Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Collier v. Astrue (No. 06-1343)

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IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

CLAIRE G. COLLIER,

Petitioner,

U.

JO ANNE B. BARNHART,

Respondent.

On PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES CourRT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

RICHARD F. Hans

Counsel of Record

THACHER ProrrFitt & Woon LLP

Two Financial Center

New York, NY 10281

(212) 912-7400

JOHN VUKELJ

DLA Piper US LLP

1251 Avenue of the Americas

New York, NY 10020

(212) 335-4500

Counsel for Petitioner

CCUNSEL PRESS

(800) 274-3321 + (800) 359-6859

i

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

A provision of the Social Security Act and its

accompanying regulations, known together as the

“20/40 Rule,” provide that an applicant for Social

Security Disability Insurance (“SSDI”) above the age

of 31 must have worked 20 of the previous 40 quarters

(i.e., five of the last ten years) to qualify for SSDI.

42 U.S.C. § 423(c)(1); 20 C.F.R. § 404.130(b).

Qualifying for SSDI is a prerequisite for being eligible

for Medicare if the applicant is under 65. 42 U.S.C.

§ 426(b).

1. Does the 20/40 Rule, which renders most

women who leave the work force to raise their

children ineligible for SSDI, invidiously discriminate

against mothers and thereby violate equal protection

under the Fifth Amendment?

2. Does the 20/40 Rule’s formula for determining

eligibility for SSDI violate due process under the

Fifth Amendment where the formula is arbitrary and

results in most women who leave the work force to

raise their children being rendered ineligible for

Social Security Disability Insurance?

li

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

The petitioner is Claire G. Collier, who lives in

Stamford, Connecticut with her husband and three

children.

The respondent is Jo Anne B. Barnhart,

Commissioner of the United States Social Security

Administration.

Th

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTIONS PRESENEED 2. cceesicssses

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING .........

WARS OP CAPPUR o e itv eve een

TARE OF APPEND 6 i ccicicccucvens

Ot SERRE MAT cen cesadvwevesees ener

BS Se ear re rope emmaereaR neers

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY

PROVISIONS INVOLVED .............

SIATEMENT OF THE CASE .........20..

A. Pactual Background ........ 22sec.

S. Procedural Mistery 5... ce vcc cnn’

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE

ee RE 3s hk ile oe ea ex

I. THE 20/40 RULE DENIES WOMEN

EQUAL PROTECTION UNDER THE

PEP STE AILPMENT, cede cence:

A. The 20/40 Rule Has A Disparate

And Disproportionate Impact On

WR es ech bee ae ees

Page

1]

12

iv

Contents

B. The 20/40 Rule Invidiously

Discriminates Against Women

Because It Is Predicated On Women

Of Child-Bearing Age Leaving The

oo er ere eee

II. THE 20/40 RULE VIOLATES MRS.

COLLIER’S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS

UNDER THE FIFTH AMENDMENT.

2 2 2S eS Oe: So 2S. OC SS OOO tO aS 2-8 SF Re Se Fee

Page

15

TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES

CASES

Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 97 S. Ct.

WUT oa ce hoes ow ewe ewe te eas

Collier v. Barnhart, 473 F.3d 444 (2d Cir.

ee eae el

er eee

Ellis v. Apfel, 147 F.3d 139 (2d Cir. 1998) ...

Harvell v. Chater, 87 F.3d 371 (9th Cir. 1996)

Pe re BO iO OP ee OO Be Se € EOS Sa 2 6 8 ee OS. 8

Hesse v. Harris, No. 78 C 5176, 1980 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 10122 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 31, 1980) ....

Hurvich v. Califano, 457 F. Supp. 760 (N.D.

Se NE i 9 05h 6 binds ncn dae ee

Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78, 92 S. Ct.

pS EE oh A Riageepiarniens pe aeeiect Meg ney nice eer akc hei re:

Tuttle v. Secretary of Health, Education &

Welfare, 504 F.2d 61 (10th Cir. 1974) .....

Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975)

Page

lz, IS

IS, 2a

11

20

EDA LE ke TROL EN ee EN LE ee 17, 18, 25

Winger v. Barnhart, 320 F. Supp. 2d 741

te 6S ic eR eas

20, 21

vi

Cited Authorities

Page

STATUTES

PRP RROEED Nc kot adineserecenedes 1

( Roe (ae | > PEPE e REECE TT CR ete passim

gtk eet Co |) Beemer rari i, 2, 12

WETS BI koa ve ee eden goees coe: i, 6, 11

REGULATIONS

a ec POE Ge es neewceieiaciusgees i, 23

LEGISLATIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE

MATERIALS

145 Conc. Rec. § $5587 (May 19, 1999) ..... 23

The Future of Aging: Hearing before the S.

Spec. Comm. on Aging, 109th Cong.

(February 3, 2005) (statement of Douglas

Holtz-Eakin, Director of Cong. Budget

RS ee a Sawn kd be ae Se des 19

H.R. Rep. No. 76-278 (1939) .............. 18

H.R. Rep. No. 106-1019 (2000) ............ 22

vil

Cited Authorities

Page

Revised Medical Criteria for Evaluating

Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis, 68 Fed. Reg.

Dh OU PE ile CAO nv e's cc vacvviass 23

S. Rep. No. 83-1987 (1954), reprinted in 1954

Rie UE oo oo ee ea 17, 25

SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, PUBLICATION

No. 05-10127, ICN 480067, Wuat Every

WoMAN SHOULD KNow: SoctAL SECURITY AND

Topay’s Woman (April 2003) ............. 15

Social Security Improvements for Women,

Seniors, and Working Americans: Hearing

Before the Subcomm. on Social Security of

the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 107th Cong.

(February 28, 2002) (testimony of Jo Anne

Barnhart, Comm’r of Social Security

FOES 5 soca eee a 16

OTHER AUTHORITIES

Matthew H. Hawes, So No Damn Politician

Can Ever Scrap It: The Constitutional

Protection of Social Security Benefits,

65 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 865, 877 (2004) ....... 18

Samuel Issacharoff & Elyse Rosenblum,

Women & the Workplace: Accommodating the

Demands of Pregnancy, 94 Co.um. L. Rev.

BE UT LEONE hc Kab ooh eee eke ee as 13

vill

Cited Authorities

Jerry A. Jacobs & Janice Fanning Madden,

Mommies & Daddies on the Fast Track:

Success of Parents in Demanding

Professions, 596 ANNALS Am. AcaD. POL. &

Soc. Sci. 246, 250 (2004). 00 0 eee

Olivia S. Mitchell & John W. R. Phillips,

Eligibility for Social Security Disability

Insurance (Univ. of Mich. Retirement

Research Ctr., Working Paper WP 2001-011,

RO 2 SSS eee

Page

13

ix

TABLE OF APPENDICES

Page

Appendix A — Opinion Of The United States

Court Of Appeals For The Second Circuit

greene senuery 4.2007 ............85. la

Appendix B — Ruling On Plaintiff's Objections

To The Magistrate Judge’s Recommended

Ruling Of The United States District Court

For The District Of Connecticut Filed July

ee an sy a'viw Ose we 10a

Appendix C — Recommended Ruling Of The

United States District Court For The

District Of Connecticut Dated And Filed

April 25, 2006

1

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Claire G. Collier respectfully petitions for a writ

of certiorari to review the judgment of the United

States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in this

case.

OPINIONS BELOW

The Opinion of the Court of Appeals is reported

at 473 F.3d 444 and is reprinted in the Appendix to

the Petition (“Pet. App.”) at la. The District Court's

opinion is reprinted at Pet. App. 10a and is not

otherwise published. The unreported recommended

ruling by the Magistrate Judge in the District Court

is reprinted at Pet. App. 32a and is not otherwise

published.

JURISDICTION

The Court of Appeals entered its judgment on

January 4, 2007. This Court has jurisdiction under

28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY

PROVISIONS INVOLVED

The Fifth Amendment to the United States

Constitution provides, in pertinent part:

No person shall ... be deprived of life,

liberty, or property, without due process of

law....

»

2

Section 223(c)(1) of the Social Security Act (the

“20/40 Rule”), 42 U.S.C. § 423 (c) (1), provides, in

pertinent part:

An individual shall be insured for disability

insurance benefits in any month if —

(A) he would have been a fully

insured individual (as defined in

section 414 of this title) had he

attained age 62 and filed

application for benefits under

section 402(a) of this title on the

first day of such month, and

(B) (i) he had not less than

20 quarters of coverage during the

40-quarter period which ends with

the quarter in which such month

occurred, or

(ii) if such month ends before

the quarter in which he attains (or

would attain) age 31, not less than

one-half (and not less than 6) of the

quarters during the period ending

with the quarter in which such

month occurred and beginning

after he attained the age of 21 were

quarters of coverage, or (if the

number of quarters in such period

is less than 12) not less than 6 of

the quarters in the 12-quarter

period ending with such quarter

were quarters of coverage, or

3

(iii) in the case of an individual

(not otherwise insured under

clause (i)) who, by reason of section

416(i)(3)(B)(ii) of this title, had a

prior period of disability that

began during a period before the

quarter in which he or she attained

age 31, not less than one-half of the

quarters beginning after such

individual attained age 21 and

ending with the quarter in which

such month occurs are quarters of

coverage, or (if the number of

quarters in such period is less than

12) not less than 6 of the quarters

in the 12-quarter period ending

with such quarter are quarters of

coverage....

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The crux of this case is the suitability of the

20/40 Rule of the Social Security Act for determining

women’s eligibility for Medicare benefits. Adopted

in 1954, the 20/40 Rule relies on a formula the intent

and impact of which is to deny SSDI and Medicare

benefits to a disproportionate number of women after

they have contributed substantial amounts to both

funds through tax payments.

A. Factual Background

1. Mrs. Collier is a 44-year-old mother of three

children, ages 12, 10, and 9. She and her husband

William had their first child, Kieran, in September

1994; their second child, Bridget, in May 1996; and

their third child, Leah, in July 1997.

4

2. Mrs. Collier worked continuously from 1979

through August 1994; she did not stop working until

she was eight months pregnant with her first child.

At ail times during her employment from 1979

through 1994, Mrs. Collier paid Social Security and

Medicare taxes, and her various employers paid

Social Security and Medicare taxes on her behalf. In

total, Mrs. Collier and her employers contributed a

total of almost $40,000 in Social Security taxes and

almost $10,000 in Medicare taxes on her behalf. From

2000 through 2002, Mrs. Collier performed part time

work as a teacher's aide an J was an active volunteer

at the school her children were attending. She and

her employers paid Social Security and Medicare

taxes on her behalf in 2000 and 2002.

3. In the spring of 2003, Mrs. Collier started

feeling strange physical sensations, including

twitching in her arms and cramping in her calves.

When the symptoms persisted and gradually

worsened, Mrs. Collier visited her doctor who in turn

referred her to a series of specialists. One by one,

her doctors eliminated the potential ailments. With

the list of possibilities shrinking, Mrs. Collier found

herself praying for cancer, anything treatable,

instead of something worse. By the fall of 2003, Mrs.

Collier's worst fear was confirmed; she was diagnosed

with amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (“ALS”), commonly

known as Lou Gehrig's Disease.

4. ALS is a progressively and rapidly debilitating

and devastating neuromuscular disease characterized

by a rapid degeneration of the nerve cells of the brain

and spinal cord, leading to the wasting of muscles,

paralysis and eventual death. Within three years of

diagnosis, ALS victims typically lose movement in every

a

muscle in their body, become unable to speak, and

lose the ability to swallow or breathe without complex

machinery. Certain augmenting breathing devices

may be employed in the short term to assist an

individual with ALS. However, the period of

effectiveness of such devices is limited. Eventually,

an individual with ALS is on a ventilator and feeding

tube, requiring round-the-clock medical supervision.

Barring a medical breakthrough, artificial life

support or divine intervention, most ALS victims will

die within five years of the onset of symptoms.

Present treatment is aimed at symptomatic relief,

prevention of complications, and maintenance of

optimal function and quality of life. There is no

known cure.

9. ALS treatment imposes a crushing economic

burden. As a result of her ALS symptoms, Mrs.

Collier has been unable to secure or perform gainful

or otherwise substantial employment. To date, Mrs.

Collier and her family have incurred and continue

to incur substantial, catastrophic costs in her

treatment and the maintenance of her condition,

having expended more than $500,000 within almost

three years. These expenditures include, but are not

limited to: (a) a specially designed hospital bed

costing $9,712.40; (b) a custom-fitted strap-on vest

to help Mrs. Collier breathe and break up and expel

mucous through her respiratory system, costing

approximately $16,000; (c) home modifications

costing over $150,000 to allow for movement of

Mrs. Collier in her home; (d) $200,000 in costs to

reallocate and modify the Colliers’s existing home

living space following the home modifications; (e) a

unique, customized wheelchair costing $24,877.40;

(f) a specially modified van to transport Mrs. Collier

6

in her customized wheelchair costing $54,184; and

(g) special leg braces and splints costing over $500

each. Mrs. Collier's current monthly care

expenditures include: (a) between $1,000 and $2,000

per month for various medications; (b) doctor

prescribed physical therapy costing over $800 per

month; (c) over $800 in costs for in-home massage

therapy; and (d) approximately $6,000 a month for

around-the-clock home healthcare. Her home

healthcare costs have only continued to spiral out of

control and it is anticipated that her nursing costs

alone this calendar year will exceed $500,000.

Furthermore, Mrs. Collier's local municipality has

required that all modifications to her home, which

are necessary to accommodate her wheelchair and

inability to climb stairs, comply with the Americans

with Disabilities Act. The added costs of compliance

are substantial.

6. Following her diagnosis, doctors told Mrs.

Collier that Medicare should offset much of the

catastrophic costs. Mrs. Collier later learned,

however, that because she was not yet 62, in order

to receive Medicare benefits she had to establish

qualification to receive Social Security disability

benefits. 42 U.S.C. § 426(b).

B. Procedural History

1. Mrs. Collier applied for SSDI in January 2004.

On February 1, 2004, the Social Security

Administration (“SSA”) denied Mrs. Collier’s SSDI

application on the grounds that she had insufficient

recent work credits to qualify. The following

month, in March 2004, Mrs. Collier applied for

reconsideration of the SSA's initial denial of Social

7

Security disability benefits. Nearly six months later,

in September 2004, the SSA denied her request for

reconsideration.

In accordance with the requirement that she

exhaust all administrative remedies, Mrs. Collier

requested and appeared at a hearing before an

Administrative Law Judge on March 14, 2005. Ina

ruling dated June 10, 2005, the Administrative Law

Judge denied Mrs. Colliér’s claim and held that she

“was not under a disability as defined in the Social

Security Act, at any time through the date of this

decision.” (quoted in part in Pet. App., at 36a n.6.)

The Administrative Law Judge added:

It is clear that ALS has taken a great toll

on [Mrs. Collier's] physical and mental

health, and on her family and finances.

[Mrs. Collier] has fought courageously

against the disease and has done

everything possible to continue in her role

as a wife and mother. Her personal story is

compelling, and her ongoing efforts to raise

her children despite the disease merit

admiration.

By letter dated June 17, 2005, Mrs. Collier

requested permission from the SSA to file an

expedited appeal of the Administrative Law Judge’s

decision. On August 25, 2005, the SSA’s Appeals

Council denied her request for review, thereby

exhausting Mrs. Collier’s administrative remedies.

2. On October 28, 2005, Mrs. Collier filed a

complaint against the Commissioner in the United

States District Court for the District of Connecticut.

8

Pursuant to a court order, on January 26, 2006,

Mrs. Collier moved for summary judgment seeking

an order ruling that the 20/40 Rule is

unconstitutional. On February 22, 2006, the

Commissioner cross-moved for an order affirming the

decision of the SSA. On April 25, 2006, Magistrate

Judge Joan Glazer Margolis issued a recommended

ruling denying Mrs. Collier’s motion for summary

judgment and affirming the decision of the

Commissioner. (Pet. App., at 32a.) On July 17, 2006,

the District Court approved and adopted the

recommended ruling, offering three bases in support

of its ruling. (Pet. App., at 10a.)

First, the District Court confirmed the SSA's

determination that Mrs. Collier was not fully insured *

and, therefore, not eligible for disability benefits

under the 20/40 Rule of the Social Security Act,

notwithstanding her extensive work history and

considerable contributions to the Social Security and

Medicare systems.

Second, although it found compelling a number

of studies cited by Mrs. Collier that indicate that the

20/40 Rule consistently excludes women from

collecting benefits after they have made substantial

contributions to the Social Security and Medicare

systems, che District Court nonetheless held that the

20/40 Rule of the Social Security Act does not violate

Mrs. Collier’s Equal Protection rights under the Fifth

Amendment. The District Court accepted the

Commissioner's assertion that the 20/40 Rule serves

the “legitimate goals of creating a self-sufficient

socia! security system and seeks to provide

protections for workers in the economy.” (Pet. App.,

at 3a-4a).

9

Third, the District Court denied Mrs. Collier's

Due Process claim, holding that the 20/40 Rule is

rationally related to Congress's alleged intent to

create a self-supporting Social Security system. The

Court rejected Mrs. Collier's arguments that the

20/40 Rule undermines Congress's overarching intent

that the Social Security system provide for “the

family as a unit” and that the 20/40 Rule conflicts

with recent efforts by Congress and the Social

Security Administration to provide easier access to

Social Security and Medicare benefits to ALS victims.

3. On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed the

District Court's ruling. (Pet. App., at 1a.) Denying

the Equal Protection claim, the court found

“persuasive” and “compelling” evidence on the record

that the 20/40 Rule disparately impacts women’s

eligibility for SSDI, but it found no evidence that

Congress was motivated by an “invidious

discriminatory purpose” in enacting the 20/40 Rule.

Accordingly, the court held that the 20/40 Rule

satisfies the rational review test. Denying the

substantive Due Process claim, the court held that

the classification created by the 20/40 Rule was not

“patently arbitrary.” The court also held that there

was no evidence of a procedural Due Process

violation.

At oral argument, the Second Circuit referred to

Mrs. Collier's plight as “a matter of human tragedy”

and noted that Mrs. Collier has advocated for

legislative reform of the 20/40 Rule. The Court noted

that Senator Christopher J. Dodd and Representative

Christopher Shays have introduced the “Claire

Collier Social Security Disability Insurance Fairness

Act,” which would make the 20/40 Rule inapplicable

‘in the case of a disabled individual suffering from a

covered terminal illness.”

10

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

The constitutionality of the 20/40 Rule is an

important question of federal law that has not, and

should be, settled by this Court. It impacts untold

numbers of unknowing families in which mothers had

once worked and contributed to the Social Security

system only to be left without government aid

precisely in their greatest moment of need. Surely,

such a cruel result should not be imposed by the

nation’s Social Security laws or endorsed by this

Court.

There is no valid or legitimate government

objective served by denying terminally ill individuals

access to Medicare simply because they do not first

qualify for SSDI. The courts below have focused on

what they have found to be the legitimate objectives

of creating barriers to access to SSDI. Yet none have

ever articulated a legitimate objective for applying

that same barrier to access for the terminally ill to

Medicare. The laws already carve out exceptions for

certain illnesses, such as blindness and end-stage

renal disease, allowing such persons access to

Medicare without first qualifying for SSDI. What

legitimate government interest is served by

permitting access to some, but then restricting access

to Medicare for those whose terminal condition is

beyond question? As it stands, the law leaves women

who have contributed significantly to the Social

Security system and who leave the workforce to bear

and raise their children without assistance in those

harrowing times they most need the societal safety

net of Medicare.

11

Moreover, drawing an arbitrary 20/40 line does

not lend legitimacy to the government’s claim that

the system is designed to be self-supporting. What

the law does, however, is single out women who, after

paying Social Security and Medicare taxes for years,

choose to stop for a time to raise their children. In

the case of Mrs. Collier, the 20/40 Rule creates a

system in which she would have been eligible for

benefits if she had been diagnosed with ALS five

years earlier. The law therefore imposes a patently

arbitrary and defenseless classification, without

rational justification. Such a law violates Mrs.

Collier's rights to equal protection and due process

under the Fifth Amendment.

I. THE 20/40 RULE DENIES WOMEN

EQUAL PROTECTION UNDER THE FIFTH

AMENDMENT.

The denial of benefits to Mrs. Collier

unconstitutionally discriminates against her and any

other women who, after materially contributing to

the Social Security and Medicare Trust Funds, elect

to stay at home and engage in raising their children.

A statutory classification in the area of social

welfare violates Equal Protection if it is not rationally

based, and it must “not engage in invidious

discrimination.” Ellis v. Apfel, 147 F.3d 139, 144 (2d

Cir. 1998); Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78, 81.

92 S. Ct. 254 (1971). Under the current rules

governing Medicare, a person under the age of 65

diagnosed with ALS is entitled to Medicare benefits

only if eligible for and entitled to receive SSDI

benefits. 42 U.S"C. § 426 (b). SSDI, in turn, is

available to an individual making a disability claim

iz

who has been employed at least 20 out of the

40 quarters preceding the quarter in which the

applicant's disability occurs. 42 U.S.C. § 423 (a) (1),

(c)(1); Harvell v. Chater, 87 F.3d 371, 372 (9th Cir.

1996) (denying challenge to the 20/40 Rule where the

plaintiff had not contributed Social Security taxes

in 31 years because he was a federal employee and,

as such, was entitled to a retirement pension under

a separate federal mandate).

A. The 20/40 Rule Has A Disparate And

Disproportionate Impact On Women.

A law violates the Equal Protection clause where

the discriminatory effects of a “facially neutral”

action bear a close relationship to a purported “non-

invidious purpose.” See, e.g., De La Cruz v. Tormey,

582 F.2d 45, 51-53 (9th Cir. 1978) (holding that

community colleges’ failure to establish childcare

facilities violated equal protection rights of women

because it resulted in a substantial number of women

being denied educational opportunities on an unequal

basis). In De La Cruz, the Ninth Circuit Court of

Appeals held that:

[aJs with facial discriminations, decisions

or actions which, while in form

nondiscriminatory, produce effects which

weigh adversely and disproportionately

upon the members of a particular protected

group of individuals, may require

explanation in terms of non-invidious

purpose.

Id. at 50.

13

The courts below found compelling various

Studies and statistics that demonstrate the disparate

and disproportional impact of the 20/40 Rule. Studies

have shown that “women with professional degrees

are out of the labor force at a rate about three times

that of their male counterparts and they

overwhelmingly cite family responsibilities as the

reason.”' In its effect, therefore, the 20/40 Rule

penalizes women between the ages of 31 and 41 who

Stay at home to care for their children and thus are

unable to work at least five of the previous ten years,

notwithstanding prior work history. See, e.g., De La

Cruz, 582 F.2d at 51-53 (holding that community

colleges’ failure to establish childcare facilities

violated equal protection rights of women because it

resulted in a substantial number of women being

denied educational opportunities on an unequal

basis).

For example, an applicant age 31 who worked

from age 21 through 26 and paid into Social Security

and Medicare for five years would be entitled to SSDI

and Medicare benefits under the 20/40 Rule.

Conversely, an applicant age 41, such as the Plaintiff

here when she was diagnosed with ALS, having

' Jerry A. Jacobs & Janice Fanning Madden, Mommies

& Daddies on the Fast Track: Success of Parents in

Demanding Professions, 596 ANNALS Am. ACAD. Pot. & Soc.

Sci. 246, 250 (2004). Another study “revealed surprising

Similarity in the wage profiles of single males and single

females, but found that with time and marriage (with

childbirth presumably strongly correlated with both the

passage of time and marital status), the wage patterns

diverged as a result of the discontinuous labor force

participation of women.” Samuel Issacharoff & Elyse

Rosenblum, Women & the Workplace: Accommodating the

Demands of Pregnancy, 94 Covum. L. Rev. 2154, 2160 (1994).

14

worked and thus contributed to Social Security and

Medicare from age 18 through 34 (a-period of

seyenteen years), would not be eligible for SSDI

or Medicare. Thus, it is clear that the recency

requirements imposed by the 20/40 Rule become more

onerous with age, ironically making it more — not

less — difficult to receive Medicare or SSDI benefits

the closer one is to the respective qualifying ages of

62 or 65.

Several studies further demonstrate the

disparate and discriminatory impact of the 20/40

Rule and its recency requirements. Rates of SSDI

coverage for women in their 30's and early 40's are

nearly 20% lower than that for men of comparable

age. Not only are women less likely to be insured,

but married women in particular are 10% less likely

to be covered than single women. In sum, the current

studies have found that “[flamily structure seems to

play an important role in the insured status of women

but has little effect for men. It appears that marriage

and childbearing, in this cohort of workers at least,

make women more susceptible to losing [disability]

insurance coverage than men.”’ Accordingly, the

recency requirements of the Social Security disability

laws represent a substantial barrier to Medicare

eligibility for women who take time off from the

workforce in order to care for and raise their children.

The result is the removal of Medicare's social safety

net out from under Mrs. Collier and all women

charged by society with the responsibility of bearing,

nurturing and caring for our children.

2 Olivia S. Mitchell & John W. R. Phillips, Eligibility

for Social Security Disability Insurance 11 (Univ, of Mich.

Retirement Research Ctr., Working Paper WP 2001-011,

2001), available at http://www.mrrc.isr.umich.edu/

publications/papers/pdf/wp01 1.pdf.

15

B. The 20/40 Rule Invidiously Discriminates

Against Women Because It Is Predicated

On Women Of Child-Bearing Age Leaving

The Workforce.

Despite the 20/40 Rule’s undisputed discriminatory

effect on women, the courts below held that the purpose

behind the 20/40 Rule is not invidious because the

purported primary purpose behind the Rule is to

maintain a “self-sufficient” Social Security system. The

SSA's public representations, however, reveal that the

Social Security Act contemplates and relies upon the

fact that women between the ages of 31 and 41 years of

age will leave the workforce to have and raise children

after having contributed Social Security and Medicare

taxes. In an April 2003 Electronic Booklet entitled

“What Every Woman Should Know: Social Security and

Today’s Woman,” the SSA stated:

Although some women choose lifetime

careers outside the home, many women work

for a few years, leave the labor force to raise

their children, and then return to work. Some

women choose not to work outside their

homes. They usually are covered by Social

Security through their husbands’ work and

can receive benefits when he retires, becomes

disabled or dies,

See SociaL SEcuRITY ADMINISTRATION, PUBLICATION No.

05-10127, ICN 480067, WHat Every Woman SHOULD

Know: SociaAL SecurITY AND Topay’s WomMAN (April

2003), available at http://www.ssa.gov/pubs/

10127.html. Furthermore, on February 28, 2002,

Commissioner Barnhart testified on Social Security

reform efforts before the Subcommittee on Social

Security, Ways and Means Committee and noted that

16

“women tend to have shorter careers, and, when they

do work, earn less than men,” and she advocated

“incremental changes ... targeted to address

concerns affecting ... women... (which) deal with

time limits in the law that are no longer appropriate

or that should allow exceptions.” See Social Security

Improvements for Women, Seniors, and Working

Americans: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Social

Security of the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 107th

Cong. (February 28, 2002) (testimony of Jo Anne

Barnhart, Comm’r of Social Security Admin.)

available at http://www.ssa.gov/legislation/

testimony_022802.html. With respect to these time

limits, Commissioner Barnhart recognized that “for

the women affected, these changes would make a

substantial difference in their economic security.” Id.

Despite the Commissioner's recommendations, the

20/40 Rule in fact fails to recognize the contributions

of women who have worked and contributed

substantially to the Social Security and Medicare

programs prior to becoming homemakers. And by the

SSA's own admission, the 20/40 Rule acts to render

women dependent on their husbands’ Social Security

benefits. Accordingly, the Commissioner's and SSA's

statements reveal that the 20/40 Rule does not

promote a “self-supporting” system at all. Instead, it

relies on the tax contributions from women who will

be incapable of fulfilling the Rule’s recency

requirements and, thereby, may never collect under

the system. In consideration of its impact and its

purpose, the 20/40 Rule should be held

unconstitutional for denying Mrs. Collier equal

protection in violation of the Fifth Amendment to

the United States Constitution.

17

The courts below rejected Mrs. Collier's claim

that the 20/40 Rule, in having a disparate and

discriminatory impact on women, undercuts the

primary purpose behind the Rule: to protect and

provide for the family. Instead, the lower courts opted

to perpetuate the myths advanced by the SSA that

the Social Security system is “self-supporting” and

designed to “‘afford protection to working members

of the nation’s economy.” Even if the Social Security

system were “self-supporting,” which it is not, its

Status as such necessarily depends on the assurance

that its female contributors ultimately will leave the

work force and be precluded from obtaining benefits.

Furthermore, the alleged goal of “afford[ing]

protection to the working members of the nation’s

economy” is similarly untenable considering that

someone like Mrs. Collier, who worked and

contributed to the system for fifteen consecutive

years before having her children, has been left

without Social Security benefits. Indeed, the 20/40

Rule undermines the Social Security system's

overarching goal of supporting families in times of

need.

The primary goal of the Social Security system

is to create “[a] basic program of contributory old-

age and survivors insurance (to provide for) the

economic security of American families.” S. Rep. No.

83-1987, at 1 (1954), as reprinted in 1954

U.S.C.C.A.N. 3710, 3710. This Court has recognized

and upheld Congress's clear intent, repeatedly

holding that the amendments to the Social Security

Act of 1939 were designed “‘to afford more adequate

protection to the family as a unit.” Weinberger v.

Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 643-44 (1975) (quoting H.R.

18

Rep. No. 76-278, at 7 (1939)) (emphasis added); see

also Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 209, 97 S.

Ct. 1021 (1977) (“Social Security is designed . . . for

the protection of the family’ ....”) (quoting

Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. at 654 (Powell, J., concurring));

Hurvich v. Califano, 457 F. Supp. 760, 763 (N.D. Cal.

1978) (“The purpose behind § 402 (g), as revealed by

its legislative history, is to provide children who have

lost a parent with the personal attention of the other

parent by enabling the survivor to stay at home and

care for the children.”). The 20/40 Rule bears no

rational relationship to this goal. In fact, the Rule

cuts against the stated objective, since it discourages

women from leaving the work force to fulfill the

demands of motherhood.

As any contributor to the Social Security system

can attest, the notion that the Social Security Act

creates a “self-supporting” system strains credulity.

It has been noted that “[d]espite being advertised as

a self-perpetuating social insurance plan, the Social

Security system has been at risk since its inception.”*

Legislators have preferred “to maintain a ‘self-

supporting’ system — at least in common expectation.”*

Moreover, recent reports expose the fiction of a

self-sustaining system. Efforts to reform the Social

Security system, as a means of averting an impending

3 Matthew H. Hawes, So No Damn Politician Can Ever

Scrap It: The Constitutional Protection of Social Security

Benefits, 65 U. Pit. L. Rev. 865, 877 (2004) (“[T]he founders

knew the program would not remain solvent and estimated

that government contributions would be necessary as early

as 1967 in order to stave off the plan's collapse.”)

4 Id. at pp. 877-78 (emphasis added).

19

collapse, have received the highest attention from

the government and the news media. The Director

of the Congressional Budget Office (“CBO”) recently

reported that the Social Security program “cannot

be sustained without continual — and substantial —

injections of funds from the rest of the budget.”®

The CBO has predicted that “under current law .. .

the Social Security trust funds would become

exhausted in 2052; after that, the Social Security

Administration would lack the authority to pay full

benefits and, without Congressional action, outlays

would be limited to annual revenues, which would

be 22 percent lower than scheduled costs.”6

The record is wholly deficient of any proof that

the SSDI program is practically self-sufficient, nor

does it proffer any documentary evidence or

Statistical analysis that the 20/40 Rule in fact

Supports a goal of self-sufficiency or that the

eradication of the 20/40 Rule would materially

undermine that goal. Indeed, the SSA has offered no

evidence that the requirement of twenty quarters of

coverage furthers the goal of self-sufficiency any more

than would 15, 10 or even 5.

° The Future of Aging: Hearing before the S. Spec.

Comm. on Aging, 109th Cong. 4 (February 3, 2005)

(statement of Douglas Holtz-Eakin, Director of Cong. Budget

Office) (“What is not sustainable is continuing to provide

the present level of scheduled benefits (those based on the

benefit formulas that exist today) given the present

financing. Under current formulas, outlays for scheduled

benefits are projected to exceed available revenues

indefinitely after about 2020.”)

* Id: at p. 7.

20

Lower courts in various jurisdictions have

addressed the constitutionality of the 20/40 Rule, but

they are distinguishable because none of them have

addressed the Rule’s disparate impact on women or,

in particular, mothers who have made significant

contributions to Social Security before leaving the

workforce to bear and raise children. For example,

in Tuttle v. Secretary of Health, Education & Welfare,

the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the

appellant’s claim that the 20/40 Rule created an

unconstitutional classification based on earnings. 504

F.2d 61, 63 (10th Cir. 1974). In Harvell v. Chater,

the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the

appellant's claim that the 20/40 Rule violated his due

process rights because he was fully-insured under

the statute but not under the recency requirements

of the 20/40 Rule. 87 F.3d 371, 372-73 (9th Cir. 1996)

(agreeing with the Tenth Circuit's holding and

rationale in Tuttle). Similarly, in Hesse v. Harris, a

nearly 30-year-old decision from the Northern

District of Illinois, the plaintiff challenged the

constitutionality of the 20/40 Rule after she was

denied disability benefits for failing to meet the

requirement of “one covered quarter per calendar

year.” No. 78 C 5176, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10122,

at *2 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 31, 1980). The court rejected the

plaintiff's claim that the 20/40 Rule created an

improper classification based on age because

individuals over 31 years had to meet the two-fold

test of the 20/40 Rule. Id. at *1-2.

Winger v. Barnhart is distinguishable as well.

There the United States District Court for the

Central District of Illinois declined to hold that the

constitutional rights of a husband and son of a

deceased homemaker were violated by the

21

Commissioner’s denial of survivor's Social Security

benefits based on the fact that the decedent had not

worked a sufficient amount of time. The decedent

cleared the first hurdle under the 20/40 Rule because

she had not worked a sufficient number of continuous

quarters. 320 F. Supp. 2d 741, 743 (C.D. Ill. 2004).

Here, Ms. Collier had worked and been fully insured

for years. Significantly, the Winger court indicated

that the plaintiffs burden of proof in challenging

the constitutionality of the 20/40 Rule is not

insurmountable. The court stated that the plaintiffs

had “failled] to identify any of the goals of the Social

Security system, or demonstrate how the quarters of

coverage system is incapable of achieving those

goals.” Id. at 746. Here, Mrs. Collier has presented,

and the District Court accepted, studies and data

demonstrating the 20/40 Rule's failure to achieve the

purported goals of self-sufficiency and protecting

workers. Moreover, as discussed supra, the 20/40

Rule is not rationally related to the overarching

purpose of supporting families but instead undercuts

that purpose.

In light of the foregoing, the 20/40 Rule should

be held unconstitutional for denying Mrs. Collier

equal protection in violation of the Fifth Amendment

to the United States Constitution.

Il. THE 20/40 RULE VIOLATES MRS.

COLLIER’S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS

UNDER THE FIFTH AMENDMENT.

Mrs. Collier and her family receive no Social

Security or Medicare assistance as a result of the

20/40 Rule, notwithstanding the fact that Mrs.

Collier and her employers paid nearly $50,000 in

22

Social Security and Medicare taxes during the 18

calendar years in which she was employed. This

result is unjust and cruel, and it runs contrary to

the policies underlying the Social Security and

Medicare systems in general and, in particular, as

they have been amended to otherwise specifically

accommodate victims of ALS.

For example, the ALS Treatment and Assistance

Act of 2000 waived Medicare's two-year waiting

period for ALS patients so that an individual

diagnosed with the disease would be entitled. to

receive Medicare benefits the very same month that

he or she is entitled to receive disability benefits. In

amending the Medicare statute, the House of

Representatives recognized that “ALS often

progresses at a rate that would make Medicare

coverage ineffective for this population if individuals

were forced to wait 24 months. This provision would

ensure individuals with ALS would be able to access

medical treatment through Medicare immediately."

H.R. Rep. No. 106-1019, at 36 (2000) (emphasis

added). The Senate's record of debate similarly

reflects that chamber’s acute concern for those

stricken with ALS:

Despite the short life expectancy of three

to five years, ALS patients must endure a

two year waiting period in order to receive*

Medicare services. Forcing ALS patients to

wait until the final months of their illness

defies common sense and human decency.

* * *

The immediacy of symptoms in ALS

patients and extremely short life

——.)

*:

a

23

expectancy illustrate the need to extend the

waiver for ALS. In addition, many ALS

victims have had productive lives and will

have paid into the Social Security system

well before the onset of ALS.

145 Conc. Rec. § $5587 (May 19, 1999) (statement of

Sen. Torricelli) (emphasis added).

In 2003, the SSA amended its regulations to

revise the criteria in the Listing of Impairments used

to evaluate ALS and added ALS to its “list of special

impairment categories.” The amendments allow the

SSA to make findings of presumptive disability with

respect to claims involving ALS. 20 C.F.R. Part 404.

Citing the 2000 amendments to the Medicare waiting

_ period and following Congress’s lead, the SSA stated

that “[t]hese rules will help people who are disabled

with ALS to qualify for Medicare sooner.”

We have decided that the simplest and fastest

way to process claims of individuals with ALS

without sacrificing the quality of our disability

determinations and decisions is to revise the listing

to provided that anyone who shows that he or she

has ALS, established by clinical and laboratory

findings, will be found disabled.

Revised Medical Criteria for Evaluating

Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis, 68 Fed. Reg. 51,689

(Aug. 28, 2003) (emphasis added). In issuing its final

rules, the SSA waived the Notice of Proposed

Rulemaking procedures calling for a 30-day notice

and comment period “because use of notice-and-

comment rulemaking procedures would be contrary

to the public interest. In light of the serious

24

consequences caused by ALS, ultimately, we find that

almost all people who apply for disability benefits

based on the condition are disabled.” 68 Fed. Reg.

51,692.’

The “public interest” to which the SSA referred,

and the changes in the rules “reflect{ing] ...

Congress’ judgment,” were expressed in the earlier

modifications to the Medicare waiting period rules:

The changes we are making in these rules

will also help to implement Congress’

judgment that individuals who are disabled

under title II of the Act based on ALS

should also receive immediate entitlement

to Medicare rather than having to wait 24

months. It is critical that we issue these

rules as soon as possible so that more people

can qualify as quickly as possible for

Medicare benefits and other services.

68 Fed. Reg. 51,692 (emphasis added). So keen was

the recognized public interest that the SSA also

“dispens[ed] with the 30-day delay in the effective

date of a substantive rule” as otherwise required by

law. That is, the rule changes were “effective upon

publication.” Id.

’ The SSA went so far as to boast that in calendar year

2002 it had granted 1,324 of 1,384 SSDI applications by those

stricken with ALS on initial review and then had granted

80% of the remaining applications on reconsideration. By

computation, this would appear to mean that only 12 of 1,384

applications were denied. It offers no further explanation

as to why it denied those applications or whether any of

those individuals were similarly situated with Mrs. Collier.

See 68 Fed. Reg. 51,691.

25

The instant action reveals that rather than serve

the statute’s underlying goals, the 20/40 Rule

undermines Congress's explicit, overarching intent

that Social Security and Medicare provide assistance

to families in need, and, in particular, to ALS victims

and their families. See S. Rep. No. 83-1987, at 1, as

reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3710, 3710 (1954):

H.R. Rep. No. 76-278 at 7 (1939); Goldfarb, 430 U.S.

at 209; Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. at 643; and Hurvich,

457 F. Supp. at 764. The SSA’s own “Social Security

Statement,” which is mailed periodically to Mrs.

Collier and every other contributor to Social Security,

highlights this very point by falsely making

promising proclamations, such as:

* “Social Security is for people of all ages

¢ “It's here to help you when you need it

most.”

* “Social Security may help you if you

become disabled — even at a young age.”

* “It is possible for a young person who

has worked and paid Social Security

taxes in as few as two years to become

eligible for disability benefits.”

These statements suggest the reader’s entitlement

— indeed her property interest ~ in the benefits of

Social Security. They create a false hope for the

reader because the 20/40 Rule operates to render

these promises meaningless, denying Mrs. Collier

due process by removing, without any reasonable or

rational basis, any possibility of achieving those

26

goals. Accordingly, the 20/40 Rule should be held

unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause of the

Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth herein, the petition for

writ of certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

RICHARD F. HANS

Counsel of Record

THACHER ProrFitr & Woop LLP

Two Financial Center

New York, NY 10281

(212) 912-7400

JOHN VUKELJ

DLA Pirer US LLP

1251 Avenue of the Americas

New York, NY 10020

(212) 335-4500

Counsel for Petitioner

APPENDIX

la

APPENDIX A — OPINION OF THE UNITED

STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

SECOND CIRCUIT DECIDED

JANUARY 4, 2007

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND CIRCUIT

August Term, 2006

Argued: December 12, 2006

Decided: January 4, 2007

Docket No. 06-3644-cv

CLAIRE G. COLLIER,

Petitioner,

sail oc

Jo ANNE B. BarNuarr,

| Respondent.

Before: FEINBERG, KATZMANN, Circuit Judges and

PauLey, District Judge.*

PER CURIAM:

We are called upon to address a matter of human

tragedy. Petitioner Claire Collier has amyotrophic

lateral sclerosis (ALS), more commonly known as Lou

" The Honorable William H. Pauley III, of the United

States District Court for the Southern District of New York,

sitting by designation.

2a

Appendix A

Gehrig's disease. She has suffered greatly from this

disease and, in addition to the physical pain, the

financial cost has been staggering. However, we are

compelled to conclude that the statute which guides

this Court’s review denies Collier Social Security

Disability Insurance (S SDI) and Medicare benefits

because she does not have the required recent work

history. Moreover, because petitioner cannot make

out a constitutional challenge to the recent work

history requirement, we must AFFIRM the district

court's adoption of the Magistrate Judge's

recommendation to deny petitioner’s motion for

summary judgment and grant respondent's motion

to affirm the denial of Social Security Disability

Insurance benefits to petitioner. We recognize the

difficulty petitioner has faced because of the eligibility

rules and, recognizing that we have no license to alter

the legislative scheme, note that a legislative solution

to petitioner’s concern may be appropriate.

I.

In the fall of 2003, Collier was diagnosed with

ALS. Since then Collier and her family have expended

more than $500,000 on special equipment and medical

care. To alleviate some of this financial burden, in

January 2004, petitioner applied for Social Security

Disability Insurance (SSDI), as that is the

prerequisite for Medicare eligibility for those under

65. 42 U.S.C. § 426(b).

The Social Security Administration denied

Collier’s application on February 1, 2004, as she had

insufficient recent work history to qualify for benefits.

3a

Appendix A

Specifically, the statute requires that.an applicant above

the age of 31 must have worked twenty of the previous

forty quarters (i.e., five of the last ten years) to qualify

for SSDI (“the 20/40 Rule”). 42 U.S.C. § 423(c)(1);

20 C.F.R. § 404.130(b). It is undisputed that Collier did

not have a recent work history as she left the paid

workforce in 1994, upon the birth of her first child.

Collier continued to be a stay-at-home mother through

the birth of her second and third children; she states

that “she always intended to return to the workforce,”

but wanted “to be a full-time mother while her children

were young.’ For fifteen consecutive years beforehand,

however, from 1979 through 1994, petitioner had

worked outside the home and, during that time, she

and her employers contributed over $40,000 in Social

Security and Medicare taxes.

After the initial denial, petitioner sought

additional review within the Social Security

Administration and her application was denied. She

then filed suit in the District of Connecticut. In her

October 28, 2005 complaint she argued that her

rights to due process and equal protection were

violated as the 20/40 rule discriminated against

women, who are more likely to leave the workforce to

parent full-time. Collier moved for summary

judgment on January 26, 2006, and, on February 22.

2006, the government cross-moved for an affirmance

of the agency's order. Magistrate Judge Joan Glazer

Margolis, on April 25, 2006, issued a Report &

Recommendation, recommending denial of Collier's

motion and affirmance of the underlying decision. The

District Court adopted this ruling on July 17, 2006,

finding that the 20/40 Rule survives rational basis

review because it serves the legitimate goals of

4a

Appendix A

ensuring that the Social Security system is self-

sufficient and limiting disability benefits to those

dependent on employment income.

II.

We review the constitutionality of a federal

statutory provision de novo. See Muller v. Costello,

187 F.3d 298, 307 (2d Cir.1999).

For those under 65, Medicare eligibility is set out

in 42 U.S.C. § 426(b). Section 426 provides that:

“every individual who ... is entitled to, and has for 24

calendar months been entitled to, ... disability

insurance benefits under section 423 of this title. . .

shall be entitled to hospital insurance benefits.”

Section 423 provides that an individual 31 or older

“shall be insured for disability insurance benefits in

any month if. . . he had not less than 20 quarters of

coverage during the 40-quarter period which ends

with the quarter in which such month occurred.” Id.

§ 423(c)(i). Similarly, the regulations provide that if

an applicant is 31 or older, not blind, and has not

suffered a period of disability before age 31, that

applicant “must meet the 20/40 requirement.” 20

C.F.R. § 404.130. It is undisputed that Collier did not

meet this statutory requirement.

The law is clear as to Collier's burden in claiming

an Equal Protection Clause violation:

When a statute gender-neutral on its face

is challenged on the ground that its effects

upon women are disproportionally adverse,

a twofold inquiry is . .. appropriate. The first

Sa

Appendix A

question is whether the statutory

Classification is ... indeed neutral in the

sense that it is not gender-based. If the

classification itself, covert [orJovert, is not

based upon gender, the second question is

whether the adverse effect reflects

invidious gender-based discrimination. In

this second inquiry, impact provides an

important starting point, but purposeful

discrimination is the condition that offends

the Constitution.

Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 274,

99 S.Ct. 2282, 60 L.Ed.2d 870 (1979) (internal

citations and quotation marks omitted); see also Back

v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 365

F.3d 107, 118 (2d Cir.2004) (“To make out... aclaim

[for gender discrimination under the Equal

Protection Clause], the plaintiff must prove that she

suffered purposeful or intentional discrimination on

the basis of gender.”). While Collier’s equal protection

claim is brought under the Fifth Amendment, the

“approach to Fifth Amendment equal protection

claims has always been precisely the same as to equal

protection claims under the Fourteenth Amendment.”

Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638 n. 2, 95

S.Ct. 1225, 43 L.Ed.2d 514 (1975): see also Adarand

Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 217-18, 235,

115 S.Ct. 2097, 132 L.Ed.2d 158 (1995).

Petitioner argues that the 20/40 Rule has a

disproportionate impact on women. There is

persuasive evidence in the record that “women with

professional degrees are out of the labor force at a

rate about three times that of their male counterparts

6a

Appendix A

and they overwhelmingly cite family responsibilities

as the reason,” Jerry A. Jacobs and Janice Fanning

Madden, Mommies & Daddies on the Fast Track:

Success of Parents in Demanding Professions, 596

Annals Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. 246, 250 (2004),

and that “marriage and childbearing . .. make women

more susceptible to losing [disability] insurance

coverage than men,” Olivia S. Mitchell & John W.R.

Phillips, Univ. Mich. Ret. Research Ctr., Eligibility

for Social Security Disability Insurance (2001). The

district court characterized this evidence as

“compelling,” Collier v. Barnhart, 05 Civ. 01677(PCD),

slip op. at 9n. 6 (D.Conn. July 24, 2006), and we agree.

However, as the district court correctly observed,

Supreme Court precedents dictate that disparate

impact is only a “starting point,” Feeney, 442 U.S. at

274, 99 S.Ct. 2282 (internal quotation marks omitted),

and petitioner must prove discriminatory purpose. See

Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 96 S.Ct. 2040, 48

L.Ed.2d 597 (1976) (holding that disparate impact is

insufficient for an Equal Protection Clause violation

claim); see also Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan

Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265-66, 97 S.Ct. 555,

50 L.Ed.2d 450 (1977) (“Proof of racially

discriminatory intent or purpose is required to show

a violation of the Equal Protection Clause[ |. . . [but]

Davis does not require a plaintiff to prove that the

challenged action rested solely on racially

discriminatory purposes. .. . [Courts must determine]

whether invidious discriminatory purpose was a

motivating factor. ...”).

It is here that petitioner’s argument fails, as she

has no evidence that Congress was motivated by an

“invidious discriminatory purpose” in enacting the 20/

Ta

Appendix A

40 Rule. At best, her evidence indicates a recognition

that women may suffer because of the 20/40 Rule.

However, we have held that “[t]he legislative

recognition of adverse impact does not suffice to imply

such a purpose; the requirement of purposeful

discrimination means that equal protection is not

violated unless the [challenged provision] was enacted

not ‘in spite of its adverse effect on the [identifiable

group] but rather because it would have that effect.”

Johnson v. Wing, 178 F.3d 611, 615 (2d Cir.1999); see

also Feeney, 442 U.S. at 279, 99 S.Ct. 2282.

Because petitioner has not demonstrated

invidious sex discrimination, we analyze the 20/40

Rule under rational basis review. Zalewska v. County

of Sullivan, New York 316 F.3d 314, 323 (2d Cir.2003).

As set forth by the Supreme Court, rational basis

review is satisfied where “there is a plausible policy

reason for the classification, the legislative facts on

which the classification is apparently based rationally

may have been considered to be true by the

governmental decisionmaker, and the relationship of

the classification to its goai is not so attenuated as to

render the distinction arbitrary or irrational.”

Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 11-12, 112 S.Ct. 2326,

120 L.Ed.2d 1 (1992) (internal citations omitted); see

also Tanov v. INS, 443 F.3d 195, 201 (2d Cir.2006).

Legislation need only meet a minimal threshold in

order to satisfy the rational review test. Here,

Congress indicated in legislative history that “it is

reasonable and desirable that there be reliable means

of limiting . . . protection to those persons who have

had sufficiently long and sufficiently recent covered

employment to indicate that they probably have been

dependent upon their earnings.” S.Rep. No. 05-2388,

8a

‘Appendix A

(1958), reprinted in 1958 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4218, 4229.

We cannot conclude that the 20/40 Rule does not meet

the minimal standard of rationality, as Congress could

_rationally choose to distribute a scarce resource

among those who both have contributed more

recently to the system and have indicated, by their

actions, that they are more dependent on the salaries

they draw from being employed. As a Court, we

observe that we have no authority to override

Congress's policy preference so as to substitute our

own views, whatever they might be, for those of

Congress.

Petitioner's due process claim fails for similar

reasons.

Congress has wide latitude to create

classifications that allocate noncontractual

benefits under a social welfare program. ...

Particularly when we deal with a

withholding of a noncontractual benefit

under a social welfare program such as

(Social Security), we must recognize that the

Due Process Clause can be thought to

interpose a bar only if the statute manifests

a patently arbitrary classification, utterly

lacking in rational justification.

Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 210,97 S.Ct. 1021,

51 L.Ed.2d 270 (1977) (internal citations and

quotation marks omitted, alteration in original). As

discussed earlier, this classification is not “patently

arbitrary.” To the extent petitioner alleges a

procedural due process violation, that too fails

because Collier does not allege that she was deprived

9a

Appendix A

of procedural protections, nor can she claim that she

is entitled to more than the statute explicitly

provides.

III.

Because there is no evidence of invidious sex

discrimination, and because the 20/40 Rule satisfies

rational basis scrutiny, we AFFIRM the District

Court's decision. We note, however, that Collier has

also advocated for legislative reform of the 20/40 Rule.

Both Senator Christopher J. Dodd and

Representative Christopher Shays have introduced

the “Claire Collier Social Security Disability

Insurance Fairness Act,” which would make the

20/40 rule inapplicable “in the case of a disabled

individual suffering from a covered terminal disease.”

S. 3839, 109th Cong. (2006); H.R. 6304, 109th Cong.

(2006). These proposals recognize that Congress, not

the courts, is the appropriate forum for any change

to the 20/40 Rule. While we as a Court are without

authority to provide the relief that petitioner seeks,

Congress can do so. Petitioner must turn to the

legislative branch to consider this issue of great

human consequence.

10a

APPENDIX B — RULING ON PLAINTIFF’S

OBJECTIONS TO THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S

RECOMMENDED RULING OF THE UNITED

STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

FILED JULY 24, 2006

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

Civil No. 3:05cv1677 (PCD) (JGM)

CLAIRE COLLIER,

Plaintiff,

-VS-

JO ANNE B BARNHART, COMMISSIONER OF

SOCIAL SECURITY,

Defendant.

RULING ON PLAINTIFF’S OBJECTIONS TO

THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S

RECOMMENDED RULING

This action, filed under § 205(g) of the Social

Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), as amended, seeks

judicial review of a final decision by the Commissioner

of Social Security (the “Commissioner”), in which she

found that Plaintiff was not entitled to Disability

Insurance Benefits (“DIB”). Currently pending are

Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. No.

10] and Defendant's Motion for Order Affirming the

Decision of the Commissioner [Doc. No. 15]. On April

lla

Appendix B

25, 2006, Magistrate Judge Joan Glazer Margolis

issued a Recommended Ruling {Doc. No. 22] denying

Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and

granting Defendant's Motion for Order Affirming the

Decision of the Commissioner (“Recommended

Ruling”). Plaintiff filed her Objections to the

Recommended Ruling [Doc. No. 23] on May 8, 2006.'

For the reasons that follow, the Recommended

Ruling is approved and adopted.

I FACTUAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE

BACKGROUND’

Plaintiff is a forty-three year-old female who is

married with three children and who worked

consecutively for fifteen years, from 1979 to August

1994. (See Certified Transcript of Administrative

Proceedings, filed December 23, 2005 (“Tr.”), 24-25,

49-50, 53, 142.) Over the course of her fifteen years of

employment, Plaintiff paid $19,544.00 to Social

Security and $4,668.00 to Medicare; her employer

matched both amounts. (See Tr. 53.) Plaintiff stopped

working in 1994 when she was eight months pregnant

with her first child, and thereafter became a stay-at-

home mother. (See Tr. 40, 41, 142, 152-53, 169-72.)

On October 13, 2003, after complaining about twitches

1. Defendant did not file any objections to the

Recommended Ruling or any response to Plaintiff's

objections.

2. Familiarity with Magistrate Judge Margolis’s

comprehensive ruling detailing the facts and circumstances

underlying this dispute is presumed.

12a

Appendix B

in her arm and cramps in her calves and the arches

of her feet, Plaintiff was diagnosed with Amyotrophic

Lateral Sclerosis (“ALS”) by Dr. Dale J. Lange.

(See Tr. 126, 179.)

Plaintiff filed her application for DIB on January

27, 2004. (See Tr. 24-26.) The ALJ found that “ALS

has taken a great toll on [Plaintiff's] physical and

mental heath, and on her family and finances,” and

that she “has fought courageously against the

disease,” however, Plaintiff was denied disability

benefits on the ground that her work history was

insufficient. (See Tr. 19-22, 27-29.) Specifically, the

ALJ found that because Plaintiff was not severely

impaired prior to December 31, 1999, her last date

insured, she was not under a “disability” as defined

in the Social Security Act, 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c).

(See Tr. 21-22) Plaintiff conceded that she was insured

for disability purposes only through December 1999

and that she had no symptoms of ALS until 2003, and

accordingly, was challenging the provisions of the

Social Security Act and regulations, specifically, 42

U.S.C. § 423(c)(1), on constitutional grounds. The

ALJ, however, observed in his decision that he lacked

“the authority to disregard the requirements of the

Social Security Act and regulations” so as to decide

in Plaintiffs favor. (See Tr. 20.)

This Court referred the parties cross-motions for

summary judgment to Magistrate Judge Joan Glazer

Margolis. In her Recommended Ruling, Magistrate

Judge Margolis recommended that this Court deny

Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment and grant

Defendant’s Motion for an Order Affirming the

13a

Appendix B

Decision of the Commissioner. Like the Commissioner,

Magistrate Judge Margolis found that Plaintiff was

not fully insured, and thus was not eligible for

disability benefits under the Social Security Act. In

addressing Plaintiff's constitutional claims,

Magistrate Judge Margolis held that the 20/40 rule

is not “patently arbitrary or lacking rational

justification” and is “rationally related to the

legislative purpose underlying the Social Security

System,” and as such, does not deny Plaintiff equal

protection under the Fifth Amendment and does not

violate the due process clause of the Fifth

Amendment. (Recomm. Ruling 16, 19.)

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review of a Magistrate

Judge’s Recommended Ruling

In the face of an objection to a Magistrate Judge's

recommended ruling, the District Court makes a de

novo determination of those portions of the

recommended ruling to which an objection is made.

Smith v. Barnhart, 406 F. Supp. 2d 209, 212 (D. Conn.

2005). This Court may accept, reject, or modify the

recommended ruling, receive further evidence, or

recommit the matter to the Magistrate Judge with

instructions. See 28 U.S.C § 636(b) (1); Fed. R. Civ. P.

72(b).

B. Standard of Review of a Social Security

Disability Determination

A court reviewing the decision of an ALJ will set

aside the decision only if it finds that the ALJ failed

14a

Appendix B

to properly apply correct legal principles in making a

determination or if the decision is unsupported by

“substantial evidence.” See Balsamo v. Chater, 142

F.3d 75, 79 (2d Cir. 1998). Substantial evidence is

“more than a mere scintilla;” it is “such relevant

evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as

adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v.

Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401,91 S. Ct. 1420, 1427, 28 L.

Ed. 2d 842 (1971) (internal quotation and citation

omitted); Yancey v. Apfel, 145 F.3d 106, 111 (2d Cir.

1998) Thus, this Court must accept the decision of

the ALJ unless it is based on legal error or not

supported by substantial evidence. Rosa v. Callahan,

168 F.3d 72, 77 (2d Cir. 1999). This “substantial

evidence” standard also applies to inferences and

conclusions drawn from findings of fact. See Gonzales

v. Apfel, 23 F. Supp. 2d 179, 189 (D. Conn. 1998);

Rodriguez v. Califano, 431 F. Supp. 421, 423 (S.

D.N.Y. 1977). The district court may not decide facts,

reweigh evidence, or substitute its judgment for that

of the Commissioner. See Dotson v. Shalala, 1 F. 3d

971, 577 (7th Cir. 1993). In reviewing the ALJ's

decision, the court must consider the entire

administrative record, including new evidence

submitted to the Appeals Council following the ALJ's

decision. See Perez v. Chalet, 77 F.3d 41, 46 (2d Cir.

1996). Furthermore, “[w|here there is a reasonable

basis fox doubt whether the ALJ applied correct legal

principles, application of the substantial evidence

standard to uphold a finding of no disability creates

an unacceptable risk that a claimant will be deprived

of the right to have her disability determination made

according to the correct legal principles” Schaal v.

Apfel, 134 F.3d 496, 504 (2d Cir. 1998).

15a

Appendix B

C. Discussion of Recommended Ruling and

Objections Thereto

Under the Social Security Act, every individual

who suffers from a “disability” is entitled to receive

disability insurance benefits See 42 U.S.C.

§ 423(d)(1)(A).* the Act defines “disability” as an

3. In reviewing disability claims, the SSA follows a five-

step procedure See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. First,

the Commissioner must determine whether the claimant is

currently engaged in any “substantial gainful activity.” If

the claimant is not so engaged, the Commissioner next

considers whether the claimant has a “severe impairment”

which is of the required duration and which significantly

limits his or her ability to work. If the claimant is engaged

in substantial gainful activity and/or does not exhibit a

sufficiently severe impairment, the claim will be disallowed

See 20 C.F.R. § 404 1520(a)-(c) Where both conditions are

met, however, the Commissioner then compares the medical

evidence of the claimant's impairment to a list of

impairments presumed severe enough to preclude any

gainful work If the claimant's impairment matches or

“equals” one of the listed impairments, he or she is considered

“disabled” and qualifies for benefits without further inquiry

See 20 C.F.R. § 404 1520(d) If, however, the claimant does

not qualify under the listings, the Commissioner must then

determine whether the claimant can perform his or her own

past work. See 20 C.F.R. § 404 1520(e)-(f) If it is found that

the claimant cannot do so, then the Commissioner will assess

the claimant's present job qualifications and determine

whether there are other jobs that the claimant could perform.

See 20 C.F.R. § 404 1520(g); see also generally Heckler v.

Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 460-61, 103 S. Ct. 1952, 76 L. Ed.

2d 66 (1983). The claimant bears the initial burden of

proving that he or she is disabled, however, if the claimant

can establish the existence of an impairment that renders

4, (Cont'd)

16a

Appendix B

“inability to engage in any substantial gainful

activity by reason of any medically determinable

physical or mental impairment which can be expected

to result in death or which has lasted or can be

expected to last for a continuous period of not less

than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). In 2003,

the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) amended

its regulations to allow the SSA to make findings of

presumptive disability in Listing 11.10 with respect

to claims involving ALS. See Revised Medical Criteria

for Evaluating Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis, 68 Fed.

Reg. 51689, 51691-92 (Aug. 28, 2003) (to be codified

20 C.F.R. pts. 404 and 416). Thus, a claimant

diagnosed with ALS is presumptively disabied. It is

undisputed in this case that Plaintiff suffers from ALS,

a medically determinable impairment. (See Tr. 22.)

In order to qualify for disability benefits, a

claimant must, in addition to proving that she is

“disabled” under the statute, show that she has

“insured status,” See 20 C.F.R. § 404.130.‘ For

Plaintiff to show that she has insured status for the

purpose of obtaining disability benefits, she must

satisfy Rule I, or the “20/40 rule,” 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.130(b). Under the 20/40 rule, Plaintiff is

required to show that she had at least twenty quarters

of coverage in the forty quarter period ending with

(Cont'd)

him or her unable to perform his or her own past work, the

burden then shifts to the Commissioner to show that there

is another job in the national economy which the claimant

could perform See Balsamo, 142 F.3d at 80.

4. There are four rules outlined in 20 C.F.R. § 401.130,

however, only Rule I is applicable to this case.

17a

Appendix B

the quarter in which she eventually become disabled.

See 20 C.F.R. § 404.130(b)(2).° It is undisputed that

Plaintiff did not have “insured status” on October 13,

2004, when she was diagnosed with ALS,. She was

only insured for benefits through December 31, 1999,

the end of the last of forty quarters during which

Plaintiff was covered for twenty quarters. (See Tr. 19-

22.) To interpret the regulation as applying to

persons who are not holly insured at the beginning

of a period of disability would conflict with the

underlying statute. See 2 SociaL. Security LAw AND

PRACTICE § 13.35, at 34, As such, the inquiry in this

case is confined to the constitutionality of 42 U.S.C.

§ 423(c) (1), which, as applied, results in the denial of

disability benefits to Plaintiff.

1. Fifth Amendment Equal Protection Claim

Plaintiff contends that the 20/40 rule denies

Plaintiff equal protection under the Fifth

Amendment because the rule has a “disparate and

discriminatory impact” upon Plaintiff and other

women who, “after materially contributing to the

Social Security and Medicare Trust Funds, elect to

stay home and engage in the mothering of their

children.” (PI's Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. 7-9; Pl.’s

Mem. Opp. Def.’s Mot. Affirm 2-3) In response,

5. A “quarter” of coverage, as used in the regulations,

“is the basic unit of social security coverage used in

determining a worker's insured status.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.

140(a) An individual earns “quarters” based on the wages

he or she was paid during the period of three calendar

months ending on March 31, June 30, September 30, or

December 31 of any year. See 42 U.S.C. § 413(a)(1); 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.101 (b).

18a

Appendix B

Defendant argues that Plaintiff has failed to show an

equal protection violation because the governmental

purposes underlying the 20/40 rule are legitimate

ones and the statute beats a rational relationship to

those purposes. (Def.’s Mem. Supp Mot. Affirm 4-5.)

Although the Fifth Amendment does not contain

an equal protection clause, “it does forbid

discrimination that is ‘so unjustifiable as to be

violative of due process.”” Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S.

163, 168, 84S. Ct. 1187, 1190, 12 L. Ed. 2d 218, 222

(1964) (quoting Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499,

74S. Ct. 693, 98 L. Ed. 884 (1954)). The standards

for analyzing equal protection claims under the Fifth

Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment are

identical. See Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636,

638 n.2, 95S. Ct. 1225, 43 L. Ed. 2d 514 (1975).

The equal protection guarantee does not forbid

all classifications; a statute that does not “burden a

fundamental right or draw distinctions based on a

suspect classification” will be upheld if it bears a

rational relationship to a “legitimate governmental

objective.” Nicholas v. Tucker, 114 F.3d 17, 20 (2d Cir.

’%97); see also Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471,

485-86, 90S. Ct. 1153, 25 L. Ed. 2d 491, reh’g denied,

398 U.S. 914, 26 L. Ed. 2d 80, 90 S. Ct. 1684 (1970)

(holding that a classification with some “reasonable

basis does not offend the Constitution simply

because [it] is not made with mathematical nicety or

because in practice it results in some inequality”)

(internal quotations & citation omitted). Both the

Supreme Court and the Second Circuit have held that

rational basis review applies to challenges to

distinctions made in the context of social welfare

19a

Appendix B

Statutes, as is at issue in this case. Brown v. Bowen,

905 F.2d 632, 635 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1093

(1991); see also Dandridge, 397 U S. at 487 (noting

that “the Constitution does not empower this Court

to second-guess state officials charged with the

difficult responsibility of allocating limited public

welfare funds among the myriad of potential

recipients”). It is well-settled that Congress has wide

latitude to create classifications that allocate non-

contractual benefits under a social welfare program.

Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 776-777 (1975):

Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 609-610 (1960). In

Flemming, 363 U.S. at 611, the Supreme Court said:

Particularly when we deal with a

withholding of a noncontractual benefit

under a social welfare program such as

[Social Securityj, we must recognize that the

Due Process Clause can be thought to

interpose a bar only if the statute manifests

a patently arbitrary classification, utterly

lacking in rational justification.

In such a case, the legislature's choices will be upheld

unless they are “clearly wrong, a display of arbitrary

power, not an exercise of judgment.” Bowen v. Owens,

476 U.S. 340, 345, 106 S. Ct, 1881, 1885, 90 L. Ed. 2d

316 (1986); see also Mathews v. De Castro, 429 US.

181, 185, 97 S. Ct. 431, 434, 50 L. Ed. 2d 389 (1976)

(“the challenged statute is entitled to a strong

presumption of constitutionality”). In sum, if social

welfare statutes have a rational basis and do not

engage in invidious discrimination, they do not

violate the equal protection clause, regardless of

whether flaws may be found in their logic. Brown, 905

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Appendix B

F.2d at 635; see also Danuridge, 397 U.S. at 486

(noting that “[t]he problems of government are

practical ones and may justify, if they do not require,

rough accommodations—illogical, it may be, and

unscientific,” and holding that federal courts have no

power to impose “their views of what constitutes wise

economic or social policy ).

There are two ways in which governmental action

can violate the equal protection clause. First, the

courts can strike down a statute when Congress

“explicitly classifies or distinguishes among persons”

based on specific criteria, such as race, gender,

religion, or ethnicity De La Cruz v. Tormey, 582 F.2d

45, 49-50 (9th Cir. 1978). Even where there is no

“facial discrimination,” as in this case, there may still

exist a second and “more subtle” form of

discrimination, which focuses on the effects rather

than the form of governmental action Id. at 50. This

type of discrimination involves decisions or actions

which, although facially nondiscriminatory, “produce

effects which weigh adversely and disproportionately

upon the members of a particular protected group of

individuals, [and] may require explanation in terms

of non-invidious purposes.” Id.

In her Recommended Ruling, Magistrate Judge

Margolis cited and did not dispute the studies cited

by Plaintiff showing that (1) women are more likely

than men to leave the workforce to care for their

children and raise their families, and (2) as a result,

women are substantially less likely than men to

qualify for Social Security Disability Insurance

2la

Appendix B

(“SSDI”) benefits (See Recomm. Ruling 11-12,13.)®

Magistrate Judge Margolis declined, however, to find

that this evidence gave rise to an inference of

intentional discrimination (Id. 12-13.)

6. Plaintiff produced, and Magistrate Judge Margolis

discussed, a number of compelling studies (See generally Pl's

Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. 7-9; Pl's Mem. Opp. Def's. Mot.

Affirm. 2-4; Recomm. Ruling 12-13) Specifically, Plaintiff *

cited studies going to show that “women with professional

degrees are out of the labor force at a rate about three times

that of their male counterparts and they overwhelmingly

cite family responsibilities as the reason. Jerry A. Jacobs &

Janice Fanning Madden, Mommies & Daddies on the Fast

Track: Success of Parents in Demanding Professions, 596

ANNALS OF Am. Acab. OF Pot. & Soc. SCI 246, 250 (2004):

see also Samuel Issacharoff & Elyse Rosenblum, Women &

the Workplace: Accommodating the Demands of Pregnancy,

94 Cotum. L. Rev. 2154, 2160-65 (1994). Specifically,

Issacharoff and Rosenblum found that “[h]aving children

makes it more likely that women will leave the workforce

altogether or switch to part-time employment.” Issacharoff

& Rosenblum, at 2165. Moreover, the evidence shows that

(1) the rates of Disability Insurance coverage for women in

their early thirties and early forties are nearly twenty

percent lower than those for men of comparable ages; (2)

married women are ten percent less likely to be insured than

single women; and (3) the SSA's records reveal that women

between the ages of thirty-one and forty-one are more likely

to be rejected by the SSA than any other group or age

bracket. Olivia S. Mitchell & John W.R. Phillips, Eligibility

for Social Security Disability Insurance, Issurs IN BRiEF—

U. Mich. RETIREMENT RESEARCH CTR. (2001). As a result,

“working women are less well-protected by Social Security

disability insurance than are working men due to their more

episodic labor market attachment “ See Mitchell & Phillips,

at 4.

22a

Appendix B

Plaintiff, in her Objections to the Recommended

Ruling, argues that because the evidence and

findings in Plaintiffs studies are undisputed, the |

Court should find that “the law itself necessarily and

invidiously discriminate[s] against women and in

particular women who left the workforce.” (PI's Objs.

to Recomm. Ruling 2-3) Plaintiff cites data produced

by the SSA in response to a Freedom of Information

Act request, which reveals that women between the

ages of thirty-one and forty-one are more likely to be

rejected by the SSA than are women or men in:

general. (See Pl.’s Objs. to Recomm. Ruling 4 (citing

Exh. A to Hans Aff.)) Specifically, the data shows that

upon initial application, 4.99 percent of all men and

4.86 percent of all women with either ALS or Anterior

Horn Cell disease are denied at the initial application

stage, whereas 7.85 percent of women between the

ages of thirty-one and forty-one are denied benefits.

(Id.)’ At the reconsideration stage, only 25.1 percent

of all men and 25.6 percent of all women are again

denied benefits, however, 57.1 percent of women

between the ages of thirty-one and forty-one are again

denied benefits. (Id.)®

7. The table provides data for 1994 through 2005, and

although women between the ages of thirty-one and forty-

one are shown to have been denied benefits at a higher

rate than men or women as a whole, these women also

applied for and were denied benefits in significantly lower

numbers. Notably, zero women between the ages of thirty-

one and forty-one were denied benefits in 1999, 2003, and

2005. (Exh. A to Hans Aff.)

8. Again, because of the very small sample size, it is

unlikely that the difference would be found to be significant.

23a

Appendix B

Although Plaintiff's studies, and particularly her

own plight, are compelling, the Supreme Court has

made it clear that facially neutral official action does

not violate the Equal Protection Clause simply

because it has a disproportionate impact on a specific

group.’ Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 96S. Ct.

2040, 48 L. Ed. 2d 597 (1976); Arlington Heights v.

Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S.

252,97 S. Ct. 555, 50 L. Ed. 2d 450 (1977); see also

De La Cruz, 582 F.2d at 58, Plaintiff must also plead

and prove intentional discrimination. Plaintiff must

prove only that a discriminatory purpose was one

motivating factor in the decision; she need not show

that the challenged statute rested solely on a

discriminatory purpose. Arlington Heights, 429 US.

at 265-66. A determination of whether intentional

discrimination was a factor in challenged

governmental action requires a “sensitive inquiry

into such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent

as may be available” and necessitates the production

of other evidence, such as “the existence of a ‘clear

pattern’ unexplainable on grounds other than

discrimination, the historical background of a

decision, the ‘specific sequence of events’ leading up

to the challenged action, and ‘departures’ from the

normal procedural sequences and substantive

policies.” Id. at 58-59 (quoting Arlington Heights, 429

U.S. at 266-68).

9. The effects of the challenged rule do not fall

exclusively upon women, but also impact men with child-

rearing responsibilities. This fact, however, is not a bar toa

finding of discriminatory impact so long as Plaintiff can show

“imbalance and disproportionality.” See De La Cruz, 582 F.2d

at 57.

24a

Appendix B

This Court, like the Magistrate Judge, finds that

Plaintiff has failed to prove intentional

discrimination. Specifically, she has failed to cite any

evidence going to show that Congress, in enacting the

20/40 rule, intended to discriminate against women,

or more specifically, against non-working mothers.

Conversely, there is a great deal of authority with

regard to Congress’ “actual purpose” in enacting the

rule.

There are two primary legitimate objectives

behind the 20/40 rule. Congress’ first objective was

to create a self-supporting program. See Tuttle v. Sec’y

of Health, Education & Welfare, 504 F.2d 61, 62-63

(10th Cir. 1974) (citing S. Rep. No. 1987, 83rd Cong.

2d Sess., 3 U.S. Code Cong. News, 1954, at 3733;

H. Rep. No. 92-231, 92d Cong. 2d Sess., 3 U.S. Code

Cong. & Admin. News, 1972, at 5111). Courts have

recognized that “maintaining the self-supporting

nature of [an] insurance program” is a legitimate

governmental interest. Id at 63 (quoting Geduldig v.

Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496, 94 S. Ct. 2485, 41 L.Ed.2d

256 (1974)); See also Lerner v. Richardson, 393

F.Supp. 1387, 1391 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (holding that

“where the funds available under a social welfare

program are finite, it is reasonable for Congress to

build into the system a safeguard against

disproportionately high payments to those who have

made the smallest contributions”), the 20/40 rule is

rationally related to and promotes this objective by

ensuring that persons make some substantial

contribution to the social security system prior to the

onset of disability. Tuttle, 504 F.2d at 63.

25a

Appendix B

Second, Congress intended to provide disability

benefits to those who were dependent on their

employment income. Id. (citingS. Rep. No. 2388, 85th

Cong. 2d Sess., 3 U.S Code Cong. & Admin. News

1958, at 4229 (“it is reasonable and desirable that

there be reliable means of limiting such protection to

those persons who have had sufficiently long and

sufficiently recent covered employment to indicate

that they probably have been dependent upon their

earnings”); S. Rep. No. 1987, 83rd Cong. 2d Sess, 3

U.S. Code Cong. News 1954, at 3729). The Social

Security program was designed to “afford protection

to working members of the nation’s economy,” and as

such, is based in part on Congress’ determination

“that those who in their productive years were

functioning members of the economy may justly call

upon that economy, in their later years, for protection

from the ‘rigors of the poor house.”” Lerner, 393 F.

Supp. at 1391 (quoting Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S.

619, 641, 57 S. Ct. 904, 909, 81 L. Ed. 1307 (1937)).

Again, the 20/40 rule is rationaily related to and

promotes this objective by “screen|[ing] out those who

have not established a substantial attachment to the

labor force because they do not have a reasonably

long, as well as recent, record of covered earnings.

Tuttle, 504 F.2d at 63.

Plaintiff argues that the goal of self-sufficiency is

an “insufficient justification for discrimination,”

asserting that there is no evidence that the Social

Security program has at any time been self-sufficient,

nor that elimination of the 20/40 rule would be an

impediment to that goal. (Pl’s Objs. to Recomm.

Ruling 5.) Moreover, Plaintiff argues that even if this

Court were to accept self-sufficiency as a legitimate

26a

Appendix B

goal of the Social Security program, it does not justify

the denial of Medicare benefits, which Plaintiff seeks

and needs (/d.) This argument, however, is not

persuasive. As set forth above, Congress had multiple

reasons for enacting the 20/40 rule, both of which have

been held to be legitimate and both of which are

rationally related to the rule. See, e.g., Geduldig v.

Aiello, 417 U.S. at 496 (holding, in the context of a

state disability insurance program, that “[t]he State

has a legitimate interest in maintaining the self-

supporting nature of its insurance program,” and “in

distributing the available resources in such a way as

to keep benefit payments at an adequate level for

disabilities that are covered, rather than to cover all

disabilities inadequately”). Even if the goal of self-

sufficiency were rejected, it remains the case that one

legitimate purpose behind the enactment of the 20/

40 rule was Congress’ desire to preserve disability

benefits for those persons who are currently

dependent on their employment income.

Numerous courts have upheld the 20/40 rule as

constitutional under both the Equal Protection and

Due Process Clauses of the Fifth Amendment See,

e.g., Harvell v. Chater, 87 F.3d 371 (9th Cir. 1996)

(per curiam); Tuttle, 504 F.2d 61; Winger v. Barnhart,

320 F. Supp. 2d 741 (C.D. Ill. 2004); Hesse v. Harris,

No. 78 C 5176, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10122, at *34

(N.D. Ul. Jan. 31, 1980) For the reasons discussed

above, this Court also finds that the 20/40 rule is

rationally related to the legitimate goals of the Social

Security program. Because the rule is not a “patently .

arbitrary classification, utterly lacking in rational

justification,” Harvell, 87 F.3d at 375, it is not

unconstitutional. Although Plaintiffs situation is a

27a

Appendix B

tragic one, any alterations to the 20/40 rule that

would rectify the problem must be initiated by the

legislative, and not the judicial, branch of

government.

2. Fifth Amendment Due Process Claim

Plaintiff also contends that the 20/40 rule, as

applied here, violates her substantive due process

rights under the Fifth Amendment. (PI.'s Mem. Supp.

Mot. Summ. J. 10-16; Pl's Mem. Opp. Def.’s Mot.

Affirm 8-9.) Defendant responds that Plaintiff has not

shown a due process violation as she was afforded an

opportunity to present her claim for disability benefits

at an administrative hearing, and the amendments

to the Social Security Act do not affect the 20/40

requirement (Def.’s Mot. Affirm 10).!°

Under either the Equal Protection Clause, see

Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78, 81, 30 L. Ed. 2d

231, 92 S. Ct. 254, or the Due Process Clause,

Hemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 611, 4 L. Ed. 2d

1435, 80 S. Ct. 1367, a statutory classification in a

social welfare program is constitutional if it is

rationally based and free from invidious

discrissination. Tuttle, 504 F.2d at 62; see also Harvell

v. Ciiafer, 87 F.3d 371, 373 (9th Cir. 1996).

The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment

requires that the government not deprive any citizen

10. Because Plaintiff is arguing that her substantive,

rather than procedural due process rights were violated, it

is unnecessary to consider whether she obtained a “full and

fair” hearing under the standard enunciated in Yancey v.

Apfel, 145 F.3d 106, 111 (2d Cir. 1998).

28a

Appendix B

of “life, liberty, or property, without due process of

law.” U.S. Const. amend. V. As an initial matter,

Plaintiff has no property right to her Social Security

taxes. The Supreme Court has rejected the notion that

social security payments create an “investment,”

holding that “the noncontractual interest of an

employee covered by the [Social Security] Act cannot

be soundly analogized to that of the holder of an

annuity, whose right to benefits is bottomed on his

contractual premium payments “ Flemming, 363 U.S.

at 610. Because there is no property right, but only a

noncontractual interest at issue, “the Due Process

Clause can be thought to interpose a bar only if the

statute manifests a patently arbitrary classification,

utterly lacking in rational justification.” Id. at 611.

Plaintiff argues that a rule which disregards her

fifteen years of full employment cannot be rationally

based. Although Plaintiffs correct that this does

evidence a significant contribution to the Social

Security program, Congress, in enacting the 20/40

rule and the Social Security Act in general, had

numerous goals, only one of which was to “afford more

protection to the family as a unit.” Weinberger v.

Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. at 643-44.'' Congress also

sought, with the enactment of the 20/40 rule, to make

the system self-supporting, See S. Rep. No. 1987, 83rd

Cong. 2d Sess., 3 U.S. Code Cong. News, 1954, at 3733;

11. The Wiesenfeld Court also noted that “[u]nderlying

the 1939 [amendments] was the principle that under a social-

insurance plan the primary purpose is to pay benefits in

accordance with the probable needs of the beneficiaries

rather than to make payments to the estate of a deceased

person.” 420 U.S. at 644 (internal quotations & citation

omitted).

29a

Appendix B

H. Rep. No. 92-231, 92d Cong. 2d Sess., 3 U.S. Code

Cong. & Admin. News, 1972, at 5111, and to ensure

that disability benefits were preserved for those who

are currently dependent on their employment income,

see S. Rep. No. 2388, 85th Cong, 2d Sess. , 3 U.S. Code

Cong & Admin. News 1958, at 4229; S. Rep. No. 1987,

83rd Cong. 2d Sess., 3 U.S. Code Cong. News 1954, at

3729. The 20/40 rule is rationally related to these

legitimate goals.

Congress, in an effort to favor victims of ALS,

recently amended the Social Security Act to allow

individuals who have filed an application, are under

a disability by virtue of being diagnosed with ALS,

and are currently insured for disability benefits to

waive the twenty-four-month waiting period for

Medicare coverage. See H.R. Rep. No, 106-1019, § 104

(2000); see also 42 U.S.C. § 426(h); 42 U.S.C.

§ 426(b)(2)(A); 42 U.S.C. § 423(a), In 2003, the SSA

amended its regulations to permit findings of

presumptive disability with respect to claims

involving ALS. See Revised Medical Criteria for

Evaluating Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis, 68 Fed.

Reg. 51689, 51691-92 (Aug. 28, 2003) (to be codified

at 20 C. F. R. pts. 404 and 416) Although Congress

thus intended to aid individuals with ALS, the

amendments did not alter the 20/40 requirement and

did not change Plaintiffs status as not currently

insured. Plaintiff is not entitled to collect disability

benefits under the statute as Congress has drawn the

criteria for eligibility in a manner which does not

embrace Plaintiff, no matter how sad her

circumstances.

30a

Appendix B

Although the 20/40 rule may not perfectly comport

with all of the goals behind the Social Security Act, it

does not contain an inherently invidious classification

and does not impinge on fundamental rights. The

“rough accommodation” reached by the 20/40 rule

may appear “illogical,” however, it cannot be said that

it is so arbitrary as to violate the Due Process Clause,

and accordingly, it is not the province of this Court

to strike it down. See Dandridge, 397 U.S. at 485;

Brown, 905 F.2d at 635.’* For the reasons set forth in

this and the preceding section, this Court finds that

the 20/40 rule is not based on a “patently arbitrary

classification,” is rationally based, and is free from

invidious discrimination. See, e.g., Harwell v. Chater,

87 F.3d 371, 373 (9th Cir. 1996); Tuttle v. Sec’y of

Health, Education & Welfare, 504 F.2d 61, 62-63 (10th

Cir. 1974). As such, the 20/40 rule does not violate

the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.

Ill. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Recommended

Ruling [Doc. No. 22] denying Plaintiffs Motion for

Summary Judgment and granting Defendant's

Motion for Order Affirming the Decision of the

Commissioner is approved and adopted.

Accordingly, Plaintiff's Motion for Summary

12. In Brown, the Second Circuit held that “[iJt is the

responsibility of Congress, not the courts, to determine how

public funds should be spent and how they should be raised.”

The Second Circuit reasoned that “legislative decisions are

constrained by fiscal necessity” and “[e]very desirable

program cannot be funded, nor can the full needs of every

funded program be met.” 905 F.2d at 635.

‘

:

7

3la

Appendix B

Tudgment (Dac. No. 10) is denied and Defendant's

Motion for Order Affirming the Decision of the

Commissioner [Doc. No. 15] is granted. The clerk is

directed to close the case.

SO ORDERED.

Dated at New Haven, Connecticut, July 17, 2006.

/s/

Peter C. Dorsey, U.S District J udge

United States District Court

32a

APPENDIX C — RECOMMENDED RULING OF

THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR

THE DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

DATED AND FILED APRIL 25, 2006

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

3:05 CV 1677 (PCD)

CLAIRE COLLIER

V.

JO ANNE B. BARNHART,

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY

DATE: APRIL 25, 2006

RECOMMENDED RULING ON PLAINTIFF'S

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND

ON DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR ORDER

AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF

THE COMMISSIONER

This action, filed under § 205(g) of the Social

Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), as amended, seeks

judicial review of a final decision by the Commissioner

of Social Security [“Commissioner”], that denied

plaintiff Disability Insurance Benefits [“DIB’].

I. ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS

On January 27, 2004, plaintiff Claire Collier, filed

her application for DIB. (See Certified Transcript of

Administrative Proceedings, filed December 23, 2005

33a

Appendix C

[“Tr.”] 24-26). The Commissioner denied the application

initially and upon reconsideration. ({ »Tr. 27-36).

On November 4, 2004, plaintiff filed a request for a

hearing before an Administrative Law Judge [ALJ].

(See Tr. 38-44). Such hearing was held before ALJ

Robert A. Di Biccaro on March 14, 2005. (See Tr. 147-

88). Plaintiff was represented by counsel at the hearing.

(See Tr. 37, 147). On June 10, 2005, ALJ Di Biccaro

issued his decision, in which he held that while plaintiff

is disabled by Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis [“ALS’”],

plaintiff did not have this impairment prior to December

31, 1999, the fast date she was insured by the Social

Security Act, so that plaintiff is not entitled to DIB.

(See Tr. 19-22). Seven days later, plaintiff submitted

the first of three letters to the Social Security

Administration (“SSA”] seeking permission to file an

expedited appeal to the district court. (See Tr. 5-15).!

Plaintiffs requests for review were denied by the

Appeals Council on August 25, 2005, rendering the

ALJ's decision, dated June 10, 2005, the final decision

of the Commissioner of Social Security. (See Tr. 2-4).

Plaintiff commenced this action on October 28,

2005 to challenge the constitutionality of 42 U.S.C.

§ 423(c)(1), commonly referred to as the “20/40 Rule.”

(Dkt. #1).2 On December 23, 2005, defendant filed

1. Plaintiffs letters, treated as a Request for Review, are

dated June 17, July 22, and August 9, 2005. (See Tr. 5-15).

2. Attached to plaintiffs Complaint are the following

three exhibits: copy of plaintiff's Social Security and Medicare

Earnings Record (Exh. A); copy of ALJ Di Biccaro’s June 10,

2005 decision (Exh B.); and copy of Notice of Appeals Council

Action, dated August 25, 2005 (Exh. C).

34a

Appendix C

her Answer, with the administrative record attached.

(Dkt. #9). Pending before the Court are plaintiff's

Motion for Summary Judgment, brief, Local Rule

56(a)1 Statement and affidavits in support, filed

January 26, 2006 (Dkts. ##10-14),° and defendant's

Motion for Order Affirming the Decision of the

Commissioner and brief in support, filed February

22, 2006. (Dkts. ##15-16). On March 6, 2006, plaintiff

filed her brief and affidavit in opposition to defendant's

Motion. (Dkts. ##19-20; see Dkt. #17-18).* Twenty-

three days later, United States District Judge Peter

C. Dorsey referred this case to this Magistrate Judge.

(Dkt. #21).

For the reasons stated below, plaintiff's Motion

for Summary Judgment (Dkt. #10) is denied and

defendant’s Motion for Order Affirming the Decision

of the Commission (Dkt. #15) is granted.

3. Attached to the affidavit of Richard F. Hans, sworn

to January 25, 2006 (Dkt. #13) are the following three exhibits:

copies of correspondence to the SSA from plaintiff's counsel,

dated August 18 & September 30, 2005 (Exhs. 1 & 3); and

copy of correspondence from the SSA to plaintiffs counsel,

dated September 15, 2005 (Exh. 2).

4. Attached to the affidavit of Richard F. Hans, sworn

to March 6, 2006 (Dkt. #20) are the following: copy of tables

indicating Allowances and Denials for Anterior Horn Cell

Disease at the Initial Adjudicative Level and Reconsideration

Adjudicative Level, prepared September 2005 (Exh. A); and

copy of DVD recording of the Today show, dated May 13,

2005 (Exh. 8).

35a

Appendix C

Il. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is a forty-three year old female who is

married with three children. (See Tr. 24-25, 142).

Plaintiff held summer jobs while she was in college,

and after graduation, she was gainfully employed as

a special events coordinator, a banquet sales

coordinator, a secretary and as an administrative

assistant for several employers for the next ten years.

(See Tr. 49-50, 53, 111, 166-69). Over the course of

her fifteen years of employment,’ plaintiff paid

$19,544 to Social Security and $4,668 to Medicare:

her employer matched both amounts. (See Tr. 53).

Plaintiff testified at her hearing before ALJ Di Biccaro

that she worked “until [she was] about eight and a

half months pregnant” and then stopped for the birth

of her first child, Kieran, who was born in September

1994. (See Tr. 169-70). Plaintiff thereafter became a

stay-at-home mom for Kieran, Bridget, who was born

in May 1996, and Leah, who was born fourteen

months later. (See Tr. 40, 41, 142, 152-53, 169-72).

While her daughters were in preschool, in 2000 and

2002, plaintiff was paid for some of the work she

performed for their classes. (See Tr. 53, 173-75).

In or around March 2003, plaintiff began “feeling

twitches in [her} arms” and would “get cramps in

[her] calves and the arches of [her] feet.” (See Tr.

177). Plaintiff was diagnesed with Amyotrophic

9. While plaintiff represents in her brief that she worked

18 calendar years (see Dkt. #11, at 10), her Complaint and

her earnings record reflect continuous employment from 1979

to August 1994, which is 15 caiendar years. (See Tr. 49-50 &

53; Dkt. #1, 9 4). The difference, however, is irrelevant.

36a

Appendix C

Lateral Sclerosis [“ALS”] by Dr. Dale J. Lange, on

October 13, 2003. (See Tr. 126, 179). Thereafter, on

January 27, 2004, plaintiff filed her application for

DIB. (See Tr. 24-26). Plaintiff was denied benefits on

grounds of insufficient work history. (See Tr. 19-22,

27-29).

oS ae oe ‘.

**.In his decision, ALJ Di Biccaro observed.that “[a]s

a threshold matter, . . . [plainitff] concedes that she

is insured for disability purposes only through a

December 1999 and that she had no symptoms of =. >. =

ALS until 2003.” (See Tr. 20). Plaintiff therefore “is =~ s

pursuing this appeal on constitutional grounds by

challenging the provisions of the Social Security Act

and regulations,” specifically, 42 U.S.C. § 423(c)(1),

and its associated regulations. (Id.). Accordingly, in

his decision, ALJ Di Biccaro observed that he lacks

the “authority to disregard the requirements of the

Social Security Act and regulations” so as to find in

her favor. (Id.).°

6. As ALJ DiBiccaro poignantly observed:

Both [plaintiff] and her husband testified in a

forthright, credible and heartfelt mannet....

[Plaintiff] has fought courageously against the

disease and has done everything possible to continue

in her role as a wife and mother. Her personal story

is compelling, and her ongoing efforts to raise her

children despite the disease merit admiration.

ty es

:

_.. [Plaintiff] alleges that the disability quarter of

coverage rules discriminate against stay-at-home

parents who are more likely than not women.

Unfortunately, the undersigned does not have the

authority to change or disregard the law regardless

of how compelling her story is.

(Tr. 21).

37a

Appendix C

Ill. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The scope of review of a Social Security disability

determination involves two levels of inquiry. The court

first must decide whether the Commissioner

applied the correct legal principles in making the

determination. Next, the court must decide whether

the determination is supported by substantial

evidence. See Balsamo v. Chater, 142 F.3d 75, 79 (2d

Cir. 1998). “Substantial evidence” is evidence that a

reasonable mind would accept as adequate to support

a conclusion; it is more than a “mere scintilla.”

Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971):

Yancey v. Apfel, 145 F.3d 106, 111 (2d Cir. 1998).

The substantial evidence rule also applies to

inferences and conclusions that are drawn from

findings of fact. See Gonzalez v. Apfel, 23 F. Supp. 2d

179, 189 (D. Conn. 1998); Rodriquez v. Califano, 431

F. Supp. 421, 423 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). The court may

not decide facts, reweigh evidence or substitute its

judgment for that of the Commissioner. See Dotson

v. Shalala, 1 F.3d 571,.577 (7th Cir. 1993). The court

must scrutinize the entire record to determine the

reasonableness of the ALJ’s findings. Furthermore,

“[w]here there is a reasonable basis for doubt whether

the ALJ applied correct legal principles, application

of the substantial evidence standard to uphold a

finding of no disability creates an unacceptable risk

that a claimant will be deprived of the right to have

her disability determination made according to the

correct legal principles.” Schaal v. Apfel, 134 F.3d

496, 504 (2d Cir. 1998) (citation omitted).

Under the Social Security Act, every individual

who is under a disability is entitled to disability

38a

Appendix C

insurance benefits. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1).

“Disability” is defined as an “inability to engage in

any substantial gainful activity by reason of any

medically ¢eterminable physical or mental

impairment -vhich can be expected to result in death

or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a

continuous period of not less than 12 months.”

42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).’ In 2003, the SSA amended

7. A number of factors are considered and a five-step

process is followed when deciding whether a claimant is disabled.

First,the court determines whether the claimant is engaged in

substantial gainful activity. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a). If the

claimant is performing substantial gainful activity, the claim

will be disallowed. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b). If the claimant

is not working, then the second step requires that a finding be

made as to the existence of a severe mental or physical

impairment; if none exist, the claim is denied. See 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.1520(c). If the claimant has a severe impairment, the

third step is to compare the claimant's impairment with those

in the Listing. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d); Bowen v. Yuckert,

482 U.S. 137, 141 (1987); Balsamo, 142 F.3d at 79-80. If the

claimant's impairment meets or equals one of the impairments

in the Listing, the claimant is automatically considered disabled.

See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d); see also Balsamo, 142 F.3d at 80.

If the claimant's impairment does not meet or equal a listed

impairment, then the fourth step is to show that he cannot

perform his former work. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e). If the

claimant cannot perform his former work, then the fifth step is

to show that he is prevented from doing any other work;

disability benefits can only be received if a claimant cannot

perform any alternate gainful employment. See Balsamo, 142

F.3d at 80 (citations omitted).

The initial burden of establishing disability is on the

claimant. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5). Once the claimant

demonstrates that he is incapable of performing his past work,

(Cont'd)

39a

Appendix C

(Cont'd)

however, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show that

the claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform

other substantial gainful activity in the national economy. See

Balsamo, 142 F.3d at 80 (citations omitted). This may require

application of the Medical-Vocational Guidelines [*the Grid”]:

the Grid classifies employment into five groups based on

exertional requirements of the different types of work, i.e.,

sedentary, light, medium, heavy and very heavy. See Gray v.

Chater, 903 F. Supp. 293, 297-98 n.5 (N.D.N.Y. 1995). These

categories are based on strength requirements of such activities

as sitting, walking, standing, lifting, carrying, pushing, and

pulling. See id. The Grid places claimants with severe exertional

impairments who can no longer perform past work into Grid

categories according to their residual functional capacity, age,

education and work experience, and dictates a conclusion of

disabled or not disabled. See id., 903 F. Supp. at 298. When the

Commissioner makes a determination as to a claimant's

disability, she must explain what physical functions the claimant

is capable of performing; in order to sustain her burden of

showing that the claimant can perform sedentary work, the

[Commissioner] must proffer specific medical evidence that

the plaintiff can meet the exertional demands necessary to

maintain sedentary work.” Mitchell_ v. Chater, 918 F. Supp.

675, 682 (W.D.N.Y. 1995) (citations omitted).

In determining whether or not a claimant is disabled, the

Commissioner considers: (1) objective medical facts and clinical

findings; (2) diagnoses and medical opinions of examining

physicians; (3) the claimant's subjective evidence of pain and

physical incapacity as testified to by himself and others who

observed him; and (4) the claimant's age, educational

background, and work history. See Carroll v. Secretary of HHS,

705 F.2d 638, 642 (2d Cir. 1983) (multiple citations e:nitted). In

addition, the opinion given by a treating physician is entitled

to considerable weight and in the absence of contradictory

evidence, is binding on the Commissioner. See id. (multiple

citations omitted).

40a

Appendix C

its regulations to allow the SSA to make findings of

presumptive disability in Listing 11.10 with respect

to claims involving ALS. See Revised Medical Criteria

for Evaluating Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis, 68 Fed.

Reg. 51689, 51691-92 (Aug. 28, 2003)(to be codified

20 C.F.R. pts. 404 and 416). Thus, a claimant

diagnosed with ALS is presumptively disabled. In this

case, it is undisputed that plaintiff suffers from ALS,

which, as stated above, is a medically determinable

impairment. (See Tr. 22).

A claimant's work history is a prerequisite to a

determination of eligibility for disability benefits.

Thus, in order for a claimant to qualify for disability

benefits, in addition to proving disability under the

statute, a claimant must have “insured status.” See

20 C.F.R. § 404.130.' For plaintiff te have disability

insured status, plaintiff must satisfy the 20/40 Rule.

See 20 C.F.R. § 404.130(b). The 20/40 Rule requires

that plaintiff have at least 20 quarters of coverage in

a 40 quarter period ending with the quarter that

she allegedly became disabled.’ See 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.130(b)(2). The inquiry in this case, therefore,

does not relate to the claim of disability or the capacity

of plaintiff to perform work related activity, but

rather, the constitutionality of 42 U.S.C. § 423(c)(1)

8. There are four rules outlined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.130,

only one of which, Rule I, is applicable to this case.

9. A “quarter” of coverage is the basic unit used by

the SSA in determining whether a claimant has sufficient

coverage under the Act to achieve insured status. See 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.140(a). An individual earns “quarters” based on the wages

the person was paid during the period of three calendar months

ending on March 31, June 30, September 30, or December 31 in

any year. See 42 U.S.C. § 413(a)(1); 20 C.F.R. § 404.101 (b).

ee ,

4la

Appendix C

which application results in a denial of disability

benefits to plaintiff who was only insured for benefits

through December 31, 1999. (See Tr. 19-22).

“The phrase ‘period of disability’ is a legal term,

encompassing both a literal disability and fully

insured status.” 2 Socia Securiry LAW AND PRACTICE

§ 13.35, at 34 (1997)(footnote omitted). Although

plaintiff urges this Court to do so, “[t]o interpret the

regulation as applying to persons who are not fully

insured at the beginning of a period of disability

would conflict with the underlying statute”. Id.

(footnote omitted); see 42 U.S.C. § 416(i).

IV. DISCUSSION

ALJ Di Biccaro found that although plaintiff has

ALS, which is a medically determinable impairment,

and plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful

activity since the alleged onset of disability, plaintiff

did not have this impairment “prior to December 31,

1999; therefore, [plaintiff] did not have a ‘severe’

impairment prior to her date last insured (20 C.F.R.

§ 404.1520).” (See Tr. 21-22). Accordingly, ALJ Di

Biccaro concluded that plaintiff “was not under a

‘disability’ as defined in the Social Security Act, at

any time through the date of this decision as it relates

to her date last insured of December 31, 1999

(20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c)).” (Id.). ALJ Di Biccaro

acknowledged, however, that because plaintiff was

“pursuing [her] appeal on constitutional grounds by

challenging the provisions of the Social Security Act

and regulations,” ALJ Di Biccaro lacked the “authority

to disregard the requirements of the Social Security

Act and regulations” so as to find in her favor. (See

Tr. 20).

42a

Appendix C

Plaintiff seeks summary judgment on grounds

that the 20/40 Rule denies plaintiff equal protection

under the Fifth Amendment as the denial of benefits

in this case discriminates against plaintiff and all

other women between the ages of 31 and 41 years

who stay at home to care for their children and thus

are unable to work at least five of the ten previous

years, notwithstanding prior work history. (Dkt. #11,

at 7-9). Additionally, plaintiff asserts that the 20/40

Rule, as applied to plaintiff, violates the due process

clause of the Fifth Amendment, as such rule “runs

contrary to the policies underlying the Social Security

and Medicare systems in general and, in particular,

as they have been amended to otherwise specifically

accommodate victims of ALS.” (Jd. at 10-16).

In her Motion for Order Affirming the Decision,

the Commissioner contends that plaintiff has failed

to show an equal protection violation as the interests

in the government in maintaining the solvency of

the Disability Insurance program and in ensuring

that disability recipients have been dependent on their

wages is legitimate, and the statute bears a rational

relationship to that interest. (Dkt. #16, at 4-10).

According to the Commissioner, plaintiff has not made

a showing of a due process violation as due process,

as applied to the federal government, requires that a

social security disability hearing be full and fair and

plaintiff had an opportunity to present her case.

(Id. at 10). Moreover, the Commissioner contends

that the amendments to the Social Security Act,

which change the eligibility requirements for

Medicare coverage for victims of ALS, do not affect

the 20/40 requirement. (Id. at 11).

43a

Appendix C

In her brief in opposition to the Commissioner's

Motion, plaintiff reasserts that the 20/40 Rule denies

plaintiff equal protection under the Fifth Amendment

as women who leave the workforce to raise children

are disproportionately excluded from eligibility for

Social Security and Medicare benefits, and the 20/40

Rule contradicts Congress's clear intent to provide

immediate assistance to ALS victims and their

families. (Dkt. #19, at 2-5 & 8-9). Plaintiff further

contends that defendant has “failed to proffer a shred

of proof that the SSDI program is self-sufficient or

that [the] eradication [of the 20/40 Rule] would

materially undermine that goal,” and the standard

of review for a procedural due process challenge is

not applicable here; rather, the rational basis

standard is appropriate as plaintiff challenges the

20/40 Rule on substantive due process grounds.

(Dkt. #19, at 5-8).

A. EQUAL PROTECTION

As stated above, plaintiff contends that the 20/

40 Rule denies plaintiff equal protection under the

Fifth Amendment as the Rule has a “disparate and

discriminatory impact” against plaintiff and other

women who “after materially contributing to the

Social Security and Medicare Trust Funds, elect to

stay home and engage in the mothering of their

children.” (Dkt. #11, at 7-9; Dkt. #19, at 2-3}) Thet

Commissioner responds that plaintiff has failed to

show an equal protection violation in that the

government interest “embodied in the ‘20/4@§ rule

is legitimate” and the statute bears a rafional

relationship to that interest. (Dkt. #16, at 4-5).

44a

Appendix C

The Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution

provides that “No person shall be. . . deprived of life,

liberty, or property, without due process of law.”

“(While the Fifth Amendment contains no equal

protection clause, it does forbid discrimination that

is so unjustifiable as to be violative of due process.”

Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163, 168 (1964) (internal

quotations & citations omitted); see also Nicholas v.

Tucker, 114 F.3d 17, 19 (2d Cir. 1997), cert. denied,

523 U.S. 1126 (1998). “It is... well-established that

the constitutional guarantee of equal protection does

not forbid all classifications, but rather keeps

governmental [decision makers] from treating

different persons who are in all relevant respects

alike.” Nicholas, 114 F.3d at 20 (internal quotations

& multiple citations omitted). Unless the challenged

statute “burden|s] a fundamental right or draw([s] on

distinctions based on a suspect classification,” a Court

must “uphold” the legislation if the statute bears a

rational relationship “to a legitimate governmental

objective.” Id. at 20 (citation omitted). Moreover, the

Second Circuit has reiterated that the rational basis

standard of review applies specifically in cases such

as the one at hand, where “|d]istinctions [are] made

in [a] social welfare statute[ |.” Brown v. Bowen, 905

F.2d 632, 635 (2d Cir. 1990)(multiple citations

omitted), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1093 (1991); see also

Rudykoff v. Apfel, 193 F.3d 579, 580 (2d Cir.

1999)(“Constitutional challenges to social welfare

legislation such as the Social Security Act are

reviewed under the rational basis standard.”)

(multiple citations omitted). Additionally, the choices

made by Congress in enacting the challenged statute

“will be upheld unless they are clearly wrong, a

display si arbitrary power, [and] not an exercise of

45a

Appendix C

judgment.” Brown, 905 F.2d at 635 (internal

quotations & multiple citations omitted). Thus,

“[uJnless a statute employs a classification that is

inherently invidious or that impinges on fundamental

rights,” federal courts should “properly exercise | only

a limited review power over Congress.” Schweiker v.

Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 230 (1981) (citation omitted).

There are two ways in which governmental action

can violate the equal protection clause. “The first occurs

when the Government explicitly classifies or

distinguishes among persons” based on specific criteria,

such as, race, sex, religion or ethnicity. De La Cruz v.

Tormey, 582 F.2d 45, 49 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,

441 U.S. 965 (1979).'° In this case, there is no claim of

this type of facial discrimination. The “second and more

subtle variety of discrimination focuses, not on the form

of the governmental action, as does the first, but rather

its results.” Id. at 50. This type of discrimination is, in

form nondiscriminatory, but produces “effects which

weigh adversely and disproportionately upon the

members of a particular group of individuals.” Id. This

10. In De La Cruz, the plaintiffs were all young women

who challenged the lack of campus child care facilities in the

San Mateo Community College District, asserting a violation

of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment

on grounds that defendants’ actions constituted intentional,

invidious, gender-based discrimination and were arbitrary

and unrelated to the legitimate goal of providing education.

982 F.2d at 48-49. The Ninth Circuit denied defendants’

motion to dismiss as to the Equal Protection challenge on

grounds that [i]t [was] too early in the course of this litigation

... to determine whether the defendants’ conduct was free

from discriminatory purpose [and] what level of ‘scrutiny’ is

applicable on the novel facts of this case.” 582 F.2d at 59.

46a

Appendix C

type of discrimination “may require explanation in

terms of non-invidious purposes.” Id.

According to plaintiff, “[s|tudies have shown that

60 women with professional degrees are out of the

labor force at a rate about three times that of their

male counterparts and they overwhelming cite family

responsibilities as the reason.” (Dkt. #11, at 7-8,

quoting Jerry A. Jacobs & Janice Fanning Madden,

Mammies & Daddies on the Fast Track: Success of

Parents in Demanding Professions, 596 Annals Of

Am. Acad. Of Pol. & Soc. Sci. 246, 250 (2004));

see also Samuel Issacharoff & Elyse Rosenblum,

Women & the Workplace: Accommodating the

Demands of Pregnancy, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 2154, 2160-

65 (1994)[“Issacharoff & Rosenblum”].!' Plaintiff

correctly observes that the rates of Disability

Insurance coverage for women in their 30’s and early

40's are nearly 20% lower than that for men of

comparable age; married women are 10% less likely

to be insured than single women; and the SSA's

records reflect that women between the ages 31 and

11. Plaintiff posits the following example in support of

her argument that the 20/40 Rule employs a classification

that is inherently invidious — an applicant 31 years old who

worked from ages 21 through 26 years and paid into Social

Security and Medicare for five years would be entitled to

SSDI and Medicare benefits under the 20/40 Rule, whereas

an applicant 41 years old, such as the plaintiff when she was

diagnosed with ALS, having worked from age 18 through 34,

would not be eligible for SSDI or Medicare. According to

plaintiff, the recency requirements imposed by the 20/40 Rule,

therefore, become more onerous with age, ironically making

it more — not less — difficult to receive Medicare or SSDI

benefits the closer one is to the respective qualifying ages of

62 or 65 years. (Dkt. #11, at 8).

47a

Appendix C

41 are far more likely to be rejected by SSA than any

other group or age bracket. (Dkt. #11, at 8-9; Dkt.

#19, at 2-4, citing Olivia S. Mitchell & John W.R.

Phillips, Eligibility for Social Security Disability

Insurance, Issues in Brief - U. Mich. Retirement

Research Ctr. (2001)[“Mitchell & Phillips”]). The sum

result is that “working women are less weil-protected

by Social Security disability insurance than are

working men due to their more episodic labor market

attachment.” See Mitchell & Phillips, at 4.

Plaintiff contends that this “imbalance and

disproportionality”'* that the 20/40 Rule imposes

upon mothers equates to invidious discrimination.

(Dkt. #19, at 3-4)(citations omitted). The allegation

of a sexually disproportionate impact, standing alone,

however, is insufficient to state a violation of the

Constitution. See De La Cruz, 582 F.2d at 58.

Moreover, “[a] classification does not offend the

Constitution because in practice it results in some

inequality.” Tuttle v. Secretary of Health, Educ. and

Welfare, 504 F.2d 61, 63 (10th Cir. 1974) (internal

quotations & multiple citations omitted). While the

“impact of the official action ... may provide an

important starting point” for determining the

existence of invidious discrimination, plaintiff must

12. Plaintiff relies on the following language of the

Ninth Circuit in De La Cruz: “[O]ne may point to the fact

that the effects of the challenged ‘policy’ do not fall

exclusively upon women,... but affect as well men with

child-rearing responsibilities. ... Challenges which rely

upon disparate impact inevitably will involve consequences

which are not restricted in their operation to one group or

another. The essence of this sort of legal attack is imbalance

and disproportionality.” 582 F.2d at 57.

48a

Appendix C

also allege that defendant's course of conduct

is susceptible to an inference of intentional

discrimination. See De La Cruz, 582 F.2d at 59

(citation omitted). To determine “whether invidious

discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor”

demands an inquiry into several evidentiary sources,

“including the existence of a ‘clear pattern’

unexplainable on grounds other than discrimination,

the historical background of a decision, the ‘specific

sequence of events’ leading up to the challenged

action, and ‘departures’ from the normal procedural

sequences and substantive policies.” Id. at 58-59

(citations omitted).

While plaintiff is correct that “[hJaving children

makes it more likely that women will leave the

workforce altogether or switch to part-time

employment,” Issacharoff & Rosenblum, 94 Colum.

L. Rev. at 2165 (footnote omitted), so as to reduce or

eliminate the number of quarters of coverage a

woman accumulates, plaintiff does not point to any

evidence giving rise to an inference of intentional

discrimination. See De La Cruz, 582 F.2d at 58-59.

Moreover, as further discussed below, there is no

evidence that an “invidious discriminatory purpose

was a motivating factor” in the enactment of the

20/40 Rule; there exists no “‘clear pattern’

unexplainable on grounds other than discrimination’;

the legislative history, as discussed below, evidences

a rational relationship of the 20/40 Rule to a

legitimate governmental objective, and plaintiff

points to no departures from the normal procedural

sequences and substantive policies applicable to this

social welfare legislation. See Nicholas, 114 F.3d at

20; De La Cruz. 582 F.2d at 59-60.

49a

Appendix C

In addition to the foregoing, when social welfare

legislation is challenged, the legislation is “entitled

to a strong presumption of constitutionality.”

Califano v. Torres, 435 U.S. 1, 5 (1978)(citation

omitted) (percuriam). “Where rational basis scrutiny

applies, the Government has no obligation to produce

evidence or empirical data to sustain the rationality

of a statutory classification, and instead can base its

statutes on rational speculation.” Lewis v. Thompson,

252 F.3d 567, 582 (2d Cir. 2001)(internal quotations

& multiple citations omitted). That notwithstanding,

the Commissioner asserts that the 20/40 Rule

promotes the legitimate interests of ensuring that

the Disability Insurance program is self-supporting

and ties disability insurance benefits to employment

income. (Dkt. #16, at 5-6).

13. Plaintiff contends that the Commissioner should

“not hide behind the skirts of a long ago discredited myth of

self-sufficiency.” (Dkt. #19, at 6). Plaintiff posits that an

assertion that the Social Security system is self-supporting

“strains credibility” as the Director of the Congressional

Budget Office has predicted that “under current law ...

the Social Security trust funds would become exhausted in

2052; after that, the [SSA] would lack the authority to pay

full benefits and, without congressional action, outlays would

be limited to annual revenues, which would be 22 percent

lower than scheduled costs.” (Dkt. #19, at 5-6, quoting

Statement of Douglas Holtz-Eakin, Director of Congressional

Budget Office, “The Future of Social Security before the

Special Committee on Aging, United States Senate,” at 2-7

(February 3, 2005)). Moreover, plaintiff argues that

defendant has failed to “proffer a shred of proof that the

SSDI program is self-sufficient, she has not proffered any

evidence that the 20/40 Rule in fact supports a goal of self-

sufficiency or that its eradication would materially

undermine the goal.” (Dkt.-#19, at 6).

(Cont'd)

50a

Appendix C

It has been Congress's position that the disability

insurance system “should be completely self-

supporting from the contributions of covered

individuals and employers” for “as nearly as can be

foreseen and thus is actuarially sound.” H.R. Rep.

No. 92-231 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N.

4989, 5111. As Congress long ago recognized:

Under a program which provides

protection against loss of earnings on

account of disability, it is reasonable and

desirable that there be reliable means of

limiting such protection to those persons

who have had sufficiently long and

sufficiently recent covered employment to

indicate that they probably have been

dependent upon their earnings. It was to

meet this purpose that the disability work

requirements were designed, and, in most

cases, the present work requirements

produce results in accordance with this

purpose.

(Cont'd)

On the contrary, the Commissioner has proffered

evidence that the 20/40 Rule supports the goal of self-

sufficiency and that notwithstanding, the statute had a.

“rational basis when enacted” regardless of the current

projections of the funding of social security. See Brown, 905

F.2d at 637, Moreover, Congress determines the entitlement

to benefits and “[i]t is the responsibility of Congress, not

the courts, to determine how public funds shouid be spent

and how they should be raised,” and accordingly, to determine

how the goal ef self-sufficiency shall continue to be met with

the present day funding challenges that face the social

security programs. Id. at 635.

5la

Appendix C

S. Rep. No. 2388 (1958), reprinted in 1958 U.S.

C.C.A.N. 4218, 4229-30."* Moreover, “[t]he Supreme

Court has recognized that a State has a legitimate

interest in maintaining the self-supporting nature of

its insurance program” and this “stated principle also

applies to the federal government.” Tuttle. 504 F.2d

at 63 (internal quotations & citation omitted).

Additionally, the 20/40 Rule has been upheld as

constitutional under both the Equal Protection and

Due Process Clauses of the Fifth Amendment. See

Harvell v. Chater, 87 F.3d 371 (9th Cir. 1996)(per

curiam); Tuttle, 504 F.2d 61. In Tuttle, the Tenth

Circuit rejected the constitutional challenge to the

20/40 Rule, brought by a plaintiff who became

disabled when he had social security credits for only

19 calendar quarters of work, on grounds that 20/40

Rule, which allows for the entitlement of benefits as

determined by Congress, has a rational basis and is

tree from invidious discrimination. Tuttle, 504 F.2d

14. Toaddress the inevitable inequity that arises under

the 20/40 Rule, namely, the existence of a disability severe

enough to cause a person to stop working, yet not severe

enough to meet the definition of disability, the legislative

history of this statute reads:

The requirement of 20 quarters of coverage

out of the 40 calendar quarters ending with the

quarter of disablement, together with the fully

insured ‘status requirement, should provide

reasonable and adequate assurance that the

protection afforded by the disability provisions

will be keyed to loss of earnings on account of

disability.

S. Rep. No. 2388 (1958), reprinted in 1958 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4218,

4230.

52a

Appendix C

at 62-63. Likewise, the Ninth Circuit rejected the

constitutional challenge of the plaintiff in Harvell who

was “fully insured” within the meaning of the Social

Security Act, but because he worked in non-covered

employment and paid no social security taxes, he earned

no quarters of coverage. Harvell, 87 F.3d at 373.

Following the Tenth Circuit's decision in Tuttle, the

Ninth Circuit concluded that the 20/40 Rule is not a

“patently arbitrary classification, utterly lacking in

rational justification.” Harvell, 87 F.3d at 373 (citation

omitted).

Moreover, as another district court held two years

ago, the 20/40 Rule does not violate equal protection

under the Fifth Amendment because it distinguishes

between homemakers and those employed outside the

home. Specifically, U.S. Magistrate Judge Evans of the

District Court for the Central District of Illinois found:

this supposed discrimination is not sex-based

— 42 U.S.C. § 414 applies equally to both

men and women who ... were employed

outside the home intermittently. [Plaintiffs]

present no evidence that homemakers are a

suspect class entitled to either strict scrutiny

or heightened scrutiny. ... The Supreme

Court has held that a classification must be

upheld against an equal protection challenge

if there is any reasonably conceivable state

of facts that could provide a rational basis for

the classification. In addition, under rational

basis scrutiny, the means need only be

rationally related to a conceivable and

legitimate end.

53a

Appendix C

[T]here is a rational basis for the

means employed (the quarters of coverage

system), to achieve the intended purpose

(determining applicants’ eligibility for Social

Security benefits, while allowing the

program to be self-supporting, and assuring

that those receiving benefits were primarily

dependent on their lost wages). Therefore,

[plaintiffs] cannot show that 42 U.S.C.

§ 414 violates the equal protection

principles inherent in the Due Process

Clause.

See Winger v. Barnhart, 320 F. Supp. 2d 741, 747

(D. Ill. 2004) (internal quotations, citations & footnote

omitted).

Accordingly, although this Court is deeply

sympathetic to plaintiff's tragic plight,'> Congress’s

legitimate goals, in enacting the 20/40 Rule, of making

the social security system self-sufficient by tying

substantial contributions to the system before the

onset of disability to an established attachment to

the labor force so that disability claimants may

demonstrate a dependence on their employment

income, cannot be said to be patently arbitrary or

lacking rational justification. Any revisions to the

20/40 Rule, to rectify the predicament of plaintiff's

situation, ought to be initiated by the legislative, and

not judicial, branch of government.

15. See note 6 supra.

54a

Appendix C

B. DUE PROCESS CLAUSE

Plaintiff further argues that denying her SSDI

benefits after she has paid social security taxes

during the 15 calendar years'® in which she was

employed, is patently unjust and cruel, and runs

contrary to the polices underlying the Social Security

and Medicare systems in general, and, in particular,

as they have been amended to otherwise specifically

accommodate victims of ALS. (Dkt. #11, at 10-16;

Dkt. #19, at 8-9). The Commissioner responds that

plaintiff has not made a showing of a due process

violation as she was afforded an opportunity to present

her claim for disability benefits at an administrative

hearing, and the amendments to the Social Security

Act do not affect the 20/40 requirement. (Dkt. #16,

at 10).

Plaintiff correctly refers to Weinberger v.

Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 643-44 (1975), which

observed that Congress’s intent in enacting and

amending the Social Security Act was to “afford more

adequate protection to the family as a unit” and that

“[uJnderlying the 1939 [amendments] was the

principle that under a social-insurance plar the

primary purpose is to pay benefits in accordance with

the probable needs of the beneficiaries|, like plaintiff

in this case,] rather than to make payment to [his or

her] estate.” (internal quotations & citation omitted).

However, in addition to furthering the goal of

protecting the family as a unit, Congress enacted

the 20/40 Rule with the legitimate goals of making

the social security system self-supporting by assuring

16. See note 5 supra.

55a

Appendix C

that disability claimants make a substantial

contribution to the system before the onset of

disability and of screening out claimants who have

not established an attachment to the labor force for

a sufficient amount of time to demonstrate that they

have depended on their employment income.

See 2 Sociat Security LAW AND Practice § 14.27, at 37-

38 (citations omitted).'”

“It is the responsibility of Congress, not the courts,

to determine how public funds should be spent” and

to legislate within the lines they must draw to ensure

the economic viability of the social welfare programs.

Brown, 905 F.2d at 635 (internal citations omitted).

In that vein, and in light of the goals articulated

above, Congress has exercised its judgment so as to

favor victims of ALS, in amending the Social Security

Act to allow for a waiver of the 24-month waiting

period for Medicare coverage for individuals who have

filed an application, who are under a disability, and

unlike plaintiff, who are insured for disability

benefits. See H.R. Rep. No. 106-1019(I) (2000):

see also 42 U.S.C. § 426(h); 42 U.S.C. § 426(b) (2) (A);

42 U.S.C. § 423(a). Moreover, in 2003, the SSA

amended its regulations to allow the SSA to make

findings of presumptive disability with respect to

claims involving ALS. See Revised Medical Criteria

for Evaluating Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis, 68 Fed.

Reg. 51689, 51691-92 (Aug. 28, 2003)(to be codified

20 C.F.R. pts. 404 and 416). The foregoing

notwithstanding, the Commissioner correctly

observes that the amendments to the Social Security

Act and to the regulations do not affect the 20/40

17. See note 14 supra.

56a

Appendix C

requirement. “[T]his Court properly exercises only a

limited review power over Congress” as the 20/40

Rule does not include “a classification that is

inherently invidious or that impinges on fundamental

rights.” Schweiker, 450 U.S. at 230 (citation omitted).

Accordingly, this Court is bound to uphold the choices

made by the legislature as they are not “clearly wrong

[or] a display of arbitrary power.” Brown, 905 F.2d

at 635 (citations omitted).

In addition to the foregoing, “[w]hether a Social

Security Act classification is attacked on equal

protection grounds . . . or on due process grounds, . . .

the test [that this Court must apply] is whether the

statute manifests a patently arbitrary classification,

utterly lacking in rational justification.” Tuttle, 504

F.2d at 62 (internal quotations & citations omitted).

“Although Congress has great latitude to make

classifications in the area of economic and welfare

legislation,” the federal government must have “some

rational basis or be pertinent to some proper objective

of Congress” in enacting such legislation in order to

withstand a due process challenge. See Davis v.

Richardson, 342 F. Supp. 588, 591 (D. Conn.), aff'd

mem., 409 U.S. 1069 (1972).'* To satisfy this

standard, plaintiff must carry her “heavy burden of

18. Plaintiff correctly observes that the rational basis

standard, as stated above, applies to plaintiffs constitutional

challenge and that defendant's assertion that due process is

satisfied because plaintiff received a “full and fair hearing” is

misplaced. See Yancey, 145 F.3d at 112 (when a challenge is

made on procedure due process grounds, due process “requires

that a social security hearing must be full and fair.” )(citation

omitted).

57a

Appendix C

proof of the system's arbitrary or irrational nature.”

Winger, 320 F. Supp. 2d at 746.

In contrast to the goals outlined by the

Commissioner which have been recognized as

rationally related to the legislative purpose

underlying the Social Security system, see Harvell.

87 F.3d 371; Tuttle, 504 F.2d 61, plaintiff has failed

to demonstrate how the quarters of coverage system

is incapable of achieving those goals. See Winger,

320 F. Supp. 2d at 745-46. Thus, for the reasons stated

in Section IV.A. supra, plaintiff's constitutional

challenge on due process grounds cannot survive.

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, plaintiffs Motion

for Summary Judgment (Dkt. #10) is denied and

defendant's Motion for Order Affirming the Decision

of the Commissioner (Dkt. #15) is granted.’

The parties are free to seek the district judge's

review of this recommended ruling. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 636(b)(written objection to ruling must be

filed within ten days after service of same); F ep.

R. Civ. P. 6(a), 6(e) & 72; Rule 72.2 of the Local Rules

for United States Magistrate Judges, United States

District Court for the District of Connecticut; Small

19. The Magistrate Judge commends Attorneys Richard

F. Hans, John Vukelj, and John P. Regan and Assistant United

States Attorney Ann M. Nevins for their comprehensive and

well written briefs on this novel legal question, and further

commends plaintiff Claire Collier and her husband William for

their courage, devotion, and selfless efforts. This is a significant

issue which Congress should address as promptly as possible.

58a

Appendix C

v. Secretary of HHS, 892 F.2d 15, 16 (2d Cir.

1989) (failure to file timely objection to Magistrate

Judge’s recommended ruling may preclude

further appeal to the Second Circuit).

Dated this 25th day of April, 2006, at New Haven,

Connecticut.

s/ Joan Glazer Margolis

United States Magistrate Judge

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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