Petition for Writ of Certiorari — DyStar Textilfarben GmbH & Co. Deutschland KG v. CH Patrick Co., 127 S. Ct. 2937 (2007) (No. 06-1207)

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No, OFFICE OF THE CLERK

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

DYSTAR TEXTILFARBEN GMBH & CO.

DEUTSCHLAND KG

Petitioner

V.

C.H. PATRICK CO., AND BANN QUIMICA LTDA,

Respondents.

On Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari

To The United States Court Of Appeals

For The Federal Circuit

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

William T. Enos*

Richard D. Kelly

Andrew K. Beverina

Robert C. Nissen

Oblon, Spivak. McClelland,

Maier & Neustadt. P.C.

1940 Duke Street

Alexandria, Virginia 22314

- (703) 413-3000

*Counsel of record

Counsel for Petitioner

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1. Whether the Federal Circuit’s standard for appellate

review in patent cases that does not give deference to a jury’s

verdict violates the Seventh Amendment.

2. Whether the Federal Circuit erred by ignoring substantial

evidence of objective indicia of non-obviousness and instead

finding that an invention must be obvious if it is within the

capability of a hypothetical ordinary artisan.

3. Whether the Federal Circuit erred by creating a new

corroboration requirement for all testimony in patent cases,

such that testimony in patent cases is now held to a different

evidentiary standard than testimony in all other cases in all

other circuits.

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS

All parties to the proceeding in the court whose

judgment is sought to be reviewed are set forth in the caption

of the case.

CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

Petitioner hereby identifies Platinum Equity, LLC, as

a parent corporation owning 10% or more of Petitioner’s

stock. No publicly held company owns 10% or more of the

stock of Petitioner.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS

CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

PETITION FOR CERTIORARI

OPINIONS BELOW

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION AND

STATUTE INVOLVED

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

PROCEEDINGS BELOW

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION ................ 5

{. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT IS VIOLATING

THE SEVENTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS OF

PARTIES BY EVISCERATING THE JURY’S

FACTFINDING ROLE

A. The Federal Circuit Ignored This Court’s

Precedent on the Role of the Jury in Determining

Obviousness

B. The Court Should Stop the Federal Circuit from

Sitting as a “Super Jury”

Il. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT HAS IGNORED

THIS COURT’S PRECEDENT BOTH BY

DECIDING THAT SECONDARY

CONSIDERATIONS OF NON-OBVIOUSNESS

ARE NO LONGER RELEVANT AND BY

CREATING A NEW CAPABILITY

STANDARD

A. The Federal Circuit Ignored or Mischaracterized

All Evidence Related to Secondary

Considerations

. The Federal Circuit Created a New Test for

Obviousness Based on an Improper “Capability”

Standard

. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT HAS IMPROPERLY

EXPANDED THE CORROBORATION

REQUIREMENT TO NOW REQUIRE

CORROBORATION OF ALL TESIMONY IN

PATENT CASES

CONCLUSION

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564 (1985)

Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover,

359 U.S. 500 (1959)

Cardinal Chemical Co. v. Morton Int’l, Inc.,

ee, rE iaaiincscsdainihacohs easecdimsescipnieticcsiocsenincse 14

Control Res. v. Delta Elecs.,

133 F. Supp. 2d 121 (D. Mass. 2001)

Dennison Mfg. Co. v. Panduit Corp.,

475 U.S. 809 (1986)

Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 486 (1935)

eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.,

126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006)

Eibel Process Co. v. Minnesota & Ontario Paper Co.,

261 U.S. 45 (1923)

Engate, Inc. v. Esquire Deposition Servs. LLC,

331 F. Supp 2d 673 (N.D. Ill. 2004)

Finnigan Corp. v. Int'l Trade Com’n,

SE Fe he Crs ih FF ei ivckikichcdsiwnctnrsdctaietvese 26, 27

Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Inc. v. Ray-O-Vac Co.,

321 U.S. 275 (1944)

Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966).......... 8, 16, 23

Vv

In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443 (Fed. Cir. 1992)

KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc.,

126 S. Ct. 2965 (2006)

Lavender v. Kurn, 327 U.S. 645 (1946)

Malta v. Schulmerich Carillons, Inc.,

952 F.2d 1320 (Fed. Cir. 1991)

Medichem, S.A. v. Rolabo, S.L.,

437 F.3d 1157 (Fed. Cir. 2006)

Nelson v. Adams, USA, Inc., 529 U.S. 460 (2000)

Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433 (1830)

Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co.,

282 U.S. 555 (1931)

Stratoflex, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp.,

FEF ee SSPE CPO Cl. FOE eiiarivtivetestinndeniicastimnivcnnins os

Truswal Systems Corp. v. Hydro-Air Engineering Inc.,

EF eee BOT UO Cie, UID ocstcerceiseumsvmerevreseventiceserens 23

United States v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39 (1966)...........ccccceeeeee 25

United States v. Gadison, 8 F.3d 186 (5" Cir. 1993)......... Ss,

United States v. Tam, 240 F.3d 797

ke sas cies ia: scsstcosasetecarencscaossreesdnshanliaanieea tec 27

The Barbed Wire Patent, 143 U.S. 275 (1892)....0... ee. 26

Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977)

Winner Int'l Royalty Corp. v. Wang,

202 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2000)

Woodland Trust v. Flowertree Nursery, Inc.,

148 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998)

U.S. Constitution

Amend. VII

Statutes

28 U.S.C. § 1254(1)

28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1)

28 U.S.C. § 1338(a)

35 U.S.C. § 103(a)

Other Authorities

73 (No. 1795) News, Pat. Trademark & Copyright J.,

67 (Nov. 24, 2006)

Dystar Textilfarben v. C.H. Patrick,

http://www.fedcirc.us/case-reviews/federal-circuit/

DyStar-textilfarben-v.-c.h.-patrick.html

(Oct. 9, 2006)

Gruner, Richard, Everything Old Is New Again: Obviousness

Limitations on Patenting Computer Updates of Old

Designs, 9 B.U.J. Sci. & Tech. L. 209 (2003)

Vil

Koneru, Phanesh, To Promote the Progress of Useful

Articles?: An Analysis of the Current Utility Standards of

Pharmaceutical Products and Biotechnological

Research Tools, 38 IDEA 625 (1998)

Lee, Ted D. & Michelle Evans, The Charade: Trying a

Patent Case to All “Three” Juries, 8 Tex. Intell.

Prop. L.J. 1 (1999)

Rooklidge, William C. & Matthew F. Weil, Judicial

Hyperactivity: The Federal Circuit's Discomfort

with its Appellate Role, 15 Berkeley Tech. L.J.

725 (Spring, 2000)

Rules

Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a)

Sup. Ct. R. 10(a)

PETITION FOR CERTIORARI

Petitioner DyStar Textilfarben GmbH & Co.

Deutschland KG (“DyStar”’) respectfully seeks a writ of

certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the

Federal Circuit.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals is reported at 464

F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2006). App. 1-33. The order of the

district court denying Respondent’s motion for judgment as a

matter of law, App. 36-37, was not reported.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

Review of a judgment of the United States Court of

Appeals for the Federal Circuit is sought. That judgment

was entered on October 3, 2006, with the Federal Circuit

denying DyStar’s petition for rehearing and rehearing en

banc on December 4, 2006. App. 34-35.

The jurisdiction of the Court is invoked under 28

U.S.C. § 1254(1).

The basis for jurisdiction in the court of first instance

is 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) and 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION

AND STATUTE INVOLVED

The Seventh Amendment to the United States

Constitution states: “In suits at common law, where the

value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of

trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury,

shall be otherwise reexamined in any court of the United

States, than according to the rules of the common law.”

35 U.S.C. § 103(a) states:

A patent may not be obtained though the

invention is not identically disclosed or

described as set forth in section 102 of this

title, if the differences between the subject

matter sought to be patented and the prior art

are such that the subject matter as a whole

would have been obvious at the time the

invention was made to a person having

ordinary skill in the art to which said subject

matter pertains. Patentability shall not be

negatived by the manner in which the

invention was made.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This case is about the Federal Circuit’s disturbing

trend of substituting its view of the facts for those found by

the jury and its willingness to ignore this Court’s binding

precedent. In 1906, 1907, and 1917, three patents related to

making indigo issued.' Nearly eighty years after the last of

these patents issued, the patent-in-suit in this case issued.

DyStar is the assignee of the ‘992 patent which claims a

simple yet elegant method for dyeing textiles, such as cotton,

with indigo by introducing into a dyebath a pre-reduced

solution of indigo made by catalytic hydrogenation.

' The three patents are United States Patent No. 820,900 (“the Wimmer

patent’’), United States Patent No. 885,978 (“the Chaumat patent”), and

United States Patent No. 1,247,927 (“the Brochet patent”), respectively

(collectively, “the early twentieth century patents”).

* United States Patent No. 5,586,992 (“the ‘992 patent”).

2

a

Although the 1917 Brochet patent taught how to

make an aqueous solution of reduced indigo by catalytic

hydrogenation, those solutions were used only as

intermediates in the production of other solid or paste forms

of indigo which were then used by dyehouses to dye textiles.

During the early 1990s, before the ‘992 patent issued,

dyehouses used forms of indigo reduced chemically on-site

which involved several preparation steps. This method

produced inconsistent dyeing, presented health and safety

concerns and caused serious environmental pollution. The

claimed process eliminated the need for these preparation

steps by the dyehouse, improved worker safety and health,

improved the quality and consistency of the dyed fabric and

eliminated waste and_ pollution. Despite all these

advantages, no one thought to use the claimed process for

almost eighty years after the invention of catalytic

hydrogenation of indigo. For this and other reasons, the jury

correctly found that the three early twentieth century patents

did not make the ‘992 patent obvious. The district court

correctly refused to grant Respondent’s JMOL motion that

the ‘992 patent was invalid for obviousness.”

The Federal Circuit, however, did not agree with the

judgment of the jury. It substituted its own factfinding for

that of the jury and held, in the face of substantial

evidentiary support to the contrary, that the three early

twentieth cer‘ury patents made the ‘992 patent obvious. To

reach this result, the Federal Circuit had to 1) violate

Petitioner’s Seventh Amendment right to have all factual

issues resolved by the jury; 2) make its own factual findings

throughout the opinion; which were both wrong and

internally inconsistent; 3) ignore the Court’s precedent

concerning secondary considerations; and 4) create out of

> As discussed in the Jurisdictional Statement, the basis for jurisdiction

in the district court was 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) and 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a).

3

whole cloth a new testimonial corroboration requirement, in

conflict with its sister circuits.

This case represents a nadir in the Federal Circuit’s

troubling tendency to substitute its view of the facts for the

jury’s. It also demonstrates the Federal Circuit’s unique

view that neither witnesses nor juries are to be trusted. Thus,

this case raises at least three issues of broad and general

importance to both patent law and constitutional law: 1) the

proper roles of the jury and the appeals court in determining

facts; 2) whether this Court’s precedent regarding secondary —

considerations and “simple” inventions are neither binding

nor relevant; and 3) whether the Federal Circuit should be

allowed to create its own unique corroboration requirement

such that testimony in a patent case is not credible if the

testimony is not corroborated. Therefore, the Court should

grant certiorari to resolve these important issues.

PROCEEDINGS BELOW

The case was tried before a jury in the United States

District Court for the District of South Carolina on

September 7-16, 2005. The jury returned a general verdict in

which it found C. H. Patrick and Bann Quimica Ltda

(collectively “Bann”) liable for infringement of z2ll asserted

claims and also found that the claims of the ‘992 patent were

not invalid. Magistrate Judge Catoe then denied Bann’s

JMOL motion because he agreed that the verdict was

reasonable and “clearly supported” by evidence in the

record, including the credibility of the witnesses. App. 37.

Bann appealed the district court’s denial of its JMOL

motions. In an October 3, 2006, published opinion, the

Federal Circuit reversed and held the claims of the ‘992

patent invalid as obvious. The panel held that substantial

evidence did not support the jury’s verdict. In so holding,

the panel (1) made factual findings regarding the scope and

content of the prior art that conflicts with the jury’s verdict;

(2) made factual findings regarding the differences between

the prior art and the claimed invention that conflicts with the

jury’s verdict; (3) held that the jury’s presumed finding

regarding the person of ordinary skill in the art was factually

wrong; (4) ignored abundant evidence concerning secondary

considerations and created a new “capability” standard that

has no room for secondary considerations; (5) repudiated the

Court’s precedent on whether “simple” inventions may be

patented; and (6) made a credibility determination that

contradicted the judge’s and jury’s determination based on a

new corroboration requirement it created for this case.

DyStar timely filed a petition for rehearing with

suggestion for rehearing en banc, which was denied on

December 4, 2006."

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

I. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT IS VIOLATING THE

SEVENTH AMENDMENT - RIGHTS '- OF

PARTIES BY EVISCERATING THE JURY’S

FACTFINDING ROLE

The Constitutional right to a jury trial “has always

been an object of deep interest and solicitude, and every

encroachment upon it has been watched with great jealousy.”

Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 446 (1830). Any

restriction on that right is an issue of high importance worthy

of careful scrutiny and provides sufficient ground to warrant

review by the Court. Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359

U.S. 500, 501 (1959) (“[w]e granted certiorari because

‘[m]Jaintenance of the jury as a fact-finding body is of such

* In that petition, DyStar requested that, at the very least, the Federal

Circuit remand for a new trial.

a

importance and occupies so firm a place in our history and

jurisprudence that any seeming curtailment of the right to a

jury trial should be scrutinized with the utmost care,’”

quoting Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 486 (19535)).

Review by this Court is even more necessary when Seventh

Amendment rights are infringed on a regular basis by a court

of appeals with exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all

patent infringement cases nationwide. See 28 U.S.C. §

1295(a)(1). Consequently, the Federal Circuit’s denial of a

party’s Seventh Amendment right to have the jury resolve all

factual issues warrants review by the Court.

Since its inception, the Federal Circuit has been

criticized for overstepping its bounds as an appellate court.

The Federal Circuit’s willingness to impose its views in

areas traditionally, and constitutionally, reserved for juries

and district courts has been labeled “judicial hyperactivity.”

William C. Rooklidge & Matthew F. Weil, Judicial

Hyperactivity: The Federal Circuit's Discomfort with its

Appellate Role, 15 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 725, 729-30 (Spring,

2000). Two commentators came to the conclusion in their

article that, in the context of reviewing jury verdicts, “it

appears that when the Federal Circuit believes the jury

verdict was correct, it simply holds that the substantial

evidence test was met. On the other hand, when the Federal

Circuit believes the jury verdict was wrong, it substitutes its

opinion for that of the jury and simply states that the

substantial evidence test was not met.”’ Ted D. Lee &

Michelle Evans, The Charade: Trying a Patent Case to All

“Three” Juries, 8 Tex. Intell. Prop. L.J. 1, 14 (1999)

(emphasis added).

Even some judges on the Federal Circuit have complained of this

willingness to ignore the jury and take on the role of factfinder. See, e.g.,

Malta v. Schulmerich Carillons, Inc., 952 F.2d 1320, 1343 (Fed. Cir.

1991) (Newman, J., dissenting).

District courts have also noted with concern the

Federal Circuit’s tendency “to take for itself the role of final

arbitrator of issues that, at least at one time, were fairly

considered the province of the trial court and jury.” Control

Res. v. Delta Elecs., 133 F. Supp. 2d 121, 124 n.4 (D. Mass.

2001). Indeed, this Court has questioned the Federal

Circuit’s lack of deference to the factfinding below.

Dennison Mfg. Co. v. Panduit Corp., 475 U.S. 809 (1986).

In Dennison, the Court granted certiorari, vacated, and

remanded so that the Federal Circuit could reconsider

whether it had given sufficient deference to the lower court’s

factfinding. The Court noted that the petitioner’s complaint

of appellate factfinding was “not insubstantial.” Jd. at 810-

11.

Commentators observed that after Dennison, the

Federal Circuit began giving more deference to factual

findings. But those same commentators have also noted that

the Federal Circuit is now “backsliding” and has reverted to

its previous pattern of substituting its own view for that of

the jury’s. Rooklidge, Judicial Hyperactivity, 15 Berkeley

Tech. L.J. at 739-40.

This recent “backsliding” reached its nadir in this

case. The Federal Circuit ignored the abundant evidence that

supported the jury’s verdict. Indeed, one reading the opinion

would not even suspect such evidence existed. Nor did the

court acknowledge Judge Catoe’s statement that the verdict

was supported by the credibility of the witnesses.

Instead, the Federal Circuit credited facts that might

have entitled the jury to decide the other way. But it is

° Dennison concerned fact-finding under Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a). A jury

verdict carries an even higher burden.

improper for an appellate court to substitute its own findings

of fact for the jury’s. “[T]he trial on the merits should be

“the ‘main event’. . . rather than a ‘tryout on the road.”

Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 575 (1985), citing

Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 US. 72, 90 (1977).

Consequently, the Court should grant certiorari to remind the

Federal Circuit of its proper role as an appellate court and to

instruct that it must cease substituting its judgment for that of

a reasonable jury.

A. The Federal Circuit Ignored This Court’s

Precedent on the Role of the Jury in

Determining Obviousness

The Court enunciated the standard for obviousness in

Graham vy. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966). Graham

established that the obviousness determination lends itself to

several basic factual inquiries: (1) the scope and content of

the prior art; (2) the differences between the prior art and the

claimed invention; (3) the level of ordinary skill in the art;

and (4) secondary considerations such as commercial

success, skepticism of others, failure of others, long-felt

need, copying and praise by others in the art. See id. at 17.

These factual inquiries are the exclusive province of the jury.

See Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co.,

282 U.S. 555, 566 (1931) (holding that the factual findings

of the jury must be allowed to stand unless unreasonable).

Although the panel admitted that it was “required to

assume the jury accepted [DyStar’s definition of a person

having ordinary skill in the art],” App. 12, it held that there

was not substantial evidence to support the jury’s presumed

finding. /d. But the panel was wrong because DyStar did

present substantial evidence regarding its definition of a

person having ordinary skill in the art through expert

testimony from Dr. Blackburn. (A497:25 — A498:13).’ The

panel, however, pointed to what it perceived to be

inconsistencies in his testimony. App. 11. Whether there

were inconsistencies in Dr. Blackburn’s testimony, however,

goes to the credibility and weight that testimony should be

given by the jury, not the weight the Federal Circuit might

give it sitting as a “super jury.”

’ The proper question is not whether there was

evidence that tended to support a different verdict, but

whether there was an evidentiary basis to support the jury’s

findings. As the Court has explained, once an evidentiary

basis for the jury’s verdict becomes apparent, “the appellate

court’s function is exhausted . . . it being immaterial that the

court might draw a contrary inference or feel that another

conclusion is more reasonable.” Lavender v. Kurn, 327 U.S.

645, 653 (1946). The fact that the Federal Circuit was

reduced to looking for inconsistencies in Dr. Blackburn’s

testimony demonstrates that Dr. Blackburn’s testimony did

provide substantial evidence in support of the jury’s verdict.

Furthermore, even assuming that it was proper for the

panel to ignore the jury’s factual findings and select Bann’s

definition of a person having ordinary skill in the art, there

was still substantial evidence to support the jury’s verdict.

Bann's expert testified that a reference entitled The

Application of Vat Dyes was directed to Bann’s definition of

a person having ordinary skill in the art. He admitted that

this reference did not contain any mention of the early

twentieth century patents or even hint at the method

described in the ‘992 patent. (A1137:9-A1139:5). Thus, it

was reasonable for the jury to infer that the twentieth century

” All cites in the form of (AXXX) are to the joint appendix filed with the

Federal Circuit. Citations to the appendix attached to this petition are in

the form App. XX.

patents did not suggest the claimed method. The Federal

Circuit was required to assume that the jury made such an

inference. Lavender, 327 U.S. at 653.

The scope and content of the prior art is a factual

issue for the jury to decide. The most important prior art was

the 1917 Brochet patent. DyStar presented substantial

evidence that the Brochet patent did not suggest the claimed

process, which included expert testimony that Brochet taught

that its indigo solution could not be used as a dye.

(A557:18-A558:22; A466:20-A467:7). In addition to that

expert testimony, DyStar offered a contemporaneous article

written by Mr. Brochet, the inventor of the Brochet patent.

In that article, Mr. Brochet explained that indigo obtained by

catalytic hydrogenation could be “concentrated in vacuum in

order to obtain indigo white as a paste,” for use in making

other products, but never suggests that it can be used as a

dye. (A1907-A1909). Thus, in neither his patent nor his

article did Mr. Brochet even imply that the product of his

method of producing indigo could be used to dye anything.

(A460: 19-A462:20).

In a rather candid admission that it was substituting

its factfinding for that of the jury, the panel wrote that the

Brochet patent “implies that all vat dyestuffs, including

indigo, may either be used immediately for dyeing or

concentrated prior to sale.” App. 16 (emphasis added). This

alleged “implication,” however, was flatly contradicted by

expert testimony that the Brochet patent did not suggest

using the indigo solution as a dye. (A557:18-23; A466:20-

A467:7). The panel ignored that testimony.

Likewise, the panel ignored the 1924 Colour Index

which lists the indigo product of the Brochet patent as

unstable. (A1881). The Colour Index’s description

contradicts the Federal Circuit’s alleged implication that the

10

Brochet indigo is ready for immediate use as a dye because

unstable indigo cannot be used as a dye. At a minimum, it

provides the jury with evidence from which it could negate

any such implication.

Finally, a// inferences are to be construed to support

the jury’s verdict. Lavender, 327 U.S. at 653. It is not the

job of the Federal Circuit to usurp the role of the jury and

decide what evidence implies. The jury decided that the

Brochet patent did not imply that its indigo could be used

immediately. As the opinion admits, it is the factfinder’s

responsibility to decide whether a reference “teaches away

from the claimed invention.” App. 13 (internal quotation

omitted). The Federal Circuit claimed, however, that it

would “not read into a reference a teaching away from a

process where no such language exists.” App. 16 (emphasis

added). But that is not what the Federal Circuit did here.

Instead, it seized the role of factfinder and read into Brochet

a teaching fowards a process where no such language

existed.

Likewise, the Federal Circuit’s factfinding regarding

the Wimmer patent was both wrong and improper. The

Federal Circuit made the factual finding that the indigo

product of the Wimmer patent could be “placed on the

market without any further treatment.” App. 16. But DyStar

presented evidence that the 1906 Wimmer patent did not

disclose indigo ready for use as a dye. This evidence

included a comprehensive history of indigo written by the

inventor of the Wimmer patent thirty-three years after the

Wimmer patent had issued.” In that history, Wimmer

explains that the only use ever made of his indigo (or the

indigo made by the Brochet method) was as an intermediate

* The Federal Circuit claimed that this article written thirty-three years

later was a “contemporaneous article.” App. 16.

11

in the production of solid products. (A2136). The panel

opinion claimed, however, that this article can not retract the

language of the patent regarding the placing of the indigo on

the market without any further treatment. But it is at least a

legitimate inference for the jury to make that the indigo from

both the Wimmer patent and the Brochet patent were placed

on the market as intermediates, not as dyes. Indeed, even

Respondent’s own expert witness conceded that the Wimmer

indigo was placed on the market as an intermediate.

(A1129:3-A1130:21). Thus, it is astounding that the Federal

Circuit substituted its factfinding for the jury’s and found

that a 1906 reference made the claimed process obvious

when it is beyond question that the claimed process was not

obvious to Dr. Wimmer even thirty-three years after his

invention.

The Federal Circuit mentions the Chaumat patent in

passing, always in combination with Brochet or Wimmer.

But DyStar presented substantial evidence that Chaumat

does not reduce indigo and, therefore, could not be used as a

dye. (A541:24-24; A542:19-A543:13). Thus, there was

substantial evidence to support the jury’s verdict that

Chaumet did not make the ‘992 patent obvious and it was

improper for the Federal Circuit to substitute its view of the

facts for that of the jury’s.

Consequently, it was reasonable for the jury to find

that the early twentieth century patents did not suggest the

claimed method of the ‘992 patent. Especially in light of the

fact that the 1915 Brochet article, the 1924 Colour Index, the

1939 Wimmer report, and the 1953 Application of Vat Dyes

all teach away from the claimed process. As even a single

reference teaching away can negate obviousness, Winner

Int'l Royalty Corp. v. Wang, 202 F.3d 1340, 1349-50 (Fed.

Cir. 2000), the jury had substantial evidence supporting its

verdict.

Rather than engaging in appellate review with proper

deference to the jury’s factual findings, the Federal Circuit

chose to re-weigh the evidence itself. To make matters

worse, it ignored much of the substantial evidence that

supperted the jury’s verdict. Indeed, many of the individual

pieces of evidence alone were sufficient to provide

substantial evidence to support the jury’s verdict. Together,

this evidence is overwhelming substantial evidence in

support of the jury’s verdict.

B. The Court Should Stop the Federal Circuit

from Sitting as a “Super Jury”

The Federal Circuit was established in 1982 to bring

greater uniformity and expertise to patent cases. This

mandate, however, does not allow the Federal Circuit to

ignore the most basic rules of judicial procedure. This point

is sometimes lost on the Federal Circuit, as illustrated by

Nelson v. Adams, USA, Inc., 529 U.S. 460 (2000), which

unanimously reversed the Federal Circuit on the fundamental

point that a party is entitled to be heard before the entry of

judgment against it. Indeed, the Court implied that the

procedure followed by the Federal Circuit in that case was

perhaps more befitting Alice in Wonderland. See id. at 468

n.2.

The real issue presented here is whether the Federal

Circuit is above the law in patent cases. The Federal Circuit

should not be allowed to sit as a federal appellate super jury

that is free to re-try patent cases. Although there can be no

circuit split in patent cases in light of the Federal Circuit’s

exclusive jurisdiction, that does not allow the Federal Circuit

to ignore basic rules of judicial review. The unique and

specialized nature of the Federal Circuit’s docket may have

the advantage of promoting greater expertise and uniformity

13

in patent cases, but it also has the corresponding

disadvantages of insularity and a willingness to second guess

trial courts, and juries.

When the Federal Circuit applies the wrong standard

in such situations, there is no other redress for litigants

except to this Court, and there is no possibility that the

system might work this issue out for itself. See Cardinal

Chemical Co. v. Morton Int'l, Inc., 508 U.S. 83, 89 (1993)

(certiorari granted “[b]ecause the Federal Circuit has

exclusive jurisdiction over appeals from all United States

District Courts in patent litigation, the rule that it applied in

this case . . . is a matter of special importance to the entire

Nation”). The Federal Circuit, although acknowledging the

proper test for overturning a jury’s verdict, has demonstrated

repeatedly that it will not rigorously apply it. Rooklidge,

Judicial Hyperactivity, 15 Berkeley Tech. L.J. at 739-40;

Lee, The Charade, 8 Tex. Intell. Prop. L.J. at 14. And in this

case, the Federal Circuit has specifically denied Petitioner its

Seventh Amendment right to have all factual issues resolved

by the jury.

Here, the Federal Circuit felt it was more important

to advocate on behalf of its obviousness jurisprudence to this

Court than it was to respect the Petitioner’s Seventh

Amendment jury rights. Indeed, one commentator noted that

the Federal Circuit attempted to use the DySzar opinion

(along with another opinion) as an “unofficial amicus

brief] ]” to defend its obviousness jurisprudence to this Court.

73 (No. 1795) News, Pat. Trademark & Copyright J., 67, 68

(Nov. 24, 2006). Similarly, another commentator noted that

the panel was “clearly speaking to inform the Supreme Court

as it prepares to consider the propriety of the

motivation/suggestion test in KSR v. Teleflex.” Dystar

Textilfarben v. C.H. Patrick, http://www.fedcirc.us/case-

reviews/federal-circuit/DyStar-textilfarben-v.-c.h.-

14

patrick.html (Oct. 9, 2006). That commentator went on to

point out that the panel “went out of its way to defend the

motivation/suggestion test, . . . [and that t]he opinion is quite

critical of commentary on the test.” /d. (emphasis added).

One need not review the articles by commentators to

see that the Federal Circuit had an agenda when it decided

this case. While the opinion spends only one page

discussing (and mostly ignoring) the substantial evidence for

secondary considerations, it spends twelve pages refuting

arguments that DyStar did not make.’ The opinion

complains that parties see the Federal Circuit’s obviousness

jurisprudence as “rigid and categorical.” App. 22. But

DyStar never made that complaint. The opinion further

complains about commentators who do not review its cases

carefully. But DyStar never mentioned any of those

commentators, nor did it mention their articles. The opinion

even appears to be complaining that this Court granted

certiorari in KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 2965

(2006). App. 22 at n.3 (implying that the Court should not

have granted certiorari because the Federal Circuit reversed

for a different reason than the basis for the Court granting

certiorari). Once again, the Iederal Circuit was not

responding to an argument raised by DyStar.

Under the rules of the Court, certiorari is appropriate

where “a United States court of appeals . . . has so far

9 Those twelve pages consist of a rather defensive overview of its

obviousness jurisprudence as shown by the following statements from

the opinion: 1) Federal Circuit opinions discussed by commentators

contain “arguably imprecise language,” App. 19 (emphasis added); 2) “a

close reading of In re Lee” demonstrates that the Federal Circuit's

obviousness jurisprudence is correct, App. 20 (emphasis added); 3) “It is

difficult to see how our suggestion test could be ‘seen as ngid and

categorical,” App. 22; and 4) “Our suggestion test is in actuality quite

flexible.” Jd.

departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial

proceedings . . . as to call for an exercise of this Court’s

supervisory power.” Sup. Ct. R. 10({a). The exercise of the

Court’s supervisory authority is especially important here. It

was entirely improper to sacrifice Petitioner's Seventh

Amendment rights merely so the Federal Circuit could file a

pseudo-amicus brief to this Court because it is upset that

there is “much confusion about [its obviousness] law” that

has now been apparently “compounded” by the Court’s

decision to grant certiorari to KSR. Filing a pseudo-amicus

brief is such a departure from the accepted and usual course

of judicial proceedings that it needs the exercise of this

Court’s supervisory power.

Il. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT HAS IGNORED

THIS COURT’S PRECEDENT BOTH BY

DECIDING THAT SECONDARY

CONSIDERATIONS OF NON-OBVIOUSNESS

ARE NO LONGER RELEVANT AND BY

CREATING A NEW CAPABILITY STANDARD

In Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966), the

Court held . that secondary considerations such as

“commercial success, long felt but unsolved needs, [and]

faiiure of others,” may provide objective indicia that a

patented claim is not obvious. /d. at 17. The Court

explained that these secondary considerations may serve to

“guard against slipping into use of hindsight, and to resist the

temptation to read into the prior art the teachings of the

invention in issue.” Jd. at 36 (internal quotation and citation

omitted). In this case; however, the Federal Circuit decided

to ignore the binding precedent of this Court, and it

implicitly held that secondary considerations of non-

obviousness are no longer relevant.

16

DyStar presented massive amounts of testimony and

documentary evidence that demonstrated that its patent

claims were not obvious. This evidence was largely

unrebutted and included the following:

Evidence of skepticism - Mr. Schnitzer

testified that his colleagues at BASF did not

believe his proposed method would work

because the solution would be unstable,

would not dye yarn properly and might

damage dyeing equipment.'” (A252:8-24).

Praise for the invention — A competitor called

DyStar’s method “a major new innovation for

the denim dyer,” (A1947); even Respondent

referred to the method as “the new

innovation,” (A1893); and a dyehouse

referred to the claimed process as an

“advanced process.” (A246:9-14).

Copying of the invention — Respondent and

another competitor advertised the method in

promotional material, (A 1820-34; A1911-47);

Respondent switched eighty percent of its

Brazilian dyehouse customers to the claimed

process. (A984:5-10).

Unexpected results for the invention — The

patented method provides better color

fastness, depth of color, contrast and greater

consistency. (A252:8 - A253:17; A254:18 -

A256:3).

Mr. Schnitzer worked at BASF. when he invented the ‘992 patent.

DyStar subsequently acquired BASF’s textile dyeing business.

17

Failure of others to solve the problem that the

invention solved — BASF had to engage in

substantial experimentation before arriving at

the solution to the environmental problems

provided by the ‘992 patent (A1356-63;

A1371-78; A1387-95; A1400-04; A241:21 -

A245:13); DyStar also demonstrated that

another chemical company, Buffalo Color,

attempted and failed to make a pre-reduced

indigo solution to sell to dyehouses for use in

dyeing in 1979, (A1899-1902); in 1990 a

dyehouse trying to use an aqueous solution of

leuco indigo made by catalytic hydrogenation

as a dye failed miserably. (A840:25-

A841:25; A847:17-A848:16; A922:15-20;

A967:6-2).

Commercial success of the invention —

Messrs. Schilling and Malpass testified that

the first, second, and fourth largest U.S. mills

(which together produce the vast majority of

the denim made in this country) use the

claimed process, (A893:25-A985:5 and

A403:7-10); Mr. Schnitzer testified that the

sales of indigo solution for use in the claimed

process constitutes eighty percent of DyStar’s

world-wide indigo sales; Mr. Schnitzer also

testified that, in a mere five years of using the

claimed process, DyStar went from zero

percent market share in Brazil to forty

percent. (A253:19 - A254:5; A257:23-

A258:5).

Long-felt need — An almost eighty year

passage of time between the Brochet patent

end the invention in the ‘992 patent.

18

A. The. Federal Circuit Ignored or

Mischaracterized All Evidence Related to

Secondary Considerations

Regarding long-felt need, the Federal Circuit

mischaracterized the Wimmer article as being

“contemporaneous” to his patent, App. 16, even though he

wrote it thirty-three years after his patent issued. This

mischaracterization allowed it to ignore the fact that it was

not obvious to Wimmer that his indigo solution (or Brochet’s

indigo solution) could be used for anything other than an

intermediate to make other indigo products. The opinion

does grudgingly mention, however, “that eighty years

elapsed between Brochet’s invention and another inventor’s

thought to vacuum-seal the Brochet solution and add it

directly to the dyebath.”” App. 29-30 (emphasis added).

The panel provided no reason for dismissing this eighty year

period despite the Court’s holding that the passage of time is

evidence of invention. See Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,

Inc. v. Ray-O-Vac Co., 321 U.S. 275, 279 (1944) (the fact

that fifty years had passed before the problem was solved

demonstrated that the patent was not obvious).

The Federal Circuit also admits that “DyStar has

enjoyed considerable commercial success from _ the

introduction of the product.” But again, it simply ignores

this fact and fails to explain why this commercial success

was not sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict.

'' Despite here characterizing Mr. Schnitzer as an “inventor” the panel

does not explain this inconsistency with its earlier factual finding that the

claimed process “is the work of a skilled chemist, not of an inventor.”

App. 29 (emphasis added).

The Federal Circuit also opined that the substantial

evidence DyStar submitted regarding the failure of others,

“actually detract[ed] from its argument, and heavily 30.”

App. 30. But to reach its opinion, the panel had to ignore

most of the substantial evidence of failure of others, and

mischeracterize the rest. First, it completely ignored that

BASF had to engage in substantial experimentation before

arriving at the claimed process. Second, it ignored that in

1990 a dyehouse tried to use an aqueous solution of leuco

indigo made by catalytic hydrogenation as a dye and failed

miserably.

The evidence it chose not to ignore, it

mischaracterized. DyStar presented substantial evidence that

Buffalo Color in 1979 tried and failed to sell dye that

dyehouses could use in a method similar to the ‘992 patent.

This substantial evidence demonstrated that Buffalo’s

product did not work because it was not stable. Substituting

its own factfinding for that of the jury, the panel held “that

Buffalo was only mildly concerned with instability

problems.” App. 30 (emphasis added). But regardless of

which adverb the Federal Circuit puts in front of

“concerned” (mildly? somewhat? incredibly?), the Federal

Circuit is here admitting that Buffalo was concerned about

stability. That admission, in turn, is conceding that sixty

years after the Brochet patent, the claimed process was still

not obvious.”

Continuing in its factfinding role regarding Buffalo's

intent, the Federal Circuit made the factual finding that

Buffalo Color failed to sell an indigo solution to dyehouses

12

Buffalo Color’s 1979 failure demonstrates that the Federal Circuit

was wrong in its belief that it “can assume comfortably” that DyStar’s

patented method would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the

art. See A28.

because it “would cost more to produce.” App. 30 (emphasis

added). Two pages previously, however, the Federal Circuit

made the opposite factual finding: that there would be a

motivation to combine the early twentieth century patents

because providing an indigo solution to dyehouses would

cost less, i.c., “would save even more time, space and

money.” App. 28 (emphasis in original). Not only was it

improper for the Federal Circuit to substitute its factfinding

for the jury’s, but its factfinding was not consistent. It

found, with respect to secondary considerations, that the

indigo solution would cost more but found that the solution

would cost /ess with respects to the prior art. These

contradictory factual findings "demonstrate that it is the

Federal Circuit’s decision to overturn the jury verdict, and

not the jury’s verdict itself, that is not supported by

substantial evidence.

Finally, regarding “skepticism of others,” the panel

implicitly decided that the jury was incorrect in finding Mr.

Schnitzer credible because his testimony was

“undocumented” and “unsupported by even a_ brief

explanation of the-chemistry underlying this assumption.” '°

Id. But Mr. Schnitzer did discuss the chemistry underlying

the skepticism of others. (A252:8-24) Most importantly, it

was improper for the Federal Circuit to pass on the

credibility of Mr. Schnitzer. Thus, once again, there was

substantial evidence to support the jury’s verdict.

All the evidence that the Federal Circuit chose to

ignore Or misconstrue is more than sufficient substantial

evidence of secondary considerations to support the jury’s

verdict. See Stratoflex, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp., 713 F.2d

1530, 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (“evidence of secondary

13

As discussed infra in Section Ul, the Federal Circuit improperly

expanded the corroboration requirement for testimony in this case.

considerations may often be the most probative and cogent

evidence in the record”). Thus, the Court should grant

certiorari to instruct the Federal Circuit that it can not ignore

the Court’s binding precedent regarding the proper use of

secondary considerations.

Finally, it would be especially appropriate for the

Court to grant certiorari on this issue now. KSR Int'l Co. v.

Teleflex, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 2965, will afford the Court the

opportunity to address the law of obviousness under Section

103(a). This case presents the Court with an opportunity to

instruct the Federal Circuit as to the proper role of the jury in

determining the Graham factors underlying the legal

determination of obviousness. If the Court is to alter or fine-

tune the legal determination of obviousness, then there is no

better time to address the complementary question of the

jury’s role in that determination.

B. The Federal Circuit Created a New Test for

Obviousness Based on an_ Improper

“Capability” Standard

Ignoring the objective indicia of non-obviousness

established by the Court, the Federal Circuit created a new

test for obviousness - one that does not safeguard against the

use of hindsight. The panel held that any time that “the

combination of references results in a product or process that

is more desirable, for example because it is stronger,

cheaper, cleaner, faster, lighter, smaller, more durable, or

more efficient,” the only remaining question to decide

whether the claim is obvious “is whether the ordinary artisan

possesses knowledge and skills rendering him capable of

combining the prior art references.” App. 28 (emphasis in

original).

This “capability” test violates this Court’s precedent

for three reasons. First, the Court has held that just because

“the means [the inventor] adopted seem simple and such as

should have been obvious to those who worked in the field,

[that] is not enough to negative invention.” See Goodyear,

321 U.S. at 279. But if an invention “should have been

obvious to those who worked in the field,” it is within the

“capabilities” of “the ordinary artisan.” Thus, the Federal

Circuit’s new capability standard can not coexist with

Goodyear’s holding that an invention may be patented even

if it “should have been obvious to those who worked in the

field.” The Court should not allow the Federal Circuit to

ignore the Court’s binding precedent.

Second, the Federal Circuit’s “capability” standard

violates the Court’s precedent by ignoring secondary

considerations. No longer will commercial success,

skepticism, praise, long felt need, passage of significant

time, failure of others or unexpected results have any role in

the analysis. There will be no role for these secondary

considerations because, according to the panel, the only

question to decide is whether the hypothetical ordinary

artisan was “capable” of combining the references. But by

failing to consider the secondary considerations, the Federal

Circuit is inviting hindsight reconstruction of inventions.

This hindsight problem is why the Court requires the

lower courts to consider the objective indicia of non-

obviousness because they “guard against slipping into [the]

use of hindsight.” Graham, 383 U.S. at 36; see also Truswal

Systems Corp. v. Hydro-Air Engineering Inc., 813 F.2d

1207, 1212 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (“[t}hat evidence is ‘secondary’

in time does not mean that it is secondary in importance”).

The Federal Circuit’s “capability” standard not only blithely

ignores this serious problem but exacerbates it. Now, the

infringer can use the patent as a road map and show how a

23

hypothetical ordinary artisan can reach the same result. The

fact that others have failed, that long periods of time have

passed (here, eighty years), and that the new invention is

commercially successful all disappear in direct violation of

the Court’s precedent.

Third, if the capability of the ordinary artisan is

enough to make a patent obvious, patents could not be

granted for simple inventions. Cf. Richard Gruner,

Everything Old Is New Again: Obviousness Limitations on

Patenting Computer Updates of Old Designs, 9 B.U.J. Sci. &

Tech. L. 209, 264 (2003) (hindsight problems regarding

obviousness determinations are especially problematic when

the patented invention is “simple”). Again, such a result

violates the Court’s precedent. The fact that an invention is

simple means that it is within the capabilities of an ordinary

artisan. See Goodyear, 321 U.S. at 279. But this Court has

explicitly held that just because an invention “seem[s] simple

and such as should have been obvious to those who worked

in the field, [that] is not enough to negative invention.””* Jd.

(emphasis added); Jn re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1447 (Fed.

Cir. 1992) (although the invention is simple, “[s]implicity 1s

not inimical to patentability”). As the Federal Circuit has

taken it upon itself to outlaw simple inventions, the Court

should step in to correct the Federal Circuit.

'4 Similarly, the Federal Circuit’s capability standard violates the

language of the statute. 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) states: "Patentability shall not

be negatived by the manner in which the invention was made." Thus, the

statute forbids finding a patent claim obvious merely because the

invention is simple, i.e. within the capabilities of one of ordinary skill in

the art. See Phanesh Koneru, To Promote the Progress of Useful

Articles?: An Analysis of the Current Utility Standards of

Pharmaceutical Products and Biotechnological Research Tools, 38

IDEA 625, 666 (1998) (explaining that the fact that “patentability shall

not be negatived by the manner... [of] invention” allows for patents for

inventions made with “minimal effort").

24

Accordingly, the Court should grant the petition for

certiorari because the Federal Circuit’s new “capability”

standard conflicts with the Court’s binding precedent for at

least these three reasons.

lll. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT HAS IMPROPERLY

EXPANDED THE CORROBORATION

REQUIREMENT TO NOW REQUIRE

CORROBORATION OF ALL TESTIMONY IN

PATENT CASES

To reach its conclusion that the ‘992 patent was

obvious, the Federal Circuit had to ignore the testimony of

Mr. Schnitzer, an inventor of the ‘992 patent. His

uncontroverted testimony was that others were skeptical

when he suggested the method claimed in the ‘992 patent.

(A252:8-24). Skepticism of others is objective indicia of

non-obviousness. United States v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39, 52

(1966). Yet, the Federal Circuit dismissed this testimony,

Stating that it was “a bare assertion” that was “undocumented

and non-specific.” App. 30. As discussed supra, its

Statement that this testimony was “a bare assertion,” and

“non-specific” is specifically contradicted by the record.

Further, it was not proper for the Federal Circuit to substitute

its judgment for the jury’s and decide that the witness was

not credible.

Apparently realizing that it was improper for it to

judge the credibility of a witness, the Federal Circuit tried to

bolster its factfinding by stating the testimony was

“undocumented.” Thus, the Federal Circuit used this case to

extend its corroboration requirement far beyond any

reasonable scope and in direct conflict with its sister circuits.

The corroboration requirement arose out of a late

1800s case, The Barbed Wire Patent, 143 U.S. 275 (1892).

Prior public use was the issue in 71 he Barbed Wire Patent,

and it is the context in which the corroboration requirement

most often arises. The Court held that the uncorroborated

testimony of a witness regarding prior public use was

insufficient as a matter of law to prove by clear and

convincing evidence that a patent is invalid.’ Jd. at 284.

Based on The Barbed Wire Patent, the Federal

Circuit has repeatedly held that oral “testimony alone cannot

surmount the hurdle that the clear and convincing evidence

standard imposes in proving patent invalidity.” Finnigan

Corp. v. Int'l Trade Com’n, 180 F.3d 1354, 1370 (Fed. Cir.

1999). The Federal Circuit has explained that its

requirement for corroboration to reach the “clear and

convincing evidence” to invalidate a patent is necessary

because it is unlikely that a party trying to invalidate a patent

based on its alleged prior invention could create an invention

without any corroborating evidence of its invention. See

Woodland Trust v. Flowertree Nursery, Inc., 148 F.3d 1368,

1373 (Fed. Cir. 1998). But until this case, no court has held

that uncorroborated testimony is insufficient as a matter of

law to oppose a party that has the burden or proving

invalidity by clear and convincing evidence.

Numerous courts have questioned whether the

Federal Circuit’s corroboration requirement to prove

invalidity by clear and convincing evidence makes sense.

See, e.g. Engate, Inc. v. Esquire Deposition Servs. LLC, 331

'5 Although the Court held that proof of invalidity had to be “clear,

satisfactory and beyond a reasonable doubt,” The Barbed Wire Patent,

143 U.S. at 284, that term has subsequently been understood to equate to

the “clear and convincing” standard. See Eibel Process Co. v. Mirnesota

& Ontario Paper Co., 261 U.S. 45, 60 (1923).

26

F. Supp 2d 673, 684-85 (N.D. III. 2004). As that court noted

“[iJt is not all that easy to understand why patent invalidity,

of all things, should rank with treason in terms of the need

for special corroboration.”'® Jd That court recommended

that “the [corroboration] rule has seen better days and ought

to be put out of its misery humanely rather than being forced

to suffer the death of a thousand cuts.”!’ Jd. at 686 n.4.

Whether the Court decides to wait for another day to

decide whether the corroboration requirement should “be put

out of its misery,” the Court should not let the Federal

Circuit expand the need for corroboration for testimony. The

Barbed Wire Patent and the subsequent Federal Circuit cases

applying that case have all addressed a specific issue:

whether uncorroborated oral testimony is sufficient to meet

the high evidentiary standard of invalidating a patent by

“clear and convincing evidence.” But here, the Federal

Circuit has now expanded the corroboration requirement for

testimony that does not even need to meet the preponderance

'© Indeed, the Federal Circuit's requirement for corroboration to meet

the clear and convincing evidence standard, contradicts the holding of its

sister circuits’ that uncorroborated oral testimony is sufficient to meet the

higher evidentiary standard of beyond a reasonable doubt. Comp. United

States v. Tam, 240 F.3d 797, 806 (9 Cir. 2001); United States y.

Gadison, 8 F.3d 186, 190 (5" Cir. 1993); with Medichem, S.A. v. Rolabo,

S.L., 437 F.3d 1157, 1164 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Finnigan Corp. v. Int'l Trade

Com’n, 180 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 1999).

'” Of course, the Court could use this case as a vehicle to decide whether

the 19" century proposition that uncorroborated oral testimony can never

reach the “clear and convincing evidence” standard still makes sense,

considering that the modern view is that uncorroborated oral testimony

can reach the higher evidentiary standard of proof “beyond a reasonable

doubt.” It would be especially appropriate for the Court to consider this

issue due to the concerns of many that it is too difficult to invalidate bad

patents. Cf eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837, 1842

(2006) (Kennedy J., concurrence).

of evidence standard. Instead, the oral testimony was offered

to meet the second lowest evidentiary standard possible:

opposing a party that had the burden of proving an issue by

clear and convincing evidence. No court, including the

Federal Circuit, has ever previously held that a party that

does not have any burden of proof can not use

uncorroborated testimony fo oppose a party that has the

burden of proof.

In this case, the Federal Circuit has held that a jury

can not judge the credibility of a witness. Thus, once again,

the Federal Circuit is demonstrating its deep distrust of

juries. The Court should grant the petition for certiorari to

stop the Federal Circuit from seizing for itself the ability to

decide whether witnesses are credible, based on an improper,

unprecedented corroboration requirement. In every other

circuit, uncorroborated testimony is acceptable to meet all

evidentiary standards, except in a treason case. Thus, the

Federal Circuit’s refusal to accept any witness testimony that

‘s uncorroborated is in direct conflict with both this Court’s

precedent and its sister circuits. The Court should grant the

petition for certiorari to resolve this split between the Federal

Circuit and all the other circuits regarding whether all

testimony must be corroborated.

CONCLUSION

The petition for writ of certiorari should be granted.

March 5, 2007

Respectfully submitted,

William T. Enos*

Richard D. Kelly

Andrew K. Beverina

Robert C. Nissen

Oblon, Spivak, McClelland,

Maier & Neustadt, P.C.

1940 Duke St.

Alexandria, VA 22314

(703) 413-3000

*Counsel of record

Counsel for Petitioner

APPENDIX

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

06-1088

DYSTAR TEXTILFARBEN GMBH & CO

DEUTSCHLAND KG,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

V.

C.H. PATRICK CO., and BANN QUIMICA LTDA

>]

Defendants-Appellants.

William T. Enos, Oblon, Spivak, McClelland, Maier

& Neustadt, P.C., of Alexandria, Virginia, argued for

plaintiff-appellee. With him on the brief were Richard D.

Kelly and Andrew K. Beverina.

Neil C. Jones, Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough,

L.L.P., of Greenville, South Carolina, argued for defendants-

appellants.

Appealed from: United States District Court for the District

of South Carolina

Magistrate Judge William M. Catoe, Jr.

App. |

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

FEDERAL CIRCUIT

06-1088

DYSTAR TEXTILFARBEN GMBH & CO

DEUTSCHLAND KG,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

V.

C.H. PATRICK CO., and BANN QUIMICA LTDA,

Defendants-Appellants.

DECIDED: October 3, 2006

Before MICHEL, Chief Judge, RADER and SCHALL,

Circuit Judges. Opinion for the court filed by Chief Judge

MICHEL. Concurring opinion filed by Circuit Judge

SCHALL.

MICHEL, Chief Judge.

DyStar Textilfarben GmbH & Co. Deutschland KG

("DyStar") sued defendants C.H. Patrick Co. and Bann

Quimica Ltda. (collectively, "Bann") in the United States

District Court for the District of South Carolina, alleging

direct, contributory, and induced infringement of U.S. Patent

App. 2

No. 5,586,992 ("the '992 patent"), which discloses a process

for dyeing textile materials with catalytically hydrogenated

leuco indigo. DyStar and Bann Quimica Ltda. are large

chemical manufacturers that, inter alia, sell prereduced

indigo for use in dyeing processes; C.H. Patrick Co.

purchased prereduced indigo solution from Bann Quimica

Ltda. in 2002 and used it to dye yarn in a process alleged to

infringe.

The parties agreed to a jury trial before a magistrate

judge. Prior to charging the jury and in open court, the

magistrate judge granted DyStar's motion for judgment as a

matter of law ("JMOL") that it had not engaged in

inequitable conduct before the United States Patent and

Trademark Office ("PTO"). The jury rendered a verdict that

"Bann Quimica and/or C.H. Patrick" had infringed each of

claims 1-4, assessed damages at $90,000, and declined to

hold the '992 patent claims invalid for lack of enablement,

anticipation or obviousness. DyStar Textilfarben GmbH &

Co Deutschland KG v. C.H. Patrick Co., Civ. No. 6:02-

2946-WMC (D.S.C. Sept. 16, 2005).

Following briefing, the magistrate judge denied

Bann's motions for JMOL or, alternatively, a new trial on the

question of invalidity of the '992 patent for anticipation,

obviousness, and lack of enablement. DyStar Textilfarben

GmbH & Co Deutschland KG v. C.H. Patrick Co., Civ. No.

6:02-2946-WMC (D.S.C. Nov. 1, 2005). The magistrate

judge did not issue an opinion. His order stated:

The jury diligently considered the evidence

presented and found for the plaintiff. This

court concludes that the jury's verdict was

' BASF was the assignee of the '992 patent. BASF divested its dyestuff

business, including the '992 patent, to DyStar in 2000.

App. 3

reasonable and was supported by evidence

in the record. Therefore, as this court has

great respect for trial by jury and the right of

the parties to request a jury trial, this court

will not substitute its findings for those of

the jury as the jury's decision was clearly

supported by the trial record and was

reasonable.

Id.

Bann appeals from the denials of its motions on

anticipation and obviousness, and the grant of JMOL to

DyStar regarding inequitable conduct. For the reasons

explained below, we reverse the district court's denial of

Bann's motion for JMOL of invalidity of claims 1-4 for

obviousness.

I

[Indigo has been used in dyeing textile materials for

thousands of years. Because indigo pigment is insoluble in

water, it must be de-oxidized, or "reduced," to a water-

soluble white form known as "leuco indigo" before it can be

used in dyeing. Leuco indigo is unstable; it oxidizes and

returns to its blue pigment form when exposed to oxygen.

Thus, leuco indigo solution needs to be kept in an oxygen-

free environment, or otherwise stabilized, if it is not being

used immediately for dyeing.

For many years, dyehouses commonly reduced

indigo in-house through a process known as hydrosulfite

reduction. Dyers created a "stock vat," in which indigo is

reduced in water with sodium hydrosulfite and solubilized

with an alkali, e.g., sodium hydroxide. The resulting leuco

indigo solution is then transferred into a feed tank and fed

App. 4

into the dyebath. After the dyebath is prepared, the textile

material is dyed through a process known as "dipping" and

"skying." In "dipping," the textile material is contacted with

leuco indigo in the dyebath; in "skying," the dyed textile

material is introduced to the air, causing the indigo to

convert back to its blue pigment form.

A second common method of indigo reduction,

catalytic hydrogenation, was patented by Andre Brochet in

1917. See U.S. Patent No. 1,247,927 ("Brochet"). The

superficial difference between hydrosulfite reduction and

catalytic hydrogenation is that the latter uses gaseous

hydrogen, rather than sodium hydrosulfite, as a reducing

agent. Catalytic hydrogenation allowed "economical

production of concentrated solutions of leuco derivatives free

from impurities and mineral salts"; when left to settle, the

solution naturally separates from nickel or another catalytic

metal and can be "drawn off and is ready for use". Brochet,

11.88-90, 109-110. Most important to the dyehouses,

however, was the fact that Brochet's leuco indigo solution

could be stabilized in solid form, usually powder or paste,

and coated with molasses or glue to protect the reduced

indigo from air and prevent premature oxidation. This

allowed the indigo reduction process to shift out of the

dyehouses and into chemical manufacturers, which began to

produce and sell prereduced indigo to dyehouses in the early

1900s. Rather than create a stock vat, dyers needed only to

dissolve the prereduced indigo into a preparation tank, add

caustic soda (i.e., sodium hydroxide) and sodium

. !drosulfite to remove oxygen from the water, and transfer

the resulting solution from the preparation tank to the

dyebath. This significantly reduced the time necessary to

prepare a dyebath, the dychouses' expenditures on sodium

hydrosulfite and caustic soda, and the level of pollution in

dyehouse waste water and on dyehouse floors.

App. 5

The process of dyeing textile materials with

catalytically hydrogenated leuco indigo traditionally has

involved six steps: (1) reducing indigo to its leuco form in

solution; (2) stabilizing the leuco indigo solution, usually in

paste or powder form, (3) creating a preparation tank in

which the dried leuco indigo is re-converted to solution

form; (4) adding the solution to the dyebath; (5) dipping; and

(6) skying.

Claim 1 of the '992 patent, the only independeni

claim at issue, recites:

A process for dyeing cellulose-containing

textile material with indigo which comprises

a) introducing into a dyebath an aqueous

solution of leuco indigo solution prepared by

catalytic hydrogenation;

b) contacting the textile material with the

dyebath; and, after the leuco indigo has gone

onto the textile material,

c) converting said leuco indigo back into the

pigment form in a conventional manner by

air oxidation.

'992 patent, col.6, 1.66-col.7, 1.6. The ‘992 patent thus

improved upon the prior art by eliminating steps two and

three of the traditional process: stabilizing the leuco indigo

solution into a paste or powder form, and then reconstituting

the solution in a preparation tank. Instead, it allowed a dyer

to pour prereduced indigo solution directly into a dyebath

and commence dyeing immediately.

Bann appeals from the denials of its motions on

anticipation of claim | and obviousness of claims 1-4, and

the grant of DyStar's JMOL of no inequitable conduct. We

review decisions on motions for JMOL and motions for a

new trial under the law of the regional circuit.

MicroStrategy, Inc. v. Bus. Objects, S.A., 429 F.3d 1344,

1348 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (JMOL); EMI Group N. Am., Inc. v.

Cypress Semiconductor Corp., 268 F.3d 1342, 1348 (Fed.

Cir. 2001) (new trial). In the Fourth Circuit, the grant or

denial of JMOL is reviewed de novo, which requires us to

Step into the shoes of the trial judge and reapply the JMOL

standard. Johnson v. MBNA Am. Bank, NA, 357 F.3d 426,

431 (4th Cir. 2004). "The question is whether a jury, viewing

the evidence in the light most favorable to {[DyStar], could

have properly reached the conclusion reached by this jury.

We must reverse if a reasonable jury could only rule in favor

of [Bann]; if reasonable minds could differ, we must affirm."

Id. (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). The

denial of a motion for a new trial is reviewed in the Fourth

Circuit for abuse of discretion. United States vy. Perry, 335

F.3d 316, 320 (4th Cir. 2003).

Bann asserts that claim | of the '992 patent is invalid

because it is anticipated by Brochet. Bann further argues that

claims 1-4 are invalid as obvious in light of Brochet and

certain other prior art, including two pre-1917 BASF

patents——United States Patent Nos. 820,900 ("Wimmer") and

885,978 ("Chaumat"), a post-World War II report of the

British Intelligence Objectives Sub-Committee ("BIOS

report"), and the 1936 Manual for the Dyeing of Cotton and

Other Vegtable Fibres ("Manual"), published by General

Dyestuff Corporation. We address the broader argument,

relating to obviousness, first.

App. 7

A

A determination that a claimed invention would have

been obvious, and thus the patent issued thereon invalid, is a

— legal conclusion that we review de novo. Richardson-Vicks,

Inc. v. The Upjohn Co., 122 F.3d 1476, 1479 (Fed. Cir.

1997). We must determine "if the differences between the

subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are

such that the subject matter as a whole would have been

obvious at the time the invention was made to a person

having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter

pertains." 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). We thus consider whether a

person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated

to combine the prior art to achieve the claimed invention and

whether there would have been a reasonable expectation of

success in doing so. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. Vv.

Philip Morris, Inc., 229 F.3d 1120, 1124 (Fed. Cir. 2000).

Underpinning this legal inquiry are four groups of

factual findings, which, in a jury trial, we review for

substantial evidence. Richardson-Vicks, 122 F.3d at 1479.

Following the 1952 enactment of § 103, the Supreme Court

explained that obviousness depends on (1) the scope and

content of the prior art; (2) the differences between the

claimed invention and the prior art; (3) the level of ordinary

skill in the art; and (4) any relevant secondary

considerations, including commercial success, long felt but

unsolved needs, and failure of others. Graham v. John Deere

Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966).

This court has articulated a subsidiary requirement

for the first Graham factor, the scope and content of the prior

art. SIBIA Neurosciences, Inc. v. Cadus Pharma. Corp., 225

F.3d 1349, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2000). Where, as here, all claim

limitations are found in a number of prior art references, the

factfinder must determine "[w]hat the prior art teaches,

App. 8

whether it teaches away from the claimed invention, and

whether it motivates a combination of teachings from

different references". Jn re Fulton, 391 F.3d 1195, 1199-

1200 (Fed. Cir. 2004). It is important in this inquiry to

distinguish between the references sought to be combined

and "the prior art", as the latter category is much broader.

For example, textbooks or treatises may include basic

principles unlikely to be restated in cited references.

As we recently explained in Alza Corp. v. Mylan

Labs., Inc., No. 06-1019, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 22616

(Fed. Cir. Sept. 6, 2006), the suggestion test—as our

motivation-to-combine inquiry has come to be known—

"prevent[s] statutorily proscribed hindsight reasoning when

determining the obviousness of an invention." /d. at *7. This

test "informs the Graham analysis", id. at *8 (quoting Jn re

Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 987 (Fed. Cir. 2006)), by implementing

the Supreme Court's recognition of "the importance of

guarding against hindsight, as is evident in its discussion of —

the role of secondary considerations as 'serv[ing] to guard

against slipping into use of hindsight and to resist the

temptation to read into the prior art the teachings of the

invention in issue." /d. at *6 (quoting Graham, 383 U.S. at

36).

In contrast to the characterization of some

commentators, the suggestion test is not a rigid categorical

rule. The motivation need not be found in the references

sought to be combined, but may be found in any number of

sources, including common knowledge, the prior art as a

whole, or the nature of the problem itself. Jn re Dembiczak,

175 F.3d 994, 999 (Fed. Cir. 1999). As we explained in

Motorola, Inc. v. Interdigital Tech. Corp., 121 F.3d 1461,

1472 (Fed. Cir. 1997), "there is no requirement that the prior

art contain an express suggestion to combine known

elements to achieve the claimed invention. Rather, the

App. 9

suggestion to combine may come from the prior art, as

filtered through the knowledge of one skilled in the art.”

For one to conclude that the invention of the '992

patent would have been obvious, then, the prior art, common

knowledge, or the nature of the problem, viewed through the

eyes of an ordinary artisan, must have suggested the

following steps: (1) creating leuco indigo solution through

catalytic hydrogenation; (2) stabilizing the leuco indigo in

solution form, (3) adding the leuco indigo solution directly

into a dyebath; (4) dipping; and (5) skying. Because the jury

did not make explicit factual findings in the form of answers

to written interrogatories or special verdicts, we must discern

the jury's implied factual findings by interpreting the

evidence consistently with the verdict and drawing all

reasonable inferences in DyStar's favor. Konkel v. Bob Evans

Farms Inc., 165 F.3d 275, 279 (4th Cir. 1999).

B

Bann's obviousness argument rests primarily on three

U.S. patents: Brochet, Wimmer, and Chaumat. Brochet is

directed to "the Manufacture of Leuco Derivatives of Vat

Dyestuffs" generally, of which indigo is one. Brochet, I1.6-7.

By its plain language, Brochet discloses the process of

preparing an aqueous solution of leuco indigo by catalytic

hydrogenation. There can be no serious dispute that the

ultimate use of a "dyestuff" is dyeing textile materials;

indeed, the '992 patent inventor, Georg Schnitzer, testified

that leuco indigo solutions were known to be used in 1917

for dyeing, and Dr. Richard Blackburn, one of DyStar's

technical experts, testified that BASF began reducing indigo

with catalytic hydrogenation, and selling the reduced indigo

to dyehouses, in 1926. Moreover, both parties agree that

dipping and skying were well known in the art. As explained

supra, when indigo is reduced in-house in a stock vat, the

App. 10

resulting leuco indigo solution is introduced directly into the

dyebath without first being stabilized through drying. Thus,

the critical issue in our obviousness analysis is whether

stabilizing catalytically reduced leuco indigo in solution

form, rather than in powder form coated with molasses, for

example, renders the claimed process nonobvious to one of

ordinary skill in the art.

1. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art

Because the parties disagree over the relevance of the

cited prior art, which, fundamentally, is a disagreement over

the level of ordinary skill in the art, we address this third

Graham factor first. DyStar asserts that we must disregard

Brochet, Wimmer, and Chaumat, because a person of

ordinary skill in the art would not be aware of these

references. In short, DyStar argues that no knowledge of

chemistry is required in the relevant technical field.

DyStar points to testimony from Dr. Blackburn that

"[a] person of ordinary skill in the art is a dyer", someone

with "a high school degree" who is "able to read and write",

but whose knowledge is limited to "flipping the switches" on

the machine. Dr. Blackburn also testified, however, that a

person of ordinary skill in the art was "running the dye

processes", which required, inter alia, "doing the

calculations". When confronted with the inconsistency

between his testimony regarding the applicable level of skill

during cross-examination, Dr. Blackburn stated that "it's

difficult to say" which of the two skill levels should be

applied to the obviousness inquiry. Dr. Blackburn explained

that "those people may do both jobs", but concluded by

stating, "I think the former [i.e., the person ‘flipping the

switches']" is the ordinary artisan. Thus, the jury had

evidence before it of two potential levels of ordinary skill:

App. 11

(1) that of a dyer and (2) that of a person creating the dye

processes, who we will refer to as a dyeing process designer.

DyStar presented evidence that The Application of

Vat Dyes, a book by the American Association of Textile

Chemists and Colorists, teaches people how to dye and is a

text that a dyer would have had at the time of the '992 patent

invention. Dr. Nolan Etters, Bann's expert witness, agreed

that "a person of ordinary skill in the art” would be a member

of the American Association of Textile Chemists and

Colorists and conceded that none of the prior art cited by

Bann is referenced in The Application of Vat Dyes.

We agree with DyStar that we are required to assume

the jury accepted its argument that a person of ordinary skill

in the art is a dyer with no knowledge of chemistry. Because

the jury heard testimony that the prior art cited by Bann was

directed toward chemists, not dyers, the jury must have

found the prior art cited by Bann neither in the relevant art

nor analogous arts and then, consistent with the limited

evidence of prior art deemed relevant, concluded that the

process claimed in the '992 patent would not have been

obvious.

However, substantial evidence does not support the

jury's finding that a person of ordinary skill is a dyer with no

knowledge of chemistry. Indeed, that factual finding is

inconsistent with the '992 patent's very purpose. The

technical problem that the process of the '992 patent and the

prior art cited by Bann sought to solve is precisely the same:

an improved process for dyeing textile materials with indigo.

This process includes several discrete subcomponents—-e.g.,

indigo reduction and dyebath preparation—-and an ordinary

artisan would be concerned with all of them. To beneficially

practice the dyeing process claimed in the '992 patent, the

ordinary artisan must have a higher-level perspective, as he

App. 12

must first decide whether it is more efficient to reduce indigo

in-house or purchase prereduced indigo and, if prereduced,

must then decide whether solid or solution form is

preferable.

Designing an optimal dyeing process requires

knowledge of chemistry and systems engineering, for

example, and by no means can be undertaken by a person of

only high school education whose skill set is limited to

"flipping the switches". This is especially true when one

considers that only in the last century have improvements in

indigo reduction chemistry enabled outsourcing of the indigo

reduction step from dyehouses to chemical manufacturers;

prior to that simplification, there would have been no

question that a dyer would also require knowledge of indigo

‘reduction. Because, for this patent, the only finding

supported by substantial evidence is that an ordinary artisan

is not a dyer but a person designing an optimal dyeing

process, the jury's implicit finding of a mere dyer cannot

withstand scrutiny on JMOL. Accordingly, the jury's

apparent decision to disregard Brochet, Wimmer, and

Chaumat, and perhaps other prior art references, as neither in

the dye process art nor even in analogous arts is unsupported

by substantial evidence.

2. Scope and Content of Prior Art

Where, as here, claim limitations are found in a

combination of prior art references, the factfinder must

determine "[w]hat the prior art teaches, whether it teaches

away from the claimed invention, and whether it motivates a

combination of teachings from different references". F. ulton,

391 F.3d at 1199-1200 (Fed. Cir. 2004).

To support its argument that an ordinary artisan—i.e.,

a dyeing process designer—would have known to attempt to

App. 13

stabilize the Brochet solution in oxygen-excluding

conditions for addition directly into a dyebath, Bann points

to two pre-Brochet BASF patents. Wimmer, issued in 1906,

discloses a leuco indigo solution that "can be filtered and the

filtrate (which contains a high percentage of indigo white)

can be placed on the market without any further treatment”,

in contrast to reduction using zinc, which required the

solution "to be separated before the solution can be used for

dyeing." Wimmer, 1134-40. Chaumat, issued in 1908,

discloses a leuco indigo solution that "may be drawn off

protected from the air and preserved indefinitely in

receptacles which are either soldered or closed in any other

hermetic manner." Chaumat, 11.84-87. Although Wimmer

and Chaumat disclose different reducing methods than

Brochet-—-Wimmer suggests the use of iron, rather than zinc,

as a reducing agent, and Chaumat discloses an electrolytic

process for indigo reduction—Bann argues that once the

indigo has been converted to its leuco form, the distinction is

irrelevant for dyeing purposes. Accordingly, Bann argues

that this prior art would teach an ordinary artisan in the field

of indigo dyeing process design to attempt to stabilize any

leuco indigo solution, however reduced, for addition directly

into the dyebath.

a. What does the prior art teach?

DyStar argues that because Wimmer and Chaumat

involve different methods of reducing indigo, they are

nonanalogous art and properly disregarded by the jury. In

support of this assertion, Mr. Schnitzer testified that, up until

the time of the invention, BASF's "people from production"

believed that leuco indigo created from catalytic

hydrogenation was too unstable to be added directly to the

dyebath, and might "stain the yarn with indigo pigment” or

"block[ ] pipes”. DyStar offered evidence that, prior to the

'992 patent, BASF had limited its sales of catalytically

App. 14

hydrogenated leuco indigo to that stabilized in paste or solid

form. Thus, argues DyStar, the language in Wimmer and

Chaumat suggesting that the solution could be stabilized and

sold in solution form does not apply to catalytically

hydrogenated leuco indigo solution.

We disagree. As explained supra, the proper focus is

on the indigo dyeing process as a whole, which requires the

ordinary artisan to consider (and choose between) the

various indigo reduction methods. The '992 patent is directed

toward a process of dyeing with indigo and, although a

specific method of reduction is required by claim 1, the first

step in the process requires indigo in prereduced form. It is

undisputed that reduced indigo by any reduction method, not

just catalytic hydrogenation, has been used in the indigo

dyeing process. The prior art involving indigo reduction by

other methods is thus not merely analogous art, it is the same

art. Accordingly, all limitations recited by claim 1 of the '992

patent—including the immediate use of leuco indigo solution

for dyeing—are contained in the prior art.’

b. Does the prior art teach away from the

claimed invention?

We reject DyStar’'s assertion that contemporaneous

articles by Wimmer and Brochet teach away from the

combination of Brochet and Chaumat, and thus the claimed

process. DyStar acknowledges that no specific language in

these references teaches away from the invention of the '992

patent. Rather, because these references do not discuss the

stabilization of leuco indigo solution (in solution form) for

immediate addition to a dyebath, DyStar somehow concludes

* Because the only difference between the claimed invention and the

cited prior art is the method of indigo reduction, which we have held 1s

irrelevant to an indigo dyeing process employing prereduced indigo, we

do not separately discuss this second Graham factor.

App. 15

that these references teach that leuco indigo solution "cannot

be used to dye but is instead useful only as an intermediate."

Although Wimmer's contemporaneous article only

describes the use of indigo solution as an intermediate

product, he does not retract his patent language indicating

that "the solution can be filtered and the filtrate (which

contains a high percentage of indigo white) can be placed on

the market without any further treatment". Wimmer, 11.33-37.

Likewise, the Brochet patent, directed toward all vat

dyestuffs, broadly teaches that the process “produce(s]

mother-liquors which can be diluted immediately before use,

or be treated by evaporation under reduced pressure or by

any other means to obtain concentrated products for sale."

Brochet, 11.66-70. This language implies that all vat

dyestuffs, including indigo, may either be used immediately

for dyeing or concentrated prior to sale. In his

contemporaneous article, Brochet stated that his catalytically

hydrogenated solution could be used "economically to obtain

concentrated indigo white [i.e., leuco indigo] solutions that

are free of impurities and alkaline ‘salts, that can be

concentrated in vacut'm in order to obtain white indigo as a

paste". This mere failure to discuss immediate use of his

leuco indigo solution for dyeing is not the same thing as

Brochet stating in his article that, though most dyestuffs may

be used immediately or stored in oxygen-excluding

containers, his leuco indigo solution may only be

concentrated in paste form. We will not read into a reference

a teaching away from a process where no such language

exists.

c. Is there a motivation to combine?

DyStar argues that this court's "suggestion test" for

obviousness requires the cited references themselves to

contain a suggestion, teaching, or motivation to combine

App. 16

them, and that it must be explicitly stated” DyStar then points

out, correctly, that Brochet does not suggest combining his

invention with those of Chaumat or Wimmeg to stabilize his

leuco indigo solution in oxygen-excluding containers until

either using it directly in the dyebath or placing it on the

market for sale, respectively. Absent such a teaching, urges

DyStar, the invention of claim 1 of the '992 patent cannot be

obvious.

DyStar's argument misreads this court's cases and

misdescribes our suggestion test, echoing notions put forth

recently by various commentators and accepted in major

reports. A 2003 report by the Federal Trade Commission, for

example, quoted testimony of certain witnesses that this

court requires "specific and definitive [prior] art references

with clear motivation of how to combine those references"

and requires the PTO to find "the glue expressly leading you

all the way [to obviousness]" and "connect the dots . . . very,

very clearly." Fed. Trade Comm'n, To Promote Innovation:

The Proper Balance of Competition and Patent Law and

Policy ch. 4, at 11 (2003). Similarly, a 2004 report by the

National Academy of Sciences summarized views of a few

commentators that "standards of patentability—especially

the non-obviousness standard-—have become too lax as a

result of court decisions" by the Federal Circuit, leading to

the deterioration of patent quality. Nat'l Research Council, A

Patent System for the 21st Century 3 (Stephen A. Merrill et

al. eds., 2004). But see Am. Intellectual Prop. Law Ass'n,

AIPLA Response to the National Academies Report entitled

“A Patent System for the 21st Century" 10 (2004) ("AIPLA

believes that the courts, including the Federal Circuit, have

applied the standard of non-obviousness with both the

needed rigor and the appropriate vigor, and they have done

so with a commendable consistency over the past two

decades. If a difficulty exists with application of the non-

obviousness standard today, it does not lie in the patent

_

App. 17

statute or in substantive law of non-obviousness as applied in

the courts.")

Seeking to support their assertions about Federal

Circuit caselaw, these few commentators have quoted

isolated statements from three of our precedents in particular,

including Dembiczak, 175 F.3d at 1000, wherein we stated

that the analysis by the Board of Patent Appeals and

Interferences ("Board") "fails to demonstrate how the [two

cited] references teach or suggest their combination"

(emphasis added), and Jn re Lee, 277 F.3d 1338, 1341, 1344

(Fed. Cir. 2002), where we characterized the Board's

statement that "[t]he conclusion of obviousness may be made

from common knowledge and common sense of a person of

ordinary skill in the art without any specific hint or

suggestion in a particular reference" as "[o]mission of a

relevant factor required by precedent". They have also cited

our repeated use of the word "references" in the following

list from Ruiz v. A.B. Chance Co., 234 F.3d 654 (Fed. Cir.

2000), where we suggested a motivation to combine may be

found:

1) in the prior art references themselves;

2) in the knowledge of those of ordinary

skill in the art that certain references, or

disclosures in those references, are of

special interest or importance in the field; or

3) from the nature of the problem to be

solved, leading inventors to fook to

references relating to possible solutions to

that problem.

Id. at 665 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks

omitted).

App. 18

Despite containing arguably imprecise language in

these statements, quoted out of context, each of thé above-

cited cases correctly applies the suggestion test and by no

means requires an explicit teaching to combine to be found

in a particular prior art reference. Dembiczak involved the

combination of a reference in the plastic trash bag art with

children's arts and crafts books that included, among

innumerable fanciful drawings, jack-o-lanterns. Contrary to

some interpretations, we stated explicitly that evidence of a

motivation to combine need not be found in the prior art

references themselves, but rather may be found in "the

knowledge of one of ordinary skill in the art, or, in some

cases, from the nature of the problem to be solved." 175 F.3d

at 999 (citation omitted). When not from the prior art

references, the "evidence" of motive will likely consist of an

explanation of the well-known principle or problem-solving

strategy to be applied. Our analysis in Dembiczak focused on

an explicit teaching in the prior art not because our case law

requires it, but because the Board had stated that "the [two

cited] references would have suggested the application of . . .

facial indicia to the prior art plastic trash bags." /d. at 1000

(emphasis added). We held the Board's obviousness

determination, legally_insufficient because, in addition to

failing to make Graham findings, the Board's analysis was

"limited to a discussion of the ways that the multiple prior art

references can be combined to read on the claimed

invention", "rather than pointing to specific information in

[the two references] that suggest the combination". /d On

appeal to this court, the Commissioner of Patents and

Trademarks attempted to defend the Board decision by

laying out, using the Graham factors, a clear—and likely

affirmable—rationale establishing the level of ordinary skill

and explaining the motivation to combine. Jd. at 1001. We

declined to consider these arguments, newly raised on

appeal, stating that they did "little more than highlight the

shortcomings of the decision below." /d.

App. 19

In Ruiz, as in Dembiczak, we vacated a conclusion of

obviousness because the factfinder failed to make Graham

factor findings. 234 F.3d at 660. Far from requiring evidence

of an explicit motivation to combine, we suggested in Ruiz

that there may have existed an implicit motivation to

combine, based on testimony that the invention was an

improvement over the prior art because it is “easy to install"

and "low cost". Jd. at 666. We explained that such

"fe]vidence which suggests that the combination of two

references would suggest the resulting improvement is one

way in which to determine a reason, suggestion, or

motivation to combine" and instructed the district court to

consider the evidence on remand. /d.

Likewise, a close reading of Jn re Lee reveals that our

objection was not to the Board's statement that "([t}he

conclusion of obviousness may be made from common

knowledge and common sense of a person of ordinary skill

in the art without any specific hint or suggestion in a

particular reference", but its utter failure to explain the

"common knowledge and common sense" on which it relied.

See 277 F.3d at 1341, 1344. Lee involved a patent combining

a prior art video game instruction handbook describing a

"demonstration mode" with a prior art television set having a

menu display allowing video and audio adjustments. The

Board, without comment, adopted the Examiner's Answer,

which merely stated that the combination of the two cited

references "would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill

in the art since the demonstration mode is just a

programmable feature which can be used in many different

devices for providing automatic introduction by adding the

proper programming software’ and that ‘another motivation

would be that the automatic demonstration mode is user

friendly and it functions as a tutorial." Jd. at 1341. We

explained that "[c]onclusory statements such as those here

App. 20

provided do not fulfill the agency's obligation" to explain all

material facts relating to a motivation to combine. Jd at

1344. In other words, we instructed the Board to explain why |

“common sense" of an ordinary artisan seeking to solve the

problem at hand would have led him to combine the

references. We noted that our predecessor court held more

than thirty years earlier that "common knowledge and

common sense" were sufficient to establish a motivation ‘>

combine, /n re Bozek, 416 F.2d 1385 (C.C.P.A. 1969° and

distinguished that case because, in Bozek, the examiner first

"established that this knowledge was in the art". Jd. at 1390.

We instructed that assumptions about common sense cannot

substitute for evidence thereof, as the Board attempted to do

in Lee. 277 F.3d at 1345;see also In re Zurko, 258 F.3d 1379,

1383, 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (reversing as unsupported by

Substantial evidence a finding of motivation to combine cited

references, where the Board adopted Examiner's unsupported

assertion that claim limitation missing from cited references

was "basic knowledge" and it "would have been nothing

more than good common sense" to combine the references,

and explaining that "[t]his assessment of basic knowledge

and common sense was not based on any evidence in the

record"); In re Rouffet, 149 F.3d 1350, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 1998)

(affirming finding of high level of ordinary skill and the

Board's explanation as to why cited reference implicitly

would suggest missing claim limitation to ordinary artisan,

but reversing its reliance on high level of ordinary skill as

basis of motivation to combine, and stating, "The Board did

not, however, explain what specific understanding or

technological principle within the knowledge of one of

ordinary skill in the art would have Suggested the

combination. Instead, the Board merely invoked the high

level of skill in the field of art. If such a rote invocation

could suffice to supply a motivation to combine, the more

sophisticated scientific fields would rarely, if ever,

experience a patentable technical advance.").

App. 21

It is difficult to see how our suggestion test could be

seen as rigid and categorical given the myriad cases over

several decades in which panels of this court have applied

the suggestion test flexibly. Obviousness is a complicated

subject requiring sophisticated analysis, and no single case

lays out all facets of the legal test. DyStar's argument and the

above-cited commentary highlight the danger inherent in

focusing on isolated dicta rather than gleaning the law of a

particular area from careful reading of the full text of a group

of related precedents for all they say that is dispositive and

for what they hold. When parties like Dystar do not engage

in such careful, candid, and complete legal analysis, ronuch

confusion about the law arises and, through time, can be

compounded.’

Our suggestion test is in actuality quite flexible and

not only permits, but requires, consideration of common

knowledge and common sense. See, e.g., In re Kotzab, 217

F.3d 1365, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2000) ("A critical step in

analyzing the patentability of claims pursuant to section

103(a) is casting the mind back to the time of invention, to

consider the thinking of one of ordinary skill in the art,

guided only by the prior art references and the then-accepted

3 Indeed, the United States Supreme Court recently granted certiorari in

a case involving this court's application of the suggestion test. KSR Int'l

Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 2006 U.S. LEXIS 4912 (June 26, 2006). In K.SR, we

vacated a district court's grant of summary judgment of invalidity for

obviousness. The district court found a motivation to combine not in the

references but "largely on the nature of the problem to be solved", which

we did not deem erroneous. Teleflex, Inc. v. KSR Int'l Co., 119 Fed.

App'x 282, 287 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (unpublished). Rather, we vacated

because the court did not explain sufficiently its rationale, and failed to

make “findings as to the specific understanding or principle within the

knowledge of a skilled artisan that would have motivated one with no

knowledge of [the] invention to make the combination in the manner

claimed." /d. at 288 (citation omitted). .

App. 22

wisdom in the field.”); Motorola, 121 F.3d at 1472 (“[T]he

suggestion to combine may come from the prior art, as

filtered through the knowledge of one skilled in the art.””);

Bozek, 416 F.2d at 1390 ("Having established that this

knowledge was in the art, the examiner could then properly

rely, as put forth by the solicitor, on a conclusion of

obviousness ‘from common knowledge and common sense of

the person of ordinary skill in the art without any specific

hint or suggestion in a particular reference."")

Indeed, we have repeatedly held that an implicit

motivation to combine exists not only when a suggestion

may be gleaned from the prior art as a whole, but when the

"improvement" is technology-independent and the

combination of references results in a product or process that

is more desirable, for example because it is stronger,

cheaper, cleaner, faster, lighter, smaller, more durable, or

more efficient. Because the desire to enhance commercial

opportunities by improving a product or process is

universal—and even common-sensical—we have held that

there exists in these situations a motivation to combine prior

art references even absent any hint of Suggestion in the

references themselves. In such situations, the proper question

is whether the ordinary artisan possesses knowledge and

skills rendering him capable of combining the prior art

references. |

in Pro-Mold & Tool Co., Inc. v. Great Lakes

Plastics, Inc., 75 F.3d 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1996), for example,

we analyzed asserted obviousness of a claimed invention of a

sports trading card holder only slightly larger than the

trading card. We stated that "[w]e start from the self-evident

proposition that mankind, in particular, inventors, strive to

improve that which already exists". Jd. at 1573. We required

no documentary evidence of motive. We explained that the

motivation to combine "a reference describing an elegant

App. 23

card holder and cover arrangement with a reference

describing a card holder no larger than necessary to enclose

the card . . . was thus evident from the very size of the card

itself." Id. at 1573. Because an ornamental card holder just

large enough to enclose the card would be more efficient,

there existed an implicit, indeed common-sensical,

motivation to combine the two references.

Similarly, in Sandt Tech., Ltd. v. Resco Metal &

Plastics Corp., 264 F.3d 1344, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001), we

held invalid for obviousness a patent claim for a stainless

steel cover for pay telephones. The only relevant difference

between the claimed invention and the prior art covers was

that the former attached the steel cover to the telephone via

studs and the latter attached it with welds. Jd. We noted that

the difference between attaching with welds and studs was

merely a "slight variation that produced convenience”. /d.

We found a clear motive to alter the prior art welded cover

simply because "[u]sing studs was a cheaper, faster, and

more convenient method of attachment", id., absent even a

hint of suggestion to combine.

In Mazzari v. Rogan, 323 F.3d 1000 (Fed. Cir. 2003),

we affirmed a district court grant of summary judgment of

invalidity for obviousness of a patent claiming the use of

underwater acoustic waves to kill zebra mussels. The Board

had upheld the rejection of an application based on two prior

art patents: an acoustic wave generator that enabled altering

wave intensity and focusing acoustic energy along a

particular angle, and a method of using water-borne acoustic

waves to kill zebra mussels. The Board held that a

motivation to combine the two references existed because an

ordinary artisan would have been aware of both references

4 We vacated the district court's grant of summary judgment of invalidity

for other reasons, finding genuine disputes of material fact on the issue of

commercial success. /d. at 1573.

App. 24

and that combination of the two was "more efficient". Jd at

1002-03. The inventor then brought a civil suit against the

Director of the PTO pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 145, and the

district court granted summary judgment in favor of the

Director. We deemed sufficient the Board's explanation of a

motivation to combine and affirmed "because the references

illustrate that it is well known in the art to use acoustic

energy to kill and repel zebra mussels." Jd. at 1006; see also

Ruiz, 234 F.3d at 666 (remanding for determination of

whether testimony that claimed invention was "easy to

install" and "low cost" established motivation to combine).

In situations where a motivation to combine is based

on these principles, the invention cannot be said to be

nonobvious. Our precedent on_ this point, moreover, is

consistent with the Supreme Court's holdings in Graham and

three other obviousness decisions pre-dating the

establishment of this court. See Sakraida v. AG Pro, Inc.,

425 U.S. 273, 282 (1976); Anderson's-Black Rock, Inc. v.

Pavement Salvage Co,. 396 U.S. 57 (1969); United States v.

Adams, 383 U.S. 39 (1966).

In Anderson's-Black Rock, the Supreme Court held

invalid for obviousness a patent covering (1) a radiant burner

for heating asphalt (2) attached to the front of a standard

asphalt-paving machine. Both elements were well-known in

the prior art individually, with the difference being that

previously, radiant-heat burners were not used in paving, but

merely for patching limited areas of asphalt. 396 U.S. at 58-

59. Because asphalt is usually laid sequentially in parallel

strips, the adjoining strip cools before the next strip is laid,

leading to what is known as a "cold joint"—an area of poor

bonding into which water and dirt enter, causing

deterioration. /d. at 57-58. By reheating the adjoining edge

of the earlier-laid strip as a new strip is laid, the invention

sought to eliminate the cold joint. No explicit suggestion to

App. 25

combine the prior art references would have been necessary

because the invention merely improved the efficiency of the

already-known’ process of laying pavement through the

already-known method of merging two sections of asphalt

through re-heating the earlier laid section—both of which

would have been common knowledge to ordinary artisans in

the field of laying asphalt. See also Graham, 383 U.S. at 24-

25 (holding invalid for obviousness Graham's patent

disclosing a spring clamp on a plow shank,.where claimed

invention merely improved mechanical weakness in prior

Graham patent, because ordinary artisan would have had

mechanical skills sufficient to "immediately see that the

thing to do was what Graham did"); id. at 36-37 (holding

invalid for obviousness Cook Chemical’s patent disclosing a

plastic finger sprayer with a "hold-down" lid serving as a

built-in dispenser for bottles of liquid products, where

differences from prior art were "exceedingly small and quite

nontechnical" and device was "old in the art").

Likewise, in Sakraida, the Suprerne Court held

invalid for obviousness a patent for a barn having "a paved,

sloped barn floor with downhill drains", "elevated" cow

stalls, and a "dam" behind which water may be stored and

abruptly released in order to "send a sheet of water cascading

through the dairy sweeping the manure to the downhill

drains." Ag Pro, Inc. v. Sakraida, 474 F.2d 167, 168 (Sth Cir.

1973) (quoting U.S. Patent No. 3,223,070), rev'd by 425 US.

273. Because the cleaning action from an uphill release of

water was superior to that from a hose, the claimed invention

reduced the quantity of water necessary to clean the barn

floor and obviated additional hand labor, e.g., brooms or

shovels, shortening the cleaning process from a few hours to

a few minutes. /d. The Supreme Court nonetheless negated

patent protection, characterizing the invention as “the work

of the skillful mechanic, not that of the inventor." Sakraida,

425 US. at 279 (internal quotation marks omitted). The

App. 26

Court aptly noted that "{e]xploitation of the principle of

gravity adds nothing to the sum of useful knowledge". Jd.

Under this court's case law, there would have been no need

for "evidence" of a motivation to combine a prior art

reference with a universally-known physical principle to

achieve more powerful and simultaneous sweep of water.

In Adams, a companion case to Graham, the Supreme

Court upheld the validity of a patent for a non-rechargeable

water-activated battery having magnesium and cuprous

chloride electrodes. Adams, 383 U.S. at 51. The Court

tecognized that “each of the elements of the Adams battery

was well known in the prior art", but rejected the United

States' obviousness argument because the prior art taught

away from the Adams patent's combination. As the Court

succinctly stated:

To combine [the references] as did Adams

required that a person reasonably skilled in

the prior art must ignore that (1) batteries

which continued to operate on an open

circuit and which heated in normal use were

not practical; and (2) water-activated

batteries were successful only when

combined with electrolytes detrimental to

the use of magnesium.

Id. at 51-52. The Court instructed that such "known

disadvantages in old devices . . . may be taken into account

in determining obviousness", id. at 52, and we have

incorporated this notion into our case law. See, e.g., Fulton,

391 F.3d at 1199-1200 (instructing the factfinder to

determine "[w]hat the prior art teaches, whether it teaches

away from the claimed invention, and whether it motivates a

combination of teachings from different references").

App. 27

Although this court customarily discusses 4

motivation to combine as part of the first Graham factor, the

scope and content of the prior art, see SIBIA Neurosciences,

925 F.3d at 1356, motivation to combine is also inextricably

linked to the level of ordinary skill. If, as is usually the case,

no prior art reference contains an express suggestion to

combine references, then the level of ordinary skill will often

predetermine whether an implicit suggestion exists. Persons

of varying degrees of skill not only possess varying bases of

knowledge, they also possess varying levels of imagination

and ingenuity in the relevant field, particularly with respect

to problem-solving abilities. If the level of skill is low, for

example that of a mere dyer, as DyStar has suggested, then it

may be rational to assume that such an artisan would not

think to combine references absent explicit direction in a

prior art reference. If, however, as we have held as a matter

of law, the level of skill is that of a dyeing process designer,

then one can assume comfortably that such an artisan will

draw ideas from chemistry and systems engineering—

without being told to do so.

A dyeing process designer would have been aware

that reducing leuco indigo in-house was time-consuming as

well as expensive and that it created much pollution on the

dyehouse floor and in public sewers. He would have known

that purchasing solid prereduced indigo would save time,

space, and money: dyers would no longer spend time

creating stock vats, and the dyehouse would require far less

hydrosulfite and caustic soda. A dyeing process designer

reading Chaumat would have learned that leuco indigo

solution "may be drawn off protected from the air and

preserved indefinitely in receptacles which are either

soldered or closed in any other hermetic manner." Chaumat,

11.84-87. From his chemistry background, he would have

known how to close off a receptacle hermetically. He would

have known that, if he could thus stabilize leuco indigo

App. 28

solution, he would save even more time, space, and money:

dyers would no longer need stock vats or preparation tanks

because they could simply pour the prereduced solution

directly into the dyebath itself, and they would no longer

need to purchase any hydrosulfite or caustic soda. A dyeing

process designer reading Brochet would have realized that

catalytic hydrogenation provided advantages over other

methods of indigo reduction in that the leuco indigo was

"free from impurities and mineral salts". Brochet, 1.90.

Naturally, then, an ordinary artisan with knowledge of

Chaumat, reading Brochet, would have realized that, by

stabilizing catalytic hydrogenated leuco indigo solution in

oxygen-excluding containers, he could devise a "cheaper,

faster, and more convenient" indigo dyeing process. See

Sandt, 264 F.3d at 1355. Although the '992 patent claimed a

new, more efficient, way of performing a known function,

dyeing indigo—the asserted innovation, storing leuco indigo

solution in airtight containers for immediate use in dyebaths,

is merely "exploitation" of the well-known principle of

vacuum packaging. See Sakraida, 425 U.S. at 279. In sum, it

is the work of a skilled chemist, not of an inventor.

J. Secondary Considerations of Nonobviousness

The presence of certain secondary considerations of

nonobviousness are insufficient as a matter of law to

overcome our conclusion that the evidence only supports a

legal conclusion that claim 1 would have been obvious. To

be sure, the jury heard testimony that DyStar has enjoyed

considerable commercial success from the introduction of its

product, and all parties agree that eighty years elapsed

between Brochet's invention and another inventor's thought

to vacuum-seal the Brochet solution and add it directly to the

dyebath. However, Mr. Schnitzer's testimony that BASF's

"people from production"—who we here assume arguendo

were dyeing process designers—believed that leuco indigo

App. 29

solution added directly to the dyebath might "stain the yarn

with indigo pigment" or "block{ ] pipes” was a bare assertion

that is not only undocumented and non-specific, but also

unsupported by even a brief explanation of the chemistry

underlying this assumption. As such, it does not constitute

substantial evidence of a secondary consideration favoring

nonobviousness.

Moreover, another secondary consideration cited by

DyStar—i.e., failed attempts—actually detracts from its

argument, and heavily so. DyStar points out that another

chemical company, Buffalo Color, abandoned a 1979 effort

to market a prereduced indigo solution made by hydrosulfite

reduction. The record shows, however, that Buffalo was only

mildly concerned with instability problems—it noted only

that the instability of leuco indigo "would require special

(and costly) shipping conditions to protect it from oxidation".

Rather, Buffalo decided against selling a leuco indigo

solution because it would involve increased shipping costs,

might require customers to invest in additional storage

facilities, and would cost more to produce, likely forcing it to

increase prices to customers. Buffalo's decision was thus not

a failed attempt, but a calculated business judgment to

abandon a potential new product fine.

C

Our inquiry does not end here, however, because we

must evaluate obviousness on a claim-by-claim basis. Dayco

Prods., Inc. v. Total Containment, Inc., 329 F.3d 1358, 1370

(Fed. Cir. 2003) ("[D]ependent or multiple dependent claims

shall be presumed valid even though dependent upon an

_ invalid claim.").

Claims 2-4 depend from process claim 1. Claim 2 requires

that the resulting solution contain from 10% to 35% by

App. 30

weight of leuco indigo; claim 3 requires that the solution

contain from 2% to 10% by weight of alkali: and claim 4

requires that the solution contain from 2% to 10% by weight

of sodium hydroxide. Dr. Blackburn, DyStar’s own expert

witness, confirmed that the plain language of Wimmer sets

forth a "30 percent aqueous solution of leuco indigo", which

falls within the range prescribed by claim 2. Dr. Blackburn

also testified that the solution disclosed by Wimmer contains

"5.1 percent" by weight of alkali—the claim language says

"at least six and a half percent", both of which fall between

2% and 10%, as required by claim 3. Likewise, Wimmer

indicates that his example solution uses "NaOH", sodium

hydroxide, and Mr. Schnitzer agreed with Bann's counsel's

assertion that the term "caustic" is "chemically the same

thing as sodium hydroxide", which meets the requirement of

claim 4. DyStar does not dispute these concessions on

appeal. Thus, given DyStar's testimony and the plain

language of Wimmer, claims 2-4 do not recite a nonobvious

invention beyond that recited in claim 1. Accordingly, claims

2-4 must also be held invalid for obviousness as a matter of

law.

In sum, because an ordinary artisan is a person

designing an optimal textile dyeing process with some

expertise in chemistry, the jury's implicit finding that the

level of ordinary skill in the art is a dyer is unsupported by

substantial evidence; its corresponding decision to disregard

the primary cited prior art as nonanalogous was also

erroneous. Under the correct level of ordinary skill, it would

have been obvious from Chaumat and Brochet. in view of

Wimmer and other references, to stabilize catalytically

hydrogenated leuco indigo solution through vacuum

conditions and to introduce the solution directly into the

dyebath.

Because all claims are held invalid for obviousness,

we need not address alleged anticipation of claim | or lack of

enablement as to claims 1-4. Likewise, whether the '992

patent is unenforceable due to inequitable conduct need not

be decided. Finally, we do not address the request for a new

trial as all asserted claims are held invalid as a matter of law

for obviousness. Accordingly, the trial court's denial of

JMOL that claims 1-4 of the '992 patent are invalid for

obviousness is reversed.

REVERSED.

App. 32

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

06-1088

DYSTAR TEXTILFARBEN GMBH & CO

DEUTSCHLAND KG,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

V.

C.H. PATRICK CO., and BANN QUIMICA LTDA,

Defendants-Appellants.

SCHALL, Circuit Judge. concurring.

I concur in the judgment of reversal. See Alza Corp.

v. Mylan Labs., Inc., No. 06-1088, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS

22616, at 4-7 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 6, 2006); In re Kahn, 441 F.3d

977, 987-88 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Cross Med. Prods.. Inc. v.

Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 424 F.3d 1293, 1322 (Fed.

Cir. 2005).

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

FEDERAL CIRCUIT

06-1088

DYSTAR TEXTILFARBEN GMBH & CO.

DEUTSCHLAND KG,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

C. H. PATRICK CO. INC., AND BANN QUIMICA, LTDA,

Defendants-Appellants.

ORDER

FILED Dec. 4, 2006

A combined petition for panel rehearing and for

rehearing en banc having been filed by the Appellee, and a

response thereto having been invited by the court and filed

by the Appellant, and the petition for rehearing and response,

having been referred to the panel that heard the appeal, and

thereafter the petition for rehearing en banc and response

having been referred to the circuit judges who are in regular

active service,

UPON CONSIDERATION THEREOF, it is

ORDERED that the petition for panel rehearing be,

and the same hereby is, DENIED and it is further

ORDERED that the rehearing en banc be, and the

same hereby is, DENIED.

: The mandate of the court will issue on December 11,

2006.

App. 34

Circuit Judge Moore did not participate in the vote.

Dated: 12/04/2006 FOR THE COURT,

/s/

Jan Horbaly, Clerk

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

UNITED STATES FOR THE

DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA

GREENVILLE DIVISION

DYSTAR TEXTILFARBEN GMBH)

& CO. DEUTSCHLAND KG, ) C.A. Action No.

Plaintiff, ) 6:02-2946

) ORDER

vs. )

)

C. H. PATRICK CO.INC.,AND )

BANN QUIMICA, LTDA, )

Defendants. )

This matter is before the court on the defendants’

motions for judgment as a matter of law or, alternatively, for

a new trial, on the issue of patent invalidity of U.S. Patent

No. 5,586,992 (“the ‘992 patent”). These motions are based

on: (1) anticipation of the *992 patent by U.S. Patent

1,247,927 under 35 U.S. C. §102; (2) obviousness of the

‘992 patent on four separate combinations of references

under 35 U.S.C. §103; and (3) lack of enablement under 35

U.S.C. §112.

The parties agreed to a trial by jury. The attorneys for

both sides diligently and ably presented their cases. The trial

itself involved issues of credibility, in particular the

testimony of expert witnesses as to the obviousness,

anticipation and validity of the patent. The jury diligently

considered the evidence presented and found for the plaintiff.

This court concludes that the jury’s verdict was reasonable

and was supported by evidence in the record. Therefore, as

this court has great respect for trial by jury and the right of

the parties to request a jury trial, this court will not substitute

App. 36

its findings for those of the jury as the jury’s decision was

clearly supported by the trial record and was reasonable.

Now, therefore, after reviewing the entire record,

including the defendants’ memorandum,

IT IS ORDERED that the defendants’ motions for judgment

as a matter of law or, alternatively, for a new trial, are

denied.

IT 1S SO ORDERED.

s/William M. Catoe

United States Magistrate Judge

November 1, 2005

Greenville, South Carolina

{N THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

UNITED STATES FOR THE

DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA

GREENVILLE DIVISION

DYSTAR TEXTILFARBEN GMBH)

& CO. DEUTSCHLAND KG, ) C.A. Action No.

Plaintiff, ) 6:02-2946-26

)

vs. ) VERDICT FORM

)

C.H. PATRICK CO. INC., AND _)

BANN QUIMICA, LTDA, )

Defendants. )

1. With respect to each claim, 1 through 4, of the ‘992

patent, indicate whether you find that DyStar KG has proven

by a preponderance of the evidence that Bann Quimica

and/or C.H. Patrick have infringed that claim?

Claim 1

X YES (if yes, answer with respect to all of

Claims 2, 3, and 4)

NO

X YES

NO

_X_ YES

X YES

NO

ONLY ANSWER QUESTION 2 IF YOU ANSWERED

“YES” TO ANY OF THE CLAIMS IN QUESTION 1.

IF YOU DID NOT ANSWER “YES” TO ANY OF THE

CLAIMS IN QUESTION 1, THEN GO TO QUESTION

3.

2. Do you find by clear and convincing evidence that Bann

Quimica willfuily infringed the ‘992 patent?

___ YES

ee

3. Do you find that Bann Quimica and C.H. Patrick have

proven by clear and convincing evidence that the ‘992

patent did not enable a person of ordinary skill in the art

in March 1993 to practice the process claimed in claim

1?

YES

_X_ NO

4. Do you find Bann Quimica and C.H. Patrick have proven

by clear and convincing evidence that the invention

claimed in claims | through 4 of the ‘992 patent was not

new in March 1993?

App. 39

YES

X NO

Claim 2

oe YES

X NO

Claim 3

_—s«s (ee

X NO

Claim 4

__—s—“<‘i'Y¥'#

X NO

5. Do you find that Bann Quimica and C.H. Patrick have

proven by clear and convincing evidence that the invention

claimed in claims 1 through 4 of the ‘992 patent would have

been obvious to a person having ordinary skill in the art in

March 1993?

Claim 1

Oe

X NO

Claim 2

_ VE

xX NO

App. 40

es ee

_X NO

Claim 4

YES

X NO

5. Ifyou find a claim of the ‘992 patent not invalid and

infringed, then what is the amount of damage you find

that DyStar KG suffered as a result of Bann and C.H.

Patrick’s patent infringement?

$ 90,000

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA

GREENVILLE DIVISION

DYSTAR TEXTILFARBEN GMBH & CO. )

)

Plaintiff,

6:02-2946

--versus--

CH PATRICK CO., INC., BANN

QUIMICA LTDA,

2005

)

)

)

) Sept. 15,

)

)

) Greenville, SC

)

Defendants.

VOLUME VI

TRANSCRIPT OF TRIAL BEFORE THE

HONORABLE WILLIAM M. CATOE

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE,

presiding

APPEARANCES:

For the Plaintiff: RONALD J. TRAYON, ESQ.

Parke Poe Adams & Bernstein

P.O. Box 1509

Columbia, SC 29202

WILLIAM T. ENOS, ESQ.

RICHARD D. KELLY, ESQ.

ANDREW K. BEVERINA, ESQ

Oblon, Spivak, McClelland

Maier & Neustadt

1940 Duke Street

Alexandria, VA 22314

App. 42

For the Defendant: NEIL C. JONES, ESQ.

A. MARVIN QUATTLEBAUM,

ESQ.

ASHLEY B. SUMMER, ESQ.

Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough

P.O. Box 10084

Greenville, SC 29603

Court Reporter: KAREN E. MARTIN, RMR, CRR

P.O. Box 10771

Greenville, SC 29603

The proceedings were taken by mechanical stenography and

the transcript produced by computer.

MR. JONES: Your Honor, I prefer not to have to read

mine all back into the record. May I renew all of our

motions we made?

THE COURT: All right. I will submit them to the

jury. Let’s go to the issue of willfulness. Do you want

willfulness as to both defendants?

App. 43

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA

GREENVILLE DIVISION

DYSTAR TEXTILFARBEN GMBH & CO. )

QUIMICA LTDA, |

Greenville, SC

)

Plaintiff, )

) 6:02-2946

--versus-- )

) Sept. 13,

CH PATRICK CO., INC., BANN ) 2005"

)

)

)

Defendants.

VOLUME IV

TRANSCRIPT OF TRIAL BEFORE THE

HONORABLE WILLIAM M. CATOE

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE, presiding

APPEARANCES:

For the Plaintiff: RONALD J. TRAYON, ESQ.

Parke Poe Adams & Bernstein

P.O. Box 1509

Columbia, SC 29202

WILLIAM T. ENOS, ESQ.

RICHARD D. KELLY, ESQ.

ANDREW K. BEVERINA, ESQ.

Oblon, Spivak, McClelland

Maier & Neustadt

1940 Duke Street

Alexandria, VA 22314

App. 44

For the Defendant: NEIL C. JONES, ESQ.

A. MARVIN QUATTLEBAUM, ESQ.

ASHLEY B. SUMMER, ESQ.

Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough

P.O. Box 10084

Greenville, SC 29603

Court Reporter: KAREN E. MARTIN, RMR, CRR

P.O. Box 10771

Greenville, SC 29603

MR. JONES: Your Honor, the defendants move for a

directed — for a judgment as a matter of law that the ‘992

Patent is invalid under Section 103 of the ‘992 — excuse me,

of 35 United States Code. Specifically, the defendants have

shown through the testimony and evidence presented through

plaintiff's witnesses that the Claims | through 4 of the

invention in those claims would have been obvious to one of

ordinary skill in the art at the time of invention. Therefore,

judgment as a matter of law is warranted.

THE COURT: Your motion is denied.

App. 45

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