
classification itself, covert [orJovert, is not
based upon gender, the second question is
whether the adverse effect reflects
invidious gender-based discrimination. In
this second inquiry, impact provides an
important starting point, but purposeful
discrimination is the condition that offends
the Constitution.
Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 274,
99 S.Ct. 2282, 60 L.Ed.2d 870 (1979) (internal
citations and quotation marks omitted); see also Back
v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 365
F.3d 107, 118 (2d Cir.2004) (“To make out... aclaim
[for gender discrimination under the Equal
Protection Clause], the plaintiff must prove that she
suffered purposeful or intentional discrimination on
the basis of gender.”). While Collier’s equal protection
claim is brought under the Fifth Amendment, the
“approach to Fifth Amendment equal protection
claims has always been precisely the same as to equal
protection claims under the Fourteenth Amendment.”
Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638 n. 2, 95
S.Ct. 1225, 43 L.Ed.2d 514 (1975): see also Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 217-18, 235,
115 S.Ct. 2097, 132 L.Ed.2d 158 (1995).
Petitioner argues that the 20/40 Rule has a
disproportionate impact on women. There is
persuasive evidence in the record that “women with
professional degrees are out of the labor force at a
rate about three times that of their male counterparts
6a
Appendix A
and they overwhelmingly cite family responsibilities
as the reason,” Jerry A. Jacobs and Janice Fanning
Madden, Mommies & Daddies on the Fast Track:
Success of Parents in Demanding Professions, 596
Annals Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. 246, 250 (2004),
and that “marriage and childbearing . .. make women
more susceptible to losing [disability] insurance
coverage than men,” Olivia S. Mitchell & John W.R.
Phillips, Univ. Mich. Ret. Research Ctr., Eligibility
for Social Security Disability Insurance (2001). The
district court characterized this evidence as
“compelling,” Collier v. Barnhart, 05 Civ. 01677(PCD),
slip op. at 9n. 6 (D.Conn. July 24, 2006), and we agree.
However, as the district court correctly observed,
Supreme Court precedents dictate that disparate
impact is only a “starting point,” Feeney, 442 U.S. at
274, 99 S.Ct. 2282 (internal quotation marks omitted),
and petitioner must prove discriminatory purpose. See
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 96 S.Ct. 2040, 48
L.Ed.2d 597 (1976) (holding that disparate impact is
insufficient for an Equal Protection Clause violation
claim); see also Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan
Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265-66, 97 S.Ct. 555,
50 L.Ed.2d 450 (1977) (“Proof of racially
discriminatory intent or purpose is required to show
a violation of the Equal Protection Clause[ |. . . [but]
Davis does not require a plaintiff to prove that the
challenged action rested solely on racially
discriminatory purposes. .. . [Courts must determine]
whether invidious discriminatory purpose was a
motivating factor. ...”).
It is here that petitioner’s argument fails, as she
has no evidence that Congress was motivated by an
“invidious discriminatory purpose” in enacting the 20/
Ta
Appendix A
40 Rule. At best, her evidence indicates a recognition
that women may suffer because of the 20/40 Rule.
However, we have held that “[t]he legislative
recognition of adverse impact does not suffice to imply
such a purpose; the requirement of purposeful
discrimination means that equal protection is not
violated unless the [challenged provision] was enacted
not ‘in spite of its adverse effect on the [identifiable
group] but rather because it would have that effect.”
Johnson v. Wing, 178 F.3d 611, 615 (2d Cir.1999); see
also Feeney, 442 U.S. at 279, 99 S.Ct. 2282.
Because petitioner has not demonstrated
invidious sex discrimination, we analyze the 20/40
Rule under rational basis review. Zalewska v. County
of Sullivan, New York 316 F.3d 314, 323 (2d Cir.2003).
As set forth by the Supreme Court, rational basis
review is satisfied where “there is a plausible policy
reason for the classification, the legislative facts on
which the classification is apparently based rationally
may have been considered to be true by the
governmental decisionmaker, and the relationship of
the classification to its goai is not so attenuated as to
render the distinction arbitrary or irrational.”
Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 11-12, 112 S.Ct. 2326,
120 L.Ed.2d 1 (1992) (internal citations omitted); see
also Tanov v. INS, 443 F.3d 195, 201 (2d Cir.2006).
Legislation need only meet a minimal threshold in
order to satisfy the rational review test. Here,
Congress indicated in legislative history that “it is
reasonable and desirable that there be reliable means
of limiting . . . protection to those persons who have
had sufficiently long and sufficiently recent covered
employment to indicate that they probably have been
dependent upon their earnings.” S.Rep. No. 05-2388,
8a
‘Appendix A
(1958), reprinted in 1958 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4218, 4229.
We cannot conclude that the 20/40 Rule does not meet
the minimal standard of rationality, as Congress could
_rationally choose to distribute a scarce resource
among those who both have contributed more
recently to the system and have indicated, by their
actions, that they are more dependent on the salaries
they draw from being employed. As a Court, we
observe that we have no authority to override
Congress's policy preference so as to substitute our
own views, whatever they might be, for those of
Congress.
Petitioner's due process claim fails for similar
reasons.
Congress has wide latitude to create
classifications that allocate noncontractual
benefits under a social welfare program. ...
Particularly when we deal with a
withholding of a noncontractual benefit
under a social welfare program such as
(Social Security), we must recognize that the
Due Process Clause can be thought to
interpose a bar only if the statute manifests
a patently arbitrary classification, utterly
lacking in rational justification.
Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 210,97 S.Ct. 1021,
51 L.Ed.2d 270 (1977) (internal citations and
quotation marks omitted, alteration in original). As
discussed earlier, this classification is not “patently
arbitrary.” To the extent petitioner alleges a
procedural due process violation, that too fails
because Collier does not allege that she was deprived
9a
Appendix A
of procedural protections, nor can she claim that she
is entitled to more than the statute explicitly
provides.
III.
Because there is no evidence of invidious sex
discrimination, and because the 20/40 Rule satisfies
rational basis scrutiny, we AFFIRM the District
Court's decision. We note, however, that Collier has
also advocated for legislative reform of the 20/40 Rule.
Both Senator Christopher J. Dodd and
Representative Christopher Shays have introduced
the “Claire Collier Social Security Disability
Insurance Fairness Act,” which would make the
20/40 rule inapplicable “in the case of a disabled
individual suffering from a covered terminal disease.”
S. 3839, 109th Cong. (2006); H.R. 6304, 109th Cong.
(2006). These proposals recognize that Congress, not
the courts, is the appropriate forum for any change
to the 20/40 Rule. While we as a Court are without
authority to provide the relief that petitioner seeks,
Congress can do so. Petitioner must turn to the
legislative branch to consider this issue of great
human consequence.
10a
APPENDIX B — RULING ON PLAINTIFF’S
OBJECTIONS TO THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S
RECOMMENDED RULING OF THE UNITED
STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
FILED JULY 24, 2006
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
Civil No. 3:05cv1677 (PCD) (JGM)
CLAIRE COLLIER,
Plaintiff,
-VS-
JO ANNE B BARNHART, COMMISSIONER OF
SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.
RULING ON PLAINTIFF’S OBJECTIONS TO
THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S
RECOMMENDED RULING
This action, filed under § 205(g) of the Social
Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), as amended, seeks
judicial review of a final decision by the Commissioner
of Social Security (the “Commissioner”), in which she
found that Plaintiff was not entitled to Disability
Insurance Benefits (“DIB”). Currently pending are
Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. No.
10] and Defendant's Motion for Order Affirming the
Decision of the Commissioner [Doc. No. 15]. On April
lla
Appendix B
25, 2006, Magistrate Judge Joan Glazer Margolis
issued a Recommended Ruling {Doc. No. 22] denying
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and
granting Defendant's Motion for Order Affirming the
Decision of the Commissioner (“Recommended
Ruling”). Plaintiff filed her Objections to the
Recommended Ruling [Doc. No. 23] on May 8, 2006.'
For the reasons that follow, the Recommended
Ruling is approved and adopted.
I FACTUAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE
BACKGROUND’
Plaintiff is a forty-three year-old female who is
married with three children and who worked
consecutively for fifteen years, from 1979 to August
1994. (See Certified Transcript of Administrative
Proceedings, filed December 23, 2005 (“Tr.”), 24-25,
49-50, 53, 142.) Over the course of her fifteen years of
employment, Plaintiff paid $19,544.00 to Social
Security and $4,668.00 to Medicare; her employer
matched both amounts. (See Tr. 53.) Plaintiff stopped
working in 1994 when she was eight months pregnant
with her first child, and thereafter became a stay-at-
home mother. (See Tr. 40, 41, 142, 152-53, 169-72.)
On October 13, 2003, after complaining about twitches
1. Defendant did not file any objections to the
Recommended Ruling or any response to Plaintiff's
objections.
2. Familiarity with Magistrate Judge Margolis’s
comprehensive ruling detailing the facts and circumstances
underlying this dispute is presumed.
12a
Appendix B
in her arm and cramps in her calves and the arches
of her feet, Plaintiff was diagnosed with Amyotrophic
Lateral Sclerosis (“ALS”) by Dr. Dale J. Lange.
(See Tr. 126, 179.)
Plaintiff filed her application for DIB on January
27, 2004. (See Tr. 24-26.) The ALJ found that “ALS
has taken a great toll on [Plaintiff's] physical and
mental heath, and on her family and finances,” and
that she “has fought courageously against the
disease,” however, Plaintiff was denied disability
benefits on the ground that her work history was
insufficient. (See Tr. 19-22, 27-29.) Specifically, the
ALJ found that because Plaintiff was not severely
impaired prior to December 31, 1999, her last date
insured, she was not under a “disability” as defined
in the Social Security Act, 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c).
(See Tr. 21-22) Plaintiff conceded that she was insured
for disability purposes only through December 1999
and that she had no symptoms of ALS until 2003, and
accordingly, was challenging the provisions of the
Social Security Act and regulations, specifically, 42
U.S.C. § 423(c)(1), on constitutional grounds. The
ALJ, however, observed in his decision that he lacked
“the authority to disregard the requirements of the
Social Security Act and regulations” so as to decide
in Plaintiffs favor. (See Tr. 20.)
This Court referred the parties cross-motions for
summary judgment to Magistrate Judge Joan Glazer
Margolis. In her Recommended Ruling, Magistrate
Judge Margolis recommended that this Court deny
Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment and grant
Defendant’s Motion for an Order Affirming the
13a
Appendix B
Decision of the Commissioner. Like the Commissioner,
Magistrate Judge Margolis found that Plaintiff was
not fully insured, and thus was not eligible for
disability benefits under the Social Security Act. In
addressing Plaintiff's constitutional claims,
Magistrate Judge Margolis held that the 20/40 rule
is not “patently arbitrary or lacking rational
justification” and is “rationally related to the
legislative purpose underlying the Social Security
System,” and as such, does not deny Plaintiff equal
protection under the Fifth Amendment and does not
violate the due process clause of the Fifth
Amendment. (Recomm. Ruling 16, 19.)
II. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review of a Magistrate
Judge’s Recommended Ruling
In the face of an objection to a Magistrate Judge's
recommended ruling, the District Court makes a de
novo determination of those portions of the
recommended ruling to which an objection is made.
Smith v. Barnhart, 406 F. Supp. 2d 209, 212 (D. Conn.
2005). This Court may accept, reject, or modify the
recommended ruling, receive further evidence, or
recommit the matter to the Magistrate Judge with
instructions. See 28 U.S.C § 636(b) (1); Fed. R. Civ. P.
72(b).
B. Standard of Review of a Social Security
Disability Determination
A court reviewing the decision of an ALJ will set
aside the decision only if it finds that the ALJ failed
14a
Appendix B
to properly apply correct legal principles in making a
determination or if the decision is unsupported by
“substantial evidence.” See Balsamo v. Chater, 142
F.3d 75, 79 (2d Cir. 1998). Substantial evidence is
“more than a mere scintilla;” it is “such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v.
Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401,91 S. Ct. 1420, 1427, 28 L.
Ed. 2d 842 (1971) (internal quotation and citation
omitted); Yancey v. Apfel, 145 F.3d 106, 111 (2d Cir.
1998) Thus, this Court must accept the decision of
the ALJ unless it is based on legal error or not
supported by substantial evidence. Rosa v. Callahan,
168 F.3d 72, 77 (2d Cir. 1999). This “substantial
evidence” standard also applies to inferences and
conclusions drawn from findings of fact. See Gonzales
v. Apfel, 23 F. Supp. 2d 179, 189 (D. Conn. 1998);
Rodriguez v. Califano, 431 F. Supp. 421, 423 (S.
D.N.Y. 1977). The district court may not decide facts,
reweigh evidence, or substitute its judgment for that
of the Commissioner. See Dotson v. Shalala, 1 F. 3d
971, 577 (7th Cir. 1993). In reviewing the ALJ's
decision, the court must consider the entire
administrative record, including new evidence
submitted to the Appeals Council following the ALJ's
decision. See Perez v. Chalet, 77 F.3d 41, 46 (2d Cir.
1996). Furthermore, “[w|here there is a reasonable
basis fox doubt whether the ALJ applied correct legal
principles, application of the substantial evidence
standard to uphold a finding of no disability creates
an unacceptable risk that a claimant will be deprived
of the right to have her disability determination made
according to the correct legal principles” Schaal v.
Apfel, 134 F.3d 496, 504 (2d Cir. 1998).
15a
Appendix B
C. Discussion of Recommended Ruling and
Objections Thereto
Under the Social Security Act, every individual
who suffers from a “disability” is entitled to receive
disability insurance benefits See 42 U.S.C.
§ 423(d)(1)(A).* the Act defines “disability” as an
3. In reviewing disability claims, the SSA follows a five-
step procedure See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. First,
the Commissioner must determine whether the claimant is
currently engaged in any “substantial gainful activity.” If
the claimant is not so engaged, the Commissioner next
considers whether the claimant has a “severe impairment”
which is of the required duration and which significantly
limits his or her ability to work. If the claimant is engaged
in substantial gainful activity and/or does not exhibit a
sufficiently severe impairment, the claim will be disallowed
See 20 C.F.R. § 404 1520(a)-(c) Where both conditions are
met, however, the Commissioner then compares the medical
evidence of the claimant's impairment to a list of
impairments presumed severe enough to preclude any
gainful work If the claimant's impairment matches or
“equals” one of the listed impairments, he or she is considered
“disabled” and qualifies for benefits without further inquiry
See 20 C.F.R. § 404 1520(d) If, however, the claimant does
not qualify under the listings, the Commissioner must then
determine whether the claimant can perform his or her own
past work. See 20 C.F.R. § 404 1520(e)-(f) If it is found that
the claimant cannot do so, then the Commissioner will assess
the claimant's present job qualifications and determine
whether there are other jobs that the claimant could perform.
See 20 C.F.R. § 404 1520(g); see also generally Heckler v.
Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 460-61, 103 S. Ct. 1952, 76 L. Ed.
2d 66 (1983). The claimant bears the initial burden of
proving that he or she is disabled, however, if the claimant
can establish the existence of an impairment that renders
4, (Cont'd)
16a
Appendix B
“inability to engage in any substantial gainful
activity by reason of any medically determinable
physical or mental impairment which can be expected
to result in death or which has lasted or can be
expected to last for a continuous period of not less
than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). In 2003,
the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) amended
its regulations to allow the SSA to make findings of
presumptive disability in Listing 11.10 with respect
to claims involving ALS. See Revised Medical Criteria
for Evaluating Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis, 68 Fed.
Reg. 51689, 51691-92 (Aug. 28, 2003) (to be codified
20 C.F.R. pts. 404 and 416). Thus, a claimant
diagnosed with ALS is presumptively disabied. It is
undisputed in this case that Plaintiff suffers from ALS,
a medically determinable impairment. (See Tr. 22.)
In order to qualify for disability benefits, a
claimant must, in addition to proving that she is
“disabled” under the statute, show that she has
“insured status,” See 20 C.F.R. § 404.130.‘ For
Plaintiff to show that she has insured status for the
purpose of obtaining disability benefits, she must
satisfy Rule I, or the “20/40 rule,” 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.130(b). Under the 20/40 rule, Plaintiff is
required to show that she had at least twenty quarters
of coverage in the forty quarter period ending with
(Cont'd)
him or her unable to perform his or her own past work, the
burden then shifts to the Commissioner to show that there
is another job in the national economy which the claimant
could perform See Balsamo, 142 F.3d at 80.
4. There are four rules outlined in 20 C.F.R. § 401.130,
however, only Rule I is applicable to this case.
17a
Appendix B
the quarter in which she eventually become disabled.
See 20 C.F.R. § 404.130(b)(2).° It is undisputed that
Plaintiff did not have “insured status” on October 13,
2004, when she was diagnosed with ALS,. She was
only insured for benefits through December 31, 1999,
the end of the last of forty quarters during which
Plaintiff was covered for twenty quarters. (See Tr. 19-
22.) To interpret the regulation as applying to
persons who are not holly insured at the beginning
of a period of disability would conflict with the
underlying statute. See 2 SociaL. Security LAw AND
PRACTICE § 13.35, at 34, As such, the inquiry in this
case is confined to the constitutionality of 42 U.S.C.
§ 423(c) (1), which, as applied, results in the denial of
disability benefits to Plaintiff.
1. Fifth Amendment Equal Protection Claim
Plaintiff contends that the 20/40 rule denies
Plaintiff equal protection under the Fifth
Amendment because the rule has a “disparate and
discriminatory impact” upon Plaintiff and other
women who, “after materially contributing to the
Social Security and Medicare Trust Funds, elect to
stay home and engage in the mothering of their
children.” (PI's Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. 7-9; Pl.’s
Mem. Opp. Def.’s Mot. Affirm 2-3) In response,
5. A “quarter” of coverage, as used in the regulations,
“is the basic unit of social security coverage used in
determining a worker's insured status.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.
140(a) An individual earns “quarters” based on the wages
he or she was paid during the period of three calendar
months ending on March 31, June 30, September 30, or
December 31 of any year. See 42 U.S.C. § 413(a)(1); 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.101 (b).
18a
Appendix B
Defendant argues that Plaintiff has failed to show an
equal protection violation because the governmental
purposes underlying the 20/40 rule are legitimate
ones and the statute beats a rational relationship to
those purposes. (Def.’s Mem. Supp Mot. Affirm 4-5.)
Although the Fifth Amendment does not contain
an equal protection clause, “it does forbid
discrimination that is ‘so unjustifiable as to be
violative of due process.”” Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S.
163, 168, 84S. Ct. 1187, 1190, 12 L. Ed. 2d 218, 222
(1964) (quoting Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499,
74S. Ct. 693, 98 L. Ed. 884 (1954)). The standards
for analyzing equal protection claims under the Fifth
Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment are
identical. See Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636,
638 n.2, 95S. Ct. 1225, 43 L. Ed. 2d 514 (1975).
The equal protection guarantee does not forbid
all classifications; a statute that does not “burden a
fundamental right or draw distinctions based on a
suspect classification” will be upheld if it bears a
rational relationship to a “legitimate governmental
objective.” Nicholas v. Tucker, 114 F.3d 17, 20 (2d Cir.
’%97); see also Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471,
485-86, 90S. Ct. 1153, 25 L. Ed. 2d 491, reh’g denied,
398 U.S. 914, 26 L. Ed. 2d 80, 90 S. Ct. 1684 (1970)
(holding that a classification with some “reasonable
basis does not offend the Constitution simply
because [it] is not made with mathematical nicety or
because in practice it results in some inequality”)
(internal quotations & citation omitted). Both the
Supreme Court and the Second Circuit have held that
rational basis review applies to challenges to
distinctions made in the context of social welfare
19a
Appendix B
Statutes, as is at issue in this case. Brown v. Bowen,
905 F.2d 632, 635 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1093
(1991); see also Dandridge, 397 U S. at 487 (noting
that “the Constitution does not empower this Court
to second-guess state officials charged with the
difficult responsibility of allocating limited public
welfare funds among the myriad of potential
recipients”). It is well-settled that Congress has wide
latitude to create classifications that allocate non-
contractual benefits under a social welfare program.
Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 776-777 (1975):
Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 609-610 (1960). In
Flemming, 363 U.S. at 611, the Supreme Court said:
Particularly when we deal with a
withholding of a noncontractual benefit
under a social welfare program such as
[Social Securityj, we must recognize that the
Due Process Clause can be thought to
interpose a bar only if the statute manifests
a patently arbitrary classification, utterly
lacking in rational justification.
In such a case, the legislature's choices will be upheld
unless they are “clearly wrong, a display of arbitrary
power, not an exercise of judgment.” Bowen v. Owens,
476 U.S. 340, 345, 106 S. Ct, 1881, 1885, 90 L. Ed. 2d
316 (1986); see also Mathews v. De Castro, 429 US.
181, 185, 97 S. Ct. 431, 434, 50 L. Ed. 2d 389 (1976)
(“the challenged statute is entitled to a strong
presumption of constitutionality”). In sum, if social
welfare statutes have a rational basis and do not
engage in invidious discrimination, they do not
violate the equal protection clause, regardless of
whether flaws may be found in their logic. Brown, 905
20a
Appendix B
F.2d at 635; see also Danuridge, 397 U.S. at 486
(noting that “[t]he problems of government are
practical ones and may justify, if they do not require,
rough accommodations—illogical, it may be, and
unscientific,” and holding that federal courts have no
power to impose “their views of what constitutes wise
economic or social policy ).
There are two ways in which governmental action
can violate the equal protection clause. First, the
courts can strike down a statute when Congress
“explicitly classifies or distinguishes among persons”
based on specific criteria, such as race, gender,
religion, or ethnicity De La Cruz v. Tormey, 582 F.2d
45, 49-50 (9th Cir. 1978). Even where there is no
“facial discrimination,” as in this case, there may still
exist a second and “more subtle” form of
discrimination, which focuses on the effects rather
than the form of governmental action Id. at 50. This
type of discrimination involves decisions or actions
which, although facially nondiscriminatory, “produce
effects which weigh adversely and disproportionately
upon the members of a particular protected group of
individuals, [and] may require explanation in terms
of non-invidious purposes.” Id.
In her Recommended Ruling, Magistrate Judge
Margolis cited and did not dispute the studies cited
by Plaintiff showing that (1) women are more likely
than men to leave the workforce to care for their
children and raise their families, and (2) as a result,
women are substantially less likely than men to
qualify for Social Security Disability Insurance
2la
Appendix B
(“SSDI”) benefits (See Recomm. Ruling 11-12,13.)®
Magistrate Judge Margolis declined, however, to find
that this evidence gave rise to an inference of
intentional discrimination (Id. 12-13.)
6. Plaintiff produced, and Magistrate Judge Margolis
discussed, a number of compelling studies (See generally Pl's
Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. 7-9; Pl's Mem. Opp. Def's. Mot.
Affirm. 2-4; Recomm. Ruling 12-13) Specifically, Plaintiff *
cited studies going to show that “women with professional
degrees are out of the labor force at a rate about three times
that of their male counterparts and they overwhelmingly
cite family responsibilities as the reason. Jerry A. Jacobs &
Janice Fanning Madden, Mommies & Daddies on the Fast
Track: Success of Parents in Demanding Professions, 596
ANNALS OF Am. Acab. OF Pot. & Soc. SCI 246, 250 (2004):
see also Samuel Issacharoff & Elyse Rosenblum, Women &
the Workplace: Accommodating the Demands of Pregnancy,
94 Cotum. L. Rev. 2154, 2160-65 (1994). Specifically,
Issacharoff and Rosenblum found that “[h]aving children
makes it more likely that women will leave the workforce
altogether or switch to part-time employment.” Issacharoff
& Rosenblum, at 2165. Moreover, the evidence shows that
(1) the rates of Disability Insurance coverage for women in
their early thirties and early forties are nearly twenty
percent lower than those for men of comparable ages; (2)
married women are ten percent less likely to be insured than
single women; and (3) the SSA's records reveal that women
between the ages of thirty-one and forty-one are more likely
to be rejected by the SSA than any other group or age
bracket. Olivia S. Mitchell & John W.R. Phillips, Eligibility
for Social Security Disability Insurance, Issurs IN BRiEF—
U. Mich. RETIREMENT RESEARCH CTR. (2001). As a result,
“working women are less well-protected by Social Security
disability insurance than are working men due to their more
episodic labor market attachment “ See Mitchell & Phillips,
at 4.
22a
Appendix B
Plaintiff, in her Objections to the Recommended
Ruling, argues that because the evidence and
findings in Plaintiffs studies are undisputed, the |
Court should find that “the law itself necessarily and
invidiously discriminate[s] against women and in
particular women who left the workforce.” (PI's Objs.
to Recomm. Ruling 2-3) Plaintiff cites data produced
by the SSA in response to a Freedom of Information
Act request, which reveals that women between the
ages of thirty-one and forty-one are more likely to be
rejected by the SSA than are women or men in:
general. (See Pl.’s Objs. to Recomm. Ruling 4 (citing
Exh. A to Hans Aff.)) Specifically, the data shows that
upon initial application, 4.99 percent of all men and
4.86 percent of all women with either ALS or Anterior
Horn Cell disease are denied at the initial application
stage, whereas 7.85 percent of women between the
ages of thirty-one and forty-one are denied benefits.
(Id.)’ At the reconsideration stage, only 25.1 percent
of all men and 25.6 percent of all women are again
denied benefits, however, 57.1 percent of women
between the ages of thirty-one and forty-one are again
denied benefits. (Id.)®
7. The table provides data for 1994 through 2005, and
although women between the ages of thirty-one and forty-
one are shown to have been denied benefits at a higher
rate than men or women as a whole, these women also
applied for and were denied benefits in significantly lower
numbers. Notably, zero women between the ages of thirty-
one and forty-one were denied benefits in 1999, 2003, and
2005. (Exh. A to Hans Aff.)
8. Again, because of the very small sample size, it is
unlikely that the difference would be found to be significant.
23a
Appendix B
Although Plaintiff's studies, and particularly her
own plight, are compelling, the Supreme Court has
made it clear that facially neutral official action does
not violate the Equal Protection Clause simply
because it has a disproportionate impact on a specific
group.’ Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 96S. Ct.
2040, 48 L. Ed. 2d 597 (1976); Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S.
252,97 S. Ct. 555, 50 L. Ed. 2d 450 (1977); see also
De La Cruz, 582 F.2d at 58, Plaintiff must also plead
and prove intentional discrimination. Plaintiff must
prove only that a discriminatory purpose was one
motivating factor in the decision; she need not show
that the challenged statute rested solely on a
discriminatory purpose. Arlington Heights, 429 US.
at 265-66. A determination of whether intentional
discrimination was a factor in challenged
governmental action requires a “sensitive inquiry
into such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent
as may be available” and necessitates the production
of other evidence, such as “the existence of a ‘clear
pattern’ unexplainable on grounds other than
discrimination, the historical background of a
decision, the ‘specific sequence of events’ leading up
to the challenged action, and ‘departures’ from the
normal procedural sequences and substantive
policies.” Id. at 58-59 (quoting Arlington Heights, 429
U.S. at 266-68).
9. The effects of the challenged rule do not fall
exclusively upon women, but also impact men with child-
rearing responsibilities. This fact, however, is not a bar toa
finding of discriminatory impact so long as Plaintiff can show
“imbalance and disproportionality.” See De La Cruz, 582 F.2d
at 57.
24a
Appendix B
This Court, like the Magistrate Judge, finds that
Plaintiff has failed to prove intentional
discrimination. Specifically, she has failed to cite any
evidence going to show that Congress, in enacting the
20/40 rule, intended to discriminate against women,
or more specifically, against non-working mothers.
Conversely, there is a great deal of authority with
regard to Congress’ “actual purpose” in enacting the
rule.
There are two primary legitimate objectives
behind the 20/40 rule. Congress’ first objective was
to create a self-supporting program. See Tuttle v. Sec’y
of Health, Education & Welfare, 504 F.2d 61, 62-63
(10th Cir. 1974) (citing S. Rep. No. 1987, 83rd Cong.
2d Sess., 3 U.S. Code Cong. News, 1954, at 3733;
H. Rep. No. 92-231, 92d Cong. 2d Sess., 3 U.S. Code
Cong. & Admin. News, 1972, at 5111). Courts have
recognized that “maintaining the self-supporting
nature of [an] insurance program” is a legitimate
governmental interest. Id at 63 (quoting Geduldig v.
Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496, 94 S. Ct. 2485, 41 L.Ed.2d
256 (1974)); See also Lerner v. Richardson, 393
F.Supp. 1387, 1391 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (holding that
“where the funds available under a social welfare
program are finite, it is reasonable for Congress to
build into the system a safeguard against
disproportionately high payments to those who have
made the smallest contributions”), the 20/40 rule is
rationally related to and promotes this objective by
ensuring that persons make some substantial
contribution to the social security system prior to the
onset of disability. Tuttle, 504 F.2d at 63.
25a
Appendix B
Second, Congress intended to provide disability
benefits to those who were dependent on their
employment income. Id. (citingS. Rep. No. 2388, 85th
Cong. 2d Sess., 3 U.S Code Cong. & Admin. News
1958, at 4229 (“it is reasonable and desirable that
there be reliable means of limiting such protection to
those persons who have had sufficiently long and
sufficiently recent covered employment to indicate
that they probably have been dependent upon their
earnings”); S. Rep. No. 1987, 83rd Cong. 2d Sess, 3
U.S. Code Cong. News 1954, at 3729). The Social
Security program was designed to “afford protection
to working members of the nation’s economy,” and as
such, is based in part on Congress’ determination
“that those who in their productive years were
functioning members of the economy may justly call
upon that economy, in their later years, for protection
from the ‘rigors of the poor house.”” Lerner, 393 F.
Supp. at 1391 (quoting Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S.
619, 641, 57 S. Ct. 904, 909, 81 L. Ed. 1307 (1937)).
Again, the 20/40 rule is rationaily related to and
promotes this objective by “screen|[ing] out those who
have not established a substantial attachment to the
labor force because they do not have a reasonably
long, as well as recent, record of covered earnings.
Tuttle, 504 F.2d at 63.
Plaintiff argues that the goal of self-sufficiency is
an “insufficient justification for discrimination,”
asserting that there is no evidence that the Social
Security program has at any time been self-sufficient,
nor that elimination of the 20/40 rule would be an
impediment to that goal. (Pl’s Objs. to Recomm.
Ruling 5.) Moreover, Plaintiff argues that even if this
Court were to accept self-sufficiency as a legitimate
26a
Appendix B
goal of the Social Security program, it does not justify
the denial of Medicare benefits, which Plaintiff seeks
and needs (/d.) This argument, however, is not
persuasive. As set forth above, Congress had multiple
reasons for enacting the 20/40 rule, both of which have
been held to be legitimate and both of which are
rationally related to the rule. See, e.g., Geduldig v.
Aiello, 417 U.S. at 496 (holding, in the context of a
state disability insurance program, that “[t]he State
has a legitimate interest in maintaining the self-
supporting nature of its insurance program,” and “in
distributing the available resources in such a way as
to keep benefit payments at an adequate level for
disabilities that are covered, rather than to cover all
disabilities inadequately”). Even if the goal of self-
sufficiency were rejected, it remains the case that one
legitimate purpose behind the enactment of the 20/
40 rule was Congress’ desire to preserve disability
benefits for those persons who are currently
dependent on their employment income.
Numerous courts have upheld the 20/40 rule as
constitutional under both the Equal Protection and
Due Process Clauses of the Fifth Amendment See,
e.g., Harvell v. Chater, 87 F.3d 371 (9th Cir. 1996)
(per curiam); Tuttle, 504 F.2d 61; Winger v. Barnhart,
320 F. Supp. 2d 741 (C.D. Ill. 2004); Hesse v. Harris,
No. 78 C 5176, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10122, at *34
(N.D. Ul. Jan. 31, 1980) For the reasons discussed
above, this Court also finds that the 20/40 rule is
rationally related to the legitimate goals of the Social
Security program. Because the rule is not a “patently .
arbitrary classification, utterly lacking in rational
justification,” Harvell, 87 F.3d at 375, it is not
unconstitutional. Although Plaintiffs situation is a
27a
Appendix B
tragic one, any alterations to the 20/40 rule that
would rectify the problem must be initiated by the
legislative, and not the judicial, branch of
government.
2. Fifth Amendment Due Process Claim
Plaintiff also contends that the 20/40 rule, as
applied here, violates her substantive due process
rights under the Fifth Amendment. (PI.'s Mem. Supp.
Mot. Summ. J. 10-16; Pl's Mem. Opp. Def.’s Mot.
Affirm 8-9.) Defendant responds that Plaintiff has not
shown a due process violation as she was afforded an
opportunity to present her claim for disability benefits
at an administrative hearing, and the amendments
to the Social Security Act do not affect the 20/40
requirement (Def.’s Mot. Affirm 10).!°
Under either the Equal Protection Clause, see
Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78, 81, 30 L. Ed. 2d
231, 92 S. Ct. 254, or the Due Process Clause,
Hemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 611, 4 L. Ed. 2d
1435, 80 S. Ct. 1367, a statutory classification in a
social welfare program is constitutional if it is
rationally based and free from invidious
discrissination. Tuttle, 504 F.2d at 62; see also Harvell
v. Ciiafer, 87 F.3d 371, 373 (9th Cir. 1996).
The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment
requires that the government not deprive any citizen
10. Because Plaintiff is arguing that her substantive,
rather than procedural due process rights were violated, it
is unnecessary to consider whether she obtained a “full and
fair” hearing under the standard enunciated in Yancey v.
Apfel, 145 F.3d 106, 111 (2d Cir. 1998).
28a
Appendix B
of “life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law.” U.S. Const. amend. V. As an initial matter,
Plaintiff has no property right to her Social Security
taxes. The Supreme Court has rejected the notion that
social security payments create an “investment,”
holding that “the noncontractual interest of an
employee covered by the [Social Security] Act cannot
be soundly analogized to that of the holder of an
annuity, whose right to benefits is bottomed on his
contractual premium payments “ Flemming, 363 U.S.
at 610. Because there is no property right, but only a
noncontractual interest at issue, “the Due Process
Clause can be thought to interpose a bar only if the
statute manifests a patently arbitrary classification,
utterly lacking in rational justification.” Id. at 611.
Plaintiff argues that a rule which disregards her
fifteen years of full employment cannot be rationally
based. Although Plaintiffs correct that this does
evidence a significant contribution to the Social
Security program, Congress, in enacting the 20/40
rule and the Social Security Act in general, had
numerous goals, only one of which was to “afford more
protection to the family as a unit.” Weinberger v.
Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. at 643-44.'' Congress also
sought, with the enactment of the 20/40 rule, to make
the system self-supporting, See S. Rep. No. 1987, 83rd
Cong. 2d Sess., 3 U.S. Code Cong. News, 1954, at 3733;
11. The Wiesenfeld Court also noted that “[u]nderlying
the 1939 [amendments] was the principle that under a social-
insurance plan the primary purpose is to pay benefits in
accordance with the probable needs of the beneficiaries
rather than to make payments to the estate of a deceased
person.” 420 U.S. at 644 (internal quotations & citation
omitted).
29a
Appendix B
H. Rep. No. 92-231, 92d Cong. 2d Sess., 3 U.S. Code
Cong. & Admin. News, 1972, at 5111, and to ensure
that disability benefits were preserved for those who
are currently dependent on their employment income,
see S. Rep. No. 2388, 85th Cong, 2d Sess. , 3 U.S. Code
Cong & Admin. News 1958, at 4229; S. Rep. No. 1987,
83rd Cong. 2d Sess., 3 U.S. Code Cong. News 1954, at
3729. The 20/40 rule is rationally related to these
legitimate goals.
Congress, in an effort to favor victims of ALS,
recently amended the Social Security Act to allow
individuals who have filed an application, are under
a disability by virtue of being diagnosed with ALS,
and are currently insured for disability benefits to
waive the twenty-four-month waiting period for
Medicare coverage. See H.R. Rep. No, 106-1019, § 104
(2000); see also 42 U.S.C. § 426(h); 42 U.S.C.
§ 426(b)(2)(A); 42 U.S.C. § 423(a), In 2003, the SSA
amended its regulations to permit findings of
presumptive disability with respect to claims
involving ALS. See Revised Medical Criteria for
Evaluating Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis, 68 Fed.
Reg. 51689, 51691-92 (Aug. 28, 2003) (to be codified
at 20 C. F. R. pts. 404 and 416) Although Congress
thus intended to aid individuals with ALS, the
amendments did not alter the 20/40 requirement and
did not change Plaintiffs status as not currently
insured. Plaintiff is not entitled to collect disability
benefits under the statute as Congress has drawn the
criteria for eligibility in a manner which does not
embrace Plaintiff, no matter how sad her
circumstances.
30a
Appendix B
Although the 20/40 rule may not perfectly comport
with all of the goals behind the Social Security Act, it
does not contain an inherently invidious classification
and does not impinge on fundamental rights. The
“rough accommodation” reached by the 20/40 rule
may appear “illogical,” however, it cannot be said that
it is so arbitrary as to violate the Due Process Clause,
and accordingly, it is not the province of this Court
to strike it down. See Dandridge, 397 U.S. at 485;
Brown, 905 F.2d at 635.’* For the reasons set forth in
this and the preceding section, this Court finds that
the 20/40 rule is not based on a “patently arbitrary
classification,” is rationally based, and is free from
invidious discrimination. See, e.g., Harwell v. Chater,
87 F.3d 371, 373 (9th Cir. 1996); Tuttle v. Sec’y of
Health, Education & Welfare, 504 F.2d 61, 62-63 (10th
Cir. 1974). As such, the 20/40 rule does not violate
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
Ill. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Recommended
Ruling [Doc. No. 22] denying Plaintiffs Motion for
Summary Judgment and granting Defendant's
Motion for Order Affirming the Decision of the
Commissioner is approved and adopted.
Accordingly, Plaintiff's Motion for Summary
12. In Brown, the Second Circuit held that “[iJt is the
responsibility of Congress, not the courts, to determine how
public funds should be spent and how they should be raised.”
The Second Circuit reasoned that “legislative decisions are
constrained by fiscal necessity” and “[e]very desirable
program cannot be funded, nor can the full needs of every
funded program be met.” 905 F.2d at 635.
‘
:
7
3la
Appendix B
Tudgment (Dac. No. 10) is denied and Defendant's
Motion for Order Affirming the Decision of the
Commissioner [Doc. No. 15] is granted. The clerk is
directed to close the case.
SO ORDERED.
Dated at New Haven, Connecticut, July 17, 2006.
/s/
Peter C. Dorsey, U.S District J udge
United States District Court
32a
APPENDIX C — RECOMMENDED RULING OF
THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
DATED AND FILED APRIL 25, 2006
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
3:05 CV 1677 (PCD)
CLAIRE COLLIER
V.
JO ANNE B. BARNHART,
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY
DATE: APRIL 25, 2006
RECOMMENDED RULING ON PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND
ON DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR ORDER
AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF
THE COMMISSIONER
This action, filed under § 205(g) of the Social
Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), as amended, seeks
judicial review of a final decision by the Commissioner
of Social Security [“Commissioner”], that denied
plaintiff Disability Insurance Benefits [“DIB’].
I. ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS
On January 27, 2004, plaintiff Claire Collier, filed
her application for DIB. (See Certified Transcript of
Administrative Proceedings, filed December 23, 2005
33a
Appendix C
[“Tr.”] 24-26). The Commissioner denied the application
initially and upon reconsideration. ({ »Tr. 27-36).
On November 4, 2004, plaintiff filed a request for a
hearing before an Administrative Law Judge [ALJ].
(See Tr. 38-44). Such hearing was held before ALJ
Robert A. Di Biccaro on March 14, 2005. (See Tr. 147-
88). Plaintiff was represented by counsel at the hearing.
(See Tr. 37, 147). On June 10, 2005, ALJ Di Biccaro
issued his decision, in which he held that while plaintiff
is disabled by Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis [“ALS’”],
plaintiff did not have this impairment prior to December
31, 1999, the fast date she was insured by the Social
Security Act, so that plaintiff is not entitled to DIB.
(See Tr. 19-22). Seven days later, plaintiff submitted
the first of three letters to the Social Security
Administration (“SSA”] seeking permission to file an
expedited appeal to the district court. (See Tr. 5-15).!
Plaintiffs requests for review were denied by the
Appeals Council on August 25, 2005, rendering the
ALJ's decision, dated June 10, 2005, the final decision
of the Commissioner of Social Security. (See Tr. 2-4).
Plaintiff commenced this action on October 28,
2005 to challenge the constitutionality of 42 U.S.C.
§ 423(c)(1), commonly referred to as the “20/40 Rule.”
(Dkt. #1).2 On December 23, 2005, defendant filed
1. Plaintiffs letters, treated as a Request for Review, are
dated June 17, July 22, and August 9, 2005. (See Tr. 5-15).
2. Attached to plaintiffs Complaint are the following
three exhibits: copy of plaintiff's Social Security and Medicare
Earnings Record (Exh. A); copy of ALJ Di Biccaro’s June 10,
2005 decision (Exh B.); and copy of Notice of Appeals Council
Action, dated August 25, 2005 (Exh. C).
34a
Appendix C
her Answer, with the administrative record attached.
(Dkt. #9). Pending before the Court are plaintiff's
Motion for Summary Judgment, brief, Local Rule
56(a)1 Statement and affidavits in support, filed
January 26, 2006 (Dkts. ##10-14),° and defendant's
Motion for Order Affirming the Decision of the
Commissioner and brief in support, filed February
22, 2006. (Dkts. ##15-16). On March 6, 2006, plaintiff
filed her brief and affidavit in opposition to defendant's
Motion. (Dkts. ##19-20; see Dkt. #17-18).* Twenty-
three days later, United States District Judge Peter
C. Dorsey referred this case to this Magistrate Judge.
(Dkt. #21).
For the reasons stated below, plaintiff's Motion
for Summary Judgment (Dkt. #10) is denied and
defendant’s Motion for Order Affirming the Decision
of the Commission (Dkt. #15) is granted.
3. Attached to the affidavit of Richard F. Hans, sworn
to January 25, 2006 (Dkt. #13) are the following three exhibits:
copies of correspondence to the SSA from plaintiff's counsel,
dated August 18 & September 30, 2005 (Exhs. 1 & 3); and
copy of correspondence from the SSA to plaintiffs counsel,
dated September 15, 2005 (Exh. 2).
4. Attached to the affidavit of Richard F. Hans, sworn
to March 6, 2006 (Dkt. #20) are the following: copy of tables
indicating Allowances and Denials for Anterior Horn Cell
Disease at the Initial Adjudicative Level and Reconsideration
Adjudicative Level, prepared September 2005 (Exh. A); and
copy of DVD recording of the Today show, dated May 13,
2005 (Exh. 8).
35a
Appendix C
Il. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is a forty-three year old female who is
married with three children. (See Tr. 24-25, 142).
Plaintiff held summer jobs while she was in college,
and after graduation, she was gainfully employed as
a special events coordinator, a banquet sales
coordinator, a secretary and as an administrative
assistant for several employers for the next ten years.
(See Tr. 49-50, 53, 111, 166-69). Over the course of
her fifteen years of employment,’ plaintiff paid
$19,544 to Social Security and $4,668 to Medicare:
her employer matched both amounts. (See Tr. 53).
Plaintiff testified at her hearing before ALJ Di Biccaro
that she worked “until [she was] about eight and a
half months pregnant” and then stopped for the birth
of her first child, Kieran, who was born in September
1994. (See Tr. 169-70). Plaintiff thereafter became a
stay-at-home mom for Kieran, Bridget, who was born
in May 1996, and Leah, who was born fourteen
months later. (See Tr. 40, 41, 142, 152-53, 169-72).
While her daughters were in preschool, in 2000 and
2002, plaintiff was paid for some of the work she
performed for their classes. (See Tr. 53, 173-75).
In or around March 2003, plaintiff began “feeling
twitches in [her} arms” and would “get cramps in
[her] calves and the arches of [her] feet.” (See Tr.
177). Plaintiff was diagnesed with Amyotrophic
9. While plaintiff represents in her brief that she worked
18 calendar years (see Dkt. #11, at 10), her Complaint and
her earnings record reflect continuous employment from 1979
to August 1994, which is 15 caiendar years. (See Tr. 49-50 &
53; Dkt. #1, 9 4). The difference, however, is irrelevant.
36a
Appendix C
Lateral Sclerosis [“ALS”] by Dr. Dale J. Lange, on
October 13, 2003. (See Tr. 126, 179). Thereafter, on
January 27, 2004, plaintiff filed her application for
DIB. (See Tr. 24-26). Plaintiff was denied benefits on
grounds of insufficient work history. (See Tr. 19-22,
27-29).
oS ae oe ‘.
**.In his decision, ALJ Di Biccaro observed.that “[a]s
a threshold matter, . . . [plainitff] concedes that she
is insured for disability purposes only through a
December 1999 and that she had no symptoms of =. >. =
ALS until 2003.” (See Tr. 20). Plaintiff therefore “is =~ s
pursuing this appeal on constitutional grounds by
challenging the provisions of the Social Security Act
and regulations,” specifically, 42 U.S.C. § 423(c)(1),
and its associated regulations. (Id.). Accordingly, in
his decision, ALJ Di Biccaro observed that he lacks
the “authority to disregard the requirements of the
Social Security Act and regulations” so as to find in
her favor. (Id.).°
6. As ALJ DiBiccaro poignantly observed:
Both [plaintiff] and her husband testified in a
forthright, credible and heartfelt mannet....
[Plaintiff] has fought courageously against the
disease and has done everything possible to continue
in her role as a wife and mother. Her personal story
is compelling, and her ongoing efforts to raise her
children despite the disease merit admiration.
ty es
:
_.. [Plaintiff] alleges that the disability quarter of
coverage rules discriminate against stay-at-home
parents who are more likely than not women.
Unfortunately, the undersigned does not have the
authority to change or disregard the law regardless
of how compelling her story is.
(Tr. 21).
37a
Appendix C
Ill. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The scope of review of a Social Security disability
determination involves two levels of inquiry. The court
first must decide whether the Commissioner
applied the correct legal principles in making the
determination. Next, the court must decide whether
the determination is supported by substantial
evidence. See Balsamo v. Chater, 142 F.3d 75, 79 (2d
Cir. 1998). “Substantial evidence” is evidence that a
reasonable mind would accept as adequate to support
a conclusion; it is more than a “mere scintilla.”
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971):
Yancey v. Apfel, 145 F.3d 106, 111 (2d Cir. 1998).
The substantial evidence rule also applies to
inferences and conclusions that are drawn from
findings of fact. See Gonzalez v. Apfel, 23 F. Supp. 2d
179, 189 (D. Conn. 1998); Rodriquez v. Califano, 431
F. Supp. 421, 423 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). The court may
not decide facts, reweigh evidence or substitute its
judgment for that of the Commissioner. See Dotson
v. Shalala, 1 F.3d 571,.577 (7th Cir. 1993). The court
must scrutinize the entire record to determine the
reasonableness of the ALJ’s findings. Furthermore,
“[w]here there is a reasonable basis for doubt whether
the ALJ applied correct legal principles, application
of the substantial evidence standard to uphold a
finding of no disability creates an unacceptable risk
that a claimant will be deprived of the right to have
her disability determination made according to the
correct legal principles.” Schaal v. Apfel, 134 F.3d
496, 504 (2d Cir. 1998) (citation omitted).
Under the Social Security Act, every individual
who is under a disability is entitled to disability
38a
Appendix C
insurance benefits. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1).
“Disability” is defined as an “inability to engage in
any substantial gainful activity by reason of any
medically ¢eterminable physical or mental
impairment -vhich can be expected to result in death
or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a
continuous period of not less than 12 months.”
42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).’ In 2003, the SSA amended
7. A number of factors are considered and a five-step
process is followed when deciding whether a claimant is disabled.
First,the court determines whether the claimant is engaged in
substantial gainful activity. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a). If the
claimant is performing substantial gainful activity, the claim
will be disallowed. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b). If the claimant
is not working, then the second step requires that a finding be
made as to the existence of a severe mental or physical
impairment; if none exist, the claim is denied. See 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1520(c). If the claimant has a severe impairment, the
third step is to compare the claimant's impairment with those
in the Listing. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d); Bowen v. Yuckert,
482 U.S. 137, 141 (1987); Balsamo, 142 F.3d at 79-80. If the
claimant's impairment meets or equals one of the impairments
in the Listing, the claimant is automatically considered disabled.
See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d); see also Balsamo, 142 F.3d at 80.
If the claimant's impairment does not meet or equal a listed
impairment, then the fourth step is to show that he cannot
perform his former work. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e). If the
claimant cannot perform his former work, then the fifth step is
to show that he is prevented from doing any other work;
disability benefits can only be received if a claimant cannot
perform any alternate gainful employment. See Balsamo, 142
F.3d at 80 (citations omitted).
The initial burden of establishing disability is on the
claimant. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5). Once the claimant
demonstrates that he is incapable of performing his past work,
(Cont'd)
39a
Appendix C
(Cont'd)
however, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show that
the claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform
other substantial gainful activity in the national economy. See
Balsamo, 142 F.3d at 80 (citations omitted). This may require
application of the Medical-Vocational Guidelines [*the Grid”]:
the Grid classifies employment into five groups based on
exertional requirements of the different types of work, i.e.,
sedentary, light, medium, heavy and very heavy. See Gray v.
Chater, 903 F. Supp. 293, 297-98 n.5 (N.D.N.Y. 1995). These
categories are based on strength requirements of such activities
as sitting, walking, standing, lifting, carrying, pushing, and
pulling. See id. The Grid places claimants with severe exertional
impairments who can no longer perform past work into Grid
categories according to their residual functional capacity, age,
education and work experience, and dictates a conclusion of
disabled or not disabled. See id., 903 F. Supp. at 298. When the
Commissioner makes a determination as to a claimant's
disability, she must explain what physical functions the claimant
is capable of performing; in order to sustain her burden of
showing that the claimant can perform sedentary work, the
[Commissioner] must proffer specific medical evidence that
the plaintiff can meet the exertional demands necessary to
maintain sedentary work.” Mitchell_ v. Chater, 918 F. Supp.
675, 682 (W.D.N.Y. 1995) (citations omitted).
In determining whether or not a claimant is disabled, the
Commissioner considers: (1) objective medical facts and clinical
findings; (2) diagnoses and medical opinions of examining
physicians; (3) the claimant's subjective evidence of pain and
physical incapacity as testified to by himself and others who
observed him; and (4) the claimant's age, educational
background, and work history. See Carroll v. Secretary of HHS,
705 F.2d 638, 642 (2d Cir. 1983) (multiple citations e:nitted). In
addition, the opinion given by a treating physician is entitled
to considerable weight and in the absence of contradictory
evidence, is binding on the Commissioner. See id. (multiple
citations omitted).
40a
Appendix C
its regulations to allow the SSA to make findings of
presumptive disability in Listing 11.10 with respect
to claims involving ALS. See Revised Medical Criteria
for Evaluating Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis, 68 Fed.
Reg. 51689, 51691-92 (Aug. 28, 2003)(to be codified
20 C.F.R. pts. 404 and 416). Thus, a claimant
diagnosed with ALS is presumptively disabled. In this
case, it is undisputed that plaintiff suffers from ALS,
which, as stated above, is a medically determinable
impairment. (See Tr. 22).
A claimant's work history is a prerequisite to a
determination of eligibility for disability benefits.
Thus, in order for a claimant to qualify for disability
benefits, in addition to proving disability under the
statute, a claimant must have “insured status.” See
20 C.F.R. § 404.130.' For plaintiff te have disability
insured status, plaintiff must satisfy the 20/40 Rule.
See 20 C.F.R. § 404.130(b). The 20/40 Rule requires
that plaintiff have at least 20 quarters of coverage in
a 40 quarter period ending with the quarter that
she allegedly became disabled.’ See 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.130(b)(2). The inquiry in this case, therefore,
does not relate to the claim of disability or the capacity
of plaintiff to perform work related activity, but
rather, the constitutionality of 42 U.S.C. § 423(c)(1)
8. There are four rules outlined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.130,
only one of which, Rule I, is applicable to this case.
9. A “quarter” of coverage is the basic unit used by
the SSA in determining whether a claimant has sufficient
coverage under the Act to achieve insured status. See 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.140(a). An individual earns “quarters” based on the wages
the person was paid during the period of three calendar months
ending on March 31, June 30, September 30, or December 31 in
any year. See 42 U.S.C. § 413(a)(1); 20 C.F.R. § 404.101 (b).
ee ,
4la
Appendix C
which application results in a denial of disability
benefits to plaintiff who was only insured for benefits
through December 31, 1999. (See Tr. 19-22).
“The phrase ‘period of disability’ is a legal term,
encompassing both a literal disability and fully
insured status.” 2 Socia Securiry LAW AND PRACTICE
§ 13.35, at 34 (1997)(footnote omitted). Although
plaintiff urges this Court to do so, “[t]o interpret the
regulation as applying to persons who are not fully
insured at the beginning of a period of disability
would conflict with the underlying statute”. Id.
(footnote omitted); see 42 U.S.C. § 416(i).
IV. DISCUSSION
ALJ Di Biccaro found that although plaintiff has
ALS, which is a medically determinable impairment,
and plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful
activity since the alleged onset of disability, plaintiff
did not have this impairment “prior to December 31,
1999; therefore, [plaintiff] did not have a ‘severe’
impairment prior to her date last insured (20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1520).” (See Tr. 21-22). Accordingly, ALJ Di
Biccaro concluded that plaintiff “was not under a
‘disability’ as defined in the Social Security Act, at
any time through the date of this decision as it relates
to her date last insured of December 31, 1999
(20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c)).” (Id.). ALJ Di Biccaro
acknowledged, however, that because plaintiff was
“pursuing [her] appeal on constitutional grounds by
challenging the provisions of the Social Security Act
and regulations,” ALJ Di Biccaro lacked the “authority
to disregard the requirements of the Social Security
Act and regulations” so as to find in her favor. (See
Tr. 20).
42a
Appendix C
Plaintiff seeks summary judgment on grounds
that the 20/40 Rule denies plaintiff equal protection
under the Fifth Amendment as the denial of benefits
in this case discriminates against plaintiff and all
other women between the ages of 31 and 41 years
who stay at home to care for their children and thus
are unable to work at least five of the ten previous
years, notwithstanding prior work history. (Dkt. #11,
at 7-9). Additionally, plaintiff asserts that the 20/40
Rule, as applied to plaintiff, violates the due process
clause of the Fifth Amendment, as such rule “runs
contrary to the policies underlying the Social Security
and Medicare systems in general and, in particular,
as they have been amended to otherwise specifically
accommodate victims of ALS.” (Jd. at 10-16).
In her Motion for Order Affirming the Decision,
the Commissioner contends that plaintiff has failed
to show an equal protection violation as the interests
in the government in maintaining the solvency of
the Disability Insurance program and in ensuring
that disability recipients have been dependent on their
wages is legitimate, and the statute bears a rational
relationship to that interest. (Dkt. #16, at 4-10).
According to the Commissioner, plaintiff has not made
a showing of a due process violation as due process,
as applied to the federal government, requires that a
social security disability hearing be full and fair and
plaintiff had an opportunity to present her case.
(Id. at 10). Moreover, the Commissioner contends
that the amendments to the Social Security Act,
which change the eligibility requirements for
Medicare coverage for victims of ALS, do not affect
the 20/40 requirement. (Id. at 11).
43a
Appendix C
In her brief in opposition to the Commissioner's
Motion, plaintiff reasserts that the 20/40 Rule denies
plaintiff equal protection under the Fifth Amendment
as women who leave the workforce to raise children
are disproportionately excluded from eligibility for
Social Security and Medicare benefits, and the 20/40
Rule contradicts Congress's clear intent to provide
immediate assistance to ALS victims and their
families. (Dkt. #19, at 2-5 & 8-9). Plaintiff further
contends that defendant has “failed to proffer a shred
of proof that the SSDI program is self-sufficient or
that [the] eradication [of the 20/40 Rule] would
materially undermine that goal,” and the standard
of review for a procedural due process challenge is
not applicable here; rather, the rational basis
standard is appropriate as plaintiff challenges the
20/40 Rule on substantive due process grounds.
(Dkt. #19, at 5-8).
A. EQUAL PROTECTION
As stated above, plaintiff contends that the 20/
40 Rule denies plaintiff equal protection under the
Fifth Amendment as the Rule has a “disparate and
discriminatory impact” against plaintiff and other
women who “after materially contributing to the
Social Security and Medicare Trust Funds, elect to
stay home and engage in the mothering of their
children.” (Dkt. #11, at 7-9; Dkt. #19, at 2-3}) Thet
Commissioner responds that plaintiff has failed to
show an equal protection violation in that the
government interest “embodied in the ‘20/4@§ rule
is legitimate” and the statute bears a rafional
relationship to that interest. (Dkt. #16, at 4-5).
44a
Appendix C
The Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution
provides that “No person shall be. . . deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law.”
“(While the Fifth Amendment contains no equal
protection clause, it does forbid discrimination that
is so unjustifiable as to be violative of due process.”
Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163, 168 (1964) (internal
quotations & citations omitted); see also Nicholas v.
Tucker, 114 F.3d 17, 19 (2d Cir. 1997), cert. denied,
523 U.S. 1126 (1998). “It is... well-established that
the constitutional guarantee of equal protection does
not forbid all classifications, but rather keeps
governmental [decision makers] from treating
different persons who are in all relevant respects
alike.” Nicholas, 114 F.3d at 20 (internal quotations
& multiple citations omitted). Unless the challenged
statute “burden|s] a fundamental right or draw([s] on
distinctions based on a suspect classification,” a Court
must “uphold” the legislation if the statute bears a
rational relationship “to a legitimate governmental
objective.” Id. at 20 (citation omitted). Moreover, the
Second Circuit has reiterated that the rational basis
standard of review applies specifically in cases such
as the one at hand, where “|d]istinctions [are] made
in [a] social welfare statute[ |.” Brown v. Bowen, 905
F.2d 632, 635 (2d Cir. 1990)(multiple citations
omitted), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1093 (1991); see also
Rudykoff v. Apfel, 193 F.3d 579, 580 (2d Cir.
1999)(“Constitutional challenges to social welfare
legislation such as the Social Security Act are
reviewed under the rational basis standard.”)
(multiple citations omitted). Additionally, the choices
made by Congress in enacting the challenged statute
“will be upheld unless they are clearly wrong, a
display si arbitrary power, [and] not an exercise of
45a
Appendix C
judgment.” Brown, 905 F.2d at 635 (internal
quotations & multiple citations omitted). Thus,
“[uJnless a statute employs a classification that is
inherently invidious or that impinges on fundamental
rights,” federal courts should “properly exercise | only
a limited review power over Congress.” Schweiker v.
Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 230 (1981) (citation omitted).
There are two ways in which governmental action
can violate the equal protection clause. “The first occurs
when the Government explicitly classifies or
distinguishes among persons” based on specific criteria,
such as, race, sex, religion or ethnicity. De La Cruz v.
Tormey, 582 F.2d 45, 49 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
441 U.S. 965 (1979).'° In this case, there is no claim of
this type of facial discrimination. The “second and more
subtle variety of discrimination focuses, not on the form
of the governmental action, as does the first, but rather
its results.” Id. at 50. This type of discrimination is, in
form nondiscriminatory, but produces “effects which
weigh adversely and disproportionately upon the
members of a particular group of individuals.” Id. This
10. In De La Cruz, the plaintiffs were all young women
who challenged the lack of campus child care facilities in the
San Mateo Community College District, asserting a violation
of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
on grounds that defendants’ actions constituted intentional,
invidious, gender-based discrimination and were arbitrary
and unrelated to the legitimate goal of providing education.
982 F.2d at 48-49. The Ninth Circuit denied defendants’
motion to dismiss as to the Equal Protection challenge on
grounds that [i]t [was] too early in the course of this litigation
... to determine whether the defendants’ conduct was free
from discriminatory purpose [and] what level of ‘scrutiny’ is
applicable on the novel facts of this case.” 582 F.2d at 59.
46a
Appendix C
type of discrimination “may require explanation in
terms of non-invidious purposes.” Id.
According to plaintiff, “[s|tudies have shown that
60 women with professional degrees are out of the
labor force at a rate about three times that of their
male counterparts and they overwhelming cite family
responsibilities as the reason.” (Dkt. #11, at 7-8,
quoting Jerry A. Jacobs & Janice Fanning Madden,
Mammies & Daddies on the Fast Track: Success of
Parents in Demanding Professions, 596 Annals Of
Am. Acad. Of Pol. & Soc. Sci. 246, 250 (2004));
see also Samuel Issacharoff & Elyse Rosenblum,
Women & the Workplace: Accommodating the
Demands of Pregnancy, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 2154, 2160-
65 (1994)[“Issacharoff & Rosenblum”].!' Plaintiff
correctly observes that the rates of Disability
Insurance coverage for women in their 30’s and early
40's are nearly 20% lower than that for men of
comparable age; married women are 10% less likely
to be insured than single women; and the SSA's
records reflect that women between the ages 31 and
11. Plaintiff posits the following example in support of
her argument that the 20/40 Rule employs a classification
that is inherently invidious — an applicant 31 years old who
worked from ages 21 through 26 years and paid into Social
Security and Medicare for five years would be entitled to
SSDI and Medicare benefits under the 20/40 Rule, whereas
an applicant 41 years old, such as the plaintiff when she was
diagnosed with ALS, having worked from age 18 through 34,
would not be eligible for SSDI or Medicare. According to
plaintiff, the recency requirements imposed by the 20/40 Rule,
therefore, become more onerous with age, ironically making
it more — not less — difficult to receive Medicare or SSDI
benefits the closer one is to the respective qualifying ages of
62 or 65 years. (Dkt. #11, at 8).
47a
Appendix C
41 are far more likely to be rejected by SSA than any
other group or age bracket. (Dkt. #11, at 8-9; Dkt.
#19, at 2-4, citing Olivia S. Mitchell & John W.R.
Phillips, Eligibility for Social Security Disability
Insurance, Issues in Brief - U. Mich. Retirement
Research Ctr. (2001)[“Mitchell & Phillips”]). The sum
result is that “working women are less weil-protected
by Social Security disability insurance than are
working men due to their more episodic labor market
attachment.” See Mitchell & Phillips, at 4.
Plaintiff contends that this “imbalance and
disproportionality”'* that the 20/40 Rule imposes
upon mothers equates to invidious discrimination.
(Dkt. #19, at 3-4)(citations omitted). The allegation
of a sexually disproportionate impact, standing alone,
however, is insufficient to state a violation of the
Constitution. See De La Cruz, 582 F.2d at 58.
Moreover, “[a] classification does not offend the
Constitution because in practice it results in some
inequality.” Tuttle v. Secretary of Health, Educ. and
Welfare, 504 F.2d 61, 63 (10th Cir. 1974) (internal
quotations & multiple citations omitted). While the
“impact of the official action ... may provide an
important starting point” for determining the
existence of invidious discrimination, plaintiff must
12. Plaintiff relies on the following language of the
Ninth Circuit in De La Cruz: “[O]ne may point to the fact
that the effects of the challenged ‘policy’ do not fall
exclusively upon women,... but affect as well men with
child-rearing responsibilities. ... Challenges which rely
upon disparate impact inevitably will involve consequences
which are not restricted in their operation to one group or
another. The essence of this sort of legal attack is imbalance
and disproportionality.” 582 F.2d at 57.
48a
Appendix C
also allege that defendant's course of conduct
is susceptible to an inference of intentional
discrimination. See De La Cruz, 582 F.2d at 59
(citation omitted). To determine “whether invidious
discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor”
demands an inquiry into several evidentiary sources,
“including the existence of a ‘clear pattern’
unexplainable on grounds other than discrimination,
the historical background of a decision, the ‘specific
sequence of events’ leading up to the challenged
action, and ‘departures’ from the normal procedural
sequences and substantive policies.” Id. at 58-59
(citations omitted).
While plaintiff is correct that “[hJaving children
makes it more likely that women will leave the
workforce altogether or switch to part-time
employment,” Issacharoff & Rosenblum, 94 Colum.
L. Rev. at 2165 (footnote omitted), so as to reduce or
eliminate the number of quarters of coverage a
woman accumulates, plaintiff does not point to any
evidence giving rise to an inference of intentional
discrimination. See De La Cruz, 582 F.2d at 58-59.
Moreover, as further discussed below, there is no
evidence that an “invidious discriminatory purpose
was a motivating factor” in the enactment of the
20/40 Rule; there exists no “‘clear pattern’
unexplainable on grounds other than discrimination’;
the legislative history, as discussed below, evidences
a rational relationship of the 20/40 Rule to a
legitimate governmental objective, and plaintiff
points to no departures from the normal procedural
sequences and substantive policies applicable to this
social welfare legislation. See Nicholas, 114 F.3d at
20; De La Cruz. 582 F.2d at 59-60.
49a
Appendix C
In addition to the foregoing, when social welfare
legislation is challenged, the legislation is “entitled
to a strong presumption of constitutionality.”
Califano v. Torres, 435 U.S. 1, 5 (1978)(citation
omitted) (percuriam). “Where rational basis scrutiny
applies, the Government has no obligation to produce
evidence or empirical data to sustain the rationality
of a statutory classification, and instead can base its
statutes on rational speculation.” Lewis v. Thompson,
252 F.3d 567, 582 (2d Cir. 2001)(internal quotations
& multiple citations omitted). That notwithstanding,
the Commissioner asserts that the 20/40 Rule
promotes the legitimate interests of ensuring that
the Disability Insurance program is self-supporting
and ties disability insurance benefits to employment
income. (Dkt. #16, at 5-6).
13. Plaintiff contends that the Commissioner should
“not hide behind the skirts of a long ago discredited myth of
self-sufficiency.” (Dkt. #19, at 6). Plaintiff posits that an
assertion that the Social Security system is self-supporting
“strains credibility” as the Director of the Congressional
Budget Office has predicted that “under current law ...
the Social Security trust funds would become exhausted in
2052; after that, the [SSA] would lack the authority to pay
full benefits and, without congressional action, outlays would
be limited to annual revenues, which would be 22 percent
lower than scheduled costs.” (Dkt. #19, at 5-6, quoting
Statement of Douglas Holtz-Eakin, Director of Congressional
Budget Office, “The Future of Social Security before the
Special Committee on Aging, United States Senate,” at 2-7
(February 3, 2005)). Moreover, plaintiff argues that
defendant has failed to “proffer a shred of proof that the
SSDI program is self-sufficient, she has not proffered any
evidence that the 20/40 Rule in fact supports a goal of self-
sufficiency or that its eradication would materially
undermine the goal.” (Dkt.-#19, at 6).
(Cont'd)
50a
Appendix C
It has been Congress's position that the disability
insurance system “should be completely self-
supporting from the contributions of covered
individuals and employers” for “as nearly as can be
foreseen and thus is actuarially sound.” H.R. Rep.
No. 92-231 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4989, 5111. As Congress long ago recognized:
Under a program which provides
protection against loss of earnings on
account of disability, it is reasonable and
desirable that there be reliable means of
limiting such protection to those persons
who have had sufficiently long and
sufficiently recent covered employment to
indicate that they probably have been
dependent upon their earnings. It was to
meet this purpose that the disability work
requirements were designed, and, in most
cases, the present work requirements
produce results in accordance with this
purpose.
(Cont'd)
On the contrary, the Commissioner has proffered
evidence that the 20/40 Rule supports the goal of self-
sufficiency and that notwithstanding, the statute had a.
“rational basis when enacted” regardless of the current
projections of the funding of social security. See Brown, 905
F.2d at 637, Moreover, Congress determines the entitlement
to benefits and “[i]t is the responsibility of Congress, not
the courts, to determine how public funds shouid be spent
and how they should be raised,” and accordingly, to determine
how the goal ef self-sufficiency shall continue to be met with
the present day funding challenges that face the social
security programs. Id. at 635.
5la
Appendix C
S. Rep. No. 2388 (1958), reprinted in 1958 U.S.
C.C.A.N. 4218, 4229-30."* Moreover, “[t]he Supreme
Court has recognized that a State has a legitimate
interest in maintaining the self-supporting nature of
its insurance program” and this “stated principle also
applies to the federal government.” Tuttle. 504 F.2d
at 63 (internal quotations & citation omitted).
Additionally, the 20/40 Rule has been upheld as
constitutional under both the Equal Protection and
Due Process Clauses of the Fifth Amendment. See
Harvell v. Chater, 87 F.3d 371 (9th Cir. 1996)(per
curiam); Tuttle, 504 F.2d 61. In Tuttle, the Tenth
Circuit rejected the constitutional challenge to the
20/40 Rule, brought by a plaintiff who became
disabled when he had social security credits for only
19 calendar quarters of work, on grounds that 20/40
Rule, which allows for the entitlement of benefits as
determined by Congress, has a rational basis and is
tree from invidious discrimination. Tuttle, 504 F.2d
14. Toaddress the inevitable inequity that arises under
the 20/40 Rule, namely, the existence of a disability severe
enough to cause a person to stop working, yet not severe
enough to meet the definition of disability, the legislative
history of this statute reads:
The requirement of 20 quarters of coverage
out of the 40 calendar quarters ending with the
quarter of disablement, together with the fully
insured ‘status requirement, should provide
reasonable and adequate assurance that the
protection afforded by the disability provisions
will be keyed to loss of earnings on account of
disability.
S. Rep. No. 2388 (1958), reprinted in 1958 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4218,
4230.
52a
Appendix C
at 62-63. Likewise, the Ninth Circuit rejected the
constitutional challenge of the plaintiff in Harvell who
was “fully insured” within the meaning of the Social
Security Act, but because he worked in non-covered
employment and paid no social security taxes, he earned
no quarters of coverage. Harvell, 87 F.3d at 373.
Following the Tenth Circuit's decision in Tuttle, the
Ninth Circuit concluded that the 20/40 Rule is not a
“patently arbitrary classification, utterly lacking in
rational justification.” Harvell, 87 F.3d at 373 (citation
omitted).
Moreover, as another district court held two years
ago, the 20/40 Rule does not violate equal protection
under the Fifth Amendment because it distinguishes
between homemakers and those employed outside the
home. Specifically, U.S. Magistrate Judge Evans of the
District Court for the Central District of Illinois found:
this supposed discrimination is not sex-based
— 42 U.S.C. § 414 applies equally to both
men and women who ... were employed
outside the home intermittently. [Plaintiffs]
present no evidence that homemakers are a
suspect class entitled to either strict scrutiny
or heightened scrutiny. ... The Supreme
Court has held that a classification must be
upheld against an equal protection challenge
if there is any reasonably conceivable state
of facts that could provide a rational basis for
the classification. In addition, under rational
basis scrutiny, the means need only be
rationally related to a conceivable and
legitimate end.
53a
Appendix C
[T]here is a rational basis for the
means employed (the quarters of coverage
system), to achieve the intended purpose
(determining applicants’ eligibility for Social
Security benefits, while allowing the
program to be self-supporting, and assuring
that those receiving benefits were primarily
dependent on their lost wages). Therefore,
[plaintiffs] cannot show that 42 U.S.C.
§ 414 violates the equal protection
principles inherent in the Due Process
Clause.
See Winger v. Barnhart, 320 F. Supp. 2d 741, 747
(D. Ill. 2004) (internal quotations, citations & footnote
omitted).
Accordingly, although this Court is deeply
sympathetic to plaintiff's tragic plight,'> Congress’s
legitimate goals, in enacting the 20/40 Rule, of making
the social security system self-sufficient by tying
substantial contributions to the system before the
onset of disability to an established attachment to
the labor force so that disability claimants may
demonstrate a dependence on their employment
income, cannot be said to be patently arbitrary or
lacking rational justification. Any revisions to the
20/40 Rule, to rectify the predicament of plaintiff's
situation, ought to be initiated by the legislative, and
not judicial, branch of government.
15. See note 6 supra.
54a
Appendix C
B. DUE PROCESS CLAUSE
Plaintiff further argues that denying her SSDI
benefits after she has paid social security taxes
during the 15 calendar years'® in which she was
employed, is patently unjust and cruel, and runs
contrary to the polices underlying the Social Security
and Medicare systems in general, and, in particular,
as they have been amended to otherwise specifically
accommodate victims of ALS. (Dkt. #11, at 10-16;
Dkt. #19, at 8-9). The Commissioner responds that
plaintiff has not made a showing of a due process
violation as she was afforded an opportunity to present
her claim for disability benefits at an administrative
hearing, and the amendments to the Social Security
Act do not affect the 20/40 requirement. (Dkt. #16,
at 10).
Plaintiff correctly refers to Weinberger v.
Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 643-44 (1975), which
observed that Congress’s intent in enacting and
amending the Social Security Act was to “afford more
adequate protection to the family as a unit” and that
“[uJnderlying the 1939 [amendments] was the
principle that under a social-insurance plar the
primary purpose is to pay benefits in accordance with
the probable needs of the beneficiaries|, like plaintiff
in this case,] rather than to make payment to [his or
her] estate.” (internal quotations & citation omitted).
However, in addition to furthering the goal of
protecting the family as a unit, Congress enacted
the 20/40 Rule with the legitimate goals of making
the social security system self-supporting by assuring
16. See note 5 supra.
55a
Appendix C
that disability claimants make a substantial
contribution to the system before the onset of
disability and of screening out claimants who have
not established an attachment to the labor force for
a sufficient amount of time to demonstrate that they
have depended on their employment income.
See 2 Sociat Security LAW AND Practice § 14.27, at 37-
38 (citations omitted).'”
“It is the responsibility of Congress, not the courts,
to determine how public funds should be spent” and
to legislate within the lines they must draw to ensure
the economic viability of the social welfare programs.
Brown, 905 F.2d at 635 (internal citations omitted).
In that vein, and in light of the goals articulated
above, Congress has exercised its judgment so as to
favor victims of ALS, in amending the Social Security
Act to allow for a waiver of the 24-month waiting
period for Medicare coverage for individuals who have
filed an application, who are under a disability, and
unlike plaintiff, who are insured for disability
benefits. See H.R. Rep. No. 106-1019(I) (2000):
see also 42 U.S.C. § 426(h); 42 U.S.C. § 426(b) (2) (A);
42 U.S.C. § 423(a). Moreover, in 2003, the SSA
amended its regulations to allow the SSA to make
findings of presumptive disability with respect to
claims involving ALS. See Revised Medical Criteria
for Evaluating Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis, 68 Fed.
Reg. 51689, 51691-92 (Aug. 28, 2003)(to be codified
20 C.F.R. pts. 404 and 416). The foregoing
notwithstanding, the Commissioner correctly
observes that the amendments to the Social Security
Act and to the regulations do not affect the 20/40
17. See note 14 supra.
56a
Appendix C
requirement. “[T]his Court properly exercises only a
limited review power over Congress” as the 20/40
Rule does not include “a classification that is
inherently invidious or that impinges on fundamental
rights.” Schweiker, 450 U.S. at 230 (citation omitted).
Accordingly, this Court is bound to uphold the choices
made by the legislature as they are not “clearly wrong
[or] a display of arbitrary power.” Brown, 905 F.2d
at 635 (citations omitted).
In addition to the foregoing, “[w]hether a Social
Security Act classification is attacked on equal
protection grounds . . . or on due process grounds, . . .
the test [that this Court must apply] is whether the
statute manifests a patently arbitrary classification,
utterly lacking in rational justification.” Tuttle, 504
F.2d at 62 (internal quotations & citations omitted).
“Although Congress has great latitude to make
classifications in the area of economic and welfare
legislation,” the federal government must have “some
rational basis or be pertinent to some proper objective
of Congress” in enacting such legislation in order to
withstand a due process challenge. See Davis v.
Richardson, 342 F. Supp. 588, 591 (D. Conn.), aff'd
mem., 409 U.S. 1069 (1972).'* To satisfy this
standard, plaintiff must carry her “heavy burden of
18. Plaintiff correctly observes that the rational basis
standard, as stated above, applies to plaintiffs constitutional
challenge and that defendant's assertion that due process is
satisfied because plaintiff received a “full and fair hearing” is
misplaced. See Yancey, 145 F.3d at 112 (when a challenge is
made on procedure due process grounds, due process “requires
that a social security hearing must be full and fair.” )(citation
omitted).
57a
Appendix C
proof of the system's arbitrary or irrational nature.”
Winger, 320 F. Supp. 2d at 746.
In contrast to the goals outlined by the
Commissioner which have been recognized as
rationally related to the legislative purpose
underlying the Social Security system, see Harvell.
87 F.3d 371; Tuttle, 504 F.2d 61, plaintiff has failed
to demonstrate how the quarters of coverage system
is incapable of achieving those goals. See Winger,
320 F. Supp. 2d at 745-46. Thus, for the reasons stated
in Section IV.A. supra, plaintiff's constitutional
challenge on due process grounds cannot survive.
V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, plaintiffs Motion
for Summary Judgment (Dkt. #10) is denied and
defendant's Motion for Order Affirming the Decision
of the Commissioner (Dkt. #15) is granted.’
The parties are free to seek the district judge's
review of this recommended ruling. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(written objection to ruling must be
filed within ten days after service of same); F ep.
R. Civ. P. 6(a), 6(e) & 72; Rule 72.2 of the Local Rules
for United States Magistrate Judges, United States
District Court for the District of Connecticut; Small
19. The Magistrate Judge commends Attorneys Richard
F. Hans, John Vukelj, and John P. Regan and Assistant United
States Attorney Ann M. Nevins for their comprehensive and
well written briefs on this novel legal question, and further
commends plaintiff Claire Collier and her husband William for
their courage, devotion, and selfless efforts. This is a significant
issue which Congress should address as promptly as possible.
58a
Appendix C
v. Secretary of HHS, 892 F.2d 15, 16 (2d Cir.
1989) (failure to file timely objection to Magistrate
Judge’s recommended ruling may preclude
further appeal to the Second Circuit).
Dated this 25th day of April, 2006, at New Haven,
Connecticut.
s/ Joan Glazer Margolis
United States Magistrate Judge
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