Reply Brief — Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd. v. Pakoototas (No. 06-1188)

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>) FILED

MAY 15 2007

OFFICE OF THE CLERK

No. 06-1188 | SUPREME COURT, U.S._]

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

TECK COMINCO METALS, LTD.,

Petitioner,

Vv.

JOSEPH A. PAKOOTAS, DONALD R. MICHEL,

AND STATE OF WASHINGTON,

Respondents.

On Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari

To The United States Court Of Appeals

For The Ninth Circuit

REPLY BRIEF FOR PETITIONER

THOMAS A. CAMPBELL THEODORE B. OLSON

KEVIN M. FONG Counsel of Record

GERALD F. GEORGE RAYMOND B. LUDWISZEWSKI

PILLSBURY WINTHROP MARK A. PERRY

SHAW PITTMAN LLP MATTHEW D. MCGILL

50 Fremont Street GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP

San Francisco, CA 94105 1050 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.

(415) 983-1000 Washington, D.C. 20036

(202) 955-8500

Counsel for Petitioner

RULE 29.6 STATEMENT

The corporate disclosure statement included in the peti-

tion for a writ of certiorari remains accurate.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

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Am. Cyanamid Co. v. Capuano,

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Braxton v. United States, 500 U.S. 344 (1991)

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F. Hoffmann-LaRoche Lid. v. Empagran S.A.,

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Lebron v. Nat. R.R. Passenger Corp.,

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Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007)

Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp.,

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Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197 (1993)...

Steele v. Bulova Watch Co..,

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Statutes

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Other Authorities

United States-Canadian Negotiations on Air

Quality, Pub. L. No. 95-426, 92 Stat. 990

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REPLY BRIEF FOR PETITIONER

At the core of this case is the question whether Congress

intended CERCLA to apply to and sanction acts of trans-

boundary pollution. Particularly in the wake of this Court’s

recent ruling that greenhouse gases are “air pollutants,” Mas-

sachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1460 (2007), that ques-

tion is undeniably and exceptionally important. By extend-

ing CERCLA’s “responsible party” status—for the first

time—to an entity that disposed of waste outside the United

States, the decision below: (1) threatens to upset a long-

standing tradition of resolving disputes over transboundary

pollution diplomatically rather than judicially; (2) disregards

this Court’s decisions establishing the presumption against

extraterritorial application of U.S. law; and (3) adopts a con-

struction of CERCLA that directly conflicts with other fed-

eral appellate decisions. Each of these untoward results is a

sufficient basis for a grant of certiorari.

1. Respondents are quick to dismiss the United States’

and Canada’s long history of resolving issues of transbound-

ary pollution through nation-to-nation negotiations and coop-

eration. Indeed, respondents reduce the cornerstone of this

extensive diplomatic practice, the 1909 Boundary Waters

Treaty, to little more than a historical curiosity. Respondents

suggest that CERCLA has “render[ed] the treaty null,” Br. in

Opp. of Washington 21 n.18, or, at least, “literally beside the

point.” Br. in Opp. of Pakootas 17.

The demise of the Boundary Waters Treaty no doubt

comes as a Surprise to at least one of the treaty’s two signa-

tory nations, see Br. of Amicus Curiae Canada 7 (arguing

that the Boundary Waters Treaty “plainly applies in this

case”), and to the Province of British Columbia, which has

entered into several similar environmental cooperation

agreements with neighboring States, see Br. of Amicus Cu-

2

riae British Columbia 13-14.! Respondents nevertheless

deny that the decision below signals any dramatic shift from

how transboundary pollution issues historically have been

resolved, suggesting that “litigation has often been a means

for addressing transboundary pollution between the United

States and Canada.” Br. in Opp. of Washington 20. That

parties may have resorted on occasion to litigation to address

sundry transboundary pollution problems, however, is—to

use respondents’ words—“literally beside the point.” The

question is not, as respondents frame it, whether the Bound-

ary Water Treaty “[p]reclude[s]” the application of U.S. envi-

ronmental laws. Br. in Opp. of Washington 18. It does not.

The question presented, instead, is whether, given the long

tradition of resolving transboundary pollution problems

through diplomatic channels, CERCLA ought to be inter-

preted to include within “responsible parties” those whose

disposal activities occur only outside the United States.

To the extent the authorities cited by respondents shed

any light at all on that question, they tend to bolster, rather

than undermine, the proposition that environmental laws

should be stretched to reach transboundary pollution prob-

lems, if at all, only at the specific direction of Congress. For

example, in Ohio v. Wyandotte Chemicals Corporation, 401

U.S. 493 (1971), this Court declined to exercise jurisdiction

over a State-law nuisance abatement suit brought by the State

of Ohio against out-of-state entities, including one Canadian

corporation. /d. at 494-95. The Court pointed to the “sense

of futility that has accompanied this Court’s attempts to treat

with the complex technical and political matters that inhere

in all disputes of the kind at hand.” /d. at 502. Noting that

“many competent adjudicatory and conciliatory bodies are

actively grappling with [the problem] on a more practical ba-

{Just two years before CERCLA’s enactment, Congress recognized “a

tradition of cooperative resolution of issues of mutual concern .. . in the

environmental area.” United States-Canadian Negotiations on Air Qual-

ity, Pub. L. No. 95-426, 92 Stat. 963, 990 (1978).

3

sis,” this Court declined to “commit [its] resources to the task

of trying to settle a small piece of a much larger problem.”

Id. at 503. When, on the other hand, courts have entertained

litigation over transboundary pollution issues, it typically has

been at the specific direction of Congress. See, e.g., Her

Majesty the Queen in Right of Ontario v. EPA, 912 F.2d

1525 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (addressing Ontario’s claim under

Section 115(c) of the Clean Air Act, which requires EPA to

take action when air pollutants may potentially cause injury

in a foreign country).

2. Respondents contend that the well-established pre-

sumption against extraterritorial application of U.S. law has

no application here because (a) the Ninth Circuit’s applica-

tion of CERCLA to Teck Cominco is purely domestic, and

(b) the presumption does not apply where U.S. law addresses

the domestic effects of foreign conduct. Both contentions are

deeply flawed.

a. The private respondents maintain that “CERCLA li-

ability is triggered not by any ‘conduct’ with respect to haz-

ardous substances but by the ‘release’ of those substances

into the ‘environment.’” Br. in Opp. of Pakootas 10. Indeed,

in respondents’ view, under “CERCLA’s sweeping, strict

liability scheme,” “‘[c]onduct’” is not “even necessary to

impose liability under CERCLA.” /d. at 9, 10 (emphasis

added). Respondents contend that because the CERCLA “‘fa-

cility” and “release” are in the United States, and Teck

Cominco’s conduct in Canada is irrelevant to its CERCLA

liability, the Ninth Circuit applied CERCLA only domesti-

cally.

99°

The key premise of respondents’ “domestic application”

argument—that conduct is completely irrelevant to CERCLA

liability—is flatly contradicted by the text of the statute.

Contrary to respondents’ characterization of CERCLA, that

statute does not simply impose liability in the abstract when-

ever there is a “release.” CERCLA instead focuses on “cov-

ered persons,” 42 U.S.C. § 9607, imposing liability only on

4

those who “own[ ]” or “operate[ }” CERCLA facilities, and

those who “arrange[ | for disposal” of or otherwise “trans-

port” hazardous waste. /d. § 9607(a). Without that con-

duct—owning, operating, arranging, or transporting—there

can be no CERCLA liability. The release thus is a necessary

but not a sufficient precondition to CERCLA liability; there

must be conduct that converts one into a “covered person.”

Under the arranger liability provision, 42 U.S.C.

§ 9607(a)(3), there must be disposal by arrangement.

Here, it cannot be seriously disputed that the “disposal”

activities took place entirely within Canada. See, e.g., Br. in

Opp. of Pakootas 8 (acknowledging petitioner’s “discharge

of hazardous substances into the river in Canada”); see also

Pet. App. 107a, 115a (operative complaints alleging that the

waste was “carried downstream into waters of the United

States”). That was the factual predicate for the Unilateral

Administrative Order (“UAO”) underlying respondents’

claims, see Pet. App. 72a (“Effluent, such as slag, was dis-

charged into the Columbia River through several outfalls at

the Trail Smelter”), and for both decisions below, Pet. App.

16a, Sla.?

Undaunted by the decisions below or even their own

pleadings, the private respondents advance the novel conten-

tion that Teck Cominco’s “act of ‘disposal’ continued” after

the initial discharge in Canada “until the contaminants came

2 The private respondents assert that Teck Cominco has never before

argued that its disposal activities “occurred exclusively in Canada.” Br.

in Opp. of Pakootas 12. That assertion is absolutely false. See, e.g., Teck

Cominco’s Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss at 30 (“The only activity

alleged as giving rise to TC Metals’ liability took place through the al-

leged disposal of metal-bearing slag into the Columbia River. That activ-

ity occurred exclusively in Canada.”). Indeed, in unsuccessfully oppos-

ing Teck Cominco’s petition for permission to appeal under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1292(b), respondents themselves observed that Teck Cominco’s motion

to dismiss was predicated on the fact that the “slag it discharged into the

Columbia River w[as] discharged in Canada.” Resp. C.A. Answer to Pet.

for Permission to Appeal at 5.

5

to rest... in the United States.” Br. in Opp. of Pakootas 13.

But, as shown above, respondents’ newly-minted legal theory

was not the factual predicate for the UAO, respondents’ op-

erative complaints, or the decisions below. And with good

reason: At the time of the issuance of the UAO, binding

Ninth Circuit authority made absolutely clear that

CERCLA’s definition of “disposal” does not include passive

migration of hazardous substances. See Carson Harbor Vill.,

Ltd. v. Unocal Corp., 270 F.3d 863, 879 (9th Cir. 2001)

(terms defining disposal “generally connote active conduct”).

It is thus unsurprising that, in the courts below, while both

respondents argued that Teck Cominco had caused a

CERCLA “release” from a “facility” in the United States,

neither respondent even remotely suggested that Teck

Cominco had disposed of waste anywhere other than in Can-

ada. See, e.g., Pakootas C.A. Br. 11 (Teck Cominco “dis-

charged hazardous substances into the river in British Co-

lumbia”’).

b. Respondents further contend that the presumption

against extraterritoriality has no effect on CERCLA because

the presumption does not apply when a statute seeks to reme-

diate domestic harms. Br. in Opp. of Pakootas 20. But this

Court has never adopted so limited a view of the presumption

against extraterritoriality, and, indeed, has very recently re-

jected it.

In Microsoft Corporation v. AT&T Corp., 127 S. Ct.

1746 (2007), this Court applied the presumption against ex-

traterritoriality in interpreting 35 U.S.C. § 271(f), which

makes it an act of infringement to export the components of a

patented invention for assembly abroad. The statute had

been enacted to provide patent holders a remedy against for-

eign acts of infringement of their U.S.-issued intellectual

property. Even though the statute sought to redress domestic

injuries caused by foreign acts, the Court nevertheless found

applicable “(t]he presumption that United States law governs

domestically but does not rule the world.” Microsoft, 127

6

S. Ct. at 1758. Indeed, in the rare instances where this Court

has found that “domestic effects” precluded the application

of the presumption against extraterritoriality, “it has done so

because it concluded that there existed an affirmative con-

gressional decision to allow such extraterritorial application.”

Br. of Amicus Curiae Chamber of Commerce of the United

States 5 (citing Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S.

764, 796 & n.22 (1993), and Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344

U.S. 280, 285, 287 (1952)).

In a similar vein, respondents suggest that the presump-

tion is limited to circumstances where there exists a “clash of

laws” of separate sovereigns. See Br. in Opp. of Washington

23; Br. in Opp. of Pakootas 18. The private respondents go

so far as to suggest that Justice Holmes’s admonition in

American Banana Company v. United Fruit Company, 213

U.S. 347 (1909), that the presumption applies to avoid “inter-

ference with the authority of another sovereign,” id. at 356,

“has been repudiated” by this Court’s subsequent cases. Br.

in Opp. of Pakootas 19 (emphasis added). This, of course, is

not the case. Far from repudiating Justice Holmes’s view of

the presumption, in F. Hoffmann-LaRoche Ltd. v. Empagran

S.A., 542 U.S. 155 (2004), this Court confirmed that it ap-

plies to “avoid unreasonable interference with the sovereign

authority of other nations.” Jd. at 164.5

Here, there can be no doubt that the Ninth Circuit’s im-

position of CERCLA liability on Teck Cominco interferes

with the sovereign authority of Canada and the Province of

British Columbia. Canada has repeatedly expressed its grow-

ing dismay at EPA’s attempts to regulate Canadian conduct,

3 The State of Washington concedes as much. Br. in Opp. of Wash-

ington 26 (“The proposition is true”). And rightly so, for if this were not

the case, this Court’s application of the presumption to the question

whether the Federal Tort Claims Act encompassed torts committed in

Antarctica would be nonsensical; there is no law of Antarctica with which

U.S. law could directly conflict. Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197,

198, 203-04 (1993).

sending a diplomatic note to the State Department protesting

the issuance of the UAO, Pet. App. 100a-101a, and now, in

this Court, stating that “the Ninth Circuit’s decision neverthe-

less subjects Canadian companies, such as Petitioner, to con-

flicting regulatory schemes and infringes Canada’s strong

sovereign interest in regulating its own corporate citizens.”

Br. of Amicus Curiae Canada 12. British Columbia echoes

the sentiment, observing that “[t]here is nothing in the Court

of Appeals’ opinion that would preclude the application of

American law to thousands of other entities whose activities

take place entirely within British Columbia and are subject to

provincial regulation.” Br. of Amicus Curiae British Colum-

bia 17. The Ninth Circuit thus departed radically from this

Court’s cases in failing to apply the presumption against ex-

traterritorial application of U.S. law.4

The presumption against extraterritoriality commands

reversal of the decision below. This Court has explained that

a court “must accept” any “reasonably permi{ssible]” reading

4 Respondents persistently suggest that EPA’s issuance of the UAO

demonstrates that the President shares their disregard for the sovereign

interests of Canada and British Columbia. But the Executive’s decision

to take no action to enforce the UAO, and the subsequent decision to

withdraw it, Pet. App. 120a, at least raise the question whether the Presi-

dent came to believe that EPA’s initial issuance of the UAO was in error.

The Court can resolve that question easily enough by calling for the

views of the Solicitor General. The Solicitor General recently filed a

brief stressing the President’s authority to “promote the effective conduct

of foreign relations, and underscore the United States’ commitment in the

international community to the rule of law” Br. for the United States as

Amicus Curiae, Medellin v. Texas, No. 06-984, at 8; see also id. at 10

(the President has a “unique role in foreign affairs,” and exercises “tradi-

tional authority in judicial proceedings implicating international law”); id.

at 12 (The “President is uniquely positioned both to evaluate and resolve

sensitive foreign policy issues and to act with dispatch”). The Solicitor

General also contended that a judicial decision “effectively frustrating

efforts to comply with international treaty obligations clearly warrants

this Court’s review.” /d. at 8-9. The Court granted review in Medellin.

75 USLW 3398 (Apr. 30, 2007). Review is also warranted in this case.

8

of the statutory language that will avoid the extraterritorial

application of U.S. law. Empagran, 542 U.S. at 174. In the

petition, Teck Cominco explained that Section 9607(a)(3)

must be read in conjunction with Section 9607(a)(4) and that,

accordingly, CERCLA’s arranger liability provision requires

that the disposal occur at the same facility from which there

is arelease. Pet. 18-21. Respondents have no answer what-

soever to that argument other than to complain they have not

before heard it articulated in precisely that fashion. Br. in

Opp. of Pakootas 11; Br. in Opp. of Washington 14-15. But

from the outset of the litigation, Teck Cominco has argued

that it cannot be held liable as an arranger, see Mot. to Dis-

miss 29-31, and it is axiomatic that a litigant in this Court is

not estopped from advancing “a new argument to support

what has been his consistent claim.” Lebron v. Nat. R.R.

Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 379 (1995). Respondents’

absence of substantive argument fairly indicates the material-

ity of the Ninth Circuit’s break from this Court’s decisions.

3. Respondents do not dispute that the First Circuit and

the Ninth Circuit examined the same statutory language in

Section 9607(a)(3)—“by any other party or entity”’—and

reached diametrically opposed interpretations. In American

Cyanamid Company v. Capuano, 381 F.3d 6 (1st Cir. 2004),

the First Circuit interpreted “by any other party or entity” as

modifying the phrase “disposal or treatmeni,” rather than

“owned or possessed,” id. at 24, while the decision below

rejected that construction and inserted an “or” into the statu-

tory text so that “by any other party or entity” might modify

“owned or possessed” instead of “disposal or treatment.”

Pet. App. 24a. As a result of those binding and conflicting

interpretations, in the First Circuit, a responsible “arranger”

must both “own{ ] or possess[ |” the waste and arrange with

some “other party or entity,” see Am. Cyanamid, 381\ F.3d at

24, while in the Ninth Circuit, one may be held liable as an

arranger whether or not he “owned or possessed’ the waste

9

and whether or not he arranged with any “other party or en-

tity.” Pet. App. 28a.

Respondents nevertheless contend that there is no circuit

split as to the meaning of “by any other party or entity” for

this Court to address. Respondents suggest that American

Cyanamid was concerned only with whether the defendant

“owned or possessed” the waste, and that its statement that,

“for arranger liability to attach, the disposal or treatment

must be performed by another party or entity” is dictum.

381 F.3d at 24 (emphasis added). See Br. in Opp. of Pa-

kootas 26-27; Br. in Opp. of Washington 12. But as the First

Circuit recognized, under CERCLA’s arranger provision, the

questions whether an “arranger” must arrange with another

party or entity, and whether an arranger must own or possess

the waste, are two sides of the same coin. The two questions

together turn on the construction of the phrase “by any other

party or entity.”

If, as the First Circuit held, the phrase modifies “disposal

or treatment,” tt follows both that an arranger must arrange

with a third party and that an arranger must own or possess

the waste. Contrariwise, if, as the decision below holds, “by

any other party or entity” expands disjunctively the preceding

clause (the statute’s omission of the critical “or” notwith-

standing) it follows both that an “arranger” may arrange only

with itself and that an arranger need not ever own or possess

the waste. That, in both cases, only one result of the statu-

tory construction was outcome-determinative does not trans-

form the other result into an insignificant dictum. The twin

results are inextricably linked to the single statutory construc-

tion giving rise to each. Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit’s

construction of “by any other party or entity” and its conclu-

sion that arrangers need not arrange with “any other party or

entity” conflict intractably with the First Circuit’s opposing

construction of the same phrase and the conclusion that fol-

lows ineluctably from that construction that the disposal

10

“must be performed by another party or entity.” Am. Cy-

anamid, 381 F.3d at 24.

The result of the diametrically opposed interpretations of

CERCLA Section 9607(a)(3) is to subject entities in the First

Circuit to a different liability scheme than entities located (or

sued) in the Ninth Circuit. “(T]he conflict created by the de-

cision below will directly affect companies and industries

that operate-in multiple states [and] ... who now face vary-

ing rules and potentially different outcomes with respect to a

crucial liability determination.” Br. for Amici Curiae Nat’|

Mining Ass’n ef al. 20. Restoring uniformity as to this im-

portant provision of federal law is a paradigmatic ground for

the exercise of certiorari jurisdiction. See Braxton v. United

States, 500 U.S. 344, 347-48 (1991).

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted.

THOMAS A. CAMPBELL THEODORE B. OLSON

KEVIN M. FONG Counsel of Record

GERALD F. GEORGE RAYMOND B. LUDWISZEWSKI

PILLSBURY WINTHROP MARK A. PERRY

SHAW PITTMAN LLP MATTHEW D. MCGILL

50 Fremont Street GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP

San Francisco, CA 94105 1050 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.

(415) 983-1000 Washington, D.C. 20036

(202) 955-8500

Counsel for Petitioner

May 15, 2007

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Reply Brief — Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd. v. Pakoototas (No. 06-1188) | Frix