Opposition Brief — Cinergy Corp. v. United States (No. 06-850)

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No. 06-850 FEB 2 6 2007

OFFICE OF THE CLERK

'_SUPREME COURT, U.S. |

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

CINERGY CORPORATION, PSI ENERGY, INC.,

CINCINNATI GAS & ELECRIC CoO.,

and CINERGY SERVICES, INC.,

Petitioners,

v.

UNITED STATES, STATE OF NEW YORK,

STATE OF CONNECTICUT, STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

HOOSIER ENVIRONMENTAL COUNCIL,

and OHIO ENVIRONMENTAL COUNCIL,

Respondents.

On PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UniTreD STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS THE STATES OF

NEW YORK, CONNECTICUT, AND NEW JERSEY,

HOOSIER ENVIRONMENTAL COUNCIL,

AND OHIO ENVIRONMENTAL COUNCIL

a eee at meses

ANDREW M. Cuomo

Attorney General of the

State of New York

ROBERT ROSENTHAL BARBARA D. UNDERWOOD*

J. JARED SNYDER Solicitor General

Assistant Attorneys General DANIEL SMIRLOCK

Deputy Solicitor General

ANDREW BING

Assistant Solicitor General

120 Broadway

New York, NY 10271

(212) 416-8016

* Counsel of Record Attorneys for Respondents

(Additional Counsel Listed on Signature Page)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES

INTRODUCTION

ARGUMENT

I. Cinergy Relies Erroneously On A Superseded

Regulation In Support Of Its Contention That

The NSPS Emissions Test Applies As A

Threshold To Determine Whether Its Renovation

Projects Constitute PSD “Major Modifications”

Cinergy’s Claim That The Utility Industry

Long Understood The PSD Regulations To

Provide A Maximum Hourly Emissions Rate

Test Is Refuted By The Record

CONCLUSION

li

TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES

Cases:

Alabama Power Co. v. Costle,

636 F.2d 323 (D.C. Cir. 1979)

Alaskan Trojan Partnership v. Gutierrez,

425 F.3d 620 (9th Cir. 2005)

Duke Energy Corp. v. Environmental Defense,

411 F.3d 539 (4th Cir. 2005), cert.

granted, 126 S. Ct. 2019 (2006)

Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. EPA,

898 F.2d 183 (D.C. Cir. 1990)

Esco Manufacturer Co., Matter of, v. Pritchard,

50 F.3d 315 (Sth Cir. 1995)

New York v. EPA, 413 F.3d 3 (D.C. Cir. ),

reh’g denied, 431 F.3d 801 (2005)

Puerto Rican Cement Puerto Rican Cement Co. v. EPA,

889 F.2d 292 (ist Cir. 1989)

United States v. Cinergy,

458 F.3d 705 (7th Cir. 2006)

Wisconsin Electric Power Co. v. Reilly (“WEPCo”),

893 F.2d 901 (7th Cir. 1990)

iti

Cited Authorities

Federal Statutes:

United States Code (“U.S.C.”)

42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(4)

42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(3)

42 U.S.C. § 7479(2)(c)

42 U.S.C. § 7607

Federal Regulations:

Code of Federal Regulations (“C.F.R.”)

40 C.E.R. § 51.166

40 C.ER. § 51.166(b)(2)(i)

40 C.ER. § 51.166(b)(21)(i)

40 C.F.R. § 51.166(b)(21)(ii)

40 C.F.R. § 52.01

40 C.E.R. § 52.01(d)

40 C.F.R. § 52.21 .

40 C.F.R. § 52.793

40 C.F.R. § 52.884

40 C.F.R. § 60.14

iv

Cited Authorities

Page

Miscellaneous:

Federal Register

36 Fed. Reg. 15,704 (Aug. 17, 1971) .......... 4

39 Fed. Reg. 42,510 (Dec. 5, 1974) ........... 4

45 Fed. Reg. 52,676 (Aug. 7, 1980) ........... 4,8

46 Fed. Reg. 9,580/3 (Jan. 29, 1981) .......... 5

57 Fed. Reg. 32,314 (July 21, 1992) .......... 4,7,9

61 Fed. Reg. 38, 250 (July 23, 1996) .......... 7

State Regulations

S.C. Code Regs. 61-62.5, Std. 7(a)(2)(ii) ....... bs

l

INTRODUCTION

The States of New York, New Jersey and Connecticut

(“State Respondents”) submit this brief in response to the

petition for a writ of certiorari of Cinergy Corporation et al.

(“Cinergy”).' We agree with petitioners that the decision of

the Seventh Circuit below, United States v. Cinergy, 458 F.3d

705 (7" Cir. 2006), squarely. conflicts with the decision of

the Fourth Circuit that 18 Whder review in Environmental

Defense, et al. v. Duke Energy Corp., No. 05-848 (argued

Nov. 1, 2006). Instead of granting certiorari at this time,

however, the Court should hold Cinergy’s petition in

abeyance until Duke Energy is decided.

Both cases involve the U.S. Environmental Protection

Agency’s (“EPA”) interpretation of the definition of “major

modification” under the 1980 Prevention of Significant

Deterioration (“PSD”) regulations, 40 C.F.R. § 51.166(b)(2)(i).

The Seventh Circuit agreed with EPA and the State Respondents

that a “major modification” for purposes of the PSD regulations

occurs when a physical change at a polluting facility increases

actual annual emissions. See Cinergy, 458 F.3d at 708-10.

In contrast, the Fourth Circuit adopted the utility industry’s view

that a major modification occurs only if the physical change

increases the facility’s maximum hourly emissions rate.’

See Duke Energy Corp. v. Environmental Defense, 411 F.3d

539, 546-49 (4" Cir. 2005), cert. granted, 126 S.Ct. 2019 (2006).

1. The State Respondents are joined in this submission by

respondents Hoosier Environmental Council and Ohio Environmental

Council. |

2. In adopting a test based on the maximum hourly emissions

rate, the Fourth Circuit utilized the test required under regulations

governing a different regulatory program, the New Source

Performance Standards (“NSPS”). See 40 C.F.R. § 60.14.

2

In Duke Energy, petitioners Environmental Defense, ef

al., argue two separate grounds for reversing the Fourth

Circuit. First, they argue that the Fourth Circuit’s decision

intruded on the D.C. Circuit’s exclusive authority to review

final agency actions under the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.

§ 7607, and thus that the Fourth Circuit lacked jurisdiction

to decide the case as it did. See Petitioners’ Brief in

Environmental Defense v. Duke Energy Corp., No. 05-848,

at 26-38. Second, they contend that the Fourth Circuit erred

on the merits in reading the NSPS hourly emission test into

the PSD definition of a “major modification,” which requires

an increase in annual emissions, not hourly emissions. /d. at

38-50. If the Court reverses the Fourth Circuit’s decision on

either of these grounds, the conflict between the circuits

would no longer exist and Cinergy’s petition should be

denied. On the other hand, Cinergy’s petition should be

granted only if the Court rules in favor of Duke Energy on

both the jurisdictional and merits issues.

In support of its petition here, Cinergy argues that the

Fourth Circuit was correct and the Seventh Circuit incorrect

on the merits. As explained below, Cinergy is wrong. Indeed,

there is a document that was introduced below in Cinergy

that is not in the Duke record, showing that the utility industry

fully understood the meaning of the regulations at issue.

See discussion of Nickel Memorandum, infra at 7.

Accordingly, the Court should hold Cinergy’s petition in

abeyance pending its decision in Duke Energy and deny the

petition if it vacates the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Duke

Energy.

3

ARGUMENT

Cinergy Relies Erroneously On A Superseded

Regulation In Support Of Its Contention That The

NSPS Emissions Test Applies As A Threshold To

Determine Whether Its Renovation Projects

Constitute PSD “Major Modifications”

In its petition, Cinergy erroneously asserts that one must

first determine whether an NSPS “modification” has occurred

before reaching the question of whether a PSD “major

modification” has occurred. Petition at 3, 11-12. In support

of this proposition, Cinergy relies on 40 C.F.R. § 52.01(d),

which defines “modification” as “any physical change in, or

change in the method of operation of, a stationary source

which increases the emission rate of any pollutant.”

See Petition at 3, 11, 12; see also Duke Br., No. 05-848, at 6,

10, 23, 28 (making the same argument).

The Seventh Circuit correctly dismissed this argument

as “makeweight.” Cinergy, 458 F.3d at 711.° The term

3. The Seventh Circuit also ruled that EPA’s interpretation of the

phrase “major modification” as requiring examination of actual annual

emissions increases is supported by a “natural reading of the regulation.”

458 F.3d at 708; accord New York v. EPA, 413 F.3d 3, 15-16 (D.C. Cir.)

(PSD emissions test measures changes in “actual annual” emissions),

reh’'g denied, 431 F.3d 801 (2005); Wisconsin Electric Power Co. v.

Reilly (‘WEPCo”), 893 F.2d 901, 913, 915 (7" Cir. 1990) (regulations

for NSPS and PSD programs “measure[] emissions in a fundamentally

distinct manner,” with NSPS test “concerned primarily with ...

emissions rates, expressed in kilograms per hour” and PSD test

“concerned with changes in total annual emissions, expressed in tons

per year”); Puerto Rican Cement Co. v. EPA, 889 F.2d 292, 296-99 (1*

Cir. 1989) (PSD regulations triggered if annual emissions will increase

even if plant’s hourly rate of emissions will remain same). In Duke

Energy, without addressing the language of the PSD regulations, the

Fourth Circuit held that the PSD regulations “can” be interpreted

consistently with the maximum hourly emissions test set forth in NSPS

regulations. 411 F.3d at 549 n.7.

4

“modif “ »n” plays no role in defining the separate regulatory

term “major modification,” which has its own definition

predicated on a “physical change or change in the method of

operation,” 40 C.F.R. § 51.166(b)(2)(i), rather than on a

“modification.” * Even if somehow incorporated into the

definition of “major modification” under § 51.166(b)(2)(i), the

term “modification” under § 52.01(d) does not help petitioners

because it is defined in terms of an unspecified “increase [in]

emission rate,” not in terms of an hourly emission increase.°

Under PSD, the applicable “rate” is tons per year. 40 C.F.R.

§ 51.166(b)(21)(i), (11). The record shows, moreover, that the

regulation relied on by Cinergy (and Duke), § 52.01(d), was

replaced and superseded by a 1978 version of the PSD

regulations that, in tum, was abandoned in 1980 by promulgation

of the PSD regulations at issue here. See Alabama Power Co. v.

Costle, 636 F.2d 323, 348 n.24 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (referring to §

52.01 as “superseded”); Env tl Defense Fund, Inc. v. EPA, 898

F.2d 183, 184 n.: (D.C. Cir. 1990) (explaining history of PSD

regulations’ promulgation).°

4. See Alaskan Trojan Partnership v. Gutierrez, 425 F.3d 620,

631 (9% Cir. 2005) (giving effect to differences in regulatory definitions

of “catcher vessels and catcher/processor vessels” because regulations

“separately defin[ed] each term”); Matter of Esco Mfr. Co. v. Pritchard,

50 F.3d 315 (5" Cir. 1995) (definition of “plan administrator” unhelpful

in understanding separately defined term “plan sponsor”).

5. As part of its initial PSD regulations, EPA in 1974 interpreted

“modification” under § 52.01 to be “consistent with” the NSPS

regulatory definition of that term. 39 Fed. Reg. 42,510, 42,513/1 (Dec.

5, 1974). The NSPS definition in effect at that time, however, applied

simply to “increases [in] the amount of any air pollutant,” with no

reference to hourly emission rates. See 36 Fed. Reg. 15,704, 15,705/1

(Aug. 17, 1971); see also Duke Energy, 411 F.3d at 542.

6. That EPA makes no mention of § 52.01(d) in the preambles to

its 1980 and 1992 PSD regulations at issue here is further evidence of

the irrelevance of that provision. See 45 Fed. Reg. 52,676 (Aug. 7, 1980);

57 Fed. Reg. 32,314 (July 21, 1992).

5

Even if the § 52.01(d) definition of “modification” is to be

grafted onto the governing definition of “major modification,”

an affirmance in Duke Energy would not necessarily require

the reversal of the Seventh Circuit’s decision at issue here

because the governing PSD requirements in any given state are

determined by that state’s implementation plan (“SIP’’), rather

than the federal regulations. In Ohio and Indiana, the states where

Cinergy’s plants at issue are located, the PSD regulations that

were approved by EPA, see 40 C.F.R. §§ 52.793, 52.884, do

not include the § 52.01 definition. Instead, only the definition

of “major modification” under 40 C.F.R. § 52.21 (which is

identical, in relevant part, to § 51.166) was incorporated into

those states’ SIPs and is applicable here. See 46 Fed. Reg. 9,580/

3, 9583/3 (Jan. 29, 1981).’

Il. Cinergy’s Claim That The Utility Industry Long

Understood The PSD Regulations To Provide A

Maximum Hourly Emissions Rate Test Is Refuted By

The Record

Cinergy also premises its Petition on the unsupported claim

that “at the time these projects occurred, no one at Cinergy

believed that they triggered NSR.” Pet. at 4; see also Duke Br.

in No. 05-848 at 16-19. Cinergy’s contention echoes Duke’s

claim at oral argument that:

[I]t is very clear that the understanding of everyone

in the industry . . . from 1980, candidly well beyond

7. In contrast, Duke’s counsel appeared to argue that South

Carolina’s PSD regulations do incorporate the § 52.01 definition,

Transcript of Oral Argument in No. 05-848, at 27-28, =Ithough

counsel did not cite to the record in support of this proposition.

In fact, the PSD preconstruction requirements under South Carolina’s

regulations, which were approved by EPA, are applicable only

to “the major modification of any existing major stationary

source.” See S.C. Code Regs. 61-62.5, Std. 7(a)(2)(ii). The term

“modification” is not separately defined in South Carolina’s PSD

regulations.

6

1988 all the way up tq 1999, was that the regulations

didn’t apply under any circumstances in the absence

of an increase the capacity ... [a]nd you had to

demonstrate that there would be an increase in the

hourly rate of emissions.

See Transcript of Oral Argument in No. 05-848 at 25-26

(emphasis added).

This contention is contradicted by a multitude of

historical documents, showing that industry long understood

the 1980 PSD regulations the same way EPA does. In a 1981

brief filed in their original challenge to the 1980 PSD

regulations, for example, industry petitioners interpreted the

regulations in the same manner as EPA does here, stating

that (i) the regulations “provide that a modification occurs

whenever a series of contemporaneous changes at a source

result in a significant increase in actual emissions, even

though the source’s net capacity to emit remains constant or

declines,” and (ii) the “question of whether there is a net

increase in actual emissions requires that variations in the

source’s hours and rates of operation be taken into account.”

See Brief for Industry Petitioners in Chemical Mfg. Ass’n v.

EPA, No. 79-1112 (D.C. Cir.), dated Feb. 12, 1981, pp. 5-6,

28-29 (filed with Court in Duke Energy). A settlement

agreement entered into by EPA and industrial polluters,

including Cinergy and Duke, to resolve that regulatory

challenge required EPA to propose changing the PSD

emissions test to allow emissions increases to be based on a

“source’s potential to emit (as calculated in terms of pounds

of pollutant emitted per hour).” See Exhibit B to Settlement

Agreement, executed on Feb. 22, 1982, in Chemical Mfg.

Ass'n v. EPA, No. 79-1112 (D.C. Cir.), at p. 1. This proposal

7

——

would have been unnecessary had the PSD regulations already

provided an hourly potential emissions test.

Moreover, additional documents show that the utility

industry long understood EPA’s assertion that the PSD and NSPS

emissions tests are separate and different. For example, a

publicly-available document prepared by a utility industry

representative establishes that industry fully understood that the

§ 52.01 definition of “modification” is inapplicable to PSD. In

a July 29, 1988 memorandum, Henry V. Nickel — counsel for

the Utility Air Regulatory Group (“UARG”) and Duke’s co-

counsel in Duke Energy — acknowledges that § 52.01(d) is

irrelevant to PSD applicability: “[I]n adding the more specific

‘major modification’ definition to § 52.21, EPA made clear that

it, and not the general definition in 40 C.F.R. § 52.01(d), applies to

the PSD program.” See Dist. Ct. Doc. No. 587, Ex. 8, at 38 n. 77.?

8. At various times since 1981, EPA considered industry’s

proposal to change the PSD emission test to one based on increases in

maximum hourly emissions, but ultimately rejected that approach in

1996. See, e.g.,61 Fed. Reg. 38, 250, 38,269/2 (July 23, 1996) (rejecting

adoption of maximum hourly emissions test based on concern that such

a test would allow a source “owner to use the [operating unit] at much

higher levels (e.g., more hours per day or week) than it had in the past”

and thus “increase [] utilization even though hourly potential emissions

remain the same”).

9. The Nickel memorandum was attached initially to a letter

written by the Wisconsin Electric Power Company (“WEPCO”) to EPA

in the context of EPA’s determination that WEPCO’s life extension

projects constituted “major modifications” and triggered the PSD pre-

construction requirements. See Wisconsin Electric Power Co. v. Reilly,

893 F.2d 901 (7" Cir. 1990). The memorandum was also included as

part of the publicly available rulemaking docket associated with EPA’s

1992 PSD regulations, 57 Fed. Reg. 32,314 (July 21, 1992). In the district

court below, plaintiffs here filed the memorandum under seal as part of

their Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the Legal Standard for

the Routine Maintenance, Repair and Replacement Exclusion, dated

Sept. 12, 2005. Because the document is publicly available, it should

not have been filed under seal.

8

Consistent with this position, UARG recognized, in a June

5, 1989 letter to the Department of Energy, that EPA requires

PSD review even for physical changes that “will not increase

the [hourly] emission rate of the units.” Dist. Ct. Doc. No.

295, Ex. 38, at 8-9. See also UARG Amicus Brief in WEPCo,

dated May 22, 1989 (Dist. Ct. Doc. No. 295, Ex. 28, at 9)

(acknowledging that EPA reads PSD requirements to “apply

even where the project merely improved the availability and

reliability of the facility, and was not needed to restore lost

capacity”). These admissions, like the others in the Duke

Energy record discussed in the briefs of petitioners in that

case,'° cannot be reconciled with Cinergy’s litigation position

in this case.

The utility industry’s understanding that the PSD

requirements apply to projects that do not increase hourly

emissions rates is consistent with repeated statements by EPA

over the last two decades that the PSD regulations do not

include or incorporate an NSPS-like maximum hourly rate

test. In adopting the 1980 PSD regulations, EPA specified

that a source could increase hours of operation “to take

advantage of favorable market conditions” without triggering

PSD but not if such increase was associated with

“construction activity.” 45 Fed. Reg. at 52,704/2; see also

WEPCo, 893 F.2d at 916 n.11 (same). In adopting changes

to its PSD regulations in 1992, EPA again explained that the

different emissions tests under the PSD and NSPS regulations

“reflect[] the fundamental distinctions between the

technology-based provisions of NSPS and the air quality-

10. For example, a 1991 Duke compliance manual states flatly

that PSD is based on increases in “annual emissions” and can be

triggered if a project causes a unit to be “operated more frequently.”

See United States Reply Br. in No. 05-848 at 14, n. 11.

9

based provisions of NSR.” 57 Fed. Reg. at 32,316/1."'

Making no mention of § 52.01(d), EPA reiterated that an

“increase in emissions attributable to an increase in hours of

operation or production rate which is the result of a

construction-related activity is not excluded from review.”

Id. at 32, 328/1."* Accordingly, the claim made by Cinergy

(and by Duke) that the electric utility industry did not

understand the PSD regulations to mandate an actual annual

emissions test is unsupported by the factual record.

11. The PSD provisions, properly construed, provide assurance

that industrial facilities will not, by expanding operations and thus

emissions, undermine the states’ efforts to prevent air quality from

deteriorating. In furtherance of this goal, the PSD regulations

consider real-world pollution impacts of refurbishment projects on

air quality: if a unit actually pollutes more as a result of a project,

the unit must install pollution controls. The maximum hourly

emissions test that Cinergy (and Duke) urges would have the opposite

effect. It would allow power plant renovation projects that are

intended to increase the number of hours a facility may operate,

with consequent increases in annual emissions, to evade review under

a statute that is intended to address “any physical change” that may

cause deterioration of air quality. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7411(a)(4),

7475(a)(3), 7479(2)(C).

12. Similarly, the record in this case includes a September 9,

1988 applicability determination regarding the WEPCO Life

Extension Project in which EPA made clear that, for PSD purposes,

“{t}he fact that [a] project is intended to restore the plant’s original

design capacity is irrelevant to” calculating emissions increases and

that “increase[s] [in] production rate or hours of operation [that] are

inextricably intertwined with the physical changes” may be

considered in such a calculation. Appellants’ Supp. App. 292-93.

10

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, the Court should hold Cinergy’s petition

in abeyance pending a decision in Duke Energy, No. 05-848.

Respectfully submitted,

ANDREW M. Cuomo

Attorney General of the

State of New York

ROBERT ROSENTHAL BARBARA D. UNDERWOOD*

J. JARED SNYDER Solicitor General

Assistant Attorneys General DANIEL SMIRLOCK

Deputy Solicitor General

ANDREW D. BING

Assistant Solicitor General

120 Broadway

New York, NY 10271

* Counsel of Record (212) 416-8016

1]

STUART RABNER

Attorney General of the

State of New Jersey

Maurice A. GRIFFIN

Deputy Attorney General

R.J. Hughes Justice Complex

25 Market Place, P.O. Box 080

Trenton, NJ 08625

(609) 292-6945

RICHARD BLUMENTHAL

Attorney General of the

State of Connecticut

KIMBERLY P. MASSICOTTE

CARMEL MOTHERWAY

Assistant Attorneys General

55 Elm Street, P.O. Box 120

Hartford, CT 06141-0120

(860) 808-5250

JONATHAN F. LEwis

Attorney for Hoosier

Environmental Council and

Ohio Environmental Council

CLEAN AiR TASK FORCE

ATTORNEY FOR CITIZENS GROUPS

18 Tremont Street, Suite 530

Boston, MA 02108

(617) 624-0234

Attorneys for Respondents

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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