Opposition Brief — Cinergy Corp. v. United States (No. 06-850)
Supreme Court brief2006
Ask Donna
What actually matters in this document.
Text
~ 1: ae
2
No. 06-850 FEB 2 6 2007
OFFICE OF THE CLERK
'_SUPREME COURT, U.S. |
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
CINERGY CORPORATION, PSI ENERGY, INC.,
CINCINNATI GAS & ELECRIC CoO.,
and CINERGY SERVICES, INC.,
Petitioners,
v.
UNITED STATES, STATE OF NEW YORK,
STATE OF CONNECTICUT, STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
HOOSIER ENVIRONMENTAL COUNCIL,
and OHIO ENVIRONMENTAL COUNCIL,
Respondents.
On PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UniTreD STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS THE STATES OF
NEW YORK, CONNECTICUT, AND NEW JERSEY,
HOOSIER ENVIRONMENTAL COUNCIL,
AND OHIO ENVIRONMENTAL COUNCIL
a eee at meses
ANDREW M. Cuomo
Attorney General of the
State of New York
ROBERT ROSENTHAL BARBARA D. UNDERWOOD*
J. JARED SNYDER Solicitor General
Assistant Attorneys General DANIEL SMIRLOCK
Deputy Solicitor General
ANDREW BING
Assistant Solicitor General
120 Broadway
New York, NY 10271
(212) 416-8016
* Counsel of Record Attorneys for Respondents
(Additional Counsel Listed on Signature Page)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES
INTRODUCTION
ARGUMENT
I. Cinergy Relies Erroneously On A Superseded
Regulation In Support Of Its Contention That
The NSPS Emissions Test Applies As A
Threshold To Determine Whether Its Renovation
Projects Constitute PSD “Major Modifications”
Cinergy’s Claim That The Utility Industry
Long Understood The PSD Regulations To
Provide A Maximum Hourly Emissions Rate
Test Is Refuted By The Record
CONCLUSION
li
TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES
Cases:
Alabama Power Co. v. Costle,
636 F.2d 323 (D.C. Cir. 1979)
Alaskan Trojan Partnership v. Gutierrez,
425 F.3d 620 (9th Cir. 2005)
Duke Energy Corp. v. Environmental Defense,
411 F.3d 539 (4th Cir. 2005), cert.
granted, 126 S. Ct. 2019 (2006)
Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. EPA,
898 F.2d 183 (D.C. Cir. 1990)
Esco Manufacturer Co., Matter of, v. Pritchard,
50 F.3d 315 (Sth Cir. 1995)
New York v. EPA, 413 F.3d 3 (D.C. Cir. ),
reh’g denied, 431 F.3d 801 (2005)
Puerto Rican Cement Puerto Rican Cement Co. v. EPA,
889 F.2d 292 (ist Cir. 1989)
United States v. Cinergy,
458 F.3d 705 (7th Cir. 2006)
Wisconsin Electric Power Co. v. Reilly (“WEPCo”),
893 F.2d 901 (7th Cir. 1990)
iti
Cited Authorities
Federal Statutes:
United States Code (“U.S.C.”)
42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(4)
42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(3)
42 U.S.C. § 7479(2)(c)
42 U.S.C. § 7607
Federal Regulations:
Code of Federal Regulations (“C.F.R.”)
40 C.E.R. § 51.166
40 C.ER. § 51.166(b)(2)(i)
40 C.ER. § 51.166(b)(21)(i)
40 C.F.R. § 51.166(b)(21)(ii)
40 C.F.R. § 52.01
40 C.E.R. § 52.01(d)
40 C.F.R. § 52.21 .
40 C.F.R. § 52.793
40 C.F.R. § 52.884
40 C.F.R. § 60.14
iv
Cited Authorities
Page
Miscellaneous:
Federal Register
36 Fed. Reg. 15,704 (Aug. 17, 1971) .......... 4
39 Fed. Reg. 42,510 (Dec. 5, 1974) ........... 4
45 Fed. Reg. 52,676 (Aug. 7, 1980) ........... 4,8
46 Fed. Reg. 9,580/3 (Jan. 29, 1981) .......... 5
57 Fed. Reg. 32,314 (July 21, 1992) .......... 4,7,9
61 Fed. Reg. 38, 250 (July 23, 1996) .......... 7
State Regulations
S.C. Code Regs. 61-62.5, Std. 7(a)(2)(ii) ....... bs
l
INTRODUCTION
The States of New York, New Jersey and Connecticut
(“State Respondents”) submit this brief in response to the
petition for a writ of certiorari of Cinergy Corporation et al.
(“Cinergy”).' We agree with petitioners that the decision of
the Seventh Circuit below, United States v. Cinergy, 458 F.3d
705 (7" Cir. 2006), squarely. conflicts with the decision of
the Fourth Circuit that 18 Whder review in Environmental
Defense, et al. v. Duke Energy Corp., No. 05-848 (argued
Nov. 1, 2006). Instead of granting certiorari at this time,
however, the Court should hold Cinergy’s petition in
abeyance until Duke Energy is decided.
Both cases involve the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency’s (“EPA”) interpretation of the definition of “major
modification” under the 1980 Prevention of Significant
Deterioration (“PSD”) regulations, 40 C.F.R. § 51.166(b)(2)(i).
The Seventh Circuit agreed with EPA and the State Respondents
that a “major modification” for purposes of the PSD regulations
occurs when a physical change at a polluting facility increases
actual annual emissions. See Cinergy, 458 F.3d at 708-10.
In contrast, the Fourth Circuit adopted the utility industry’s view
that a major modification occurs only if the physical change
increases the facility’s maximum hourly emissions rate.’
See Duke Energy Corp. v. Environmental Defense, 411 F.3d
539, 546-49 (4" Cir. 2005), cert. granted, 126 S.Ct. 2019 (2006).
1. The State Respondents are joined in this submission by
respondents Hoosier Environmental Council and Ohio Environmental
Council. |
2. In adopting a test based on the maximum hourly emissions
rate, the Fourth Circuit utilized the test required under regulations
governing a different regulatory program, the New Source
Performance Standards (“NSPS”). See 40 C.F.R. § 60.14.
2
In Duke Energy, petitioners Environmental Defense, ef
al., argue two separate grounds for reversing the Fourth
Circuit. First, they argue that the Fourth Circuit’s decision
intruded on the D.C. Circuit’s exclusive authority to review
final agency actions under the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 7607, and thus that the Fourth Circuit lacked jurisdiction
to decide the case as it did. See Petitioners’ Brief in
Environmental Defense v. Duke Energy Corp., No. 05-848,
at 26-38. Second, they contend that the Fourth Circuit erred
on the merits in reading the NSPS hourly emission test into
the PSD definition of a “major modification,” which requires
an increase in annual emissions, not hourly emissions. /d. at
38-50. If the Court reverses the Fourth Circuit’s decision on
either of these grounds, the conflict between the circuits
would no longer exist and Cinergy’s petition should be
denied. On the other hand, Cinergy’s petition should be
granted only if the Court rules in favor of Duke Energy on
both the jurisdictional and merits issues.
In support of its petition here, Cinergy argues that the
Fourth Circuit was correct and the Seventh Circuit incorrect
on the merits. As explained below, Cinergy is wrong. Indeed,
there is a document that was introduced below in Cinergy
that is not in the Duke record, showing that the utility industry
fully understood the meaning of the regulations at issue.
See discussion of Nickel Memorandum, infra at 7.
Accordingly, the Court should hold Cinergy’s petition in
abeyance pending its decision in Duke Energy and deny the
petition if it vacates the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Duke
Energy.
3
ARGUMENT
Cinergy Relies Erroneously On A Superseded
Regulation In Support Of Its Contention That The
NSPS Emissions Test Applies As A Threshold To
Determine Whether Its Renovation Projects
Constitute PSD “Major Modifications”
In its petition, Cinergy erroneously asserts that one must
first determine whether an NSPS “modification” has occurred
before reaching the question of whether a PSD “major
modification” has occurred. Petition at 3, 11-12. In support
of this proposition, Cinergy relies on 40 C.F.R. § 52.01(d),
which defines “modification” as “any physical change in, or
change in the method of operation of, a stationary source
which increases the emission rate of any pollutant.”
See Petition at 3, 11, 12; see also Duke Br., No. 05-848, at 6,
10, 23, 28 (making the same argument).
The Seventh Circuit correctly dismissed this argument
as “makeweight.” Cinergy, 458 F.3d at 711.° The term
3. The Seventh Circuit also ruled that EPA’s interpretation of the
phrase “major modification” as requiring examination of actual annual
emissions increases is supported by a “natural reading of the regulation.”
458 F.3d at 708; accord New York v. EPA, 413 F.3d 3, 15-16 (D.C. Cir.)
(PSD emissions test measures changes in “actual annual” emissions),
reh’'g denied, 431 F.3d 801 (2005); Wisconsin Electric Power Co. v.
Reilly (‘WEPCo”), 893 F.2d 901, 913, 915 (7" Cir. 1990) (regulations
for NSPS and PSD programs “measure[] emissions in a fundamentally
distinct manner,” with NSPS test “concerned primarily with ...
emissions rates, expressed in kilograms per hour” and PSD test
“concerned with changes in total annual emissions, expressed in tons
per year”); Puerto Rican Cement Co. v. EPA, 889 F.2d 292, 296-99 (1*
Cir. 1989) (PSD regulations triggered if annual emissions will increase
even if plant’s hourly rate of emissions will remain same). In Duke
Energy, without addressing the language of the PSD regulations, the
Fourth Circuit held that the PSD regulations “can” be interpreted
consistently with the maximum hourly emissions test set forth in NSPS
regulations. 411 F.3d at 549 n.7.
4
“modif “ »n” plays no role in defining the separate regulatory
term “major modification,” which has its own definition
predicated on a “physical change or change in the method of
operation,” 40 C.F.R. § 51.166(b)(2)(i), rather than on a
“modification.” * Even if somehow incorporated into the
definition of “major modification” under § 51.166(b)(2)(i), the
term “modification” under § 52.01(d) does not help petitioners
because it is defined in terms of an unspecified “increase [in]
emission rate,” not in terms of an hourly emission increase.°
Under PSD, the applicable “rate” is tons per year. 40 C.F.R.
§ 51.166(b)(21)(i), (11). The record shows, moreover, that the
regulation relied on by Cinergy (and Duke), § 52.01(d), was
replaced and superseded by a 1978 version of the PSD
regulations that, in tum, was abandoned in 1980 by promulgation
of the PSD regulations at issue here. See Alabama Power Co. v.
Costle, 636 F.2d 323, 348 n.24 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (referring to §
52.01 as “superseded”); Env tl Defense Fund, Inc. v. EPA, 898
F.2d 183, 184 n.: (D.C. Cir. 1990) (explaining history of PSD
regulations’ promulgation).°
4. See Alaskan Trojan Partnership v. Gutierrez, 425 F.3d 620,
631 (9% Cir. 2005) (giving effect to differences in regulatory definitions
of “catcher vessels and catcher/processor vessels” because regulations
“separately defin[ed] each term”); Matter of Esco Mfr. Co. v. Pritchard,
50 F.3d 315 (5" Cir. 1995) (definition of “plan administrator” unhelpful
in understanding separately defined term “plan sponsor”).
5. As part of its initial PSD regulations, EPA in 1974 interpreted
“modification” under § 52.01 to be “consistent with” the NSPS
regulatory definition of that term. 39 Fed. Reg. 42,510, 42,513/1 (Dec.
5, 1974). The NSPS definition in effect at that time, however, applied
simply to “increases [in] the amount of any air pollutant,” with no
reference to hourly emission rates. See 36 Fed. Reg. 15,704, 15,705/1
(Aug. 17, 1971); see also Duke Energy, 411 F.3d at 542.
6. That EPA makes no mention of § 52.01(d) in the preambles to
its 1980 and 1992 PSD regulations at issue here is further evidence of
the irrelevance of that provision. See 45 Fed. Reg. 52,676 (Aug. 7, 1980);
57 Fed. Reg. 32,314 (July 21, 1992).
5
Even if the § 52.01(d) definition of “modification” is to be
grafted onto the governing definition of “major modification,”
an affirmance in Duke Energy would not necessarily require
the reversal of the Seventh Circuit’s decision at issue here
because the governing PSD requirements in any given state are
determined by that state’s implementation plan (“SIP’’), rather
than the federal regulations. In Ohio and Indiana, the states where
Cinergy’s plants at issue are located, the PSD regulations that
were approved by EPA, see 40 C.F.R. §§ 52.793, 52.884, do
not include the § 52.01 definition. Instead, only the definition
of “major modification” under 40 C.F.R. § 52.21 (which is
identical, in relevant part, to § 51.166) was incorporated into
those states’ SIPs and is applicable here. See 46 Fed. Reg. 9,580/
3, 9583/3 (Jan. 29, 1981).’
Il. Cinergy’s Claim That The Utility Industry Long
Understood The PSD Regulations To Provide A
Maximum Hourly Emissions Rate Test Is Refuted By
The Record
Cinergy also premises its Petition on the unsupported claim
that “at the time these projects occurred, no one at Cinergy
believed that they triggered NSR.” Pet. at 4; see also Duke Br.
in No. 05-848 at 16-19. Cinergy’s contention echoes Duke’s
claim at oral argument that:
[I]t is very clear that the understanding of everyone
in the industry . . . from 1980, candidly well beyond
7. In contrast, Duke’s counsel appeared to argue that South
Carolina’s PSD regulations do incorporate the § 52.01 definition,
Transcript of Oral Argument in No. 05-848, at 27-28, =Ithough
counsel did not cite to the record in support of this proposition.
In fact, the PSD preconstruction requirements under South Carolina’s
regulations, which were approved by EPA, are applicable only
to “the major modification of any existing major stationary
source.” See S.C. Code Regs. 61-62.5, Std. 7(a)(2)(ii). The term
“modification” is not separately defined in South Carolina’s PSD
regulations.
6
1988 all the way up tq 1999, was that the regulations
didn’t apply under any circumstances in the absence
of an increase the capacity ... [a]nd you had to
demonstrate that there would be an increase in the
hourly rate of emissions.
See Transcript of Oral Argument in No. 05-848 at 25-26
(emphasis added).
This contention is contradicted by a multitude of
historical documents, showing that industry long understood
the 1980 PSD regulations the same way EPA does. In a 1981
brief filed in their original challenge to the 1980 PSD
regulations, for example, industry petitioners interpreted the
regulations in the same manner as EPA does here, stating
that (i) the regulations “provide that a modification occurs
whenever a series of contemporaneous changes at a source
result in a significant increase in actual emissions, even
though the source’s net capacity to emit remains constant or
declines,” and (ii) the “question of whether there is a net
increase in actual emissions requires that variations in the
source’s hours and rates of operation be taken into account.”
See Brief for Industry Petitioners in Chemical Mfg. Ass’n v.
EPA, No. 79-1112 (D.C. Cir.), dated Feb. 12, 1981, pp. 5-6,
28-29 (filed with Court in Duke Energy). A settlement
agreement entered into by EPA and industrial polluters,
including Cinergy and Duke, to resolve that regulatory
challenge required EPA to propose changing the PSD
emissions test to allow emissions increases to be based on a
“source’s potential to emit (as calculated in terms of pounds
of pollutant emitted per hour).” See Exhibit B to Settlement
Agreement, executed on Feb. 22, 1982, in Chemical Mfg.
Ass'n v. EPA, No. 79-1112 (D.C. Cir.), at p. 1. This proposal
7
——
would have been unnecessary had the PSD regulations already
provided an hourly potential emissions test.
Moreover, additional documents show that the utility
industry long understood EPA’s assertion that the PSD and NSPS
emissions tests are separate and different. For example, a
publicly-available document prepared by a utility industry
representative establishes that industry fully understood that the
§ 52.01 definition of “modification” is inapplicable to PSD. In
a July 29, 1988 memorandum, Henry V. Nickel — counsel for
the Utility Air Regulatory Group (“UARG”) and Duke’s co-
counsel in Duke Energy — acknowledges that § 52.01(d) is
irrelevant to PSD applicability: “[I]n adding the more specific
‘major modification’ definition to § 52.21, EPA made clear that
it, and not the general definition in 40 C.F.R. § 52.01(d), applies to
the PSD program.” See Dist. Ct. Doc. No. 587, Ex. 8, at 38 n. 77.?
8. At various times since 1981, EPA considered industry’s
proposal to change the PSD emission test to one based on increases in
maximum hourly emissions, but ultimately rejected that approach in
1996. See, e.g.,61 Fed. Reg. 38, 250, 38,269/2 (July 23, 1996) (rejecting
adoption of maximum hourly emissions test based on concern that such
a test would allow a source “owner to use the [operating unit] at much
higher levels (e.g., more hours per day or week) than it had in the past”
and thus “increase [] utilization even though hourly potential emissions
remain the same”).
9. The Nickel memorandum was attached initially to a letter
written by the Wisconsin Electric Power Company (“WEPCO”) to EPA
in the context of EPA’s determination that WEPCO’s life extension
projects constituted “major modifications” and triggered the PSD pre-
construction requirements. See Wisconsin Electric Power Co. v. Reilly,
893 F.2d 901 (7" Cir. 1990). The memorandum was also included as
part of the publicly available rulemaking docket associated with EPA’s
1992 PSD regulations, 57 Fed. Reg. 32,314 (July 21, 1992). In the district
court below, plaintiffs here filed the memorandum under seal as part of
their Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the Legal Standard for
the Routine Maintenance, Repair and Replacement Exclusion, dated
Sept. 12, 2005. Because the document is publicly available, it should
not have been filed under seal.
8
Consistent with this position, UARG recognized, in a June
5, 1989 letter to the Department of Energy, that EPA requires
PSD review even for physical changes that “will not increase
the [hourly] emission rate of the units.” Dist. Ct. Doc. No.
295, Ex. 38, at 8-9. See also UARG Amicus Brief in WEPCo,
dated May 22, 1989 (Dist. Ct. Doc. No. 295, Ex. 28, at 9)
(acknowledging that EPA reads PSD requirements to “apply
even where the project merely improved the availability and
reliability of the facility, and was not needed to restore lost
capacity”). These admissions, like the others in the Duke
Energy record discussed in the briefs of petitioners in that
case,'° cannot be reconciled with Cinergy’s litigation position
in this case.
The utility industry’s understanding that the PSD
requirements apply to projects that do not increase hourly
emissions rates is consistent with repeated statements by EPA
over the last two decades that the PSD regulations do not
include or incorporate an NSPS-like maximum hourly rate
test. In adopting the 1980 PSD regulations, EPA specified
that a source could increase hours of operation “to take
advantage of favorable market conditions” without triggering
PSD but not if such increase was associated with
“construction activity.” 45 Fed. Reg. at 52,704/2; see also
WEPCo, 893 F.2d at 916 n.11 (same). In adopting changes
to its PSD regulations in 1992, EPA again explained that the
different emissions tests under the PSD and NSPS regulations
“reflect[] the fundamental distinctions between the
technology-based provisions of NSPS and the air quality-
10. For example, a 1991 Duke compliance manual states flatly
that PSD is based on increases in “annual emissions” and can be
triggered if a project causes a unit to be “operated more frequently.”
See United States Reply Br. in No. 05-848 at 14, n. 11.
9
based provisions of NSR.” 57 Fed. Reg. at 32,316/1."'
Making no mention of § 52.01(d), EPA reiterated that an
“increase in emissions attributable to an increase in hours of
operation or production rate which is the result of a
construction-related activity is not excluded from review.”
Id. at 32, 328/1."* Accordingly, the claim made by Cinergy
(and by Duke) that the electric utility industry did not
understand the PSD regulations to mandate an actual annual
emissions test is unsupported by the factual record.
11. The PSD provisions, properly construed, provide assurance
that industrial facilities will not, by expanding operations and thus
emissions, undermine the states’ efforts to prevent air quality from
deteriorating. In furtherance of this goal, the PSD regulations
consider real-world pollution impacts of refurbishment projects on
air quality: if a unit actually pollutes more as a result of a project,
the unit must install pollution controls. The maximum hourly
emissions test that Cinergy (and Duke) urges would have the opposite
effect. It would allow power plant renovation projects that are
intended to increase the number of hours a facility may operate,
with consequent increases in annual emissions, to evade review under
a statute that is intended to address “any physical change” that may
cause deterioration of air quality. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7411(a)(4),
7475(a)(3), 7479(2)(C).
12. Similarly, the record in this case includes a September 9,
1988 applicability determination regarding the WEPCO Life
Extension Project in which EPA made clear that, for PSD purposes,
“{t}he fact that [a] project is intended to restore the plant’s original
design capacity is irrelevant to” calculating emissions increases and
that “increase[s] [in] production rate or hours of operation [that] are
inextricably intertwined with the physical changes” may be
considered in such a calculation. Appellants’ Supp. App. 292-93.
10
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the Court should hold Cinergy’s petition
in abeyance pending a decision in Duke Energy, No. 05-848.
Respectfully submitted,
ANDREW M. Cuomo
Attorney General of the
State of New York
ROBERT ROSENTHAL BARBARA D. UNDERWOOD*
J. JARED SNYDER Solicitor General
Assistant Attorneys General DANIEL SMIRLOCK
Deputy Solicitor General
ANDREW D. BING
Assistant Solicitor General
120 Broadway
New York, NY 10271
* Counsel of Record (212) 416-8016
1]
STUART RABNER
Attorney General of the
State of New Jersey
Maurice A. GRIFFIN
Deputy Attorney General
R.J. Hughes Justice Complex
25 Market Place, P.O. Box 080
Trenton, NJ 08625
(609) 292-6945
RICHARD BLUMENTHAL
Attorney General of the
State of Connecticut
KIMBERLY P. MASSICOTTE
CARMEL MOTHERWAY
Assistant Attorneys General
55 Elm Street, P.O. Box 120
Hartford, CT 06141-0120
(860) 808-5250
JONATHAN F. LEwis
Attorney for Hoosier
Environmental Council and
Ohio Environmental Council
CLEAN AiR TASK FORCE
ATTORNEY FOR CITIZENS GROUPS
18 Tremont Street, Suite 530
Boston, MA 02108
(617) 624-0234
Attorneys for Respondents
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.