Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Hopkins v. Northbrook Mobile Park Corp (No. 06-1252)

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OFFICE OF THE CLERK

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THE SUPREME COURT

OF THE UNITED STATES

OF AMERICA

No

Glenn J. Hopkins, Cindy S. Hopkins

Petitioners

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-orthbrook Mobrie Homme Park Coiporation.

Ron Cottrell, Shea Courell.

Responaeats.

ON PETITON FOR A WRIT OF |

CERTIORARI

FROM PHE 1LLINOES 4° DISTRICT

COMRYT OF APPEALS

:»pkins \ Northbrook -200}-L-0227> NO O4-05-9435

thbrook v Hopkins-200 f-i Mi-2 bob NOL0S-G5-0 186

For Pethooners:

William Shatter. Atterney at Law

1648 So Macarthur Blyva

Sormutield Himois 62704

217-322-9880

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

-j-

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

-Issue I-

As to whether or not the Illinois State Courts

misuse the state court’s.doctrine of Resjudicata in

violation of the 14° Amendment when all prior

filed state and federal claims in another state court

civil action are dismissed-on resjudicata grounds

without a hearing on the merits when, under the

comity rule and state law, the pending issues could

not be raised as a defense to a retaliatory state

court action under Forcible Entry and Detainer?

-Issue H-

As to whether or not the State Courts finding

that Hopkins federal claims were “frivolous” and

improper grounds for any state court relief under

735-ILCS-5/2-1401(f) Was an exercise of state power in

conflict with the Supremacy Clause, in re Ex Parte

Young, justifying this Supreme Courts intervention

for the protection of rights established by Federal

law that have been invalidated hy the state courts

of Illinois, in re Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. v.

De la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141 (1982)?

-Issue III-

As to whether or not there is a violation of

42-USC-1983 and 42-USC-1986 by the State

courts when imstate special interests conspire to

act under color of a state law and known judicial

policy with the intent to use the states judicial

process to confiscate property and invalidate

applicable federal and state laws under color of a

state court doctrine of Resjudicata, in re Collins v

-ij-

-Issue IV-

As to whether or not the victims of such a

“conspiracy” would have a cause of action for

relief in the federal courts under 42-USC-1983, or

should the victims be restricted to what is now a

useless petition in a state court, creating a question

of how to obtain relief from constitutional

violations and enforcement of federal law arising

from this type of corruption of the state judicial

process, in-re California Motor’ ransport, 404 U.S. 512-

513, thus justifying this Courts review, in re_West

Lynn Creamery v. Healy, 512'U.S. 186 (1994)?

-Issue V-

As to whether or not the state Courts have the

constitutional power to arbitrarily redefine “what is

due process” under the Supremacy clause when

this U.S. Supreme Court has already clearly

defined that Due process requires written notice be

served by the States within a reasonable time to

respond, In Re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, (1967)?

-Issue VI-

As to whether or not the state courts are

required to provide post judgment relief when

there has been a failure to serve notice by the

-iil-

-Issue VII-

As to whether or not there has been a failure to

accommodate violation of Title II of the ADA, 42-

USC Sec. 12132 when a state court neglects to serve

notice of the dismissal of a Civil rights action upon

a pro-se disabled litigant within the time allowed

for filing an appeal, then refusing to grant relief

and sanctioning the petitioner for seeking relief

within the time allowed by law?

Issue VIII-

As to whether or not Hopkins action in the District

Court on the federal claims pertaining to this

action had diligently suspended the tolling of the

state statute of limitations under 28-USC-1367(d)

as it applies to the time for filing a petition for

relief in the State Court in both actions under 735-

ILCS-5/2-1401(f), in re JINKS V._ RICHLAND

COUNTY, 538 U.S. 456 (2003) and Hudson v Palmer,

468 U.S. 517.(1984))?

-Issue [X-

As to whether or not that if state courts engage in

retaliatory type conduct towards a party who is

opposing the judicial usurpation of state law rights,

discrimination, and unlawful deprivation of

property under federal law, there is a foreseeable

denial of due process that undermines the intent

and the purpose of the United States Constitution

that is defeating this Courts authority under _the

Supremacy _clause to determine_what_is _the

national policy as the legislature of Illinois and

Congress intended it should be?

-iV-

-Issue X-

As to whether or not a State Court abuses its

power by refusing to hear a justified good faith

attack on the constitutionality of a State’s law and

policy when proven that state “law” and associated

policy was used by private parties to confiscate

property and invalidate federal law in conflict with

the Supremacy Clause, see Silkwood v_Kerr-

McGee Corp. 464 U.S. 238 (1984)?

-Issue XI-

As to whether or not when a Judge refuses to

recuse themselves.on Motion to do so when there

is reasonable evidence of a prior conspiracy by

private parties in the courts at issue, was a severe

abuse of discretion after a complaint had been filed

against them for Title If ADA discrimination and

participation in a conspiracy to violate Civil rights

in violation of 42-U.S.C.-1983, and is it reasonable

to presume this refusal to recuse has precluded the

fair and meaningful determination of these claims

in violation of the 14 Amendment?

-Issue XII-

As to whether or not the Illinois Supreme

Courts policy that leases do not have to be valid to

be enforced under the Forcible Entry and Detainer

Act, has unconstitutionally created conditions in

the State Courts that arbitrarily invades and

deprives all disabled mobile home tenants in

illinois of the fair and meaningful protection of

State and Federal law in their civil rights and

property in violation of the 14" Amendment?

-/V-

-Issue XIII-

As to whether or not the State court was in

error in finding that denial of a court reporter to a

memory impaired disabled person in this case was

not discrimination in violation of Title II of the

ADA in re Tennessee v Lane?

-TABLE OF CONTENTS-

Questions in this Appeal I-IV

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Vi-Vili

Statutory provisions involved Vill- XV

Jurisdiction l

Statement of the Facts 2-9

Reasons for granting the writ 10-28

Conclusion 29

Oath and Affirmation 30

-vi-

-Table of authorities-

*denotes U.S. Supreme Court cases prior raised,

cited and ignored by the Illinois State Courts.

1. *Associated Industries of Missouri v Lohman,

114 S. Ct. 1815, 128 L. Ed. 2d 639 (1994) page 19

2. *ALDEN V. MAINE, 527 U.S. 706 (1999).

Page 18

3. Bank of Belleville v. Stidmire 119 Ill. Sup. 3d

73 456 N_E. Ed 175 74 Ill. Dec. 673 (5" District

1983) page 15

4. *Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S.

250, 254-255 (1988) page 18

5. Bute v Illinois, 333 U.S. 640 (1948)page 25

6 *Bennis v. Michigan, 517 U.S. 1163 (1996)

— page Il

7. Briscoe v Lahue, 460 U.S. 325 (1983) page 21

8.*California Motor Transport, 404 U.S. 512-513

page 26

9.* Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392

(1987) page 13

10. Carpenter v Mobile World Inc, 194. Ill. App.

3d 830,839 551 N.E.2d 724,729 (1990) page 14

11. Collins v Harker Heights, 503 U.S.115(1992)

page 14

12. * Degan v United States, $17 U.S. 820 (1996),

page 28

13. *EX PARTE YOUNG, 209 US. 123 (1908) Page 10

14. * Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. v. De la

Cuesta, 458 U. S. 141 (1982) page 11

15. *Free v Bland, 369 U.S. 663 page 17

16. *Holmes v_ Vornado, 534 U.S. 1016 (2001)

page 13

-Vii-

17. *Hudson v Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984) page

21

18. *In Re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, (1967) page 22

19. *Johnson v Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 485 (1969)

page 23

20. *JINKS V. RICHLAND COUNTY, 538 USS.

456 (2003) page 24

21. *Lugar _v Edmondson Oil Company Inc,

457.U.S. 922. page 20

22. *McClellan v. Carland, 217U.S.268, 282 page

1]

23. Miuitchell v_ Fiat Allis, 158 Ill. 2d 143, 632

N.E.2d 1010, 198 Ill. Dec. 399, page 22

24. *Mitchum v Foster 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972)

page 23

25. *Nebbia v New York 291 U.S. 502 (1934)

page 15

26. *Norris v Alabama, 294 U.S. 587(1935) page

21

27. *Osborne_v. Ohio, 495 U. S. 103, 122-125

page 15

28. *Oklahoma City v Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808 page

20

29. *Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981) page

10

30. * Pierson v Ray 386 U.S.547 (1967) page 21

31. People v Evans, 163 Ill. App. 3d 561, 516

N.E.2d 817 (1st Dist 1987.) page 13

32. *Powell v Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) page

21

33. Rosewood Corporation V. Fisher 263 N.E.2d

833 page 13

-Vill-

34. Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945)

page 11

35. *Silkwood v Kerr-McGee Corp. 464 U.S. 238

page I1

36. *Soldal v. Cook County, Ill., 506 U.S. 56

page 12

37. *Tennessee v Lane, 539 U.S. 941 (2004) page

1]

38. Testa v Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947) page 12

39. *Tumey v Ohio, 273U.S. 510 page 11

40. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-

248 page 20

41. *Wilson v Garcia 471 U.S. 261 Page 20

42. *West Lynn Creamery v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186,

page 21

Constitutional Issues

Article I- Commerce Clause

Article VI-Supremacy Clause

Amendment I

Amendment XIV

Federal Statutory provisions in Question

Title III of the Americans with Disabilities

act, 42-U.S.C. Sec. 12182. - Prohibition of

discrimination by public accommodations

Fair Housing Act 42-U.S.C. See. Sec.

3602. -3604, 3605, 3606, or 3617 of this title.

42-USC-1981- Equal rights under the law

42-USC-1983_Civil action for deprivation of

rights: 42-USC $1986. Action for neglect to

prevent

28-USC§-1367(c) and (d)

ies

28-USC§-1343 Civil rights and elective franchise

STATE STATUTES IN QUESTION:

735 ILCS 5/2-619: Involuntary dismissal based

upon certain defects or defenses. (a) Defendant

may, within the time for pleading, file a motion for

dismissal of the action or for other appropriate

relief upon any of the following grounds. If the

grounds do not appear on the face of the pleading

attacked the motion shall be supported by

affidavit: (3) That there is another action pending

between the same_parties for the same cause.

(4)That_the cause of action is barred by a prior

judgment

Forcible Entry, (735 ILCS 5/9-102) When action

may be maintained. (a) The person entitled to the

possession of lands or tenements may be restored

thereto under any of the following circumstances:

(4) When any lessee of the lands or tenements, or

any person holding under such lessee, holds

possession without right after the termination of

the lease or tenancy by its own_ limitation,

condition or terms, or by notice to quit or

otherwise.

(Forcible Entry 735 ILCS 5/9-106). Pleadings and

evidence. On complaint by the party or parties

entitled to the possession of such premises being

filed in the circuit court for the county where such

premises are situated, stating that such party is

entitled to the possession of such premises

(describing the same with reasonable certainty),

and that the defendant (naming the defendant)

unlawfully withholds the possession thereof from

-X-

him, her or them, the clerk of the court shall issue

asummons. The defendant may under a general

denial of the allegations of the complaint offer in

evidence any matter in defense of the action.

Except as otherwise provided in Section 9-120, no

matters not germane to the distinctive purpose—of

the proceeding shall be introduced by joinder,

counterclaim _or_otherwise. However, a claim for

rent may be joined in the complaint, and judgment

may be entered for the amount of rent found due.

Mobile Home Park Landlord and Tenants Rights

Act, (765 ILCS 745/1) Sec. 1. Applicability. This

Act shall regulate and determine legal rights,

remedies and obligations of the parties to any lease

of a mobile home or mobile home lot in a mobile ©

home park containing five or more mobile homes

within this State. Any lease, written or oral, shall

be unenforceable insofar as any provision thereof

conflicts with any provision of this Act.

Mobile Home Park Landlord and Tenants Rights

Act (765 ILCS 745/6) Sec. 6. Obligation of Park

Owner to Offer Written Lease. No person shall

offer a mobile home or lot for rent or sale in a

mobile home park without having first exhibited to

the prospective tenant or purchaser a copy of the

lease applicable to the respective mobile home

park.

(a) The park owner shall be required to offer to

each present and future tenant a written lease for a

term of not less than 12 months, unless the parties

agree to a different term subject to existing leases

which shall be continued pursuant to their terms.

-Xl-

(c) The park owner shall notify his tenants in

writing not later than 30 days after the effective

date of this Act, that a written lease shall be

available to the tenant and that such lease is being

offered in compliance with and will conform to the

requirements of this Act.

Mobile Home Park Landlord and Tenants Rights

Act 765 ILCS 745/12: Sec. 12. Lease prohibitions.

No lease hereafter executed or Currently existing

between a park owner and tenant in a mobile home

park in this State shall contain any provision: (a)

Permitting the park owner to charge a penalty fee

for late payment of rent without allowing a tenant

a minimum of 5 days beyond the date the rent is

due in which to remit such payment;...(d)

Permitting the park owner to transfer, or move, a

mobile home to a different lot, including a

different lot in the same mobile home park, during

the term of the lease..

Mobile Home Park Landlord and Tenants Rights

Act 765 ILCS 745/14: Rules and regulations of

park. Rules and regulations promulgated and

adopted by the park owner are enforceable

against a tenant only if: (a) A copy of all rules

and regulations was delivered by the park owner to

the tenant prior to his signing the lease; (b) The

purpose of such rules and regulations is to promote

the Convenience, safety and welfare of the tenants,

preserve park property from damage or to fairly

distribute park services and facilities to the tenants:

(c) They are reasonably related to the purpose for

-xii-

which adopted: (d)They apply to all tenants in a

fair manner.

Mobile Home Park Landlord and Tenants Rights

Act 765 ILCS 745/16. Improper grounds for

eviction. The following conduct by a tenant shall

not constitute grounds for eviction or termination

of the lease, nor shall a judgment for possession of

the premises be entered against a tenant: (a) As a

reprisal for the tenant's effort to secure or enforce

any rights under the lease _or the laws of the State

of Illinois, or its governmental subdivisions of the

United States; (b) As a reprisal for the tenant’s

good faith complaint to a governmental authority

of the park owner’s alleged violation of any health

or safety law, regulation, code or ordinance, or

State law or regulation which has as its objective

the regulation -of premises used for dwelling

purposes;

Mobile Home Park Landlord and Tenants Rights

Act 765 ILCS 745/21: Sec. 21. Remedies,

Tenants. If the park owner fails to substantially

conform to the lease agreement or fails to

substantially comply with any code, statute,

ordinance or regulation governing the operation of

a mobile home park or the maintenance of the

premises, the tenant may, on written notice to the

park owner, terminate the lease and vacate the

premises at any time during the first 30 days of

occupancy After the expiration of said 30 days the

tenant may terminate the lease only if he has

remained in possession in reliance upon the park

owner's written promise to correct all or any part

-xiii-

of the condition which would justify termination

by the tenant under this Section. Any condition

which deprives the tenant of substantial benefit

and enjoyment which the park owner shall fail to

remedy within 30 days after having received notice

in writing of such condition shall constitute

grounds for the tenant to. terminate the lease and

vacate the premises. No such notice shall be

required where the condition renders the mobile

home uninhabitable or poses an imminent threat to

the health, welfare and safety of any occupant. If

such condition was proximately caused by the

willful or negligent act or omission of the park

owner, the tenant may recover any damages

sustained as a result of the condition including, but

not limited to, reasonable expenditures necessary

to obtain adequate substitute housing while the

mobile home is uninhabitable. The tenant may

sue to enforce all Sections of this Act and the court

may award damages or grant any injunctive or

other relief.

Consumer Fraud and unfair and Deceptive

Business Practices Act; 815 ILCS 3505/1: Sec. 1.

(c) The term “person” includes any natural person

or his legal representative, partnership, corporation

(domestic and foreign), company, trust, business

entity or association, and any agent, employee,

salesman, partner, officer, director, member,

stockholder, associate, trustee or cestui que trust

thereof: (d) The term "sale" includes any sale,

offer for sale, or attempt to sell any merchandise

for cash or on credit... (e) The term "consumer"

-xiv- :

means any person who purchases or contracts for

the purchase of merchandise not for resale in the

ordinary course of his trade or business but for his

use or that of a member of his household... (f) The

terms “trade" and "commerce" mean_ the

advertising, offering for sale, sale, or distribution

of any services and any property, tangible or

intangible, real, personal or mixed, and any other

article, commodity, or thing of value wherever

situated, and shall include any trade or commerce

directly or indirectly affecting the people of this

State. |

Consumer Fraud and unfair and Deceptive

Business Practices Act_815 ILCS 5035/2. — Unfair

methods of competition and unfair or deceptive

acts or practices, including but not limited to the

use or employment of any deception fraud, false

pretense, false promise, misrepresentation or the

concealment, suppression or omission of any

material fact, with intent that others rely upon the

concealment, suppression or omission of such

material fact, or the use or employment of any

practice described in Section 2 of the "Uniform

Deceptive Trade Practices Act", approved August

5, 1965, in the conduct of any trade or

commerce are hereby declared unlawful whether

any person has in fact been misled, deceived or

damaged thereby. In construing this section

consideration shall be given to the interpretations

of the Federal Trade Commission and the federal

courts relating to Section 5 (a) of the Federal Trade

Commission Act.

735-ILCS-5/2- 1401(f) Relief from judgments.

(a) Relief from final orders and judgments, after 30

days from the entry thereof, may be had upon

petition as provided in this Section. Writs of error

coram nobis and coram vobis, bills of review and

bills in the nature of bills of review are abolished. All

relief heretofore obtainable and the grounds for such

relief heretofore available, whether by any of the

foregoing remedies or otherwise, shall be available in

every case, by proceedings hereunder, regardless of

the nature of the order or judgment from which relief

is sought or of the proceedings in which it was

entered.

(b) The petition must be filed in the same

proceeding in which the order or judgment was

entered but is not a continuation thereof. The petition

must be supported by affidavit or other appropriate

showing as to matters not of record. All parties to the

petition shall be notified as provided by rule.

(c) Except as provided ... the petition must be filed

not later than 2 years after the entry of the order or

judgment. /ime_ during which _the_person_seeking

relief is under legal disability or duress or

the ground for relief is fraudulently concealed shall

be excluded in computing the period of 2 years.

(d) The filing of a petition under this Section does

not affect the order or judgment, or suspend its

operation.

(f) Nothing contained in this Section affects any

existing right to relief from _a void order or judgment,

or to employ any existing method to procure that

relief.

ele

-PRAYER-

Petitioners respectfully prays that a writ of

Certiorari issue to review this cause, or in the

alternative, a per curium Order to vacate the

Judgment for sanctions and the judgments of the

Illinois 7" Circuit Courts in re Hopkins v Northbrook -

2001-L-0227; and Northbrook v_Hopkins-2001-LM-2161;

and the subsequent Fourth District Appellate Court

mandate, NO.04-05-0435, NO.04-05-0186, which the

Illinois Supreme Court has refused to review.

-JURISDICTION-

The Jurisdiction of this Court to review the

State Courts in re; NO.04-05-0435, NO.04-05-0186, is

invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1257(a). The Jurisdiction of

the Illinois Supreme Court was established under

Federal law, 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d),. and state law

under Illinois Supreme Court rules 301 and 315.

Affidavit of Intent to Appeal filed April 25, 2006,

The Illinois Supreme Court declined to review on

September 27, 2006. Appeal was timely.

-STATEMENT OF THE CASE-

State law and state judicial policy has been

employed by Private parties in the state Courts to

invalidate applicable state and federal law and

confiscate a disabled persons property. The state

Courts found Hopkins claims of State law usurpation

and federal civil rights violations were “frivolous,”

and has issued sanctions in excess of $7.000 (seven

thousand dollars),that is negating the intent and

purpose of the 1% and the 14" Amendment in

violation of the Supremacy Clause.

s, 2

-Verified STATEMENT OF THE CASE FACTS -

(1.) Glenn J. Hopkins was a disabled Mobile home

owner, and with his spouse, entered into a lease

agreement for one of several available mobile home

park lots owned by Respondent on March 24, 2001.

Hopkins selected lot 73 on March 26, 2001, moved

their mobile home into the park on March 29, 2001.

(R.A. C000029, 38, and C000100, Index

lines 2-7, and Hopkins y_ Northbrook, 2001-L-0227 Amended

Complaint)

(2.) Northbrook retained control of the lease

Documentation until Hopkins had moved the mobile

home in, and subsequently thereafter modified the

terms and conditions of the Hopkins original signed

lease agreement from the Statutory 12 months as

required under 765-ILCS-745/6, to seven months,

and imposed handwritten conditions of continued

tenancy that was specific only to Hopkins tenancy,

without the prior knowledge or

the consent of Hopkins, and thereafter served

Hopkins a copy of this modified lease agreement on

April 6, 2001, after Hopkins had moved in and had

no funds to relocate. There was no valid lease to the

premises. (R.A. C000100, Index lines 7-17 and Hopkins_v

Northbrook, 2001-L-0227 Amended Complaint

S.R.A.C00059).

(3.) June rent was due June |, 2001, and was paid on

June 6, 2001. Northbrook thereafter demanded a late

fee of $60.00 on June 10, 2001, claiming entitlement

pursuant to terms of the lease. which Hopkins refused

to pay, stating it was unlawful,

and reported this matter to the Attorney General of

Illinois. Northbrook canceled the skirting deal in

afi

retaliation. (R.A. C000100, Index lines 17-21, C000101,

index lines 6-9, and Hopkins v Northbrook, 2001-L-0227 Amended

Complaint).

(4.) On June 27, 2001, Hopkins witnessed and

reported to police an act of property damage on

another tenant’s property by Brandon Potts, an

alleged business associate of Respondents operating

Pine Ridge Mobile Home Sales. Potts then gave

notice of eviction of Hopkins in retaliation for

Hopkins calling the police, claiming the cause would

be for not having painted the home in managements

chosen color, not having skirting, and quoting the

terms of the lease as if he were a party to them.! (R.A.

C000101, Index lines 10-18, and Hopkins v Northbrook, 2001-L-

0227 Amended Complaint S.R.A.C00068.)

(5.) Northbrook agents Ron and Sheila Cottrell

subsequently that same day again demanded

payment again of the late fee, then after it was

refused, served verbal notice to move the home by

the end of the month or Hopkins was to surrender

title to their home’, stating as cause the very same

claims of failure to perform pursuant to terms of

the lease as had Potts. (R.A. C000101, Index lines 19-24,

and Hopkins v Northbrook, 2001-L-0227 Amended Complaint)

~ (6.) This verbal Notice of retaliatory eviction was

followed by a written notice from the Council

identified as Beth Wilkie on July 5, 2001 stating in

' Potts has robbed, assaulted and battered Hopkins before when

he managed another park, see C000269-272.

“Northbrook has used the Forcible entry action to obtain

possession of the home. and demanded the title for “court costs’.

is

writing the very same_ allegations. Note

‘The mobile home had been green and white tone

when it was moved in, Northbrook had required it

to be repainted solid gray, until they and Potts -

changed their minds’, and then claimed the home

had not been painted, and there was no skirting in

that Northbrook breached an agreement to supply

replacement skirting on June 10, 2001. Glenn

Hopkins, a disabled person, unable to move his

home, had such a severe anxiety attack that it

caused a heart attack on July 11, 2001. (A

C000101, Index lines 24-28, and Hopkins v Northbrook, 2001-

L-0227 Amended Complaint $.R.A.C00059)

(7.) Hopkins subsequently filed a Pro-Se Civil

Action in the Seventh Circuit Court of Illinois for

damages in excess of $50.000, and to enforce

allegedly protected interests under both State and

Federal laws against Northbrook on July 16, 2001.

(R.A. CO000101 Index line 30, C000102, index line 3)

(8.) While that action was pending hearing on a

motion to amend and a preliminary Injunction for

the protection of Hopkins property from an

intervention action under the Forcible Entry and

Detainer Act, Northbrook agents commenced

dumping garbage and- debris on Hopkins lot and

the adjacent lot, threatening other tenants with

eviction to intimidate witnesses, killing Hopkins

dog “Buddie” by beating it to death while it was on

a chain, and ordering wrecker services to seize

Hopkins motor vehicles at night, thus repeatedly

‘one of many examples of Direct evidence of perjury the

Appeals Court has “objected to,” appendix c, page 43.

-5-

‘requiring police intervention to get them back,

with three vehicles, a 1984 ford truck owned by

Cindy Hopkins that was returned with sand in the

oil pan that had destroyed it’s engine, a 1989

Dodge Colt also owned by Cindy Hopkins (to

replace the truck) that was returned without it’s

computer, and a 1985 Chevy Beretta that belonged

to Serina Hopkins, (daughter) that was returned

with a hole torn in its drivers side door and the

transmission housing cracked, resulting in the total

loss of the vehicles. (R.A. C000102, Index liries 4-5)

(S.R.A.C00286)

(9.) Northbrook Council Manson, Lahr, and Beth

Wilkie then brought a separate action for

possession under color of the Illinois Code of Civil

Procedures Forcible Entry and Detainer act, 735

ILCS 5/9-102/a (4) on November 2, 2001, which is

the matter of Northbrook v_ Hopkins, 2001-LM-

2161 that is also before this Court in this appeal.

(R.A. C000001) Appendix B, H,

(10.) In that intervening action Hopkins, acting

Pro-se, filed a combined Motion to dismiss under

Illinois Code of Civil Procedures sections 2-619(3)

and Section 2-615. These motions clearly

disclosed that Northbrook was a defendant in a

prior civil action brought by Hopkins as a disabled

person entitled Hopkins v. Northbrook, 2001-L-

0227 filed July 16, 2002, raising by Judicial Notice -

{That the action was under The Mobile Home Park

Landlord and Tenants Rights Act, 765- ILCS-

-6- ,

745/1 et seq., The Consumer Fraud and Unfair

- Business practices Act 815-ILCS-505/2, and the

Americans with Disabilities Act, 42-U.S.C.

12181.} Under Section 2-619(a) (3) Hopkins had

claimed “That there is another action pending

between the same parties for the same cause”

which required that the second action between the

same parties for the same cause was to be

dismissed if a hearing of it would create a

collateral estoppels bar to the prior filed cause, and

disclosed under section 2-615 that Northbrook did

not have a legitimate cause of action in that the

lease was not valid, enumerating 5 specific

provisions in the lease and its associated park rules

that were in prima facie and unequivocal violation

of the act, so that lease could not be enforced as a

matter of law or equity under 765-ILCS-745/1._ It

was further alleged as clearly apparent that this

second action was one of reprisal in violation of

765 ILCS 745/16, because filing a complaint in a

Court meets (b) “As a reprisal for the tenant’s

good faith complaint to a governmental

authority...” (R.A. C000102, Index lines 9-21)

(11.) Northbrook, represented in Northbrook _v

Hopkins 2001-LM-2161 by Beth Wilkie, with the

assistance of Councils Manson and Nicholson who

were also handling the first action, Hopkins _v

Northbrook 2001-L-0227, filed a response

claiming Section 2-619(A) (3) did not apply to

Forcible Entry actions as_a matter of Illinois

Supreme Court Policy, that the issue of validity of

the lease and the park rules was properly matters

e, See

for their trial, stating a superior night of action.

(R.A. C000102, Index lines 22-30, C000045-47).

(12.) Judge Shiffman, Trial Court of Northbrook v,

Hopkins, 2001-LM-2161, while knowing Hopkins

was impaired, refused to recuse himself, did not

provide an attorney, denied Hopkins access to a

Court reporter unless he could pay for it in

advance. On December 20, Judge Shiffman denied

the Motions to Dismiss without recording his

reasons for his denial in the common law record.

Hopkins recalls Judge Shiffman commenting that

the issues of Federal disability law and _ the

numerous state law violations of the Mobile Home

Park Landlord and tenants Rights Act were not

germane to this action of Forcible Entry, claiming

that “the lease did not have to be valid in order for

Northbrook to bring action when the lease expired

of its own limitations based on Fisher. When

Hopkins pointed out that this would result in

dismissal of Hopkins action under Resjudicata,

Judge Shiffman stated that “Hopkins was to take

the issues of Northbrook’s violations of law up

with the other Court”, Judge Shiffman citing

People v Evans, but not recording that fact in the

record. (R.A. C000103, Index lines 4-15)

(13.) A bench proceeding was held on January 2,

2002 with only the Court judge, Beth Wilkie,

Sheila Cottrill, and Glenn Hopkins present.

Hopkins issues related to the prior cause were

precluded “as belonging to the other action” and

not Germane, thus Hopkins could not “prove” his

-&-

affirmative defenses. Judgment was then entered

for possession to Northbrook in that summary

Bench proceeding without any method to record

those proceedings.

(14.) Northbrook Council Almon Manson, in the

hearing held on January 7, 2002 before Judge

Cadigan, then verbally’ moved to dismiss the civil

action Hopkins v_ Northbrook 2001-L-0227

claiming there was resjudicata from the January 2,

2002 judgment. (In subsequent pleadings Manson

represented the federal issues _as having been

raised _and adjudicated, and that Hopkins had

appealed Judge Shiffman’s decision on January 23,

2002. Opinion, October 16", 2002. Sce RA

C000092. )

(15.) While Hopkins was appealing this decision of

Judge Shiffman, Hopkins was not permitted to

move his mobile home without paying the attorney

fees of both actions by verbal order of Judge

Shiffman on February 25, 2002. Northbrook

requested the title from the Court, and Hopkins

refused, and while Hopkins mobile home was kept

in the park pursuant to Judge Shiffman’s verbal

order, Potts and Northbrook park management

stripped the home of its furnace, washing machine

and dryer, water heater, stove, refrigerator,

electrical outlets, ceiling fans, leaving the home an

empty shell full of Garbage, and _ utterly

uninhabitable without paying thousands of dollars

in repairs, resulting in total loss of their property

* Had Manson filed a paper motion, Hopkins could then have

filed a motion to vacate due to the proof of the conspiracy

-9.

and a complaint of Judicial misconduct being filed

against Judge Shiffman and the Court of Appeals.

(R.A. C000320-321) (16.) On November 17, 2003,

30 days after denial of Hopkins first petition of

Certiorari, (S.R.A.C00249) Hopkins discovered

that Hopkins v_ Northbrook had been dismissed

without notice on August 28, 2003 by order of

Judge Cadigan.

(17.) Hopkins brought an action in the Federal

Courts under Title II of the ADA, and 42- U.S.C.

-1983 on December 8, 2003, R.A. C00197 Index lines

4-9. The District Court dismissed stating Hopkins

only recourse was a petition for relief in the state

courts. Hopkins filed a rule 59 Motion to

reconsider, Relief was denied on April 20, 2004,

that Court declaring the action was frivolous and

threatened sanctions. R.A. C000188-215 and 223-226.

(18.) Hopkins filed joint petitions for relief in the

state court on May 20, 2004. Judge Shiffman,

when apprised of his part in_a federal civil rights

conspiracy violation, exercised the right to remain

Silent, choosing not to confirm or deny the issues

of federal civil rights violations in the petitions.

(R.A.C00498-504).

(19.) The 2-1401 petitions were then denied.

Hopkins appealed, and moved to consolidate the

two actions so as to straighten out this conflict of

state and federal law and the fraud upon the court.

(20.) Hopkins appeal was found frivolous and

Hopkins was sanctioned for petitioning for relief

and then appealing that denial based on the District

Courts judgment denying a rule 59 motion.

mp -10-

-REASONS FOR REVIEW-

INTRODUCTION

This cause concerns issues of Federal law in

the state courts that were dismissed without a

hearing on the merits under color of _resjudicata

and deprivation of property, both as a result of a

conspiracy to violate civil rights, an issue that

could not be raised and addressed in Hopkins first

appeal to this Court, (in re; Hopkins v Northbrook,

No. 03-5882, Cert denied Oct 15, 2003).

It is a matter of record that Northbrook has

used state law and courts to confiscate Hopkins

mobile home while creating a defense to Hopkins

prior filed civil action under color of 2-619(a)(4).

It is a matter of record that it was not known

_by Hopkins until after October 15, 2003 that the

federal and state civil action had been dismissed on

grounds of resjudicata on August 28, 2003-but no

notice was given, and thus it could not be

appealed, which is both a denial of due process and

of the 1“ Amendment.

It is a matter of record that the foreseeable

and obvious end result of Northbrook’s action in

the state court has resulted in state law and judicial

policy circumventing and superseding state and

applicable federal laws intended to _ protect

disabled mobile home park tenants, in conflict

with EX PARTE YOUNG, 209 US. 123 (1908), and

Silkwood v Kerr-McGee Corp. 464 U.S. 238 (1984).

The_state Court_of appeals treatment of this

case 1s grounds to justify this U.S. Supreme Courts

intervention for the protection of civil rights that

sit.

are established by the Constitution and Federal law

because these laws are being denied any force and

effect_by the state courts on the basis of state law

rules and a policy that has clearly invalidated the

constitution itself, see Silkwood v Kerr-McGee Corp.

464 U.S. 238 (1984), Screws v. United States, 325

U.S. 91 (1945), Tumey v Ohio, 273U.S. 510,

Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. v. De la Cuesta,

458 U.S. 141 (1982), and Tennessee v Lane, 539 U.S.

941 (2004).

-Arguments in support -

{1} A Lack of due diligence by the state courts has

created _an_ indisputable Denial _of Due Process,

and has resulted in a violation _of the supremacy

Clause, which the State Courts claim is not proper

grounds for relief under 2-1401(f).

Issues of federal law are supposed to be

supreme in any proceeding, and thus can only be

raised in a state court proceeding as part of a

complaint, (see Testa v Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947) and

Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987).

The facts of these two cases combined clearly

show that Northbrook was a defendant in a federal

and state law civil action in the state court because

of the operators intentional violation of the Mobile

Home Park Act- (which this Court has already

found was sufficient to protect tenants rights “‘i/

adequately enforced’, see Soldal v. Cook County,

Ill., 506 U.S. 56 (1992)).

These state la’ rights however are not actually

viable, as shown ere by the fact that Northbrook

was freely able to create a cause of action under

a,

the Forcible Entry and Detainer act by the simple

expedient of willfully violating the park act in

deliberately corrupting the terms and conditions of

the lease. (S.R.A.C00059).

Hopkins has pointed out to the state Courts

that this is conduct that is clearly forbidden by the

state’s Legislature under 765 ILCS 745/1 and

745/6 of the Mobile Home park act, (which_is

supposed to regulate these transactions,) as well as

by the Consumer Fraud Act_815 -[LCS 505/2, and

the Federal laws under the Fair Housing Act 42-

U.S.C. Sec. 3602, and the ADA, 42-U.S.C. Sec.

12181. This deliberate and calculated violation

of state (and federal law) by Northbrook et all is

actually due _to the fact -these laws are

unenforceable because under Forcible Entry and

Detainer, and extant case law rules, (a) Violations

of state (and federal laws) by a landlord are not

germane to the question of the “nght to

possession”, see People v Evans, 163 [li. App. 3d

561, 516 N.E.2d 817 (1st Dist 1987) and; (b) A

lease is not required in any case under Forcible

Entry to be valid before it can be terminated by its

“own limitations”, see Rosewood Corporation V. Fisher

263 N.E.2d 833, (which should be noted is a judicial

policy that prima facie_undermines the _ intent,

purpose, and enforceability of the Mobile Home

park act, see art | and 6) and is thus a judicial

usurpation of the intent and purpose of state

law that is contrary to the will of the legislature.

Federal _law_has_been treated the same way

even though it is well known that a disabled person

-13-

can only raise their federal claims in the state

courts in a complaint, see Caterpillar Inc. v.

Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987), and it is

equally well known that all such federal claims,

while superior,(in re Silkwood), cannot be raised

at any time in any way that is a defense to a State

court action, see the comity rule set forth in re

Holmes v Vornado, 534 U.S. 1016 (2001).

It must be understood that just like Northbrook

has in this case, any landlord can freely use this

state law action to preempt under color of

resjudicata these prior state and federal causes of

their tenants if these actions have been brought in

a state Court under the Parrat rule, leaving these

tenants constitutionally disenfranchised, see

Carpenter _v Mobile World Inc, 194. Ill. App. 3d 830,839 551

N.E.2d 724,729 (1990), quoting from the Mandate of

Appendix B, page 34; “Z7hus, by holding a trial on

the merits, the courts and the parties have already

borne the burden of litigation, and thus the issue is

addressed in the subsequent trial.” There is no

reference to subject matter jurisdiction.

It should be noted that the Appeals Court had

negligently refused to take Judicial notice of the

pending Federal laws at issue in the prior cause,

see Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U. S. 103, 122-125, with

the Appeals court admittedly stating; “we note the

record is insufficient as to this issue because the

defendants failed to include a complete copy of the

complaint from the other action.” appendix b page

34.

; -] 4.

It is pointed out that what the state Courts had

demanded as a condition for Hopkins to receive

judicial notice on these pending federal claims in

their first Appeal, Hopkins was actually forbidden

from doing under _the comity rule as this would

have been _“constructively _raising” _ Hopkins

federal issues as a defense to the state action, see

in re; Holmes v Vornado, 534 U.S. 1016 (2001).

Hopkins clearly did not violate the comity rule

by attempting to raise federal claims as a defense,

thus these issues were properly raised only by

Judicial Notice, in re Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U. S.

103, 122-125.

The Appeals Court, having failed to take proper

judicial notice of the pending federal claims, has

stated that Northbrook’s separate action under 735

ILCS5/9-102, et seq, (while omitting that the

forcible entry action lacked any subject matter

jurisdiction over the federal and state law issues)

was a resjudicata bar to the civil action prior filed

in a state court between the same parties under 2-

619(4)(a), which although contrary to this U.S.

Supreme courts rule against using ones rights to

prevent others from the exercise of their rights, see

in re Nebbia v New York 291 U.S. 502 (1934), it is

nonetheless considered an accepted state court

practice when it comes to landlord tenant actions.

this “policy” is clearly “pretense due

process” that_has_ heen established by _the_state

Courts in all Landlord tenant cases- even though it

is known to be based on a limited state law

proceeding that is admittedly lacking due process,

mi

see Bank of Belleville v. Stidmire 119 Ill. Sup. 3d

73 456 N.E. Ed 175 74 Ill. Dec. 673 (5" District

1983).

It should be noted that the appeals Court,

when confronted on appeal by the records showing

the facts of Hopkins compliance with the Comity

rule that were claimed to have precluded Hopkins

from raising these federal and state law claims in

the prior proceeding, and that subject matter

Jurisdiction is essential for due process that the

Court should have _ diligently noted in the first |

appeal but had negligently had failed to do so,

has shifted and “restated’ their position, see

Appendix C page 49; “Zhe proper course of action

for Hopkins would have been to timely appeal the

circuit courts dismissal of their civil action, raising

each of the issues they submit _in_their 2-140]

petition:” This statement is arbitrarily unfair as it

“omits” the rather obvious fact that that the record

shows clearly that Notice of the dismissal was

never served upon Hopkins as_a matter of Illinois

Supreme court policy that would otherwise would

have allowed them “to timely appeal.” There was

no notice ever given-the Court of Appeals knew

that!

Therefore, was Hopkins denied due process?

Furthermore, the statement of the appellate

Court cited above cannot actually be reconciled

with that state courts policy that is stated in the

ee

order_in_ the following statement; quote; “a

reasonable attorney would not have filed a 2-1401

petition for the dismissal of the civil action having

-16-

“twice” been put on notice that the issues sought

to be raised were barred by resjudicata...

The order is clearly contradictory on this

because even if notice had been timely served and

the appeal taken, the court seems to admit it would

have been “an exercise of futility’ due to that

Courts admittedly finding the Forcible Entry

action to be “resjudicata” to the prior federal

claims, this being implicit as the Court asserts that

the claims were frivolous, quote; “..the_ issues

sought to be raised were barred by resjudicata..”

Appendix C, page 50.

The Order admits that it has been clearly

explained by Hopkins to the state Courts that

“Subject matter jurisdiction” is required as a clear

matter of due process for any state Court judgment

to be held as resjudicata, see McClellan v.

Carland, 217 U.S. 268, 282 (1910), (R.A.C00498-504)

and that such jurisdiction arises only when a State

Court Plaintiff raises the federal issue in their state

court complaint, see in re Caterpillar Inc. _v.

Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987).

It was also pointed out that these issues of

federal law in the State Courts obviously cannot

otherwise be raised or introduced by any State

Court defendant on a motion to dismiss, by

answer, or by a counter claim in any defense to a

state law action under the comity rule.

Hopkins had clearly explained that this comity

rule exists because of the primacy of federal law,

which preempts any state law, see in re; Silkwood

v Kerr-McGee Corp. 464 U.S. 238 (1984), and

of 9.

Free v Bland, 369 U.S. 663, and thus the rule acts

to protect the States right to enforce their own

laws in their own Courts, see in re, Holmes v

Vornado, 534 U.S. 1016 (2001), by barring the

raising of issues of federal law except by means of

a state court complaint.(R.A.C00498-504).

This state right to enforce their own laws in

their own courts does not confer upon the State

courts the right to disregard the constraints of the

Constitution, see in re Bank of Nova Scotia v.

United States, 487 U.S. 250, 254-255 (1988) by

invalidating the force and effect of applicable

federal law under color of state court resjudicata,

see in re ALDEN _V. MAINE, 527 U.S. 706

(1999), which was known to be prohibited

conduct, in re; Screws v. United States, 325 US.

91 (1945), and Powell v Alabama, 287 U.S. 45

(1932). (R.A.C00498-504).

Hopkins has indisputably raised all of the

above federal law and due process issues. What is

interesting is that these claims are ambiguously

declared by the 4" District Court of appeals to be

not in good faith, and that this bad faith in raising

these (federal) issues has “justified” severe

sanctions against Hopkins and counsel, Appendix

C page 51; ..the courts declined to impose

monetary sanctions because Hopkins were pro-se.

However it is clear that this generous approach

has_not stopped the Hopkins from engaging in

frivolous litigation against Northbrook.”

~ 18.

These statements as to Hopkins engaging in

“frivolous” litigation are allegedly in reference to

Hopkins federal law issues in these state court

proceedings-(R.A.C00498-504)- proving prima facie

that Federal laws in the State courts of Illinois are

intentionally being denied force and effect in the

state courts in regards to landlord tenant.

This is contended to be judicial protectionism

of special interests that is in conflict with the

Supremacy Clause, see West Lynn Creamery _v.

Healy, 512 U.S. 186 (1994), and shold be stopped

by this court as this is state conduct that is clearly

undermining the U.S. Constitutions authority in

Illinois to determine what is proper national policy

as it should be applied to all the disabled citizens

living in Illinois, See Associated Industries of

Missouri v Lohman, 114 S. Ct. 1815, 128 L. Ed.

2d 639 (1994). States cannot delegate the power

to violate the constitution to its Courts as this is a

power they do not have.)

{2} Judicial participation in a conspiracy.

According to the 4" District Court of Appeals, a

second separate action under color of 735 ILCS

5/9-102, et seq, by a defendant landlord, does not

constitute in any case “a violation of 42-

U.S.C.§1983” when the judgment thereafter

becomes a resjudicata bar to a prior filed federal

action in the state court because such an action

under the Forcible entry act is one that is permitted

understate law, thus the §1983 claim is

“frivolous”, see appendix c, page 49; quote; “..,

-19-

including the suggestion that the state courts have

conspired to violate Hopkins federal due process

rights under 42-USC§1983.”

This Court needs to address this issue, as it is

believed to be not unfair in this case to claim the

state courts were a party, either voluntarily or

involuntarily, to a conspiracy by a private business

to violate civil rights, in re Collins v Harker

Heights, 503 U.S.115 (1992) when the official

conduct concerns state judicial officials who thus

should have known that they were acting outside

the limits laid out by the constitution, see also

Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-248, in

their allowing the “private use of challenged State

procedures with the help of State Officials” to

violate civil rights see Lugar_v Edmondson Oil

Company Inc, 457.U.S. 922, and Oklahoma City v

Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808.

Hopkins points out that 42-U.S.C.§1983

actions arise from actions under state law that

violate Civil rights (which include the protection of

property under the 4" Amendment), see Wilson v

Garcia 471 U.S. 261 (1985), as; (1) the deprivation

must be caused by the exercise by a party of some

right _or_a privilege that is created by the State,

and; (2) the party charged with the deprivation

must be a person who may be fairly said to be a

state actor either because he is a state official, or is

a_private party who_has obtained significant aid

from State Officials.

-20-

As was carefully explained to the State Courts

in the petitions for relief, and appeal brief, the

State Courts had been misled by Northbrook’s

misfeasance under a defective law, which created

due process grounds for relief as 42- U.S.C. §1983

does not require the state official(s) to be

intentional conspirators, See Collins v_ Harker

Heights, 503 U.S.115(1992).

The Appeals Court refuses to admit however

that Northbrook has done anything wrong when

the facts show that Northbrook did obtain a

judgment in a state court forum that is contested as

to it’s constitutional validity because Northbrook

did_not have to face _at any time any of Hopkins

federal _and state law issues, and thus was able to

obtain from the State’s “judiciary” “a state court

judgment” that has became a shield under state

court resjudicata to all prior filed state and federal

claims action, and in the process, the State Courts

have allowed Northbrook to confiscate Hopkins

property, a mobile home worth $6.000. (This type

of “confiscation” is a form of grand theft that was

not covered by _insurance- making Hopkins a

“crime victim” who is without any protection of

law because the state Courts were used instead of a

gun). This type of conduct is an abuse of judicial

independence that gives all courts a black eye,

justifying public distrust and contempt.

The State Courts as institutions thus cannot be

allowed to be “exempt” in such a case as “state

actors’, (and nothing shows that the constitution or

congress had ever intended that state courts actions

Jit.

created by the willful misuse of state law by

private parties to violate civil rights ever should be

absolutely immune_as_ to “to creating state

liability” under 42-U.S.C.-1983, based on Pierson

v Ray 386 U.S.547 (1967) and Marshalls dissent in

re Briscoe v Lahue, 460 U.S. 325 (1983)). Northbrook’s

action was without question a 42-USC-1983 type

of violation.

The Court of Appeals has said these

conspiracy claims are “frivolous”, see appendix c

page 46, and are not grounds in any case for relief

in_the Illinois courts under 2-1401, and_has

sanctioned Hopkins and counsel for even trying to

obtain relief under color of Hudson v Palmer, 468 U.S.

517 (1984), and Tennessee v Lane, 539 U.S. 941 (2004),-

thus a paradox now exists that only this Court can

now resolve, see Norris v Alabama, 294 U.S. 587(1935),;

“When a federal right has been specifically

setup and claimed in a State court, it_is our

province to inquire not merely it was denied in

express terms, but also determine whether it was

denied in substance or effect.” Hopkins state and

Federal rights have been denied in both substance

and effect, requiring this Courts enforcement of the

Constitution’s Supremacy Clause, citing Justice

Cardoza: “Nothing can destroy a government more

guickly than it’s failure to observe it's own laws,

or worse, it’s disregard for the charter of it’s own

existence.”

23-

{3} The Illinois Supreme Court no longer

requires that the clerks serve notice;

This U.S. Supreme Court has clearly defined

that Due process requires written notice be served

within a reasonable time to respond, In Re Gault,

387U.S. 1, (1967). The facts show that the state

Court did not serve notice of the judgment

dismissing the Civil action, whether it was by

accident _or compliance with Illinois rules. The

record shows that while the Court directly ordered

notice was to be served on the defense attorney of

record, (i.e. Almon Manson), Hopkins was known

to be pro-se, and Hopkins was not ordered to be

served notice.

The records prove that no attempt to serve

notice was ever made. It was pointed out in the

Petitions for relief that Due process required this

service of notice. Trial Court denied this Courts

rule of law, claiming that Hopkins instead had “an

obligation to check their case_for judgments,”

citing Mitchell v Fiat Allis, 158 Ill. 2d 143, 632 N.E.2d

1010, 198 Ill. Dec. 399, in which the Illinois supreme

court has overruled Gault under a State rule

regulating attorney conduct, which Hopkins points

out is not in any way pertinent to the issue as to

failing to accommodate a pro- se disabled person

without counsel by fair _and timely service of

notice of dismissal in time to appeal.

The Illinois Supreme Court had this pointed out

as well, and refuses to alter its policy to conform

with the prior rule. By any definition, this state

court practice automatically annuls in re Gault.

a.

{4} Hopkins action was timely under 28-USC-

1367d:

According to the 4" District Court of Appeals,

the dismissal of the prior filed Civil Action on

“state Resjudicata” grounds without service of

notice in time to appeal, and the confiscation of

Hopkins property, did not justify Hopkins taking

action against the state courts and Northbrook in

the U.S. District Courts under Title Il of the ADA

and 42-U.S.C. §1983.

Counsel points out that Hopkins 1°

Amendment rights had been disposed of by the

state’s refusal to serve notice of dismissal, see

Johnson v Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 485 (1969), along with a

due process denial that combined’ with

Northbrook’s intentional misuse use of state law to

prevent a hearing on the merits through a patently

inapplicable resjudicata, see in re; Nebbia v New

York 291 U.S. 502 (1934) and McClellan v. Carland,

217 U.S. 268, 282 (1910), was clearly elements of

a conspiracy by a private business to use the state

Courts to violate Hopkins civil rights that had

created a federal cause of action in re 42-

USC§1983.

Hopkins should have had a constitutional right

to a cause of action against Northbrook in the

District Federal courts under 42-USC§1983, see

Mitchum v Foster 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972).

Counsel points out there was no clear

justification that was sufficient to justify to the

people as to the District court to be seemingly

“turning its back on the fraud and constitutional

_ =24-

violations” and thus allowing these 42-USC§1983

violations to go unchallenged. Her response to

Hopkins rule 59 motion clearly showed that the

District Court had been seriously aggravated by

Hopkins claims of conspiracy violations involving

her “friends” on the state courts, and that she had

made it very clear that any such actions for relief

under these claims must _be taken to the state

courts, not hers-which in a way, Hopkins states

she may have been right because the State Courts

deserved the chance to correct their misuse. R.A.

C000188-215 and 223-226.

Thus, while it is reasonably believed the

action in the District Court under Title Il of the

ADA and 42-USC§1983 was of itself valid, (there

is no actual requirement that the federal action

must have been valid), with the dismissal of the

action by the District Court with notice by that

court that these claims should be filed in the state

courts as a petition for_relief, the merits of the

District Court action became immaterial under 28-

USC§1367(d), see JINKS V. RICHLAND

COUNTY, 538 U.S. 456 (2003).

The petitions in both state court proceedings

were thus timely filed when filed within 30 days

of the District Courts dismissal. The Court of

Appeals however refused to even consider the

issue of timeliness under 28-USC-1367d which

was raised on Petition for relief and appeal

(though the Court made no actual reference to that

law).

-25-

That Court made a statement the action wasn’t

timely under state law. (while intentionally

omitting the federal law issue, which Hopkins

claims is dishonest and appears to be an attempt to

avoid review by this Court.)

{5} RETALITATON for Hopkins opposing

. discrimination?: The presiding judge of the Court

of Appeals, (Judge Turner,) denied the motion to

recuse for cause, and took part in both cases even

though he knew that Hopkins had filed

discrimination and misconduct charges against the

Courts with both the Department of Justice, FBI,

and the State Judicial Review Board.

This subsequent refusal to recuse, followed by

the excessive use of rules to avoid considering the

actual federal law merits at issue in this case, was

an exercise of judicial power that was, “in

essence”, retaliatory _conduci-it_appears Judge

Turner_was trying to protect his reputation or

worse, punish Hopkins for daring to accuse the

courts of discrimination and complicity under

1981-and 83.

Hopkins respectfully points out that while any

reasonable doubts here clearly should be resolved

in favor of the integrity, competence, and proper

performance of official duties, see in re Bute v

Illinois, 333 U.S. 640 (1948), it’s argued to be

quite a different story when (there is any

substantive, _if not compelling _ evidence of

improper state court conduct.

-26-

The Appeals Courts ““conduct’ is therefore not

in this case entitled to any “presumption” of good

faith due to the refusal to recuse to avoid any

sense of impropriety in_the face of a clear

conspiracy that has without any doubt been

proven to have been used to defeat the intent and

purpose of both state and federal law, which has

corrupted the state courts as defined by this courts

rule in re; California Motor Transport, 404 U.S.

512-513. As Prima lacie evidence of _this

judicial corruption and_ retaliation against

Hopkins; _(1.) It should be noted that the time

for filing a Petition for relief under state law is

two years, (unless one takes part of the matter to

federal court which suspends the tolling under 28-

USCs1367(d).) Hopkins v_Northbrook was

dismissed on August 28, 2003 without service of

notice, the District court case was filed December

8, 2003, and dismissed on April 21, 2004, with the

petition for relief in the Civil action filed May 20,

2004, all less than two years after the state court

dismissal of the civil action. Northbrook _v

Hopkins entered final judgment on January . 2,

2002. The Statute of limitations would have

expired on January 2, 2004 except for the federal

action filed in December/03.

A reasonable’ interpretation of 28-

U.S.C.§1367(d) supports the application of this

federal law as to the issue of the timeliness of

these state court petitions for relief. The 4”

District Court refused to even consider this issue,

stating that Hopkins had not acted timely with due

a.

diligence as a matter of state law(while making an

ambiguous reference to tolling) in filing their state

court petitions for relief_as to the Civil action.

The 4" District Court instead has declared that

Hopkins federal based issues and claims (as to the

denial of due process) were frivolous, even though

based in good faith on this Courts holdings, and

has struck the Appellants brief that was proving

these federal law violation claims for the

“implausible” reasons very._clearly shown

hereafter as follows:

Ill. Sup. Ct. Rule 341 (a) states Brief Page

Limitations “shall each be limited to 50 pages if

printed, or 75 pages if not printed.” and Ill. Sup.

Ct. Rule 344(b), Form of Briefs and Abstracts

states: “If printed, the brief shall be on paper 6%

by 10 inches in type not smaller than 11! point.

Footnotes are discouraged. /f not printed, the brief

shall be legibly and neatly produced on paper 8/2

by 1] inches...” The 4" District Court of appeals

has obviously rewrote the law for the benefit of

Northbrook, contrary to_the public’s best interest

that the Illinois Supreme Court ignored in that the

4" District Court has claimed that Hopkins brief

was a printed brief on 8 '% by 11 inch paper of 69°

pages which had supposedly exceeded the length

permitted of 50 pages.

That finding is contrary to the rather all too

obvious fact that a brief that is made on 8 2 by 11

inch paper would not be a printed brief, and only

physically match the definition for a_nonprinted

brief -whose page limits are 75 pages, but the

‘ -28-

Court has “disagreed”, quote; “Hopkins has cited

no ¢ “hority for_this novel interpretation of rule

34]1( and we_are_not persuaded by _ their

argument.” Appendix C, page 42. The Illinois

Supreme court declined making such authority.

(b) Next, The Court “attacked” Counsels use of

footnotes-which are discouraged in only one form

of brief, but are not barred in either of the two

types. It should be noted that this was a combined

appeal of complexity due _to issues of federal vs

state law, clear fraud, perjury and misfeasance that

fairly must be pleaded with particularity.

Counsel was only using the Footnotes for

clarity of the facts and law linking the two cases

and merging of the issues. If the brief was in fact

“confusing” because of this, the Court properly

should have ordered amendment because of the

importance of _ the federal__issues inthis

controversy.

The brief was_not all that confusing to any

reasonable person, it was only found so and

rejected because the 4" District Court refused to

accept the accurate issues of federal law, fraud

and _misfeasance raised in the combined appeal

which if true, proved an unconscionable error, in re

Bennis v. Michigan, 517 U.S. 1163 (1996).

It is apparent that court unwisely went looking

for Hopkins “violations” of the rules to justify

their refusing to hear the “federal” merits, thus

while Hopkins may have made mistakes, as maybe

did counsel, nothing warranted that Court ignoring

the facts and issues.

-29-

That Court has granted sanctions for

Northbrook in the face of facts that show

indisputably that Northbrook has used the law to

rob a disabled person, and were in blatant violation

of other state and federal laws. In the light of the

very real “conspiracy issues’ that has set the

constitution at naught, this type of conduct of the

state Court of Appeals is contrary to both the intent

and purpose of constitutional “due process”, see in

re Degan v United States, 517 U.S. 820 (1996).

- CONCLUSION-

Something is very clearly wrong with any

state court that thinks its legitimate use of the

courts for a Park operator to act under color of law

to confiscate a disabled person’s property and deny

the mght to be heard. The Courts refusal to

scrutinize this case indicates the Court may have

been involved in something that had to avoid

scrutiny in order to succeed. It cannot be justified

that just because Hopkins were disabled tenants in

a State judicial system where clearly the state

Courts deny that any tenants have any rights, that

these federal rights should be denied, see Hopkins

first Petition for Certiorari, Hopkins v Northbrook

03-5882. (cert. denied October 15, 2003).

Federal laws and supposedly protected civil

rights, (as defined as the rule of law by this Court.)

mean absolutely nothing if they cannot possibly be

enforced in the State Courts. This case proves that

if brought in the state court, they cannot be

enforced in Illinois, the Forcible Entry and

Detainer act stands as bar.

-30-

It defies the meaning and_ intent of the

Constitution itself when a private business can

freely use the state courts to rob a disabled person,

followed by a subsequent state court judgment “to

cover it up” by state judicial officials who, either

voluntarily or involuntarily, had participated in this

conduct that so obviously usurps the State and

federal rights of the real injured party without the

opportunity to be heard.

Hopkins prays that this U.S. Supreme Court

shall grant certiorari, or whatever Iquity relief

Per Curium this Court finds to be appropriate to

these facts and circumstances.

OATH AND AFFIRMATION

We affirm that the foregoing is true except

as to statements made upon information and belief,

and as to those, We believe them to be true.

Witness our hand under the penalties of perjury,

this 2 dayof Fok Zao [

Glenn Hopkins, BZ E S £7,

Cindy HopkinsC__-~A... pre A (Hf |

By their attorney: William Sha Fear Sea

INDEX OF APPENDICES

Appendix A Trial court orders 31-32

Appendix B Mandate 4-02-0085, 33 to 36

Appendix C. Mandate NO.04-05-0435

and NO04-05-0186 37 to 53

«31.

Appendix A:

Northbrook _ Mobile Home _ Park _ Plaintiff

respondent

v- _2001-LM-2161

Hopkins-Defendant Petitioner

Dismissal order of Judge Hall, issued January

12, 2005; “Plaintiff in Court by Attorney Nicholson.

Defendant in Court in person and by Attorney Shaffer.

Although the Court feels that it has lost jurisdiction

due to the time that has elapsed since the judgment,

even assuming that Defendants appeal tolled the

time, the Court will address Defendants issue. Under

Tennessee v Lane, a disabled person must receive

modifications to allow him or her to participate in the

judicial process, but only when the disabled person is

otherwise eligible for service. In this case, no litigants

is given the right to a court reporter, and therefore, a

brain damaged person would also not have that right.

That slippery slope would lead to the right of an

attorney in civil cases for people with limited

intellectual abilities. While that would not be a bad

idea, no such right presently exists. In addition to the

reasons stated above, defendants Motion for Relief

from Judgment is denied as moot in that Defendant

does not wish to return to the mobile home from

which he was evicted’. He requests an award greater

than $50.000 from the State of Illinois for denial of

due process and /or violations of the American with

Disabilities act, However the state is not a party to this

case, and this Court would not have jurisdiction over

such a matter. Motion denied, cause stricken.”

January 24, 2005, Called on objection to ex Parte

Communication (Motion to Vacate Judgment). Motion

denied. The Court cannot recall if a request was

* Court failed to note Hopkins home had been destroyed.

39.

made by Plaintiff to provide case law as to jurisdiction

or whether such a request was granted, but the

question is irrelevant in that the Court denied Hopkins

motions on its substantive merits, not on Northbrook’s

argument as to lack of jurisdiction. Notice to be given

by clerk to attorneys.”

Hopkins, et all

Plaintiff petitioner

v. 2001-L-0227

Northbrook et all.

Defendant respondents

February 28, 2004

-ORAL FINDING OF JUDGE CADIGAN-

“Hopkins cannot obtain relief under 2-1401 from the

States failure to serve notice of judgment that would

have allowed appeal as a matter of Illinois Supreme

Court policy because Hopkins had the duty to check

his case for judgments. Whatever the merits of

Hopkins Federal issues, | find since Judge Shiffman

has already found for Northbrook, this would be

relitigating the same issues- | consider his claims are

all barred by resjudicata. Hopkins ADA claims may

have merit but the State is not a party to the action. |

am granting sanctions that bar Hopkins from any

further filings in this matter before this Court without

leave of Court, Northbrook is instructed to prepare

such order.”

As.

Appendix B.

Mandate 4-02-0085

4th District Appellate Court of Illinois

Northbrook Mobile Home park, Appellees

V

Glenn and Cindy Hopkins, Appellants

2001-LM-2161, Judge Stuart Shiffman

before Judges: J. Turner, J. Knecht, J. Cook

Rule 23 Order dated October 18, 2002.

In November of 2001, Plaintiff Northbrook

Mobile Home community corporation, filed a

complaint for forcible entry and detainer against

the defendants Glenn and Cindy Hopkins.

Defendants filed a motion to dismiss asserting the

cause should be dismissed under{1} section 2-

619(a)(3) of the code of civil procedure (code)

(735-ILCS-2-619(a)(3) (West 2000) because

defendants had filed a complaint against Plaintiff

based on the lease between the parties, and {2}

section 2-615 of the Code (735-ILCS-2-615 (West

2000)) because (a) the lease was void, (b) plaintiff

did not properly serve defendants with notice. In

December, 2001, the trial court denied defendants

motion. After a January 2002 hearing, the trial

court found in favor of plaintiff. Defendants

appeal, contending that the trial court erred in

_ denying defendants motion to dismiss, We affirm.

I Analysis

Plaintiff asserts this Court cannot address the

merits of defendants arguments. We agree. This

Court has held that where the issue contained in a

denied motion for summary judgment is then

) -34-

decided at trial the ruling denying the summary

judgment merges in the judgment after trial, and

error in the denial cannot be raised on appeal of

that judgment, Carpenter _v Mobile World Inc,

194. Ill. App. 3d 830,839 551 N.E.2d

724,729(1990). Courts have applied this merger

theory to section 2-619 Motions to Dismiss, see in

re J.M. 245 Ill. App. 3d 909,919-20, N.E.2d 1345,

1354 (1993). Moreover, we find merger is

applicable to denials of section 2-615 motions as

well. The rational behind the merger doctrine is

that where the-evidence has been completely

presented to the Trier of fact and subject to cross

examination, it would be unjust for the resulting

verdict to be overturned on less evidence, that is ,

evidence obtained only from the pleadings.

Paulson v Suson, 97 Ill. App. 3d 326, 325 423

N.E.2d 243,245 (1981). With a section 2-615

motion a court should grant the motion only if no

set of facts can be proved that will entitle the

plaintiff to recover. Ashley v Snyder, 315 Ill. App

3d 1252, 1255 735 N.E. 2d 887, 900 (2000) At

the subsequent trial the Trier of fact determines

whether plaintiff proved sufficient facts to allow

him to recover. Thus it would be unjust to overturn

the judgment of the Trier of fact based solely on

the parties pleadings.

Here. The issues raised by defendants in their

motion to dismiss were presumably decided at the

subsequent trial.

<<

In their answer, defendants asserted improper

service of notice and the invalidity of the lease as

affirmative defenses.

Defendants suggest the trial court prohibited

them from raising those defenses at trial. However,

we note defendants did not file a transcript of the

proceedings or a bystanders report. See 155 Ill. 2d

R. 321, 166 Ill. 2d R. 323. The Appellant bears the

burden of providing this court with a record

adequate to resolve all issues. Absent a sufficient

record on appeal this court wiil presume the trial

courts ruling was in conformity with the law,

People v Brummatt, 279 Ill. App. 3d 421, 426.

664 N.E. 2d 1074, 1079 (1996).

As to the pendancy of the other action, we note

that dismissal under section 2-619(a)(3) of the

code in not mandatory, Zurich Insurance Co. v

Baxter International Inc, 173 Ill. 2d 235, 249 570

N.E. 2d 664, 670 (1996). The purpose behind

section 2-619(a)(3) is to relieve both the courts

and litigants of duplicative litigation. Ransom v

Marrese, 122 Ill. 2d. 518, 530. 524 N.e. 2d 535,

560 (1988). Thus, by holding a trial on the merits,

the courts and the parties have already borne the

burden of litigation, and thus the issue is addressed

in the subsequent trial. Additionally, we note the

record is insufficient as to this issue because _the

defendants failed to include a complete copy of the

complaint from the other action. Accordingly, we

find the issues raised by Defendants in their

motion to dismiss merged with the subsequent trial

and cannot be raised on appeal.

—~36-

For the reasons above, we affirm the trial courts

judgment. Affirmed, Turner*, J, with Knecht and

Cook, con.

KKRKAKKKKKKKKKEKEKKKKEKEKKAKHEKKKE HK K OK

-JUDICIAL NOTICE-

NOTE: in re Appendix C: The facts as

“restated” by the following appeals Court

rule 23 order in support of their contentions

in the order, omit the following serious

omissions referenced herein for Judicial

Notice in that: (1) It is omitted by the

tribunal that Hopkins was not able to raise

his federal claims as a defense to the

Forcible entry and Detainer action based on

known federal pleading rules, and; (2) It 1s

omitted by the tribunal that Hopkins was not

allowed to raise their state law claims as a

defense to the action of forcible entry and

Detainer as a matter of state court policy in

re People v Evans, 163 Ill. App. 3d 561, 516

N.E.2d 817 (1st Dist 1987,) and: (3) It 1s

omitted by the tribunal that Hopkins Civil

action was dismissed on the basis of that

Forcible Entry and Detainer action being

considered to be Resjudicata despite the fact of law

that Hopkins could not raise the federal claims as a

defense in that Forcible Entry proceeding, see

Holmes v_ Vornado, 534 U.S. 1016 (2001), (nor in

the subsequent appeal as issues not raised 1n trial

a.

court are not available for review on appeal,) and;

(4) It 1s omitted by the tribunal that Hopkins was

never served notice of the Circuit Courts dismissal

of the Civil action within time to be able to file an

appeal. *This is Certified as raised on motion to

reconsider and Petition for appeal as a matter of

right to the Illinois Supreme Court.

-38-

Appendix C:

ILLINOIS APPELLATE COURT OF THE 4"

DISTRICT; Hopkins v Northbrook; NO.04-05-0435

Northbrook v Hopkins-,; NO.04-05-0186

Glenn J. Hopkins, ) Appeal from the

Cindy S. Hopkins ) Circuit courts of

Appellants ) Sangamon County

Vv )

Northbrook Mobile Home Park )No. 2001-L-0227 ———

Corporation, Sheila Cottrill, ) Judge Cadigan

Ron Cottnill ) No. 2001-LM-2161

Appellees ) Judge Hall*

) Judge Shiffman.*

Rule 23 Order of February 21, 2006

McCullough J, with J. 7urner® PJ. and J Appleton.

Plaintiffs, Glenn J Hopkins and Cindy S Hopkins

appeal from the January 12, 2005 denial of their

petition for relief from judgment in_ case

01LM2161 and the February 23, 2005 denial of

their petition for relief from judgment in case

0110227. For the reasons which follow, we

Affirm. The origin of these two cases dates back

over four years. Although both parties are well

aware of the facts, a brief recitation of the history

of these cases will be presented to highlight the

extent of the litigation involved.

On August 16. 2001 the Hopkins filed an

amended complaint against Defendants

Northbrook Mobile home park Corporation and

Sheila and Ron Cottrell,(Northbrook ), alleging

° This judge had participated as the author of the document in

appendix b. and had refused to recuse himself.

-39-

various violations of the Mobile home Landlord

and tenants rights act, (765-ILCS-745/1 et Seq.

(west, 2000)), the consumer fraud and deceptive

business practices act, (81 5-ILCS-5/19-101 et Seq,

(West 2000) and the Americans with Disabilities

Act of 1990, (42-USC-12101 (West _)) (Case

No. 01L0227, hereinafter the Civil action).

On November 2, 2001, Northbrook filed a

complaint against the Hopkins under the Forcible

Entry and Detainer act. (735-ILCS-5/19-101 et

seq, (West 2000)) (Case No 0O1LM2161,

hereinafter the forcible entry and detainer action)

alleging the Hopkins were in illegal possession of

certain real estate upon which their mobile home

remained. On November 16, 2001, the Hopkins

filed a motion to dismiss instanter, arguing all

issues in controversy in the forcible entry and

detainer were matters in contention in the Civil

suit. On December 20, 2001, after a hearing, the

Hopkins motion to dismiss instanter was denied.

On January 2, 2002. after a trial, the circuit court

found in favor of Northbrook and issued an order

to vacate. On January 23, 2002, the Hopkins filed a

notice of appeal, arguing the Court erred in

denying their motion to dismiss. On October 16,

2002, this Court Affirmed the circuit courts

judgment, holding the issues raised in the Hopkins

motion to dismiss merged with the subsequent

trial, and thereafter could not be raised on appeal.

Northbrook Mobile Home Community

Corporation v_ Glenn _J Hopkins and Cindy S.

Hopkins, Ill App 3d__, = N.E.2d __, No; 4-02-

-40-

0085 (2002) (unpublished order under Supreme

Court rule 23), Leave to Appeal denied. According

to Hopkins, this_case has been appealed to_the

United States court of Appeals’ and the United

States Supreme Court.

On August 11, 2003, a hearing was held on

Northbrook’s motion to dismiss the Hopkins civil

action pursuant to section 2-619 of the code of

civil procedure (the code). Neither a transcript of

this hearing nor a bystanders report appear in the

record. On August 28, 2003, by docket entry, the

circuit court granted Northbrook’s motion to

dismiss. Thereafter, on October 27, 2003, the

Hopkins attempted to transfer the Civil action to

the U.S, District Court. On November 13, 2003,

the District Court, by docket entry, declined to

hear the Hopkins case stating it lacked the

jurisdiction to do so as only defendants can remove

a state case to federal court. Later, Hopkins

unsuccessfully attempted to bring an_ original

action in the federal court based on the underlying

facts of the civil action.

On March 19, 2004, the District Court found

the Hopkins claims were barred by resjudicata’.

On April 19, 2004, the District Court declined to

impose monetary sanctions on Hopkins because

they were not represented by counsel. However the

Court remarked that the Hopkins had brought two

meritless actions in the District Court against

” Hopkins has no idea of how they reached that conclusion!

* The Court omits that Judge Scott stated Petitions for relief should be

taken in the state courts on these claims

-41-

Northbrook, and warned Hopkins that it would not

hesitate in imposing sanctions if they filed any

further actions against Northbrook in the District

Court.

On May 20, 2004, the Hopkins filed Petitions

for relief from judgment pursuant to section 2-

1401 of the code (735-ILCS-5/2-1401 (West

2004) in both the Civil Action and the Forcible

entry and detainer action. Each Petition was

substantively similar and argued that they were

entitled to relief under section 2-1401 because (1)

Glenn was entitled to preferential treatment based

on his alleged disability in that he was entitled to a

court reporter, and written notice of the Courts

decision, the right to counsel and the right of

compensation from the state for violating his due

process rights, (2) the tnal court judges and

justices of this court made serious errors in the

interpretation and application of federal law, and

(3) the Forcible entry and detainer act is

unconstitutional as it conflicts with the commerce

clause and the Americans with Disabilities act.

On January 12, 2005, the Circuit Court denied

the Hopkins petition for relief from judgment in

the forcible entry and detainer action, finding it did

not have jurisdiction over the parties because it

was filed outside of the two year limitation

mandated by section 2-1401 (c) of the code (735-

ILCS-5/2-1401(c) (West 2000)). Even so, the

court chose to address the merits of the Hopkins

petition. The court found the Hopkins claim that

Mr. Hopkins was denied the reasonable

-42-

accommodation of a court reporter under the ADA

Act lacked merit because a _ reasonable

accommodation must be given only when a

disabled person is otherwise eligible for the

service, and no litigant is entitled to a court

reporter. Further, the Court denied the petition as

Moot in that they did not wish to return to the

mobile home from which they were evicted’, and

they sought damages in excess of $50.000.00 from

the state of Illinois who was not a party to the

proceedings. The Hopkins motion to vacate was

denied on January 24, 2005. They filed a Notice of

Appeal on February 23, 2005 and an amended

notice of appeal on March 10, 2005.

On February 23, 2005, a hearing was held on the

Hopkins petition for relief from judgment in the

Civil action. Neither a transcript or a bystanders

report of this hearing appears in the record. Per

docket entry , the circuit court denied their petition

and granted Northbrook’s motion for sanctions.

The court directed Northbrook to prepare a written

order to this effect. A written order was not

prepared and the Hopkins appealed the denial of

the Petition the same day. On April 23, over

objection, this court dismissed the Hopkins appeal

as premature. On April 25, 2005, a written order

was signed by the circuit court. The court denied

the petition for relief from judgment finding they

had stated no basis upon which relief could be

granted. The court struck from the petition any

* The mobile home had been seized and destroved. Hopkins did

not have a home to go back to. unlike Soldol -

-43-

claims against the State of Illinois, finding the state

was not a party to the proceedings. Further, the

Court granted Northbrook’s motion for sanctions,

Finding any further filings by the Hopkins against

Northbrook arising from any facts, circumstances,

or allegations that had been or could have been

brought would be jor the sole purpose of

harassment. Therefore, they were barred from

filing any further proceedings against Northbrook,

its owners, officers, directors, agents or employees

without prior leave of court. On May 13, 2005, the |

Hopkins filed notice of appeal. On June 14, 2005

the civil action and forcible entry action were

consolidated for the purpose of appeal.

On August 26, 2005, Northbrook filed a

motion to strike Plaintiffs-appellants brief and for

sanctions. This Court order the motion taken with

the case. Northbrook asks this Court to strike the

brief in its entirety for failure to comply with

supreme court rule 341(a) ‘s 50 page limitation and

footnote requirements. Northbrook also argues

the Hopkins brief is wnintelligible and

incomprehensible, and does not address the issues

before this court on appeal. Rather, Northbrook

contends the Hopkins present irrelevant matters

not at issue and attempt _to_reargue matters

previously before this court on appeal. If it is this

courts decision not to strike the brief in its entirety,

Northbrook requests that we strike that portion of

the brief that is in excess of 50 pages and all the

footnotes. Supreme Court rule 341(a) provides that

appellant and appellees briefs submitted to a

2 -44-

reviewing court shall be limited to 50 pages if

printed, or 75 pages if not printed. Official reports

Advance sheet no. 21 (October 17, 2001) R. 341(a)

eff. October 1, 2001. Hopkins Brief is 69 pages

long. In their 17 page response to Northbrook’s

motion to strike, the Hopkins argue “not printed”

briefs under rule 341(a) include briefs typically

created on typewriters or computers that are then

printed out by a printer, and therefore their brief is

“not printed” within the meaning of the rule, and is

within the page limitation requirement. Hopkins

has cited no authority for this novel interpretation

of rule 341(a) and we are not persuaded by their

argument.

Rule 341(a) states “footnotes, if any, shall be used

sparingly.” Official Reports advance sheet NO. 21,

(October 17, 2001). R. 341(a) eff. October 1,

2001.Rule 344(b)~ states “Foo* notes are

discouraged” Official Reports advance sheet NO.

22, (October 27, 2001). R. 344(b) eff. January 1,

2005. Hopkins brief contains 32 footnotes. 16

footnotes contain argument that should have been

presented in the body of the brief. (see Technology

Solutions Co. v Northrop Gruman Corp, 356 II.

App. 3d 380, 382, 826 N.E. 2d 1220, 1223 (2005),

Stating substantive arguments may not be made in

footnotes. ) Five footnotes contain irrelevant

information such as the color of the Hopkins

mobile home'”, the allegation that Judge Shiffman

and Glenn are not friends and the fact that Glenn is

a very good writer and inventor and ts currently

This concerned one of many elements of perjury

-45-

writing a book about his experiences with these

cases. Three foot notes contain inflammatory

accusations not supported by the record including

Hopkins assertion that it has become and

increasingly common practice for Illinois attorneys

to abuse their position of trust with the court and to

intentionally misrepresent fact, law, and testimony.

Such use of foot notes is not necessary and can

hardly be described as sparingly used. In their

reply to Northbrook’s Motion to strike, the

Hopkins argue Northbrook must establish that the

footnotes were unduly prejudicial to their defense.

Again, the Hopkins cite no authority for this

assertion, and our research discloses no such

requirement. Illinois Supreme court rules are not

aspiritional goals, and are to be followed

regardless of whether an opposing party_has

suffered any prejudice. In addition to the

violations of rule 341 Northbrook points out, we

note these additional violations; the points and

authorities are not presented as required by rule

341 (e)(1) Official Reports advance sheet NO. 21,

(October 17, 2001). R. 341(e)(1) eff. October 1,

2001), in that no page reference numbers have

been included, the statement of issues presented

for review are violative of rule 341(e)(3) (Official

Reports advance sheet NO. 21, (October 17, 2001).

R. 341(e) (3) eff. October 1, 2001.) in that they

are unclear and too detailed, the statement of

jurisdiction does not include page references to the

record on appeal in violation of rule 341(e)(4) (11)

Official Reports advance sheet NO. 21, (October

-46-

17, 2001). R. 341(e) (4)(11) eff. October 1, 2001.

The standard of review section of the brief violates

rule 341 (e)(3) in that it is 12 pages long'’ and

accounts for nothing more than a recitation of

irrelevant facts, alleged violation of Hopkins due

process rights and conspiracy theories, including

the suggestion that the state courts have conspired —

to violate Hopkins federal due process rights

under 42-USC-1983; and case citations have not

been set forth as required by rules 6 (145 Ill. 2d R

6) and 341(e)(7) Official Reports advance sheet

NO. 21, (October 17, 2001). R. 341(e)(7) eff.

October 1, 2001, in that only case names are

provided throughout the brief.

The purpose of the supreme courts rules is to

require parties to proceedings before a reviewing

court to present clear and orderly arguments so that

the court may properly ascertain and dispose of the

issues involved. (Citation) When an appellants

brief fails to comply with the rules, this court has

the inherent authority to dismiss the appeal for non

compliance with its rules (citation.) Collier v Avis

Rent a Car System, inc, 248 IilApp. 3d. 1088,

1095, 618 N.E.2d 771,776 (1993)

The number of violations _in_ the Hopkins _ brief

have made review of the issue on appeal nearly

impossible and would easily warrant our striking

of their entire brief and dismissing the appeal.

Technology Solutions Co, 356 Ill. App. 3d at 381,

826 N.E. 2d at 1222. However, rather than dismiss

‘' This was for background of the fraud

-47-

the appeal outright, we will grant Northbrook’s

motion and strike Hopkins brief.

In their motion to strike, Northbrook also

requests sanctions pursuant to supreme court rule

375(b). 155 Ill.2d R 375(b); In relevant part rule

375(b) states: “if, after consideration of an appeal

or other action pursued in a reviewing court, it is

determined that the appeal or other action was not

taken in good faith, for an improper purpose, such

as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or

needless increase in the cost of litigation, or the

manner of prosecuting or defending the appeal or

Other action is for such purpose. An appropriate

sanction may be imposed upon any party or the

attorney, or attorneys of the party or parties. An

appeal or other action will be deemed frivolous

where it is not reasonably well grounded in fact,

and not warranted by existing law or a good faith

argument for the extension, modification, or

reversal of existing law.'? An appeal or other

action will be deemed to have been taken for an

improper purpose where the primary purpose of

the appeal or other action is to delay, harass, or

cause needless expense. Appropriate sanctions for

violation of this section may include an order to

pay the other party or parties damages, the.

reasonable costs of the appeal or other action, and

any expenses necessarily incurred by the filing of

the appeal or other action including reasonable

attorney fees.”

'° Federal law prevailing over state law is no: good reason apparently!

-48-

In determining whether an appeal is frivolous, an

objective standard should be applied. “7he appeal

is considered frivolous if it would not have been

brought in good faith by a reasonable prudent

attorney”. Dreisilker Electric Motors Inc v

Rainbow Electric Co, 203 Ill App 3d 304, 312 562

N.E. 2d. 970,974 (1990)."°

A reasonable prudent attorney would not have

brought in good faith, an appeal of the circuit

courts denial of the Hopkins petitions for relief

from Judgment in the forcible entry action and in

the civil action for the petitions fail on basic

procedural grounds “the purpose of a section 2-

1401 petition for relief from judgment is to bring

before the circuit court facts not appearing in the

record which if known to the court at the time

judgment was entered would have prevented the

entry of the judgment. (citation) “to be entitled to

relief under section 2-1401, the petitioner must

affirmatively set forth specific factual allegations

showing each of the following elements by a

preponderance of the evidence; (1) the existence of

a meritous defense or claim. (2) due diligence in

presenting this defense or claim to the circuit court

in the original action, and (3) due diligence in

filing the 2-1401 petition for relief. (Citation) In re

Detention of Morris Ill. App.3d_, , NE.

2d =. ~No. 4-05-0033, slip opinion at

3(December 7, 2005.)

Hopkins have failed to show the requisite due

diligence in filing their 2-140] petitions.

'* See Appendix D, and compare

-49-

The Hopkins petition for relief from judgment

in the forcible entry action was not timely filed.'*

Section 2-1401(c) provides that the petition must

be filed not later than 2 years after the entry of the

order or judgment. Time during which the person

seeking relief is under legal disability or duress, or

the grounds for relief were fraudulently concealed

shall be excluded in computing the period of two

years.” 735-ILCS-5/2-1401(c) (West 2000). This

two year period of limitations is to be strictly

construed, Sidwell v Sidwell, 127 Ill. App. 3d 169,

173, 468 N.E. 2d 200, 203 (1984). Pending

motions or appeals do not toll this limitation

period. People v Caballero, 179 Ill. 2d 205, 211.

688 N.E. 2d 658, 661 (1997).

Judgment was entered in the forcible entry and

detainer action on January 2, 2002. The Hopkins

did not file their 2-1401 petition for relief from

judgment until May 20, 2004, clearly outside of

the two year limitation period*. The Hopkins

argument that pending appeals in this and the Civil

action toiled the limitations period is contrary to

established state law The petition is untimely, and

properly dismissed by the circuit court, see

Rodriquez _v_ The Sheriffs Merit Comm of Kane

co. Wizd. .., N.E. 2d, _, No 100165,

slip opinion at 7, January 20, 2005. stating the

reasons given for_a judgment _or order are not

material if the judgment itself is correct, and the ~

reviewing court ts not bound fo accept the reasons

given by the lower court for its judgments.

~ The appeals court totally ignores 28-USC- 1367, in re Jinks .*

‘ -50-

Hopkins did not show due diligence in the filing

of their. 2-140] Petition for relief from the

dismissal of their civil action. Due diligence

requires a petitioner to show that his failure to

pursue his petition was the result of excusable

mistake and that he had acted reasonably, not

negligently. See Dassion v Homan, 161 IIl. App.

3d 141, 145 514N.E.2d 41,43 (1987). A section 2-

1401 petition is not intended to relieve a party

from the consequences of his own negligence or to

provide review of an order from which a party

could have timely appealed. Anest v Bailey 265

Ill. App. 3d 58, 68-69- 637 N.E. 2d 1209, 1216-17

(1994). The Civil action was dismissed on August

28, 2003. Hopkins did not appeal the circuit

courts judgment. Instead, the Hopkins attempted to

remove the civil action to federal court'’. After the

District Court held that it did not have the

jurisdiction to hear Hopkins case, they filed an

origimal action in the district court based on the

sanie set of circumstances as the civil action. On

March 19, 2004, the District Court declined to hear

Hopkins case, holding that it was barred by

resjudicata, the same grounds for which the civil

action was dismissed in the state court. /t was not

until after Hopkins had been warned by the district

court against filing any further pleadings against

Northbrook that it filed their 2-1401 petition on

May 20, nearly nine months after the dismissal of

their civil action by the circuit court.

'> This is dishonest-no notice was given of dismissal.

43.

The proper course of action for Hopkins would

have been to timely appeal the circuit courts

dismissal of their civil action'®, raising each of the

issues they submit in their 2-1401 petition. Instead

they chose to file, in the district courts own words,

“two meritless actions in_ federal court”.

Unsuccessful in their attempt to bring suit against

Northbrook in federal court, the Hopkins sought

review of issues that could and should have been

raised on direct appeal through their 2-140]

petition'’. Such conduct is not evidence of due

diligence, and the circuit court properly denied the

Hopkins 2-1401 petition. We agree with

Northbrook that sanctions should be imposed

against Hopkins and their attorney for filing a

frivolous appeal. \t should have been apparent to a

reasonable prudent attorney that the 2-1401

Petition for relief from judgment in the forcible

entry and detainer action was filed outside of the

two year limitation. (see Dreisilker Electric Motors

Inc v Rainbow Electric Co, 203 Ill App 3d 304,

312 562 N.E. 2d. 974,975 (1990), imposing

sanctions against a 2-1401 petitioner because it

would have been readily apparent to a reasonable

prudent attorney that the cause of action was

barred by a three year statute of limitations.) Zhe

Hopkins and counsels only argument is that the

two year period was tolled,'*an argument clearly

© no notice of the decision means no knowledge to act upon.

'” This is indicative of corruption.

* 28-USC-1367(d) in re Jinks V. RICHLAND COUNTY, 538

U.S. 456 (2003)

.

$2.

against established state law. (see Caballero, 179

Ill. 2d at 211. 688 N.E. 2d 661, 661 (1997).

Further, a reasonable attorney would not have filed

a 2-1401 petition for the dismissal of the civil

action having twice been put on notice that the

issues sought to be raised were barred by

resjudicata. (See Singer v Brookman, 217 Ill. App.

3d 870, 879-80 578 N_E. 2d 1, 6 (1991), imposing

sanctions where plaintiffs and their counsel were

warned by trial court that their litigation might be

barred by resjudicata, and finding there was no

conceivable basis for the action other than to

waste the courts time, generate legal fees, and

harass the defendant.) In finding sanctions are

appropriate against Hopkins and their attorney,

we note the Hopkins were warned about filing

further frivolous litigation against Northbrook on

two prior occasions once by the circuit court in

ordering the civil action dismissed. And once by

the District Court after dismissing the federal

action against Northbrook.

In each of these circumstances the courts

declined to impose monetary sanctions because

Hopkins were pro-se. However it is clear that

this generous approach has not stopped the

Hopkins from engaging in frivolous litigation

against Northbrook.

Therefore, pursuant to rule 375(b) we order

Northbrook to file a statement of reasonable

expenses and attorney fees as a_result of this

appeal within 14 days. The Hopkins and their

attorney shall have 7 days to file a response.

“$4.

This court will then file a supplemental order

determining the amount of the sanction that will

be imposed on the Hopkins and their attorney.

For the fore going reasons, the circuit courts

judgments are affirmed.

MuCullough, j, with Turner , PJ, and Appleton, J.

Concurring.