Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Sacks v. Office of Foreign Assets Control (No. 06-948)

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Supreme Co |

p rae pur U.S.

at 6-948 JAN g

No.06-__ - OFFICEOF THE CLERK

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

BERTRAM SACKS,

Petitioner,

V.

OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL, United States

Department of the Treasury; R. RICHARD NEWCOMB,

Director, Office of Foreign Assets Control,

Respondents.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States

Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Donald B. Scaramastra

Counsel of Record

Gary D. Swearingen

GARVEY SCHUBERT BARER

Eighteenth Floor

1191 Second Avenue

Seattle, Washington 98101-2939

(206) 464-3939

January 8, 2007

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

On several occasions before the Second Gulf War,

Petitioner Bertram Sacks transported medicine to civilian

hospitals in Iraq for use by children and other civilian

patients. Mr. Sacks did so with several other members of an

unincorporated association known as Voices in the

Wilderness. . 7

At the time, the federal Office of Foreign Assets Control

and its director, Richard Newcomb (collectively referred to

as the “agency”) had prohibited travel to Iraq. The agency

had also banned unlicensed humanitarian exports of food

and medicine to Iraqi civilians. It did so even though UN

Security Council Resolutions, Presidential Executive

Orders, and federal statutes pertaining to Iraq did not

authorize an absolute embargo on humanitarian exports,

an embargo that would have violated international law.

In response to Mr. Sacks’s actions, the agency sent Mr.

Sacks and Voices a joint prepenalty notice that charged:

“you and Voices in the Wilderness (‘VW’) have engaged in

certain prohibited transactions” that “concern your and

VW’s exportation of donated goods, including medical

supplies and toys, to Iraq.” When Mr. Sacks admitted to

exporting medicine, the agency sent him a penalty notice:

“You admitted the [Prepenalty} Notice’s allegation in Count .

6 that you exported goods to Iraq absent prior OFAC

approval.” Based on this admission, the agency found that

Mr. Sacks had “violated the Regulations as alleged in

Count 6 of the Notice” and imposed a $10,000 civil penalty.

The agency fined Voices separately for exporting medicine.

The Ninth Circuit held that notwithstanding these

penalties, Mr. Sacks lacked standing to challenge the

agency's prohibition.of humanitarian exports. The Ninth

Circuit recognized that Mr. Sacks had standing to challenge

the agency’s travel ban, but held that Congressional

statutes authorized such a ban, even if it had the intended

effect of preventing humanitarian aid from reaching Iraqi

children and other civilians.

i

Mr. Sacks now petitions for a writ of certiorari. The

petition raises two questions:

1. Does Mr. Sacks have standing to challenge the

agency's civil penalty and its direct or indirect restrictions

on humanitarian exports of food and medicine to Iraqi

civilians and children?

2, Are the agency’s direct and. indirect restrictions on

humanitarian exports of food and medicine to Iraqi

civilians and children, through a travel ban or otherwise,

lawful and enforceable as a matter of both international

and domestic U.S. law?

I.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

The Ninth Circuit’s Erroneous

Ruling on Standing Will

Prevent Judicial Scrutiny of

Regulations like Those at Issue

Injury in Fact

Causation and

Redressability

A Prohibition on Humanitarian

Donations Violates

International Law That

Congress Has Not Abrogated

A. International Law

Forbids the Deliberate,

Mass Starvation of

The UN Participation

Act Does Not Authorize

an Embargo on

Humanitarian Aid

The Irag Sanctions Act

of 1990 Does Not

Authorize an Embargo

on Humanitarian Aid

Conclusion

TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

U.S. Const. Art. 6

ASES

Babbitt v. United Farm Workers, 442 U.S.

289 (1979)

Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973)

Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental

Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978)

Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728 (1984)

INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421

(1987)

Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614

(1973)

Murray v. Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64 (1804)

O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974)

Office of Foreign Assets Control v. Voices in

the Wilderness, No. 03-1356 (JDB)

(D.D.C. July 9, 2004), at 2

Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1

Vv

REP. No. 99-2, pt. I, reprinted in 28

Sm POR I 25

cks v. Office of Foreign Assets Control,

466 F.3d 764, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS

25294 (9t Cir. 2006)

mon v. Kastern Kentucky Welfare Rights

Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976)

2el Co. v. Citizens for a Better

Environment, 523 U.S. 83 (1998)

Paquete-Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700

arth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975)

aunberger uv. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25 (1982)

iiiney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194

ungstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,

343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952)

‘ATUTES AND LEGISLATIVE MATERIALS

U.S.C. § 287c

U.S.C. § 1254(1)

U.S.C. § 1331

U.S.C. § 1337

U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2)

U.S.C. § 2461(a)

ternational Emergency Economic Powers

Act (“TEEPA”) § 203(b)

Vi

Iraq: Are Sanctions Collapsing?: Joint

Hearing before the Senate Committee on

Foreign Relations and the Senate

Committee on Energy and Natural

Resources, 105th Cong., S. Hrg. 105-

650, at 59-60 (1998)

REGULATORY MATERIALS

31 CFR § 575

31 CFR § 575.205

31 CFR § 575.207

56 Fed. Reg. 2113 (Jan. 18, 1991)

Executive Order 12,722, 55 F.R. 31803

(Aug. 2, 1990), reprinted in 50 U.S.C.

§ 1701 note

Executive Order 12,724 § 2(b), 55 F.R.

33089 (Aug. 9, 1990), reprinted in 50

U.S.C. § 1701 note |

Executive Order 13350, 69 Fed. Reg. 46055

(July 30, 2004)

COURT RULES

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)

TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL

MATERIALS

Convention on the Prevention and

Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,

78 U.N.T.S. 277

Convention on the Rights of the Child,

opened for sig ‘ure Nov. 20, 1989,

1577 U.N.T.S

Geneva Convention Relative to the

Protection of Civilian Persons in Time

of War, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.TS. 135

Optional Protocol to the Convention on the

Rights of the Child on the Involvement

of Children in Armed Conflict, done on

May 25, 2000, G.A. Res. 54/263, Annex

I, 54 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49) at 7,

U.N. Doc. A/54/49, Vol. III (2000)

Optional Protocol to the Convention on the

Rights of the Child, United States Dept.

of State, Treaties in Force (2006), a

PM <i sncctenibiseieineniiphataaiilitg age Pas Stes 26

UN Security Council Resolution 661, U.N.

SCOR, 2938rd mtg, U.N. Doc.

S/RES/661 (1990)

Universal Declaration of Human Rights,

GA Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc A/810 at

71 (1948)

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,

done on May 23, 1969, art. 53, 1155

SECONDARY SOURCES

Alberto Ascherio, et al., The Effect of the

Gulf War on Infant and Child Mortality

in Iraq, 327 NEW ENG. J. MED. at 931

(Sept. 24, 1992)

Barton Gellman, Allied Air War Struck

Broadly in Iraq; Officials Acknowledge

Strategy Went Beyond Purely Military |

Targets, THE WASHINGTON Post, June

DE IEA OD 1,3

CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ET AL., FEDERAL

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3581.5, at

BF BRI, cic sc cccererscenctvessvcvvvevaccccvecessovecsvesascesess 21

Iraq Water Treatment Vulnerabilities,

Defense Intelligence Agency (Jan. 18,

oo ohlcaseoncnsveneepesuvevensvecsoereeeveveseceeerervane 2

Leon Eisenberg, The Sleep of Reason

Produces Monsters -- Human Costs of

Economic Sanctions, 336 NEW ENGLAND

JOURNAL OF MEDICINE, at 1248-50 (April

BT 1h. 2s cimnaveheatavenevonsrvevessesesersonorsoveevooscouseees 4

_ Marc BossuytT, THE ADVERSE ;

CONSEQUENCES OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS

ON THE ENJOYMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS

TE cds socsnscinkeckoqeanenavevenvnveeveyernvevcesscencesovesvevensoes 7

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN

RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §

BE IEEE Ds catddanersectexcncesseopesceseccosceveseceresencesovevevees PES 27

The Harvard Study Team, The Effect of the

Gulf Crisis On the Children of Iraq, 325

New Eng. J. Med. 977-80 (1991)........sssssseseesersreeeeseeees 4

U.S. Department of State Dispatch, Vol. 2,

IEEE, RIN Rcossvevsecareesevoursrvesanecassveveenacerse cesses 3

UNICEF, THE SITUATION OF CHILDREN IN

Neen acc aacicnespunminncapesveennnenssein 6

Opinions and Orders Below

The opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the

Ninth Circuit is published at Sacks v. Office of Foreign

Assets Control, 466 F.3d 764, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 25294

(9th Cir. 2006) and is reprinted in the appéndix. The

opinion of the United States District Court for the Western

District of Washington is unpublished and is reprinted in

the appendix.

BASIS FOR JURISDICTION IN THIS COURT

The Court of Appeals issued its opinion on October 10,

2006. Neither side petitioned for rehearing or for hearing

by the Ninth Circuit en banc. This Court has jurisdiction

under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

AUTHORITIES INVOLVED

The following are the principal constitutional provisions,

treaties, UN Security Council Resolutions, statutes,

regulations, and executive orders that are involved in the

case. Excerpts from these materials are set forth in the

appendix.

United Nations Participation Act, 22 U.S.C. § 287c.

Iraq Sanctions Act, Pub. L. 101-513, § 586C.

Executive Order 12,722, 55 F.R. 31803 (Aug. 2, 1990),

reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 1701 note.

Executive Order 12,724 § 2(b), 55 F.R. 33089 (Aug. 9, 1990),

reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 1701 note.

31 CFR § 575.205.

_ 81 CFR § 575.207.

UN Security Council Resolution 661, U.N. SCOR, 2933rd

mtg, U.N. Doc. S/RES/661 (1990).

Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the

Crime of Genocide, 78 U.N.T.S. 277.

Corvention on the Rights of the Child, opened for signature

Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T'S. 3.

Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian

Persons in Time of War, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.TS. 135.

Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res. 217A

(IIT), U.N. Doc A/810 at 71 (1948).

x1

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

In 1990, the United States began a years-long military

and economic campaign that targeted Iraq’s civilian

population, contributing to the mass deaths of children and

other civilians there. The regulations at issue here, and

under which petitioner Bertram Sacks was fined, were part

of that effort.

Bombing worked hand in hand with an embargo,

exacerbating its effect. This was intended, one military

planner explained to the Washington Post:

The worst civilian suffering, senior [American]

officers say, has resulted not from bombs that went

astray but from precision-guided weapons that hit

exactly where they were aimed --- at electrical

plants, oil refineries and transportation networks.

... People say, ‘You didn’t recognize that it was

going to have an effect on water or sewage,” said

the planning officer. “Well, what were we trying to

do with [United Nations-approved economic]

sanctions -- help out the Iraqi people? No. What we

were doing with the attacks on infrastructure was

to accelerate the effect of the sanctions.”'

Before the First Gulf War, U.S. officials were aware of

the potential consequences of targeting Iraq’s

infrastructure. In January 1991, just as the First Gulf War

was beginning and six months into the embargo, the

Pentagon’s Defense Intelligence Agency projected that the

embargo would cause Iraq’s ability to provide clean

drinking water to collapse within six months. Chemicals for

water treatment, the agency noted, were “depleted or

nearing depletion,” chlorine supplies were “critically low,”

* Barton Gellman, Allied Air War Struck Broadly in Iraq; Officials

Acknowledge Strategy Went Beyond Purely Military Targets, THE

WASHINGTON Post, June 23, 1991, at Al.

1

the main chlorine-production plants had been shut down,

and industries such as pharmaceuticals and food processing

were already becoming incapacitated. “Unless the water is

purified with chlorine,” the agency concluded, “epidemics of

such diseases as cholera, hepatitis, and typhoid could

occur.”2

After the war, the United Nations Secretary- aie’

dispatched a mission to assess the situation in Iraq.’ The

mission reported that the ware had “wrought

near-apocalyptic results,” that the bombing had relegated

Iraq “to a pre-industrial age,” and warned that Iraq could

face “epidemic and famine if massive life-supporting needs

are not rapidly met.” The report called for an immediate

end to the embargo on imports of food and other

essential supplies to prevent “imminent catastrophe.

The U.S. embargo’s initial goal was to force an Iraqi

withdrawal from Kuwait. This was consistent with Security

Resolution 661, which called for sanctions “to secure °

compliance with paragraph 2 of resolution 660,” which in

turn “demand{ed} that Iraq withdraw immediately and

unconditionally “ from Kuwait.°

But after the First Gulf War ended, U.S. officials

expanded the embargo’s objective had expanded to

encompass the removal of Saddam Hussein from power. In

a May 22, 1991 written statement prepared for delivery to

the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations of the House

Appropriations Committee, then-Secretary of State James

Baker announced: “[W]e will act with others to continue to

n§

? Iraq Water Treatment Vulnerabilities, Defense Intelligence Agency

(Jan. 18, 1991).

§ See Amended Complaint § 8. A copy of the report is available on the

UN's website at http://www.un.org/Depts/oip/background/reports/

822366.pdf.

$ Td.

5 Td.

§S.C. Res. 661, U.N. SCOR, 2933rd mtg, U.N. Doc. S/RES/661 (1990),

available on-line at http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1990/scres90. htm, last

visited 4/8/05.

2

isolate Saddam's regime. ... That means maintaining UN

sanctions in place sc long as Saddam remains in power.”

Military planners explained the logic underlying this

decision:

Col. John A. Warden III, deputy director of

strategy, doctrine and plans for the Air Force,

agreed that one purpose of destroying Iraq’s

electrical grid was that “you have imposed a long-

term problem on the leadership that it has to deal

with sometime.”

“Saddam Hussein cannot restore his own

electricity,” he said. “He needs help. If there are

political objectives that the U.N. coalition has, it

can say, ‘Saddam, when you agree to do these

things, we will allow people to come in and fix your

electricity.’ It gives us long-term leverage.”

Said another Air Force planner: “Big picture, we

wanted to let people know, ‘Get rid of this guy and

we'll be more than happy to assist in rebuilding.

We're not going to tolerate Saddam Hussein or his

regime. Fix that, and we'll fix your electricity.”

But the embargo remained in effect. As expected and

intended, its post-war continuation prevented Iraq from

rebuilding water and sewage treatment plants — and the

electric-generating plants used to power them — that were

destroyed during the First Gulf War.’ This, and the

resulting lack of potable water, had widespread lethal

consequences that were visited with particular ferocity on

7 U.S. Department of State Dispatch, Vol. 2, No. 21, May 27, 1991.

§ Barton Gellman, Allied Air War Struck Broadly in Iraq; Officials

Acknowledge Strategy Went Beyond Purely Military Targets, THE

WASHINGTON PosT, June 23, 1991, at Al.

* Amended Complaint ¥ 18.

3

children under five.’® In 1992 the New England Journal of

Medicine reported:

strong evidence that the Gulf war and trade

sanctions caused a threefold increase in mortality

among Iraqi children under five years of age. We

estimate that an excess of more that 46,900

~children died between January and August 1991."

In 1997, the same journal reported:

The destruction of the country’s power plants had

brought its entire system of water purification and

distribution to a halt, leading to epidemics of

cholera, typhoid fever, and gastroenteritis,

particularly among children. Mortality rates

doubled or tripled among children admitted to

hospitals in Baghdad and Basra. Cases of

marasmus appeared for the first time in decades.

The team observed "suffering of tragic

proportions.... [with children] dying of preventable

diseases and starvation." Although the allied

bombing had caused few civilian casualties, the.

destruction of the infrastructure resulted in

devastating long-term effects on health.”

Since 1992, sanctions have contributed to the deaths of

three to six thousand children under five in Iraq every

10 Td.

11 Alberto Ascherio, et al., The Effect of the Gulf War on Infant and

Child Mortality in Iraq, 327 NEW ENG. J. MED. at 931 (Sept. 24, 1992); see

also Amended Complaint 4 19.

12 Leon Eisenberg, The Sleep of Reason Produces Monsters -- Human

Costs of Economic Sanctions, 336 NEW ENGLAND JOURNAL OF MEDICINE,

at 1248-50 (April 24, 1997) (citing The Harvard Study Team, The Effect

of the Gulf Crisis On the Children of Iraq, 325 New Eng. J. Med. 977-80

(1991).

4

month." According to UNICEF's Director, sanctions

reversed a decades-long decline in infant mortality in

Iraq.'* She relied upon UNICEF reports that between 199]

and 1998, this reversal contributed to the deaths of a half

million children under five. c

Page 3 of a 2000 UNICEF report entitled “UNICEF in

Iraq” warned: “Mounting evidence shows that the sanctions

are having a devastating humanitarian impact on Iraq.” "5

UNICEF quoted a 1997 report by the UN Human Rights

Committee, which lamented that “the effect of sanctions

and blockades has been to cause suffering and death in

Iraq, especially to children.”'®

In 20038, UNICEF published another report, entitled

“The Situation of Children in Iraq.’ Page 13 of that report

stated that a country like Iraq, which had an infant

mortality rate of 40-60 deaths per 1,000 live births in 1990,

was expected to achieve a rate of 20-30 by 2003."8 Instead,

the infant mortality rate in southern and central Iraq

climbed to 107 deaths per 1,000 live births by 1999," There

was a similar upswing in the under-five mortality rate,

which nearly tripled between 1985 and 1999.” UNICEF

attributed the increase in childhood mortality in Iraq to

economic sanctions.”!

- The “oil-for-food” program failed to eliminate widespread

embargo-related infant and child mortality” and the first

two directors of the oil-for-food program resigned from the

UN in protest.” The first, Denis Halliday, explained:

8 Amended Complaint q 19.

4 Amended Complaint q 21.

© Amended Complaint G 20.

16 Jd,

7 Amended Complaint { 22; see http /unicef org/publicationsindex 4439 html,

last visited 4/8/05.

‘8 Amended Complaint q 22.

19 Td,

20 Td,

21 Td.

*2 Amended Complaint § 26.

23 Amended Complaint 4 27.

Malnutrition is running at about 30 percent for

children under 5 years old. In terms of mortality,

probably 5 or 6 thousand children are dying per

month. This is directly attributable to the impact

of sanctions, which have caused the breakdown of

the clean water system, health facilities and all the

things that young children require... . I do not

want to administer a program that results in these

kinds of figures.” |

He later warned: “We are in the process of destroying an

entire society. [t is as simple and terrifying as that.””

The second director, Hans von Sponeck, resigned after

he “became aware that I was associated with a policy of

implementing an oil-for-food program that could not

possibly meet the needs of the Iraqi people.”” “If we

continue this policy when we fully recognize its

consequences,” he warned, “we move toward genocide.”””

UNICEF reports confirm that the oil-for-food program

“did not greatly improve conditions for most Iraqis. This is

partly because revenue has not been sufficient to

comprehensively rehabilitate the country’s

infrastructure.””* UNICEF's 2003 report, cited above,

concluded: “since the introduction of the Oil for Food

Programme, the nutritional status of children has not ;

improved. One in five children in the south and centre of

Iraq remain so malnourished that they need special

feeding, and child sickness rates continue to be alarmingly

high.”

24 Id.

26 Id.

26 Amended Complaint 4 28.

27 Amended Complaint 4 28.

78 Amended Complaint § 29.

79 Amended Complaint § 29; see UNICEF, THE SITUATION OF CHILDREN

IN IRAQ, at 11 (2003).

6

Meanwhile, a 2000 working paper for the Office of the

UN High Commissioner for Human Rights concluded, “The

sanctions regime against Iraq is unequivocally illegal under

existing international humanitarian law and human rights

law. Some would go as far as making a charge of

genocide,”””

Many in government not only anticipated these

consequences, they were aware or accepted them as they

unfolded. In 1996, for example, then-UN Ambassador

Madeleine Albright was asked: “We have heard that.a half

million children have died. I mean, that’s more children

than died in Hiroshima. ...[I]s the price worth it?”3! She

responded, “I think this is a very hard choice, but the

price -- we think the price is worth it.”82 Two years later, in

a prepared statement submitted to a May 21, 1998 joint

hearing before the Senate Committees on Foreign Relations

and on Energy and Natural Resources, Senator Larry Craig

insisted: “The use of food as a weapon is wrong. Starving

populations into submission is poor foreign policy.”

In response to this, Mr. Sacks transported medicine to

. children and other civilians in Iraq. He expected to incur

the ire of the authorities by doing so. This, he expected and

hoped, would put the U.S. embargo before the judiciary of

the United States, where the rule of law prevails. And there

he proposed to ask the question: Is the deliberate targeting

of children and civilian populations — with resulting mass

80 MARC BossuyYt, THE ADVERSE CONSEQUENCES OF ECONOMIC

SANCTIONS ON THE ENJOYMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2000) § 71. This report

is available on-line at ;

www.unhchr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.nsf/e06a5300f90fa023802566870051

8ca 4/c56876817262a5b2c125695e0050656e/SFILE/G0014092.doc, last

visited April 8, 2005.

31 Amended Complaint ¥ 25.

32 Id. Ms. Albright later expressed regret for this statement, but

insisted that sanctions were justified notwithstanding the “starvation”

and “horrors” they caused. Jd.

® Traq: Are Sanctions Collapsing?: Joint Hearing before the Senate

Committee on Foreign Relations and the Senate Committee on Energy

and Natural Resources, 105th Cong., S. Hrg. 1056-650, at 62-80 (1998).

7

deaths — legal under peremptory norms of international law

(also known as “jus cogens”), norms from which civilized

nations may not legally depart.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

1. The U.S. embargo of Iraq has its genesis in °

Executive Orders 12,722 and 12,724, which the first

President Bush issued in response to the Iraqi occupation of

Kuwait.” These orders prohibited certain economic

transactions with Iraq but exempted “donations of articles

intended to relieve human suffering, such as food, clothing,

medicine and medical supplies intended strictly for medical

purposes.”

Meanwhile, the UN Security Council issued Resolution

661,°° which called for certain economic sanctions but also

exempted “supplies intended strictly for medical purposes”

and “payments exclusively for strictly medical or

humanitarian purposes.””” UN sanctions were limited to the

purpose of securing Iraq's departure from Kuwait.”

On November 5, 1990, Congress enacted the Iraq

Sanctions Act of 1990,” which approved President Bush’s

two executive orders.”’ The orders’ exemption for

humanitarian aid did not escape Congress’s notice, for the

Act expressly referred to them and the fact that they “were

established by the United States pursuant to United

34 Exec, Order No. 12,722, 55 F.R. 31803 (Aug. 2, 1990) (emphasis

added), reprinted in 60 U.S.C. § 1701 note; Exec. Order No. 12,724, 56

F.R. 33089 (Aug. 9, 1990) (emphasis added), reprinted in 50 U.S.C.

§ 1701 note.

36 Wxec, Order 12,722, § 2(b); see also Exec. Order 12,724, § 2(b).

36 S.C. Res. 661, U.N. SCOR, 2933rd mtg, U.N. Doc. S/RES/661 (1990),

available on-line at http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1990/scres90.htm, last

visited 4/8/05.

37 Td. §§ 3(c) & 4.

38 See supra note 6.

39 P T,, 101-513, see 50 U.S.C. § 1701 note.

40P L. 101-513, § 586C(a).

8

Nations Security Council Resolution 661 ....”“' Finally, the

Act required that:

[aJny regulations issued after the date of

enactment of this Act with respect to the economic

sanctions imposed with respect to Iraq and Kuwait

by the United States under Executive Orders

Numbered 12722 and 12723 (August 2, 1990) and

Executive Orders Numbered 12724 and 12725

(August 9, 1990) shall be submitted to the

Congress before those regulations take effect. ”

On January 18, 1991, the agency promulgated

regulations that imposed trade sanctions on Iraq,” but the

Federal Register contains no indication that the agency

submitted its regulations to Congress beforehand as

required.“ Unlike Executive Orders 12,722 and 12,724 and

Resolution 661, these regulations prohibited the unlicensed

export of “donated foodstuffs in humanitarian

circumstances, and donated supplies intended strictly for

medical purposes.”” Theoretically, the regulations allowed

one to obtain a license, but they stated no criteria, and

imposed no deadline, by which the agency would consider

applications for such licenses.“ The agency refused to

answer a Freedom of Information Act request for

information concerning its handling of license

applications.*’ Together, the agency’s regulations forbade

U.S. citizens from either sending or bringing humanitarian

aid to Iraq. The first, which the lower courts named the

“Medicine Restriction,” was 31 CFR § 575.205. The second,

41 Id. § 586C(b).

42 Td. § 586C(c)(1).

8 31 CFR Part 675; Amended Complaint 4 9.

“4 56 Fed. Reg. 2113 Wan. 18, 1991).

© Amended Complaint J 11; 31 CFR § 576.205.

46 Amended Complaint § 11; 31 CFR § 576.205.

47 Amended Complaint § 44.

9

which the lower courts called the “Travel Ban,” was 31 CFR

§ 575.207.

2. Mr. Sacks responded to the humanitarian

catastrophe — wrought in significant part by the agency's

implementation of the U.S. embargo — by bringing medicine

and medical supplies to patients in Iraqi civilian hospitals

on several occasions.” In November 1997, Mr. Sacks helped

bring roughly $40,000 worth of medicine for this purpose.”

His trip received national media coverage.” In December

1998, the agency responded with a written “Prepenalty

Notice” that was jointly addressed to Mr. Sacks, several

other individuals, and an organization called Voices in the

Wilderness.”

“fYJou and Voices in the Wilderness (VW’),” the

prepenalty notice began, “have engaged in certain

prohibited transactions.” These violations, the notice

continued, “concern your and VW’s exportation of donated

goods, including medical supplies and toys, to Iraq.” Count

6 of the notice charged: “Between on or about November

21-30, 1997 ... Sacks ... engaged in currency travel-related

transactions to/from/within Iraq absent prior license or

other authorization from OFAC. These currency

transactions included, but are not limited to, the purchase

of food, lodging, ground transportation, and incidentals.”™

The agency proposed a $10,000 penalty” and invited a

response from Mr. Sacks as to all of the charges, including

the charges against Voices. Mr. Sacks responded by

admitting that he donated medical supplies,” explaining:

48 Amended Complaint { 13.

49 Td.

60 Amended Complaint { 15.

61 Td,

52 Amended Complaint, Ex. 1, at 1.

83 Td.

64 Amended Complaint, Ex. 1, at 2.

66 Amended Complaint, Ex. 1, at 3.

66 Td.

67 Amended Complaint { 16.

10

The decision to turn to civil disobedience to end

sanctions, in public defiance of the laws you are

entrusted with enforcing, was not a natural one for

me.... In deciding to publicly violate sanctions, two

events and two people played an important role for

me. [One was] knowing that 150 years ago it was

the highest law of the United States of America

that runaway slaves from the South were legally

“stolen property” of their owners. Anywhere in this

country, an American was breaking the law to help

such a slave escape via the “underground railroad.”

The people I greatly admire from this terrible era

in our history were not law-abiding citizens, but

those who broke the law to help slaves....*

Nearly four years later, the Agency sent Mr. Sacks a

May 2002 “Penalty Notice”” that claimed: “You admitted

the [Prepenalty] Notice’s allegation in Count 6 that you

exported goods to Iraq absent prior OFAC approval

.... OFAC notes that you have admitted to Count 6 alleged

in the Notice. .. .”” Based on this admission, the agency

found that Mr. Sacks had “violated the Regulations as

alleged in Count 6 of the Notice” and imposed a $10,000

penalty.” |

In August 2003, an organization named Ocwen Federal

Bank wrote Mr. Sacks to advise that the agency had

retained it to collect the penalty.” Meanwhile, the agency

sued Voices to collect a penalty for exporting medical

supplies to Iraq.” The district court in that case noted that

Voices “is an unincorporated association of individuals,”

that “Voices delegations delivered medical supplies to Iraq”

58 Amended Complaint § 16.

59 Amended Complaint q 41.

60 Amended Complaint, Ex. 2, at 1 (emphasis added).

6! Amended Complaint, Ex. 2, at 2.

62 Amended Complaint Jf 46 & 47.

63 Td.

11

without obtaining a license,” and that Voices’ website was

www.vitw.us/who_we_are.” That website, in turn,

identifies Mr. Sacks as a “representative” of Voices. In

addition, the agency’s motion to dismiss warned of further

enforcement efforts, stating that it “reserve[d] the right” to

“act{] in response to Plaintiffs eight other trips to Iraq.”™

Thus, Mr. Sacks was faced with a three-fold threat: (1)

the agency’s penalty based on Mr. Sacks’s admission that

he “exported goods to Iraq”; (2) a possible agency attempt to

collect its judgment against Voices from Mr. Sacks, a

judgment premised on Voices’ export of medicine to Iraq;

and (3) the agency’s threat to seek further penalties from

Mr. Sacks for violating its ban on humanitarian exports.

This suit followed.

3. Mr. Sacks filed this action on January 14, 2004 and

amended his complaint shortly thereafter. He challenged

the agency’s restriction on humanitarian donations of

medicine and other medical supplies, and its ban on travel

for the purpose of making such donations.

The district court had subject matter jurisdiction of the

action under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (as it arose under the laws of

the United States); 28 U.S.C. § 1337 (as it arose under an

Act of Congress regulating commerce), under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1346(a)(2) (as it was an action against the United States

' founded upon federal law that involved more than $10,000),

and under 28 U.S.C. § 2461(a) (as the court had jurisdiction

of the agency’s underlying claims).

The agency moved to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b)(6). After Mr. Sacks served discovery requests and

initial disclosures, the agency requested, and the district

court granted, a stay of discovery and initial disclosures

until the agency’s motion to dismiss was decided.”

84 Office of Foreign Assets Control v. Voices in the Wilderness, No. 03-

1356 (JDB) (D.D.C. July 9, 2004), at 2; see also Amended Complaint 4 46.

85 Office of Foreign Assets Control v. Voices in the Wilderness, at 2.

66 Motion to Dismiss, at 5 n.4.

’ A copy of the protective order staying discovery

appears in the Appendix.

12

as

The district court granted the agency’s motion to dismiss

in part. The district court held that the agency’s regulations

required it to refer its civil] penalty to the Justice

Department for enforcement in a civil proceeding rather

than collect its fine extra-judicially, (The Ninth Circuit

subsequently affirmed this ruling.)

But the district court ruled that the agency had not

exceeded its authority by prohibiting U.S. citizens from

bringing or sending humanitarian aid to Iraq. After

acknowledging that Mr. Sacks “present[ed] a compelling

argument” that the agency transgressed statutory limits,

the court concluded that the Iraq Sanctions Act authorized

those regulations, even if the Act ran counter to

international treaties or customary international law. The

court went so far as to hold that the Geneva Convention “is

not binding on the United States.”

Mr. Sacks timely appealed the district court’s decision

and the agency timely cross-appealed. The United States

Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district

court's dismissal, although on different grounds. Pertinent

to this petition, the Ninth Circuit held that Mr. Sacks

lacked standing to challenge the agency’s prohibition on

humanitarian exports of food and medical supplies to Iraq.

While agreeing that Mr. Sacks satisfied all other elements

of standing and ripeness,” the court concluded that his

“fear of prosecution runs aground on the government's

decision to charge and penalize him for only the violation of

the Travel Ban and not for the Medicine Restrictions

violation.””'

The Ninth Circuit acknowledged that the agency’s

penalty notice “described [Mr. Sacks’s] prior admission

ambiguously” and that the penalty notice was “confusing.” ””

Nonetheless, without the benefit of facts that might bear on

68 Order at 5.

69 Td. at 7.

7 466 F.3d 764, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 25294, at *21.

) Id. at *21-*22,

72 Td. at *11 & *17,

13

the agency’s intent, the court made the factual

determination — on a rule 12(b)(6) motion ~ that “Sacks was

not penalized for violating the Medicine Restrictions” and

that the agency decided “to charge and penalize him for

only the violation of the Travel Ban and not for the

Medicine Restrictions violation ... when it was fully aware

he had also violated the Medicine Restrictions.”

Based on these factual findings, the Ninth Circuit.

concluded that Mr. Sacks had not demonstrated an actual

injury. Going further, the court concluded that Mr. Sacks

could not even demonstrate a threat of future injury. In the

Ninth Circuit's eyes, the agency's conduct “indicate[d] that

the government does not intend to penalize him for any of

his numerous violations of the Medicine Restrictions.” The

court next went entirely outside the confines of the

complaint, found that the agency had failed to pursue

additional fines against Mr. Sacks, and concluded that this

was “a strong indication of its lack of intent to do so in the

future.” The court also deemed insignificant the agency’s

pursuit of fines against Voices, and its reservation of its

right to impose additional penalties on Mr. Sacks.

Mr. Sacks now petitions for a writ of certiorari.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

This case raises important issues regarding the scope of

executive power to punish U.S. citizens in violation of

Congressional statutes and international law. If left

uncorrected, moreover, individuals threatened with

punishment for voicing their opposition to illegal conduct by

the executive or acting for humanitarian purposes could

lose the right to judicial review of the penalty’s validity

through tactically worded penalty notices. As set forth in

the following sections, the case also presents a unique

3 Td. at *18.

™ Id, at *22-*23 (emphasis in original).

18 Id. at "24.

14

opportunity to address these issues without undue

interference with ongoing foreign policy initiatives of the

executive branch.

I. The Ninth Circuit’s Erroneous Ruling on

Standing Will Prevent Judicial Scrutiny

of Regulations like Those at Issue Here

The Ninth Circuit narrowly construed this Court's

standing jurisprudence in order to deny Mr. Sacks’

standing to challenge the agency’s restriction on

humanitarian donations of food and medicine (while

recognizing his standing to challenge the travel ban). By

doing so, the Ninth Circuit has done more than simply

depart from established law. Rather, under the Ninth

Circuit’s ruling, it is difficult to conceive how the agency’s

authority to directly restrict humanitarian donations of

food and medicine could ever be subjected to review. Under

the Ninth Circuit’s analysis, the agency may indirectly

preclude all humanitarian exports through a travel ban,

perpetually rendering its restrictions on humanitarian

exports unreviewable.

Not only that, the Ninth Circuit's ruling on Mr. Sacks's 3

standing is wrong. Mr. Sacks has Article III standing to

challenge the agency’s restriction on medical exports if

three elements are present: (1) injury in fact to Mr. Se ‘ks;

(2) causation, i.e., a fairly traceable connection between

Mr. Sacks’ injury and the agency’s restriction on medical

exports; and (3) redressability, i.e., a likelihood that the

relief Mr. Sacks requests will redress the injuries he

alleges.”®

At this stage of the proceedings, a motion directed to the

pleadings, general factual allegations in support of

standing are sufficient.” And when standing is challenged

6 E.g., Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 103

(1998); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 565, 560-61 (1992).

1 Steel Co., 623 U.S. at 105; Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561.

15

on the basis of the pleadings, the court must “accept as true

all material allegations of the complaint, and ... construe

the complaint in favor of the complaining party.””

As will be seen, the Ninth Circuit failed to apply these

rules. Instead, it construed the complaint against Mr.

Sacks, looked to facts outside the complaint, including facts

that took place after the complaint was filed and, based on

this review, concluded that Mr. Sacks lacked i haneng and

that his claims were unripe.

A. Injury in Fact

A plaintiff has standing to challenge allegedly illegal

action if he or she faces “some threatened or actual injury

resulting from the putatively illegal action.”” Here, Mr.

Sacks faces both actual and threatened prosecution under

. the agency’s medicine restriction.

Mr. Sacks was fined, the agency’s penalty notice

claimed, because he “admitted the [Prepenalty] Notice’s

allegation in Count 6 that you exported goods to Iraq

absent prior OFAC approval.”™ This claim followed a

prepenalty notice directed jointly to Voices and him

(making clear that the agency did not view Mr. Sacks as

any ordinary dues-paying member of that organization).

The prepenalty notice claimed that “you and Voices in the

Wilderness (‘VW’) have engaged in certain prohibited

transactions” which “concern[ed] your and VW's

exportation of donated goods, including medical

supplies and toys, to Iraq.””

78 Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 7 (1988) (quoting Warth v.

Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975)).

7 E.g., Warth, 422 U.S. at 490; Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614,

617 (1973); see also Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728, 736 (1984) (“actual

or threatened injury” is required).

80 Amended Complaint, Ex. 2, at 1 (emphasis added).

8! Amended Complaint, Ex. 1, at 1.

82 Jd.

16

As previously mentioned, the Ninth Circuit dismissed

the language of the penalty notice as ambiguous and

“confusing.” It then resolved the ambiguity against Mr.

Sacks and concluded that Mr. Sacks had not been pursued

or punished for exporting medical goods. But the court did

not stop there. It went further and found that the agency’s

conduct did not suggest that the threat of future

enforcement of the medicine restriction was anything more

than conjectural.

These rulings do not comport with this Court’s

jurisprudence regarding standing. The complaint,

construed in Mr. Sacks’ favor, alleges that he was fined

because he “exported goods to Iraq.” The Ninth Circuit had

no license to resolve factual issues on a Rule 12(b)(6)

motion, which is precisely what it did when it found

ambiguity in the penalty notice. A proper reading of the

complaint reveals an actual injury in fact — a $10,000 civil

penalty — imposed because he admitted that he “exported

goods to Iraq.” This satisfied the first prong of Article III's

tripartite standing requirement.

The Ninth Circuit compounded its error by dismissing

the threat of future prosecution as insufficiently concrete to

satisfy Article III. But the combination of the agency’s

enforcement actions against Voices and Mr. Sacks plainly

raises, at least on the pleadings, a credible threat of future

prosecution. In Babbitt v. United Farm Workers”, this

Court articulated the difference between prosecutorial

threats that are sufficient to confer standing and those that

are not:

When the plaintiff has alleged an intention to

engage in a course of conduct arguably affected

with a constitutional interest, but proscribed by a

statute, and there exists a credible threat of -

prosecution thereunder, he should not be required

® 442 U.S. 289 (1979).

17

to await and undergo a criminal prosecution as the

sole means of seeking relief. But persons having no

fears of state prosecution except those that are

imaginary or speculative, are not to be accepted as

appropriate plaintiffs. When plaintiffs do not claim

that they have ever been threatened with

prosecution, that a prosecution is likely, or even

that a prosecution is remotely possible, they do not

allege a dispute susceptible to resolution by a

federal court.™

Here, as the Ninth Circuit acknowledged, Mr. Sacks had

done more than merely-assert an intention to engage in

conduct that violated the medicine restriction. He has

actually done so on several occasions. The question was

therefore reduced to whether the threat of prosecution was

something other than remote or speculative.

This Court has, from time to time, dismissed a threat of

future prosecution as insufficient. In Poe v. Ullman,™ this

Court dismissed the threat of prosecution under a statute

as insignificant where the statute had never been enforced

in nearly a century (save for a single test case to establish

its constitutionality and then not to the point that anyone

was punished). In O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974),

the threat of future abusive or discriminatory prosecution

was dismissed where the plaintiffs did not allege any

specific threats against them, where they did not challenge

the validity of the any of the laws under which they might

be prosecuted, and where the court “assume[d] that

[plaintiffs] will conduct their activities within the law and

so avoid prosecution and conviction as well as exposure to

the challenged course of conduct said to be followed by

(defendants].” Here, of course, the regulations at issue are

being enforced, and enforced against an association of

84 442 U.S. at 298-99 (citations and quotations omitted).

86 367 U.S. 497 (1961).

18

which Mr. Sacks is a member in connection with acts Mr.

Sacks committed.

The threats Mr. Sacks faces are akin to those presented

in Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973). There, the Court

upheld the standing of physicians to challenge a law

proscribing doctor assistance at most abortions where the

statute was “recent and not moribund” and the Court was

informed at oral argument that physicians had been

prosecuted under it.

The threats here are certainly more concrete than those

found to confer standing in Pennell. There, this Court ruled

that an association of landlords had standing to challenge a

rent control ordinance that limited their right to raise the

rent where it would impose a hardship on the tenant and

subjected landlords who violated the ordinance to civil and

criminal penalties. It was enough, this Court ruled, that the

complaint stated that the plaintiffs were “subject to the

ordinance” and counsel stated, during oral argument, that

most landlords had hardship tenants.”

Here, in contrast, the agency has assessed one civil

penalty against Mr. Sacks because he admitted “exported

goods to Iraq.” It alleged — in a prepenalty notice sent to

him as well as Voices — that “you and [Voices] engaged in

certain prohibited transactions” including “your and ~

[Voices’] exportation of donated goods, including medical

supplies.” Having identified Mr. Sacks as one of the

individuals involved in this exportation, the agency sued

Voices and pursued the claim to judgment. There is every

reason to believe, on this record, that the agency intends to

enforce its restriction on humanitarian donations and that

Mr. Sacks is one of small handful of individuals in whom

the agency is particularly interested in penalizing. The

agency never disclaimed interest in doing so, warning the

district court that it “reserve[d]he right” to “act[ ] in

response to Plaintiff's eight other trips to Iraq.”"’

86 Pennell, 485 U.S. at 7-8.

87 Motion to Dismiss at 5, n.4.

19

Surely this was enough to move Mr. Sacks’s claim past

the pleading stage. To the extent there were doubts about

the agency's enforcement philosophy, resolving those

doubts on a motion to dismiss was improper. Factual

questions regarding the agency’s enforcements should have’

awaited discovery and development of the factual record.

In short, this Court’s teaching in Lujan v. Defenders of

Wildlife applies here:

When the suit is one challenging the legality of

government action or inaction, the nature and

extent of facts that must be averred (at the

summary judgment stage) or proved (at the trial

stage) in order to establish standing depends

considerably upon whether the plaintiff is himself

an object of the action (or forgone action) at issue.

If he is, there is ordinarily little question that the

action or inaction has caused him injury, and that

a judgment preventing or requiring the action will

redress it.™

Here, Mr. Sacks himself has made humanitarian donations

of medicine to civilians in Iraq, something the agency's

regulations prohibit. The agency has accused him of

exporting goods to Iraq and has fined him for admitting he

did so. And it has reduced its claim against Voices to

judgment, a claim that arises from the same conduct

alleged in the prepenalty notice, conduct in which Mr.

Sacks is alleged to have participated. For all these reasons,

Mr. Sacks has alleged both a past injury as well as

threatened future injuries. These satisfy the first element

of standing.

B. Causation and Redressability

85 Tujan, 604 U.S. at 561-62.

20

Before the Ninth Circuit, the agency did not contend

that the second and third prongs of Article II] standing

were absent and the Ninth Circuit did not so rule.

Causation simply requires “a fairly traceable connection

between the plaintiffs injury and the complained. of

conduct of the defendant.’ Here, the agency’s own penalty

and prepenalty notices trace the connection between the

agency’s restriction on medical exports and the pending

civil penalty against Mr. Sacks. These notices demonstrate

that the agency imposed the penalty because ‘Mr. Sacks

“exported goods to Iraq.”

This Court’s decision in Duke Power Co. uv. Carolina

Environmental Study Group, Inc.” shows that courts may

and should tolerate fairly attenuated causal chains, ones

that might not satisfy traditional notions of causation

under tort law. There, neighbors of a nuclear power plant

under construction challenged the constitutionality of a

statute that limited the liability of such plants. This

Supreme Court found two injuries that conferred standing:

~ thermal pollution of a nearby lake and non-natural

radiation from the plant, neither of which was directly

caused by the liability limitation at issue. Nor was the

plaintiffs’ alleged injury caused by the (alleged) illegal

aspects of the defendant's behavior.”’ To the contrary, as a

respected treatise notes, the plaintiffs’ injuries arose from

actions that were entirely lawful: the operation of a

properly licensed generating plant.” But because the plant

would not be built in the absence of a liability limitation,

this Court concluded that the plaintiffs had satisfied the

causation element of standing.

Redressability is likewise satisfied. It is fair to say that

generally speaking, redressability only presents a problem

where a third party, not the defendant, is the direct cause

89 Steel Co., 423 U.S. at 103 (citations omitted).

90 438 U.S. 59 (1978).

91 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

§ 3531.5, at 879 (2004 supp.

$2 Td.

21

of the plaintiffs injury.” In those instances, an order

directed to the defendant may not redress the problem,

because there is no guarantee that the third party will

change its conduct in response to the order.” Here, of

course, the agency, and not some third party, is the direct

cause of Mr. Sacks’s injury. An injunction prohibiting the

agency from enforcing its regulatory prohibition against

‘humanitarian exports of food and medicine would redress

Mr. Sacks’s injury.

Article ITI standing, ‘therefore, was present. The Ninth

Circuit should have proceeded to addresses the merits of

Mr. Sacks’s challenge to the medicine restriction, just as

the district court did. Having done so, the Ninth Circuit

should have reached a different conclusion than the district

court, one that was not premised upon the determination

that Geneva Converition “is not binding on the United

States” and similar observations.”

Ul. A Prohibition on Humanitarian Donations

Violates International Law That Congress

Has Not Abrogated

The Ninth Circuit’s ruling left unresolved the question of

the executive’s authority to punish U.S. citizens who try to

relieve human suffering with humanitarian aid. The scope

of the executive’s power, especially in the face of clear and

contrary legislation from Congress, is an important one

worthy of this Court’s consideration.

This case provides an excellent vehicle for addressing

that issue because the Court may address the issue without

8 Fig, Linda R.S. uv. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 (1973) (suit by

unwed mother to force state to prosecute father who refused to pay child

support); Simon uv. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26

(1976) (suit by indigent persons challenging IRS elimination of

requirement that hospitals provide services to indigents to extent of

financial ability to qualify as charitable organization).

94 Td.

36 Order at 7.

22

concern for interference with either the political processes

or ongoing foreign policy initiatives. This is so because the

embargo on Iraq was lifted after the fall of the Saddam

Hussein regime in 2008, without mooting the issues, since

the executive reserves the right to punish past violations.”

As the district court noted below, the agency’s embargo

on Iraq is but one of over a dozen sets of regulations under

which the agency has sought to restrict trade with foreign

states.” Thus, issues concerning the proper use and scope

of such restrictions are likely to recur. As the following

sections show, the agency lacks the authority to impose the

regulatory embargo that it did.

A. International Law Forbids the

Deliberate, Mass Starvation of

Children and Other Civilians

The prohibition against the deliberate starvation of

civilian children is a peremptory norm, or “jus cogens,”

which means that it cannot be overruled by. any other law

or local custom.” The notion that a state may not

intentionally target children and civilians during peacetime

is not codified in a treaty. Rather, it is derived from treaty

and international custom. Custcmary international law,

like international law embodied treaties, is part of our

law.

See Executive Order 13350, 69 Fed. Reg. 46055 (July 30, 2004).

Order at 9-10. |

98 The concept of peremptory norms finds expression in a number of

international legal sources. Among these is Article 53 of the Vienna

Convention on the Law of Treaties, which declares void any treaty that

“conflicts with a peremptory norm of general international law.” Article

53 defines a peremptory norm as “a norm accepted and recognized by the

international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no

derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent

norm of general international law having the same character.” Vienna

Convention on the Law of Treaties, done on May 23, 1969, art. 53, 1156

U.N.T.S. 331.

99 The Paquete-Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900)

23

A number of international agreements evidence the

international community’s consensus that the intentional

mass killing of civilians, especially children, is a crime. In

the modern era, these begin with the 1948 Universal

Declaration of Human Rights.! Article 26(1) of the

Universal Declaration states:

Everyone has the right to a standard of living

adequate for the health and well-being of himself

and of his family, including food, clothing, housing

and medical care and necessary social services ....

Article 25(2) provides that “[mJotherhood and childhood

are entitled to special care and assistance.” Civilized

nations thus recognize that depriving people — particularly

mothers, infants, and young children — of “food, clothing,

housing and medical care and necessary social services”

constitutes a deprivation of their human rights.

Although the Declaration itself does not have the force of

a treaty under U.S. domestic law, it provides evidence of

peremptory norms and customary international law, i.e.,

law that has not been codified in a treaty.

Moreover, many of the rights set forth in the Declaration

were subsequently enshrined in other treaties. One is the

Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian

Persons in Time of War’°! entered into force in 1956. Article

23 of the Geneva Convention states that even during war,

parties to the treaty:

shall allow the free passage of all consignments of

medical and hospital stores ... intended only for

civilians of another High Contracting Party, even if

the latter is its adversary. It shall likewise permit

the free passage of all consignments of essential

foodstuffs, clothing and tonics intended for children

100 GA Res. 217A (IIT), U.N. Doc A/810 at 71 (1948).

101 Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T:S. 135.

24

under fifteen, expectant mothers and maternity

cases.

Another is the Convention on the Prevention and

Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,!°? which entered into

force in 1951. This Convention, drafted in response to Nazi

atrocities, largely embodied the principles of law that

were applied during the post-war Nuremberg trials. The

Senate ratified the Convention in 1988. Article II of the

Convention defines genocide to include killing or causing

serious bodily or mental harm to members of a group as

well as deliberately inflicting conditions of life calculated to

bring about the partial or total physical destruction of the

group.

Finally, Article 24 of the Convention on the Rights of the

Child! “recognize[s] the right of the child to the enjoyment

of the highest attainable standard of health and to facilities

for the treatment of illness and rehabilitation of health.” 105.

The Convention states that nations “shall strive to ensure

that no child is deprived of his or her right of access to such

health care services.” Accordingly, the Convention requires

countries to:

take appropriate measures: (a) To diminish infant

and child mortality; (b) To ensure the provision of

necessary medical assistance and health care to all

children with emphasis on the development of

primary health care; (c) To combat disease and

malnutrition, including within the framework of

primary health care, through, inter alia, the

application of readily available technology and

through the provision of adequate nutritious foods

and clean drinking-water, taking into

102 Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277.

103 S. REP. No. 99-2, pt. I, reprinted in 28 1.L.M. 754, 762 (1989).

104 Convention on the Rights of the Child, opened for stgnature Nov. 20,

1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3.

105 Tq

25

consideration the dangers and risks of

environmental pollution; [and] (d) To ensure

appropriate pre-natal and post-natal health care

for mothers, 06

The United States admittedly has not ratified the

Convention on the Rights of the Child (although not

because it expressed an interest in exposing children to the

hazards of international conflict). It has, however, ratified

the “Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of

the Child on the involvement of children in armed

_ conflict.”"” The preamble to that Protocol condemns “the

targeting of children in situations of armed conflict and

direct attacks on objects protected under international law,

_ including places generally having a significant presence of

children, such as schools and hospitals.” The Protocol

accordingly increases the strictures against the military

recruitment of children.

These treaties and international documents embody or

reflect certain principles of international law, most notably

the principle is that one state may not carry out its foreign

policy objectives vis-a-vis another state by intentionally

targeting and killing the civilians, especially children, of

the other state. Under the Supremacy Clause, these

principles are the highest law of the land,'”

In other sanctions-related contexts, Congress has

enacted legislation that avoids conflict with these

principles. Thus, the International Emergency Economic

Powers Act (“IEEPA”) § 203(b) contains the following

restrictions on executive authority:

106 Tq

107 UNITED STATES DEPT. OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE (2006), at 389-90.

106 Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on

the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, done on May 25, 2000,

G.A. Res. 54/263, Annex I, 654 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49) at 7, U.N. Doc.

A/54/49, Vol. ITI (2000).

'? U.S. Const. Art. 6.

26

The authority granted to the President by this

section does not include the authority to regulate

or prohibit, directly or indirectly --

(2) donations ... of articles, such as food,

clothing, and medicine, intended to be used to

relieve human suffering ... ; or

(4) any transactions ordinarily incident to travel

to or from any country, including importation of

accompanied baggage for personal use,

maintenance within any country including

payment of living expenses and acquisition of

goods or services for personal use, and

arrangement or facilitation of such travel including

nonscheduled air, sea, or land voyages.!!°

Nonetheless, before the Court of Appeals, the agency

contended that two statutes each abrogated these

peremptory norms of international law and authorized its

restrictions on humanitarian donations. This brings into

play this Court’s admonition, in an opinion by Chief Justice

Marshall, that “a statute ought never to be construed to

violate the law of nations, if any other possible construction

remains.”''' Where fairly possible, a United States statute

is to be construed so as not to conflict with international

law or with an international agreement of the United

States.”''? And “when the President takes measures

incompatible with the expressed or implied will of

Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb.”’”

110 Section 203(b) of IEEPA is codified at 60 U.S.C. § 1702(b).

'! Murray v. Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64, 118 (1804); see also

Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 32-33 (1982) (narrowly interpreting a

federal statute in deference to an executive agreement between the

United States and the Philippines); INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S.

421 (1987) (using a definition from an international treaty to interpret

the Refuge Act of 1980); Whitney uv. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888).

'!? RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED

STATES § 114 (1987).

113 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952)

(Jackson, J. concurring). This assumes, of course, that Congress has the

27

B. The UN Participation Act Does Not

Authorize an Embargo on

Humanitarian Aid

The first statute the agency cited to support its

restriction on humanitarian aid was the UN Participation

Act. That statute authorizes the executive branch to

regulate trade with other countries when a UN Security

Council resolution calls upon the United States to do so.

Specifically, 22 U.S.C. § 287c(a) states that “whenever the

United States is called upon by the Security Council to

apply measures which said Council has decided .. are to be

employed to give effect to its decisions .., the president

may, to the extent necessary to apply such measures,

regulate or prohibit ... economic relations,”114 Thus, UN

Participation Act only authorizes the agency to regulate or

prohibit economic relations “to the extent necessary to

apply” Security Council measures.

Here, the pertinent Security Council resolution is

Resolution 661, But that resolution did not call for an

embargo on medicine and medical supplies. To the

contrary, it exempted “supplies intended strictly for

medical purposes” and “payments exclusively for strictly

medical or humanitarian purposes” from the embargo. Nor

was the purpose of Resolution 661 unlimited. Its

self-proclaimed goal was “to bring the invasion and

occupation of Kuwait by Iraq to an end and to restore the

sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of

Kuwait.”'” Nothing in the resolution purports to authorize

an embargo until Saddam Hussein was removed from

power. Because the UN Security Council rejected an

Constitutional authority to act, which it plainly does when it comes to

embargoes on foreign countries. Article 8, section 3 of the federal

Constitution gives Congress the power “To regulate Commerce with

foreign Nations.”

422 U.S.C. § 287c(a) (emphasis added).

as See, supra, note 6.

28

embargo on humanitarian supplies, the UNPA does not

authorize the imposition of such an embargo.

Hence, the agency’s medicine restriction falls to extent

that it is applied to implement such an embargo. The same

is true of the travel ban. While the President has the

authority to limit international travel, he is bound by

statutory limits.

C. The Iraq Sanctions Act of 1990 Does

Not Authorize an Embargo on

Humanitarian Aid

The agency also claimed that the Iraq Sanctions Act of

1990 “ratified” its regulations.!16 But the Act could not have

ratified those regulations, since they were promulgated

after the Act’s November 5, 1990 passage.!!? The Act

admittedly approved President Bush’s earlier executive

orders by name, but noted that these orders exempted

' humanitarian aid from their scope.!!8 Perhaps most

_ important, the Act required any regulations issued after it

took effect to be submitted to Congress before taking

effect.1!8 The agency did not follow this Congressional

directive. Nothing in the Act, therefore, can be read to

approve the agency’s regulations. This conclusion extends

both to the medicine restriction and, to the extent employed

to prevent humanitarian aid from reaching Iraq, the travel

ban as well.

II. Conclusion

The agency has pursued Mr. Sacks for violating its

restrictions on humanitarian aid to the people of Iraq. Mr.

Sacks has standing to challenge the agency’s restrictions.

116 PL. 101-513. see 50 U.S.C. § 1701 note.

117 See 56 Fed. Reg. 2113 (Jan. 18, 1991).

118 PL, 101-513, § 586C(a) & (b).

119 Td, § 586C(c)(1).

29

Those restrictions contravene the highest principles of the

law of nations, principles Congress has never abrogated.

Congress likewise has never authorized the agency’s ban on

humanitarian aid. For all these reasons, this Court should

grant the petition for a writ of certiorari.

Respectfully submitted,

Donald B: Scaramastra

Counsel of Record

Gary D. Swearingen

GARVEY SCHUBERT BARER

Eighteenth Floor

1191 Second Avenue

Seattle, WA 98101-2939

(206) 464-3939

January 8, 2007

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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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