Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Hall v. Civil Air Air Patrol, Inc. (No. 06-1179)

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

ARIC W HALL,

Petitioner

CIVIL AIR PATROL, INC., ET AL,

Respondents

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari

to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Aric W Hall, pro se

P. O. Box 952

Bullard, TX 75757

(903) 894-8780

arichall@yahoo.com

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

Does the petitioner have a right to a trial?

Does the petitioner have a remedy for violations of

his First Amendment freedom of petition?

Is the petitioner entitled to a permanent injunction and

writ of mandamus.to.compel government to abide by

its policies and reverse those policies that constitute

an act of war upon the Constitution?

Does the petitioner have a right to default judgments

against defendants who choose not to appear?

Pg. 1

LIST OF ALL PARTIES

CIVIL AIR PATROL, INC.

U.S. AIR FORCE

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

ALBERT ALLENBACK

RODNEY AMMONS

DONALD ANGEL

M ALLEN APPLEBAUM

ARP STATE BANK

BRUCE P BAUGHMAN

FREDERICK BELDEN

DENNIS H BENNETT

PAUL BERGMAN

MARY BERKOWITZ

ROBERT BESS

GARY BLEVINS

ROBERT M BOST

ERNEST BOURGEOIS

RICHARD BOWLING

GEORGE BOYD

ROGER BRADY

WILLIAM BROCKMAN

DAVID C BROOKS

ROBERT BROUILLETTE

CARL L BROWN

VALERIE M BROWN

FRANK BUETHE

ROGER W BURG

JAY BURRELL

JOHN BUSCHMANN

GEORGE W BUSH

RICHARD BUTLER

JACK BUTTERFIELD

CHARLES L CARR

JOE CASLER

WILLIAM CHARLES

TED CHAVEZ

RUSSELL E CHAZELL

REGGIE CHITWOOD

ANN BCLARK .

DAVID CLARY

MR. COLLIE (Minor)

MR. COLLIE (Father)

MRS. COLLIE (Mother)

AUGUSTINE COMELLA

DONALD G COOK

GREGORY CORTUM

TIMOTHY CRAMER

JANE E DAVIES

STEVE DAVISON

GILBERT DAY

JOHN DEAN

DION DECAMP

ROBERT DIDUCH

MICHAEL L DOMINGUEZ

MARY DONLEY

STEVE R DOSS

FRANK F ELDRIDGE

Pg. ii

COLIN FAKE

STANLEY FERNANDEZ

JAMES E FLETCHER

CORNELIUS FLYNN

PETE GEREN

MAURICE GIVENS

REX GLASGOW

CHARLES GLASS

AUSTYN GRANVILLE

GEORGE GRAVES

CHARLES GREENE

RICHARD GREENHUT

CHARLES GREENWOOD

PHILLIP GROSHONG

RAYMOND HARRIS

HENRY L HEABERLIN

RUSSELL HODGKINS

DALE HOIUM

LORETTA HOLBROOK

JOHN D HOPPER JR

SAUL HYMAN

GARY JACKSON

JOSEPH C JENSEN

MARK D JOHNSON

CLAIR JOWETT

JOHN P JUMPER

LARRY KAUFFMAN

NICHOLAS B KEHOE

VIRGINIA KELLER

RONALD E KEYS

BERNARD F KING

STEVEN KUDDES

THEODORE S KYLE

DONALD LAMONTAGNE

STAN LEIBOWITZ

HERMAN LIBOY

WILLIAM R LOONEY III

STEPHEN LORENZ

BRADY T MARKING

JOSEPH J MARTIN

GARY MAYO

ROBERT J MCCABE

FRANKLIN MCCONNELL

JOSEPH MEIGHAN JR

JAMES MELANCON

RICHARD MENTEMEYER

STEVEN G MILLER

RODNEY MOODY

WILLIAM R MORTON JR.

RICHARD L MOSELEY

T MICHAEL MOSELEY

TOM MUNDT

MICHAEL MURRELL

LARRY MYRICK

DAVID NEEL

VIRGINIA NELSON

DAVID R NICHOLSON

JAMES NORVELL

RUSSELL OPLAND

J ROCK PALERMO

JAMES PALMER

HAL PARKER

KAREN PAYNE

BOBBY PICKER

ANTONIO J PINEDA

RICHARD PROBST

Pg. iti

LARRY J RAGLAND

JOHN F REGNI

SCOTT RICHARDS

LYNDA ROBINSON

JAMES ROCHE

JAMES ROWELL

DON ROWLAND

DONALD RUMSFELD .

JAMES RUSHING

MARGIE SAMBOLD

MITCHELL SAMMONS

STEVEN J SAMPLE

HAROLD SCHAFFER

HENRY SCHLATTNER

RALPH TOMLINSON

SCOTT TREPINSKI

LAWRENCE TRICK

JAN VAN HOVIN

JOHN VARLJEN

JOSEPH VAZQUEZ

ANTHONY VESELLA JR

GEORGE VOGT

WALTER VOLLMERS

MATTHEW WALLACE

KATHRYN J WALLING

DICKIE WARREN

WILLIAM WEBB

FREDRIC WEISS

ERNESTUS SCHNABLER NORMA WENDT

GEORGE SCISS

CHARLES SEAROCK

NORMAN R SEIP

STEVEN SENDERLING

MATTHEW SHARKEY

CHARLES E SHARP

WARDER SHIRES

ANDREW SKIBA

BRYAN SMITH

JOE R SMITH

RUSSELL SMITH

MERLE V STARR

ROY STEPHENSON

JEFFREY STICKEL

JOHN TILTON

ROBERT K TODD

TOM TODD

MILTON TOMASSINI

DWIGHT H WHELESS

BRUCE WHITMAN

JOHN B WILKES

CARL R WILLERT

Pg. iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Questions presented for review

List of parties

Table of contents

Table of cited authorities

Citations of official orders

Jurisdiction

Basis of jurisdiction of the court of first instance

Constitutional & statutory citations

Statement of the case

Argument # |

Argument # 2

Argument # 3

Argument # 4

Actions

Conclusion

Prayer

Appendix A — 5" Circuit Ruling

Appendix B — District Court Ruling

Appendix C — Report & Recommendation

Appendix D — Verbatim References

Pg.v

TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES

U.S.C. Const. Amend. I 2

7

8

U.S.C. Const. Amend. VI 1

10 U.S.C. § 9447 9

10

10 U.S.C. § 9448 10

18 U.S.C. § 4 8

18 U.S.C. § 241 2

4

9

18 U.S.C. § 245 (b)(1)(B&E) 2

28 U.S.C. § 1254 ]

28 U.S.C. § 1331 l

28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(1-2) ]

28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) |

2

28 U.S.C. § 1349 l

28 U.S.C. § 1361 2

36 U.S.C. § 40303(a) l

36 U.S.C. § 40303(b) 9

42 U.S.C. §§ 1985 and 1986 7

8

9

14

Fed. R. Civ. P.R 8 6

Fed. R. Civ. P. R 55 12

Sup. Ct. R. 10 2

Sup. Ct. R. 14.1(f) 2

Barksdale v. King,

699 F.2d 744, 746 (5" Cir. 1983) 6

Buerger v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co.,

982 F.Supp. 1247 (E. D. Tex. 1997) 6

Grant v. Civil Air Patrol,

No. 91-45-B (D. NH 1995) 9

Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972) 6

AFI 10-2701, par. 1.4.4 9

AFI 10-2701, par. 1.9.4 9

AFI 10-2701, Attch #1, Al.2.6 9

AFI 10-2702, par. 2.5 10

AFI 10-2702, par. 2.6 10

AFI 10-2702, par. 4 9

AFPD 10-27, par. 9.6 9

AFPD 10-27, par. 9.8 9

SoW par. 2.3.1.1 10

SoW par. 5.4.3 10

SoW par. 7.1] 10

SoW par. 7.1.2 10

SoW par. 7.1.2.1 10

14

SowW par. 11.2 9

CAPR 35-3, Sect. A, par. 1b 14

CAPR 35-3, Sect. B, par. 4b 14

CAPR 35-3, Sect. C, par. 5 14

CAPR 35-3, Sect. C, par. 6b 14

CAPR 35-3 [Dec. 2002 ver.], Sect. D, par. 9(b)(1) 14

CAPR 123-2 [Sep. 1999 ver.], par. 4d 9

CAPR 123-2 [May 2003 ver.], par. 6e 9

Pg. vii

CITATIONS OF OFFICIAL ORDERS

The order of the 5" Circuit (Appendix A) affirmed

the order of the District Court (Appendix B), affirming the

magistrate’s R&R (Appendix C). None were published.

JURISDICTION

This is an appeal from the 5" Circuit Court of

Appeals (No. 06-40461). The case was appealed from the

U. S. District Court, Eastern District of Texas (No.

6:05cv193). The 5" Circuit affirmed dismissal of the

petitioner’s case on July 26, 2006. The U. S. Supreme Court

has the discretion of certiorari on appeals from the circuit

courts (28 U.S.C. § 1254).

BASIS OF JURISDICTION

OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

The U. S. District Court was the court of competent

jurisdiction. The defendant U. S. Air Force (hereinafter

“USAF”), its actors, and its co-conspirators within Civil Air

Patrol (hereinafter “CAP”), through policy and written

confessions, denied petitioner the freedom of speech and

petition (28 U.S.C. § 1331). CAP, USAF, and their actors

who are defendants, conspired to violate the civil rights of the

petitioner (28 U.S.C. § 1343 [a][1-2]). The privileges and

conditions of membership in CAP are established by

corporate policy, protected by the organizational constitution

and bylaws, and further protected by law (36 U.S.C. §

40303{[a]), giving rise to another federal issue (28 U.S.C.

§1331 and § 1346[a][2]). CAP receives most of its funding

from appropriated funds, thus subjecting the organization to

federal jurisdiction (28 U.S.C. § 1349). Respondent USAF is

a defendant for breach of implied contract, exclusive of any

tort claim, thus being further subject to federal jurisdiction

Pg. |

(28 U.S.C. § 1346 [a][2]). Only the federal district court may

assert the power of mandamus, as sought by the petitioner, to

force the USAF and its actors to comply with relevant laws,

regulations, and agreements concerning petitioner and CAP

(28 U.S.C. § 1361). It is also possible to further satisfy

federal jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act of

2005.

The U. S. District Court for the Eastern District of

Texas was also proper venue. Petitioner resides here, the

bulk of the torts or other violations were committed against

petitioner here, several of the respondents reside here, and

CAP has national citizenship and an established presence

here.

This Court’s own rules (Rule 10) indicate that the

Court will give greater consideration for certiorari where the

lower courts have so far departed from the law and standards

of judicial proceedings to warrant intervention by this Court.

In this case, five federal judges have openly fabricated lies to

justify denying a trial. All five judges have been charged as __

accessories to felony theft for denying the petitioner a

remedy for the same. All five judges have been charged with

felony Conspiracy Against Rights (18 U.S.C. § 241) for

conspiring with the government-actor defendants in denying

the petitioner a remedy for the violation of his Freedom of

Petition (U.S.C. Const. Amend. I), and all five judges have

been charged with interfering with federally protected

activities (18 U.S.C. § 245[b][1][B&E]). For the lower

courts to deny a trial on the action for fraud is to license the

USAF and CAP to continue stealing several million dollars

per year through fraud.

CONSTITUTIONAL & STATUTORY CITATIONS

Pursuant to S.Ct. Rule 14.1(f), this is a restatement of

the references to law that are listed in the Table of Cited

Authorities and referenced within this document.

Pg. 2

U.S.C. Const. Amend. |

U.S.C. Const. Amend. VII

10 U.S.C. § 9447

—t eet

10 U.S.C. § 9448

IS U.S.C. § 4

18 U.S.C. § 241

18 U.S.C. § 245 (b)\(1)(B&E)

28 U.S.C. § 1254

28 U.S.C. § 1331

28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(1-2)

28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2)

28 U.S.C. § 1349

28 U.S.C. § 1361

36 U.S.C. § 40303(a)

36 U.S.C. § 40303(b)

42 U.S.C. §§ 1985 and 1986

—

AFI 10-2701, par. 1.4.4

AFI 10-2701, par. 1.9.4

AFI 10-2701, Attch #1, A1.2.6

AFI 10-2702, par. 2.5

AFI 10-2702, par. 2.6

AFI 10-2702, par. 4

AFPD 10-27, par. 9.6

COSOSTOCKDO ORO MIWDOHENH NHK KB HK NOUYUNASASSWO IWAN

ae

Pg. 3

AFPD 10-27, par. 9.8 9

SoW par. 2.3.1.1 10

SoW par. 5.4.3 10

~ SoW par. 7.1 10

SoW par. 7.1.2 10

SoW par. 7.1.2.1 10

ha

Sow par. 11.2 9

CAPR 35-3, Sect. A, par. 1b 14

CAPR 35-3, Sect. B, par. 4b 14

CAPR 35-3, Sect. C, par. 5 14

CAPR 35-3, Sect. C, par. 6b I4

CAPR 35-3 [Dec. 2002 ver.], Sect. D, par. 9(b)(1) 14

CAPR 123-2 [Sep. 1999 ver.], par. 4d 9

CAPR 123-2 [May 2003 ver.], par. 6e 9

Verbatim references are found in Appendix D.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Petitioner filed a lawsuit in U. S. District Court,

Eastern District of Texas, June 1, 2005, alleging numerous

causes of action against numerous defendants. The trial court

dismissed the case, stating that the petitioner failed to provide

a legal theory for his claim of monetary damages against the

United States. The petitioner appealed to the 5" Circuit

Court of Appeals. Likewise, the appellate court affirmed,

July 26, 2006, stating that the petitioner failed to state a legal

theory to support his claim of monetary damages against the

United States. The petitioner has been denied a trial of right

and denied all of the rights and remedies afforded by law and

pled in the causes of action of the Complaint. The petitioner

is still being denied the freedom of petition, the right to own

private property, and the right to trial by jury.

Pg. 4

ARGUMENT #1

The judicial proceedings in this case have been a

competition between the defense lawyers and the judges to

see who can tell the most lies. The magistrate judge told 27

lies and errors in her Report and Recommendation (trial doc.

# 224), where she recommended dismissal. The petitioner

lists these lies in his response (trial doc. # 229; Appellant’s

Record Excerpts, doc. # 17). Government lawyers lied to

deceive the court on official capacity defendants, when there

were none (trial doc. # 221-1). Civil Air Patrol’s lawyers lied

to the court in stating that the petitioner threatened to murder

the defendants and that this was a reason for termination of

petitioner (trial doc. # 15, pg. 6), which led to the apparent

firing of one of those lawyers. The petitioner responded to

such allegations on another occasion (trial doc. #204, pg. 4).

All five judges have stated and restated a lie that the

petitioner sought monetary damages against the United States

and failed to set forth a legal basis for doing so (5" Cir.

Opinion, see p. 15). At no point has the petitioner ever

sought monetary damages against the United States, and

there is no legal theory for doing so in an intentional tort

case. All five judges lied to conspire with the defendants to

commit all of the crimes that this action was intended to be a

civil remedy against. All five judges have been charged with

felony theft of money, felony theft of property, felony

conspiracy against rights, felony retaliation, felony organized

crime, and for theft in awarding a judgment of costs against

the petitioner. Having refused to allow the petitioner the

legal rights and remedies afforded to him by law and as pled

in the causes of action of the Complaint, each judge became a

willing accomplice to the defendants’ crimes, which this

action was intended to remedy. The judges denied the

petitioner a trial on the basis of the judges’ own lies.

The judges also state that the petitioner filed an

unintelligible complaint, and that the petitioner failed to state

a cause of action upon which relief could be granted. Upon

Pg. 5

the magistrate judge ordering an amended complaint to

provide time, place, and person details, the iudges then

complained that the Complaint became too cumbersome.

The fact remains that the petitioner has responded to every

lie, deception, or legitimate request for clarification made by

every defense lawyer. Any lack of clarity that did exist was

rectified in subsequent court filings. No amended complaint

was ever ordered to consolidate or account for issues raised

by the defense lawyers.

Petitioner cited numerous lies by opposing counsel in

his reply brief (Appellant’s Brief, pg. 3, et seq). The same

was true in pre-trial documents before the trial court. Just

because lawyers and judges confuse the court with lies does

not make the Complaint or motions unintelligible.

A pro se litigant’s claim should only be dismissed if it

appears beyond doubt that he can prove no set of facts in

support of his claim that would entitle him to relief

(Barksdale v. King, 699 F.2d 744, 746 [5" Cir. 1983]).

In Buerger v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 982 F.Supp.

1247 (E. D. Tex. 1997), the Court stated that motions to

dismiss for failure to state a claim are viewed with disfavor

and rarely granted. The Court further stated that a complaint

should not be dismissed unless it appears beyond doubt that

the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claims

that would entitle him to relief. The Court went on to opine

on the statement that the pleader is entitled to relief (Fed. R.

Civ. P. Rule 8). Citing other cases, the Court stated that the

short, plain statement need not be hypertechnical, but need

only set out a generalized statement.

In Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972), the U. S.

Supreme Court reversed and remanded a dismissal because

the lower courts denied the appellant an opportunity for a

trial to prove the facts and allegations. Haines is the case on

point, as the petitioner seeks a trial to prove facts and

allegations. Petitioner takes the liberty of citing the above

cases supporting his position that were previously and

Pg. 6

erroneously cited by Judge Guthrie and the United States

against petitioner.

The 5" Circuit affirmed that the petitioner has no

right to a trial or trial by jury (U.S.C. Const. Amend. VII).

ARGUMENT #2

It should be acceptable by judicial notice that a citizen

can petition the Court for equitable relief in response to

violations of his Constitutional and civil rights by agents of

government as pled (2"’ Amended Complaint, pg. 9 ef seq).

The petitioner also has a right to file suit for damages

resulting from a conspiracy against rights (42 U.S.C. §§

1985-1986) as was pled (2"’ Amended Complaint, pg. 11).

Petitioner sought relief in the Complaint and in the

Motion for Writ to Declassify the Phonebook (trial doc. #

189), to enable himself and any other citizen to have access

to contact information for military personnel in a position of

authority. Neither petitioner, the informants of the Abu

Ghraib scandal, nor the informants of any other act of crime,

corruption, or tort committed within the military has the

ability to contact a person in authority. Petitioner has found

it most difficult to report crimes, torts, or violations of

regulation against any military personnel, because he is not

allowed to know where they are. Petitioner has further found

it difficult to serve the military defendants, at the Pentagon or

elsewhere, because he has to deduce as to where the

individuals might work. This is a violation of the freedom of

petition (U.S.C. Const. Amend I), it is a felony (18 U.S.C. §

241), it serves to protect crime and corruption in the military,

and it ensures that no person in any command position can be

held responsible. Whether a lieutenant or a four-star general,

individuals in a position of responsibility can always say “I

didn’t know”, as such individuals are protected from contact

from the people. There is no motivation for the offending

commanders to stop the crimes, torts, or other infractions

Pg. 7

being committed under their command or being committed

with the commander’s blessing. By barring contact with

government officials, while at the same time requiring the

People to report crimes to military authorities, the People are

subject to prosecution for misprison of felony for failing to

report felonies to appropriate military authorities (18 U.S.C.

§ 4), thus constituting entrapment. Under the First

Amendment, whether by injunction, writ of mandamus, or

other final order of the Court, it is unavoidable that the Court

must force the government to allow contact with itself from

the People. The judges denied the motion to declassify the

phonebook (trial docs. # 193 & 227). Any other avenue for

granting contact with government was denied upon dismissal

of the case.

The 5" Circuit affirmed that the petitioner has no

right to a remedy for civil rights violations or to be free from

felony crimes by government officials in retaliation for his

exercise of the freedom of petition.

ARGUMENT #3

It is within the Court’s discretion to grant or deny

motions for injunctions. However, whether by motion for

injunction, motion for writ of mandamus, or by final order at

the conclusion of trial, the Court must issue a writ of

mandamus compelling government actors to fulfill their

duties and to comply with the law.

Conspiracy Against Rights and a request for equitable

relief for civil rights violations was pled in some manner in

the complaint (trial doc. # 133, pg. 9-12; 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985

and 1986). Petitioner stated that he was retaliated against for

contacting and promising to contact regulatory bodies,

elected officials, and the police, in violation of the Freedom

of Petition (U.S.C. Const. Amend. I). Petitioner further

stated that he had been denied contact information for

military officials, which was needed to report crime, to seek

Pg. 8

corrective action based on the authority of those individuals,

and to serve process. The defendants have maintained,

enforced, and defended their policy of terminating and

defrauding anyone who contacts government (2 Amended

Complaint, Appendix I, citing CAPR 123-2 [Sep. 1999

version], par. 4d; and CAPR 123-2 [May 2003 version], par.

6e) Both the Air Force and Civil Air Patrol carried out at

least the termination of the petitioner and one Mr. Steven

Douglas Hays for contacting elected and regulatory

government officials. The petitioner and the bulk of the

defendants are in possession of the written confession and of

the nationally published confession. The long list of

defendants reviewed and upheld the terminations at their

board meetings, per policy. It is a felony (18 U.S.C. § 241)

and it is a cause of action (42 U.S.C. §§ 1985 and 1986) for

which the petitioner was denied a trial and a remedy. The

Board of Governors (hereinafter “BoG”) has absolute

authority and is under 50% control of the Secretary of the

USAF (2™ Amended Complaint, Appendix I, citing 10 USC

§ 9447; 36 U.S.C. § 40303[b]; AFPD 10-27, par. 9.8; and

AFI 10-2702, par. 4). The USAF approves of all CAP

policies (2"’ Amended Complaint, Appendix I, citing SoW

par. 11.2; and AFI 10-2701, par. 1.4.4 and par. 1.9.4). The

USAF controls the CAP through its CAP-USAF Commander

(AFPD 10-27 par. 9.6). The USAF reserves the right to

regulate corporate CAP activities at its pleasure (AFI 10-

2701, Attch #1, A1.2.6). With these considerations, the civil

rights violations are both a corporate and government action

(Grant v. Civil Air Patrol, No. 91-45-B, [D. NH 1995]).

Petitioner filed a Motion for Writ of Mandamus and

Preliminary Injunction against the USAF (trial doc. # 203).

In the interest of expediency, the petitioner refers the Court to

that document and to Appendix I of the 2" Amended

Complaint. In addition to the government control established

in the preceding paragraph, there are additional

considerations. The USAF officials on the BoG and one

member from CAP-USAF had to approve of petitioner’s

Pg. 9

felonious termination (§ 9447; AFI 10-2702, par. 2.6). The

Secretary of the USAF, with the approval of the Secretary of

Defense, must write USAF regulations to administer the

federal statutes (10 U.S.C. § 9448). Per the CAP-USAF

Statement of Work, the USAF must suspend funding and

mission status to CAP in the case of fraud or criminal activity

(SoW par. 2.3.1.1.), but has refused. The USAF has the

authority to suspend appropriated funds (SoW par. 5.4.3).

Three USAF actors, including an Inspector General

(hereinafter “IG”’) at CAP-USAF have sent letters to

petitioner, claiming they have no authority or responsibility

in the matters brought to light by petitioner. In fact, the IG

has no other purpose. The USAF officials on the BoG have

authority over the IG system (SoW par. 7.1; AFI 10-2702,

par. 2.5), which means the USAF approves of CAP’s

ongoing refusal to provide petitioner with the findings of the

IG investigation as required and agreed. Petitioner knows

that CAP cannot provide those findings because the findings

are a confession to fraud and theft by CAP personnel. The

USAF is supposed to require a complaints and whistleblower

protection program to protect petitioner (SoW par. 7.1.2 and

par. 7.1.2.1), which they have not done. The USAF and its

personnel have repeatedly rebelled against federal law,

USAF regulations, and the agreement between USAF and

CAP. Denying responsibility and refusing to stop the crime

and tort of fraud benefits the USAF, as it saves the USAF

millions of dollars annually on missions the CAP performs

on behalf of USAF. It is still the prerogative of the Court to

protect petitioner and to issue the necessary orders to enforce

laws, regulations, and agreements. The motion was denied

upon dismissal of the case (trial docs. # 232 and # 233).

In denying a trial, the 5" Circuit affirmed that

government may continue enforcing its written policy of

retaliating against and stealing money from anyone who

contacts their elected officials and regulatory officials. The

5" Circuit also gave license the USAF to continue violating a

litany of its own regulatory law.

Pg. 10

ARGUMENT #4

Petitioner filed for default judgments against two

groups of defendants (Motion for Default Judgment, trial

doc. # 215). Counsel for the United States stated on multiple

occasions that they were not representing the individual

government-actor defendants (trial docs. # 199, 210, & 211),

and petitioner responded to this problem at least once (trial

doc. # 206) prior to filing for default judgments. These

individuals were only being sued in their personal capacity,

as they were being sued for intentional torts and punitive

damages. As such, they filed no Answer nor made other

contact with the court. These individuals are identified on

page 2 of the motion.

The second group of defendants is those individials

who refused, ignored, rejected, or opened and then returned

their summons and complaint. These individuals are listed

on page 3 and 4 of the motion (Motion for Default Judgment,

trial doc. # 215). It is the petitioner’s position that such

defendants could not possibly have hired or acknowledged an

attorney if they did not know what cause or controversy the

attorney was to be hired for. Likewise, how can an attorney

for CAP claim to represent someone who has not solicited

representation or be allowed to represent all clients who

simply do not refuse the representation?

To further complicate the issue, some of these

defendants serve in dual or ex officio roles, while in one

position. Such individuals can be represented by the

government, the corporate-hired lawyer, or some other

lawyer. Upon Answers being filed by counsel, such dual

capacity defendants will have filed two conflicting answers.

Which one is the Court going to accept?

In a real flabbergasting moment, Judge Guthrie stated

that petitioner had no right to know who is representing who

(Order, trial doc. # 192; in response to Motion for Writ to

Clarify Defense Counsel, trial doc. # 186). Even the 5"

Circuit has contacted petitioner trying to ascertain such facts,

Pg. 11

as this information is devoid on the trial court docket sheet.

It is up to the Court to order default judgments, so as to

remedy this problem.

Procedural law provides for automatic default

judgments against those who do not appear (Fed. R. Civ. P.

Rule 55). No objections were ever filed. Judge Schneider

denied all pending motions on dismissal of the case (see

Appendix B on pg. 18) on February 22, 2006. This was forty

days after the motion was filed, meaning that any objection

would have been due much sooner, not that anyone was

representing said defendants.

ACTIONS

There is no lingering lack of clarity on causes of

action. Despite the lies and red herrings of the judges and

lawyers, everything has been made clear. The verbiage was

the result of excessive motions practice by defense lawyers

and the demand for an amended complaint with exhaustive

time, place, and person details.

Slander was spelled out in precise detail (2"¢

Amended Complaint, trial doc. # 133, pg. 13-15). No other

clarification was ever needed.

Libel was spelled out in precise detail (2"’ Amended

Complaint, trial doc. # 133, pg. 16-17). No other

clarification was ever needed.

Fraud was pled with several examples (2"' Amended

Complaint, trial doc. # 133, pg. 16-18) and with a laundry list

of the policies and regulations used to defraud petitioner (trial

doc. # 133, Appendix I). As pled, fraud occurred where the

defendants extorted money from the petitioner with false

promises of whistleblower protection, promising to terminate

all of the offenders for the protection of plaintiff, and that the

petitioner could not be terminated without violating policies.

Breach of fiduciary duty was pled in the 2" Amended

Complaint (trial doc. # 133, pg. 18-19). As explained, Gary

Pg. 12

Blevins broke promises to the petitioner that he would not

release stolen funds to his co-conspirators. Dennis Bennett

and Gary Jackson conspired with Blevins to steal money and

seize confidential bank records to which only the petitioner

had a right to at the time. As such, the bank and the named

individuals breached fiduciary duty with petitioner. No more

clarification is needed.

Damages resulting from theft was pled in the

Amended Complaint (trial doc. # 133, pg. 19). As explained,

the defendants stole the petitioner’s personal property in both

the Tyler and Palestine facilities of Civil Air Patrol. This

was explained in greater detail subsequently (trial doc. # 201,

p. 6). Though lying lawyers have claimed this cause of

action is vague, the defendants have the property records

showing what property they stole from petitioner. The

petitioner was also defrauded of tens of thousands of dollars

through fraud that he gave to Civil Air Patrol on false

pretenses, as explained in the fraud section.

Intentional infliction of emotional distress was pled

with amazing clarity in the 2"’ Amended Complaint (trial

doc. # 133, pg. 20-21).

Negligence was pled in the 2" Amended Complaint

(trial doc. # 133, pg. 21). The foregoing causes of action

explained the intentional torts. As pled, all officers and

governors received letters from the petitioner informing them

of the harm, and of the violations of policy or contract, and

each was intentionally negligent in refusing to enforce the

policies or restore the petitioner. Each refused to provide

whistleblower protection as promised and each refused to

terminate the offenders as promised.

Breach of contract was succinctly pled in the 2"

Amended Complaint (trial doc. # 133, pg. 21-22). As pled,

the defendants defied the policies providing whistleblower

protection, privileges and conditions of membership, terms of

investigations, inspector general investigations, terminations

and appeals, and MARB appeals. The 2"? Amended

Complaint provides an exhaustive list of the breaches (trial

Pg. 13

doc. # 133, Appendix I). Here are a few examples. The

USAF mandates and promises whistleblower protection

(SoW par. 7.1.2.1). CAP guarantees that assailants will be

terminated (CAPR 35-3, Sect. B, par. 4b; CAPR 35-3, Sect.

A, par. 1b). Complaints must be investigated (CAPR 35-3,

Sec. C, par. 5). Termination victims must be told the

charges against them (CAPR 35-3, Sect. C, par. 6b). The

victim has the right to interview witnesses at his termination

hearing (CAPR 35-3, Sec. D, Par. 9 [b][1] [version Dec

2002]). Not one of these contractual terms were complied

with, resulting in the petitioner being victimized though fraud

and theft. Though lying lawyers contend this is not very

specific, each and every defendant has received detailed

letters from the petitioner providing the details. For example,

each knows that the inspector general contract was not

followed, because the inspector general refused to submit to

petitioner his findings, which were a ccnfession of felony

fraud, as reported by petitioner. Contrary to the lying judges’

comments, no fact is left unclear to the defendants, and no

one has to “fish a gold coin from a bucket of mud”.

Conspiracy Against Rights as a cause of action (42

U.S.C. §§ 1985 and 1986) was explained in argument # 3

above.

CONCLUSION

The simple fact remains that the judges did not want

this matter to go to trial. Each had to lie in order to justify

denying a trial. The magistrate’s order was obeyed to the

extent relevant to the case. Subsequently, every challenge

raised against the Complaint was responded to in exhaustive

detail. It is impossible to argue that all causes of action are

unclear. Little could be left to the imagination. Slander, for

example, could not have been more specific. Yet, the case

was dismissed in its entirety.

Pg. 14

PRAYER

It is the petitioner’s prayer to the Court that the

judgment for costs be reversed and this case be reversed and

remanded for trial.

Respectfully,

aD CSA beCf

The Honorable Maj. Aric W Hall, CAP, Commanding

P. O. Box 952

Bullard, TX 75757

(903) 894-8780

arichall(@yahoo.com

Pg. 15

APPENDIX A — 5" Cir. Opinion:

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

FILED JUL 26, 2006

No. 06-40461

Summary Calendar

ARIC W HALL

Plaintiff-Appellant

CIVIL AIR PATROL, INC., ET AL

Defendant-Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court for

The Eastern District of Texas

(USDC No. 6:05-CV-193)

Before REAVLEY, BARKSDALE, and OWEN, Circuit

Judges.

PER CURIAM:

" Pursuant to 5" Cir. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this

opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under

the limited circumstances set forth in

Pg. 16

Plaintiff Aric Hall, pro se, appeals the district court’s

order dismissing his civil complaint with prejudice under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) for non-compliance

with an order to conform his complaint to the requirements of

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), and for failing to state a

claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).".

We affirm for the following reasons:

1. Upon review of the record, and consideration of

Hall’s brief, we find no reversible error here. Hall’s first

amended complaint was twenty-five pages long and named

151 defendants, including President George W. Bush and

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. The magistrate

judge explicitly instructed Hall to amerd his complaint to

include the “time, place or person details concerning the

alleged reporting of violations,” and to “set[] forth sufficient

factual allegations and the legal basis upon which the

Plaintiff believes that the United States Air Force,

Department of Defense and individual defendants are liable

to him for monetary damages.”

Instead of clarifying his complaint, Hall filed his

second amended complaint which was seventy-five pages

long, contained nine appendices including a key with a list of

acronyms, and named 177 defendants. The appendices

contain hundreds of names, dates, and assertions without

showing how the information bears upon the complaint. The

second amended complaint was not better than its

predecessor and failed to correct any of the deficiencies noted

by the court. As the Seventh Circuit so aptly stated:

5" Cir. R. 47.5.4.

' We need not reach the Rule 12(b)(6) issue as the district

court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the complaint with

prejudice for failure to comply with a court order and the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure.

Pg. 17

Rule 8(a) requires parties to make their pleadings

straightforward, so that judges and adverse

parties need not try to fish a gold coin from a

bucket of mud. Federal judges have better things

to do, and the substantial subsidy of

litigation...should be targeted on those litigants

who take the preliminary steps to assemble a

comprehensible claim.

United States ex rel. Garst v. Lockheed-Martin Corp., 328

F.3d 374, 378 (7" Cir. 2003). Where, as here, a plaintiff has

been given leave to file a second amended complaint that

meets the requirements of Rule 8(a) and fails to do so, the

case should be dismissed. The style and prolixity of Hall’s

pleadings would have made an orderly trial impossible.

Hall’s deliberate persistence in refusing to conform his

pleadings to the requirements of Rule 8 justified dismissal of

the complaint with prejudice.

2. Hall also argues that a default judgment should

have been entered against the non-appearing defendants.

While the district court never ruled directly on Hall’s motion

for default judgment or the government’s motion for an

extension of time for these defendants to answer, all of the

defendants were named in the same defective pleading and

were entitled to dismissal for Hall’s deliberate persistence in

refusing to conform his pleadings to the requirements of Rule

8.

Pg. 18

3. Hall filed a motion for temporary injunction

against the Civil Air Patrol that was denied by the district

court. In his prayer for relief in this court. Hall requests that

this court “use its own authority or force the district court to

use common sense and rational discretion in granting the

Motion for Injunction against” the Civil Air Patrol. Because

this issue was not briefed by Hall, it is waived. Matassarin v.

Lynch, 174 F.3d 549, 570 (5™ Cir. 1999).

AFFIRMED.

APPENDIX B — DISTRICT COURT RULING

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

TYLER DIVISION

ARIC HALL ; §

Vv. a CIVIL ACTION NO.

6:05cv193

CIVIL AIR PATROL, INC., §

ET AL.

ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES

MAGISTRATE JUDGE

The Report and Recommendation of the Magistrate

Judge, which contains her findings, conclusions, and a

recommendation for the disposition of this action, has been

presented for consideration. The Report and

Recommendations recommends that Defendant Civil Air

Patrol, Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss (document #15), Defendant

Gary Jackson’s Motion to Dismiss (document #161),

Defendant Henry Schlattner’s Motion to Dismiss (document

#195), Defendant Civil Air Patrol, Inc. and Dennis Bennett’s

Renewed Motion to Dismiss (document #197) and Defendant

United States Air Force, the United States Department of

Defense, and All Federal Defendants in Their Official

Capacities’ Motion to Dismiss (document #198) be granted

and that the complaint be dismissed with prejudice. Plaintiff

filed written objections to the Report and Recommendation

on February 6, 2006. A response was filed by Defendants

United States Air Force, the United States Department of

Defense and all federal defendants in their official capacities

Pg. 20

on February 19, 2006. Plaintiff then f filed a reply on

February 21, 2006. ae

Having made a de novo review of the objections filed

by Plaintiff and the response and reply thereto, the Court

finds that the findings, conclusions and recommendation of

the Magistrate Judge are correct and the objections are

without merit. Despite being given ample opportunity to

amend his complaint, Plaintiff has not adequately stated

claims upon which relief may be granted and he has not

complied with the September 29, 2005 Order to submit an

amended complaint with sufficient factual allegations and an

explanation of the legal bases upon which is relying to seek

relief. Plaintiff's pleadings are voluminous, but provide no

more than conclusory allegations and accusations. At its

core, Plaintiff's complaint is that his membership in the Civil

Air Patrol was terminated because he allegedly complained

about the activities of various other Civil Air Patrol members

and alleged that those members were violating policies or

committing crimes. He alleges that all of the defendants

engaged in a conspiracy against him. Indeed, Plaintiff now

asserts that the United states Magistrate Judge Judith Guthrie

has joined the conspiracy against him by issuing a Report and

Recommendation recommending dismissal of his claims.

Plaintiff's pleadings are insufficient to state a claim and

Plaintiff has not complied with the Order issued on

September 29, 2005. Therefore, the findings and conclusions

of the Magistrate J one are hereby adopted as those of the

Court. r

In light of the foregoing, it is

ORDERED that Defendant Civil Air Patrol, Inc.’s

Motion to Dismiss (document #15), Defendant Gary

Jackson’s Motion to Dismiss (document #161), Defendant

Henry Schlattner’s Motion to Dismiss (document #195),

Defendant Civil Air Patrol, Inc. and Dennis Bennett’s

Renewed Motion to Dismiss (document #197) and Defendant

United States Air Force, the United States Department of

Defense, and All Federal Defendants in Their Official

Pg. 21

Capacities’ Motion to Dismiss (document #198) are

GRANTED and the above-styled lawsuit is hereby

DISMISSED with prejudice.

All motions not previously ruled on are DENIED.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

TYLER DIVISION

ARIC HALL § Filed 2-22-06

v. § CIVIL ACTION NO.

6:05cv193

CIVIL AIR PATROL, INC., §

ET AL

FINAL JUDGMENT

The above-entitled civil action has come before the

Court for consideration, and decision having been duly

rendered, it is hereby

ORDERED and ADJUDGED that the above-entitled

action be DISMISSED. ;

Pg. 23

APPENDIX C —- REPORT & RECOMMENDATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

TYLER DIVISION

ARIC HALL § FILED JAN. 23, 2006

Vs. § CIVIL ACTION NO.

6:05CV193

CIVIL AIR PATROL, INC., §

ET AL

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Plaintiff, Aric Hall, proceeding pro se, filed the

above-styled lawsuit on June 1, 2005. An Amended

Complaint was filed on July 5, 2005, and a Second Amended

complaint was filed on October 24, 2005. The matter was

referred to the undersigned for all pretrial matters. There are

several pending motions to dismiss. Defendant Civil Air

Patrol, Inc., (“CAP”) filed a Motion to Dismiss (document

#15) on August 1, 2005. Defendant Gary Jackson filed a

motion seeking to join in CAP’s motion to dismiss

(document #161) on November 15, 2005. Defendant Henry

Schlattner filed a Motion to Dismiss (document #195) on

December 2, 2005. Defendants Civil Air Patrol, Inc., and

Dennis Bennett filed a Renewed Motion to Dismiss

(document #197) on December 7, 2005. On the same date,

Defendants United States Air Force, United States

Department of Defense and All Federal Defendants in Their

Official Capacities filed a Motion to Dismiss (document

#198). For the reasons assigned below, the undersigned finds

Pg. 24

that the motions to dismiss should be granted and the above-

styled lawsuit should be dismissed with prejudice.

Background

Plaintiff is a former volunteer member of CAP. He

alleges that his membership was terminated in retaliation for

reporting violations of CAP policy. The original complaint

lists more than one hundred and forty defendants. Plaintiff

amended his complaint on July 5, 2005, adding five

additional defendants, including President George W. Bush

and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. A motion for

more definite statement was granted on September 29, 2005,

and Plaintiff was ordered to file and serve on Defendants an

Amended Complaint setting forth sufficient factual

allegations and the legal basis upon which Plaintiff believes

that the United States Air Force, Department of Defense and

individual defendants are liable to him for monetary

damages. Plaintiff filed a lengthy Second Amended

Complaint on October 24, 2005, adding another twenty-five

defendants to his lawsuit.

In his Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges

that he reported violations of CAP policy and criminal law

“to the persons required by CAP policy and the CAP-USAF

Statement of Work.” He asserts that this reports resulted in

“cover-up investigations” and that he was “terminated and

otherwise retaliated against for doing as required.” He

complains that CAP has not provided a justification for the

termination of his membership. According to Plaintiff,

“[e]ach defendant engaged in complex and organized crimes,

torts, and breaches of implied contract against plaintiff,

culminating in the termination and public defamation of

plaintiff.” Plaintiff argues that “each defendant” had a duty

to act on his reports of violations, but failed to do so. With

regard to jurisdiction, Plaintiff alleges that there is a federal

question jurisdiction because the United States Air Force

Pg. 25

(“USAF”), CAP and other individuals conspired to violate

his civil rights.

Plaintiff alleges that he was retaliated against because

he contacted a senator, state and federal regulatory agencies

and the police, and he threatened to contact other

congressmen on September 23, 2002. He does not explain

what form of retaliation allegedly occurred. He submits that

he first forwarded complaints to USAF personnel in October

2002. Plaintiff complains that he sent letters to various

USAF officials regarding the alleged “crimes,” and received

some letters back stating that the USAF would not involve

itself in CAP matters. Plaintiff further alleges that CAP

changed its policies concerning internal investigations to

further cover-up the activities complained of by Plaintiff.

Plaintiff submits that the defendants conspired to violate his

constitutional rights of freedom of speech, right to petition

the government and freedom of association. It is Plaintiff's

belief that “each defendant may have contributed to the

actions against plaintiff, or at least interfered with the

restoration of plaintiff in some way.”

Plaintiff additionally asserts the following claims:

slander, libel, fraud and misrepresentation, breach of

fiduciary duty, theft and conversion of personal property,

interference with “prospective advantage,” malicious

prosecution, intentional infliction of emotional distress,

negligence, and breach of contract. Plaintiff alleges that he

was slandered on various occasions when certain individual

defendants either stated or implied that Plaintiff had

threatened deadly force against someone, that he is a habitual

complainer, that he was unfit to lead and that he was trying to

destroy CAP. He submits that libelous statements were

published in CAP newsletters concerning his termination.

Plaintiff argues that CAP and its officers committed fraud by

encouraging him to spend his time and money on CAP and

then failing to uphold CAP policies or provide him with

whistleblower protection. Plaintiff's breach of fiduciary duty

claim is directed at Arp State Bank, Blevins, Bennett,

Pg. 26

Jackson, Tom Todd, Mundt, Warren and CAP. Without

explanation, Plaintiff alleges that “[dJefendants are in

possession of stolen property from plaintiff.” He does not

identify the personal property. Plaintiff complains that he

has lost employment and personal references among CAP

personnel due to the libelous and defamatory statements

made about him. Plaintiff argues that his termination from

CAP amounted to malicious prosecution. According to

Plaintiff, the efforts to terminate his membership and to

cover-up violations of CAP policy caused an intentional

infliction of emotional distress and each defendant in a

position of responsibility was negligent for not taking action

to address his complaints. Finally, Plaintiff alleges that CAP

breached an implied contract to provide whistleblower

protections and conduct a proper investigation. Plaintiff

seeks equitable relief, compensatory damages and punitive

damages.

CAP and Dennis Bennett seek dismissal of the

complaint because Plaintiff cannot state any set of facts that

would allow relief under the causes of action asserted in the

Second Amended Complaint. Defendants argue that Plaintiff

has not submitted sufficient factual allegations to support a

cause of action. Defendants USAF, United States

Department of Defense, and the individual federal defendants

assert that the complaint should be dismissed with prejudice

because Plaintiff did not comply with the September 29,

2005 Order to submit an amended complaint with sufficient

factual allegations and an explanation of the legal bases upon

which he is relying to seek relief. Defendants further argue

that the complaint is deficient pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a).

Discussion and Analysis

A pro se litigant’s pleadings are to be liberally

construed and his compiaint should only be dismissed for

failure to state a claim if it appears beyond doubt that he can

prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would

Pg. 27

entitle him to relief. Barksdale v. King, 699 F.2d 744, 746

(5™ Cir. 1983). All well-pleaded facts must be accepted as

true for purposes of a motion to dismiss pursuant to

Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), and well-pleaded facts are to be

viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff. Calhoun v.

Hargrove, 312 F.3d 730, 733 (5" Cir. 2002) (citing

McCartney v. First City Bank, 970 F.2d 45, 47 (5'

2992)).

Following the filing of Plaintiff's First Amended

Complaint, Defendants USAF and United States Department

of Defense filed a motion for more definite statement

asserting that the complaint was ambiguous and did not

contain sufficient information to allow a responsive pleading

to be framed. More specifically, the Defendants argued that

Plaintiff failed to adequately plead his theories of relief and

did not identify each defendant’s participation in causing his

alleged injuries. The First Amended complaint did not

provide sufficient factual information concerning Plaintiffs

claims or clearly set forth Plaintiff's legal basis for seeking

relief in this case. The undersigned granted the motion and

delayed consideration of CAP’s first motion to dismiss until

Plaintiff had been given an opportunity to correct the

deficiencies in his complaint.

In this case, Plaintiff has been given ample

opportunity to amend his complaint. Rather than clarifying

his claims in his Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff used

this pleading to add even more defendants without providing

specific facts stating a cause of action against any of them.

Though lengthy, Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint

contains very little facts. The pleading is rife with

conclusions and accusations, but does not offer much factual

information. The basic facts in the complaint are that

Plaintiff was a member of CAP, Plaintiff complained about

the activities of various other CAP members and alleged that

they were violating CAP policy or committing crimes, and

Plaintiff feels that his membership from CAP was unjustly

terminated. Beyond that, Plaintiff alleges that there was a

Cir. -

Pg. 28

general conspiracy among all of the defendants to violate his

constitutional rights of freedom of speech, right to petition

the government and freedom of association and that “each

defendant may have contributed to the actions against

plaintiff, or at least interfered with the restoration of plaintiff

in some way.” He states that he is asserting claims such as

slander, libel, malicious prosecution, fraud, breach of

contract, theft and conversion of personal property,

interference with “prospective advantage,” intentional

infliction of emotional distress, breach of fiduciary duty and

negligence. Even taking Plaintiffs allegations as true,

however, he does not plead facts to support the elements of

these theories of liability or explain each individual

defendant’s participation. He does not allege facts showing

that a contract or fiduciary duty existed to be breached or that

a theft or conversion of property occurred. Likewise, he does

not allege facts stating a claim of malicious prosecution,

fraud, slander or libel. There are no well-pleaded facts

showing an intentional infliction of emotional distress or

negligence. It is also not clear what Plaintiff means by

“interference with prospective advantage.”

Plaintiff does not clarify his claims in his responses to

the motions to dismiss. Rather, he asserts that the

Defendants should know the claims against them because

they have more information than he does. He further states

that he “is not going to bet very specific when witnesses can

be tampered with and documents can succumb to the

evidence tampering device (shredder).” What is clear from

Plaintiff's pleadings is that he endeavored to sue every

person that he came into contact with in CAP, every person

that he submitted a grievance to, and everyone that he

believes should have known about his complaints and should

have done something for him.

In this case, Plaintiff has not adequately stated claims

upon which relief may be granted and he has not complied

with the September 29, 2005 Order to submit an amended

complaint with sufficient factual allegations and an

Pg. 29

explanation of the legal bases upon which he is relying to

seek relief. For these reasons, the undersigned finds that the

Motions to Dismiss should be granted and the complaint

should be dismissed with prejudice pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P.

12(b)(6) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b).

Recommendation

It is recommended that Defendant Civil Air Patrol,

Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss (document #15), Defendant Gary

Jackson’s Motion to Dismiss (document #161), Defendant

Henry Schlattner’s Motion to Dismiss (documents #195),

Defendant Civil Air Patrol, Inc. and Dennis Bennett’s

Renewed Motion to Dismiss (document #197) and Defendant

United States Air Force, the United States Department of

Defense, and All Federal Defendants in Their Official

Capacities’ Motion to Dismiss (document #198) be granted

and that the complaint be dismissed with prejudice.

Within ten (10) days after receipt of the magistrate

judge’s report, any party may serve and file written

objections to the findings and recommendations of the

magistrate judge.

A party’s failure to file written objections to the

findings, conclusions and recommendations contained in this

Report within ten days after service shall bar that party from

de novo review by the district judge of those findings,

conclusions and recommendations and, except upon grounds

of plain error, from attacking on appeal the unobjected-to

proposed factual findings and legal conclusions accepted and

adopted by the district court. Douglass v. United Services

Auto. Assn., 79 F.3d 1415, 1430 (5" Cir. 1996) (en banc).

Pg. 30

So ORDERED and SIGNED this 23 day of January,

2006.

// signed //

JUDITH K. GUTHRIE

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Pg. 31

APPENDIX D —- VERBATIM REFERNCES

U.S.C. Const. Amend. I — Freedom of Petition

U.S.C. Const. Amend. VII — Trial by Jury in Civil Cases

U.S.C. § 9447 — The Board of Governors is the governing

body of Civil Air Patrol. It may amend the CAP

constitution and bylaws. Four members are appointed

by the Secretary of the Air Force, and three are

appointed jointly by the Secretary and the president of

CAP.

10 U.S.C. § 9448 — The Secretary of the Air Force prescribes

regulations to administer this chapter, and that is

subject to approval of the Secretary of Defense

18 U.S.C. § 4~— Misprison of Felony

18 U.S.C. § 241 — Criminal offense: Conspiracy Against

Rights

18 U.S.C. § 245 (b)(1)(B&E) — Criminal offense:

Interference with Federally Protected Activities

28 U.S.C. § 1254 — Appellate cases may be reviewed by the

Supreme Court, by certiorari

28 U.S.C. § 1331 — District courts have original jurisdiction

over all cases arising under the laws or Constitution

of the United States

28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(1-2) — District courts have original

jurisdiction over cases to remedy civil rights

violations or harm resulting from a § 1985

Conspiracy Against Rights

28 U.S.C. § 1349 ~ District courts have jurisdiction regarding

corporations established by Congress, provided that

the U. S. owns a majority of its capital stock

28 U.S.C. § 1361 — District courts have the power of

mandamus, to compel government actors to fulfill

their responsibilities

Pg. 32

36 U.S.C. § 40303(a) — The rights and privileges of

membership in CAP are established in the CAP

constitution and bylaws.

36 U.S.C. § 40303(b) — The Board of Governors is the

governing body of CAP.

42 U.S.C. §§ 1985 and 1986 — Civil action: Conspiracy

Against Rights

AFI 10-2701, par. 1.4.4 — The Air Force’s CAP-USAF

commander approves or disapproves of every

corporate CAP policy

AFI 10-2701, par. 1.9.4 — The Air Force’s CAP-USAF

commander approves or disapproves of every

corporate CAP policy

AFI 10-2701, Attch #1, Al.2.6 — The administration,

activities, and business affairs of CAP are controlled

by its constitution, bylaws, and regulations. The Air

Force may regulate corporate activities to the extent

determined by Sec/AF.

AFI 10-2702, par. 2.5 — The Board of Governors, and the Air

Force actors thereon, have ultimate authority for the

Inspector General system.

AFI 10-2702, par. 2.6 — The Board of Governors, and the Air

Force actors thereon, have final authority over the

Membership Action Review Board (MARB) and will

oversee MARB cases.

AFI 10-2702, par. 4 — Prescribes the appointment of the Air

Force members of the Board of Governors, with four

being appointed solely by the Secretary of the Air

Force and three appointed jointly by the Secretary and

the president of CAP.

AFPD 10-27, par. 9.6 — The Air Force accomplishes its

funding, oversight, and control of CAP, and the

enforcement of the CAP-USAF Statement of Work,

via its CAP-USAF commander.

Pg. 33

AFPD 10-27, par. 9.8 — The Board of Governors, including

the Air Force actors thereon, is the governing body of

CAP.

SoW par. 2.3.1.1 — The Air Force and its CAP-USAF

commander have the authority to suspend

appropriated funds and mission authorizations to CAP

in cases of fraud or crime.

SoW par. 5.4.3 — If CAP has inadequate control of its funds

or resources, the Air Force may suspend appropriated

funds or resources to CAP.

SoW par. 7.1 — The Board of Governors, and its Air Force

actors, shall have final authority over the Inspector

General system.

SoW par. 7.1.2 - CAP must maintain a complaints and

whistleblower program similar to that of the Air

Force.

SoW par. 7.1.2.1 - CAP must provide whistleblower

protections, similar to those required in the Air Force.

SoW par. 11.2 — Air Force approval or disapproval of the

policies, programs, or activities of CAP shall be

accomplished through the Air Force’s CAP-USAF

commander. The Secretary of the Air Force may

delegate his authority in providing Air Force

assistance to CAP.

CAPR 35-3, Sect. A, par. 1b - CAP members must comply

with the CAP constitution, bylaws, and regulations.

CAPR 35-3, Sect. B, par. 4b - Members who fail to meet the

standards of behavior prescribed in par. | shall be

terminated.

CAPR 35-3, Sect. C, par. 5 — This policy allows for the

equivalent to the military’s Unlawful Command

Influence, whereby a superior may order a

subordinate to order the termination of another,

allowing the superior to be the approving authority

for the termination he ordered in the first place. It

Pg. 34

offsets any pretension of impartiality or fact-finding

in the termination appellate process.

CAPR 35-3, Sect. C, par. 6b — Superiors ordering a

termination must provide written notice, stating the

facts. |

CAPR 35-3 [Dec. 2002 ver.], Sect. D, par. 9(b)(1) — Victim

has the right to interview any witnesses at his

termination appeal hearing. The catch is that the

victim has no power of subpoena.

CAPR 123-2 [Sep. 1999 ver.], par. 4d — This policy,

approved by the Air Force, prohibits CAP members

from contacting government, specifically the

government oversight body that is the U. S. Air Force

CAPR 123-2 [May 2003 ver.], par. 6e — This new policy,

approved by the Air Force, prohibits CAP members

from contacting government, specifically the Air

Force actors on the Board of Governors.

os