Petition for Writ of Certiorari — DyStar Textilfarben GmbH & Co. Deutschland KG v. CH Patrick Co., 127 S. Ct. 2937 (2007) (No. 06-1207)
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No, OFFICE OF THE CLERK
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
DYSTAR TEXTILFARBEN GMBH & CO.
DEUTSCHLAND KG
Petitioner
V.
C.H. PATRICK CO., AND BANN QUIMICA LTDA,
Respondents.
On Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari
To The United States Court Of Appeals
For The Federal Circuit
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
William T. Enos*
Richard D. Kelly
Andrew K. Beverina
Robert C. Nissen
Oblon, Spivak. McClelland,
Maier & Neustadt. P.C.
1940 Duke Street
Alexandria, Virginia 22314
- (703) 413-3000
*Counsel of record
Counsel for Petitioner
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1. Whether the Federal Circuit’s standard for appellate
review in patent cases that does not give deference to a jury’s
verdict violates the Seventh Amendment.
2. Whether the Federal Circuit erred by ignoring substantial
evidence of objective indicia of non-obviousness and instead
finding that an invention must be obvious if it is within the
capability of a hypothetical ordinary artisan.
3. Whether the Federal Circuit erred by creating a new
corroboration requirement for all testimony in patent cases,
such that testimony in patent cases is now held to a different
evidentiary standard than testimony in all other cases in all
other circuits.
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS
All parties to the proceeding in the court whose
judgment is sought to be reviewed are set forth in the caption
of the case.
CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
Petitioner hereby identifies Platinum Equity, LLC, as
a parent corporation owning 10% or more of Petitioner’s
stock. No publicly held company owns 10% or more of the
stock of Petitioner.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS
CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI
OPINIONS BELOW
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION AND
STATUTE INVOLVED
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
PROCEEDINGS BELOW
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION ................ 5
{. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT IS VIOLATING
THE SEVENTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS OF
PARTIES BY EVISCERATING THE JURY’S
FACTFINDING ROLE
A. The Federal Circuit Ignored This Court’s
Precedent on the Role of the Jury in Determining
Obviousness
B. The Court Should Stop the Federal Circuit from
Sitting as a “Super Jury”
Il. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT HAS IGNORED
THIS COURT’S PRECEDENT BOTH BY
DECIDING THAT SECONDARY
CONSIDERATIONS OF NON-OBVIOUSNESS
ARE NO LONGER RELEVANT AND BY
CREATING A NEW CAPABILITY
STANDARD
A. The Federal Circuit Ignored or Mischaracterized
All Evidence Related to Secondary
Considerations
. The Federal Circuit Created a New Test for
Obviousness Based on an Improper “Capability”
Standard
. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT HAS IMPROPERLY
EXPANDED THE CORROBORATION
REQUIREMENT TO NOW REQUIRE
CORROBORATION OF ALL TESIMONY IN
PATENT CASES
CONCLUSION
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564 (1985)
Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover,
359 U.S. 500 (1959)
Cardinal Chemical Co. v. Morton Int’l, Inc.,
ee, rE iaaiincscsdainihacohs easecdimsescipnieticcsiocsenincse 14
Control Res. v. Delta Elecs.,
133 F. Supp. 2d 121 (D. Mass. 2001)
Dennison Mfg. Co. v. Panduit Corp.,
475 U.S. 809 (1986)
Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 486 (1935)
eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.,
126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006)
Eibel Process Co. v. Minnesota & Ontario Paper Co.,
261 U.S. 45 (1923)
Engate, Inc. v. Esquire Deposition Servs. LLC,
331 F. Supp 2d 673 (N.D. Ill. 2004)
Finnigan Corp. v. Int'l Trade Com’n,
SE Fe he Crs ih FF ei ivckikichcdsiwnctnrsdctaietvese 26, 27
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Inc. v. Ray-O-Vac Co.,
321 U.S. 275 (1944)
Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966).......... 8, 16, 23
Vv
In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443 (Fed. Cir. 1992)
KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc.,
126 S. Ct. 2965 (2006)
Lavender v. Kurn, 327 U.S. 645 (1946)
Malta v. Schulmerich Carillons, Inc.,
952 F.2d 1320 (Fed. Cir. 1991)
Medichem, S.A. v. Rolabo, S.L.,
437 F.3d 1157 (Fed. Cir. 2006)
Nelson v. Adams, USA, Inc., 529 U.S. 460 (2000)
Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433 (1830)
Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co.,
282 U.S. 555 (1931)
Stratoflex, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp.,
FEF ee SSPE CPO Cl. FOE eiiarivtivetestinndeniicastimnivcnnins os
Truswal Systems Corp. v. Hydro-Air Engineering Inc.,
EF eee BOT UO Cie, UID ocstcerceiseumsvmerevreseventiceserens 23
United States v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39 (1966)...........ccccceeeeee 25
United States v. Gadison, 8 F.3d 186 (5" Cir. 1993)......... Ss,
United States v. Tam, 240 F.3d 797
ke sas cies ia: scsstcosasetecarencscaossreesdnshanliaanieea tec 27
The Barbed Wire Patent, 143 U.S. 275 (1892)....0... ee. 26
Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977)
Winner Int'l Royalty Corp. v. Wang,
202 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2000)
Woodland Trust v. Flowertree Nursery, Inc.,
148 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
U.S. Constitution
Amend. VII
Statutes
28 U.S.C. § 1254(1)
28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1)
28 U.S.C. § 1338(a)
35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
Other Authorities
73 (No. 1795) News, Pat. Trademark & Copyright J.,
67 (Nov. 24, 2006)
Dystar Textilfarben v. C.H. Patrick,
http://www.fedcirc.us/case-reviews/federal-circuit/
DyStar-textilfarben-v.-c.h.-patrick.html
(Oct. 9, 2006)
Gruner, Richard, Everything Old Is New Again: Obviousness
Limitations on Patenting Computer Updates of Old
Designs, 9 B.U.J. Sci. & Tech. L. 209 (2003)
Vil
Koneru, Phanesh, To Promote the Progress of Useful
Articles?: An Analysis of the Current Utility Standards of
Pharmaceutical Products and Biotechnological
Research Tools, 38 IDEA 625 (1998)
Lee, Ted D. & Michelle Evans, The Charade: Trying a
Patent Case to All “Three” Juries, 8 Tex. Intell.
Prop. L.J. 1 (1999)
Rooklidge, William C. & Matthew F. Weil, Judicial
Hyperactivity: The Federal Circuit's Discomfort
with its Appellate Role, 15 Berkeley Tech. L.J.
725 (Spring, 2000)
Rules
Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a)
Sup. Ct. R. 10(a)
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI
Petitioner DyStar Textilfarben GmbH & Co.
Deutschland KG (“DyStar”’) respectfully seeks a writ of
certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit.
OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the court of appeals is reported at 464
F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2006). App. 1-33. The order of the
district court denying Respondent’s motion for judgment as a
matter of law, App. 36-37, was not reported.
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Review of a judgment of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit is sought. That judgment
was entered on October 3, 2006, with the Federal Circuit
denying DyStar’s petition for rehearing and rehearing en
banc on December 4, 2006. App. 34-35.
The jurisdiction of the Court is invoked under 28
U.S.C. § 1254(1).
The basis for jurisdiction in the court of first instance
is 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) and 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION
AND STATUTE INVOLVED
The Seventh Amendment to the United States
Constitution states: “In suits at common law, where the
value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of
trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury,
shall be otherwise reexamined in any court of the United
States, than according to the rules of the common law.”
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) states:
A patent may not be obtained though the
invention is not identically disclosed or
described as set forth in section 102 of this
title, if the differences between the subject
matter sought to be patented and the prior art
are such that the subject matter as a whole
would have been obvious at the time the
invention was made to a person having
ordinary skill in the art to which said subject
matter pertains. Patentability shall not be
negatived by the manner in which the
invention was made.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case is about the Federal Circuit’s disturbing
trend of substituting its view of the facts for those found by
the jury and its willingness to ignore this Court’s binding
precedent. In 1906, 1907, and 1917, three patents related to
making indigo issued.' Nearly eighty years after the last of
these patents issued, the patent-in-suit in this case issued.
DyStar is the assignee of the ‘992 patent which claims a
simple yet elegant method for dyeing textiles, such as cotton,
with indigo by introducing into a dyebath a pre-reduced
solution of indigo made by catalytic hydrogenation.
' The three patents are United States Patent No. 820,900 (“the Wimmer
patent’’), United States Patent No. 885,978 (“the Chaumat patent”), and
United States Patent No. 1,247,927 (“the Brochet patent”), respectively
(collectively, “the early twentieth century patents”).
* United States Patent No. 5,586,992 (“the ‘992 patent”).
2
a
Although the 1917 Brochet patent taught how to
make an aqueous solution of reduced indigo by catalytic
hydrogenation, those solutions were used only as
intermediates in the production of other solid or paste forms
of indigo which were then used by dyehouses to dye textiles.
During the early 1990s, before the ‘992 patent issued,
dyehouses used forms of indigo reduced chemically on-site
which involved several preparation steps. This method
produced inconsistent dyeing, presented health and safety
concerns and caused serious environmental pollution. The
claimed process eliminated the need for these preparation
steps by the dyehouse, improved worker safety and health,
improved the quality and consistency of the dyed fabric and
eliminated waste and_ pollution. Despite all these
advantages, no one thought to use the claimed process for
almost eighty years after the invention of catalytic
hydrogenation of indigo. For this and other reasons, the jury
correctly found that the three early twentieth century patents
did not make the ‘992 patent obvious. The district court
correctly refused to grant Respondent’s JMOL motion that
the ‘992 patent was invalid for obviousness.”
The Federal Circuit, however, did not agree with the
judgment of the jury. It substituted its own factfinding for
that of the jury and held, in the face of substantial
evidentiary support to the contrary, that the three early
twentieth cer‘ury patents made the ‘992 patent obvious. To
reach this result, the Federal Circuit had to 1) violate
Petitioner’s Seventh Amendment right to have all factual
issues resolved by the jury; 2) make its own factual findings
throughout the opinion; which were both wrong and
internally inconsistent; 3) ignore the Court’s precedent
concerning secondary considerations; and 4) create out of
> As discussed in the Jurisdictional Statement, the basis for jurisdiction
in the district court was 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) and 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a).
3
whole cloth a new testimonial corroboration requirement, in
conflict with its sister circuits.
This case represents a nadir in the Federal Circuit’s
troubling tendency to substitute its view of the facts for the
jury’s. It also demonstrates the Federal Circuit’s unique
view that neither witnesses nor juries are to be trusted. Thus,
this case raises at least three issues of broad and general
importance to both patent law and constitutional law: 1) the
proper roles of the jury and the appeals court in determining
facts; 2) whether this Court’s precedent regarding secondary —
considerations and “simple” inventions are neither binding
nor relevant; and 3) whether the Federal Circuit should be
allowed to create its own unique corroboration requirement
such that testimony in a patent case is not credible if the
testimony is not corroborated. Therefore, the Court should
grant certiorari to resolve these important issues.
PROCEEDINGS BELOW
The case was tried before a jury in the United States
District Court for the District of South Carolina on
September 7-16, 2005. The jury returned a general verdict in
which it found C. H. Patrick and Bann Quimica Ltda
(collectively “Bann”) liable for infringement of z2ll asserted
claims and also found that the claims of the ‘992 patent were
not invalid. Magistrate Judge Catoe then denied Bann’s
JMOL motion because he agreed that the verdict was
reasonable and “clearly supported” by evidence in the
record, including the credibility of the witnesses. App. 37.
Bann appealed the district court’s denial of its JMOL
motions. In an October 3, 2006, published opinion, the
Federal Circuit reversed and held the claims of the ‘992
patent invalid as obvious. The panel held that substantial
evidence did not support the jury’s verdict. In so holding,
the panel (1) made factual findings regarding the scope and
content of the prior art that conflicts with the jury’s verdict;
(2) made factual findings regarding the differences between
the prior art and the claimed invention that conflicts with the
jury’s verdict; (3) held that the jury’s presumed finding
regarding the person of ordinary skill in the art was factually
wrong; (4) ignored abundant evidence concerning secondary
considerations and created a new “capability” standard that
has no room for secondary considerations; (5) repudiated the
Court’s precedent on whether “simple” inventions may be
patented; and (6) made a credibility determination that
contradicted the judge’s and jury’s determination based on a
new corroboration requirement it created for this case.
DyStar timely filed a petition for rehearing with
suggestion for rehearing en banc, which was denied on
December 4, 2006."
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION
I. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT IS VIOLATING THE
SEVENTH AMENDMENT - RIGHTS '- OF
PARTIES BY EVISCERATING THE JURY’S
FACTFINDING ROLE
The Constitutional right to a jury trial “has always
been an object of deep interest and solicitude, and every
encroachment upon it has been watched with great jealousy.”
Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 446 (1830). Any
restriction on that right is an issue of high importance worthy
of careful scrutiny and provides sufficient ground to warrant
review by the Court. Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359
U.S. 500, 501 (1959) (“[w]e granted certiorari because
‘[m]Jaintenance of the jury as a fact-finding body is of such
* In that petition, DyStar requested that, at the very least, the Federal
Circuit remand for a new trial.
a
importance and occupies so firm a place in our history and
jurisprudence that any seeming curtailment of the right to a
jury trial should be scrutinized with the utmost care,’”
quoting Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 486 (19535)).
Review by this Court is even more necessary when Seventh
Amendment rights are infringed on a regular basis by a court
of appeals with exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all
patent infringement cases nationwide. See 28 U.S.C. §
1295(a)(1). Consequently, the Federal Circuit’s denial of a
party’s Seventh Amendment right to have the jury resolve all
factual issues warrants review by the Court.
Since its inception, the Federal Circuit has been
criticized for overstepping its bounds as an appellate court.
The Federal Circuit’s willingness to impose its views in
areas traditionally, and constitutionally, reserved for juries
and district courts has been labeled “judicial hyperactivity.”
William C. Rooklidge & Matthew F. Weil, Judicial
Hyperactivity: The Federal Circuit's Discomfort with its
Appellate Role, 15 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 725, 729-30 (Spring,
2000). Two commentators came to the conclusion in their
article that, in the context of reviewing jury verdicts, “it
appears that when the Federal Circuit believes the jury
verdict was correct, it simply holds that the substantial
evidence test was met. On the other hand, when the Federal
Circuit believes the jury verdict was wrong, it substitutes its
opinion for that of the jury and simply states that the
substantial evidence test was not met.”’ Ted D. Lee &
Michelle Evans, The Charade: Trying a Patent Case to All
“Three” Juries, 8 Tex. Intell. Prop. L.J. 1, 14 (1999)
(emphasis added).
Even some judges on the Federal Circuit have complained of this
willingness to ignore the jury and take on the role of factfinder. See, e.g.,
Malta v. Schulmerich Carillons, Inc., 952 F.2d 1320, 1343 (Fed. Cir.
1991) (Newman, J., dissenting).
District courts have also noted with concern the
Federal Circuit’s tendency “to take for itself the role of final
arbitrator of issues that, at least at one time, were fairly
considered the province of the trial court and jury.” Control
Res. v. Delta Elecs., 133 F. Supp. 2d 121, 124 n.4 (D. Mass.
2001). Indeed, this Court has questioned the Federal
Circuit’s lack of deference to the factfinding below.
Dennison Mfg. Co. v. Panduit Corp., 475 U.S. 809 (1986).
In Dennison, the Court granted certiorari, vacated, and
remanded so that the Federal Circuit could reconsider
whether it had given sufficient deference to the lower court’s
factfinding. The Court noted that the petitioner’s complaint
of appellate factfinding was “not insubstantial.” Jd. at 810-
11.
Commentators observed that after Dennison, the
Federal Circuit began giving more deference to factual
findings. But those same commentators have also noted that
the Federal Circuit is now “backsliding” and has reverted to
its previous pattern of substituting its own view for that of
the jury’s. Rooklidge, Judicial Hyperactivity, 15 Berkeley
Tech. L.J. at 739-40.
This recent “backsliding” reached its nadir in this
case. The Federal Circuit ignored the abundant evidence that
supported the jury’s verdict. Indeed, one reading the opinion
would not even suspect such evidence existed. Nor did the
court acknowledge Judge Catoe’s statement that the verdict
was supported by the credibility of the witnesses.
Instead, the Federal Circuit credited facts that might
have entitled the jury to decide the other way. But it is
° Dennison concerned fact-finding under Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a). A jury
verdict carries an even higher burden.
improper for an appellate court to substitute its own findings
of fact for the jury’s. “[T]he trial on the merits should be
“the ‘main event’. . . rather than a ‘tryout on the road.”
Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 575 (1985), citing
Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 US. 72, 90 (1977).
Consequently, the Court should grant certiorari to remind the
Federal Circuit of its proper role as an appellate court and to
instruct that it must cease substituting its judgment for that of
a reasonable jury.
A. The Federal Circuit Ignored This Court’s
Precedent on the Role of the Jury in
Determining Obviousness
The Court enunciated the standard for obviousness in
Graham vy. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966). Graham
established that the obviousness determination lends itself to
several basic factual inquiries: (1) the scope and content of
the prior art; (2) the differences between the prior art and the
claimed invention; (3) the level of ordinary skill in the art;
and (4) secondary considerations such as commercial
success, skepticism of others, failure of others, long-felt
need, copying and praise by others in the art. See id. at 17.
These factual inquiries are the exclusive province of the jury.
See Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co.,
282 U.S. 555, 566 (1931) (holding that the factual findings
of the jury must be allowed to stand unless unreasonable).
Although the panel admitted that it was “required to
assume the jury accepted [DyStar’s definition of a person
having ordinary skill in the art],” App. 12, it held that there
was not substantial evidence to support the jury’s presumed
finding. /d. But the panel was wrong because DyStar did
present substantial evidence regarding its definition of a
person having ordinary skill in the art through expert
testimony from Dr. Blackburn. (A497:25 — A498:13).’ The
panel, however, pointed to what it perceived to be
inconsistencies in his testimony. App. 11. Whether there
were inconsistencies in Dr. Blackburn’s testimony, however,
goes to the credibility and weight that testimony should be
given by the jury, not the weight the Federal Circuit might
give it sitting as a “super jury.”
’ The proper question is not whether there was
evidence that tended to support a different verdict, but
whether there was an evidentiary basis to support the jury’s
findings. As the Court has explained, once an evidentiary
basis for the jury’s verdict becomes apparent, “the appellate
court’s function is exhausted . . . it being immaterial that the
court might draw a contrary inference or feel that another
conclusion is more reasonable.” Lavender v. Kurn, 327 U.S.
645, 653 (1946). The fact that the Federal Circuit was
reduced to looking for inconsistencies in Dr. Blackburn’s
testimony demonstrates that Dr. Blackburn’s testimony did
provide substantial evidence in support of the jury’s verdict.
Furthermore, even assuming that it was proper for the
panel to ignore the jury’s factual findings and select Bann’s
definition of a person having ordinary skill in the art, there
was still substantial evidence to support the jury’s verdict.
Bann's expert testified that a reference entitled The
Application of Vat Dyes was directed to Bann’s definition of
a person having ordinary skill in the art. He admitted that
this reference did not contain any mention of the early
twentieth century patents or even hint at the method
described in the ‘992 patent. (A1137:9-A1139:5). Thus, it
was reasonable for the jury to infer that the twentieth century
” All cites in the form of (AXXX) are to the joint appendix filed with the
Federal Circuit. Citations to the appendix attached to this petition are in
the form App. XX.
patents did not suggest the claimed method. The Federal
Circuit was required to assume that the jury made such an
inference. Lavender, 327 U.S. at 653.
The scope and content of the prior art is a factual
issue for the jury to decide. The most important prior art was
the 1917 Brochet patent. DyStar presented substantial
evidence that the Brochet patent did not suggest the claimed
process, which included expert testimony that Brochet taught
that its indigo solution could not be used as a dye.
(A557:18-A558:22; A466:20-A467:7). In addition to that
expert testimony, DyStar offered a contemporaneous article
written by Mr. Brochet, the inventor of the Brochet patent.
In that article, Mr. Brochet explained that indigo obtained by
catalytic hydrogenation could be “concentrated in vacuum in
order to obtain indigo white as a paste,” for use in making
other products, but never suggests that it can be used as a
dye. (A1907-A1909). Thus, in neither his patent nor his
article did Mr. Brochet even imply that the product of his
method of producing indigo could be used to dye anything.
(A460: 19-A462:20).
In a rather candid admission that it was substituting
its factfinding for that of the jury, the panel wrote that the
Brochet patent “implies that all vat dyestuffs, including
indigo, may either be used immediately for dyeing or
concentrated prior to sale.” App. 16 (emphasis added). This
alleged “implication,” however, was flatly contradicted by
expert testimony that the Brochet patent did not suggest
using the indigo solution as a dye. (A557:18-23; A466:20-
A467:7). The panel ignored that testimony.
Likewise, the panel ignored the 1924 Colour Index
which lists the indigo product of the Brochet patent as
unstable. (A1881). The Colour Index’s description
contradicts the Federal Circuit’s alleged implication that the
10
Brochet indigo is ready for immediate use as a dye because
unstable indigo cannot be used as a dye. At a minimum, it
provides the jury with evidence from which it could negate
any such implication.
Finally, a// inferences are to be construed to support
the jury’s verdict. Lavender, 327 U.S. at 653. It is not the
job of the Federal Circuit to usurp the role of the jury and
decide what evidence implies. The jury decided that the
Brochet patent did not imply that its indigo could be used
immediately. As the opinion admits, it is the factfinder’s
responsibility to decide whether a reference “teaches away
from the claimed invention.” App. 13 (internal quotation
omitted). The Federal Circuit claimed, however, that it
would “not read into a reference a teaching away from a
process where no such language exists.” App. 16 (emphasis
added). But that is not what the Federal Circuit did here.
Instead, it seized the role of factfinder and read into Brochet
a teaching fowards a process where no such language
existed.
Likewise, the Federal Circuit’s factfinding regarding
the Wimmer patent was both wrong and improper. The
Federal Circuit made the factual finding that the indigo
product of the Wimmer patent could be “placed on the
market without any further treatment.” App. 16. But DyStar
presented evidence that the 1906 Wimmer patent did not
disclose indigo ready for use as a dye. This evidence
included a comprehensive history of indigo written by the
inventor of the Wimmer patent thirty-three years after the
Wimmer patent had issued.” In that history, Wimmer
explains that the only use ever made of his indigo (or the
indigo made by the Brochet method) was as an intermediate
* The Federal Circuit claimed that this article written thirty-three years
later was a “contemporaneous article.” App. 16.
11
in the production of solid products. (A2136). The panel
opinion claimed, however, that this article can not retract the
language of the patent regarding the placing of the indigo on
the market without any further treatment. But it is at least a
legitimate inference for the jury to make that the indigo from
both the Wimmer patent and the Brochet patent were placed
on the market as intermediates, not as dyes. Indeed, even
Respondent’s own expert witness conceded that the Wimmer
indigo was placed on the market as an intermediate.
(A1129:3-A1130:21). Thus, it is astounding that the Federal
Circuit substituted its factfinding for the jury’s and found
that a 1906 reference made the claimed process obvious
when it is beyond question that the claimed process was not
obvious to Dr. Wimmer even thirty-three years after his
invention.
The Federal Circuit mentions the Chaumat patent in
passing, always in combination with Brochet or Wimmer.
But DyStar presented substantial evidence that Chaumat
does not reduce indigo and, therefore, could not be used as a
dye. (A541:24-24; A542:19-A543:13). Thus, there was
substantial evidence to support the jury’s verdict that
Chaumet did not make the ‘992 patent obvious and it was
improper for the Federal Circuit to substitute its view of the
facts for that of the jury’s.
Consequently, it was reasonable for the jury to find
that the early twentieth century patents did not suggest the
claimed method of the ‘992 patent. Especially in light of the
fact that the 1915 Brochet article, the 1924 Colour Index, the
1939 Wimmer report, and the 1953 Application of Vat Dyes
all teach away from the claimed process. As even a single
reference teaching away can negate obviousness, Winner
Int'l Royalty Corp. v. Wang, 202 F.3d 1340, 1349-50 (Fed.
Cir. 2000), the jury had substantial evidence supporting its
verdict.
Rather than engaging in appellate review with proper
deference to the jury’s factual findings, the Federal Circuit
chose to re-weigh the evidence itself. To make matters
worse, it ignored much of the substantial evidence that
supperted the jury’s verdict. Indeed, many of the individual
pieces of evidence alone were sufficient to provide
substantial evidence to support the jury’s verdict. Together,
this evidence is overwhelming substantial evidence in
support of the jury’s verdict.
B. The Court Should Stop the Federal Circuit
from Sitting as a “Super Jury”
The Federal Circuit was established in 1982 to bring
greater uniformity and expertise to patent cases. This
mandate, however, does not allow the Federal Circuit to
ignore the most basic rules of judicial procedure. This point
is sometimes lost on the Federal Circuit, as illustrated by
Nelson v. Adams, USA, Inc., 529 U.S. 460 (2000), which
unanimously reversed the Federal Circuit on the fundamental
point that a party is entitled to be heard before the entry of
judgment against it. Indeed, the Court implied that the
procedure followed by the Federal Circuit in that case was
perhaps more befitting Alice in Wonderland. See id. at 468
n.2.
The real issue presented here is whether the Federal
Circuit is above the law in patent cases. The Federal Circuit
should not be allowed to sit as a federal appellate super jury
that is free to re-try patent cases. Although there can be no
circuit split in patent cases in light of the Federal Circuit’s
exclusive jurisdiction, that does not allow the Federal Circuit
to ignore basic rules of judicial review. The unique and
specialized nature of the Federal Circuit’s docket may have
the advantage of promoting greater expertise and uniformity
13
in patent cases, but it also has the corresponding
disadvantages of insularity and a willingness to second guess
trial courts, and juries.
When the Federal Circuit applies the wrong standard
in such situations, there is no other redress for litigants
except to this Court, and there is no possibility that the
system might work this issue out for itself. See Cardinal
Chemical Co. v. Morton Int'l, Inc., 508 U.S. 83, 89 (1993)
(certiorari granted “[b]ecause the Federal Circuit has
exclusive jurisdiction over appeals from all United States
District Courts in patent litigation, the rule that it applied in
this case . . . is a matter of special importance to the entire
Nation”). The Federal Circuit, although acknowledging the
proper test for overturning a jury’s verdict, has demonstrated
repeatedly that it will not rigorously apply it. Rooklidge,
Judicial Hyperactivity, 15 Berkeley Tech. L.J. at 739-40;
Lee, The Charade, 8 Tex. Intell. Prop. L.J. at 14. And in this
case, the Federal Circuit has specifically denied Petitioner its
Seventh Amendment right to have all factual issues resolved
by the jury.
Here, the Federal Circuit felt it was more important
to advocate on behalf of its obviousness jurisprudence to this
Court than it was to respect the Petitioner’s Seventh
Amendment jury rights. Indeed, one commentator noted that
the Federal Circuit attempted to use the DySzar opinion
(along with another opinion) as an “unofficial amicus
brief] ]” to defend its obviousness jurisprudence to this Court.
73 (No. 1795) News, Pat. Trademark & Copyright J., 67, 68
(Nov. 24, 2006). Similarly, another commentator noted that
the panel was “clearly speaking to inform the Supreme Court
as it prepares to consider the propriety of the
motivation/suggestion test in KSR v. Teleflex.” Dystar
Textilfarben v. C.H. Patrick, http://www.fedcirc.us/case-
reviews/federal-circuit/DyStar-textilfarben-v.-c.h.-
14
patrick.html (Oct. 9, 2006). That commentator went on to
point out that the panel “went out of its way to defend the
motivation/suggestion test, . . . [and that t]he opinion is quite
critical of commentary on the test.” /d. (emphasis added).
One need not review the articles by commentators to
see that the Federal Circuit had an agenda when it decided
this case. While the opinion spends only one page
discussing (and mostly ignoring) the substantial evidence for
secondary considerations, it spends twelve pages refuting
arguments that DyStar did not make.’ The opinion
complains that parties see the Federal Circuit’s obviousness
jurisprudence as “rigid and categorical.” App. 22. But
DyStar never made that complaint. The opinion further
complains about commentators who do not review its cases
carefully. But DyStar never mentioned any of those
commentators, nor did it mention their articles. The opinion
even appears to be complaining that this Court granted
certiorari in KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 2965
(2006). App. 22 at n.3 (implying that the Court should not
have granted certiorari because the Federal Circuit reversed
for a different reason than the basis for the Court granting
certiorari). Once again, the Iederal Circuit was not
responding to an argument raised by DyStar.
Under the rules of the Court, certiorari is appropriate
where “a United States court of appeals . . . has so far
9 Those twelve pages consist of a rather defensive overview of its
obviousness jurisprudence as shown by the following statements from
the opinion: 1) Federal Circuit opinions discussed by commentators
contain “arguably imprecise language,” App. 19 (emphasis added); 2) “a
close reading of In re Lee” demonstrates that the Federal Circuit's
obviousness jurisprudence is correct, App. 20 (emphasis added); 3) “It is
difficult to see how our suggestion test could be ‘seen as ngid and
categorical,” App. 22; and 4) “Our suggestion test is in actuality quite
flexible.” Jd.
departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial
proceedings . . . as to call for an exercise of this Court’s
supervisory power.” Sup. Ct. R. 10({a). The exercise of the
Court’s supervisory authority is especially important here. It
was entirely improper to sacrifice Petitioner's Seventh
Amendment rights merely so the Federal Circuit could file a
pseudo-amicus brief to this Court because it is upset that
there is “much confusion about [its obviousness] law” that
has now been apparently “compounded” by the Court’s
decision to grant certiorari to KSR. Filing a pseudo-amicus
brief is such a departure from the accepted and usual course
of judicial proceedings that it needs the exercise of this
Court’s supervisory power.
Il. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT HAS IGNORED
THIS COURT’S PRECEDENT BOTH BY
DECIDING THAT SECONDARY
CONSIDERATIONS OF NON-OBVIOUSNESS
ARE NO LONGER RELEVANT AND BY
CREATING A NEW CAPABILITY STANDARD
In Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966), the
Court held . that secondary considerations such as
“commercial success, long felt but unsolved needs, [and]
faiiure of others,” may provide objective indicia that a
patented claim is not obvious. /d. at 17. The Court
explained that these secondary considerations may serve to
“guard against slipping into use of hindsight, and to resist the
temptation to read into the prior art the teachings of the
invention in issue.” Jd. at 36 (internal quotation and citation
omitted). In this case; however, the Federal Circuit decided
to ignore the binding precedent of this Court, and it
implicitly held that secondary considerations of non-
obviousness are no longer relevant.
16
DyStar presented massive amounts of testimony and
documentary evidence that demonstrated that its patent
claims were not obvious. This evidence was largely
unrebutted and included the following:
Evidence of skepticism - Mr. Schnitzer
testified that his colleagues at BASF did not
believe his proposed method would work
because the solution would be unstable,
would not dye yarn properly and might
damage dyeing equipment.'” (A252:8-24).
Praise for the invention — A competitor called
DyStar’s method “a major new innovation for
the denim dyer,” (A1947); even Respondent
referred to the method as “the new
innovation,” (A1893); and a dyehouse
referred to the claimed process as an
“advanced process.” (A246:9-14).
Copying of the invention — Respondent and
another competitor advertised the method in
promotional material, (A 1820-34; A1911-47);
Respondent switched eighty percent of its
Brazilian dyehouse customers to the claimed
process. (A984:5-10).
Unexpected results for the invention — The
patented method provides better color
fastness, depth of color, contrast and greater
consistency. (A252:8 - A253:17; A254:18 -
A256:3).
Mr. Schnitzer worked at BASF. when he invented the ‘992 patent.
DyStar subsequently acquired BASF’s textile dyeing business.
17
Failure of others to solve the problem that the
invention solved — BASF had to engage in
substantial experimentation before arriving at
the solution to the environmental problems
provided by the ‘992 patent (A1356-63;
A1371-78; A1387-95; A1400-04; A241:21 -
A245:13); DyStar also demonstrated that
another chemical company, Buffalo Color,
attempted and failed to make a pre-reduced
indigo solution to sell to dyehouses for use in
dyeing in 1979, (A1899-1902); in 1990 a
dyehouse trying to use an aqueous solution of
leuco indigo made by catalytic hydrogenation
as a dye failed miserably. (A840:25-
A841:25; A847:17-A848:16; A922:15-20;
A967:6-2).
Commercial success of the invention —
Messrs. Schilling and Malpass testified that
the first, second, and fourth largest U.S. mills
(which together produce the vast majority of
the denim made in this country) use the
claimed process, (A893:25-A985:5 and
A403:7-10); Mr. Schnitzer testified that the
sales of indigo solution for use in the claimed
process constitutes eighty percent of DyStar’s
world-wide indigo sales; Mr. Schnitzer also
testified that, in a mere five years of using the
claimed process, DyStar went from zero
percent market share in Brazil to forty
percent. (A253:19 - A254:5; A257:23-
A258:5).
Long-felt need — An almost eighty year
passage of time between the Brochet patent
end the invention in the ‘992 patent.
18
A. The. Federal Circuit Ignored or
Mischaracterized All Evidence Related to
Secondary Considerations
Regarding long-felt need, the Federal Circuit
mischaracterized the Wimmer article as being
“contemporaneous” to his patent, App. 16, even though he
wrote it thirty-three years after his patent issued. This
mischaracterization allowed it to ignore the fact that it was
not obvious to Wimmer that his indigo solution (or Brochet’s
indigo solution) could be used for anything other than an
intermediate to make other indigo products. The opinion
does grudgingly mention, however, “that eighty years
elapsed between Brochet’s invention and another inventor’s
thought to vacuum-seal the Brochet solution and add it
directly to the dyebath.”” App. 29-30 (emphasis added).
The panel provided no reason for dismissing this eighty year
period despite the Court’s holding that the passage of time is
evidence of invention. See Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,
Inc. v. Ray-O-Vac Co., 321 U.S. 275, 279 (1944) (the fact
that fifty years had passed before the problem was solved
demonstrated that the patent was not obvious).
The Federal Circuit also admits that “DyStar has
enjoyed considerable commercial success from _ the
introduction of the product.” But again, it simply ignores
this fact and fails to explain why this commercial success
was not sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict.
'' Despite here characterizing Mr. Schnitzer as an “inventor” the panel
does not explain this inconsistency with its earlier factual finding that the
claimed process “is the work of a skilled chemist, not of an inventor.”
App. 29 (emphasis added).
The Federal Circuit also opined that the substantial
evidence DyStar submitted regarding the failure of others,
“actually detract[ed] from its argument, and heavily 30.”
App. 30. But to reach its opinion, the panel had to ignore
most of the substantial evidence of failure of others, and
mischeracterize the rest. First, it completely ignored that
BASF had to engage in substantial experimentation before
arriving at the claimed process. Second, it ignored that in
1990 a dyehouse tried to use an aqueous solution of leuco
indigo made by catalytic hydrogenation as a dye and failed
miserably.
The evidence it chose not to ignore, it
mischaracterized. DyStar presented substantial evidence that
Buffalo Color in 1979 tried and failed to sell dye that
dyehouses could use in a method similar to the ‘992 patent.
This substantial evidence demonstrated that Buffalo’s
product did not work because it was not stable. Substituting
its own factfinding for that of the jury, the panel held “that
Buffalo was only mildly concerned with instability
problems.” App. 30 (emphasis added). But regardless of
which adverb the Federal Circuit puts in front of
“concerned” (mildly? somewhat? incredibly?), the Federal
Circuit is here admitting that Buffalo was concerned about
stability. That admission, in turn, is conceding that sixty
years after the Brochet patent, the claimed process was still
not obvious.”
Continuing in its factfinding role regarding Buffalo's
intent, the Federal Circuit made the factual finding that
Buffalo Color failed to sell an indigo solution to dyehouses
12
Buffalo Color’s 1979 failure demonstrates that the Federal Circuit
was wrong in its belief that it “can assume comfortably” that DyStar’s
patented method would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the
art. See A28.
because it “would cost more to produce.” App. 30 (emphasis
added). Two pages previously, however, the Federal Circuit
made the opposite factual finding: that there would be a
motivation to combine the early twentieth century patents
because providing an indigo solution to dyehouses would
cost less, i.c., “would save even more time, space and
money.” App. 28 (emphasis in original). Not only was it
improper for the Federal Circuit to substitute its factfinding
for the jury’s, but its factfinding was not consistent. It
found, with respect to secondary considerations, that the
indigo solution would cost more but found that the solution
would cost /ess with respects to the prior art. These
contradictory factual findings "demonstrate that it is the
Federal Circuit’s decision to overturn the jury verdict, and
not the jury’s verdict itself, that is not supported by
substantial evidence.
Finally, regarding “skepticism of others,” the panel
implicitly decided that the jury was incorrect in finding Mr.
Schnitzer credible because his testimony was
“undocumented” and “unsupported by even a_ brief
explanation of the-chemistry underlying this assumption.” '°
Id. But Mr. Schnitzer did discuss the chemistry underlying
the skepticism of others. (A252:8-24) Most importantly, it
was improper for the Federal Circuit to pass on the
credibility of Mr. Schnitzer. Thus, once again, there was
substantial evidence to support the jury’s verdict.
All the evidence that the Federal Circuit chose to
ignore Or misconstrue is more than sufficient substantial
evidence of secondary considerations to support the jury’s
verdict. See Stratoflex, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp., 713 F.2d
1530, 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (“evidence of secondary
13
As discussed infra in Section Ul, the Federal Circuit improperly
expanded the corroboration requirement for testimony in this case.
considerations may often be the most probative and cogent
evidence in the record”). Thus, the Court should grant
certiorari to instruct the Federal Circuit that it can not ignore
the Court’s binding precedent regarding the proper use of
secondary considerations.
Finally, it would be especially appropriate for the
Court to grant certiorari on this issue now. KSR Int'l Co. v.
Teleflex, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 2965, will afford the Court the
opportunity to address the law of obviousness under Section
103(a). This case presents the Court with an opportunity to
instruct the Federal Circuit as to the proper role of the jury in
determining the Graham factors underlying the legal
determination of obviousness. If the Court is to alter or fine-
tune the legal determination of obviousness, then there is no
better time to address the complementary question of the
jury’s role in that determination.
B. The Federal Circuit Created a New Test for
Obviousness Based on an_ Improper
“Capability” Standard
Ignoring the objective indicia of non-obviousness
established by the Court, the Federal Circuit created a new
test for obviousness - one that does not safeguard against the
use of hindsight. The panel held that any time that “the
combination of references results in a product or process that
is more desirable, for example because it is stronger,
cheaper, cleaner, faster, lighter, smaller, more durable, or
more efficient,” the only remaining question to decide
whether the claim is obvious “is whether the ordinary artisan
possesses knowledge and skills rendering him capable of
combining the prior art references.” App. 28 (emphasis in
original).
This “capability” test violates this Court’s precedent
for three reasons. First, the Court has held that just because
“the means [the inventor] adopted seem simple and such as
should have been obvious to those who worked in the field,
[that] is not enough to negative invention.” See Goodyear,
321 U.S. at 279. But if an invention “should have been
obvious to those who worked in the field,” it is within the
“capabilities” of “the ordinary artisan.” Thus, the Federal
Circuit’s new capability standard can not coexist with
Goodyear’s holding that an invention may be patented even
if it “should have been obvious to those who worked in the
field.” The Court should not allow the Federal Circuit to
ignore the Court’s binding precedent.
Second, the Federal Circuit’s “capability” standard
violates the Court’s precedent by ignoring secondary
considerations. No longer will commercial success,
skepticism, praise, long felt need, passage of significant
time, failure of others or unexpected results have any role in
the analysis. There will be no role for these secondary
considerations because, according to the panel, the only
question to decide is whether the hypothetical ordinary
artisan was “capable” of combining the references. But by
failing to consider the secondary considerations, the Federal
Circuit is inviting hindsight reconstruction of inventions.
This hindsight problem is why the Court requires the
lower courts to consider the objective indicia of non-
obviousness because they “guard against slipping into [the]
use of hindsight.” Graham, 383 U.S. at 36; see also Truswal
Systems Corp. v. Hydro-Air Engineering Inc., 813 F.2d
1207, 1212 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (“[t}hat evidence is ‘secondary’
in time does not mean that it is secondary in importance”).
The Federal Circuit’s “capability” standard not only blithely
ignores this serious problem but exacerbates it. Now, the
infringer can use the patent as a road map and show how a
23
hypothetical ordinary artisan can reach the same result. The
fact that others have failed, that long periods of time have
passed (here, eighty years), and that the new invention is
commercially successful all disappear in direct violation of
the Court’s precedent.
Third, if the capability of the ordinary artisan is
enough to make a patent obvious, patents could not be
granted for simple inventions. Cf. Richard Gruner,
Everything Old Is New Again: Obviousness Limitations on
Patenting Computer Updates of Old Designs, 9 B.U.J. Sci. &
Tech. L. 209, 264 (2003) (hindsight problems regarding
obviousness determinations are especially problematic when
the patented invention is “simple”). Again, such a result
violates the Court’s precedent. The fact that an invention is
simple means that it is within the capabilities of an ordinary
artisan. See Goodyear, 321 U.S. at 279. But this Court has
explicitly held that just because an invention “seem[s] simple
and such as should have been obvious to those who worked
in the field, [that] is not enough to negative invention.””* Jd.
(emphasis added); Jn re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1447 (Fed.
Cir. 1992) (although the invention is simple, “[s]implicity 1s
not inimical to patentability”). As the Federal Circuit has
taken it upon itself to outlaw simple inventions, the Court
should step in to correct the Federal Circuit.
'4 Similarly, the Federal Circuit’s capability standard violates the
language of the statute. 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) states: "Patentability shall not
be negatived by the manner in which the invention was made." Thus, the
statute forbids finding a patent claim obvious merely because the
invention is simple, i.e. within the capabilities of one of ordinary skill in
the art. See Phanesh Koneru, To Promote the Progress of Useful
Articles?: An Analysis of the Current Utility Standards of
Pharmaceutical Products and Biotechnological Research Tools, 38
IDEA 625, 666 (1998) (explaining that the fact that “patentability shall
not be negatived by the manner... [of] invention” allows for patents for
inventions made with “minimal effort").
24
Accordingly, the Court should grant the petition for
certiorari because the Federal Circuit’s new “capability”
standard conflicts with the Court’s binding precedent for at
least these three reasons.
lll. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT HAS IMPROPERLY
EXPANDED THE CORROBORATION
REQUIREMENT TO NOW REQUIRE
CORROBORATION OF ALL TESTIMONY IN
PATENT CASES
To reach its conclusion that the ‘992 patent was
obvious, the Federal Circuit had to ignore the testimony of
Mr. Schnitzer, an inventor of the ‘992 patent. His
uncontroverted testimony was that others were skeptical
when he suggested the method claimed in the ‘992 patent.
(A252:8-24). Skepticism of others is objective indicia of
non-obviousness. United States v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39, 52
(1966). Yet, the Federal Circuit dismissed this testimony,
Stating that it was “a bare assertion” that was “undocumented
and non-specific.” App. 30. As discussed supra, its
Statement that this testimony was “a bare assertion,” and
“non-specific” is specifically contradicted by the record.
Further, it was not proper for the Federal Circuit to substitute
its judgment for the jury’s and decide that the witness was
not credible.
Apparently realizing that it was improper for it to
judge the credibility of a witness, the Federal Circuit tried to
bolster its factfinding by stating the testimony was
“undocumented.” Thus, the Federal Circuit used this case to
extend its corroboration requirement far beyond any
reasonable scope and in direct conflict with its sister circuits.
The corroboration requirement arose out of a late
1800s case, The Barbed Wire Patent, 143 U.S. 275 (1892).
Prior public use was the issue in 71 he Barbed Wire Patent,
and it is the context in which the corroboration requirement
most often arises. The Court held that the uncorroborated
testimony of a witness regarding prior public use was
insufficient as a matter of law to prove by clear and
convincing evidence that a patent is invalid.’ Jd. at 284.
Based on The Barbed Wire Patent, the Federal
Circuit has repeatedly held that oral “testimony alone cannot
surmount the hurdle that the clear and convincing evidence
standard imposes in proving patent invalidity.” Finnigan
Corp. v. Int'l Trade Com’n, 180 F.3d 1354, 1370 (Fed. Cir.
1999). The Federal Circuit has explained that its
requirement for corroboration to reach the “clear and
convincing evidence” to invalidate a patent is necessary
because it is unlikely that a party trying to invalidate a patent
based on its alleged prior invention could create an invention
without any corroborating evidence of its invention. See
Woodland Trust v. Flowertree Nursery, Inc., 148 F.3d 1368,
1373 (Fed. Cir. 1998). But until this case, no court has held
that uncorroborated testimony is insufficient as a matter of
law to oppose a party that has the burden or proving
invalidity by clear and convincing evidence.
Numerous courts have questioned whether the
Federal Circuit’s corroboration requirement to prove
invalidity by clear and convincing evidence makes sense.
See, e.g. Engate, Inc. v. Esquire Deposition Servs. LLC, 331
'5 Although the Court held that proof of invalidity had to be “clear,
satisfactory and beyond a reasonable doubt,” The Barbed Wire Patent,
143 U.S. at 284, that term has subsequently been understood to equate to
the “clear and convincing” standard. See Eibel Process Co. v. Mirnesota
& Ontario Paper Co., 261 U.S. 45, 60 (1923).
26
F. Supp 2d 673, 684-85 (N.D. III. 2004). As that court noted
“[iJt is not all that easy to understand why patent invalidity,
of all things, should rank with treason in terms of the need
for special corroboration.”'® Jd That court recommended
that “the [corroboration] rule has seen better days and ought
to be put out of its misery humanely rather than being forced
to suffer the death of a thousand cuts.”!’ Jd. at 686 n.4.
Whether the Court decides to wait for another day to
decide whether the corroboration requirement should “be put
out of its misery,” the Court should not let the Federal
Circuit expand the need for corroboration for testimony. The
Barbed Wire Patent and the subsequent Federal Circuit cases
applying that case have all addressed a specific issue:
whether uncorroborated oral testimony is sufficient to meet
the high evidentiary standard of invalidating a patent by
“clear and convincing evidence.” But here, the Federal
Circuit has now expanded the corroboration requirement for
testimony that does not even need to meet the preponderance
'© Indeed, the Federal Circuit's requirement for corroboration to meet
the clear and convincing evidence standard, contradicts the holding of its
sister circuits’ that uncorroborated oral testimony is sufficient to meet the
higher evidentiary standard of beyond a reasonable doubt. Comp. United
States v. Tam, 240 F.3d 797, 806 (9 Cir. 2001); United States y.
Gadison, 8 F.3d 186, 190 (5" Cir. 1993); with Medichem, S.A. v. Rolabo,
S.L., 437 F.3d 1157, 1164 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Finnigan Corp. v. Int'l Trade
Com’n, 180 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
'” Of course, the Court could use this case as a vehicle to decide whether
the 19" century proposition that uncorroborated oral testimony can never
reach the “clear and convincing evidence” standard still makes sense,
considering that the modern view is that uncorroborated oral testimony
can reach the higher evidentiary standard of proof “beyond a reasonable
doubt.” It would be especially appropriate for the Court to consider this
issue due to the concerns of many that it is too difficult to invalidate bad
patents. Cf eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837, 1842
(2006) (Kennedy J., concurrence).
of evidence standard. Instead, the oral testimony was offered
to meet the second lowest evidentiary standard possible:
opposing a party that had the burden of proving an issue by
clear and convincing evidence. No court, including the
Federal Circuit, has ever previously held that a party that
does not have any burden of proof can not use
uncorroborated testimony fo oppose a party that has the
burden of proof.
In this case, the Federal Circuit has held that a jury
can not judge the credibility of a witness. Thus, once again,
the Federal Circuit is demonstrating its deep distrust of
juries. The Court should grant the petition for certiorari to
stop the Federal Circuit from seizing for itself the ability to
decide whether witnesses are credible, based on an improper,
unprecedented corroboration requirement. In every other
circuit, uncorroborated testimony is acceptable to meet all
evidentiary standards, except in a treason case. Thus, the
Federal Circuit’s refusal to accept any witness testimony that
‘s uncorroborated is in direct conflict with both this Court’s
precedent and its sister circuits. The Court should grant the
petition for certiorari to resolve this split between the Federal
Circuit and all the other circuits regarding whether all
testimony must be corroborated.
CONCLUSION
The petition for writ of certiorari should be granted.
March 5, 2007
Respectfully submitted,
William T. Enos*
Richard D. Kelly
Andrew K. Beverina
Robert C. Nissen
Oblon, Spivak, McClelland,
Maier & Neustadt, P.C.
1940 Duke St.
Alexandria, VA 22314
(703) 413-3000
*Counsel of record
Counsel for Petitioner
APPENDIX
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
06-1088
DYSTAR TEXTILFARBEN GMBH & CO
DEUTSCHLAND KG,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
V.
C.H. PATRICK CO., and BANN QUIMICA LTDA
>]
Defendants-Appellants.
William T. Enos, Oblon, Spivak, McClelland, Maier
& Neustadt, P.C., of Alexandria, Virginia, argued for
plaintiff-appellee. With him on the brief were Richard D.
Kelly and Andrew K. Beverina.
Neil C. Jones, Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough,
L.L.P., of Greenville, South Carolina, argued for defendants-
appellants.
Appealed from: United States District Court for the District
of South Carolina
Magistrate Judge William M. Catoe, Jr.
App. |
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
FEDERAL CIRCUIT
06-1088
DYSTAR TEXTILFARBEN GMBH & CO
DEUTSCHLAND KG,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
V.
C.H. PATRICK CO., and BANN QUIMICA LTDA,
Defendants-Appellants.
DECIDED: October 3, 2006
Before MICHEL, Chief Judge, RADER and SCHALL,
Circuit Judges. Opinion for the court filed by Chief Judge
MICHEL. Concurring opinion filed by Circuit Judge
SCHALL.
MICHEL, Chief Judge.
DyStar Textilfarben GmbH & Co. Deutschland KG
("DyStar") sued defendants C.H. Patrick Co. and Bann
Quimica Ltda. (collectively, "Bann") in the United States
District Court for the District of South Carolina, alleging
direct, contributory, and induced infringement of U.S. Patent
App. 2
No. 5,586,992 ("the '992 patent"), which discloses a process
for dyeing textile materials with catalytically hydrogenated
leuco indigo. DyStar and Bann Quimica Ltda. are large
chemical manufacturers that, inter alia, sell prereduced
indigo for use in dyeing processes; C.H. Patrick Co.
purchased prereduced indigo solution from Bann Quimica
Ltda. in 2002 and used it to dye yarn in a process alleged to
infringe.
The parties agreed to a jury trial before a magistrate
judge. Prior to charging the jury and in open court, the
magistrate judge granted DyStar's motion for judgment as a
matter of law ("JMOL") that it had not engaged in
inequitable conduct before the United States Patent and
Trademark Office ("PTO"). The jury rendered a verdict that
"Bann Quimica and/or C.H. Patrick" had infringed each of
claims 1-4, assessed damages at $90,000, and declined to
hold the '992 patent claims invalid for lack of enablement,
anticipation or obviousness. DyStar Textilfarben GmbH &
Co Deutschland KG v. C.H. Patrick Co., Civ. No. 6:02-
2946-WMC (D.S.C. Sept. 16, 2005).
Following briefing, the magistrate judge denied
Bann's motions for JMOL or, alternatively, a new trial on the
question of invalidity of the '992 patent for anticipation,
obviousness, and lack of enablement. DyStar Textilfarben
GmbH & Co Deutschland KG v. C.H. Patrick Co., Civ. No.
6:02-2946-WMC (D.S.C. Nov. 1, 2005). The magistrate
judge did not issue an opinion. His order stated:
The jury diligently considered the evidence
presented and found for the plaintiff. This
court concludes that the jury's verdict was
' BASF was the assignee of the '992 patent. BASF divested its dyestuff
business, including the '992 patent, to DyStar in 2000.
App. 3
reasonable and was supported by evidence
in the record. Therefore, as this court has
great respect for trial by jury and the right of
the parties to request a jury trial, this court
will not substitute its findings for those of
the jury as the jury's decision was clearly
supported by the trial record and was
reasonable.
Id.
Bann appeals from the denials of its motions on
anticipation and obviousness, and the grant of JMOL to
DyStar regarding inequitable conduct. For the reasons
explained below, we reverse the district court's denial of
Bann's motion for JMOL of invalidity of claims 1-4 for
obviousness.
I
[Indigo has been used in dyeing textile materials for
thousands of years. Because indigo pigment is insoluble in
water, it must be de-oxidized, or "reduced," to a water-
soluble white form known as "leuco indigo" before it can be
used in dyeing. Leuco indigo is unstable; it oxidizes and
returns to its blue pigment form when exposed to oxygen.
Thus, leuco indigo solution needs to be kept in an oxygen-
free environment, or otherwise stabilized, if it is not being
used immediately for dyeing.
For many years, dyehouses commonly reduced
indigo in-house through a process known as hydrosulfite
reduction. Dyers created a "stock vat," in which indigo is
reduced in water with sodium hydrosulfite and solubilized
with an alkali, e.g., sodium hydroxide. The resulting leuco
indigo solution is then transferred into a feed tank and fed
App. 4
into the dyebath. After the dyebath is prepared, the textile
material is dyed through a process known as "dipping" and
"skying." In "dipping," the textile material is contacted with
leuco indigo in the dyebath; in "skying," the dyed textile
material is introduced to the air, causing the indigo to
convert back to its blue pigment form.
A second common method of indigo reduction,
catalytic hydrogenation, was patented by Andre Brochet in
1917. See U.S. Patent No. 1,247,927 ("Brochet"). The
superficial difference between hydrosulfite reduction and
catalytic hydrogenation is that the latter uses gaseous
hydrogen, rather than sodium hydrosulfite, as a reducing
agent. Catalytic hydrogenation allowed "economical
production of concentrated solutions of leuco derivatives free
from impurities and mineral salts"; when left to settle, the
solution naturally separates from nickel or another catalytic
metal and can be "drawn off and is ready for use". Brochet,
11.88-90, 109-110. Most important to the dyehouses,
however, was the fact that Brochet's leuco indigo solution
could be stabilized in solid form, usually powder or paste,
and coated with molasses or glue to protect the reduced
indigo from air and prevent premature oxidation. This
allowed the indigo reduction process to shift out of the
dyehouses and into chemical manufacturers, which began to
produce and sell prereduced indigo to dyehouses in the early
1900s. Rather than create a stock vat, dyers needed only to
dissolve the prereduced indigo into a preparation tank, add
caustic soda (i.e., sodium hydroxide) and sodium
. !drosulfite to remove oxygen from the water, and transfer
the resulting solution from the preparation tank to the
dyebath. This significantly reduced the time necessary to
prepare a dyebath, the dychouses' expenditures on sodium
hydrosulfite and caustic soda, and the level of pollution in
dyehouse waste water and on dyehouse floors.
App. 5
The process of dyeing textile materials with
catalytically hydrogenated leuco indigo traditionally has
involved six steps: (1) reducing indigo to its leuco form in
solution; (2) stabilizing the leuco indigo solution, usually in
paste or powder form, (3) creating a preparation tank in
which the dried leuco indigo is re-converted to solution
form; (4) adding the solution to the dyebath; (5) dipping; and
(6) skying.
Claim 1 of the '992 patent, the only independeni
claim at issue, recites:
A process for dyeing cellulose-containing
textile material with indigo which comprises
a) introducing into a dyebath an aqueous
solution of leuco indigo solution prepared by
catalytic hydrogenation;
b) contacting the textile material with the
dyebath; and, after the leuco indigo has gone
onto the textile material,
c) converting said leuco indigo back into the
pigment form in a conventional manner by
air oxidation.
'992 patent, col.6, 1.66-col.7, 1.6. The ‘992 patent thus
improved upon the prior art by eliminating steps two and
three of the traditional process: stabilizing the leuco indigo
solution into a paste or powder form, and then reconstituting
the solution in a preparation tank. Instead, it allowed a dyer
to pour prereduced indigo solution directly into a dyebath
and commence dyeing immediately.
Bann appeals from the denials of its motions on
anticipation of claim | and obviousness of claims 1-4, and
the grant of DyStar's JMOL of no inequitable conduct. We
review decisions on motions for JMOL and motions for a
new trial under the law of the regional circuit.
MicroStrategy, Inc. v. Bus. Objects, S.A., 429 F.3d 1344,
1348 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (JMOL); EMI Group N. Am., Inc. v.
Cypress Semiconductor Corp., 268 F.3d 1342, 1348 (Fed.
Cir. 2001) (new trial). In the Fourth Circuit, the grant or
denial of JMOL is reviewed de novo, which requires us to
Step into the shoes of the trial judge and reapply the JMOL
standard. Johnson v. MBNA Am. Bank, NA, 357 F.3d 426,
431 (4th Cir. 2004). "The question is whether a jury, viewing
the evidence in the light most favorable to {[DyStar], could
have properly reached the conclusion reached by this jury.
We must reverse if a reasonable jury could only rule in favor
of [Bann]; if reasonable minds could differ, we must affirm."
Id. (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). The
denial of a motion for a new trial is reviewed in the Fourth
Circuit for abuse of discretion. United States vy. Perry, 335
F.3d 316, 320 (4th Cir. 2003).
Bann asserts that claim | of the '992 patent is invalid
because it is anticipated by Brochet. Bann further argues that
claims 1-4 are invalid as obvious in light of Brochet and
certain other prior art, including two pre-1917 BASF
patents——United States Patent Nos. 820,900 ("Wimmer") and
885,978 ("Chaumat"), a post-World War II report of the
British Intelligence Objectives Sub-Committee ("BIOS
report"), and the 1936 Manual for the Dyeing of Cotton and
Other Vegtable Fibres ("Manual"), published by General
Dyestuff Corporation. We address the broader argument,
relating to obviousness, first.
App. 7
A
A determination that a claimed invention would have
been obvious, and thus the patent issued thereon invalid, is a
— legal conclusion that we review de novo. Richardson-Vicks,
Inc. v. The Upjohn Co., 122 F.3d 1476, 1479 (Fed. Cir.
1997). We must determine "if the differences between the
subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are
such that the subject matter as a whole would have been
obvious at the time the invention was made to a person
having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter
pertains." 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). We thus consider whether a
person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated
to combine the prior art to achieve the claimed invention and
whether there would have been a reasonable expectation of
success in doing so. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. Vv.
Philip Morris, Inc., 229 F.3d 1120, 1124 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
Underpinning this legal inquiry are four groups of
factual findings, which, in a jury trial, we review for
substantial evidence. Richardson-Vicks, 122 F.3d at 1479.
Following the 1952 enactment of § 103, the Supreme Court
explained that obviousness depends on (1) the scope and
content of the prior art; (2) the differences between the
claimed invention and the prior art; (3) the level of ordinary
skill in the art; and (4) any relevant secondary
considerations, including commercial success, long felt but
unsolved needs, and failure of others. Graham v. John Deere
Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966).
This court has articulated a subsidiary requirement
for the first Graham factor, the scope and content of the prior
art. SIBIA Neurosciences, Inc. v. Cadus Pharma. Corp., 225
F.3d 1349, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2000). Where, as here, all claim
limitations are found in a number of prior art references, the
factfinder must determine "[w]hat the prior art teaches,
App. 8
whether it teaches away from the claimed invention, and
whether it motivates a combination of teachings from
different references". Jn re Fulton, 391 F.3d 1195, 1199-
1200 (Fed. Cir. 2004). It is important in this inquiry to
distinguish between the references sought to be combined
and "the prior art", as the latter category is much broader.
For example, textbooks or treatises may include basic
principles unlikely to be restated in cited references.
As we recently explained in Alza Corp. v. Mylan
Labs., Inc., No. 06-1019, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 22616
(Fed. Cir. Sept. 6, 2006), the suggestion test—as our
motivation-to-combine inquiry has come to be known—
"prevent[s] statutorily proscribed hindsight reasoning when
determining the obviousness of an invention." /d. at *7. This
test "informs the Graham analysis", id. at *8 (quoting Jn re
Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 987 (Fed. Cir. 2006)), by implementing
the Supreme Court's recognition of "the importance of
guarding against hindsight, as is evident in its discussion of —
the role of secondary considerations as 'serv[ing] to guard
against slipping into use of hindsight and to resist the
temptation to read into the prior art the teachings of the
invention in issue." /d. at *6 (quoting Graham, 383 U.S. at
36).
In contrast to the characterization of some
commentators, the suggestion test is not a rigid categorical
rule. The motivation need not be found in the references
sought to be combined, but may be found in any number of
sources, including common knowledge, the prior art as a
whole, or the nature of the problem itself. Jn re Dembiczak,
175 F.3d 994, 999 (Fed. Cir. 1999). As we explained in
Motorola, Inc. v. Interdigital Tech. Corp., 121 F.3d 1461,
1472 (Fed. Cir. 1997), "there is no requirement that the prior
art contain an express suggestion to combine known
elements to achieve the claimed invention. Rather, the
App. 9
suggestion to combine may come from the prior art, as
filtered through the knowledge of one skilled in the art.”
For one to conclude that the invention of the '992
patent would have been obvious, then, the prior art, common
knowledge, or the nature of the problem, viewed through the
eyes of an ordinary artisan, must have suggested the
following steps: (1) creating leuco indigo solution through
catalytic hydrogenation; (2) stabilizing the leuco indigo in
solution form, (3) adding the leuco indigo solution directly
into a dyebath; (4) dipping; and (5) skying. Because the jury
did not make explicit factual findings in the form of answers
to written interrogatories or special verdicts, we must discern
the jury's implied factual findings by interpreting the
evidence consistently with the verdict and drawing all
reasonable inferences in DyStar's favor. Konkel v. Bob Evans
Farms Inc., 165 F.3d 275, 279 (4th Cir. 1999).
B
Bann's obviousness argument rests primarily on three
U.S. patents: Brochet, Wimmer, and Chaumat. Brochet is
directed to "the Manufacture of Leuco Derivatives of Vat
Dyestuffs" generally, of which indigo is one. Brochet, I1.6-7.
By its plain language, Brochet discloses the process of
preparing an aqueous solution of leuco indigo by catalytic
hydrogenation. There can be no serious dispute that the
ultimate use of a "dyestuff" is dyeing textile materials;
indeed, the '992 patent inventor, Georg Schnitzer, testified
that leuco indigo solutions were known to be used in 1917
for dyeing, and Dr. Richard Blackburn, one of DyStar's
technical experts, testified that BASF began reducing indigo
with catalytic hydrogenation, and selling the reduced indigo
to dyehouses, in 1926. Moreover, both parties agree that
dipping and skying were well known in the art. As explained
supra, when indigo is reduced in-house in a stock vat, the
App. 10
resulting leuco indigo solution is introduced directly into the
dyebath without first being stabilized through drying. Thus,
the critical issue in our obviousness analysis is whether
stabilizing catalytically reduced leuco indigo in solution
form, rather than in powder form coated with molasses, for
example, renders the claimed process nonobvious to one of
ordinary skill in the art.
1. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art
Because the parties disagree over the relevance of the
cited prior art, which, fundamentally, is a disagreement over
the level of ordinary skill in the art, we address this third
Graham factor first. DyStar asserts that we must disregard
Brochet, Wimmer, and Chaumat, because a person of
ordinary skill in the art would not be aware of these
references. In short, DyStar argues that no knowledge of
chemistry is required in the relevant technical field.
DyStar points to testimony from Dr. Blackburn that
"[a] person of ordinary skill in the art is a dyer", someone
with "a high school degree" who is "able to read and write",
but whose knowledge is limited to "flipping the switches" on
the machine. Dr. Blackburn also testified, however, that a
person of ordinary skill in the art was "running the dye
processes", which required, inter alia, "doing the
calculations". When confronted with the inconsistency
between his testimony regarding the applicable level of skill
during cross-examination, Dr. Blackburn stated that "it's
difficult to say" which of the two skill levels should be
applied to the obviousness inquiry. Dr. Blackburn explained
that "those people may do both jobs", but concluded by
stating, "I think the former [i.e., the person ‘flipping the
switches']" is the ordinary artisan. Thus, the jury had
evidence before it of two potential levels of ordinary skill:
App. 11
(1) that of a dyer and (2) that of a person creating the dye
processes, who we will refer to as a dyeing process designer.
DyStar presented evidence that The Application of
Vat Dyes, a book by the American Association of Textile
Chemists and Colorists, teaches people how to dye and is a
text that a dyer would have had at the time of the '992 patent
invention. Dr. Nolan Etters, Bann's expert witness, agreed
that "a person of ordinary skill in the art” would be a member
of the American Association of Textile Chemists and
Colorists and conceded that none of the prior art cited by
Bann is referenced in The Application of Vat Dyes.
We agree with DyStar that we are required to assume
the jury accepted its argument that a person of ordinary skill
in the art is a dyer with no knowledge of chemistry. Because
the jury heard testimony that the prior art cited by Bann was
directed toward chemists, not dyers, the jury must have
found the prior art cited by Bann neither in the relevant art
nor analogous arts and then, consistent with the limited
evidence of prior art deemed relevant, concluded that the
process claimed in the '992 patent would not have been
obvious.
However, substantial evidence does not support the
jury's finding that a person of ordinary skill is a dyer with no
knowledge of chemistry. Indeed, that factual finding is
inconsistent with the '992 patent's very purpose. The
technical problem that the process of the '992 patent and the
prior art cited by Bann sought to solve is precisely the same:
an improved process for dyeing textile materials with indigo.
This process includes several discrete subcomponents—-e.g.,
indigo reduction and dyebath preparation—-and an ordinary
artisan would be concerned with all of them. To beneficially
practice the dyeing process claimed in the '992 patent, the
ordinary artisan must have a higher-level perspective, as he
App. 12
must first decide whether it is more efficient to reduce indigo
in-house or purchase prereduced indigo and, if prereduced,
must then decide whether solid or solution form is
preferable.
Designing an optimal dyeing process requires
knowledge of chemistry and systems engineering, for
example, and by no means can be undertaken by a person of
only high school education whose skill set is limited to
"flipping the switches". This is especially true when one
considers that only in the last century have improvements in
indigo reduction chemistry enabled outsourcing of the indigo
reduction step from dyehouses to chemical manufacturers;
prior to that simplification, there would have been no
question that a dyer would also require knowledge of indigo
‘reduction. Because, for this patent, the only finding
supported by substantial evidence is that an ordinary artisan
is not a dyer but a person designing an optimal dyeing
process, the jury's implicit finding of a mere dyer cannot
withstand scrutiny on JMOL. Accordingly, the jury's
apparent decision to disregard Brochet, Wimmer, and
Chaumat, and perhaps other prior art references, as neither in
the dye process art nor even in analogous arts is unsupported
by substantial evidence.
2. Scope and Content of Prior Art
Where, as here, claim limitations are found in a
combination of prior art references, the factfinder must
determine "[w]hat the prior art teaches, whether it teaches
away from the claimed invention, and whether it motivates a
combination of teachings from different references". F. ulton,
391 F.3d at 1199-1200 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
To support its argument that an ordinary artisan—i.e.,
a dyeing process designer—would have known to attempt to
App. 13
stabilize the Brochet solution in oxygen-excluding
conditions for addition directly into a dyebath, Bann points
to two pre-Brochet BASF patents. Wimmer, issued in 1906,
discloses a leuco indigo solution that "can be filtered and the
filtrate (which contains a high percentage of indigo white)
can be placed on the market without any further treatment”,
in contrast to reduction using zinc, which required the
solution "to be separated before the solution can be used for
dyeing." Wimmer, 1134-40. Chaumat, issued in 1908,
discloses a leuco indigo solution that "may be drawn off
protected from the air and preserved indefinitely in
receptacles which are either soldered or closed in any other
hermetic manner." Chaumat, 11.84-87. Although Wimmer
and Chaumat disclose different reducing methods than
Brochet-—-Wimmer suggests the use of iron, rather than zinc,
as a reducing agent, and Chaumat discloses an electrolytic
process for indigo reduction—Bann argues that once the
indigo has been converted to its leuco form, the distinction is
irrelevant for dyeing purposes. Accordingly, Bann argues
that this prior art would teach an ordinary artisan in the field
of indigo dyeing process design to attempt to stabilize any
leuco indigo solution, however reduced, for addition directly
into the dyebath.
a. What does the prior art teach?
DyStar argues that because Wimmer and Chaumat
involve different methods of reducing indigo, they are
nonanalogous art and properly disregarded by the jury. In
support of this assertion, Mr. Schnitzer testified that, up until
the time of the invention, BASF's "people from production"
believed that leuco indigo created from catalytic
hydrogenation was too unstable to be added directly to the
dyebath, and might "stain the yarn with indigo pigment” or
"block[ ] pipes”. DyStar offered evidence that, prior to the
'992 patent, BASF had limited its sales of catalytically
App. 14
hydrogenated leuco indigo to that stabilized in paste or solid
form. Thus, argues DyStar, the language in Wimmer and
Chaumat suggesting that the solution could be stabilized and
sold in solution form does not apply to catalytically
hydrogenated leuco indigo solution.
We disagree. As explained supra, the proper focus is
on the indigo dyeing process as a whole, which requires the
ordinary artisan to consider (and choose between) the
various indigo reduction methods. The '992 patent is directed
toward a process of dyeing with indigo and, although a
specific method of reduction is required by claim 1, the first
step in the process requires indigo in prereduced form. It is
undisputed that reduced indigo by any reduction method, not
just catalytic hydrogenation, has been used in the indigo
dyeing process. The prior art involving indigo reduction by
other methods is thus not merely analogous art, it is the same
art. Accordingly, all limitations recited by claim 1 of the '992
patent—including the immediate use of leuco indigo solution
for dyeing—are contained in the prior art.’
b. Does the prior art teach away from the
claimed invention?
We reject DyStar’'s assertion that contemporaneous
articles by Wimmer and Brochet teach away from the
combination of Brochet and Chaumat, and thus the claimed
process. DyStar acknowledges that no specific language in
these references teaches away from the invention of the '992
patent. Rather, because these references do not discuss the
stabilization of leuco indigo solution (in solution form) for
immediate addition to a dyebath, DyStar somehow concludes
* Because the only difference between the claimed invention and the
cited prior art is the method of indigo reduction, which we have held 1s
irrelevant to an indigo dyeing process employing prereduced indigo, we
do not separately discuss this second Graham factor.
App. 15
that these references teach that leuco indigo solution "cannot
be used to dye but is instead useful only as an intermediate."
Although Wimmer's contemporaneous article only
describes the use of indigo solution as an intermediate
product, he does not retract his patent language indicating
that "the solution can be filtered and the filtrate (which
contains a high percentage of indigo white) can be placed on
the market without any further treatment". Wimmer, 11.33-37.
Likewise, the Brochet patent, directed toward all vat
dyestuffs, broadly teaches that the process “produce(s]
mother-liquors which can be diluted immediately before use,
or be treated by evaporation under reduced pressure or by
any other means to obtain concentrated products for sale."
Brochet, 11.66-70. This language implies that all vat
dyestuffs, including indigo, may either be used immediately
for dyeing or concentrated prior to sale. In his
contemporaneous article, Brochet stated that his catalytically
hydrogenated solution could be used "economically to obtain
concentrated indigo white [i.e., leuco indigo] solutions that
are free of impurities and alkaline ‘salts, that can be
concentrated in vacut'm in order to obtain white indigo as a
paste". This mere failure to discuss immediate use of his
leuco indigo solution for dyeing is not the same thing as
Brochet stating in his article that, though most dyestuffs may
be used immediately or stored in oxygen-excluding
containers, his leuco indigo solution may only be
concentrated in paste form. We will not read into a reference
a teaching away from a process where no such language
exists.
c. Is there a motivation to combine?
DyStar argues that this court's "suggestion test" for
obviousness requires the cited references themselves to
contain a suggestion, teaching, or motivation to combine
App. 16
them, and that it must be explicitly stated” DyStar then points
out, correctly, that Brochet does not suggest combining his
invention with those of Chaumat or Wimmeg to stabilize his
leuco indigo solution in oxygen-excluding containers until
either using it directly in the dyebath or placing it on the
market for sale, respectively. Absent such a teaching, urges
DyStar, the invention of claim 1 of the '992 patent cannot be
obvious.
DyStar's argument misreads this court's cases and
misdescribes our suggestion test, echoing notions put forth
recently by various commentators and accepted in major
reports. A 2003 report by the Federal Trade Commission, for
example, quoted testimony of certain witnesses that this
court requires "specific and definitive [prior] art references
with clear motivation of how to combine those references"
and requires the PTO to find "the glue expressly leading you
all the way [to obviousness]" and "connect the dots . . . very,
very clearly." Fed. Trade Comm'n, To Promote Innovation:
The Proper Balance of Competition and Patent Law and
Policy ch. 4, at 11 (2003). Similarly, a 2004 report by the
National Academy of Sciences summarized views of a few
commentators that "standards of patentability—especially
the non-obviousness standard-—have become too lax as a
result of court decisions" by the Federal Circuit, leading to
the deterioration of patent quality. Nat'l Research Council, A
Patent System for the 21st Century 3 (Stephen A. Merrill et
al. eds., 2004). But see Am. Intellectual Prop. Law Ass'n,
AIPLA Response to the National Academies Report entitled
“A Patent System for the 21st Century" 10 (2004) ("AIPLA
believes that the courts, including the Federal Circuit, have
applied the standard of non-obviousness with both the
needed rigor and the appropriate vigor, and they have done
so with a commendable consistency over the past two
decades. If a difficulty exists with application of the non-
obviousness standard today, it does not lie in the patent
_
App. 17
statute or in substantive law of non-obviousness as applied in
the courts.")
Seeking to support their assertions about Federal
Circuit caselaw, these few commentators have quoted
isolated statements from three of our precedents in particular,
including Dembiczak, 175 F.3d at 1000, wherein we stated
that the analysis by the Board of Patent Appeals and
Interferences ("Board") "fails to demonstrate how the [two
cited] references teach or suggest their combination"
(emphasis added), and Jn re Lee, 277 F.3d 1338, 1341, 1344
(Fed. Cir. 2002), where we characterized the Board's
statement that "[t]he conclusion of obviousness may be made
from common knowledge and common sense of a person of
ordinary skill in the art without any specific hint or
suggestion in a particular reference" as "[o]mission of a
relevant factor required by precedent". They have also cited
our repeated use of the word "references" in the following
list from Ruiz v. A.B. Chance Co., 234 F.3d 654 (Fed. Cir.
2000), where we suggested a motivation to combine may be
found:
1) in the prior art references themselves;
2) in the knowledge of those of ordinary
skill in the art that certain references, or
disclosures in those references, are of
special interest or importance in the field; or
3) from the nature of the problem to be
solved, leading inventors to fook to
references relating to possible solutions to
that problem.
Id. at 665 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
App. 18
Despite containing arguably imprecise language in
these statements, quoted out of context, each of thé above-
cited cases correctly applies the suggestion test and by no
means requires an explicit teaching to combine to be found
in a particular prior art reference. Dembiczak involved the
combination of a reference in the plastic trash bag art with
children's arts and crafts books that included, among
innumerable fanciful drawings, jack-o-lanterns. Contrary to
some interpretations, we stated explicitly that evidence of a
motivation to combine need not be found in the prior art
references themselves, but rather may be found in "the
knowledge of one of ordinary skill in the art, or, in some
cases, from the nature of the problem to be solved." 175 F.3d
at 999 (citation omitted). When not from the prior art
references, the "evidence" of motive will likely consist of an
explanation of the well-known principle or problem-solving
strategy to be applied. Our analysis in Dembiczak focused on
an explicit teaching in the prior art not because our case law
requires it, but because the Board had stated that "the [two
cited] references would have suggested the application of . . .
facial indicia to the prior art plastic trash bags." /d. at 1000
(emphasis added). We held the Board's obviousness
determination, legally_insufficient because, in addition to
failing to make Graham findings, the Board's analysis was
"limited to a discussion of the ways that the multiple prior art
references can be combined to read on the claimed
invention", "rather than pointing to specific information in
[the two references] that suggest the combination". /d On
appeal to this court, the Commissioner of Patents and
Trademarks attempted to defend the Board decision by
laying out, using the Graham factors, a clear—and likely
affirmable—rationale establishing the level of ordinary skill
and explaining the motivation to combine. Jd. at 1001. We
declined to consider these arguments, newly raised on
appeal, stating that they did "little more than highlight the
shortcomings of the decision below." /d.
App. 19
In Ruiz, as in Dembiczak, we vacated a conclusion of
obviousness because the factfinder failed to make Graham
factor findings. 234 F.3d at 660. Far from requiring evidence
of an explicit motivation to combine, we suggested in Ruiz
that there may have existed an implicit motivation to
combine, based on testimony that the invention was an
improvement over the prior art because it is “easy to install"
and "low cost". Jd. at 666. We explained that such
"fe]vidence which suggests that the combination of two
references would suggest the resulting improvement is one
way in which to determine a reason, suggestion, or
motivation to combine" and instructed the district court to
consider the evidence on remand. /d.
Likewise, a close reading of Jn re Lee reveals that our
objection was not to the Board's statement that "([t}he
conclusion of obviousness may be made from common
knowledge and common sense of a person of ordinary skill
in the art without any specific hint or suggestion in a
particular reference", but its utter failure to explain the
"common knowledge and common sense" on which it relied.
See 277 F.3d at 1341, 1344. Lee involved a patent combining
a prior art video game instruction handbook describing a
"demonstration mode" with a prior art television set having a
menu display allowing video and audio adjustments. The
Board, without comment, adopted the Examiner's Answer,
which merely stated that the combination of the two cited
references "would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill
in the art since the demonstration mode is just a
programmable feature which can be used in many different
devices for providing automatic introduction by adding the
proper programming software’ and that ‘another motivation
would be that the automatic demonstration mode is user
friendly and it functions as a tutorial." Jd. at 1341. We
explained that "[c]onclusory statements such as those here
App. 20
provided do not fulfill the agency's obligation" to explain all
material facts relating to a motivation to combine. Jd at
1344. In other words, we instructed the Board to explain why |
“common sense" of an ordinary artisan seeking to solve the
problem at hand would have led him to combine the
references. We noted that our predecessor court held more
than thirty years earlier that "common knowledge and
common sense" were sufficient to establish a motivation ‘>
combine, /n re Bozek, 416 F.2d 1385 (C.C.P.A. 1969° and
distinguished that case because, in Bozek, the examiner first
"established that this knowledge was in the art". Jd. at 1390.
We instructed that assumptions about common sense cannot
substitute for evidence thereof, as the Board attempted to do
in Lee. 277 F.3d at 1345;see also In re Zurko, 258 F.3d 1379,
1383, 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (reversing as unsupported by
Substantial evidence a finding of motivation to combine cited
references, where the Board adopted Examiner's unsupported
assertion that claim limitation missing from cited references
was "basic knowledge" and it "would have been nothing
more than good common sense" to combine the references,
and explaining that "[t]his assessment of basic knowledge
and common sense was not based on any evidence in the
record"); In re Rouffet, 149 F.3d 1350, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
(affirming finding of high level of ordinary skill and the
Board's explanation as to why cited reference implicitly
would suggest missing claim limitation to ordinary artisan,
but reversing its reliance on high level of ordinary skill as
basis of motivation to combine, and stating, "The Board did
not, however, explain what specific understanding or
technological principle within the knowledge of one of
ordinary skill in the art would have Suggested the
combination. Instead, the Board merely invoked the high
level of skill in the field of art. If such a rote invocation
could suffice to supply a motivation to combine, the more
sophisticated scientific fields would rarely, if ever,
experience a patentable technical advance.").
App. 21
It is difficult to see how our suggestion test could be
seen as rigid and categorical given the myriad cases over
several decades in which panels of this court have applied
the suggestion test flexibly. Obviousness is a complicated
subject requiring sophisticated analysis, and no single case
lays out all facets of the legal test. DyStar's argument and the
above-cited commentary highlight the danger inherent in
focusing on isolated dicta rather than gleaning the law of a
particular area from careful reading of the full text of a group
of related precedents for all they say that is dispositive and
for what they hold. When parties like Dystar do not engage
in such careful, candid, and complete legal analysis, ronuch
confusion about the law arises and, through time, can be
compounded.’
Our suggestion test is in actuality quite flexible and
not only permits, but requires, consideration of common
knowledge and common sense. See, e.g., In re Kotzab, 217
F.3d 1365, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2000) ("A critical step in
analyzing the patentability of claims pursuant to section
103(a) is casting the mind back to the time of invention, to
consider the thinking of one of ordinary skill in the art,
guided only by the prior art references and the then-accepted
3 Indeed, the United States Supreme Court recently granted certiorari in
a case involving this court's application of the suggestion test. KSR Int'l
Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 2006 U.S. LEXIS 4912 (June 26, 2006). In K.SR, we
vacated a district court's grant of summary judgment of invalidity for
obviousness. The district court found a motivation to combine not in the
references but "largely on the nature of the problem to be solved", which
we did not deem erroneous. Teleflex, Inc. v. KSR Int'l Co., 119 Fed.
App'x 282, 287 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (unpublished). Rather, we vacated
because the court did not explain sufficiently its rationale, and failed to
make “findings as to the specific understanding or principle within the
knowledge of a skilled artisan that would have motivated one with no
knowledge of [the] invention to make the combination in the manner
claimed." /d. at 288 (citation omitted). .
App. 22
wisdom in the field.”); Motorola, 121 F.3d at 1472 (“[T]he
suggestion to combine may come from the prior art, as
filtered through the knowledge of one skilled in the art.””);
Bozek, 416 F.2d at 1390 ("Having established that this
knowledge was in the art, the examiner could then properly
rely, as put forth by the solicitor, on a conclusion of
obviousness ‘from common knowledge and common sense of
the person of ordinary skill in the art without any specific
hint or suggestion in a particular reference."")
Indeed, we have repeatedly held that an implicit
motivation to combine exists not only when a suggestion
may be gleaned from the prior art as a whole, but when the
"improvement" is technology-independent and the
combination of references results in a product or process that
is more desirable, for example because it is stronger,
cheaper, cleaner, faster, lighter, smaller, more durable, or
more efficient. Because the desire to enhance commercial
opportunities by improving a product or process is
universal—and even common-sensical—we have held that
there exists in these situations a motivation to combine prior
art references even absent any hint of Suggestion in the
references themselves. In such situations, the proper question
is whether the ordinary artisan possesses knowledge and
skills rendering him capable of combining the prior art
references. |
in Pro-Mold & Tool Co., Inc. v. Great Lakes
Plastics, Inc., 75 F.3d 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1996), for example,
we analyzed asserted obviousness of a claimed invention of a
sports trading card holder only slightly larger than the
trading card. We stated that "[w]e start from the self-evident
proposition that mankind, in particular, inventors, strive to
improve that which already exists". Jd. at 1573. We required
no documentary evidence of motive. We explained that the
motivation to combine "a reference describing an elegant
App. 23
card holder and cover arrangement with a reference
describing a card holder no larger than necessary to enclose
the card . . . was thus evident from the very size of the card
itself." Id. at 1573. Because an ornamental card holder just
large enough to enclose the card would be more efficient,
there existed an implicit, indeed common-sensical,
motivation to combine the two references.
Similarly, in Sandt Tech., Ltd. v. Resco Metal &
Plastics Corp., 264 F.3d 1344, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001), we
held invalid for obviousness a patent claim for a stainless
steel cover for pay telephones. The only relevant difference
between the claimed invention and the prior art covers was
that the former attached the steel cover to the telephone via
studs and the latter attached it with welds. Jd. We noted that
the difference between attaching with welds and studs was
merely a "slight variation that produced convenience”. /d.
We found a clear motive to alter the prior art welded cover
simply because "[u]sing studs was a cheaper, faster, and
more convenient method of attachment", id., absent even a
hint of suggestion to combine.
In Mazzari v. Rogan, 323 F.3d 1000 (Fed. Cir. 2003),
we affirmed a district court grant of summary judgment of
invalidity for obviousness of a patent claiming the use of
underwater acoustic waves to kill zebra mussels. The Board
had upheld the rejection of an application based on two prior
art patents: an acoustic wave generator that enabled altering
wave intensity and focusing acoustic energy along a
particular angle, and a method of using water-borne acoustic
waves to kill zebra mussels. The Board held that a
motivation to combine the two references existed because an
ordinary artisan would have been aware of both references
4 We vacated the district court's grant of summary judgment of invalidity
for other reasons, finding genuine disputes of material fact on the issue of
commercial success. /d. at 1573.
App. 24
and that combination of the two was "more efficient". Jd at
1002-03. The inventor then brought a civil suit against the
Director of the PTO pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 145, and the
district court granted summary judgment in favor of the
Director. We deemed sufficient the Board's explanation of a
motivation to combine and affirmed "because the references
illustrate that it is well known in the art to use acoustic
energy to kill and repel zebra mussels." Jd. at 1006; see also
Ruiz, 234 F.3d at 666 (remanding for determination of
whether testimony that claimed invention was "easy to
install" and "low cost" established motivation to combine).
In situations where a motivation to combine is based
on these principles, the invention cannot be said to be
nonobvious. Our precedent on_ this point, moreover, is
consistent with the Supreme Court's holdings in Graham and
three other obviousness decisions pre-dating the
establishment of this court. See Sakraida v. AG Pro, Inc.,
425 U.S. 273, 282 (1976); Anderson's-Black Rock, Inc. v.
Pavement Salvage Co,. 396 U.S. 57 (1969); United States v.
Adams, 383 U.S. 39 (1966).
In Anderson's-Black Rock, the Supreme Court held
invalid for obviousness a patent covering (1) a radiant burner
for heating asphalt (2) attached to the front of a standard
asphalt-paving machine. Both elements were well-known in
the prior art individually, with the difference being that
previously, radiant-heat burners were not used in paving, but
merely for patching limited areas of asphalt. 396 U.S. at 58-
59. Because asphalt is usually laid sequentially in parallel
strips, the adjoining strip cools before the next strip is laid,
leading to what is known as a "cold joint"—an area of poor
bonding into which water and dirt enter, causing
deterioration. /d. at 57-58. By reheating the adjoining edge
of the earlier-laid strip as a new strip is laid, the invention
sought to eliminate the cold joint. No explicit suggestion to
App. 25
combine the prior art references would have been necessary
because the invention merely improved the efficiency of the
already-known’ process of laying pavement through the
already-known method of merging two sections of asphalt
through re-heating the earlier laid section—both of which
would have been common knowledge to ordinary artisans in
the field of laying asphalt. See also Graham, 383 U.S. at 24-
25 (holding invalid for obviousness Graham's patent
disclosing a spring clamp on a plow shank,.where claimed
invention merely improved mechanical weakness in prior
Graham patent, because ordinary artisan would have had
mechanical skills sufficient to "immediately see that the
thing to do was what Graham did"); id. at 36-37 (holding
invalid for obviousness Cook Chemical’s patent disclosing a
plastic finger sprayer with a "hold-down" lid serving as a
built-in dispenser for bottles of liquid products, where
differences from prior art were "exceedingly small and quite
nontechnical" and device was "old in the art").
Likewise, in Sakraida, the Suprerne Court held
invalid for obviousness a patent for a barn having "a paved,
sloped barn floor with downhill drains", "elevated" cow
stalls, and a "dam" behind which water may be stored and
abruptly released in order to "send a sheet of water cascading
through the dairy sweeping the manure to the downhill
drains." Ag Pro, Inc. v. Sakraida, 474 F.2d 167, 168 (Sth Cir.
1973) (quoting U.S. Patent No. 3,223,070), rev'd by 425 US.
273. Because the cleaning action from an uphill release of
water was superior to that from a hose, the claimed invention
reduced the quantity of water necessary to clean the barn
floor and obviated additional hand labor, e.g., brooms or
shovels, shortening the cleaning process from a few hours to
a few minutes. /d. The Supreme Court nonetheless negated
patent protection, characterizing the invention as “the work
of the skillful mechanic, not that of the inventor." Sakraida,
425 US. at 279 (internal quotation marks omitted). The
App. 26
Court aptly noted that "{e]xploitation of the principle of
gravity adds nothing to the sum of useful knowledge". Jd.
Under this court's case law, there would have been no need
for "evidence" of a motivation to combine a prior art
reference with a universally-known physical principle to
achieve more powerful and simultaneous sweep of water.
In Adams, a companion case to Graham, the Supreme
Court upheld the validity of a patent for a non-rechargeable
water-activated battery having magnesium and cuprous
chloride electrodes. Adams, 383 U.S. at 51. The Court
tecognized that “each of the elements of the Adams battery
was well known in the prior art", but rejected the United
States' obviousness argument because the prior art taught
away from the Adams patent's combination. As the Court
succinctly stated:
To combine [the references] as did Adams
required that a person reasonably skilled in
the prior art must ignore that (1) batteries
which continued to operate on an open
circuit and which heated in normal use were
not practical; and (2) water-activated
batteries were successful only when
combined with electrolytes detrimental to
the use of magnesium.
Id. at 51-52. The Court instructed that such "known
disadvantages in old devices . . . may be taken into account
in determining obviousness", id. at 52, and we have
incorporated this notion into our case law. See, e.g., Fulton,
391 F.3d at 1199-1200 (instructing the factfinder to
determine "[w]hat the prior art teaches, whether it teaches
away from the claimed invention, and whether it motivates a
combination of teachings from different references").
App. 27
Although this court customarily discusses 4
motivation to combine as part of the first Graham factor, the
scope and content of the prior art, see SIBIA Neurosciences,
925 F.3d at 1356, motivation to combine is also inextricably
linked to the level of ordinary skill. If, as is usually the case,
no prior art reference contains an express suggestion to
combine references, then the level of ordinary skill will often
predetermine whether an implicit suggestion exists. Persons
of varying degrees of skill not only possess varying bases of
knowledge, they also possess varying levels of imagination
and ingenuity in the relevant field, particularly with respect
to problem-solving abilities. If the level of skill is low, for
example that of a mere dyer, as DyStar has suggested, then it
may be rational to assume that such an artisan would not
think to combine references absent explicit direction in a
prior art reference. If, however, as we have held as a matter
of law, the level of skill is that of a dyeing process designer,
then one can assume comfortably that such an artisan will
draw ideas from chemistry and systems engineering—
without being told to do so.
A dyeing process designer would have been aware
that reducing leuco indigo in-house was time-consuming as
well as expensive and that it created much pollution on the
dyehouse floor and in public sewers. He would have known
that purchasing solid prereduced indigo would save time,
space, and money: dyers would no longer spend time
creating stock vats, and the dyehouse would require far less
hydrosulfite and caustic soda. A dyeing process designer
reading Chaumat would have learned that leuco indigo
solution "may be drawn off protected from the air and
preserved indefinitely in receptacles which are either
soldered or closed in any other hermetic manner." Chaumat,
11.84-87. From his chemistry background, he would have
known how to close off a receptacle hermetically. He would
have known that, if he could thus stabilize leuco indigo
App. 28
solution, he would save even more time, space, and money:
dyers would no longer need stock vats or preparation tanks
because they could simply pour the prereduced solution
directly into the dyebath itself, and they would no longer
need to purchase any hydrosulfite or caustic soda. A dyeing
process designer reading Brochet would have realized that
catalytic hydrogenation provided advantages over other
methods of indigo reduction in that the leuco indigo was
"free from impurities and mineral salts". Brochet, 1.90.
Naturally, then, an ordinary artisan with knowledge of
Chaumat, reading Brochet, would have realized that, by
stabilizing catalytic hydrogenated leuco indigo solution in
oxygen-excluding containers, he could devise a "cheaper,
faster, and more convenient" indigo dyeing process. See
Sandt, 264 F.3d at 1355. Although the '992 patent claimed a
new, more efficient, way of performing a known function,
dyeing indigo—the asserted innovation, storing leuco indigo
solution in airtight containers for immediate use in dyebaths,
is merely "exploitation" of the well-known principle of
vacuum packaging. See Sakraida, 425 U.S. at 279. In sum, it
is the work of a skilled chemist, not of an inventor.
J. Secondary Considerations of Nonobviousness
The presence of certain secondary considerations of
nonobviousness are insufficient as a matter of law to
overcome our conclusion that the evidence only supports a
legal conclusion that claim 1 would have been obvious. To
be sure, the jury heard testimony that DyStar has enjoyed
considerable commercial success from the introduction of its
product, and all parties agree that eighty years elapsed
between Brochet's invention and another inventor's thought
to vacuum-seal the Brochet solution and add it directly to the
dyebath. However, Mr. Schnitzer's testimony that BASF's
"people from production"—who we here assume arguendo
were dyeing process designers—believed that leuco indigo
App. 29
solution added directly to the dyebath might "stain the yarn
with indigo pigment" or "block{ ] pipes” was a bare assertion
that is not only undocumented and non-specific, but also
unsupported by even a brief explanation of the chemistry
underlying this assumption. As such, it does not constitute
substantial evidence of a secondary consideration favoring
nonobviousness.
Moreover, another secondary consideration cited by
DyStar—i.e., failed attempts—actually detracts from its
argument, and heavily so. DyStar points out that another
chemical company, Buffalo Color, abandoned a 1979 effort
to market a prereduced indigo solution made by hydrosulfite
reduction. The record shows, however, that Buffalo was only
mildly concerned with instability problems—it noted only
that the instability of leuco indigo "would require special
(and costly) shipping conditions to protect it from oxidation".
Rather, Buffalo decided against selling a leuco indigo
solution because it would involve increased shipping costs,
might require customers to invest in additional storage
facilities, and would cost more to produce, likely forcing it to
increase prices to customers. Buffalo's decision was thus not
a failed attempt, but a calculated business judgment to
abandon a potential new product fine.
C
Our inquiry does not end here, however, because we
must evaluate obviousness on a claim-by-claim basis. Dayco
Prods., Inc. v. Total Containment, Inc., 329 F.3d 1358, 1370
(Fed. Cir. 2003) ("[D]ependent or multiple dependent claims
shall be presumed valid even though dependent upon an
_ invalid claim.").
Claims 2-4 depend from process claim 1. Claim 2 requires
that the resulting solution contain from 10% to 35% by
App. 30
weight of leuco indigo; claim 3 requires that the solution
contain from 2% to 10% by weight of alkali: and claim 4
requires that the solution contain from 2% to 10% by weight
of sodium hydroxide. Dr. Blackburn, DyStar’s own expert
witness, confirmed that the plain language of Wimmer sets
forth a "30 percent aqueous solution of leuco indigo", which
falls within the range prescribed by claim 2. Dr. Blackburn
also testified that the solution disclosed by Wimmer contains
"5.1 percent" by weight of alkali—the claim language says
"at least six and a half percent", both of which fall between
2% and 10%, as required by claim 3. Likewise, Wimmer
indicates that his example solution uses "NaOH", sodium
hydroxide, and Mr. Schnitzer agreed with Bann's counsel's
assertion that the term "caustic" is "chemically the same
thing as sodium hydroxide", which meets the requirement of
claim 4. DyStar does not dispute these concessions on
appeal. Thus, given DyStar's testimony and the plain
language of Wimmer, claims 2-4 do not recite a nonobvious
invention beyond that recited in claim 1. Accordingly, claims
2-4 must also be held invalid for obviousness as a matter of
law.
In sum, because an ordinary artisan is a person
designing an optimal textile dyeing process with some
expertise in chemistry, the jury's implicit finding that the
level of ordinary skill in the art is a dyer is unsupported by
substantial evidence; its corresponding decision to disregard
the primary cited prior art as nonanalogous was also
erroneous. Under the correct level of ordinary skill, it would
have been obvious from Chaumat and Brochet. in view of
Wimmer and other references, to stabilize catalytically
hydrogenated leuco indigo solution through vacuum
conditions and to introduce the solution directly into the
dyebath.
Because all claims are held invalid for obviousness,
we need not address alleged anticipation of claim | or lack of
enablement as to claims 1-4. Likewise, whether the '992
patent is unenforceable due to inequitable conduct need not
be decided. Finally, we do not address the request for a new
trial as all asserted claims are held invalid as a matter of law
for obviousness. Accordingly, the trial court's denial of
JMOL that claims 1-4 of the '992 patent are invalid for
obviousness is reversed.
REVERSED.
App. 32
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
06-1088
DYSTAR TEXTILFARBEN GMBH & CO
DEUTSCHLAND KG,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
V.
C.H. PATRICK CO., and BANN QUIMICA LTDA,
Defendants-Appellants.
SCHALL, Circuit Judge. concurring.
I concur in the judgment of reversal. See Alza Corp.
v. Mylan Labs., Inc., No. 06-1088, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS
22616, at 4-7 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 6, 2006); In re Kahn, 441 F.3d
977, 987-88 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Cross Med. Prods.. Inc. v.
Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 424 F.3d 1293, 1322 (Fed.
Cir. 2005).
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
FEDERAL CIRCUIT
06-1088
DYSTAR TEXTILFARBEN GMBH & CO.
DEUTSCHLAND KG,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
C. H. PATRICK CO. INC., AND BANN QUIMICA, LTDA,
Defendants-Appellants.
ORDER
FILED Dec. 4, 2006
A combined petition for panel rehearing and for
rehearing en banc having been filed by the Appellee, and a
response thereto having been invited by the court and filed
by the Appellant, and the petition for rehearing and response,
having been referred to the panel that heard the appeal, and
thereafter the petition for rehearing en banc and response
having been referred to the circuit judges who are in regular
active service,
UPON CONSIDERATION THEREOF, it is
ORDERED that the petition for panel rehearing be,
and the same hereby is, DENIED and it is further
ORDERED that the rehearing en banc be, and the
same hereby is, DENIED.
: The mandate of the court will issue on December 11,
2006.
App. 34
Circuit Judge Moore did not participate in the vote.
Dated: 12/04/2006 FOR THE COURT,
/s/
Jan Horbaly, Clerk
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES FOR THE
DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
GREENVILLE DIVISION
DYSTAR TEXTILFARBEN GMBH)
& CO. DEUTSCHLAND KG, ) C.A. Action No.
Plaintiff, ) 6:02-2946
) ORDER
vs. )
)
C. H. PATRICK CO.INC.,AND )
BANN QUIMICA, LTDA, )
Defendants. )
This matter is before the court on the defendants’
motions for judgment as a matter of law or, alternatively, for
a new trial, on the issue of patent invalidity of U.S. Patent
No. 5,586,992 (“the ‘992 patent”). These motions are based
on: (1) anticipation of the *992 patent by U.S. Patent
1,247,927 under 35 U.S. C. §102; (2) obviousness of the
‘992 patent on four separate combinations of references
under 35 U.S.C. §103; and (3) lack of enablement under 35
U.S.C. §112.
The parties agreed to a trial by jury. The attorneys for
both sides diligently and ably presented their cases. The trial
itself involved issues of credibility, in particular the
testimony of expert witnesses as to the obviousness,
anticipation and validity of the patent. The jury diligently
considered the evidence presented and found for the plaintiff.
This court concludes that the jury’s verdict was reasonable
and was supported by evidence in the record. Therefore, as
this court has great respect for trial by jury and the right of
the parties to request a jury trial, this court will not substitute
App. 36
its findings for those of the jury as the jury’s decision was
clearly supported by the trial record and was reasonable.
Now, therefore, after reviewing the entire record,
including the defendants’ memorandum,
IT IS ORDERED that the defendants’ motions for judgment
as a matter of law or, alternatively, for a new trial, are
denied.
IT 1S SO ORDERED.
s/William M. Catoe
United States Magistrate Judge
November 1, 2005
Greenville, South Carolina
{N THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES FOR THE
DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
GREENVILLE DIVISION
DYSTAR TEXTILFARBEN GMBH)
& CO. DEUTSCHLAND KG, ) C.A. Action No.
Plaintiff, ) 6:02-2946-26
)
vs. ) VERDICT FORM
)
C.H. PATRICK CO. INC., AND _)
BANN QUIMICA, LTDA, )
Defendants. )
1. With respect to each claim, 1 through 4, of the ‘992
patent, indicate whether you find that DyStar KG has proven
by a preponderance of the evidence that Bann Quimica
and/or C.H. Patrick have infringed that claim?
Claim 1
X YES (if yes, answer with respect to all of
Claims 2, 3, and 4)
NO
X YES
NO
_X_ YES
X YES
NO
ONLY ANSWER QUESTION 2 IF YOU ANSWERED
“YES” TO ANY OF THE CLAIMS IN QUESTION 1.
IF YOU DID NOT ANSWER “YES” TO ANY OF THE
CLAIMS IN QUESTION 1, THEN GO TO QUESTION
3.
2. Do you find by clear and convincing evidence that Bann
Quimica willfuily infringed the ‘992 patent?
___ YES
ee
3. Do you find that Bann Quimica and C.H. Patrick have
proven by clear and convincing evidence that the ‘992
patent did not enable a person of ordinary skill in the art
in March 1993 to practice the process claimed in claim
1?
YES
_X_ NO
4. Do you find Bann Quimica and C.H. Patrick have proven
by clear and convincing evidence that the invention
claimed in claims | through 4 of the ‘992 patent was not
new in March 1993?
App. 39
YES
X NO
Claim 2
oe YES
X NO
Claim 3
_—s«s (ee
X NO
Claim 4
__—s—“<‘i'Y¥'#
X NO
5. Do you find that Bann Quimica and C.H. Patrick have
proven by clear and convincing evidence that the invention
claimed in claims 1 through 4 of the ‘992 patent would have
been obvious to a person having ordinary skill in the art in
March 1993?
Claim 1
Oe
X NO
Claim 2
_ VE
xX NO
App. 40
es ee
_X NO
Claim 4
YES
X NO
5. Ifyou find a claim of the ‘992 patent not invalid and
infringed, then what is the amount of damage you find
that DyStar KG suffered as a result of Bann and C.H.
Patrick’s patent infringement?
$ 90,000
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
GREENVILLE DIVISION
DYSTAR TEXTILFARBEN GMBH & CO. )
)
Plaintiff,
6:02-2946
--versus--
CH PATRICK CO., INC., BANN
QUIMICA LTDA,
2005
)
)
)
) Sept. 15,
)
)
) Greenville, SC
)
Defendants.
VOLUME VI
TRANSCRIPT OF TRIAL BEFORE THE
HONORABLE WILLIAM M. CATOE
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE,
presiding
APPEARANCES:
For the Plaintiff: RONALD J. TRAYON, ESQ.
Parke Poe Adams & Bernstein
P.O. Box 1509
Columbia, SC 29202
WILLIAM T. ENOS, ESQ.
RICHARD D. KELLY, ESQ.
ANDREW K. BEVERINA, ESQ
Oblon, Spivak, McClelland
Maier & Neustadt
1940 Duke Street
Alexandria, VA 22314
App. 42
For the Defendant: NEIL C. JONES, ESQ.
A. MARVIN QUATTLEBAUM,
ESQ.
ASHLEY B. SUMMER, ESQ.
Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough
P.O. Box 10084
Greenville, SC 29603
Court Reporter: KAREN E. MARTIN, RMR, CRR
P.O. Box 10771
Greenville, SC 29603
The proceedings were taken by mechanical stenography and
the transcript produced by computer.
MR. JONES: Your Honor, I prefer not to have to read
mine all back into the record. May I renew all of our
motions we made?
THE COURT: All right. I will submit them to the
jury. Let’s go to the issue of willfulness. Do you want
willfulness as to both defendants?
App. 43
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
GREENVILLE DIVISION
DYSTAR TEXTILFARBEN GMBH & CO. )
QUIMICA LTDA, |
Greenville, SC
)
Plaintiff, )
) 6:02-2946
--versus-- )
) Sept. 13,
CH PATRICK CO., INC., BANN ) 2005"
)
)
)
Defendants.
VOLUME IV
TRANSCRIPT OF TRIAL BEFORE THE
HONORABLE WILLIAM M. CATOE
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE, presiding
APPEARANCES:
For the Plaintiff: RONALD J. TRAYON, ESQ.
Parke Poe Adams & Bernstein
P.O. Box 1509
Columbia, SC 29202
WILLIAM T. ENOS, ESQ.
RICHARD D. KELLY, ESQ.
ANDREW K. BEVERINA, ESQ.
Oblon, Spivak, McClelland
Maier & Neustadt
1940 Duke Street
Alexandria, VA 22314
App. 44
For the Defendant: NEIL C. JONES, ESQ.
A. MARVIN QUATTLEBAUM, ESQ.
ASHLEY B. SUMMER, ESQ.
Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough
P.O. Box 10084
Greenville, SC 29603
Court Reporter: KAREN E. MARTIN, RMR, CRR
P.O. Box 10771
Greenville, SC 29603
MR. JONES: Your Honor, the defendants move for a
directed — for a judgment as a matter of law that the ‘992
Patent is invalid under Section 103 of the ‘992 — excuse me,
of 35 United States Code. Specifically, the defendants have
shown through the testimony and evidence presented through
plaintiff's witnesses that the Claims | through 4 of the
invention in those claims would have been obvious to one of
ordinary skill in the art at the time of invention. Therefore,
judgment as a matter of law is warranted.
THE COURT: Your motion is denied.
App. 45
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