Reply Brief — Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd. v. Pakoototas (No. 06-1188)
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>) FILED
MAY 15 2007
OFFICE OF THE CLERK
No. 06-1188 | SUPREME COURT, U.S._]
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
TECK COMINCO METALS, LTD.,
Petitioner,
Vv.
JOSEPH A. PAKOOTAS, DONALD R. MICHEL,
AND STATE OF WASHINGTON,
Respondents.
On Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari
To The United States Court Of Appeals
For The Ninth Circuit
REPLY BRIEF FOR PETITIONER
THOMAS A. CAMPBELL THEODORE B. OLSON
KEVIN M. FONG Counsel of Record
GERALD F. GEORGE RAYMOND B. LUDWISZEWSKI
PILLSBURY WINTHROP MARK A. PERRY
SHAW PITTMAN LLP MATTHEW D. MCGILL
50 Fremont Street GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP
San Francisco, CA 94105 1050 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.
(415) 983-1000 Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 955-8500
Counsel for Petitioner
RULE 29.6 STATEMENT
The corporate disclosure statement included in the peti-
tion for a writ of certiorari remains accurate.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co..,
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Am. Cyanamid Co. v. Capuano,
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Braxton v. United States, 500 U.S. 344 (1991)
Carson Harbor Vill., Lid. v. Unocal Corp.,
SFO FSG GOs (ORR CW. 2001). 0crccocecessorecnves
F. Hoffmann-LaRoche Lid. v. Empagran S.A.,
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Hartford Fire Ins. Co v. California,
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Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Ontario v.
EPA, 912 F.2d 1525 (D.C. Cir. 1990)........
Lebron v. Nat. R.R. Passenger Corp.,
Pe Se ee P iierobiccncsinncedecinntivavenses
Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007)
Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp.,
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Ohio v. Wyandotte Chem. Corp.,
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Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197 (1993)...
Steele v. Bulova Watch Co..,
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Page(s)
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Statutes
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Other Authorities
United States-Canadian Negotiations on Air
Quality, Pub. L. No. 95-426, 92 Stat. 990
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REPLY BRIEF FOR PETITIONER
At the core of this case is the question whether Congress
intended CERCLA to apply to and sanction acts of trans-
boundary pollution. Particularly in the wake of this Court’s
recent ruling that greenhouse gases are “air pollutants,” Mas-
sachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1460 (2007), that ques-
tion is undeniably and exceptionally important. By extend-
ing CERCLA’s “responsible party” status—for the first
time—to an entity that disposed of waste outside the United
States, the decision below: (1) threatens to upset a long-
standing tradition of resolving disputes over transboundary
pollution diplomatically rather than judicially; (2) disregards
this Court’s decisions establishing the presumption against
extraterritorial application of U.S. law; and (3) adopts a con-
struction of CERCLA that directly conflicts with other fed-
eral appellate decisions. Each of these untoward results is a
sufficient basis for a grant of certiorari.
1. Respondents are quick to dismiss the United States’
and Canada’s long history of resolving issues of transbound-
ary pollution through nation-to-nation negotiations and coop-
eration. Indeed, respondents reduce the cornerstone of this
extensive diplomatic practice, the 1909 Boundary Waters
Treaty, to little more than a historical curiosity. Respondents
suggest that CERCLA has “render[ed] the treaty null,” Br. in
Opp. of Washington 21 n.18, or, at least, “literally beside the
point.” Br. in Opp. of Pakootas 17.
The demise of the Boundary Waters Treaty no doubt
comes as a Surprise to at least one of the treaty’s two signa-
tory nations, see Br. of Amicus Curiae Canada 7 (arguing
that the Boundary Waters Treaty “plainly applies in this
case”), and to the Province of British Columbia, which has
entered into several similar environmental cooperation
agreements with neighboring States, see Br. of Amicus Cu-
2
riae British Columbia 13-14.! Respondents nevertheless
deny that the decision below signals any dramatic shift from
how transboundary pollution issues historically have been
resolved, suggesting that “litigation has often been a means
for addressing transboundary pollution between the United
States and Canada.” Br. in Opp. of Washington 20. That
parties may have resorted on occasion to litigation to address
sundry transboundary pollution problems, however, is—to
use respondents’ words—“literally beside the point.” The
question is not, as respondents frame it, whether the Bound-
ary Water Treaty “[p]reclude[s]” the application of U.S. envi-
ronmental laws. Br. in Opp. of Washington 18. It does not.
The question presented, instead, is whether, given the long
tradition of resolving transboundary pollution problems
through diplomatic channels, CERCLA ought to be inter-
preted to include within “responsible parties” those whose
disposal activities occur only outside the United States.
To the extent the authorities cited by respondents shed
any light at all on that question, they tend to bolster, rather
than undermine, the proposition that environmental laws
should be stretched to reach transboundary pollution prob-
lems, if at all, only at the specific direction of Congress. For
example, in Ohio v. Wyandotte Chemicals Corporation, 401
U.S. 493 (1971), this Court declined to exercise jurisdiction
over a State-law nuisance abatement suit brought by the State
of Ohio against out-of-state entities, including one Canadian
corporation. /d. at 494-95. The Court pointed to the “sense
of futility that has accompanied this Court’s attempts to treat
with the complex technical and political matters that inhere
in all disputes of the kind at hand.” /d. at 502. Noting that
“many competent adjudicatory and conciliatory bodies are
actively grappling with [the problem] on a more practical ba-
{Just two years before CERCLA’s enactment, Congress recognized “a
tradition of cooperative resolution of issues of mutual concern .. . in the
environmental area.” United States-Canadian Negotiations on Air Qual-
ity, Pub. L. No. 95-426, 92 Stat. 963, 990 (1978).
3
sis,” this Court declined to “commit [its] resources to the task
of trying to settle a small piece of a much larger problem.”
Id. at 503. When, on the other hand, courts have entertained
litigation over transboundary pollution issues, it typically has
been at the specific direction of Congress. See, e.g., Her
Majesty the Queen in Right of Ontario v. EPA, 912 F.2d
1525 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (addressing Ontario’s claim under
Section 115(c) of the Clean Air Act, which requires EPA to
take action when air pollutants may potentially cause injury
in a foreign country).
2. Respondents contend that the well-established pre-
sumption against extraterritorial application of U.S. law has
no application here because (a) the Ninth Circuit’s applica-
tion of CERCLA to Teck Cominco is purely domestic, and
(b) the presumption does not apply where U.S. law addresses
the domestic effects of foreign conduct. Both contentions are
deeply flawed.
a. The private respondents maintain that “CERCLA li-
ability is triggered not by any ‘conduct’ with respect to haz-
ardous substances but by the ‘release’ of those substances
into the ‘environment.’” Br. in Opp. of Pakootas 10. Indeed,
in respondents’ view, under “CERCLA’s sweeping, strict
liability scheme,” “‘[c]onduct’” is not “even necessary to
impose liability under CERCLA.” /d. at 9, 10 (emphasis
added). Respondents contend that because the CERCLA “‘fa-
cility” and “release” are in the United States, and Teck
Cominco’s conduct in Canada is irrelevant to its CERCLA
liability, the Ninth Circuit applied CERCLA only domesti-
cally.
99°
The key premise of respondents’ “domestic application”
argument—that conduct is completely irrelevant to CERCLA
liability—is flatly contradicted by the text of the statute.
Contrary to respondents’ characterization of CERCLA, that
statute does not simply impose liability in the abstract when-
ever there is a “release.” CERCLA instead focuses on “cov-
ered persons,” 42 U.S.C. § 9607, imposing liability only on
4
those who “own[ ]” or “operate[ }” CERCLA facilities, and
those who “arrange[ | for disposal” of or otherwise “trans-
port” hazardous waste. /d. § 9607(a). Without that con-
duct—owning, operating, arranging, or transporting—there
can be no CERCLA liability. The release thus is a necessary
but not a sufficient precondition to CERCLA liability; there
must be conduct that converts one into a “covered person.”
Under the arranger liability provision, 42 U.S.C.
§ 9607(a)(3), there must be disposal by arrangement.
Here, it cannot be seriously disputed that the “disposal”
activities took place entirely within Canada. See, e.g., Br. in
Opp. of Pakootas 8 (acknowledging petitioner’s “discharge
of hazardous substances into the river in Canada”); see also
Pet. App. 107a, 115a (operative complaints alleging that the
waste was “carried downstream into waters of the United
States”). That was the factual predicate for the Unilateral
Administrative Order (“UAO”) underlying respondents’
claims, see Pet. App. 72a (“Effluent, such as slag, was dis-
charged into the Columbia River through several outfalls at
the Trail Smelter”), and for both decisions below, Pet. App.
16a, Sla.?
Undaunted by the decisions below or even their own
pleadings, the private respondents advance the novel conten-
tion that Teck Cominco’s “act of ‘disposal’ continued” after
the initial discharge in Canada “until the contaminants came
2 The private respondents assert that Teck Cominco has never before
argued that its disposal activities “occurred exclusively in Canada.” Br.
in Opp. of Pakootas 12. That assertion is absolutely false. See, e.g., Teck
Cominco’s Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss at 30 (“The only activity
alleged as giving rise to TC Metals’ liability took place through the al-
leged disposal of metal-bearing slag into the Columbia River. That activ-
ity occurred exclusively in Canada.”). Indeed, in unsuccessfully oppos-
ing Teck Cominco’s petition for permission to appeal under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292(b), respondents themselves observed that Teck Cominco’s motion
to dismiss was predicated on the fact that the “slag it discharged into the
Columbia River w[as] discharged in Canada.” Resp. C.A. Answer to Pet.
for Permission to Appeal at 5.
5
to rest... in the United States.” Br. in Opp. of Pakootas 13.
But, as shown above, respondents’ newly-minted legal theory
was not the factual predicate for the UAO, respondents’ op-
erative complaints, or the decisions below. And with good
reason: At the time of the issuance of the UAO, binding
Ninth Circuit authority made absolutely clear that
CERCLA’s definition of “disposal” does not include passive
migration of hazardous substances. See Carson Harbor Vill.,
Ltd. v. Unocal Corp., 270 F.3d 863, 879 (9th Cir. 2001)
(terms defining disposal “generally connote active conduct”).
It is thus unsurprising that, in the courts below, while both
respondents argued that Teck Cominco had caused a
CERCLA “release” from a “facility” in the United States,
neither respondent even remotely suggested that Teck
Cominco had disposed of waste anywhere other than in Can-
ada. See, e.g., Pakootas C.A. Br. 11 (Teck Cominco “dis-
charged hazardous substances into the river in British Co-
lumbia”’).
b. Respondents further contend that the presumption
against extraterritoriality has no effect on CERCLA because
the presumption does not apply when a statute seeks to reme-
diate domestic harms. Br. in Opp. of Pakootas 20. But this
Court has never adopted so limited a view of the presumption
against extraterritoriality, and, indeed, has very recently re-
jected it.
In Microsoft Corporation v. AT&T Corp., 127 S. Ct.
1746 (2007), this Court applied the presumption against ex-
traterritoriality in interpreting 35 U.S.C. § 271(f), which
makes it an act of infringement to export the components of a
patented invention for assembly abroad. The statute had
been enacted to provide patent holders a remedy against for-
eign acts of infringement of their U.S.-issued intellectual
property. Even though the statute sought to redress domestic
injuries caused by foreign acts, the Court nevertheless found
applicable “(t]he presumption that United States law governs
domestically but does not rule the world.” Microsoft, 127
6
S. Ct. at 1758. Indeed, in the rare instances where this Court
has found that “domestic effects” precluded the application
of the presumption against extraterritoriality, “it has done so
because it concluded that there existed an affirmative con-
gressional decision to allow such extraterritorial application.”
Br. of Amicus Curiae Chamber of Commerce of the United
States 5 (citing Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S.
764, 796 & n.22 (1993), and Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344
U.S. 280, 285, 287 (1952)).
In a similar vein, respondents suggest that the presump-
tion is limited to circumstances where there exists a “clash of
laws” of separate sovereigns. See Br. in Opp. of Washington
23; Br. in Opp. of Pakootas 18. The private respondents go
so far as to suggest that Justice Holmes’s admonition in
American Banana Company v. United Fruit Company, 213
U.S. 347 (1909), that the presumption applies to avoid “inter-
ference with the authority of another sovereign,” id. at 356,
“has been repudiated” by this Court’s subsequent cases. Br.
in Opp. of Pakootas 19 (emphasis added). This, of course, is
not the case. Far from repudiating Justice Holmes’s view of
the presumption, in F. Hoffmann-LaRoche Ltd. v. Empagran
S.A., 542 U.S. 155 (2004), this Court confirmed that it ap-
plies to “avoid unreasonable interference with the sovereign
authority of other nations.” Jd. at 164.5
Here, there can be no doubt that the Ninth Circuit’s im-
position of CERCLA liability on Teck Cominco interferes
with the sovereign authority of Canada and the Province of
British Columbia. Canada has repeatedly expressed its grow-
ing dismay at EPA’s attempts to regulate Canadian conduct,
3 The State of Washington concedes as much. Br. in Opp. of Wash-
ington 26 (“The proposition is true”). And rightly so, for if this were not
the case, this Court’s application of the presumption to the question
whether the Federal Tort Claims Act encompassed torts committed in
Antarctica would be nonsensical; there is no law of Antarctica with which
U.S. law could directly conflict. Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197,
198, 203-04 (1993).
sending a diplomatic note to the State Department protesting
the issuance of the UAO, Pet. App. 100a-101a, and now, in
this Court, stating that “the Ninth Circuit’s decision neverthe-
less subjects Canadian companies, such as Petitioner, to con-
flicting regulatory schemes and infringes Canada’s strong
sovereign interest in regulating its own corporate citizens.”
Br. of Amicus Curiae Canada 12. British Columbia echoes
the sentiment, observing that “[t]here is nothing in the Court
of Appeals’ opinion that would preclude the application of
American law to thousands of other entities whose activities
take place entirely within British Columbia and are subject to
provincial regulation.” Br. of Amicus Curiae British Colum-
bia 17. The Ninth Circuit thus departed radically from this
Court’s cases in failing to apply the presumption against ex-
traterritorial application of U.S. law.4
The presumption against extraterritoriality commands
reversal of the decision below. This Court has explained that
a court “must accept” any “reasonably permi{ssible]” reading
4 Respondents persistently suggest that EPA’s issuance of the UAO
demonstrates that the President shares their disregard for the sovereign
interests of Canada and British Columbia. But the Executive’s decision
to take no action to enforce the UAO, and the subsequent decision to
withdraw it, Pet. App. 120a, at least raise the question whether the Presi-
dent came to believe that EPA’s initial issuance of the UAO was in error.
The Court can resolve that question easily enough by calling for the
views of the Solicitor General. The Solicitor General recently filed a
brief stressing the President’s authority to “promote the effective conduct
of foreign relations, and underscore the United States’ commitment in the
international community to the rule of law” Br. for the United States as
Amicus Curiae, Medellin v. Texas, No. 06-984, at 8; see also id. at 10
(the President has a “unique role in foreign affairs,” and exercises “tradi-
tional authority in judicial proceedings implicating international law”); id.
at 12 (The “President is uniquely positioned both to evaluate and resolve
sensitive foreign policy issues and to act with dispatch”). The Solicitor
General also contended that a judicial decision “effectively frustrating
efforts to comply with international treaty obligations clearly warrants
this Court’s review.” /d. at 8-9. The Court granted review in Medellin.
75 USLW 3398 (Apr. 30, 2007). Review is also warranted in this case.
8
of the statutory language that will avoid the extraterritorial
application of U.S. law. Empagran, 542 U.S. at 174. In the
petition, Teck Cominco explained that Section 9607(a)(3)
must be read in conjunction with Section 9607(a)(4) and that,
accordingly, CERCLA’s arranger liability provision requires
that the disposal occur at the same facility from which there
is arelease. Pet. 18-21. Respondents have no answer what-
soever to that argument other than to complain they have not
before heard it articulated in precisely that fashion. Br. in
Opp. of Pakootas 11; Br. in Opp. of Washington 14-15. But
from the outset of the litigation, Teck Cominco has argued
that it cannot be held liable as an arranger, see Mot. to Dis-
miss 29-31, and it is axiomatic that a litigant in this Court is
not estopped from advancing “a new argument to support
what has been his consistent claim.” Lebron v. Nat. R.R.
Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 379 (1995). Respondents’
absence of substantive argument fairly indicates the material-
ity of the Ninth Circuit’s break from this Court’s decisions.
3. Respondents do not dispute that the First Circuit and
the Ninth Circuit examined the same statutory language in
Section 9607(a)(3)—“by any other party or entity”’—and
reached diametrically opposed interpretations. In American
Cyanamid Company v. Capuano, 381 F.3d 6 (1st Cir. 2004),
the First Circuit interpreted “by any other party or entity” as
modifying the phrase “disposal or treatmeni,” rather than
“owned or possessed,” id. at 24, while the decision below
rejected that construction and inserted an “or” into the statu-
tory text so that “by any other party or entity” might modify
“owned or possessed” instead of “disposal or treatment.”
Pet. App. 24a. As a result of those binding and conflicting
interpretations, in the First Circuit, a responsible “arranger”
must both “own{ ] or possess[ |” the waste and arrange with
some “other party or entity,” see Am. Cyanamid, 381\ F.3d at
24, while in the Ninth Circuit, one may be held liable as an
arranger whether or not he “owned or possessed’ the waste
9
and whether or not he arranged with any “other party or en-
tity.” Pet. App. 28a.
Respondents nevertheless contend that there is no circuit
split as to the meaning of “by any other party or entity” for
this Court to address. Respondents suggest that American
Cyanamid was concerned only with whether the defendant
“owned or possessed” the waste, and that its statement that,
“for arranger liability to attach, the disposal or treatment
must be performed by another party or entity” is dictum.
381 F.3d at 24 (emphasis added). See Br. in Opp. of Pa-
kootas 26-27; Br. in Opp. of Washington 12. But as the First
Circuit recognized, under CERCLA’s arranger provision, the
questions whether an “arranger” must arrange with another
party or entity, and whether an arranger must own or possess
the waste, are two sides of the same coin. The two questions
together turn on the construction of the phrase “by any other
party or entity.”
If, as the First Circuit held, the phrase modifies “disposal
or treatment,” tt follows both that an arranger must arrange
with a third party and that an arranger must own or possess
the waste. Contrariwise, if, as the decision below holds, “by
any other party or entity” expands disjunctively the preceding
clause (the statute’s omission of the critical “or” notwith-
standing) it follows both that an “arranger” may arrange only
with itself and that an arranger need not ever own or possess
the waste. That, in both cases, only one result of the statu-
tory construction was outcome-determinative does not trans-
form the other result into an insignificant dictum. The twin
results are inextricably linked to the single statutory construc-
tion giving rise to each. Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit’s
construction of “by any other party or entity” and its conclu-
sion that arrangers need not arrange with “any other party or
entity” conflict intractably with the First Circuit’s opposing
construction of the same phrase and the conclusion that fol-
lows ineluctably from that construction that the disposal
10
“must be performed by another party or entity.” Am. Cy-
anamid, 381 F.3d at 24.
The result of the diametrically opposed interpretations of
CERCLA Section 9607(a)(3) is to subject entities in the First
Circuit to a different liability scheme than entities located (or
sued) in the Ninth Circuit. “(T]he conflict created by the de-
cision below will directly affect companies and industries
that operate-in multiple states [and] ... who now face vary-
ing rules and potentially different outcomes with respect to a
crucial liability determination.” Br. for Amici Curiae Nat’|
Mining Ass’n ef al. 20. Restoring uniformity as to this im-
portant provision of federal law is a paradigmatic ground for
the exercise of certiorari jurisdiction. See Braxton v. United
States, 500 U.S. 344, 347-48 (1991).
CONCLUSION
The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.
Respectfully submitted.
THOMAS A. CAMPBELL THEODORE B. OLSON
KEVIN M. FONG Counsel of Record
GERALD F. GEORGE RAYMOND B. LUDWISZEWSKI
PILLSBURY WINTHROP MARK A. PERRY
SHAW PITTMAN LLP MATTHEW D. MCGILL
50 Fremont Street GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP
San Francisco, CA 94105 1050 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.
(415) 983-1000 Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 955-8500
Counsel for Petitioner
May 15, 2007
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