Appendix — Haban v. United States (No. 06-1178)

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IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

No. 05-12250

Non-Argument Calendar

D.C. Docket No. 02-21079-CV-KMM

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

ONE PIECE OF REALTY LOCATED AT

5800 S.W. 74TH AVENUE, MIAMI,

FLORIDA, more particularly described as

Lot3, Block 3,of Camner Estates

according to the Plat Book 58 at Page

21 of the public records of Dade

County, Florida together with all

appurtences thereto and all

Improvements thereon,

Defendant,

STEVEN HABAN,

Claimant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

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(May 25, 2005)

Before BARKETT, MARCUS and WILSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Steven Haban, the owner of the property in question,

appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor

of the government in an inrem civil forfeiture action, 21 U.S.C.

§ 881 (a)(7). The Government alleged in its complaint that the

property had been used to commit or facilitate the commission

fo a violation of the Controlled Substances Act. Police officers

investigating a marijuan{a]-growing operation conducted a

warrantless search of Haban’s residence and located 84

marijuana plants, 767 grams of marijuana, and $45,000 in cash.

On appeal, Haban first argues that the district court

clearly erred in finding that he voluntarily consented to the

search of his house and seeks suppression of the marijuana

evidence found therein. “A district court’s ruling on a motion

to suppress presents a mixed question of law and fact.” United

States v. Zapata, 180 F.3d 1237, 11240 (11th Cir. 1999). We

accept the district court’s factual findings as true unless the

findings are shown to be clearly erroneous. Id. “[A]ll facts are

construed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party

below.” United States v. Bervaldi, 226 F.3d 1256, 1262 (11th

Cir. 2000). The district court’s application of the law to the is

reviewed de novo. Id.

“Credibility determinations are typically the province of

the fact finder because the fact finder personally observes the

testimony an dis thus in a better position than a reviewing court

to assess the credibility of witnesses.” United States v.

Ramirez-Chilel, 289 F.3d 744, 749 (11th Cir. 2002). We have

held that a “trial judge’s choice of whom to believe is

conclusive on the appellate court unless the judge credits

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exceedingly improbable testimony.” Id. (internal citations and

punctuation omitted)(emphasis in original).

In this case, the magistrate found that the testimony of

Haban and his girlfriend was not credible, in light of their

denials and minimizations of their participation in any illegal

activity. Specifically, among other things, the court noted that

they claimed that much of the marijuana was for personal use

and denied any prior knowledge about the marijuana, but that

(1) Haban had admitted to growing 36 pounds of marijuana

over 9 months, worth $216,000, and it would have been

“virtually impossible” for him to consume that amount of

marijuana, (2) the residence smelled of marijuana, and (3) there

were marijuana growing apparatuses throughout the house.

Conversely, the magistrate judge credited the testimony of the

police officers and, based on the totality of the circumstances,

ultimately found that Haban had given voluntarily consented to

the search and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights. Because

the police officer’s testimony was not exceedingly improbable,

the district court did not err in finding her credible, and, thus,

did not err by finding that Haban voluntarily consented to the

search of his home.

Haban next argues that the district court erred in

denying him a de novo evidentiary hearing on his motions to

suppress the physical evidence and his confession. He

concedes that the Supreme Court has held that a district court

is not required to conduct a de novo evidentiary hearing on a

motion to suppress when a magistrate judge has conducted an

evidentiary hearing, but he asserts that the instant case is

distinguishable. He asserts that the Supreme Court only has

considered this question in relation to a confession, whereas,

here he seeks to suppress physical evidence. Alternatively, he

argues that the Supreme Court should overrule the existing

precedent. Finally, Haban contends that the district court

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abused its discretion in denying his motions without a hearing

because the police officers’ testimony was contradictory.

A district court judge may designate a magistrate to

conduct suppression hearings, but must “make a de novo

determination of those portions of the report or specified

proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is

made.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). The Supreme Court has held

that “the statute calls for ade novo determination, not a de novo

hearing.” United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 674 100

S.Cr. 2406, 2411, 65 L.Ed.2d 424 (1980). The Court noted that

the district court may, in its discretion, opt to conduct a de novo

evidentiary hearing. Id. at 676, 100 S.Ct. At 2413. We have

recognized that holding, noting that the district court’s statutory

obligation is satisfied “as long as the judge, rather than the

magistrate, exercised ‘ultimate adjudicatory power.” Profitt v

Wainwright, 685 F.2d 1227, 1237 (11th Cir. 1982). Because

the Supreme Court has held that a district court is not required

to conduct a de novo evidentiary hearing when a party objects

to a magistrate’s recommendations, the district court did not

abuse iis discretion by denying Haban a de novo evidentiary

hearing.

Finally, Haban filed a motion in the district court for

leave to file a supplemental answer to the complaint, asserting

that collateral estoppel was an affirmative defense that had not

been available at the time when he filed his initial answer.

Specifically, he argued that, since the time when he filed his

initial answer, the Florida state court had granted his motions

to suppress the same evidence in a criminal proceeding

stemming from the same activity. Consequently, Haban sought,

essentially, to enforce the state court ruling in the federal

proceedings. The district court denied the motion, and, on

appeal, Haban argues that we have accepted a policy of liberal

amendments in regard to supplemental pleading, and thus,

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because there was no good reason for denying leave to

supplement a pleading, the district court abused its discretion

in denying the motion. He asserts that there would have been

no prejudice to the government due to the amended pleading,

and a supplemental pleading was the appropriate vehicle for

asserting the defense of collateral estoppel. Next, he argues

that he only needed to show that the claim was potentially

meritorious, or not futile, and that a claim that may survive a

motion to dismiss is not futile. He states that the district court

appeared to find that his claim was futile, but the case to which

it cited did not stand for the proposition for which it was

offered. Finally, he argues, applying Florida law, all the

elements of collateral estoppel are present in the instant case.

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

Upon a motion of a party the court may, upon

reasonable notice and upon such terms as are just,

permit the party to serve a supplemental pleading

setting forth transactions or occurrences or events which

have happened since the date of the pleading sought to

be supplemented. Permission may be granted even

though the original pleading is defective in its statement

of a claim for relief or defense. If the court deems it

advisable that the adverse party plead to the

supplemental pleading, it shall so order, specifying the

time therefor.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(d). The district court’s application of Rule

15 is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Davenport v. United

States, 217 F.3d 1341, 1343 n.4 (11th Cir. 2000). We have

accepted a policy of liberal amendments and supplements to the

pleadings under Rule 15. See Harris v. Garner, 216 F.3d 970,

984 (11th Cir. 2000).

However, there is no error here. Because this Court

held, in an earlier appeal in this case, that a state court’s ruling

on a motion to suppress was not binding on the federal court,

the law-of-the-case doctrine barred the district court from

reconsidering the issue. Upon careful review of the record on

appeal and consolidation of the parties’ briefs, we discern no

reversible error in any of the claims asserted.

AFFIRMED.

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

-VS.-

ONE PIECE OF REAL PROPERTY LOCATED AT 5800

SW 74™ AVENUE, MIAMI, FLORIDA, more particularly

described as Lot 3, Block 3 of camner estates according to

the Plat Book 58, at page 21 of the public records of Dade

County, Florida together with all appurtenances thereto and

all improvements thereon, Defendant,

STEPHEN HABAN, Defendant-Appellant

No. 03-11736

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

363 F.3d 1099

March 24, 2004, Filed

WILSON and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges, and Goldberg*,

Judge.

* Honorable Richard W. Goldberg, Judge, United States

Court of International Trade, sitting by designation.

OPINION BY: KRAVITCH

I. BACKGROUND

In June 2001, the Drug Enforcement Agency and

Miami-Dade police officers initiated an investigation into

possible marijuana cultivation and distribution activities at the

house of Stephen Haban, the defendant. Exactly what

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happened that day is not clear. According to the government,

several officers knocked on Haban’s front door. Haban’s

girlfriend responded and then went to find Haban. A few

minutes later, Haban, who had been in the shower,, stepped

outside wrapped in only a towel. The lead officer informed

Haban that they were investigating a marijuana tip and

presented Haben with a “consent-to-search” form and a

“Miranda rights” form. Haban initially had reservations about

waiving his Miranda rights and began to check the “no” box on

the form. When the police explained the rights more

thoroughly, Haban indicated his understanding. The officer

checked the box indicating a waiver and Haban initialed above

each checkmark. Haban also initialed a box stating that he was

“willing to answer [any] questions without having a lawyer

present,” and signed the Miranda form and the consent-to-

search form. The police commenced the search of Haban’s

house, finding eighty-four live marijuana plants, growing

equipment, 767 grams of processed marijuana, and $45,000 in

cash. During this time, Haban made several incriminating

remarks.

According to Haban, he did not voluntarily consent to

the search of his residence. Rather, he claims that he only

signed the consent-to-search form because th police refused to

allow him to speak to a lawyer, although he asked several

times. In addition, he claims that the police told him that he

would be forced to wait outside until the police obtained a

warrant, and once they obtained that warrant they would tear his

house apart and arrest his girlfriend.’

7 Based on the evidence seized during the search, Haban faced

criminal charges in a Florida state court. Haban filed a motion to suppress

the evidence obtained from the search. The Florida state court apparently

believed Haban’s account of the events and granted that motion. Federal

courts, however, are not bound by the state court’s decision. See Elkins v.

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The United States brought a forfeiture action, claiming

that Haban’s residence was used to commit, or facilitate the

commission of, a drug crime, in violation of 2/ U.S.C. § 881

(a)(7). On November 1, 2002, Haban filed a motion to

suppress the evidence seized during the search, and to suppress

the statements he made during the interview with law

enforcement agents. The magistrate judge held an evidentiary

hearing on January 14 and 16, 2003, and, on November 27,

2002, while the suppression motion was pending but prior to

the suppression hearing, the United States filed a motion for

summary judgment. Haban never responded to this motion and,

on January 31, 2003, the district court granted summary

judgment for the United States. At the same time, the district

court denied all pending motions, including Haban’s

suppression motion, as moot.

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW AND RULES OF LAW

We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment

de novo. Pennington v. City of Huntsville, 261 F.3d 1262,

1265 (11th Cir. 2001). We view the facts and inferences in the

light most favorable to the non-moving party. /d. Where “th

adverse party does not respond, summary judgment, if

appropriate, shall be entered against the adverse party.” Fed.

R. Civ. P. 56(e) (emphasis added). Thus, summary judgment,

even when unopposed, can only be entered when “appropriate.”

Summary judgment is appropriate where the “pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,

together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

United States, 364 U.S. 206, 2323-24, 4 L 4. Ed. 23 1669, 80S. Ct. 1437

(1960); United States vy. Perchitti, 955 F. 2d 674, 675 (11th Cir. 1992).

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56(c) (emphasis added). Thus, the district court cannot base the

entry of summary judgment on the mere act that the motion wsa

unopposed, but, rather, must consider the merits of the motion.

See Dunlap v. Transamerica Occidental Live Ins. Co., 858 F.2d

629, 632 (11th Cir. 1988) (per curiam). The district court need

not sua sponte review all of the evidentiary materials on file at

the time the motion is granted, but must ensure that the motion

itself is supported by evidentiary materials. See id. At the

least, the district court must review all of the evidentiary

materials submitted in support of the motion for summary

judgment. Jaroma v. Massey, 873 F.2d 17, 20 (Ist Cir. 1989)

(per curiam) (“The district court cannot grant a motion for

summary judgment merely for lack of any response by the

opposing party, since the district court must review the motion

and the supporting papers to determine whether they establish

the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.”). In addition,

so that there can be an effective review of the case on appeal,

the district court’s order granting summary judgment must

“indicate that the merits of the motion were addressed.”

Dunlap, 858 F.2d at 632.

Finally, local rules cannot provide that summary

® The district court’s order granting summary judgment, in relevant

portion, stated only that: “THE COURT has considered the Motion, the

pertinent portions of the record, and is otherwise fully advised of the

premises. It appearing that the Defendant has not responded to the motion

for Summary Judgment, it is ADJUDGED that the motion is, GRANTED

by default.” Although the order states that the district court considered the

“pertinent portions of the record,” from this language, we cannot determine

specifically which portions of the record the district court actually

considered. Moreover, the fact that the court granted summary judgment

“by default” suggests that the district court may not have reviewed all the

required portions of the record. We need not decide the case on this basis,

however, because our review of the records convinces us that there is a

genuine issue of material fact that made summary judgment inappropriate.

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judgment by default is appropriate. Rule 83 of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure requires that local rules be consistent

with the Federal Rules. If a local rule purports to allow

summary judgment to be granted by default, the rule is

impermissible.

Ii]. ANALYSIS

A review of the record indicates that there was a was a

genuine issue of material fact as to whether the search of

Haban’s house was legal, which made summary judgment

inappropriate. The government represents that the search of

Haban’s house was a valid consent search, but the deposition of

Haban’s girlfriend contradicts this proposition, indicating that

there is a genuine issue ofmaterial fact as to whether Haban

voluntarily consented to the search of his house, and therefore,

whether the search was legal.’ The government’s summary

judgment motion states: “On June 15, 2001, a consent search

was executed at the defendant property .. .” Similarly, the

government’s “Statement of Undisputed Facts in Support of its

Motion for Summary Judgment” reads: “Steven J. Haban

answered the door and provided oral and written consent to

search the defendant property.” The deposition of Beth

Yannuci Fhmie, Haban’s girlfriend, however, suggests that

Haban’s consent was involuntary. Her deposition was attached

to the government’s motion for summary judgment. '°

Fahmie’s deposition statements suggest that the

9 The Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule applies in civil

forfeiture actions. One 1958 Plymouth Sedon v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S.

693, 14 L. Ed. 2d 170, 85S. Ct. 1246 (1965). Without the evidence from

the search, there is no evidence to support the government’s position.

© We confine our review of the record in this case to the materials

submitted by the United States in support of its summary judgment motion.

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circumstances under which Haban consented to the search may

have been coercive. Fahmie was present during the events

leading up to the search. She stated that, a short while after

summoning Haban, someone called her to the front door. As

she was walking to the front door, an officer with a gun greeted

her and escorted her outside. Once outside, Fahmie heard

Haban ask to speak with an attorney several times, but, each

time, the officers refused to allow him to do so. According to

Fhmie, the police also refused Haban’s request to make a

telephone call and his request to obtain more clothing.'' In

addition, she alleged that the police told Haban he had to sign

the consent-to-search form, and, if he did not do so, he would

be forced to wait until they got a warrant, at which time they

would “tear his house apart and arrest his girlfriend.” Finally,

she claimed that when Haban “went to sign the [form]”, the

police said “no, no, no, not there,” and had him resign it.

Apparently, Haban began to sign the blank that indicated a

refusal to waive his rights and consent to the search. The

police, however, allegedly stopped him, and only then did he

sign the blank indicating that the was aware of, and waived, his

rights. These facts, if true, indicate that the search was not

consensual and that its eventual occurrence was, therefore,

illegal. Thus, Sahmie’s deposition creates a genuine issue of

material fact as to what happened on the day of the search, and

as to whether the search was legal.'* Summary judgment

'' Haban was still dressed in only a towel.

2 The government contends that, under the local rules, its

Statement of Undisputed Facts was “deemed admitted” by Haban because

it was not “controverted by the opposing party’s statement.” S.D. Fla. L.R.

7.5(D). Such facts are only “deemed admitted . . . to the extent [that they

are] supported by specific references to the [record].” Id. The government

supports its statements with citations to the record, and, thus, under the local

rule, they would appear to be admitted. The district court must, howevere

review the record and determine if there is, indeed, no genuine issue of

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should not have been granted on such a record.”

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the decision of the

district court granting the government’s motion for summary

judgment. We remand the case for proceedings consistent with

this opinion.

REVERSED and REMANDED

material fact. Because a review of the record indicates a disputed issue of

material fact, summary judgment could not be granted. To the extent that

Local Rule 7.5(D) permits the district court to grant summary judgment

without a review of hte record, that rule is inconsistent with Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 56, and therefore, void.

We also note that the government’s summary judgment motion

acknowledged that summary judgment would not be appropriate if the

evidence obtained from the search was suppressed. The motion stated:

“Should the court deny claimant’s [suppression] motion, then this Motion

for Summary Judgment is ripe of consideration and ruling.” (Emphasis

add.)

In addition, we recognize that Haban filed objections to the

magistrate’s recommendation on the suppression issue. Although required

to do so, the district court did not make a de novo review of these

objections. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)

13 As stated above, supra n.3 , the evidence from the search is

necessary to support the government’s position. The district court should

have ruled on the suppression motion prior to considering the government’s

summary judgment motion in order to determine what evidence it could

consider on summary judgment.

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IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE

ELEVENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT OF

FLORIDA IN AND FOR MIAMI-

DADE COUNTY

CRIMINAL DIVISION

CASE NO: F01-18879

THE STATE OF FLORIDA

Plaintiff,

vs.

STEPHEN HABAN,

Defendant.

/

Order Granting Defendant’s Motion to Suppress Physical

Evidence and Motion to Suppress Defendant’s Statements

THIS CAUSE came before this Court on December 20,

2002, for an evidentiary hearing on Defendant’s Motion to

Suppress Physical Evidence and Motion to Suppress

Defendant’s Statements.

For the purposes of the hearing, the parties stipulated

that the house’ which was searched, was owned and

' A single family dwelling located at 5800 S.W. 74th Avenue,

Miami-Dade County, Florida.

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occupied by the Defendant, Stephen Haban? and that the

search was conducted without a warrant.

Having considered the testimony of all witnesses,

photographs, the Miranda rights waiver form, the consent

to search form, the argument of counsel and the applicable

authority, the court makes the following findings of fact’:

FINDINGS OF FAC

1. As a result of a mere tip’, at approximately

11:50 am, several police officers’ approached the front

door of the Defendant’s home.

2. In order to reach the front door, the officers

had to enter through a closed wooden gate, which blocks

the walkway between the door and the sidewalk.

3. The officers knocked on the front door and

the Defendant’s friend, Beth Fahmie, who was inside,

went to summon the Defendant who was taking a shower.

4. The Defendant, wet and clothed only in a

towel around his waist, went to the door and observed the

officers on his front porch.

5. The Defendant looked through a small

. Accordingly, the Defendant has standing to contest the legality

of the search.

> The court specifically finds all testimony which is inconsistent

with these findings to not be credible or worth of belief.

* There was no testimony suggesting the tip was from a reliable

source or that it was corroborated in any way.

5 ;

There were between six and seven armed officers.

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window in the front door and could see Detective Donnelly

holding papers in her hand.

6. One of the officers told the Defendant to

open the door because they wanted to speak with him.

; The Defendant complied with the instruction

to open the door by unlocking it and opening the door

approximately eight inches.

8. The police claim that when the Defendant

opened the door they could smell the odor of marijuana.

As will be explained later, this testimony is not credible

and is rejected.

9. The officers then told the Defendant that

they had information that marijuana was being grown in

the home and that they wanted him to come outside, onto

the front porch (dripping wet and virtually naked - dressed

only in a towel) so they could talk to him.

10. The Defendant again complied with the

instruction and exited his home and was directed to a table

to be interviewed by the only female police officer present,

where he was essentially surrounded by the other officers.

11. This court specifically finds the Defendant

to be educated, intelligent and eloquent.

12. The Defendant was then presented with both

the Miranda rights waiver form and the consent to search

form. His attention was directed first to the Miranda form.

13. The Miranda form presented to the

Defendant contains each right separately set forth. After

each, there si a “yes” with a blank space to indicate a lack

of understanding of that right. The Defendant was

supposed to place his initials on either the yes or no blank

space according to whether he understood that right or not.

14. With respect to the first right on that form

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(i.e. the right to remain silent) the Defendant tried to place

his initials in the “no” space but was interrupted and

prevented by the police from doing so. The form contains

the Defendant’s partial initials in the “no” space.

15. |The Defendant’s claim that he tried to initial

the “no” with a blank space because he did not wish to

waive his rights, is credible and is believed.

16. Thereafter, Detective Donnelly placed a

check mark next to each “yes” blank and instructed the

Defendant to place his initials next to each mark. The

Defendant complied with this instruction.

17. Prior to the Defendant’s execution of the

consent to search form, the police informed him that they

would obtain a warrant if he refused.

18. Afterthe Defendant signed both the Miranda

form and the consent to search form he “confessed” and

told the police where the marijuana plants and other

contraband were located.

19. Detective Robbins and a drug sniffing dog

then approached and entered the residence. Apparently,

the drug sniffing dog has a very limited abilities since it

did not “alert” upon approaching the door and thus the dog

could not smell the marijuana all the officers claimed they

could smell. For this reason the claim by the officers that

they could smell the marijuana when the Defendant

opened the door is rejected and is not believed.

20. Det. Robbins exited the house and informed

the other officers that the dog had alerted at several

locations within the home.

21. The police then searched the home and

seized growing marijuana plants, money, and other

contraband.

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CONCLUSION

Assessing the objective circumstances of the

situation from the perspective of a reasonable person in the

Defendant’s position, this court finds that the Defendant’s

freedom of action was deprived in a significant way and

that he was thus in custody at the time of his interrogation.

In Miranda v. Arizona’, the Supreme Court held that a

Defendant’s statement may not be introduced in evidence

unless the prosecution shows that the accused voluntarily,

knowingly and intelligently waived his right to remain

silent as guaranteed under the Fifth Amendment to the

Constitution. The State has failed in this showing and this

court finds that Defendant actually tried to exercise his

right to remain silent, but was prevented from doing so.

The court finds that the Miranda rights wavier form was

not executed voluntarily and that the Defendant’s

statements were not voluntarily made.

Because a warrantless search is per se unreasonable

under the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution’, the

State has attempted to show that the search was sub judice

was conducted pursuant to the Defendant’s voluntary

consent. It is well-settled that consent is not voluntary if

given only in acquiescence to a claim of lawful authority*.

Therefore, a warrantless search may not be justified on the

basis of consent that is given only after the police claim

that they have possession of a warrant or that one can be

® 384 U.S. 436 (1984).

” Jorgenson v. State, 714 So. 2d 423 (Fla. 1998).

5 Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968).

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obtained if necessary’. Here, once again, the totality of the

circumstances show that the consent to search was not

freely and voluntarily given and that it was given, at best,

because the Defendant acquiesced to the show of authority

after he was escorted out of his house, in daylight, in view

of his neighbors while virtually naked and surrounded and

questioned by both male and female officers.

It is therefore, ORDERED and ADJUDGED that

Defendant’s Motion to Suppress Physical Evidence and

Motion to Suppress Defendant’s statements is hereby

GRANTED.

DONE and ORDERED in Miami-Dade County,

Florida this 7th day of January, 2003.

Pedro P. Echarte, Jr.

Circuit Court Judge

” See e.g. U.S. v. Tovar-Rico, 61 F3d 1529 (11th Cir. 1995).

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IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

No. 05-12250

D.C. Docket No. 02-21079-CV-KMM

Filed November 16, 2006

Thomas K. Kahn, Clerk

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

ONE PIECE OF REALTY LOCATED AT

5800 S.W. 74TH AVENUE, MIAMI,

FLORIDA, more particularly described as

Lot3, Block 3,of Camner Estates

according to the Plat Book 58 at Page

21 of the public records of Dade

County, Florida together with all

appurtences thereto and all

Improvements thereon,

Defendant,

STEVEN HABAN,

Claimant-Appellant.

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ON _PETITION(S) FOR REHEARING AND

PETITION(S) FOR REHEARING EN BANC

Before: BARKETT, MARCUS and WILSON, Circuit

Judges.

PER CURIAM:

The Petition(s) for Rehearing are DENIED and no Judge

in regular active service on the Court having requested that

the Court be polled on rehearing en banc (Rule 35, Federal

Rules of Appellate Procedure), the Petition(s) for

Rehearing En Banc are DENIED.

ENTERED FOR THE COURT:

Rosemary Barkett

UNITED STATES CIRCUIT JUDGE

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