Appendix — Haban v. United States (No. 06-1178)
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IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 05-12250
Non-Argument Calendar
D.C. Docket No. 02-21079-CV-KMM
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
ONE PIECE OF REALTY LOCATED AT
5800 S.W. 74TH AVENUE, MIAMI,
FLORIDA, more particularly described as
Lot3, Block 3,of Camner Estates
according to the Plat Book 58 at Page
21 of the public records of Dade
County, Florida together with all
appurtences thereto and all
Improvements thereon,
Defendant,
STEVEN HABAN,
Claimant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
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(May 25, 2005)
Before BARKETT, MARCUS and WILSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Steven Haban, the owner of the property in question,
appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor
of the government in an inrem civil forfeiture action, 21 U.S.C.
§ 881 (a)(7). The Government alleged in its complaint that the
property had been used to commit or facilitate the commission
fo a violation of the Controlled Substances Act. Police officers
investigating a marijuan{a]-growing operation conducted a
warrantless search of Haban’s residence and located 84
marijuana plants, 767 grams of marijuana, and $45,000 in cash.
On appeal, Haban first argues that the district court
clearly erred in finding that he voluntarily consented to the
search of his house and seeks suppression of the marijuana
evidence found therein. “A district court’s ruling on a motion
to suppress presents a mixed question of law and fact.” United
States v. Zapata, 180 F.3d 1237, 11240 (11th Cir. 1999). We
accept the district court’s factual findings as true unless the
findings are shown to be clearly erroneous. Id. “[A]ll facts are
construed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party
below.” United States v. Bervaldi, 226 F.3d 1256, 1262 (11th
Cir. 2000). The district court’s application of the law to the is
reviewed de novo. Id.
“Credibility determinations are typically the province of
the fact finder because the fact finder personally observes the
testimony an dis thus in a better position than a reviewing court
to assess the credibility of witnesses.” United States v.
Ramirez-Chilel, 289 F.3d 744, 749 (11th Cir. 2002). We have
held that a “trial judge’s choice of whom to believe is
conclusive on the appellate court unless the judge credits
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exceedingly improbable testimony.” Id. (internal citations and
punctuation omitted)(emphasis in original).
In this case, the magistrate found that the testimony of
Haban and his girlfriend was not credible, in light of their
denials and minimizations of their participation in any illegal
activity. Specifically, among other things, the court noted that
they claimed that much of the marijuana was for personal use
and denied any prior knowledge about the marijuana, but that
(1) Haban had admitted to growing 36 pounds of marijuana
over 9 months, worth $216,000, and it would have been
“virtually impossible” for him to consume that amount of
marijuana, (2) the residence smelled of marijuana, and (3) there
were marijuana growing apparatuses throughout the house.
Conversely, the magistrate judge credited the testimony of the
police officers and, based on the totality of the circumstances,
ultimately found that Haban had given voluntarily consented to
the search and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights. Because
the police officer’s testimony was not exceedingly improbable,
the district court did not err in finding her credible, and, thus,
did not err by finding that Haban voluntarily consented to the
search of his home.
Haban next argues that the district court erred in
denying him a de novo evidentiary hearing on his motions to
suppress the physical evidence and his confession. He
concedes that the Supreme Court has held that a district court
is not required to conduct a de novo evidentiary hearing on a
motion to suppress when a magistrate judge has conducted an
evidentiary hearing, but he asserts that the instant case is
distinguishable. He asserts that the Supreme Court only has
considered this question in relation to a confession, whereas,
here he seeks to suppress physical evidence. Alternatively, he
argues that the Supreme Court should overrule the existing
precedent. Finally, Haban contends that the district court
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abused its discretion in denying his motions without a hearing
because the police officers’ testimony was contradictory.
A district court judge may designate a magistrate to
conduct suppression hearings, but must “make a de novo
determination of those portions of the report or specified
proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is
made.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). The Supreme Court has held
that “the statute calls for ade novo determination, not a de novo
hearing.” United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 674 100
S.Cr. 2406, 2411, 65 L.Ed.2d 424 (1980). The Court noted that
the district court may, in its discretion, opt to conduct a de novo
evidentiary hearing. Id. at 676, 100 S.Ct. At 2413. We have
recognized that holding, noting that the district court’s statutory
obligation is satisfied “as long as the judge, rather than the
magistrate, exercised ‘ultimate adjudicatory power.” Profitt v
Wainwright, 685 F.2d 1227, 1237 (11th Cir. 1982). Because
the Supreme Court has held that a district court is not required
to conduct a de novo evidentiary hearing when a party objects
to a magistrate’s recommendations, the district court did not
abuse iis discretion by denying Haban a de novo evidentiary
hearing.
Finally, Haban filed a motion in the district court for
leave to file a supplemental answer to the complaint, asserting
that collateral estoppel was an affirmative defense that had not
been available at the time when he filed his initial answer.
Specifically, he argued that, since the time when he filed his
initial answer, the Florida state court had granted his motions
to suppress the same evidence in a criminal proceeding
stemming from the same activity. Consequently, Haban sought,
essentially, to enforce the state court ruling in the federal
proceedings. The district court denied the motion, and, on
appeal, Haban argues that we have accepted a policy of liberal
amendments in regard to supplemental pleading, and thus,
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because there was no good reason for denying leave to
supplement a pleading, the district court abused its discretion
in denying the motion. He asserts that there would have been
no prejudice to the government due to the amended pleading,
and a supplemental pleading was the appropriate vehicle for
asserting the defense of collateral estoppel. Next, he argues
that he only needed to show that the claim was potentially
meritorious, or not futile, and that a claim that may survive a
motion to dismiss is not futile. He states that the district court
appeared to find that his claim was futile, but the case to which
it cited did not stand for the proposition for which it was
offered. Finally, he argues, applying Florida law, all the
elements of collateral estoppel are present in the instant case.
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
Upon a motion of a party the court may, upon
reasonable notice and upon such terms as are just,
permit the party to serve a supplemental pleading
setting forth transactions or occurrences or events which
have happened since the date of the pleading sought to
be supplemented. Permission may be granted even
though the original pleading is defective in its statement
of a claim for relief or defense. If the court deems it
advisable that the adverse party plead to the
supplemental pleading, it shall so order, specifying the
time therefor.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(d). The district court’s application of Rule
15 is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Davenport v. United
States, 217 F.3d 1341, 1343 n.4 (11th Cir. 2000). We have
accepted a policy of liberal amendments and supplements to the
pleadings under Rule 15. See Harris v. Garner, 216 F.3d 970,
984 (11th Cir. 2000).
However, there is no error here. Because this Court
held, in an earlier appeal in this case, that a state court’s ruling
on a motion to suppress was not binding on the federal court,
the law-of-the-case doctrine barred the district court from
reconsidering the issue. Upon careful review of the record on
appeal and consolidation of the parties’ briefs, we discern no
reversible error in any of the claims asserted.
AFFIRMED.
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,
-VS.-
ONE PIECE OF REAL PROPERTY LOCATED AT 5800
SW 74™ AVENUE, MIAMI, FLORIDA, more particularly
described as Lot 3, Block 3 of camner estates according to
the Plat Book 58, at page 21 of the public records of Dade
County, Florida together with all appurtenances thereto and
all improvements thereon, Defendant,
STEPHEN HABAN, Defendant-Appellant
No. 03-11736
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
363 F.3d 1099
March 24, 2004, Filed
WILSON and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges, and Goldberg*,
Judge.
* Honorable Richard W. Goldberg, Judge, United States
Court of International Trade, sitting by designation.
OPINION BY: KRAVITCH
I. BACKGROUND
In June 2001, the Drug Enforcement Agency and
Miami-Dade police officers initiated an investigation into
possible marijuana cultivation and distribution activities at the
house of Stephen Haban, the defendant. Exactly what
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happened that day is not clear. According to the government,
several officers knocked on Haban’s front door. Haban’s
girlfriend responded and then went to find Haban. A few
minutes later, Haban, who had been in the shower,, stepped
outside wrapped in only a towel. The lead officer informed
Haban that they were investigating a marijuana tip and
presented Haben with a “consent-to-search” form and a
“Miranda rights” form. Haban initially had reservations about
waiving his Miranda rights and began to check the “no” box on
the form. When the police explained the rights more
thoroughly, Haban indicated his understanding. The officer
checked the box indicating a waiver and Haban initialed above
each checkmark. Haban also initialed a box stating that he was
“willing to answer [any] questions without having a lawyer
present,” and signed the Miranda form and the consent-to-
search form. The police commenced the search of Haban’s
house, finding eighty-four live marijuana plants, growing
equipment, 767 grams of processed marijuana, and $45,000 in
cash. During this time, Haban made several incriminating
remarks.
According to Haban, he did not voluntarily consent to
the search of his residence. Rather, he claims that he only
signed the consent-to-search form because th police refused to
allow him to speak to a lawyer, although he asked several
times. In addition, he claims that the police told him that he
would be forced to wait outside until the police obtained a
warrant, and once they obtained that warrant they would tear his
house apart and arrest his girlfriend.’
7 Based on the evidence seized during the search, Haban faced
criminal charges in a Florida state court. Haban filed a motion to suppress
the evidence obtained from the search. The Florida state court apparently
believed Haban’s account of the events and granted that motion. Federal
courts, however, are not bound by the state court’s decision. See Elkins v.
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The United States brought a forfeiture action, claiming
that Haban’s residence was used to commit, or facilitate the
commission of, a drug crime, in violation of 2/ U.S.C. § 881
(a)(7). On November 1, 2002, Haban filed a motion to
suppress the evidence seized during the search, and to suppress
the statements he made during the interview with law
enforcement agents. The magistrate judge held an evidentiary
hearing on January 14 and 16, 2003, and, on November 27,
2002, while the suppression motion was pending but prior to
the suppression hearing, the United States filed a motion for
summary judgment. Haban never responded to this motion and,
on January 31, 2003, the district court granted summary
judgment for the United States. At the same time, the district
court denied all pending motions, including Haban’s
suppression motion, as moot.
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW AND RULES OF LAW
We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment
de novo. Pennington v. City of Huntsville, 261 F.3d 1262,
1265 (11th Cir. 2001). We view the facts and inferences in the
light most favorable to the non-moving party. /d. Where “th
adverse party does not respond, summary judgment, if
appropriate, shall be entered against the adverse party.” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56(e) (emphasis added). Thus, summary judgment,
even when unopposed, can only be entered when “appropriate.”
Summary judgment is appropriate where the “pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
United States, 364 U.S. 206, 2323-24, 4 L 4. Ed. 23 1669, 80S. Ct. 1437
(1960); United States vy. Perchitti, 955 F. 2d 674, 675 (11th Cir. 1992).
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56(c) (emphasis added). Thus, the district court cannot base the
entry of summary judgment on the mere act that the motion wsa
unopposed, but, rather, must consider the merits of the motion.
See Dunlap v. Transamerica Occidental Live Ins. Co., 858 F.2d
629, 632 (11th Cir. 1988) (per curiam). The district court need
not sua sponte review all of the evidentiary materials on file at
the time the motion is granted, but must ensure that the motion
itself is supported by evidentiary materials. See id. At the
least, the district court must review all of the evidentiary
materials submitted in support of the motion for summary
judgment. Jaroma v. Massey, 873 F.2d 17, 20 (Ist Cir. 1989)
(per curiam) (“The district court cannot grant a motion for
summary judgment merely for lack of any response by the
opposing party, since the district court must review the motion
and the supporting papers to determine whether they establish
the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.”). In addition,
so that there can be an effective review of the case on appeal,
the district court’s order granting summary judgment must
“indicate that the merits of the motion were addressed.”
Dunlap, 858 F.2d at 632.
Finally, local rules cannot provide that summary
® The district court’s order granting summary judgment, in relevant
portion, stated only that: “THE COURT has considered the Motion, the
pertinent portions of the record, and is otherwise fully advised of the
premises. It appearing that the Defendant has not responded to the motion
for Summary Judgment, it is ADJUDGED that the motion is, GRANTED
by default.” Although the order states that the district court considered the
“pertinent portions of the record,” from this language, we cannot determine
specifically which portions of the record the district court actually
considered. Moreover, the fact that the court granted summary judgment
“by default” suggests that the district court may not have reviewed all the
required portions of the record. We need not decide the case on this basis,
however, because our review of the records convinces us that there is a
genuine issue of material fact that made summary judgment inappropriate.
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judgment by default is appropriate. Rule 83 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure requires that local rules be consistent
with the Federal Rules. If a local rule purports to allow
summary judgment to be granted by default, the rule is
impermissible.
Ii]. ANALYSIS
A review of the record indicates that there was a was a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether the search of
Haban’s house was legal, which made summary judgment
inappropriate. The government represents that the search of
Haban’s house was a valid consent search, but the deposition of
Haban’s girlfriend contradicts this proposition, indicating that
there is a genuine issue ofmaterial fact as to whether Haban
voluntarily consented to the search of his house, and therefore,
whether the search was legal.’ The government’s summary
judgment motion states: “On June 15, 2001, a consent search
was executed at the defendant property .. .” Similarly, the
government’s “Statement of Undisputed Facts in Support of its
Motion for Summary Judgment” reads: “Steven J. Haban
answered the door and provided oral and written consent to
search the defendant property.” The deposition of Beth
Yannuci Fhmie, Haban’s girlfriend, however, suggests that
Haban’s consent was involuntary. Her deposition was attached
to the government’s motion for summary judgment. '°
Fahmie’s deposition statements suggest that the
9 The Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule applies in civil
forfeiture actions. One 1958 Plymouth Sedon v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S.
693, 14 L. Ed. 2d 170, 85S. Ct. 1246 (1965). Without the evidence from
the search, there is no evidence to support the government’s position.
© We confine our review of the record in this case to the materials
submitted by the United States in support of its summary judgment motion.
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circumstances under which Haban consented to the search may
have been coercive. Fahmie was present during the events
leading up to the search. She stated that, a short while after
summoning Haban, someone called her to the front door. As
she was walking to the front door, an officer with a gun greeted
her and escorted her outside. Once outside, Fahmie heard
Haban ask to speak with an attorney several times, but, each
time, the officers refused to allow him to do so. According to
Fhmie, the police also refused Haban’s request to make a
telephone call and his request to obtain more clothing.'' In
addition, she alleged that the police told Haban he had to sign
the consent-to-search form, and, if he did not do so, he would
be forced to wait until they got a warrant, at which time they
would “tear his house apart and arrest his girlfriend.” Finally,
she claimed that when Haban “went to sign the [form]”, the
police said “no, no, no, not there,” and had him resign it.
Apparently, Haban began to sign the blank that indicated a
refusal to waive his rights and consent to the search. The
police, however, allegedly stopped him, and only then did he
sign the blank indicating that the was aware of, and waived, his
rights. These facts, if true, indicate that the search was not
consensual and that its eventual occurrence was, therefore,
illegal. Thus, Sahmie’s deposition creates a genuine issue of
material fact as to what happened on the day of the search, and
as to whether the search was legal.'* Summary judgment
'' Haban was still dressed in only a towel.
2 The government contends that, under the local rules, its
Statement of Undisputed Facts was “deemed admitted” by Haban because
it was not “controverted by the opposing party’s statement.” S.D. Fla. L.R.
7.5(D). Such facts are only “deemed admitted . . . to the extent [that they
are] supported by specific references to the [record].” Id. The government
supports its statements with citations to the record, and, thus, under the local
rule, they would appear to be admitted. The district court must, howevere
review the record and determine if there is, indeed, no genuine issue of
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should not have been granted on such a record.”
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the decision of the
district court granting the government’s motion for summary
judgment. We remand the case for proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
REVERSED and REMANDED
material fact. Because a review of the record indicates a disputed issue of
material fact, summary judgment could not be granted. To the extent that
Local Rule 7.5(D) permits the district court to grant summary judgment
without a review of hte record, that rule is inconsistent with Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 56, and therefore, void.
We also note that the government’s summary judgment motion
acknowledged that summary judgment would not be appropriate if the
evidence obtained from the search was suppressed. The motion stated:
“Should the court deny claimant’s [suppression] motion, then this Motion
for Summary Judgment is ripe of consideration and ruling.” (Emphasis
add.)
In addition, we recognize that Haban filed objections to the
magistrate’s recommendation on the suppression issue. Although required
to do so, the district court did not make a de novo review of these
objections. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)
13 As stated above, supra n.3 , the evidence from the search is
necessary to support the government’s position. The district court should
have ruled on the suppression motion prior to considering the government’s
summary judgment motion in order to determine what evidence it could
consider on summary judgment.
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IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE
ELEVENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT OF
FLORIDA IN AND FOR MIAMI-
DADE COUNTY
CRIMINAL DIVISION
CASE NO: F01-18879
THE STATE OF FLORIDA
Plaintiff,
vs.
STEPHEN HABAN,
Defendant.
/
Order Granting Defendant’s Motion to Suppress Physical
Evidence and Motion to Suppress Defendant’s Statements
THIS CAUSE came before this Court on December 20,
2002, for an evidentiary hearing on Defendant’s Motion to
Suppress Physical Evidence and Motion to Suppress
Defendant’s Statements.
For the purposes of the hearing, the parties stipulated
that the house’ which was searched, was owned and
' A single family dwelling located at 5800 S.W. 74th Avenue,
Miami-Dade County, Florida.
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occupied by the Defendant, Stephen Haban? and that the
search was conducted without a warrant.
Having considered the testimony of all witnesses,
photographs, the Miranda rights waiver form, the consent
to search form, the argument of counsel and the applicable
authority, the court makes the following findings of fact’:
FINDINGS OF FAC
1. As a result of a mere tip’, at approximately
11:50 am, several police officers’ approached the front
door of the Defendant’s home.
2. In order to reach the front door, the officers
had to enter through a closed wooden gate, which blocks
the walkway between the door and the sidewalk.
3. The officers knocked on the front door and
the Defendant’s friend, Beth Fahmie, who was inside,
went to summon the Defendant who was taking a shower.
4. The Defendant, wet and clothed only in a
towel around his waist, went to the door and observed the
officers on his front porch.
5. The Defendant looked through a small
. Accordingly, the Defendant has standing to contest the legality
of the search.
> The court specifically finds all testimony which is inconsistent
with these findings to not be credible or worth of belief.
* There was no testimony suggesting the tip was from a reliable
source or that it was corroborated in any way.
5 ;
There were between six and seven armed officers.
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window in the front door and could see Detective Donnelly
holding papers in her hand.
6. One of the officers told the Defendant to
open the door because they wanted to speak with him.
; The Defendant complied with the instruction
to open the door by unlocking it and opening the door
approximately eight inches.
8. The police claim that when the Defendant
opened the door they could smell the odor of marijuana.
As will be explained later, this testimony is not credible
and is rejected.
9. The officers then told the Defendant that
they had information that marijuana was being grown in
the home and that they wanted him to come outside, onto
the front porch (dripping wet and virtually naked - dressed
only in a towel) so they could talk to him.
10. The Defendant again complied with the
instruction and exited his home and was directed to a table
to be interviewed by the only female police officer present,
where he was essentially surrounded by the other officers.
11. This court specifically finds the Defendant
to be educated, intelligent and eloquent.
12. The Defendant was then presented with both
the Miranda rights waiver form and the consent to search
form. His attention was directed first to the Miranda form.
13. The Miranda form presented to the
Defendant contains each right separately set forth. After
each, there si a “yes” with a blank space to indicate a lack
of understanding of that right. The Defendant was
supposed to place his initials on either the yes or no blank
space according to whether he understood that right or not.
14. With respect to the first right on that form
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(i.e. the right to remain silent) the Defendant tried to place
his initials in the “no” space but was interrupted and
prevented by the police from doing so. The form contains
the Defendant’s partial initials in the “no” space.
15. |The Defendant’s claim that he tried to initial
the “no” with a blank space because he did not wish to
waive his rights, is credible and is believed.
16. Thereafter, Detective Donnelly placed a
check mark next to each “yes” blank and instructed the
Defendant to place his initials next to each mark. The
Defendant complied with this instruction.
17. Prior to the Defendant’s execution of the
consent to search form, the police informed him that they
would obtain a warrant if he refused.
18. Afterthe Defendant signed both the Miranda
form and the consent to search form he “confessed” and
told the police where the marijuana plants and other
contraband were located.
19. Detective Robbins and a drug sniffing dog
then approached and entered the residence. Apparently,
the drug sniffing dog has a very limited abilities since it
did not “alert” upon approaching the door and thus the dog
could not smell the marijuana all the officers claimed they
could smell. For this reason the claim by the officers that
they could smell the marijuana when the Defendant
opened the door is rejected and is not believed.
20. Det. Robbins exited the house and informed
the other officers that the dog had alerted at several
locations within the home.
21. The police then searched the home and
seized growing marijuana plants, money, and other
contraband.
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CONCLUSION
Assessing the objective circumstances of the
situation from the perspective of a reasonable person in the
Defendant’s position, this court finds that the Defendant’s
freedom of action was deprived in a significant way and
that he was thus in custody at the time of his interrogation.
In Miranda v. Arizona’, the Supreme Court held that a
Defendant’s statement may not be introduced in evidence
unless the prosecution shows that the accused voluntarily,
knowingly and intelligently waived his right to remain
silent as guaranteed under the Fifth Amendment to the
Constitution. The State has failed in this showing and this
court finds that Defendant actually tried to exercise his
right to remain silent, but was prevented from doing so.
The court finds that the Miranda rights wavier form was
not executed voluntarily and that the Defendant’s
statements were not voluntarily made.
Because a warrantless search is per se unreasonable
under the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution’, the
State has attempted to show that the search was sub judice
was conducted pursuant to the Defendant’s voluntary
consent. It is well-settled that consent is not voluntary if
given only in acquiescence to a claim of lawful authority*.
Therefore, a warrantless search may not be justified on the
basis of consent that is given only after the police claim
that they have possession of a warrant or that one can be
® 384 U.S. 436 (1984).
” Jorgenson v. State, 714 So. 2d 423 (Fla. 1998).
5 Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968).
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obtained if necessary’. Here, once again, the totality of the
circumstances show that the consent to search was not
freely and voluntarily given and that it was given, at best,
because the Defendant acquiesced to the show of authority
after he was escorted out of his house, in daylight, in view
of his neighbors while virtually naked and surrounded and
questioned by both male and female officers.
It is therefore, ORDERED and ADJUDGED that
Defendant’s Motion to Suppress Physical Evidence and
Motion to Suppress Defendant’s statements is hereby
GRANTED.
DONE and ORDERED in Miami-Dade County,
Florida this 7th day of January, 2003.
Pedro P. Echarte, Jr.
Circuit Court Judge
” See e.g. U.S. v. Tovar-Rico, 61 F3d 1529 (11th Cir. 1995).
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IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 05-12250
D.C. Docket No. 02-21079-CV-KMM
Filed November 16, 2006
Thomas K. Kahn, Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
ONE PIECE OF REALTY LOCATED AT
5800 S.W. 74TH AVENUE, MIAMI,
FLORIDA, more particularly described as
Lot3, Block 3,of Camner Estates
according to the Plat Book 58 at Page
21 of the public records of Dade
County, Florida together with all
appurtences thereto and all
Improvements thereon,
Defendant,
STEVEN HABAN,
Claimant-Appellant.
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ON _PETITION(S) FOR REHEARING AND
PETITION(S) FOR REHEARING EN BANC
Before: BARKETT, MARCUS and WILSON, Circuit
Judges.
PER CURIAM:
The Petition(s) for Rehearing are DENIED and no Judge
in regular active service on the Court having requested that
the Court be polled on rehearing en banc (Rule 35, Federal
Rules of Appellate Procedure), the Petition(s) for
Rehearing En Banc are DENIED.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT:
Rosemary Barkett
UNITED STATES CIRCUIT JUDGE
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