Appendix Brief for the United States — Sacks v. Office of Foreign Assets Control (No. 06-948)

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APPENDIX CONTENTS

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U.S. Court of Appeals Opinion (10/10/06).................... 1A

U.S. District Court Order (10/22/04)............c:0cccceeeeeee 36 A

U.S. District Court Order Staying

Ss a 5B1A

United Nations Participation Act,

sn, cid sencinesendutoresveereerioes 53 A

Iraq Sanctions Act, Pub. L. 101-513, § 586C............. 54 A

Executive Order 12,722, 55 F.R. 31803

(Aug. 2, 1990), reprinted in 50 U.S.C.

T(t iicebenedsoncasoroeenesersotesoveverousonse 56 A

Executive Order 12,724 § 2(b), 55 F.R. 33089

(Aug. 9, 1990), reprinted in 50 U.S.C.

cctv techaduensvectacverntorvorsees 59 A

TIED cs sindsbarepsseesedseseeteccascevsensoessneccocscee ses 62 A

Te nal isccnbbecnadatcesesveosevecosvccoocoss cede 63 A

UN Security Council Resolution 661, U.N. SCOR,

2933" mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/661 (1990).......64 A

Convention on the Prevention and Punishment

Of the Crime of Genocide, 78 U.N.T-:S.

access ica veseunensscbvecvorsonesetece coos 66 A

Convention on the Rights of the Child, opened

for signature Nov. 20, 1989, 1577

ET 68 A

Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection

Of Civilian Persons in Time of War,

6 U.S.T. 3816, 76 U.N.T.S. 186 .....ccccccsescececes 72A

Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA

Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc A/810 at

BE eee incisuisiecatdicaitdloniardainandhaaiiaapaadaiaaie 74A

U.S. District Court Amended Complaint for

Declaratory and Injunctive Relief

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SEA_DOCS:830944. 1

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

NINTH CIRCUIT

BERTRAM SACKS,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

V.

OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS

CONTROL, United States

Department of the Treasury;

RICHARD NEWCOMB, Director,

Office of Foreign Assets Control,

Defendants-Appellees.

BERTRAM SACKS,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

V.

OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS

CONTROL, United States

Department of the Treasury;

RICHARD NEWCOMB, Director,

Office of Foreign Assets Control,

Defendants-Appellants.

LA

No. 04-36136

D.C. No.

CV-04-00108-JLR

No. 05-35001

D.C. No.

CV-04-00108-JLR

OPINION

SACKS V. OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Washington

James L. Robart, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

July 24, 2006-Seattle, Washington

Filed October 10, 2006

Before: 1. Clifford Wallace, Kim McLane Wardlaw, and

Raymond C. Fisher, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Wardlaw

SACKS V. OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL

COUNSEL

Donald B. Scaramastra (argued) and Gary D.

Swearingen, Garvey Schubert’ Barer, Seattle,

Washington, for appellant/cross-appellee Bertram Sacks.

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SACKS V. OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL

H. Thomas Byron III (argued) and Douglas Letter,

Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for

appellees/crossappellants Office of Foreign Assets

Control.

Kenneth S. Kagan, Carney Badley Spellman, P.S.,

Seattle, Washington, for amicus curiae Washington

Physicians for Social Responsibility.

OPINION

WARDLAW, Circuit Judge:

These consolidated cross-appeals arise from a challenge

to the pre-2003 United States sanctions prohibiting both

travel to and the unlicensed donation of humanitarian

medical supplies to Iraq. We affirm the district court's

. decision that Bertram Sacks has standing to challenge

the ban on travel and that the travel ban regulation was

validly promulgated. Sacks fails, however, to

demonstrate a concrete and imminent likelihood that he

will be penalized for violations of the restriction on

medical donations. Therefore, his challenge to the

restriction on medical donations does not fulfill the

constitutional requirements of standing and ripeness. We

also affirm the district court's holding that the Office of

Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) regulation in effect at the

time prohibited the government from referring Sacks's

unpaid penalty to a private collection agency.

I. BACKGROUND

Bertram Sacks traveled to Iraq nine times between

1990 and 2003 in violation of sanctions the United States

imposed against Iraq following the 1990 invasion of

Kuwait. According to Sacks's Amended Complaint, the

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SACKS V. OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL

twelve years of United States and United Nations

sanctions were a dire time for Iraqi civilians, marked by

malnutrition, high rates of infant and child mortality,

and shortages of medicine.! Sacks, and an advocacy

group called Voices in the Wilderness (Voices), opposed

these sanctions on humanitarian grounds. In an effort to

draw attention to the effect of the sanctions, Sacks and

other Voices members traveled to Iraq repeatedly while

the sanctions were in effect, bringing with them medicine

and medical supplies for which they had failed to procure

an export license. They did so in knowing violation of the

United States regulations prohibiting travel and the

sending of unlicensed humanitarian donations to Iraq.

' In support of his claims, Sacks cites, among other

documents, the following sources: UNICEF, The

Situation of Children in Iraq 20 (2003), available at

http://www. unicef.org/publications/index_4439.html(revie

wing data on increased infant and child mortality during

the sanctions regime period and concluding that "most of

the children who are dying in Iraq are dying from

preventable illness"); UNICEF, Iraq's Children: A Lost

Generation 3 (2001), available at http://www.scn.org/ccpi/

Uniceflivfay2001].html ("Mounting evidence shows that the

sanctions are having a devastating humanitarian impact

on Iraq."); Mare Bossuyt, U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, The

Adverse Consequences of Economic Sanctions on the

Enjoyment of Human Rights ~~ 63-67 (June 21, 2000),

available at

http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/sanction/unreports/b

ossuyt.htm ("[{T]he sanctions upon Iraq have produced a

humanitarian disaster comparable to the worst

catastrophes of the past decades. . . . Owing to the lack of

medical supplies, it was estimated that, by 1997, 30 per

cent of hospitai beds were out of use, 75 per cent of ail

hospital equipment did not work and 25 per cent of Iraq's

1,305 health centres were closed.").

SA

SACKS V. OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL

Sacks has been assessed a penalty by the federal

government for one violation arising from these trips,

and he seeks relief from enforcement of that penalty.

A. Iraqi Sanctions

To place this case in context, it is necessary to review

the history of the Iraqi sanctions regime. On August 2,

1990, one day after Saddam Hussein's armies invaded

Kuwait, President George H.W. Bush issued Executive

Order 12,722, which declared a national emergency and

imposed sweeping prohibitions on numerous economic

and social transactions with Iraq. 55 Fed. Reg. 31,803

(Aug. 2, 1990). Four days later, the United Nations

Security Council passed Resolution 661, which called on

all Member States to prevent their nationals from

engaging in economic and financial transactions with

Iraq except for humanitarian donations of food and

medical supplies. Prohibited activities included:

(c) The sale or supply by their nationals or

from their territories or using their flag

vessels of any commodities or products,

including weapons or any other military

equipment, whether or not originating in

their territories but not including supplies

intended strictly for medical purposes,

and, in humanitarian circumstances,

foodstuffs, to any person or body in Iraq or

Kuwait. . . and any activities by their

nationals or in their territories which

promote or are calculated to promote such

sale or supply of such commodities or

products;

S.C. Res. 661, 4 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/661 (Aug. 6, 1990).

Following passage of this resolution, President Bush

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replaced the earlier Executive Order with Executive

Order 12,724, a more thorough and detailed set of

sanctions, which likewise included an exception for

humanitarian donations of food and medicine. It

prohibited, among other things:

(b) The exportation to Iraq... , directly or

indirectly, of any goods, technology. . . or

) services either (i) from the United States,

1 or (ii) requiring the issuance of a license

by a Federal agency, or any activity that

promotes or is intended to promote such

exportation, except donations of articles

intended to relieve human suffering, such

as food and supplies intended strictly for

medical purposes;

(d) Any transaction by a United States

person relating to travel by any United

States citizen or permanent resident alien

to Iraq, or to activities by any such person

within Iraq, after the date of this order,

other than transactions necessary to

effect (i) such person's departure from

Iraq, (ii) travel and activities for the

conduct of the official business of the

Federal Government or the United

Nations, or (iii) travel for journalistic

activity by persons regularly employed in

such capacity by a news-gathering

organization;

55 Fed. Reg. 33,089, 33,089 (Aug. 9, 1990). For the

President's authority to impose these sanctions,

Executive Order 12,724 relied upon the International

Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701 et

seq., and the United Nations Participation Act, 22 U.S.C.

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SACKS V. OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL

§ 287c. 55 Fed. Reg. at 33,089. The Executive Order also

made clear that the sanctions described therein could be

modified or limited by future regulation, and authorized

the Treasury Secretary to promulgate whatever

regulations were necessary to carry out its proscriptions.

Id.

A month after its initial resolution on Iraq, the United

Nations Security Council became concerned that the

Iraqi government was diverting donated humanitarian

food and medical supplies to its military. U.N. SCOR, 4th

Sess., 2939th mtg. at 12-13, 19,25, U.N. Doc. S/PV.2939

(Sept. 13, 1990). It therefore passed a new resolution

recommending, among other steps to be taken, “that

medical supplies should be exported under the strict

supervision of the Government of the exporting State or

by appropriate humanitarian agencies." S.C. Res. 666, q

8, U.N. Doc. S/RES/666 (Sept. 13, 1990). When the

United States Congress engaged the issue that

November, it authorized the President to continue the

embargo and sanctions embodied in Executive Order

12,724, but also required that transactions involving

"foodstuffs .. exempted ‘in humanitarian circumstances"

be conducted pursuant to the later Security Council

Resolution, Resolution 666. Iraq Sanctions Act of 1990,

Pub. L. No. 101-513, 104 Stat. 1979, 2048 (1990).

In January 1991, OFAC, an agency within the

Department of Treasury responsible for coordinating

international sanctions, published a final rule in the

Federal Register establishing the Iraqi Sanctions

Regulations (the Iraqi Sanctions). 56 Fed. Reg. 2112-01

(Jan. 18, 1991) (codified at 31 C.F.R. §§ 575.101 et seq.).

These regulations included the two at issue here: 31

C.F.R. § 575.207, which prohibited all United States

persons from conducting “any transaction relating to

travel by any U.S. citizen or permanent resident alien to

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SACKS V. OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL

Iraq, or to activities. . . within Iraq," except for

journalists, United States or United Nations officials,

and those assisting American citizens or permanent

residents to flee Iraq (the Travel Ban); and 31 C.F.R. §

575.205, which banned the export of goods, services, and

technology to Iraq but retained an exception for "donated

foodstuffs in humanitarian circumstances, and donated

supplies intended strictly for medical purposes, the

exportation of which has been specifically licensed" (the

Medicine Restrictions). OFAC also established a

licensing program to enable humanitarian donations of

food and medical supplies, id. §§ 575.501, 575.520,

575.521, repealed by 68 Fed. Reg. 61,362, 61,363 (Oct. 28,

2003), and a process for assessing penalties against those

who violated the sanctions, id. §§ 575.701-705. The Iraqi

Sanctions remained in place until, soon after the

American-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, the United

Nations lifted all non-weapons trade restrictions against

Iraq, S.c. Res. 1483, '110, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1483 (May 22,

2003), and OFAC issued a general license permitting all

Iraq-related transactions that previously had been

prohibited, including unlicensed humanitarian

donations, 68 Fed. Reg. 38,188, 38,189 (June 27, 2003)

(codified at 31 C.F.R. § 575.533).

B. Assessment of the Penalty

Following a_ highly-publicized November 1997

humanitarian trip to Iraq in which Sacks participated,

OFAC issued Sacks a Prepenalty Notice, pursuant to 31

C.F.R. § 575.702. The Prepenalty Notice accused Sacks,

other individuals, and Voices of violating the Iraqi

Sanctions.? In its Violations section, the Prepenalty

* It appears from the record that a single Prepenalty

Notice was issued to Sacks and the other named

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SACKS V. OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL

Notice described "your and [Voices]' exportation of

donated goods, including medical supplies and toys, to

Iraq absent specific prior authorization by OFAC." It

then listed ten specific violations. Six of these violations

accused Voices of exporting medical supplies and/or other

goods "absent prior specific license or other

authorization." Sacks was individually charged with only

one violation:

6. Between on or about November 21-30,

1997, Messrs. Handleman, Mullins, Sacks

and Zito engaged in currency travel-

related transactions to/ from/within Iraq

absent prior license or other authorization

from OFAC. These currency transactions

included, but are not limited to, the

purchase of food, lodging, ground

transportation, and incidenials;

The Prepenalty Notice proposed a $10,000 penalty for

Sacks and the other individuals described in the sixth

charge, and a $120,000 penalty for Voices ($20,000 for

each of the six violations). It further provided Sacks an

opportunity to respond to the charges in writing, which

he did. Although he was individually charged only with

violating the Travel Ban, in his written response Sacks

admitted that he had violated the Medicine Restrictions,

as well as the Travel Ban, stating, "You are correct to say

in your prepenalty letter (12/3/98) that I brought medical

supplies and toys to Iraq absent prior OFAC approval."

Although he did not explicitly address the travel charge,

the statement that he “brought medical supplies and toys

to Iraq” is an implied admission that he had traveled to

Iraq.

individuals. Presumably, a separate Prepenalty Notice

was issued to Voices.

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SACKS V. OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL

Three-and-a-half years later, OFAC issued Sacks a

formal Penalty Notice, which described his prior

admission ambiguously: “You admitted the Notice's

allegation in Count 6 that you exported goods to Iraq

absent prior OFAC approval." Citing his willful violation

of the Iraqi Sanctions, OFAC imposed the full $10,000

penalty against him and demanded that it be paid within

thirty days. When Sacks did not pay the penalty, he

received a letter in August 2003 from the Ocwen Federal

Bank, which sought to collect the debt - $13,767.08

including interest and late fees - on behalf of the United

States Department of Treasury.

C. Procedural History

Seeking to prevent collection of the penalty, Sacks

brought suit in the United States District Court for the

Western District of Washington against OFAC and its

director, Richard Newcomb (collectively, OFAC). He

sought declaratory and injunctive relief on the theory

that the Medicine Restrictions and the Travel Ban lacked

statutory authority and violated principles of

international law. Sacks also alleged that OFAC's claims

against him were time-barred. The district court granted

OFAC's motion to dismiss, holding that the Travel Ban

was validly promulgated and enforceable; that,

regardless of whether Sacks had standing to challenge

the Medicine Restrictions, they too were validly

promulgated; that international law did not render these

regulations unconstitutional; and that enforcement of the

penalty was not timebarred. However, the court held

that OFAC was prohibited by its own regulations from

referring the unpaid penalty to a collection agency.

Sacks appeals the district court's dismissal only on the

ground that the two regulations were invalidly

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SACKS V. OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL

promulgated.3

OFAC cross-appeals the district court's determination

that it could not use an outside collection agency to

collect the penalty and was required to refer the penalty

to the Department of Justice for collection in a federal

civil suit. We have jurisdiction over these consolidated

appeals pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we now affirm.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review de novo a district court's grant of a

defendant's motion to dismiss. See Decker v. Advantage

Fund, Lid., 362 F.3d 593, 595-96 (9th Cir. 2004).

Standing is a question of law reviewed de novo, see S.D.

Myers, Inc. v. City and County of San Francisco, 253 F.3d

461,474 (9th Cir. 2001), as are challenges that an

agency's regulations exceed its statutory authority, see

©* Perez-Martin v. Ashcroft, 394 F.3d 752, 757 (9th Cir.

2005). On cross-appeal, we review the district court's

interpretation of OFAC's enforcement regulation de novo,

according deference to OFAC's interpretation of its own

regulations so long as that interpretation is not plainly

erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation. See League

of Wilderness Defenders/Blue Mountains Biodiversity

Project v. Forsgren, 309 F.3d 1181, 1183 (9th Cir. 2002).

> Sacks does not appeal the district court's ruling that

enforcement of the penalty is not time-barred. Sacks

disclaims on appeal the argument that international law

forbids the President from placing limits’ on

humanitarian medical donations. Instead, he posits that

the international treaties and conventions he cites were

background principles that Congress intended to codify

when it limited the President's emergency authority in

the International Emergency Economic Powers Act of

1977. We discuss this argument below.

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SACKS V. OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL

Ill. STANDING

[1] Sacks challenges two provisions within the Iraqi

Sanctions: the Travel Ban and the Medical Restrictions.

We must first determine whether he has standing to

assert these claims. "[S]tanding is a threshold question

which we must resolve before proceeding to the merits."

Los Angeles County Bar Ass 'n v. Eu, 979 F.2d 697, 700

(9th Cir. 1992). This principle is grounded in the "case or

controversy" requirement of Article III of the United

States Constitution: If Sacks suffered no injury-in-fact

caused by the Travel Ban or Medicine Restrictions

themselves, then any opinion we render on that provision

would be merely advisory. See Scott v. Pasadena Unified

Sch. Dist., 306 F.3d 646, 654 (9th Cir. 2002).

The requirements of Article III standing are well

established:

[A] plaintiff must show (1) it has suffered

an "injury in fact" that is ( a) concrete and

particularized and (b) actual or imminent,

not conjectural or hypothetical;

(2) the injury is fairly traceable to the

challenged action of the defendant; and

(3) it is likely, as opposed to merely

speculative, that: the injury will be

redressed by a favorable decision.

Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC),

Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180-81 (2000). Article ITI standing

requires the plaintiff to establish standing for each

challenge he wishes to bring and each form of relief he

seeks. See id. To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to

dismiss, Sacks must allege facts in his Amended

Complaint that, if proven, would confer standing upon

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SACKS V. OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL

him. Warren v. Fox Family Worldwide, Inc., 328 F.3d

1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Lujan v. Defenders of

Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992) (noting that, at this

stage, “general factual allegations of injury resulting

from the defendant's conduct may suffice"). Therefore, we

must determine whether Sacks's Amended Complaint

identifies an injury caused by each of the two regulations

that is both concrete and actual or imminent.

SACKS V. OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL

A. Travel Ban

[2] Sacks has standing to challenge the Travel Ban

and the government does not contend otherwise. The

Prepenalty Notice that explained the charge against him

explicitly mentioned his violation of the prohibition on

travel to and currency-related travel transactions within

Iraq. Where the "plaintiff is himself an object of the

action (or forgone action) at issue... there is ordinarily

little question that the action or inaction has caused him

injury, and that a judgment preventing or requiring the

action will redress it." Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561-62. The

government, through the Ocwen Federal Bank, now

seeks to collect a civil penalty from Sacks for violating

the Travel Ban. A civil fine is a pecuniary injury, and

"(pecuniary injury is clearly a sufficient basis for

standing." Cent. Ariz. Water Conserv. Dist. v. EPA, 990

F.2d 1531, 1537 (9th Cir. 1993) (internal quotation

marks omitted).

B. Medicine Restrictions

[3] Sacks challenges only the facial validity of the

restrictions on unlicensed medical donations, and not the

application of the licensing regime. Sacks concedes that

he did not apply for an OFAC license to donate

humanitarian medical supplies to Iraq, as 31 C.F.R. §

575.521 allowed. We clarified in United States v. Hugs

that a plaintiff s failure to apply for an available permit

precludes him from challenging the operation of the

permitting scheme but not the facial validity of the

statute or regulations. 109 F .3d 13 75, 13 78 (9th Cir.

1997). Sacks therefore lacks standing to challenge the

operation of the licensing regime but is not prohibited

under Hugs from facially challenging the Medicine

Restrictions.

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SACKS V, OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL

Sacks cites three reasons why he satisfies the injury-in-

fact requirement as to the Medicine Restrictions: (1) he

has been actually punished for violating the Medicine

Restrictions; (2) he will be called upon to pay the

penalties assessed against Voices; and (3) he legitimately

fears future prosecution for openly violating the Medicine

Restrictions. We find none of these to be persuasive.

[4] Sacks contends that his 2003 penalty was assessed

for violation of the Medicine Restrictions. We disagree.

OFAC's treatment of Sacks indicates its belief that

penalties were assessed only for the Travel Ban violation.

The Penalty Notice, while confusing, expressly references

"Count 6" of the earlier Notice, which referred only to the

Travel Ban. Moreover, it was reasonable for OFAC to

treat Sacks's admission that he "brought" medical

supplies to Iraq as an admission that he traveled to Iraq.

As Sacks concedes, bringing medical supplies to Iraq can

be accomplished only by traveling to that country to

deliver them. Finally, the $10,000 penalty ultimately

levied against Sacks was consistent with those proposed

in the Penalty Notice for violating the Travel Ban; in

contrast, the proposed penalties for violating the

Medicine Restrictions were $20,000 per violation.

Therefore, we conclude that Sacks was not penalized for

violating the Medicine Restrictions.

[5] Nor does Sacks's status as a member of Voices

expose him to liability for the penalties assessed against

the organization so as to confer standing. Sacks does not

suggest that he has third-party standing to challenge the

Medicine Restrictions on Voices's behalf; indeed, Voices

has already challenged the penalties assessed against it.

See Office of Foreign Assets Control v. Voices in the

Wilderness, 329 F. Supp. 2d 71 (.D.C. 2004). More

importantly, nothing in the Amended Complaint or in the

record indicates that Sacks has any financial

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SACKS V. OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL

responsibility for Voices's fine; that action against him

has been initiated or is imminent; or even that OFAC has

ever turned to individual group members of an

unincorporated organization to collect civil fines against

the organization. Therefore, Sacks's mere membership

in a penalized organization does not create a " ‘realistic

danger of [his] sustaining a direct injury as a result of

the statute's operation or enforcement.' " LSO, Ltd. v.

Stroh, 205 F.3d 1146, 1154 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting

Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat'l Union, 442 U.S.

289, 298 (1979)).

[6] Finally, Sacks does not face imminent, or even

likely, prosecution for violating the Medicine

Restrictions. It is true that the Executive Order

terminating the "national emergency" in Iraq explicitly

reserved the government's right to bring proceedings

based on acts in violation of the sanctions committed

before the sanctions expired. Exec. Order No. 13,350, 69

Fed. Reg. 46,055,46,055 (July 29, 2004). Therefore, Sacks

theoretically may be subject to penalties for taking

medicine to Iraq, even though the United States has

allowed humanitarian medical donations to Iraq since

May 2003.

However, while it is well-established that an individual

need not await prosecution under a law or regulation

before challenging it, see Babbitt, 442 U.S. at 298;

Canatella v. California, 304 F.3d 843, 852 (9th Cir. 2002)

(as amended), we require a "genuine threat of imminent

prosecution" and not merely an "imaginary or speculative

fear of prosecution." San Diego County Gun Rights

Comm. v. Reno, 98 F.3d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir. 1996)

(internal quotation marks omitted).

The requirement that a fear of prosecution be fairly

certain to confer standing on the plaintiff is informed by

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SACKS V. OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL

the same considerations as the doctrine of ripeness. The

ripeness requirement aims to "prevent the courts,

through avoidance of premature adjudication, from

entangling themselves in abstract disagreements."

Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148 (1967),

abrogated on other grounds by Caifano v. Sanders, 430

U.S. 99 (1977). As we have previously observed, "the

constitutional component of the ripeness inquiry... , in

many cases, .. . coincides squarely with standing's injury

in fact prong." Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights

Comm'n, 220 F.3d 1134, 1138 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc).

Therefore, we employ the same test to determine if a

plaintiff has established standing based on a fear of

prosecution that we use to determine if a case or

controversy is sufficiently ripe.

In evaluating the genuineness of a

claimed threat of prosecution, we look to

whether the plaintiffs have articulated a

"concrete plan" to violate the law in

question, whether the prosecuting

authorities have communicated a specific

warning or threat to initiate proceedings,

and the history of past prosecution or

enforcement under the challenged statute.

See id. at 1139 (citing San Diego County Gun Rights

Comm. 98 F.3d at 1126-27). Whether viewed through the

lens of standing or ripeness, Sacks's challenge to the

Medicine Restrictions is not justiciable.

Sacks has established two of the requisite elements

required to survive the motion to dismiss on standing or

ripeness grounds. He had more than a "concrete plan" to

violate the Medicine Restrictions; he admits that he

actually did violate them on a number of occasions. See

Jacobus v. Alaska, 338 F.3d 1095, 1105 (9th Cir. 2003).

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SACKS V. OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL

He also alleges that OFAC has historically targeted other

alleged violators of the Medicine Restrictions, including

Voices. Because, on review of a district court's Rule

12(b)(6) dismissal, we assume all facts alleged in the

Amended Complaint are true, see Bassidji v. Goe, 413

F.3d 928, 930 (9th Cir. 2005), these allegations are

sufficient to satisfy the first two elements.

Sacks's fear of prosecution runs aground on the

government's decision to charge and penalize him for

only the violation of the Travel Ban and not for the

Medicine Restrictions violation. In Jacobus v. Alaska, we

similarly confronted a plaintiff who feared future

prosecution under a repealed statute. The plaintiffs in

Jacobus had knowingly violated Alaska campaign

finance laws capping contributions to political parties

and volunteer professional services to campaigns. 338

F.3d at 1101 the wake of a district court ruling against

the state, the Alaska legislature revised its campaign

finance laws to remove the offending provisions, but the

state continued to argue their legality on appeal. The

Alaska Public Offices Commission (APOC) then wrote

Jacobus indicating that “if the law were upheld it

reserved the right to prosecute any past violations" he

had committed, “although it would not pursue any

enforcement action during the pendency of the

litigation." Jd. at 1104. We held that Jacobus faced a

genuine threat of imminent prosecution because even

though "the letter sent to Jacobus does not threaten to

initiate enforcement proceedings in so many words, it

indicates that APOC is only awaiting the outcome of the

litigation to initiate such proceedings." Jd. at 1105.

Sacks is in a materially different position than the

Jacobus plaintiffs. Contrary to Sacks's contention, the

government's decision to penalize him for only the Travel

Ban violation, when it was fully aware he had also

19 A

SACKS V. OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL

violated the Medicine Restrictions, indicates that the

government does not intend to penalize him for any of his

numerous violations of the Medicine Restrictions. OFAC

has not taken the step it normally would take to express

its intent to penalize Sacks and thus preserve its right to

do so, by sending him a prepenalty notice. The Amended

Complaint is devoid of any allegations suggesting that

OFAC has communicated an intent to punish him

further.

[7] To demonstrate the requisite "specific warning or

threat to initiate proceedings," Thomas, 220 F.3d at

1139, Sacks points only to a footnote in OFAC's Motion to

Dismiss that reads: "Although OFAC has not yet acted in

response to Plaintiffs eight other trips to Iraq, it reserves

the right to do so in the future." While this language is

similar to the language used by the agency in Jacobus,

that alone does not demonstrate that prosecution is

imminent. First and foremost, unlike the agency in

Jacobus, which could not bring charges against the

plaintiff because the relevant law had been declared

unconstitutional by the district court, nothing has

prevented OFAC from charging Sacks under the

Medicine Restrictions over the last decade. OFAC's

declination to charge him for the Medicine Restrictions

violations during the last eight years, therefore, is a

strong indication of its lack of intent to do so in the

future. Furthermore, the footnote Sacks relies on to

demonstrate the threat of prosecution does not mention

the Medicine Restrictions at all, but rather references his

violation for engaging in travel-related transactions.

Therefore, Sacks has failed to demonstrate any specific

threat of prosecution for violations of the Medicine

Restrictions. See Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 180

(noting that Article III requires plaintiffs injury to be

"actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical").

20A

SACKS V. OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL

Moreover, it is not clear from the Amended Complaint

that OFAC could still bring charges against Sacks for

violating the Medicine Restrictions. The relevant statute

of limitations for the government to bring proceedings

enforcing a civil penalty is five years from the date of the

act. See 28 U.S.C. § 2462. A plaintiffs standing is

evaluated as of the date the complaint was filed, in this

case January 14, 2004. See Bernhardt v, County of Los

Angeles, 279 F.3d 862, 868 (9th Cir. 2002). The Amended

Complaint does not allege that Sacks violated the

Medicine Restrictions after January 14, 1999. The

alleged violations are thus likely time-barred,

diminishing any threat of prosecution that would have

supported standing at the outset of this suit. Moreover,

even if Sacks had more recently violated the Medicine

Restrictions, it is quite possible that the statute of

limitations on those violations has also passed, rendering

his fears of prosecution moot. See Jacobus, 338 F.3d at

1102 (noting that mootness may warrant dismissal

where it is" ‘absolutely clear that the litigant no longer

ha[s] any need of the judicial protection' " he seeks

(quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Slater, 528 U.S.

216, 224 (2000))).

[8] Because Sacks fails to allege a concrete and

imminent injury-in-fact caused by the Medicine

Restrictions, this claim is not justiciable both for lack of

standing and ripeness. Of course, should OFAC take

action to penalize Sacks for violating the Medicine

Restrictions at a later date, he would then have standing

to challenge their legitimacy. We therefore do not reach

Sacks's challenge to the district court's ruling that the

Medicine Restrictions were validly promulgated. See

Mustang Marketing, Inc. v. Chevron Products Co., 406

. (9th Cir. 2005) ("Our review is not limited

to a consideration of the grounds upon which the district

court decided the issues: the Court can affirm the district

21A

SACKS V. OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL

court on any grounds supported by the record.").

IV. VALIDITY OF THE TRAVEL BAN

Sacks does not challenge OFAC's basic authority to

restrict travel to Iraq at the President's direction under

the United Nations Participation Act (UNPA). See 22

U.S.C. § 287c(a) (allowing the President to prohibit rail,

sea, and air "communication" with another country in

order to comply with United Nations directives); Karpova

v. Snow, 402 F. Supp. 2d 459, 469 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)

(holding that the Iraq Travel Ban is duly authorized by

the UNPA). Instead, he alleges that the Travel Ban

regulation, 31 C.F.R. § 575.207, exceeded the President's

statutory authority because it indirectly regulated the

donation of humanitarian medical supplies, something

Sacks contends the International Emergency Economic

Powers Act (IEEPA) forbids the President from doing.

Because the IEEPA imposes no such burden on the

President's powers when he acts under the UNPA, we

reject this argument.

[9] The IEEPA grants the President authority to

unilaterally impose regulations on economic transactions

between the United States or its nationals, and foreign

countries or their nationals. 50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1). To

trigger this authority, the President must declare a

"national emergency" necessitated by an "unusual and

extraordinary threat." Id. § 1701. However, the

President's power under the JEEPA is constrained: It

"does not include the authority to regulate or prohibit,

directly or indirectly. .. donations, by persons subject to

the jurisdiction of the United States, of articles, such as

food, clothing and medicine, intended to be used to

relieve human suffering.” unless the President

determines that such donations would seriously impair

his ability to address the emergency or would endanger

22 A

SACKS V. OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL

the safety of American combat forces engaged in

hostilities, Jd. § 1702(b )(2). The President, acting under

the IEEPA, is also precluded from regulating the export

of postal, telegraphic, telephonic and personal

communications; information or informational materials,

including magazines, photographs, and artwork; and

travel to or from a country. Id. § 1702(b).

As the district court recognized, however, the IEEPA is

not the lone source of the President's power to enact

economic sanctions. Executive Order 12,724, which

instructed the Treasury Secretary or his designate

(OFAC) to promulgate regulations enforcing the

economic sanctions against Iraq, derived its power from

both the IEEPA and the UNPA. 55 Fed. Reg. 33,089

(Aug. 9, 1990). OFAC contends that Congress did not

intend the IEEPA's limits to interfere with the

President's authority under the UNP . Our review of the

Structure and plain language of the two statutes

convinces us that OFAC is correct.

{10] The economic restrictions authorized by the

IEEPA (and the related limits on that authority) are

confined to a particular circumstance: the declared

national emergency. See 50 U.S.C § 1701(b) ("The

authorities granted to the President by section 1702 of

this title may only be exercised to deal with an unusual

and extraordinary threat with respect to which a

national emergency has been declared . . o 2 ta 4

1702(b) ("The authority granted to the President by this

sectton does not include the authority to regulate

[humanitarian aid, travel, etc.]." (emphasis added)). The

IEEPA also requires the president to consult with

Congress before acting, and to regularly consult and

report to Congress after exercising his authority. Jd. §

1703. By contrast, the UNPA allows the President to

impose sanctions that are more wide-ranging, without

23 A

SACKS V. OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL

any built-in congressional review and "(njotwithstanding

the provisions of any other law." 22 U.S.C. § 287c. When

called upon to enforce a Security Council directive, the

UNPA authorizes the President:

to the extent necessary to apply such

measures .. . [to] investigate, regulate or

prohibit, in whole or in part, economic

relations or rail, sea, air, postal,

telegraphic, radio and other means of

communication between any foreign

country or national thereof. . .and the

United States or any person subject to the

jurisdiction thereof.

Id. The UNPA thus authorizes the President to take

measures when enforcing a Security Council resolution,

such as limiting postal communication and air travel,

that he could not take independently by declaring a

national emergency. Sacks's proposed interpretation

would treat Congress's passage of the IEEPA in 1977 as

a partial sub silentio repeal of the UNPA. Weare

reluctant to conclude that a statute has been repealed

without a clear statement from Congress: "[E]ven when

two statutes are in some conflict, repeal is to be regarded

as implied only if necessary to make the latter enacted

law work, and even then, only to the minimum extent

necessary." Lujan Armendariz v. INS, 222 F.3d 728, 744

(9th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks and brackets

omitted).

[11] We refuse to read Congress's passage of the

IEEPA as repealing key provisions of the UNPA. Proper

functioning of the IEEPA does not depend on a repealing

of the UNPA, since the two statutes authorize

presidential actions in unique, albeit sometimes

overlapping, situations. Reading the statutes to avoid a

244A

SACKS V. OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL

EEN AODETS CONTROL

conflict maintains the complete viability of both Statutes

and is most faithfy] to Congress's plain language.

The bill js a4 response to two

developments: first, extensive use by

Presidents of emergency authority under

section 5(b) of the Trading with the

Enemy Act of 1917 to regulate both

domestic and international]

Provides safeguards for the role of

Congress in declaring and terminating

national emergencies... .

at 2 (1977), as reprinted in 1977

The Senate Report then

the four national emergencies that were in

effect in 1976, two of which had been in place for more

than twenty-five years. Jd at 4541-42.

tions as

stated the Committee's belief rs were

necessary to fulfill the United States's obligations under

the United Nations Charter and make international

25A

SACKS V. OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL

sanctions effective. As the House Report states,

The committee realizes that the powers

proposed to be granted to the President

under this section are very great.

However, the basic decision in this regard

was made when the Charter was ratified

and this provision is simply a necessary

corollary to our membership in. this

Organization [the U.N.]. The committee

also believes that the Security Council

must be placed in the most effective

position possible to act under article 41

since the prompt and effective application

of economic and diplomatic sanctions by

all the United Nations (or even the threat

or possibility thereof) may avoid the

necessity for the use of the armed forces

available to the Security Council.

The better prepared this country is to

participate promptly in action of this

kind, the more effective will be the

Security Council and the more hope there

will be that the United Nations may serve

its major purpose, namely, the prevention

of armed conflict.

U.S. Code Congo Serv., 79th Cong., p. 932 (1945). This

legislative history confirms what the plain text of the

statute indicates: that the IEEPA significantly restricted

the President's emergency authority but did not intend to

alter the President's” very great" powers to impose

economic sanctions enforcing a United Nations

resolution.

Nor does the IEEPA's legislative history indicate, as

26A

SACKS V. OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL

Sacks contends, that the statute was intended to codify

and make binding international law principles on

humanitarian relief that had emerged since the passage

of the UNPA thirty years earlier. Neither the IEEPA nor

its legislative history mentions international law or a

universal right to medica] supplies. Congress's only

indication of its intent in exempting medical supplies

from the President's emergency powers is a statement in

the Senate Report that the exemption would "enable U.S.

persons to make humanitarian contributions in

accordance with their conscience." S. Rep. No. 95-466,

1977 US.C.C.A.N. at 4544 Sacks's claim of

congressional intent is further belied by the IEEPA

provision allowing the President to unilaterally regulate,

or even prohibit, humanitarian medical supplies simply

by declaring that doing so is necessary to address the

declared national emergency, as President George W.

Bush did when he prohibited the export of humanitarian

supplies to al-Qaeda and other terrorist entities following

the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. See Exec.

Order No. 13,224,66 Fed. Reg. 49,079, 49.080-81 (Sept.

23, 2001).

[13] Therefore, the district court correctly held that the

medical supplies exception to presidential power

embodied in the IEEPA did not limit the President's

ability to ban travel to and within Iraq pursuant to the

UNPA.4

Vv. USE OF COLLECTION AGENCY

* Because we conclude that the IEEPA provisions do not

restrict the President's authority under the UNPA, we do

not reach OFAC's argument that the Travei Ban is not

an indirect regulation of humanitarian medica]

donations.

27 A

SACKS V. OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL

In its cross-appeal, OFAC asks us to vacate the district

court's injunction prohibiting OFAC's use of the Ocwen

Federal Bank to collect Sacks's unpaid penalty. Because

the OFAC regulation in effect when Sacks's penalty was

assessed clearly required referral exclusively to the

United States Department of Justice for collection in a

federal civil suit, we affirm the district court's issuance of

the injunction.

Neither Executive Order 12,724 nor the Iraq Sanctions

Act specified the method by which penalties should be

imposed or collected, effectively leaving that gap to be

filled by OFAC, the agency to which the President

delegated his regulatory powers over the Iraqi Sanctions.

See Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231 (1974) ("The power

of an administrative agency to administer a

congressionally created . . . program necessarily requires

the formulation of policy and the making of rules to fill

any gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by Congress.").

OFAC promulgated regulations for the collection of

unpaid penalties under the Iraqi Sanctions. In relevant

part, they read:

In the event that the person named does

not pay the penalty imposed pursuant to

this subpart oor make payment

arrangements acceptable to the Director

with*s 30 days of the mailing of the

written, notice of the imposition of the

penalty, the matter shall be referred to

the United States Department of Justice

for appropriate action to recover the

penalty in a civil suit in a Federal district

cout.

381 C.F.R. § 575.705 (2002). OFAC claims that this

provision also allowed it to use administrative collection

28A

SACKS V. OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL

efforts, including outside collection agencies, to obtain

unpaid penalties.

Where an agency offers an interpretation of its own

regulations in federal court, we must give "substantial

deference" to that interpretation "unless an alternative

reading is compelled by the regulation's plain language

or by other indications of the [agency's] intent at the time

of the regulation's promulgation." Thomas Jefferson

Univ. v. Shalala, 512 US. 504, 512 (1994) (internal

quotation marks omitted). We will defer to the agency's

interpretation of its own regulation, unless that

interpretation is "plainly erroneous or inconsistent with

the regulation." Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16-17

(1965); Rendleman v. Shalala, 21 F.3d 957, 961 (9th Cir.

1994).

[14] Here, the agency's command is absolute: if the

penalty is unpaid after thirty days, "the matter shall be

referred to the [Justice Department] for appropriate

action to recover the penalty in a civil suit." Following

the guidance of the Supreme Court, see, e.g., Lopez v.

Davis, 531 U.S. 230, 241 (2001) (explaining the difference

between Congress's use of the "permissive 'may' " and its

"use of a mandatory 'shail' “), we have previously made

clear that Congress's or an agency's use of the word

"shall" indicates a mandatory duty that is not subject to

discretion. For example, in Center for Biological Diversity

v. United States Forest Service, 349 F.3d 1157, 1167 (9th

Cir. 2003), we held that a Council on Environmental

Quality regulation Stating that an agency "shall" discuss

opposing viewpoints and its response to them in a final

environmental impact statement could not be satisfied

merely by including and analyzing a more

environmentally-restrictive alternative to the proposed

plan. Similarly, in Webber v, Crabtree, 158 F.3d 460, 461

(9th Cir. 1998) (per curiam), we held that a Bureau of

29A

SACKS V. OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL

Prisons regulation stating that wardens "shall identify"

outdoor smoking areas left the warden no discretion but

to do so. Although we will depart from the interpretation

of "shall" as mandatory where a “convincing argument to

the contrary is made," Newman v. Chater, 87 F.3d 358,

361 (9th Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks omitted);

see also Sierra Club v. Whitman, 268 F.3d 898, 904 (9th

Cir. 2001), such occasions are rare. OFAC offers three

reasons to support its contentions that we should

disregard the plain language of the regulations. None of

these is persuasive.

First, OFAC argues that all government agencies are

authorized, and even encouraged, to utilize private

collection agencies and other administrative collection

efforts before referring cases to the Department of

Justice. We do not disagree. For example, 31 U.S.C. §

3718(a) expressly authorizes federal agency heads to

establish contracts with collection services to recover

United States assets. Current Treasury Department

regulations, codified in 2002, go even further, indicating

that every unpaid debt should be referied for debt

collection services, 31 C.F.R. § 5.9, that multiple

collection remedies should be utilized, id. § 5.2, and even

that "aggressive collection activity" should take place

before referral to the Department of Justice, id. § 5.16.

We may even accept, without deciding, OFAC's

contention that it would not need to adopt an explicit

regulation before utilizing administrative collection

efforts. As the district court noted, however, what OFAC

overlooks in emphasizing these general, permissive

provisions is that the one provision that specifically

addresses violations of the iraqi Sanctions, 31 C.F.R. §

575.705, did not take advantage of OFAC’s authority to

permit the use of outside collection agencies and, in fact,

made referral to the Justice Department mandatory. See

Bonneville Power Admin. v. FERC, 422 F.3d 908, 916

30 A

SACKS V. OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL

without ever having had an Opportunity to challenge

their penalties before an Article III court. Regardless of

the rationale for the regulation, there is nothing in the

Second, OFAC points to its recent revision of section

975.705 as evidence of how the previous section 575.705

> The Sanctions regulations established before the Iraqi

Sanctions Regulations similarly mandated referral to the

Department of Justice, and did not provide for other

collection efforts. At some point in the 1990s, however,

without the prompting of a court decision, OFAC began

including language in its sanctions regulations that unpaid

penalties shal] be, or may be, "referred for administrative

collection measures . . . or to the United States Department

of Justice" for recovery in a civil suit. See, e.g., 58 Fed. Reg.

13,199, 13,212-13 (Mar. 10, 1993) (codified at 31 C.F.R. §

585.705) (Yugoslavian sanctions regulations); 60 Fed. Reg.

47,061,47,073 (Sept. 11, 1995) (codified at 31 CFR. §

560.706) (Iranian sanction regulations); 61 Fed. Reg. 3805,

3812 (Feb. 2,1996) (codified at 3] C.F.R. § 595.705)

(terrorism sanction regulations); 70 Fed. Reg. 48,240,

48,524 (Aug. 16, 2005) (codified at 3] C.F.R. § 537.705)

(Burmese sanctions regulations).

31 A

SACKS V. OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL

was understood and should be interpreted. In response to

the district court's ruling in this very case, OFAC issued

a rule revising 31 C.F.R. § 575.705 to read that, if the

penalized individual does not make arrangements to pay

within thirty days, "the matter may be referred for

administrative collection measures by the Department of

the Treasury or to the United States Department of

Justice for appropriate action to recover the penalty in a

civil suit in a Federal district court." 70 Fed. Reg. 15,761,

15,762 (Mar. 29, 2005) (emphasis added). While OFAC

does not argue that the revised regulation applies

retroactively, it contends that the revision 1s dispositive

proof that OFAC consistently has interpreted the

collection regulation to provide for administrative

collection in addition to civil suits in federal court. See 70

Fed. Reg. at 15,761 (stating that the rule was revised "to

reaffirm that administrative collection of unpaid civil

penalties imposed by OFAC is authorized in addition to

judicial means of collection"). It is unclear why an

interpretive statement added to the Federal Register

post-litigation should be entitled to any more deference

than the litigation position OFAC already advances.

Indeed, although an agency interpretation first

articulated in a legal brief is not categorically "unworthy

of deference," OFAC's position appears to be little more

than a "post hoc rationalization advanced . . . to defend

past agency action against attack." Auer v. Robbins, 519

U.S. 432, 462 (1997) (internal quotation marks omitted)

(alteration in original). Even if OFAC's interpretive

statement represents the agency's reasoned

interpretation as of 2005, it tells us nothing of the

agency's interpretation during the life of the Iraqi

Sanctions. As such, the statement in the Federal

Register is neither controlling nor particularly helpful.

Third, OFAC makes the novel claim that section

575.705's “silence concerning administrative collection

32 A

SACKS V. OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL

remedies" permits the use of those remedies in

satisfaction of the regulatory requirement. In other

words, a regulation or statute mandating that an agency

"shall" do x in fact means that it "shall" do x or y, unless

the statute or regulation explicitly states that it "shall

not" do y. This proposed "rule of the silent disjunctive" is

patently absurd. By OFAC's rationale, the Endangered

Species Act's requirement that the final determination of

whether a species is threatened "shall be published in

the Federal Register" could also be satisfied by

publishing that information in USA Today. Though the

Mandatory Victims Restitution Act requires that the

sentencing court shall order the defendant to pay

restitution, applying OFAC's proposed interpretive rule,

the sentencing court could also comply with the statute

by ordering the defendant to make a public apology. Or,

to bring the examples closer to home, the requirement of

former 31 C.F .R. § 575.521 that an application for a

license to send medicine to Iraq "shall be made in

advance" of the exportation could have been satisfied by

Sacks if he submitted an application in advance I within

ten years following the exportation.

We rejected a similar argument in Webber, where the

warden asserted that a regulation Stating that he "shall"

identify outdoor smoking areas at federal prison

facilities, to prevent employee exposure to second-hand

smoke, also would allow him to achieve that goal by

banning all smoking at the facility, 158 F.3d at 461. Our

view has not changed. We will not require that Congress

or an agency articulate all of the acts the agency may not

engage in simply to guarantee that mandatory

prescriptions are followed.

Our decision in Lawrence v. Commodity Futures

Trading Comm'n, 759 F.2d 767 (9th Cir. 1985), is aot to

the contrary. In Lawrence, a commodities broker

33 A

SACKS V. OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL

consented to findings that he had violated the

Commodities Exchange Act and agreed to pay a $3,500

civil penalty. Id. at 769. When he refused to pay the

penalty, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission

suspended his registration pursuant to a statutory

provision allowing it to do so if an individual violated one

of its rules or orders. Id. at 770 & n.5 (citing 7 U.S.C. §§

]12a(3)-(4)). Lawrence argued that the Commission was

powerless to suspend him because a separate statutory

provision stated that “collection of overdue money

penalties imposed by the [Commission] shall be referred

to the Attorney General for recovery in a federal district

court action." Id. at 771 (citing 7 U.S.C. § 9a). We rejected

Lawrence's claim, holding that referral to the Justice

Department was not intended to be the Commission's

"exclusive remedy for violation of its orders to pay fines."

Id. at 772. Despite OFAC's multiple citations to it,

Lawrence is inapposite. The alternative remedy taken by

the Commission, suspension of Lawrence's registration,

was explicitly articulated in the same statute, whereas

nothing in the Iraqi Sanctions regulations mentions

administrative collection. Furthermore, as we recognized

in Lawrence, suspension of the license and referral to the

Justice Department were not mutually exclusive

remedies. See Id. at 771-72. The Lawrence court was not

required to reach the question of whether the agency

could collect the penalty using means other than Justice

Department referral because suspension of his

registration was 4 different punishment altogether.

[15] Rather than adopt OFAC's troublesome "rule of

the silent disjunctive," we hold that the plain language of

the regulation authorizes no other methods for the

collection of unpaid penalties. Because the regulation is

clear. no deference 1s owed to OFAC's questionable

interpretation. See Thomas Jefferson Univ., 512 U S. at

512. If OFAC wishes to collect the $10,000 penalty from

34 A

SACKS V. OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL

Sacks, it may do so by referring the matter to the

Department of Justice for the filing of a civil suit in

federal district court as its own regulation mandates.

VI. CONCLUSION

Sacks lacks standing to challenge the Medicine

Restrictions, and his challenge to the Travel Ban fails

because OFAC's power to promulgate it was authorized

by the UNPA and not limited by any other statute.

Therefore, the penalty against Sacks is valid. However,

OFAC is precluded by its own then-operative regulations

from utilizing the Ocwen Federal Bank or any private

third-party entity to collect the $10,000 penalty from

Sacks. Therefore, we AFFIRM the district court's order

dismissing Sacks's complaint for declaratory relief. We

also AFFIRM the district court's order enjoining OFAC

from collecting the penalty from Sacks in a manner

inconsistent with the then-effective version of 31 C.F R. §

575.705.

AFFIRMED.

SEA_DOCS:830794.|

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON

AT SEATTLE

BERTRAM SACKS,

Plaintiff, NO. C04-108JLR

vs. ORDER

OFFICE OF FOREIGN

ASSETS CONTROL, UNITED

STATES DEPARTMENT OF

THE TREASURY, and

RICHARD NEWCOMB,

DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF

FOREIGN ASSETS

CONTROL,

Defendants.

I.

INTRODUCTION

This matter comes before the court on

Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint.

(Dkt. #8). For the reasons stated below, the court

grants Defendants’ motion in part and denies it in part.

In addition, because there is no further relief to grant to

either party, the court dismisses this action.

il.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is a member of Voices in the Wilderness

(“Voices”), an unincorporated organization that provides

humanitarian assistance to Iraqi citizens suffering as a

result of the worldwide embargo on trade with Iraq in

place since 1990. Although Plaintiff made several trips

to Iraq to deliver humanitarian aid, it was a November

issue in Plaintiffs current dispute

with the Office of Foreign Asset Control (“OFAC”).

OFAC, an agency of the United States

Department of the Treasury, had issued two regulations

governing the activities of United States citizens in

Iraq. The first, the “Travel Ban,” prohibits travel-

related expenditures for travel to or within Iraq:

Except as otherwise

authorized, no U.S. person

may engage in any

transaction relating to

travel by any USS. citizen

or permanent resident

alien to Iraq.... This

section prohibits the

unauthorized payment by a

U.S. person of his or her

own travel or living

expenses within Iraq.

31 C.F.R. § 575.207. The second regulation, the

“Medicine Restriction,” prohibits the export of medicine

to Iraq except as licensed by OFAC:

Except as otherwise

authorized, no goods ... may

be exported from the

United States ... to any

entity operated from Iraq,

except donated foodstuffs

in humanitarian

circumstances, and donated

supplies intended strictly

for medical purposes, the

exportation of which has

been specifically licensed

pursuant to fother OFAC

- regulations].

31 C.F.R. § 575.205.

_ On December 3, 1998, OFAC sent a pre-penalty

notice to Mr. Sacks, Voices, and other members of

Voices. The only allegation specifically directed to

‘Mr. Sacks was that he had violated the Travel Ban by

traveling “to/from/within” Iraq and making incidental

payments for living expenses. OFAC also alleged that

Voices had violated the Medicine Restriction by

importing medical supplies, toys, and other goods into

Iraq.

On January 8, 1999, Mr. Sacks offered a written

response to the pre-penalty notice in which he admitted

to bringing medicine to Iraq. There was no further

contact between the parties until May 17, 2002, when

OFAC issued a penalty notice fining Plaintiff $10,000

for his violation of the Travel Ban.

OFAC has chosen to use a collection agency,

Ocwen Federal Bank, to collect the $10,000 penalty it

levied against the Plaintiff. Ocwen Federal Bank has

contacted Plaintiff at least once in an effort to collect

the penalty.

Plaintiff brought the instant action alleging that

OFAC lacked the statutory authority to issue bth the

Travel Ban and the Medicine Restriction. In addition,

Plaintiff seeks a declaration that the challenged

regulations are unconstitutional because they violate

international law. He claims that OFAC’s effort to

collect the civil penalty against him is time-barred. He

also seeks injunctive relief against OFAC’s collection

efforts.

Il.

ANALYSIS

OFAC’s purely legal challenges to Plaintiffs

complaint are appropriately addressed in a Fed. R. Civ.

P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. The court may dismiss a

claim only if it appears beyend doubt that the plaintiff

can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which

would entitle him to relief. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d

729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). In reviewing the allegations of - -

the complaint, all material allegations are accepted as

true, as well as all reasonable inferences to be drawn ~™

from them. Id. A motion to dismiss is also properly .

granted where the plaintiff has no “cognizable legal

theory” to tie the factual allegations into a claim upon

which the court can grant relief. Id.

A. The Travel Ban Is Valid and Enforceable.

The Travel Ban (like the Medicine Restriction) is

the result of a series of executive and legislative actions

that began when Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990. On

August 6, 1990, the United Nations Security Council

issued Resolution No. 661, which called for member

nations to restrict all economic transactions with Iraq.

S.C. Res. 661(3)(c), U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2933d mtg.,

U.N. Doc. S/RES/660 (1990). The Resolution exempted

humanitarian aid from the scope of the sanctions it

imposed. Id. (sanctions do not “includ[e}] supplies

intended strictly for medical purposes, and, in

humanitarian circumstances, foodstuffs”). President

George H.W. Bush then issued Executive Order 12,724,

ordering the Secretary of the Treasury to promulgate

regulations enforcing the sanctions called for in the

Security Council resolution.! 50 Fed. Reg. at 33089.

| Executive Order 12,722, which was similar,

was superseded by Executive Order 12,724. 50 Fed.

Reg. at 33089.

OFAC in turn issued regulations that included the

Medicine Restriction and the Travel Ban.

In August of this year, the court in Office of

Foreign Assets Control v. Voices in the Wilderness

upheld the Medicine Restriction against Voices’

contentions that OFAC lacked statutory and

constitutional authority to issue it. 329 F. Supp. 2d 71

(D.D.C. 2004). Although Voices is not precedential

authority, the court agrees with its analysis of the

Medicine Restriction. The Voices court determined that

the Executive Order authorized OFAC to issue the

Medicine Restriction. Id. at 77-78. It also determined

that the Executive Order itself was lawful, as it was

authorized by the United Nations Participation Act

(SUNPA”). Id. at 78. UNPA gives the President broad |

authority to take measures necessary to implement

Security Council resolutions. It provides that:

Notwithstanding the

provisions of any other law,

whenever the United

States is called upon by the

Security Council to apply

measures which said

Council has decided,

pursuant to article 41 of

said Charter, are to be

employed to give effect to

its decisions under said

Charter, the President

may, to the extent

necessary to apply such

measures, through any

agency which he may

designate, .. . regulate, or

prohibit, in whole or in

part, economic relations or

rail, sea, air, postal,

40 4

telegraphic, radio, and

other means of

communication between

any foreign country or any

national thereof or any

person therein and the

United States or any

person subject to the

jurisdiction thereof ....

22 U.S.C. § 287c(a). Although other federal statutes

provide more limited presidencial authority, and limit

the President’s ability to restrict humanitarian aid (e.g.,

50 U.S.C. § 1702(b)), UNPA gives the President the

authority to implement Security Council resolutions

“[njotwithstanding the provisions of any other law.” 22

U.S.C. § 287c(a). In short, the court agrees with the

Voices court that the Medicine Restriction was valid.

The Voices analysis is equally applicable to the Travel

Ban.

Plaintiff Sacks advances one argument that the

Voices court did not expressly consider. He notes that

Resolution No. 661 expressly excludes humanitarian

aid from the scope of the sanctions to be imposed

against Iraq. S.C. Res. 661(3)(c), U.N. SCOR, 45th

Sess., 2933d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/660 (1990)

(sanctions do not “includ[e] supplies intended strictly

for medical purposes, and, in humanitarian

circumstances, foodstuffs”). UNPA, in turn, only

authorizes presidential action “to the extent necessary

to apply” Security Council measures. 22 U.S.C.

§ 287c(a) (emphasis added). Plaintiff argues that

regulations on travel for humanitarian purposes were

not necessary to implement the Security Council

Resolution, and thus even if the Executive Order

authorized such measures, it did so without legal

authority.

Although Plaintiff presents a compelling

argument, it is an argument that ignores the decision of

Congress to ratify the Iraqi sanctions regime. In the

Iraqi Sanctions Act of 1990, Congress directed the

President to “continue to impose the trade embargo and

other economic sanctions with respect to Iraq and

Kuwait that the United States is imposing” pursuant to

Executive Order 12,724. Pub. L. No. 101-513, 104 Stat.

2047-2054 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1701). As Congress

ratified the Executive Order on which the Travel Ban

and Medicine Restriction were based,? the court must

reject Plaintiffs argument that the Executive Order

directed measures that were not “necessary” (under

UNPA) to enforce Resolution No. 661.

B. Even if Plaintiff Has Standing to Challenge

It, the Medicine Restriction is Valid and

Enforceable.

OFAC contends that Plaintiff does not have

standing to challenge the Medicine Restriction, because

OFAC has never contended that Plaintiff violated the

Medicine Restriction. A plaintiff seeking to challenge a

federal statute or regulation must generally prove that

he has suffered or will suffer an injury, that the

challenged statute or regulation caused the injury, and

that the court can provide redress for the injury. Lujan

v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561-62 (1992).

2 The Iraqi Sanctions Act also required that any

regulations promulgated after the Act (after

November 5, 1990) were to be submitted to Congress.

The challenged regulations were issued in January

1991, and it does not appear that they were submitted

to Congress. Although OFAC may have neglected its

statutory duties, this is not a basis for invalidating the

challenged regulations. In_ re Surface Mining

Regulation Litig., 627 F.2d 1346, 1365 (D.C. Cir. 1980).

4 2 A

He Ps « -

OFAC argues that Plaintiff Sacks has suffered no

injury as a result of the Medicine Restriction.

Plaintiff does not contest that OFAC has not

attempted to penalize him for violating the Medicine

Restriction,? but Plaintiff contends that his admitted

violation of the Medicine Restriction, coupled with

OFAC’s ageressive enforcement policy, means that the

threat that he will be penalized is sufficient to confer

standing. He notes that in its pre-penalty notice, OFAC

not only alleged that Plaintiff violated the Travel Ban,

but also that Voices, an organization to which Plaintiff

belongs, violated the Medicine Restriction.

Although the parties present an intriguing

argument on the standing issue, the court finds it

unnecessary to resolve it.’ Whether Plaintiff has

standing to contest the Medicine Restriction or not, his

challenge fares no better than his challenge to the

Travel Ban. The Court’s discussion of the statutory

authority for the Travel Ban, supra, applies equally to

the Medicine Restriction. The Medicine Restriction is a

3 At oral argument, Plaintiff suggested that

because one must necessarily “travel” in order to deliver

food and medicine, the court can conflate the Travel

Ban and the Medicine Restriction for standing

purposes. The court disagrees. The two regulations

proscribe different sets of conduct, and Plaintiff was

penalized only for his travel-related expenditures in

Iraq.

4 The court has considered OFAC’s late-filed

motion to file a supplementary brief on the standing

issue. (Dkt. # 28). The court has granted that motion,

and has considered OFAC’s arguments in the

supplemental brief. Given the court’s disposition of the

issue, the court finds it unnecessary to grant Plaintiff

an opportunity to respond to the supplemental brief.

valid exercise of authority granted to OFAC through

Executive Order 12,724 and the Iraqi Sanetions Act.

fed International Law Does Not Render the

Regulations Unconstitutional.

Plaintiff cites four sources of international law

that he believes render the challenged regulations

unconstitutional. Plaintiff does not explain how the

United States Constitution incorporates these

principles of international law. Nor does Plaintiff

contest that international law is not binding on the

United States unless the United States ratifies the law

or the law is “self-executing.” Whitney v. Robinson, 124

U.S. 190, 194 (1888).

The court finds that the international law upon

which Plaintiff relies is not binding on the United

States. The United Nations Convention on the Rights

of the Child is not self-executing, and the United States

Senate has declined to ratify it. Flores v. Southern

Peru Copper Corp., 343 F.3d 140, 165 (2d Cir. 2003).

. The same is true of the Geneva Convention Relative to

the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. Tel-

Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 809 (D.C.

Cir. 1984). Although the United States has ratified

part of the Convention on the Prevention and

Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, it also provided

that the Convention creates no “substantive or

procedural right enforceable by law by any party in any

proceeding.” 18 U.S.C. § 1092. Finally, the Universal

Declaration of Human Rights is aspirational, not

binding, and is not recognized as law in the United

States. Flores, 343 F.3d at 165.

Customary international law also provides no

defense for the Plaintiff. Plaintiff argues that even if

the international! law he cites has not been ratified or

enacted in the United States, customary international

law embodying the same principles is controlling. Even

if the court accepts the Plaintiffs interpretation of the

relevant customary international law, it cannot

overlook the executive and legislative acts that

expressly address sanctions against Iraq. Customary

international law is not binding where there is a

controlling legislative or executive act addressing the

same subject. Galo-Garcia v. INS, 86 F.3d 916, 918 (9th

Cir. 1996). International law does not provide Plaintiff

with a legally cognizable claim against the challenged

regulations.

D. OFAC’s Effort to Collect Its Penalty From

Plaintiff is Not Time-Barred.

Plaintiff contends that OFAC’s effort to collect

its $10,000 penalty is barred by the five-year statute of

limitations in 28 U.S.C. § 2462, which provides that:

Except as otherwise

provided by Act of

Congress, an action, suit or

proceeding for the

enforcement of any civil

fine, penalty, or forfeiture,

pecuniary or otherwise,

shall not be entertained

unless commenced within

five years from the date

when the _ claim first

accrued ....

Plaintiff argues that OFAC’s penalty arises from

Plaintiffs November 1997 trip to Iraq, which was more

than five years before OFAC initiated efforts to collect

its penalty through Ocwen Federal Bank in August

2003.

Both parties assume that the phrase “proceeding

for the enforcement of any ... penalty” applies

exclusively to proceedings to collect penalties like the

one that OFAC imposed against him. The phrase has.

been interpreted to include any proceeding for the

Lmposition of a penalty. 3M Co. v. Browner, 17 F.3d

1453, 1457-59 (D.C. Cir. 1994). The Browner court held

that an agency’s effort to impose a penalty is itself a

“proceeding for the enforcement” of the penalty. Id. at

1459 (holding that a contrary result would be

“inconceivable”); Federal Election Comm. v. Williams,

104 F.3d 237, 240 (9th Cir. 1996) (adopting the Browner

view of 28 U.S.C. § 2462). OFAC commenced its

proceeding to enforce its penalty against Plaintiff in

December 1998, when it sent its pre-penalty notice to

the Plaintiff. That proceeding concluded in May 2002,

when OFAC issued its final penalty notice against

Plaintiff. Regardless of which date is relevant, the

court finds that OFAC commenced its enforcement

proceeding within the five-year statute of limitations

(which would not have run until November 2002).

E. OFAC’s Regulations Bar the Use of a

Collection Agency to Collect Its Penalty

From Plaintiff.

Although OFAC met the applicable statute of

limitations for enforcing its penalty against Plaintiff,

the court asked the parties to provide supplemental

briefing to address whether OFAC is subject to

restrictions on its effort to collect on that penalty. In

particular, OFAC’s own regulations provide that in the

event that a person does not pay or make arrangements

to pay an OFAC penalty within 30 days of its issuance,

“[T]he matter shall be referred to the United States

Department of Justice for appropriate action to recover

the penalty in a civil suit in a Federal district court.”

31 C.F.R. § 57&.705. OFAC has not referred the matter

to the Department of Justice; it has chosen to use a

collection agency to collect its penalty.’

Plaintiff argues that 31 C.F.R. § 575.705

unambiguously bars any method of penalty collection

except reference to the Department of Justice for a civil

suit. Although a court should ordinarily defer to an

agency’s interpretation of its own regulations, deference

is not necessary where the language of the regulation is

unambiguous. Ward’s Cove Packing Corp. v._ Nat'l

Marine Fisheries Serv., 307 F.3d 1214, 1219 (9th Cir.

2002).

OFAC argues that the regulation is ambiguous,

because while it might mandate a referral of a penalty

to the Department of Justice, it is silent as to the

availability of other remedies. Moreover, OFAC points

out that both statutes and regulations generally

applicable to the Treasury provide that multiple

collection remedies are usually encouraged. 31 U.S.C.

§ 3718(a); 31 C.F.R. § 5.2(e). OFAC thus contends that

the meaning of 31 C.F.R. § 575.705 is that OFAC may

refer penalties to the Department of Justice or it may

refer them to a collection agency.

Given the substantial deference owed to OFAC

in interpreting its regulations, the court might be

inclined to accept OFAC’s position. See Alhambra

Hosp. v. Thompson, 259 F.3d 1071, 1076 (9th Cir. 2001)

(recognizing limitations on deference to agency

interpretation). To do so, however, would be to ignore

the 13 other regulatory subchapters that expressly

5 Plaintiff urges the court to hold that the

Federal Debt Collection Procedure Act (“FDCPA”)

(28 U.S.C. §§ 3001-3015) prevents OFAC from using a

collection agency. OFAC correctly points out that

31 U.S.C. § 3718 authorizes OFAC to use a collection

agency, although that agency must follow the FDCPA.

state what OFAC asks the court to read into 31 C.F.R.

§ 575.705. For example, the Iraqi sanctions’ closest

neighbor in the Code of Federal Regulations is at

31 C.F.R. subchapter 585. That subchapter establishes

sanctions for prohibited transactions with the Federal

Republic of Yugoslavia. At 31 C.F.R. § 585.705, OFAC

provides that if a person does not pay an OFAC penalty

within 30 days, “[T]he matter shall be referred for

administrative collection measures or to the United

States Department of Justice for appropriate action to

recover the penalty in a civil suit in a Federal district

court.” This provision, or its substantial equivalent, is

repeated in three other subchapters relating to OFAC

prohibitions on transactions with regions in the Baltics

(31 C.F.R. §§ 586.705, 587.705, 588.705), six other

OFAC regulations on transactions with Angola

(31C.F.R. § 590.705), Iran (31 C.F.R. § 560.706),

Afghanistan (31 C.F.R. § 545.705), the Sudan (31 C.F.R.

§ 538.705), Burma (31 C.F.R. § 537.705), and Cuba

(31 C.F.R. § 515.718), as well as OFAC prohibitions on

transactions in weapons of mass destruction (31 C.F.R.

§ 539.705), highly enriched uranium (31 C.F.R.

§ 540.705), and narcotics (31 C.F.R. § 536.705). The

only regulations dictating that penalty collections “shall

be referred” to the Department of Justice without

mentioning administrative collection measures are the

Iraq sanctions regulations at issue here, older

regulations on transactions with Iran (31 C.F.R.

§ 535.705), and regulations on transactions with Libya

(31 C.F.R. § 550.706).°

6 The court recognizes that changes in the

political climate may have caused OFAC to rescind or

amend some of the regulations listed above, or at least

adopt different enforcement policies. Those changes

would not, however, affect the court’s analysis of the

regulation in question.

The court does not dispute that OFAC was

authorized to enact regulations that permit it to use

extra judicial means of collection. The statute and

regulation that authorize such means, however, are

merely permissive. 31 U.S.C. § 3718(a) (“Under

conditions the head of an executive ... agency considers

appropriate, the head of the agency may enter into a

contract with a person for collection service to recover

indebtedness owed”); 31 C.F.R. § 5.2(e) (“Use of multiple

collection remedies allowed.”). A review of OFAC

regulations shows that OFAC often chooses to exercise

that authority by issuing regulations that allow

multiple avenues for penalty collection. For the lraqi

regulations in question, OFAC chose not to do so. Even

giving substantial deference to OFAC’s interpretations

of its regulations, the court finds that 31 C.F.R.

§ 575.705 requires OFAC to use the Department of

Justice to collect penalties for violations of the Iraqi

Travel Ban.

: IV.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the court GRANTS

Defendants’ motion to dismiss (Dkt. #8) in part, and

DENIES it in part.

The only claim remaining in Plaintiffs

complaint is its request for injunctive relief against

OFAC’s unlawful attempts to collect a penalty against

him. It is not clear whether OFAC has any continuing

control over Ocwen Federal Bank’s efforts to collect

OFAC’s penalty from Plaintiff. To the extent that

OFAC continues to exercise such control, the court

ORDERS that OFAC is enjoined from using any means

of collecting its penalty against Plaintiff that is

inconsistent with this order. As Ocwen Federal Bank is

not a party to this action, the court cannot enter an

order enjoining it.

49 A

The court also notes that Plaintiff in his

supplemental brief, and at oral argument, suggests that

he has brought a claim contesting the amount of the

penalty that OFAC levied. Although Plaintiff could

possibly bring this challenge in the form of a claim

under the Administrative Procedures Act or otherwise,

the court finds that even a generous reading of the

complaint shows that Plaintiff has brought no such

claim. Even if there were such a claim, the court's

decision that OFAC cannot use extrajudicial means to

collect its penalty means that Plaintiffs objection to the

amount of that penalty is not yet ripe for consideration

by this court.

As there is no further relief to grant to either

party, this action 1s DISMISSED.

DATED this 22nd day of October, 2004.

s/ James L. Robart

JAMES L. ROBART

United States District Judge

SEA_DOCS:830778.1

SOA

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON

AT SEATTLE

BERTRAM SACKS,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO, C04-108JLR

V.

ORDER

ASSETS

CONTROL, UNITED

STATES

DEPARTMENT OF THE

TREASURY, et al.

)

)

)

)

OFFICE OF FOREIGN )

)

)

)

)

)

)

Defendants. )

I. INTRODUCTION

This matter comes before the court on two related

motions from the Defendants: Defendants’ Motion for a

Protective Order Staying Discovery (Dkt. # 17) and

Defendants’ Motion for Extension of Time to Respond to

Pending Discovery (Dkt. #20). For the reasons stated

below, the court GRANTS both motions and stays

discovery in this matter until the court orders the stay

lifted.

IL. BACKGROUND & ANALYSIS

Plaintiff Sacks filed this action challenging the

authority of the United States to issue various

restrictions on financial transactions and other activity

by United States citizens in Iraq. Defendants have

responded with a motion to dismiss plaintiffs complaint.

On August 26, 2004, the court ordered the parties to

provide supplemental briefing on two issues relevant to

the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss.

The court is persuaded that the parties should not

engage in an expensive discovery effort before the

court determined the scope of this litigation in its

ruling on Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. For that

reason, the court will stay discovery in this action

until further order of the court.

Ill. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the court GRANTS

Defendants’ motions (Dkt. ##17, 20). Discovery in

this action is stayed until further order of the court.

DATED this 31% day of August, 2004.

s/James L. Robart

United States District Judge

SEA_DOCS:830918.1

The United Nations (UN) Participation Act, 22 U.S.C. §

287c(a), provides in relevant part:

§ 287c. Economic and communication

sanctions pursuant to United, Nations Security

Council Resolution

(a) Enforcement measures: importation of Rhodesian

chromium

Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law,

whenever the United States is called upon by the

Security Council to apply measures which said Council

has decided, pursuant to article 4 I of said Charter, are to

be employed to give effect to its decisions under said

Charter, the President may, to the extent necessary to

apply such measures, through any agency which he may

designate, and under such orders, rules, and regulations

as may be prescribed by him, investigate, regulate, or

prohibit, in whole or in part, economic relations or rail,

sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of

communication between any foreign country or any

national thereof or any person therein and the United

States or any person subject to the jurisdiction thereof, or

involving any property subject to the jurisdiction of the

United States.

The Iraq Sanctions Act, Pub.L.101-513, §§ 586-586J, 104

Stat. 2047, codified at 50 U.S.C. §1701 note, provides in

part:

§ 586A. _ Declarations Regarding Iraq's

Invasion of Kuwait.

The Congress-

(1) condemns Iraq's invasion of Kuwait on August

2, 1990;

(2) supports the actions that have been taken by

the President in response to that invasion;

(3) calls for the immediate and unconditional

withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait;

(4) supports the efforts of the United Nations

Security Council to end this violation of international law

and threat to international peace; :

(5) supports the imposition and enforcement of

multilateral sanctions against Iraq;

(6) calls on United States allies and other

countries to support fully the efforts of the United

Nations Security Council, and to take other appropriate

actions, to bring about an end to Iraq's occupation of

Kuwait; and

(7) condemns the brutal occupation of Kuwait by

Iraq and its gross violations of internationally recognized

human rights in Kuwait, including widespread arrests,

torture, summary executions, and mass extrajudicial

killings.

§ 586C. Trade Embargo Against Iraq.

(a) CONTINUATION OF EMBARGO. -- Except as

otherwise provided in this section, the President shall

continue to impose the trade embargo and other

economic sanctions with respect to Jraq and Kuwait that

the United States is imposing, in response to Iraq's

invasion of Kuwait, pursuant to Executive Orders

FA

Numbered 12724 and 12725 (August 9, 1990) and, to the

extent they are still in effect, Executive Orders

Numbered 12722 and 12723 (August 2, 1990).

Executive Order 12722 of

August 2, 1990

55 FR 31803

August 3, 1990 --

TEXT: By the authority vested in me as President by the

constitution and laws of the United states of America,

including the International Emergency Economic Powers

Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.), the National Emergencies

act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.), and section 301 of title 3 of

the United States Code.

I, GEORGE BUSH, President of the United States of

America, find that the policies and actions of the

Government of Iraq constitute an unusual and

extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign

policy of the United States and hereby declare a national

emergency to deal with that threat.

I hereby order:

Section 1. All property and interests in property of

the Government of Iraq, its agencies, instrumentalities

and controlled entities and the Central Bank of Iraq that

are in the United States, that hereafter come within the

United States or that are or hereafter come within the

possession or control of United States persons, including

their overseas branches, are hereby blocked.

Section 2. The following are prohibited, except to the

extent provided in regulations which may hereafter be

issued pursuant to this Order:

(a) The import into the United States of any goods or

services of Iraqi origin, other than publications and other

informational materials;

(b) The export to Iraq of any goods, technology

(including technical data or other information controlled

for export pursuant to Section 5 of the Export

56 A

administration Act (50 U.S.C. App. 2404)) or services

from the United States, except publications and other

informational materials, and donations of articles

articles intended to relieve human suffering, such as

food, clothing, medicine and medical supplies intended

strictly for medical purposes;

(c) Any transaction by a United States person

relating to transportation to or from Iraq; the provision of

transportation to or from the United states by any Iraqi

person or any vessel or aircraft of Iraqi registration; or

the sale in the United States by any person holding

authority under the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, as

amended (49 U.S.C. 1514), of any transportation by air

which includes any stop in Iraq;

(d) The purchase by any United States person of

goods for export from Iraq to any country;

(e) The performance by any United States person of

any contract in support of an industrial or other

commercial or governmental project in Iraq;

(f) The grant or extension of credits or loans by any

United States person to the Government of Iraq, its

instrumentalities and controlled entities;

(g) Any transaction by the United States person

relating to travel by any United States citizen or

permanent resident alien to Iraq, or to activities by any

such person within Iraq, after the date of this Order,

other than transactions necessary to effect such person's

departure from Iraq, or travel for journalistic activity by

persons regularly employed in such capacity by a

newsgathering organization; and

(h) Any transaction by the United States person

which evades or avoids, or has the purpose of evading cr

avoiding, any of the prohibitions set forth in this Order

For purposes of this Order, the term "United States

person" means any United States citizen, permanent

TA

resident alien, juridical person organized under the laws

of the United States, or any person in the United States.

Section 3. This Order is effective immediately.

Section 4. The Secretary of the Treasury, in

consultation with the Secretary of State, is hereby

authorized to take such actions, including the

promulgation of rules and regulations, as may be

necessary to carry out the purposes of this Order, Such

actions may include prohibiting or regulating payments _

or transfers of any property or any transactions involving

the transfer of anything of economic value by any United

States person to the Government of Iraq, its

instrumentalities and controlled entities, or to any Iraqi

national or entity owned or controlled, directly or

indirectly, by Iraq or Iraqi nationals. The Secretary may

redelegate any of these functions to other officers and

agencies of the Federal government. All agencies of the

United States government are directed to take all

appropriate measures within their authority to carry out

the provisions of this Order, including the suspension or

termination of licenses or other authorizations in effect

as of the date of this Order.

This Order shall be transmitted to the Congress and

published in the Federal Register.

SEA_DOCS:830911.1

Executive Order 12724, 55 Fed. Reg. 33089 (Aug. 9,

1990) reprinted at 50 U.S.C. §1701 note, provides in part:

Executive Order 12724: Blocking Iraqi

Government Property and Prohibiting

Transactions With Iraq

By the authority vested in me as President by the

Constitution and laws.of the United States of America,

including the international Emergency Economic Powers

Act(50U.8.C.1701 et seq.), the National Emergencies Act

(50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.), section 301 of title 3 of the

United States Code, and the United Nations

Participation Act (22 U .S.C. 287 c), in view of United

Nations Security Council Resolution No. 661 of August 6,

1990, and in order to take additional steps with respect

to Iraqis invasion of Kuwait and the national emergency

declared in Executive Order No. 12722,

I, GEORGE BUSH, President of he United States

of America, hereby order:

¥*K*

Sec. 2. The following are prohibited, except to the

extent provided in regulations that may hereafter be

issued pursuant to this order:

(a) The importation into the United States of any

goods or services of Iraqi origin, or any activity that

promotes or is intended to promote such importation;

(b) The exportation to Iraq, or to any entity

operated from Iraq, or owned or controlled by the

Government of Iraq, directly or indirectly, of any goods,

technology (including technical data oor other

information), or services either (i) from the United

States, or (ii) requiring the issuance of a license by a

S9A

Federal agency, or any activity that promotes or is

intended to promote such exportation, except donations

of articles intended to relieve human suffering, such as

food and supplies intended strictly for medical purposes;

(c) Any dealing by a United States person related

to property of Iraqi origin exported from Iraq after

August 6, 1990, or property intended for exportation from

Iraq to any country, or exportation to Iraq from any

country, or any activity of any kind that promotes or is

intended to promote such dealing;

(d) Any transaction by a United States person

relating to travel by any United States citizen or

permanent resident alien to Iraq, or to activities by any

such person within Iraq, after the date of this order,

other than transactions necessary to effect (i) such

person's departure from Iraq, (ii) travel and activities for

the conduct of the official business of the Federal

Government or the United Nations, or (iii) travel for

journalistic activity by persons regularly employed in

such capacity by a news-gathering organization;

(e) Any transaction by a United States person

relating to transportation to or from Iraq; the provision of

transportation to or from the United States by any Iraqi

person or any vessel or aircraft of Iraqi registration; or

the sale in the United States by any person holding

authority under the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, as

amended (49 U.S.C. 1301 et seq.), of any transportation

by air that includes any stop in Iraq;

(f) The performance by any United States person

of any contract, including a financing contract, in support

of an industrial, commercial, public utility, or

governmental project in Iraq;

60 A

(g) Except as otherwise authorized herein, any

commitment or transfer, direct or indirect, of funds, or

other financial or ~conomic resources by any United

States person to t » ‘xovernment of Iraq or any other

person in [raq;

(h) Any transaction by any United States person

that evades or avoids, or has the purpose of evading or

avoiding, any of the prohibitions set forth in this order.

kEK

Sec. 5. The Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation

with the Secretary of State, is hereby authorized to take

such actions, including the promulgation of rules and

regulations, as may be necessary to carry out the

purposes of this order. Such actions may include

prohibiting or regulating payments or transfers of any

property or any transactions involving the transfer of

anything of economic value by any United States person

to the Government of Iraq, or to any Iraqi national or

entity owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by the

Government of Iraq or Iraqi nationals. The Secretary of

the Treasury may redelegate any of these functions to

other officers and agencies of the Federal Government.

All agencies of the Federal Government are directed to

take all appropriate measures within their authority to

carry out the provisions of this order, including the

suspension or termination of licenses or other

authorizations in effect as of the date of this order.

31 C.F.R § 575.205 (including the Medicine

Restriction), provides:

§ 575.205. Prohibited exportation and

reexportation of goods, technology, or services to

Iraq. 3

Except as otherwise authorized, no goods, technology

(including technical data or other information), or

services may be exported from the United States, or, if

subject to U.S. jurisdiction, exported or reexported from a

third country to Iraq, to any entity owned or controlled

by the Government of Iraq, or to any entity operated

from Iraq, except donated foodstuffs in humanitarian

circumstances, and donated supplies intended strictly for

medical purposes, the exportation of which has been

specifically licensed pursuant to § 575.507, 575.517 or

575.518.

62 A

31 C.F.R. § 575.207 (the Iraq Travel Ban),

provides:

§ 575.207 Prohibited transactions relating to

travel to Iraq or to activities within Iraq.

Except as otherwise authorized, no U.S. person

may engage in any transaction relating to travel by any

U.S. citizen or permanent resident alien to Iraq, or to

activities by any U.S. citizen or permanent resident alien

within Iraq, after the effective date, other than

transactions: .

(a) Necessary to effect the departure of a U.S.

citizen or permanent. resident alien from Kuwait or Iraq;

(b) Relating to travel and activities for the

conduct of the official business of the United States

Government or the United Nations; or

(c) Relating to journalistic activity by persons

regularly employed in such capacity by a newsgathering

organization.

This section prohibits the unauthorized payment by a

U.S. person of his or her own travel or living expenses to

or within Iraq.

63 A

UN Security Council Resolution 661, U.N. SCOR,

2933"4 mtg, U.N. Doc. S/RES/661 (1990)

The Security Council,

Reaffirming its resolution 660 (1990) of 2 August 1990,

Deeply concerned that that resolution has not been

implemented and that the invasion by Iraq of Kuwait

continues, with further loss of human life and material

destruction,

Determined to bring the invasion and occupation of

Kuwait by Iraq to an end and to restore the sovereignty,

independence and territorial integrity of Kuwait,

Noting that the legitimate Government of Kuwait has

expressed its readiness to comply with resolution 660

(1990),

Mindful of its responsibilities under the Charter of the

United Nations for the maintenance of international

peace and security,

Affirming the inherent right of individual or collective

self-defense, in response to the armed attack by Iraq

against Kuwait, in accordance with Article 51 of the

Charter,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter,

1. Determines that Iraq so far has failed to comply

with paragraph 2 of the resolution 660 (1990) and has

usurped the authority of the legitimate Government of

Kuwait;

2. Decides, as a consequence, to take the following

measures to secure compliance of Iraq with paragraph 2

64A

a

of resolution 660 (1990) and to restore the authority of

the Government of Kuwait;

kkk

4, Decides that all States shall not make available to

the Government of Iraq, or to any commercial, industrial

or public utility undertaking in Iraq or Kuwait, any

funds or any other financial or economic resources and

shall prevent their nationals and any persons within

their territories from removing from their territories or

otherwise making available to that Government or to any

such undertaking any such funds or resources and from

remitting any other funds to persons or bodies within

Iraq or Kuwait, except payments exclusively for strictly

medical or humanitarian purposes and, in humanitarian

circumstances, foodstuffs;

5. Calls upon all States, including States non-

members of the United Nations, to act strictly in

accordance with the provisions of the present resolution

notwithstanding any contract entered into or license

granted before the date of the present resolution;

KEKE

Adopted at the 2933" meeting by 13 votes to none, with 2

abstentions (Cuba and Yemen).

SEA_DOCS:830900.1

65 A

Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of

the Crime of Genocide

Approved and proposed for signature and ratification or

accession by General Assembly resolution 260 A (III) of 9

December 1948 ,

Entry into force: 12 January 1951, in accordance with

article XIII

The Contracting Parties,

Having considered the declaration made by the General

Assembly of the United Nations in its resolution 96 (1)

dated 11 December 1946 that genocide is a crime under

international law, contrary to the spirit and aims of the

United Nations and condemned by the civilized world,

Recognizing that at all periods of history genocide has

inflicted great losses on humanity, and

Being convinced that, in order to liberate mankind from

such an odious scourge, international co-operation is

required,

Hereby agree as hereinafter provided:

Article I

The Contracting Parties confirm that genocide, whether

committed in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime

under international law which they undertake to prevent

and to punish.

Article Il

In the present Convention, genocide means any of the

following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole

66 A

ar in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group,

as such:

(a) Killing members of the group;

( b ) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members

of the group;

(c ) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life

calculated to bring about its phy ical destruction in

whole or in part;

( d ) Imposing measures intended to prevent births

within the group;

( e )Forcibly transferring children of the group to

another group.

Article III

The following acts shall be punishable:

(a) Genocide;

(b ) Conspiracy to commit genocide;

(c ) Direct and public incitement to commit genocide:

(d) Attempt to commit genocide;

(e ) Complicity in genocide.

Article [V

Persons committing genocide or any of the other acts

enumerated in article III shall be punished, whether they

are constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials or

private individuals

67 A

Convention on the Rights of the Child

Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and

accession by General Assembly resolution 44/25 of .

20 November 1989 |

Entry into force 2 September 1990, in accordance

with article 49

Preamble

The States Parties to the present Convention,

Considering that, in accordance with the principles

proclaimed in the Charter of the United Nations,

recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and

inalienable rights of all members of the human family is

the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world,

Bearing in mind that the peoples of the United Nations

have, in the Charter, reaffirmed their faith in

fundamental human rights and in the dignity and worth

of the human person, and have determined to promote

social progress and better standards of life in larger

freedom, .

Recognizing that the United Nations has, in the

Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in the

International Covenants on Human Rights, proclaimed

and agreed that everyone is entitled to all the rights and

freedoms set forth therein, without distinction of any

kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion,

political or other opinion, national or social origin,

property, birth or other status,

Recalling that, in the Universal Declaration of Human

Rights, the United Nations has proclaimed that

childhood is entitled to special care and assistance,

68 A

Bearing in mind that the need to extend particular care

to the child has been stated in the Geneva Declaration of

the Rights of the Child of 1924 and in the Declaration of

the Rights of the Child adopted by the General Assembly

on 20 November 1959 and recognized in the Universal

Declaration of Human Rights, in the International

Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (in particular in

articles 23 and 24), in the International Covenant on

Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (in particular in

article 10) and in the statutes and relevant instruments

of specialized agencies and international organizations

concerned with the welfare of children,

Recalling the provisions of the Declaration on Social and

Legal Principles relating to the Protection and Welfare of

Children, with Special Reference to Foster Placement

and Adoption Nationally and Internationally; the United

Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the

Administration of Juvenile Justice (The Beijing Rules);

and the Declaration on the Protection of Women and

Children in Emergency and Armed Conflict, Recognizing

that, in all countries in the world, there are children

living in exceptionally difficult conditions, and that such

children need special consideration,

Have agreed as follows:

Article 24

1. States Parties recognize the right of the child to the

enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health

and to facilities for the treatment of illness and

rehabilitation of health. States Parties shall strive to

69 A

ensure that no child is deprived of his or her right of

access to such health care services.

2. States Parties shall pursue full implementation of this

right and, in particular, shall take appropriate measures:

(a) To diminish infant and child mortality;

(b) To ensure the provision of necessary medical

assistance and health care to all children with emphasis

on the development of primary health care;

(c) To combat disease and malnutrition, including within

the framework of primary health care, through, inter

alia, the application of readily available technology and

through the provision of adequate nutritious foods and

clean drinking-water, taking into consideration the

dangers and risks of environmental pollution;

(d) To ensure appropriate pre-natal and post-natal health

care for mothers;

(e) To ensure that all segments of society, in particular

parents and children, are informed, have access to

education and are supported in the use of basic

knowledge of child heaith and nutrition, the advantages

of breastfeeding, hygiene and environmental sanitation

and the prevention of accidents;

(f) To develop preventive health care, guidance for

parents and family planning education and services.

3. States Parties shall take all effective and appropriate

measures with a view to abolishing traditional practices

prejudicial to the health of children.

4. States Parties undertake to promote and encourage

international co-operation with a view to achieving

progressively the full realization of the right recognized

70A

in the present article. In this regard, particular account

shall be taken of the needs of developing countries.

SEA_DOCS:830906.!

Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of

Civilian Persons in Time of War.

Geneva, 12 August 1949.

The undersigned Plenipotentiaries of the Governments

represented at the Diplomatic Conference held at Geneva

from April 21 to August 12, 1949, for the purpose of

establishing a Convention for the Protection of Civilian

Persons in Time of War, have agreed as follows:

Art. 23. Each High Contracting Party shall allow the free

passage of all consignments of medical and hospital

stores and objects necessary for religious worship

intended only for civilians of another High Contracting ~

Party, even if the latter is its adversary. It shall likewise

permit the free passage of all consignments of essential

foodstuffs, clothing and tonics intended for children

under fifteen, expectant mothers and maternity cases.

The obligation of a High Contracting Party to allow the

free passage of the consignments indicated in the

preceding paragraph is subject to the condition that this

Party is satisfied that there are no serious reasons

for fearing:

(a) that the consignments may be diverted from their

destination,

(b) that the control may not be effective, or

(c) that a definite advantage may accrue to the

military efforts or economy of the enemy through the

substitution of the above-mentioned consignments for

goods which would otherwise be provided or produced by

the enemy or through the release of such material,

services or facilities as would otherwise be required for

the production of such goods.

The Power which allows the passage of the consignments

indicated in the first paragraph of this Article may make

such permission conditional on the distribution to the

72 A

persons benefited thereby being made under the local

supervision of the Protecting Powers.

Such consignments shall be forwarded as rapidly as

possible, and the Power which permits their free passage

shall have the right to prescribe the technical

arrangements under which such passage is allowed.

SEA_DOCS:830904.1

Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res.

217A (IID), U.N. Doc 1/810 at 71 (1948)

Preamble

Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the

equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human

family is the foundation of freedom, Justice and peace in

the world,

Whereas disregard and contempt for human rights have

resulted in barbarous acts which have outraged the

conscience of mankind, and the advent of a world in

which human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and

belief and freedom from fear and want has been

proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common

people,

Whereas it is essential, if man is not to be compelled to

have recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against

tyranny and oppression, that human rights should be

protected by the rule of law,

Whereas it is essential to promote the development of

friendly relations between nations,

Whereas the peoples of the United Nations have in the

Charter reaffirmed their faith in fundamental human

rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person and

in the equal rights of men and women and have

determined to promote social progress and better

standards of life in larger freedom,

Whereas Member States have pledged themselves to

achieve, in cooperation with the United Nations, the

promotion of universal respect for and observance of

human rights and fundamental freedoms,

Whereas a common understanding of these rights and

freedoms is of the greatest importance for the full

realization of this pledge,

Now, therefore,

The General Assembly,

Proclaims this Universal Declaration of Human Rights

as a common standard of achievement for all peoples and

all nations, to the end that every individual and every

organ of society, keeping this Declaration constantly in

mind, shall strive by teaching and education to promote

respect for these rights and freedoms and by progressive

measures, national and international, to secure their

universal and effective recognition and observance, both

among the peoples of Member States themselves and

among the peoples of territories under their jurisdiction.

Article 25

1. Everyone has the right to a standard of living

adequate for the health and well-being of himself

and of his family, including food, clothing, housing

and medical care and necessary social services,

and the right to security in the event of

unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood,

old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances

beyond his control.

Motherhood and childhood are entitled to special

care and assistance. All children, whether born in

or out of wedlock, shall enjoy the same social

protection.

bo

Article 30

Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as

implying for any State, group or person any right to

engage in any activity or to perform any act aimed at the

TSA

destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth

herein.

SEA_DOCS:830902.1

76A

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON

AT SEATTLE

BERTRAM SACKS,

Plaintiff, NO. C04-108C

vs. AMENDED COM-

PLAINT FOR

OFFICE OF FOREIGN DECLARATORY

ASSETS CONTROL, UNITED | AND INJUNCTIVE

STATES DEPARTMENT OF RELIEF

THE TREASURY, and

RICHARD NEWCOMB,

DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF

FOREIGN ASSETS

CONTROL,

Defendants.

Plaintiff Bertram Sacks alleges:

I,

PARTIES

l. Plaintiff Bertram Sacks is a citizen of the

State of Washington. He resides in Seattle,

Washington, in the Western District of Washington.

This case arises from Mr. Sacks’s journeys to Iraq. On

each trip, Mr. Sacks has brought medicine and medical

supplies for use in civilian hospitals there. He has done

so to publicize and ameliorate the effect of economic

sanctions imposed by the government of the United

States. These sanctions have led to widespread

suffering and death of Iraqi civilians, especially

children.

2. Defendant Office of Foreign Assets

Contrel is an agency of the United States government.

Defendant R. Richard Newcomb is, and at all material

times has been, the Director of the Office of Foreign

Assets Control. For the sake of convenience, the

defendants, and each of them, shall be referred to as

“OFAC.” In furtherance of, and as part of, economic

Sanctions, OFAC has promulgated regulations that

prohibit certain transactions in Iraq. Purporting to act

under those regulations. OFAC has announced its

intention to impose a $10,000 civil penalty on Mr. Sacks

for traveling to Iraq with medical supplies.

3. OFAC’s fine, and the regulations under

which OFAC imposed that fine, violate statutory law,

executive orders, international law, and the United

States Constitution. Mr. Sacks seeks injunctive relief,

and declaratory relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2201, that will

stop OFAC’s unlawful enforcement of an alleged

$10,000 civil penalty against Mr. Sacks.

Il.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

4, This Court has jurisdiction of the subject

matter under 28 U.S.C. §1331, as this case arises under

the laws of the United States. This Court also has

subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1337, as

this case arises under an Act of Congress regulating

commerce. This Court further has subject matter

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2), as this is an

action against the United States for an amount not

exceeding $10,000 and founded upon the Constitution,

Acts of Congress, and regulations promulgated by the

defendant. This Court further has subject matter of

this action, as it has jurisdiction of the underlying

claims by OFAC against Mr. Sacks under 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1331, 1337, and 2461(a).

5. Venue in the Western District of

Washington is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e), as Mr.

Sacks resides therein and no real property is involved

in this action.

Il.

OPERATIVE FACTS

A. Background.

6. On August 2, 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait.

In response, then-President George H.W. Bush declared

a “national emergency” pursuant to Executive Order

12722. That “national emergency” remains in effect to

the present day. Executive Order 19890 (July 31,

2003). In Executive Order 12722 and in Executive

Order 12724 dated a week later, President Bush

authorized the imposition of economic sanctions on

Iraq.

3 Iraq’s invasion led to the First Gulf War.

A coalition led by the United States defeated Iraq after

an extensive bombing campaign.

8. Immediately after the conclusion of the

First Gulf War, in March 1991, the United Nations

reported on the extensive damage to Iraqi

infrastructure caused by the U.S.-led bombing

campaign. Then-Secretary-General Javier Perez de

Cuellar dispatched a mission headed by Under-

Secretary-General Martti Ahtisaari to assess the

situation in Iraq. The Under-Secretary-General

reported:

I and the members of my

mission were fully

conversant with media

reports regarding the

situation in Iraq and, of

course, with the _ recent

T9A

WHO/UNICEF report on

water, sanitary, and health

conditions in the Greater

Baghdad area. It should,

however, be said at once

that nothing we had seen

or read had quite prepared

us for the particular form of

devastation which has now

befallen the country. The

recent conflict has wrought

near-apocalyptic results

upon the economic

infrastructure of what had

been, until January 1991, a

rather highly urbanized

and mechanized society.

Now, most means of

modern life support have

been destroyed or rendered

tenuous. Iraq has, for some

time to come, '_ been

relegated to a _pre-

industrial age, but with all

the disabilities of post-

industrial dependency on

an intensive use of energy

and technology.

The report recommended an immediate end to the

embargo on imports of food and other essential supplies

to prevent “imminent catastrophe.”

B. OFAC’s Regulations in Response to the

“National Emergency.”

9. In January 1991, OFAC first

promulgated regulations to enforce economic sanctions

igainst the people of Iraq. Those regulations appear at

{1 CFR Part 575.

10. OFAC purported to act under 50 U.S.C.

‘§ 1701(a) & 1702. These statutes grant the President

ertain powers to deal with an “unusual and

‘xtraordinary threat” posed by a “national emergency”

leclared by the President. Among those powers is the

vower to regulate certain financial transactions. These

sowers “may only be exercised to deal with an unusual

ind extraordinary threat with respect to which a

1ational emergency has been declared... .” 50 U.S.C.

+ 1701(b).

11. OFAC’s regulations prohibit the

mportation of goods into Iraq. The regulations include

donated foodstuffs in humanitarian circumstances, and

lonated supplies intended strictly for medical purposes”

inless those imports are “specifically licensed” by

IFAC. 31 CFR § 575.205. OFAC’s regulations do not

tate the criteria by which OFAC grants such licenses.

Nor do the regulations impose any deadline on OFAC to

rrant such licenses. Hence, OFAC has reserved to itself

‘he unrestricted and unfettered power to keep food and

nedical supplies from reaching people in Iraq who need

‘hem.

12. OFAC has also prohibited travel to Iraq,

ncluding travel for the purpose of bringing food and

nedical supplies to the Iraqi people. 31 CFR § 575.207

yrovides in relevant part, and subject to very limited

*xceptions, that “no U.S. person may engage in any

ransaction relating to travel by any U.S. citizen or

yermanent resident alien to Iraq, or to activities by any

J.S. citizen or permanent resident alien within Iraq.”

JFAC also prohibited “[aJny transaction by a U.S.

yerson relating to transportation to or from Iraq.”

31 CFR § 575.208.

Beh Enter Bert Sacks.

13. Bert Sacks has traveled to Iraq nine

times. On each trip, Mr. Sacks has brought medicine

and medical supplies and distributed them to civilians,

many of them children, in civilian hospitals in Iraq. In

1997, he helped bring roughly $40,000 worth of

medicine into Iraq for the purpose of relieving human

suffering. Mr. Sacks also brought medicine and medical

supplies to Iraq to publicize the effect of economic

sanctions on the people of Iraq, especially children.

14. While in Iraq, Mr. Sacks has visited

medical clinics and pediatric hospitals. He has seen the

children who are dying there. Mr. Sacks has met with

other U.S. citizens in Iraq to highlight the effects of

U.S. policy there. Probably the best known among

them is United States Representative Jim McDermoit,

who traveled to Iraq in 2002. :

15. Mr. Sacks’ November 1997 trip to Iraq

was covered in the national news media. In response to

this particular trip, OFAC sought to punish Mr. Sacks.

On December 3, 1998, OFAC sent a written “Prepenalty

Notice” to Mr. Sacks and others. A true and correct

copy of the Prepenalty Notice is attached hereto as

Exhibit 1. In the Prepenalty Notice, OFAC claimed

Mr. Sacks had violated its regulations enforcing

economic sanctions during his 1997 trip to Iraq. The

Prepenalty Notice contained ten “counts,” only one of

which, Count 6, was directed at Mr. Sacks. Count 6

made the following charge:

Between on or about [sic]

November 21-30, 1997,

Messrs. Handelman,

Mullins, Sacks, and Zito,

engaged in currency travel-

related transactions

to/from/within Iraq absent

prior license or other

authorization from OFAC.

These currency

transactions included, but

are not limited to, the

purchase of food, lodging,

ground transportation, and

incidentals.

OFAC proposed a penalty of $10,000 for Mr. Sacks “for

Count 6” and invited written comments within thirty

days.

16. On December 28, 1998, Mr. Sacks wrote

back to OFAC:

I appreciate that you must

see yourselves as_ doing

your job to uphold US

sanctions laws _ against

Iraq, which I have violated.

However I want to explain

here, as I would to any

personal friends of mine,

why I have done this... .

You are correct to say in

your prepenalty letter

(12/3/98) that I brought

“medical supplies and toys

to Iraq” absent prior OFAC

approval. We all recognize,

I hope, that the $40,000 of

medicines we brought to

Iraq --- despite the lives it

saved --- was essentially a

symbolic act: it lasted the

22 million people of Jraq

about 15 minutes, given

their pre-sanctions needs of

$1,000,000 of imported

medicines per day.

Further, we brought

nothing towards the

$10,000,000 of food imports

Iraqis need per day. And

we brought nothing

towards the

$22,000,000,000 of

essential repairs for the

life-supporting

infrastructure needed to

stop the water-borne

epidemics in Iraq. These

numbers long ago

convinced me that the

human crisis in Irag cannot

be solved by humanitarian

aid --- but only by an end of

economic sanctions.

The decision to turn to civil

disobedience to end

sanctions, in public

defiance of the laws you are

entrusted with enforcing,

was not a natural one for

me. | first spent two years

of research, - writing, and

contacting people about the

situation, but this failed to

cast any significant public

attention on the thousands

of Iraqi children who were

dying every month because

of the bombed civilian

infrastructure (unsafe

84 A

drinking water) and

sanctions (lack of food and

medicines). In deciding to

publicly violate sanctions,

two events and two people

played an important role

for me.

The first is knowing that

150 years ago it was the

highest law of the United

States of America that

runaway slaves from the

South were legally “stolen

property” of their owners.

Anywhere in this country,

an American was breaking

the law to help such a slave

escape via the

“underground railroad.”

The people I greatly admire

from this terrible era in our

history were not law-

abiding citizens, but those

who broke the law to help

slaves....

The second event

influencing me is_ the

deaths of milbions of

innocent civilians during

WWII. I visited Auschwitz

one year ago, just before

my trip to Irag. At both

places over a million

innocent civilians have

died. I greatly admire the

people who took personal

risks to help Jews, against

85 A

prevailing indifference and

prejudice. ...

These two events are

certainly not identical with

events in Iraq, but the

example of people

motivated by high moral

considerations to “break

the law” has given me

encouragement to do the

same....

17. After writing this letter, Mr. Sacks

continued his work to call attention to the effect of

economic sanctions, and the regulations through which

OFAC seeks to enforce them, on the people of Iraq.

Those sanctions have deprived many Iraqi civilians,

especially children, of the food, clean water, and

medicine they need to survive.

D. Economic Sanctions Contribute To the

Deaths of Thousands of Young Children in

Iraq Every Month.

18. Economic sanctions have prevented Iraq

from rebuilding water treatment plants destroyed in

the First Gulf War. Water treatment facilities were

fairly widespread in Iraq until many were bombed

during the First Gulf War, along with virtually all of

the country’s electrical-generating plants that powered

Iraq's water and sewage treatment facilities. The

resulting lack of potable water has led to the outbreak

of severe diarrhea among young children, which is often

fatal in the absence of medical treatment. OFAC

regulations, however, have prevent people like

Mr. Sacks from bringing medicine and medical supplies

to Iraq. OFAC regulations also effectively prohibit the

importation of the amount of food needed to feed the

children of Iraq.

19. Each month, economic sanctions have

helped cause the deaths of three to six thousand

children in Iraq under five years of age. In 1992, the

New England Journal of Medicine put the figure at

5,862 deaths per month for the first eight months of

1991 alone. (This does not include adults who have

died in Iraq as a consequence of economic sanctions.)

20. In 2000, UNICEF issued a report entitled

“UNICEF in Iraq.” The report warned: “Mounting

evidence shows that the sanctions are having a

devastating humanitarian impact on Iraq.” It quoted a

1997 report by the UN Human Rights Committee,

which stated: “the effect of sanctions and blockades has

been to cause suffering and death in Iraq, especially to

children.”

21. According to former UNICEF Director’

Carol Bellamy, sanctions imposed by the United States

through the UN Security Council have reversed a

decades-long decline in infant mortality in Iraq. Ms.

Bellamy cites UNICEF reports that between 1991 and

1998, this reversal contributed te the deaths of half a

million children under the age of five. One such

UNICEF report appears at

http://www.unicef.org/reseval/pdfs/irqub5est.pdf. It

contains graphs such as the following, which depict the

upsurge in child mortality in Iraq after 1990, the year

economic sanctions were first imposed:

Chart 2:

lraq - under-five mortality rate disparities

140

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1980 1982 1984 1986 19868 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000

Year

The chart shows the large disparity between the moriality rates based on

recent surveys and what would have been the situation if the mortality tend

in the 1980s had been continued through the 1990s.

22. In 2003 UNICEF published another

report, entitled “The Situation of Children in Iraq.” See

http://www.unicef.org/publications/pub_ children of irag

en.pdf. That report states that a country like Iraq,

which had an infant mortality rate of 40-60 deaths per

1,000 live births in 1990, should have had a rate of 20-

30 by now. Jd. at 13. Instead, the infant mortality rate

in southern and central Iraq climbed to 107 deaths per

1,000 live births by 1999. Id. The under-five mortality

rate, meanwhile, rose from 56 deaths per 1,000 live

births in 1985-89 to 131 in 1995-99. Id. The report

contains the following chart, which compares the 160%

increase in childhood mortality in Iraq to the (generally

improving) trend in other countries:

Id. at 14. UNICEF attributes the increase in childhood

mortality in Iraq to economic sanctions. Jd. at 13.

23. In 1999, the Seattle Post-Intelligencer

sent a team to Iraq to report on conditions there. The

resulting articles, which are available on-line,

document the deaths of Iraqi children due to the

absence of medical supplies. See

http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/irag/lifel.shtml.

89 A

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

24. The situation has not improved since the

end of the Second Gulf War. UNICEF's website

(http://www. unicef.org/infobycountry/iraq.html)

currently reports:

Even before the most recent conflict

began, many children were highly

vulnerable to disease and malnutrition.

One in four children aged under five is

chronically malnourished. One in eight

children die before their fifth birthday.

25. Members of the United States

government have publicly deemed these widespread

deaths of infants and children in Iraq to be “worth it.”

In 1996 former Secretary of State (and then U.S

Ambassador to the UN) Madeleine Albright was asked:

“We have heard that a half million children have died. I

mean, that's more children than died in Hiroshima.

And, you know, is the price worth it?” Ms. Albright

responded, “I think this is a very hard choice, but the

price--we think the price is worth it.” Ms. Albright has

later expressed regret for this statement, but has

insisted that sanctions are justified notwithstanding

the “starvation” and “horrors” experienced by the Iraqi

people. She claimed sanctions did not preclude food

from reaching civilians in Iraq.

E. Humanitarian Exemptions to Economic

Sanctions Have Not Stopped Children

From Dying As a Result of Those Sanctions.

26, In theory, OFAC regulations allow food

and medicine to be imported into Iraq. Food has also

been brought into Iraq under the so-called “oil-for-food

program,” which began in 1996: But widespread

sanctions-related infant and child mortality remain.

27. As a result, the first two directors of the

oil-for-food program both resigned from the UN in

protest. The first director, Denis Halliday, served as

United Nations Assistant Secretary General and

Humanitarian Coordinator in Iraq from September 1,

1997 until the end of September 1998. He later

explained: |

Malnutrition is running at about 30

percent for children under 5 years old. In

terms of mortality, probably 5 or 6

thousand children are dying per month.

This is directly attributable to the impact

of sanctions, which have caused the

breakdown of the clean water system,

health facilities and all the things that

young children require.... I do not want

to administer a program that results in

these kind of figures.

A month after resigning, Mr. Halliday warned: “We are

in the process of destroying an entire society. It is as

simple and terrifying as that.”

28. Mr. Halliday was succeeded by Hans von

Sponeck, who served as UN Assistant Secretary

General and Humanitarian Coordinator for Iraq. Mr.

Von Sponeck served until February 2000, when he, too,

resigned. Mr. von Sponeck stated, “I increasingly

became aware that I was associated with a policy of

implementing an oil-for-food program that could not

possibly meet the needs of the Iraqi people.” He, too,

cautioned, “If we continue this policy when we fully

recognize its consequences, we move toward genocide.”

29. UNICEF reports confirm that the oil-for-

food program “stopped the humanitarian situation from

deteriorating, but did not greatly improve conditions for

most Iragis. This is partly because revenue has not

been sufficient to comprehensively rehabilitate the

country’s infrastructure.” This assessment is confirmed

by recent events. In 1996, the oil-for-food program was

set up to allow $2 billion of oil to be exported every 180

days. Yet L. Paul Bremer, currently the U.S. civilian

administrator for Iraq, has publicly estimated that

rebuilding Iraq will cost $100 billion. The oil-for-food

program never made capital of this kind available to

the people of Iraq.

UNICEF's 2003 report, cited above, concludes:

[S]ince the introduction of

the Oil for Food

Programme, the nutritional

status of children has not

improved. One in five

children in the south and

centre of Iraq remain so

malnourished that they

need special feeding, and

child sickness rates

continue to be alarmingly

high.

See UNICEF, THE SITUATION OF CHILDREN IN IRAQ

(2003) at 11.

F, International Law Does Not Allow States

To Deprive Civilians, Especially Mothers,

Infants, and Young Children, of Food,

Medicine, and Other Necessities.

30. International law is the supreme law of

the land under the United States Constitution.

Accordingly, to the extent OFAC regulations are

inconsistent with international law, they are

unconstitutional.

31. International custom and _ general

principles of law recognized by civilized nations do not

allow states to deprive civilians, especially mothers,

infants, and children under the age of fifteen, of food,

medicine, and other necessities of life.

32. Several treaties signed by the United

States reflect or embody these principles of

international law. Perhaps the best known of these is

the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of

Civilian Persons in Time of War. Article 23 of the

Geneva Convention states that even in war, parties to

the treaty:

shall allow the free passage

of all consignments of

medical and hospital stores

and objects necessary for

religious worship intended

only for civilians of another

High Contracting Party,

even if the latter is its

adversary. It shall likewise

permit the free passage of

all consignments of

essential foodstuffs,

clothing and tonics

intended for children under

fifteen, expectant mothers

and maternity cases.

The Geneva Convention codifies international

custom and general principles of law recognized by

civilized nations and applies those principles of law to

the exigencies of wartime. Civilized nations recognize

that depriving civilians, especially mothers and

children, of the necessities of life is illegal and immoral,

even (but not especially) during war.

33. Other treaties to which the United States

is a party also codify or reflect these general principles

‘of international law. One is the Convention on the

Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.

Article II of the Convention defines genocide to include

killing or causing serious bodily or mental harm to

members of a group as well as deliberately inflicting

conditions of life calculated to bring about the partial or

total physical destruction of the group. Legal scholars

have suggested that economic sanctions against Iraq

may have risen to the level of genocide within the

meaning of the Convention.

34. The Universal Declaration of Human

Rights, adopted by the United Nations General

Assembly in 1948, likewise springs from principles of

international law that condemn state deprivation of

food, medicine, and other necessities. Article 25(1) of

the Universal Declaration states that

Everyone has the right to a

standard of living adequate

for the health and well-

being of himself and of his

family, including food,

clothing, housing and

medical care and necessary

social services....

Article 25(2) provides that “[m]otherhood and childhood

are entitled to special care and assistance.” Civilized

nations thus recognize that depriving people —

particularly mothers, infants, and young children — of

“food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary

social services” constitutes a deprivation of their human

rights.

35. Another treaty, the Convention on the

Rights of the Child, also springs from these principles

and affirms that states may not deprive children of

their means of subsistence. Article 24 of the

Convention on the Rights of the Child, for example,

“recognize[s] the right of the child to the enjoyment of

the highest attainable standard of health and to

facilities for the treatment of illness and rehabilitation

of health.” The Convention states that nations “shall

strive to ensure that no child is deprived of his or her

right of access to such health care services.”

Accordingly, the Convention requires countries to “take

appropriate measures: (a) To diminish infant and child

mortality; (b) To ensure the provision of necessary

medical assistance and health care to all children with

emphasis on the development of primary health care;

(c) To combat disease and malnutrition, including

within the framework of primary health care, through,

inter alia, the application of readily available

technology and through the provision of adequate

nutritious foods and clean drinking-water, taking into

consideration the dangers and risks of environmental .

pollution; [and] (d) To ensure appropriate pre-natal and

post-natal health care for mothers.”

, 36. OFAC regulations, and the economic

sanctions they enforce, violate international law and

the Constitution because they deny civilians, particular

mothers and young children, of food, medicine, and

other necessities of life. OFAC, therefore, may not

constitutionally prevent individuals like Mr. Sacks from

bringing food or medical supplies to civilians in Iraq.

37. Congress has implicitly recognized that

international law does not allow states to deprive

civilians, especially mothers and children, of food,

medicine, and other necessities. Accordingly, Congress

imposed several limits on OFAC’s power to impose

economic sanctions.

388. 50 U.S.C. §1702(b)(2), for example,

provides that the “authority granted to the President by

this section does not include the authority to regulate or

prohibit, directly or indirectly ... donations, by persons

subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, of

articles, such as food, clothing, and medicine, intended

to be used to relieve human suffering.” The only

exceptions are for donations that: (1) would “seriously

impair” the President’s “ability to deal with any

national emergency”; (2) are in response to “coercion

against the proposed recipient or donor”; or (3) would

endanger U.S. armed forces that “are engaged in

hostilities or are in a situation where imminent

involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the

circumstances.

39. 50 U.S.C. § 1702(b)(4) provides: “The

authority granted to the President by this section does

not include the authority to regulate or prohibit,

directly or indirectly .. . any transactions ordinarily

incident to travel to or from any country, including

importation of accompanied baggage for personal use,

maintenance within any country including payment of

living expenses and acquisition of goods or services for

personal use, and arrangement or facilitation of such

travel including nonscheduled air, .sea, or land

voyages.”

40. OFAC’s regulations exceed the authority

Congress granted it.

G. OFAC Enforces Its Sanctions Regulations

to Quash Conscientious Objectors.

41. Notwithstanding restrictions on OFAC’s

power imposed by international law, by the

Constitution, and by Congress, OFAC has persisted in

its efforts to punish Mr. Sacks and others who bring

food and medicine to civilians in Iraq. Nearly four

years after Mr. Sacks responded to OFAC’s “Prepenalty

Notice” in 1998, OFAC sent a written “Penalty Notice”

to Mr. Sacks. A true and correct copy of the Penalty

Notice, which is dated May 17, 2002, is attached hereto

as Exhibit 2. In it, OFAC informed Mr. Sacks:

You admitted the [initial

Prepenalty] Notice’s

allegation in Count 6 that

you exported goods to Iraq

absent prior OFAC

approval and also stated

that you decided to violate

the U.S.-Government’s

economic sanctions against

Iraq as an act of civil

disobedience. OFAC notes

that you have admitted to

Count 6 alleged in the

Notice. The allegations

included your currency

travel-related transaction

to/from/within Iraq absent

prior license or other

authorization from OFAC.

Accordingly, OFAC finds

that you have violated the

Regulations as alleged in

Count 6 of the Notice.

The Penalty Notice concluded that a $10,000 penalty

was appropriate.

4? Mr. Sacks responded to the notice and

noted (correctly) that he had not admitted the charges

set forth in Count 6; he had only admitted to bringing

medicine to Iraq. As Mr. Sacks explained:

Count 6 fin your letter to

us of December 3, 1998]

deals only with “travel-

related transactions ... the

purchase of food, lodging,

ground transportation and

incidentals.” I have never

admitted to, nor supplied

information about, any

such transactions.

43. OFAC regulations theoretically allow a

license to be granted to bring medicine to Iraq. But the

regulations do not say how, when, or under what

circumstances, OFAC will grant such a license. OFAC

has accepted no restrictions on its power to deny such

licenses.

44. In late 2002, Mr. Sacks sent a written

request to OFAC under the Freedom of Information Act

to assess OFAC’s willingness to grant licenses to U.S.

citizens to travel to Iraq with medical supplies. In his

request, Mr. Sacks asked OFAC to provide, among

other things:

1. All internal or

external summaries. of

requests to the Office of

Foreign Assets Control

since January 1991 by any

individual, organization or

business for license to

travel to Iraq for . the

purpose of supplying

medicine, health supplies,

foodstuffs, and materials

and supplies for essential

civilian needs of the Iraqi

population, including but

not limited to summaries

that show the final

determination or status of

those requests.

2. All requests to the

Office of Foreign Assets

Control since January 1991

by any individual,

organization or business for

license to travel to Iraq for

the purpose of supplying

medicine, health supplies,

foodstuffs, and materials

and supplies for essential

civilian needs of the Iraqi

population.

3. All requests to the

Office of Foreign Assets

Control since January 1991

by any individual,

organization or business for

license to export to Iraq

medicine, health supplies,

foodstuffs, and materials

and supplies for essential

civilian needs of the Iraqi

population.

4. All responses by the

Office of Foreign Assets

Control to those requests

numbered 2 and 3 above,

including but not limited to

a denial or granting of a

license, or a request for

further information.

Mr. Sacks has sent two follow-up letters seeking a

response to his request. To date, OFAC. has not

responded to this request, which has been pending for

nearly a year.

45. OFAC has targeted other alleged

violators of its ban on travel and importation of medical

supplies to Iraq. Several people who traveled to Iraq

with medical supplies have also received civil penalty

notices (including the other individuals named in the

Prepenalty Notice to Mr. Sacks). So did Voices in the

Wilderness, an organization that, like Mr. Sacks, seeks

to publicize the effects of U.S. economic ‘sanctions and

bring an end to their use.

46. In June 2003, OFAC sued Voices in the

Wilderness to recover a civil penalty. Voices in the

Wilderness consists of many individuals who oppose

economic sanctions in Iraq. Several of these individuals

have, like Mr. Sacks, brought medicine and medical

supplies to Iraq.

47. Then, in early August, 2003, an

organization called Ocwen Federal Bank called Mr.

Sacks to advise that it was attempting to collect the

civil penalty on behalf of the federal government. Mr.

Sacks subsequently received an August 11, 2003 letter

from Ocwen Federal Bank, a true and correct copy of

which is attached hereto as Exhibit 3. That letter

advised that Ocwen was attempting to collect

Mr. Sacks’ alleged “debt” to OFAC for the civil penalty.

48, OFAC clearly intends to sue to collect the

civil penalty it claims Mr. Sacks owes. Consequently, a

case of actual controversy now exists concerning

Mr. Sacks’ alleged obligation to pay such a penalty.

Moreover, because Mr. Sacks has traveled to Iraq since

the 1997 trip for which he was fined, a case of actual

controversy exists as to OFAC’s authority to impose

further penalties for these other trips.

49. Notwithstanding the fact that Mr. Sacks

is the plaintiff in this cause, Mr. Sacks does not waive

his right to have OFAC carry its burden of proving its

entitlement to collect a civil penalty or any other matter

on which OFAC has the burden of proof.

IV.

CAUSES OF ACTION

50. OFAC’s attempts to collect a civil penalty ~

are unlawful and unauthorized.

51. OFAC’s Prepenalty and Penalty Notices

state that OFAC is seeking to collect an civil penalty

from Mr. Sacks for “currency transactions,” namely “the

purchase of food, lodging, ground transportation, and

incidentals.” Yet OFAC lacks the statutory authority to

do so. 50 U.S.C. §1702(b)(4) expressly denies OFAC

“the . authority to regulate or prohibit, directly or

indirectly . . . any transactions ordinarily incident to

travel to or from any country, including importation of

accompanied baggage for personal use, maintenance

within any country including payment of living

expenses and acquisition of goods or services for

personal use, and arrangement or facilitation of such

travel including nonscheduled air, sea, or land

voyages.”

52. To the extent OFAC seeks to impose a

penalty for the importation of medicine or medical

supplies to Iraq, OFAC lacks the statutory authority to

do so. 50 U.S.C. § 1702(b)(2) expressly denies OFAC

the authority to regulate or prohibit, directly or

indirectly . . . (2) donations, by persons subject to the

jurisdiction of the United States, of articles, such as

food, clothing, and medicine, intended to be used to

relieve human suffering.” OFAC’s demand that Mr.

Sacks obtain a license to donate medicine constitutes a

prohibited attempt to directly or indirectly regulate (if

not outright prohibit) those donations.

53. To the extent OFAC seeks to impose a

penalty for the importation of medicine or medical

supplies to Iraq, OFAC lacks the constitutional

authority to do so. Government efforts to withhold food

and needed medical supplies from innocent civilians,

particularly mothers, infants, and young children,

violate international law. This international law, to

which the United States has acceded, is the supreme

law of the land under the Supremacy Clause set forth in

Article VI of the United States Constitution (“all

Treaties made, or which: shall be made, under the

Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme

Law of the Land”). OFAC may not punish Mr. Sacks in

violation of international law and the Constitution of

the United States.

54, According to OFAC’s Prepenalty Notice,

its claim for a civil penalty arises from conduct by Mr.

Sacks that took place “on or about November 21-30,

1997.” To the extent OFAC seeks a civil penalty for

such conduct, it is untimely and is barred by the five-

year statute of limitations that applies to the collection

civil fines and penalties. 28 U.S.C. § 2461 provides:

Except as otherwise

provided by Act of

Congress, an action, suit or

proceeding for the

enforcement of any civil

fine, penalty, or forfeiture,

pecuniary or otherwise,

shall not be entertained

unless commenced within

five years from the date

when the claim first

accrued.

By its own admission, OFAC’s claim for a civil penalty

first accrued over five years ago.

Vs

RELIEF REQUESTED

WHEREFORE Bert Sacks requests the following

relief:

1. A declaration that OFAC is not entitled

to collect a civil penalty from him for all of the following

reasons:

a. OFAC lacks the ~ statutory

authority to regulate Mr. Sacks or others who seek to

donate food and medicine to civilians in Iraq, and OFAC

lacks the authority to prohibit Mr. Sacks or others from

doing so;

b. OFAC lacks the _ statutory

authority to regulate Mr. Sacks or others who seek to

travel to Iraq for the purpose of donating food and

medicine to civilians in Iraq, and OFAC lacks the

authority to prohibit Mr. Sacks or others from doing so;

C. OFAC lacks the constitutional

cuthority to prohibit Mr. Sacks or others from bringing

jovod and medical supplies to Iraqi civilians, as

international law to which the United States has

acceded forbids the United States government from

killing civilians, especially mothers, infants, and young

children; and

d. OFAC’s claims, to the extent they

arise from conduct that took place five or more years

ago, are untimely and barred by the statute of

limitations.

2. An order enjoining OFAC from further

efforts to collect civil penalties from individuals who

seek to travel to Iraq or donate food or medicine to

civilians there; and

3. Such other and further relief as this

Court deems just and proper.

DATED this 17th day of June, 2004.

s/Donald B. Scaramastra

WSBA#21416

GARVEY SCHUBERT

BARER

1191 2™4 Avenue, 18% Floor

Seattle, WA 98101

Telephone: 206-464-3939

Fax: 206-464-0125

E-Mail: dscar@gsblaw.com

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on June 17, 2004, I

electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk of the

Court using the CM/ECF system which will send

notification of such filing to the persons listed below:

Joshua Z. Rabinovitz

U.S. Department of Justice

(Civil — 20 Mass)

_ Civil Division Federal Programs

20 Massachusetts Ave. NW

Washington, DC 20530

202-353-7633

Email: joshua.rabinovitz@usdoj.gov

Brian C. Kipnis

U.S. Attorney’s Office

601 Union Street

Suite 5100

Seattle, WA 98101-3903

206-553-7970

Fax: 206-553-0116

Email: brian. kipnis@usdoj.gov

DATED this 17" day of June, 2004.

s/Donald B. Scaramastra

WSBA #21416

GARVEY SCHUBERT BARER

1191 2? Avenue, 18" Floor

Seattle, WA 98101

Telephone: 206-464-3939

Fax: 206-464-0125

E-Mail: dscar@gsblaw.com

SEA_DOCS:830638.2

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY —

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20220

DEC 03 1998

FAC Nos. 1Q-162016 and 1Q-162433

-PREPENALTY NOTICE

Dear Ms. Kelly and Messrs. Handelman, Mullins, Sacks,

and Zito:

The Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) has

reasonable cause to believe that you and Voices in the

Wilderness ("VW") have engaged in certain prohibited

transactions, detailed below, relating to the embargo

against Iraq in 1997. Inasmuch as no license or approval

had ‘been issued by OFAC prior to such transactions,

they violated the Iraqi Sanctions Regulations, 31 CPR

Part"575 (the Regulations")" and underlying statutes and

Executive Orders. See, specifically, §§ 575.204-.207 and

575.211 of the Regulations.

Violations

. The violations of the Regulations and underlying statutes

and Executive Orders for which this Notice is issued

concern your and VW's exportation of donated goods,

including medical supplies and toys, to Iraq absent

specific prior authorization by OFAC and transactions

relating to travel to Iraq and activities in Iraq.

Additionally, the violations involve transactions for the

purpose of, or which have the effect of, evading or

avoiding, or which facilitate the evasion or avoidance of,

any of the prohibitions of the Regulations, as well as a

conspiracy formed for the purpose .of, engaging in

transactions prohibited by the Regulation. In this regard,

EXHIBIT 1

VW has organized members to deliver goods to, Iraq in

violation of the embargo and made express statements of

the organization's l:nowledge of its violative actions. As

to Messrs. Handélman and Mullins, the violations also

concern the importation of goods and services of Iraqi

origin. Specifically, the violations are as follows:

1. In March 1996, VW exported goods, including medical

supplies, valued at approximately $18,000, to Iraq absent

prior specific license or other authorization issued by

OPAC;

2. In August 1996, VW exported goods, including medical

supplies, valued at approximately $8,000, to Iraq absent

prior specific license or other authorization, issued ,by

OPAC;

3 In November 1996, VW exported goods, including

medical supplies, valued at approximately $10,000, to

Iraq absent prior specific license or other authorization

issued by OPAC;

4. In November 1997, VW exported goods, including

medical supplies and toys, valued at approximately

$30,000-40,000, to Iraq absent prior specific license or

other authorization ‘issued by OPAC;

5. On or about November 21, 1997, Mr. Handelman

exported film and videotape to Iraq, through Jordan;

6. Between on or about November 21-30, 1997, Messrs.

Handelman, Mullins, Sacks and Zito, eugaged. in

currency travel-related transactions to/from/within [req

absent prior license or other authorization from OFAC.

These currency transactions included, but are not limited

EXHIBIT 1

to, the purchase of food, lodging, ground transportation,

and incidentals;

7. On December 3, 1997, Mr. Handelman imported goods

and/or: services of Iraqi origin, including photographic

and video graphic services, into the United States at

Detroit, Michigan. Upon entry of the goods, the United

States Customs Service ("USCS") seized them (District

Case Nos. 98-3801-000235). The goods included an Iraqi

water bottle labeled, an Iraqi stamp, photographic film,

video and audio tapes and/or cassettes, postcards, and

assorted papers;

8. On December 3, 1997, Hr. Mullins imported goods

and/or services of Iraqi origin, including photographic

and/or video graphic services, into the United States at

Detroit, Michigan. Upon entry of the goods, USCS seized

them. (District Case No. 98-3801-00238). The goods

included: a necklace, a wooden drum, audio tapes, a

computer disc, notebooks, pictures, and miscellaneous

papers and cards;

9. In July 1998, VW exported goods to Iraq absent prior

specific license or other authorization issued by OFAC;

and

10. In September 1998, VW exported goods, including

medical supplies, to Iraq absent prior specific license or

other authorization issued by OFAC.

Proposed Penalty

Section 206 of IEEPA, 50 U.S.C. § 1705, provides, in

part, for a civil penalty not to exceed $10,000 per

violation. Section 566E of the Iraq Sanctions Act 6f 1990,

PL.101-513, 104 Stat. 2049, provides, in part, for a civil

penalty not to exceed $250,000 for each violation

EXHIBIT 1

108 A

occurring after November 5, 1990.! See, Regulations §

575.701. Pursuant to § 575~702 of the Regulations, you

are hereby notified that OFAC intends to issue a claim

against each of you and VW for a monetary penalty in

the amounts’ set forth below:

As to VW: $120,000, computed at $20,000 for each of

Counts 1-4, 9 and 10

As to Mr. Handelman: $12,000, computed at $1,000 for

each of. Counts 5 and 7, plus $10,000 for Count 6

As to Mr. Mullins: $11,000, computed at $1,000 for Count

B, plus $10,000 for Count 6

As to Mr. Sacks: $10,000, for Count 6

As to Mr. Zito: $10,000 for Count 6

With respect to the disposition goods seized in the above-

cited USCS District Cases from Messrs. Handelman and

Mullins, we recommend that, inasmuch as such goods

! Section 4 of the Federal Civil Penalties Inflation

Adjustment Act of 1990 (Pub.L. 101-410. 104 Stat. 890,

28 U.S.C. 2461 note), as amended by the Debt Collection

Improvement Act of 1996 (Pub.L. 104-134. sec.

31001(s)1). Apr. 26. 1996, 110 Stat. 1321-373 --.jointly,

the “FCPIA”), requires each Federal agency with

statutory authority to assess civil monetary penalties

(“CMPs”) to adjust CMPs for inflation according to a

formula described in § 5 of the FCPIA. Accordingly, on

October 23, 1996, OFAC published in the Federal

Register the required amendment, effective October 21,

1996, to the Regulations adjusting its CMP to $275,000.

See 61 FR 54936 at 54939

EXHIBIT 1

109 A

have been involved in the violation of U.S. law by U.S.

persons, such goods be forfeited to the United States in

accordance with USCS procedures.

Election of Proceedings. You have the right to make a

written presentation to FAC within thirty (30) days of

the mailing of this Notice. Such written presentation in

response to this Notice need not be in any particular

form, but it should contain a response to the allegations

herein, and set forth the reasons why the penalty should

not be issued, or if issued, why the amount should be less

than that proposed in this Notice. Such response should

be addressed to the Office of Foreign Assets Control

(Attention: Civil Penalties), U.S. Department of the

Treasury, 1500 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.,W.,

Washington, D.C. 20220.

2. In the event that you elect not to respond, OFAC will

conclude that, you have decided not to submit any new

facts or explanations for our consideration, In such

instance, OFAC will issue a Penalty Notice in accordance

with § 575.70(b) of the Regulations, finding a violation

and assessing a penalty generally in the amount

proposed herein.

3. Should you elect to resolve this matter informally

absent any final agency finding of violation, you may

initiate settlement negotiations by telephoning the OFAC

staff member named below under "Contact Person" at

any time before you are issued a Penalty notice. If the

negotiations result in settlement, you are not required to

make a written response to this Notice, which will be

withdrawn without a, formal determination of violation,

provided settlement occurs within the time period set in

this Notice.

EXHIBIT 1

Collection

Section 575.705 of the Regulations provides that this

matter shall be referred to the United States Department

of Justice for collection if the penalty is not paid within

thirty (30) days of the mailing of a Penalty Notice, should

one be issued imposing a penalty pursuant to § 575.704

of the Regulations. Prior to such referral, OFAC may

undertake administrative collection through the Office of

Financial Management of the U.S. Treasury Department.

Contact

In view of the short response time, if you have any

questions concerning this matter, please feel free to

contact the appropriate member of my staff, Mrs. B.S.

Scott, Chief, Civil Penalties Program, at telephone

number (202) 622-6140.

Sincerely,

s/R. Richard Newcomb

Director

Office of Foreign Assets Control

SEA_DOCS:830747.1

EXHIBIT 1

This electronic version will be amended with a copy of

the original letter.

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20220

FAC No. IQ-162016 and IQ-162433 MAY 17 2002

PENALTY NOTICE

Dear Mr. Sacks:

A Prepenalty Notice-("Notice") dated December 3, 1998,

was issued to you, by the Office of Foreign Assets Control

("OFAC") for having engaged in certain prohibited

transactions relating to Iraq, as detailed in the Notice.

No license or approval was issued by OFAC for these

transactions. Accordingly, such transactions violated the

Iraqi Sanctions Regulations, 31 CF.R Part 575 (the

"Regulations", promulgated pursuant to the

International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50

U.S.C. 1701 et seq. ("IEEPA") and underlying statutes

and Executive Orders. See §§ 575.207 and 515.211 of the

Regulations.

Section 206 of IEEPA, 50 U.S.C. § 1705, provides, in

part, for a civil penalty not to exceed $10,000 for each

such violation. Section 586E of the Iraq Sanctions Act of

1990, PL.IO1-S13, 104 Stat. 2049, provides, in part, for a

civil penalty not to exceed $250,000 for each violation

occurring after November 5, 1990. Pursuant to §§

575.702 of the Regulations, the Notice proposed a penalty

against you in the amount of $10,000. You were advised

of your right to make a written presentation to OFAC

setting forth reasons why the penalty should not be

issued or, if issued why the amount should be less than

EXHIBIT 2

LIZA

that proposed. Such written response was required to be

made within thirty (30) days of the mailing of the Notice.

OFAC mailed the Notice to you on December 3, 1998.

Delivery is evidenced by a signed United States Postal

Service Form 3811, Domestic Return Receipt.

By a response received at OFAC January 8, 1999, you

made a written presentation setting forth reasons why

you engaged in certain prohibited transactions relating

to the embargo against Iraq. You admitted the Notice’s

allegation in Count 6 that you exported goods to Iraq

absent prior OFAC approval and also stated that you

decided to violate the U.S. Government's economic

sanctions against Iraq as an act of civil disobedience.

OFAC notes that you have admitted to Count 6 alleged in

the Notice. The allegations included your currency

travel-related transactions to/from/within Iraq absent

prior license or other authorization from OFAC. The

Regulations prohibit persons subject to United States

jurisdiction from engaging in any transaction relating to

travel to Iraq. See § 575.207 of the Regulations.

Accordingly, OFAC finds that you have violated the

Regulations as alleged in Count 6 of the Notice.

After a careful review of the entire file, it is determined

that you did violate IEEPA and the Regulations. It is

further determined that, while some relief is warranted

to take into account the fact that the instant violation

was your first offense on record at OFAC, such relief

must be balanced against aggravating factors present,

specifically your willful violation of the Regulations.

EXHIBIT 2

Accordingly, the proposed civil penalty in the amount of

$10,000 is hereby imposed upon you pursuant to §

575.704 of the Regulations.

A check payable to the "U.S. Treasury" in the amount of

$10,000 should be sent within 30 days of the mailing of

this Penalty Notice to the Office of Foreign Assets

Control, (Attention: Civil Penalties), U.S. Treasury

Department, 1500 Pennsylvania Avenue. N.W.,

Washington, D.C. 20229. Please note that interest,

administrative charges and late fees will commence to

accrue after 30 days of the mailing of the Penalty Notice.

Under Public Law 97-365, 31 U.S.C. § 3717, interest at

an annual rate inter of .5% and an administrative charge

of $12.00 will be added monthly if the amount is not paid

by the due date. Should the amount not be paid within

ninety (90) days, an additional late charge of 6% will be

added.

Please note that § 575.705 of the Regulations provides

that this matter shall be referred for administrative

collection measures or to the United States Department

of Justice for collection if the penalty is not paid within

30 days of the mailing of the Penalty Notice.

Please further note that 31 U.S.C. § 7701 requires that a

person assessed a penalty by a Federal agency furnish a

taxpayer identification number/Social Security Number

and also requires the agency to disclose that we intend to

use

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Appendix Brief for the United States — Sacks v. Office of Foreign Assets Control (No. 06-948) | Frix