Petition for Writ of Certiorari — United States Forest Service v. Earth Island Institute, 127 S. Ct. 1829 (2007) (No. 06-797)

Supreme Court brief2007

Ask Donna

What actually matters in this document.

Text

auras Coe, U.S.

fo

|,

06-7975EC 8 - 2006

No. OFFICE OF THE CLERK

In the Supreme Court of the Gnited States

UNITED STATES FOREST SERVICE, ET AL.,

PETITIONERS

Uv.

EARTH ISLAND INSTITUTE, ET AL.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

PAUL D. CLEMENT

Solicitor General

Counsel of Record

SUE ELLEN WOOLDRIDGE

Assistant Attorney General

EDWIN S. KNEEDLER

Deputy Solicitor Genera

JONATHAN L. MARCUS

Assistant to the Solicitor

General

RONALD M. SPRITZER

Attorney

Department of Justice

Washington, D.C. 20530-0001

(202) 514-2217

QUESTION PRESENTED

In this action under the Administrative Procedure Act,

respondents challenge two projects adopted by the Forest

Service to restore portions of the Eldorado National Forest

that were severely damaged by fire. The court of appeals

ordered entry of a preliminary injunction barring the Forest

Service from proceeding with those projects.

The question presented is whether the court of appeals

erred in ordering a preliminary injunction, including by:

a. Relying on declarations filed by respondents in the

district court, rather than confining its review to the

administrative record, in determining that respondents had

shown a likelihood of success on the merits;

b. Holding that respondents could satisfy the “irreparable

injury” prong of the test for obtaining a preliminary

injunction by showing only a “possibility” of such injury; and

c. Discounting competing interests in the use of Forest

lands under multiple use principles, and the Forest Service’s

balance of those competing uses, in weighing the balance of

harms and the public interest.

(I)

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS

Petitioners are: Dale Bosworth, Chief of the United

States Forest Service; Ramiro Villalvazo, Forest Supervisor

for the Eldorado National Forest; and the United States For-

est Service, an agency of the United States Department of

Agriculture.

Respondents who were Plaintiffs-Appellants below are:

Earth Island Institute, a California non-profit organization;

and the Center for Biological Diversity, a non-profit organiza-

tion.

Respondent who was the Defendant-Intervenor-Appellee

below is: Sierra Pacific Industries, Inc (SPI).

(II)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Cpe DOI 6 oc.no5.00 i vakceversantesticsusaadves anwe

POOR. 3 6h. kkd te is eisieteteir tee 1

Statutory provisions involved .............0cccececeeeees 2

IE ss oo 5 5.0.45 0 kaos bes hake cknd enka 2

A. The statutory framework ..................e00e- 3

B. The facts and proceedings below ................. 5

Reasons for granting the petition ..................0005- 13

I. The Ninth Circuit erred with respect to each of the

four factors to be considered in ruling on a motion

for a preliminary injunction .............ccccseoces 14

A. Likelihood of suecess on the merits .............. 14

D. SUR INS, oik.sw keene Sooke bata eiesee ca ees 19

C. Balance of harms and the public interest ......... 26

II. Review by this Court is warranted .................. 29

PSN Cer er rey Mi rier mes 30

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

Able v. United States, 44 F.3d 128 (2d Cir. 1995) ....... 23

Adams v. Freedom Forge Corp., 204 F.3d 475 (3d Cir.

AlliedSignal, Ivc. v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 183 F.3d 568

CURIE EE kk vascdexeeebanaacsterseeu 22

American Biosci., Inc. v. Thompson, 243 F.3d 579

” GEE Se 56 65a oko enc eumnaenes 15

American Coke & Coal Chems. Inst. v. EPA, 452 F.3d

Ss CAs Ek cbadhveccendtesnseceeeseaee 17

Amoco Prod. Co. v. Village of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531

SEUNG ik cdskcdeuvcscedvedvucescanvusuerenten 21, 26

IV

Cases—Continued: Page

Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656 (2004) ..........0000. 20

Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Coalition

for Econ. Equity, 950 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir. 1991),

cert. denied, 503 U.S. 985 (1992) ............00000. 20,

Association of Pac. Fisheries v. EPA, 615 F.2d 794

Se Git EE es bc ck was enmaeeeeun a scaeee-oue dos 17

Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. NRDC, 462 U.S. 87

SR er here arene Pye arene ream 4

Beacon Theaters, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500

ES fre oes ee ecuurccdueuelu iiss ese sau nee hes 20

Beltran v. Smith, 458 U.S. 1303 (1982) ............... 21

Big Country Foods, Inc. v. Board of Educ., 868 F.2d

Pe A xcs cn cbkeedsuenseaeeesssee tes 20

Blackwelder Furniture Co. v. Seilig Mfg. Co., 550

Fe A UTED Bice ce van saves ndene neues 22

Borey v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 934 F.2d 30

NE ae Get es odbc oe ste vanenens dete 22

Brown v. Chote, 411 U.S. 452 (1973) ...........-ee00-- 28

Camp v. Pitie, 411 US. 198 (1973)... cece cc eee. 15, 16

Caribbean Marine Servs. Co. v. Baldrige, 844 F.2d

Se CUE ecb cbsecsduecsararsearioebiwen 24

Center for Biological Diversity v. United States Fish

& Wildlife Serv., 450 F.3d 930 (9th Cir. 2006) ....... 17

Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401

ik Ee | ery ee er ree rrr eer ry ere 15, 16, 17

Clear Channel Outdoor Inc. v. City of Los Angeles,

BOD Fe BIO Cl. FOU) oc cc cccecverecvcesess 19

Commercial Drapery Contractors, Inc. v. United

States, 133 F' 3d 1 (D.C. Civ. 1089) 2... cc ccccccccces 17

Cases—Continued: Page

Custer County Action Ass’n v. Garvey, 256 F.3d 1024

to ot es eer rer re ‘ea dheesaceecayeeries 18

DOT v. Public Citizen, 541 U.S. 752 (2004) ......... 15, 18

Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922 (1975) ... 20, 22, 28

Earth Island Inst. v. United States Forest Serv., 351

Fee Ce CE CA UD kine dh dddebeeneeseeedads 20

eBay Inc. v. MercExch., L.L.C., 1268S. Ct. 1837

NE a duh bud dns cvkae ne ek eee 21, 28

Florida Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729

Ep errer er ere ren te rer Tree reer y 15

Forest City Daly Housing, Inc. v. Town of

N. Hempstead, 175 F.3d 144 (2d Cir. 1999) ......... 23

FPC v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 423

Cee OED 35 65 ddR ea hove ected ti eereleee 14

Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. 167

CY hte 6505 40S beweso vas ke eee eeeieaes 23, 24

Fund for Animals v. Frizzell, 530 F.2d 982 (D.C. Cir.

EE aes ose ces eve dab dds are eee 25

Globe Nuclear Servs. & Supply GNSS, Ltd. v. AO

Techsnabexport, 376 F.3d 282 (4th Cir. 2004) ....... 22

Greater Yellowstone Coal. v. Flowers, 321 F.3d 1250

Gk DN eg see rma 22, 23

Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo S.A. v. Alliance Bond

Fund, Fe, Bt UB. CBG kt cceecieveucvncess 20

Idaho Sporting Cong. v. Alexander, 222 F.3d 562 (9th

Ra Se oso xv bre ren icekess a eereuuaieons 20

INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478 (1992) ......... 4,15

VI

Cases—Continued: Page

Kootenai Tribe v. Veneman, 313 F.3d 1094 (9th Cir.

EE coh Dna hn Ceaan gees Uhadee be ba eet OC eee 20

Los Angeles Mem Coliseum Comm’n v. NFL, 634

ee ee ED vb oko bccdeabnoendseecums 19

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) .... 24

Marsh v. Oregon Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360

SY SaUh eis oud i aoe erak Meee aes beewewneress es 3

Matos ex rel. Matos v. Clinton Sch. Dist., 367 F.3d 68

SE EL EE» Gb.s bea &00s0 bend cheered ts carsovens 22

Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968 (1997) ........... 20

Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto.

PR: Ba Se GP EE nn wan bho deus a ehoesaes 14

National Audubon Soc’y v. Hoffman, 132 F.3d 7 (2d -

SUE cus cena aa dada ves uccnasasesaeeeeeuruee 18

Newton County Wildlife Ass’n v. Rogers, 141 F.3d

SM MEE, base Gdn sa Vedeneesahaskccaveess 17

NLRB v. Columbian Enameting & Stamping Co.,

ee ED once sd deca d os viwebnanavesaeuses 4

Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542

ok | ay Seen rr peter ee 18, 26

NVE, Inc. v. Department of Health & Human Servs.,

Poe te SD rr ere 17

Oakland Tribune, Inc. v. Chronicle Publ’g Co., 762

Fe tte GR CW. IGGD) ... c ccwcccsccvecsevecess 8, 20

Ohio Forestry Ass'n v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726

DE -. cur Oecccueuencas headbee ce eeunedeueawen 3, 4

Rum Creek Coal Sales, Inc. v. Caperton, 926 F.2d 353

EE OEE: SNe cakes kien dese pleeeert 22, 23

Cases—Continued: Page

Rushia v. Town of Ashburnham, 701 F.2d 7 (1st Cir.

SE 6a vevbewdsnededacsavedecwerntstustierineses 22

Sammartano v. First Judicial Dist. Court, 303 F.3d

Ce = bes orcaksscdeveesensesvactease 20

Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61 (1974) .............. 20

Siegel v. LePore, 234 F.3d 1163 (11th Cir. 2000) ....... 22

Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972) ............ 24

Simula, Inc. v. Autoliv, Inc., 175 F.3d 716 (9th Cir.

NE Pm ne Dene se ep eee ee BE oe Teer oe 20

Southwest Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. USFS, 100

POG L668 GU Clr. TOGR) occ cece sccesccccess 11, 15, 17

Stuhlbarg Int'l Sales Co. v. John D. Brush & Co., 240

Pe ER EE) idee vik wancewisecesiensius 8

United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409 (1941) ......... 15

Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC,

SE Cy HT nh knw bebe seks sens ckevectas .. 3, 15

Village of Gambell v. Hodel, 774 F.2d 1414 (9th Cir.

1986) ...... ABER EUR ge yee GAD seve ORION epee ery Fim cy 21

Virginia Petroleum Jobbers Ass’n v. FPC, 259 F.2d

BR CIE ce tscccudétewecsousde deine aseneeeene 20

Virginia Ry. Co. v. System Fed’n No. 40, 300 U.S. 515

GRE. ckwscsisensenaccokvuuabecacraeneeesan eas 26

Voyageurs Nat'l Park Ass’n v. Norton, 381 F.3d 759

SR is EE wk swede veccenercesuwdcaseeanies 17

Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305 (1982) .... 20

Constitution, statutes and regulation:

te FF Ore re ere Tere Troe 24

Vill

Statutes and re, *. ion—Continued: Page

Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 501 et seq. ...... 2

DIR PE oar o dos ¥neoindek ia bance 2

PEG PES oh: 0d00ba0d0 sensi ornt eee 4

Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. 531 et seg. .. 24

SEL. SO. sao avcksacesartenneoeitees 25

National Environmental Policy Act of 1969,

SEU. Mee MEO. o k.p cca insndscdciseeuaesiaes 3

42 U.S.C. 4832(2)(C) (§ 102(2)(c)) ............6-- 3

National Forest Management Act.of 1976, 16 U.S.C.

UO vid vec cncdacevevesiecniieeiweenee 3

MURS. MD i siscisrsriees eas 28

MUS, BS skein 4

SB ch Ce dacvcs esthetic nee 4

USL: SOM on disacesscass eee 4

16 UBC. TORRE | oc deca convceudes caaces 28

UBL. BN oss bares 28

SU ULB TE bkkdecssssnccans eee ee 27

Rte Se rere rs perry erry 28

WOT, Ge okecaitns shea ee ee 28

SEUSS. COGS visdesccvsecuesteneeies eueunrne 4

BUSBG SE vccssckikicvensiteatineeeeeeee 28

RECT RGR castor iaeeeeeeee 4

Miscellaneous:

70 Fed. Reg. 35,607 (June 21, 2005) .................. 25

71 Fed. Reg. 29,886 (May 24, 2006) .................. 25

In the Supreme Court of the Gnited States

No.

UNITED STATES FOREST SERVICE, ET AL.,

PETITIONERS

Vv.

EARTH ISLAND INSTITUTE, ET AL.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

The Solicitor General, on behalf of the United States Forest

Service and the other federal parties, respectfully petitions for

a writ of certiorari to review the judgment of the United States

Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in this case.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals (App. 1a-58a) is re-

ported at 442 F.3d 1147. The opinion of the district court

(App. 63a-78a) is unreported.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on

March 24, 2006. A petition for rehearing was denied on July

12, 2006 (App. 146a-147a). On September 30, 2006, Justice

Kennedy extended the time within which to file a petition for

a writ of certiorari to and including November 9, 2006. On

October 31, 2006, Justice Kennedy further extended the time

(1)

2

to December 8, 2006. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked

under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).

STATUTORY PROVISION INVOLVED

Section 706 of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)

provides, in relevant part:

To the extent necessary to decision and when presented,

the reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of

law[.] * * * The reviewing court shall—

* * kK *

(2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings,

and conclusions found to be—

(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or

otherwise not in accordance with law[.]

* * * F *

In making the foregoing determinations, the court shall

review the whole record or those parts of it cited by a

party[.]

5 U.S.C. 706.

STATEMENT

_ In this action under the Administrative Procedure Act

(APA), 5 U.S.C. 501 et seg., the Ninth Circuit ordered the

district court to enter a preliminary injunction barring the

United States Forest Service (Forest Service) from further

implementation of two projects in the Eldorado National For-

est in California. Those projects were adopted by the Forest

Service to address deteriorating conditions in the aftermath

of serious fires in the Forest and to restore the burned areas.

The court of appeals erred with respect to all four of the fac-

tors bearing on the propriety of a preliminary injunction. Of

particular concern, it applied a watered-down standard of

3

irreparable injury—allowing the mere “possibility” of irrepa-

rable injury to suffice—and erred in evaluating the likelihood

of success on the merits on the basis of declarations filed in

court rather than the administrative record. The Court

should grant review in this case to restore the proper frame-

work for evaluating applications for preliminary injunctions

in cases under the APA.

A. The Statutory Framework

The two forest projects respondents challenge in this case

are subject to the requirements of the National Environmen-

tal Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4821 et seg., and the

National Forest Management Act of 1976 (NFMA), 16 U.S.C.

1600 et seq. °

1. NEPA. NEPA mandates the procedure by which agen-

cies must consider the environmental impacts of their actions,

- but it does not dictate substantive results. Marsh v. Oregon

Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 371 (1989). Section

102(2)(C) of NEPA requires federal agencies to: :

include in every recommendation or report on * * * ma-

jor Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of

the human environment, a detailed statement by the re-

sponsible official on—

(i) the environmental! impact of the proposed action.

42 U.S.C. 4332(2)(c)(i). NEPA is designed to “insure a fully

informed and well-considered decision, not necessarily a deci-

sion the judges of the Court of Appeals or of this Court would

have reached had they been members of the decisionmaking

unit of the agency.” Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v.

NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978).

2. NFMA. NFMA governs the Forest Service’s manage-

ment of the National Forest System. See generally Ohio For-

estry Ass’n v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726, 728 (1998). NFMA

directs the Forest Service to develop a land and resource

4

management plan (forest plan) for each unit of the System to

provide for multiple uses and sustained yield of the various

forest resources, including timber and wildlife. See 16 U.S.C.

1604(a) and (e); see also 16 U.S.C. 528-531 (requiring Forest

Service to administer renewable resources of National For-

ests for multiple use and sustained yield). A forest plan is a

broad, long-term programmatic planning document that es-

tablishes goals and objectives for units of the National Forest

System, ensuring consideration of economic as well as envi-

ronmental factors. 16 U.S.C. 1604(g)(1)-(3); 36 C.F.R. 219.1;

see Ohio Forestry, 523 U.S. at 729-730. Where the forest plan

also establishes specific limitations or rules for site-specific

projects, 21 individual proposed project may proceed only if

it is consistent with such provisions. See 16 U.S.C. 1604(i);

Ohio Forestry, 523 U.S. at 730.

3. APA. Judicial review of a Forest Service decision ap-

proving a project is governed by the APA, under which review

is limited to the administrative record and a court may set

aside final agency action if it is “arbitrary, capricious, an

abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.”

5 U.S.C. 706(2)(A). A reviewing court’s inquiry is limited to

whether the agency “considered the relevant factors and ar-

ticulated a rational connection between the facts found and

the choice made.” Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. NRDC, 462

U.S. 87, 105 (1983). Factual determinations may be reviewed

only to determine whether they are supported by substantial

evidence. Such a determination by the agency must be upheld

unless no reasonable fact-finder could have reached that con-

clusion based on the evidence in the administrative record,

and the evidence is sufficient to sustain the agency’s decision

if, in a case to be tried to a jury, it would be sufficient to allow

the court to refuse to direct a verdict. INS v. Elias-Zacarias,

502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992); NLRB v. Columbian Enameling &

Stamping Co., 306 U.S. 292, 300 (1939).

5

B. The Facts And Proceedings Below

1. In October 2004, a fire known as the Power Fire con-

sumed more than 14,000 acres of the Eldorado National For-

est. Approximately 48% of that area burned with high inten-

sity, killing between 75 and 100 percent of the trees and incin-

erating duff and natural litter protecting the soils. App. 64a.

Less than ten days later, another fire, known as the Freds

Fire, burned 4600 acres in the Forest, 2600 of which burned

with high intensity. /bid.

The Forest Service designed a project for each of the

burned areas “to restore portions of the fire-ravaged land-

scape.” App. 65a. The Forest Service identified four goals in

that regard: (1) to reduce long-term fuel loading (the presence

of combustible material) in order to reduce future fire sever-

ity and resistance to control; (2) to improve road drainage and

establish effective ground cover in severely burned areas to

alleviate erosion and sedimentation to streams; (3) to remove

certain dead trees while they retain economic value; and (4)

to reduce safety hazards to the public and forest workers

from trees falling in the future. Jbid.; see id. at 8la-84a,

115a-120a (Forest Service Records of Decision).

The Forest Service issued Final Environmental Impact.

Statements (FEISs) for each of the projects on July 1, 2005.

App. 65a. The Forest Service issued its Records of Decision

(RODs) for the projects on August 1, 2005. The Power project

permitted timber harvesting on 5574 acres in the area burned

in the Power Fire, and contemplated harvesting of an addi-

tional 2600 acres depending on ultimate tree mortality. The

Freds project allowed timber cutting on 2900 acres in the area

burned by the Freds Fire. /d. at 65a-66a.

The projects included mitigation measures designed to

minimize environmental effects. App. 65a. For example, the

projects provided for “snag (dead tree) retention areas of

various sizes, create[d] no harvest zones along perrenial

streams, and call{ed] for the preservation of additional dead

6

trees in other harvest areas of various dimensions and config-

urations in order to accommodate wildlife dependent on such

habitat.” Jbid. In addition, “[t|ree harvest would be accom-

plished using skyline and helicopter methods on steeper

slopes to minimize soil impacts, and slash (debris) from har-

vesting operations would be treated, so as to ensure accept-

able fuel loading levels while, at the same time, creating

ground cover as needed to reduce erosion.” Jbid.

Because the timber to be harvested was deteriorating and

its value declining rapidly, the Forest Service also issued

emergency situation determinations, which allowed the pro-

jects to be implemented immediately without administrative

appeals. App. 66a.

2. a. Respondents Earth Island Institute and the Center

for Biological Diversity filed this action under the APA on

August 11, 2005, challenging the Power and F reds projects on

several grounds. In their Amended Complaint (Compl.),

Earth Island Institute asserted a general interest in protect-

ing “all federal public forest lands from commercial exploita-

tion,” and that it is “a membership organization with over

15,000 members in the U.S., over 3,000 of whom use and enjoy

the National Forests of California for recreational, educa-

tional, aesthetic, spiritual and other purposes.” Compl.

para. 8. Earth Island alleged that it had recently appealed

numerous timber sales in the Pacific Northwest and Sierra

Nevada, and that it and its members participated in govern-

mental decisionmaking processes concerning National For-

ests. bid. The Center for Biological Diversity alleged that

it is concerned with “the preservation, protection, and resto-

ration of biological diversity, native species and ecosystems in

the Western United States and elsewhere.” /d. para.9. The

complaint contained general allegations that the interests of

both organizations and their members “will be irreparably

harmed if the defendants continue to violate NEPA and

NFMA,” 2d. paras 8, 9, but did not describe how (or even al-

lege that) any of their members would be injured specifically

7

by the measures to be undertaken in the Freds and Power

projects.

b. On August 16, 2005, respondents (collectively Earth

Island) moved for a temporary restraining order and prelimi-

nary injunction to prevent further implementation of the pro-

jects. Earth Island argued, inter alia, that the Forest Service

_(1) used faulty methodology in developing its guidelines for

projecting tree mortality, which were used to determine

which burnt trees would be-cut; (2) ignored adverse impacts

of the projects on the California Spotted Owl (CASPO); and

(3) failed to compile sufficient population data for certain so-

called Management Indicator Species (MIS) of birds identi-

fied in the applicable forest plan. App. 66a. In making those

arguments, Earth Island relied upon expert declarations gen-

erated specifically for use in court. /d. at 22a, 34a, 39a, 68a.

The declarations themselves totaled 45 pages, with dozens

of additional pages of exhibits. Earth Island did not provide

the declarations to the Forest Service during the comment

period on the FEISs.' Like their complaint, respondents’

' motion did not identify any of their members who would visit

the burned areas or how any such members would personally

be injured by the two projects.

On August 18, 2005, the district court entered a temporary

restraining order that prohibited further timber harvesting

while the district court considered Earth Island’s request for

' A Notice of Availability of the Draft EIS for the Power project was

published in the Federal Register on March 25, 2005. The comment period

closed on May 9, 2005. App. 97a. The Forest Service provided the same time

period for comment on the Freds Draft EIS. Both the Center for Biological

Diversity and the John Muir Project (described as a project of Earth Island,

see Compl., para. 8) submitted comments on the draft EISs, including

comments from experts criticizing the tree mortality guidelines and the Forest

Service's mitigation measures for bird species. During the litigation, however,

Earth Island did not rely on the comment letters, but instead submitted new

declarations that were not part of the administrative record.

8

a preliminary injunction. On August 25, 2005, the district

court denied the motion for a preliminary injunction. App.

§3a-78a. Invoking Ninth Circuit standards, the district court

stated that, in order to obtain a preliminary injunction, “a

party must demonstrate either: 1) a combination of probable

success on the merits and the possibility of irreparable injury;

or 2) that serious questions are raised and the balance of

hardships tips sharply in [its] favor.” Jd. at 67a (citing

Stuhlbarg Int'l Sales Co. v. John D. Brush & Co., 240 F.3d

832, 839-840 (9th Cir. 2001)). The district court noted that

those two alternatives represent two points on a sliding scale,

“pursuant to which the required degree of irreparable harm

increases or decreases in inverse correlation to the probabil-

ity of success on the merits.” /bid. (citations omitted). The

district court further explained, however, that “[u|nder any

formulation of the test, plaintiff must demonstrate that there

exists a significant threat of irreparable injury.” /b:d. (citing

Oakland Tribune, Inc. v. Chronicle Publ’g Co., 762 F.2d 1374

(9th Cir. 1985)).

i. Applying that test, the district court first concluded

that Earth Island had not demonstrated a probability of suc-

cess with respect to any of its claims that the projects violated

NEPA and NFMA, reviewing the agency decisions under the

APA’s arbitrary and capricious standard. App. 68a-77a.” De-

ferring to the opinions of the Forest Service’s experts, the

court concluded that Earth Island had not made that showing

in its challenges to the Forest Service’s tree mortality guide-

lines. Jd. at 69a-71a. The court explained that examination of

the FEISs “shows that the Forest Service identified the

methodologies it used in reaching conclusions in these areas,

provided supporting data for those conclusions, and cited the

* The district court did not specifically address the Forest Service's

objection to respondents’ reliance on the declarations filed for the first time in

court.

9

scientific literature relied upon for said conclusions.” /d. at

69a.

The district court also ruled that Earth Island was un-

likely to sueceed on its claim that the Forest Service violated

NFMaA by failing adequately to monitor populations of three

species—the hairy woodpecker (HAW), black-backed wood-

pecker (BBW), and Williamson’s sapsucker (WSS). The dis-

trict court accepted Earth Island’s contention that Appendix

E to the FEIS for the 2001 Sierra Nevada Forest Plan

Amendment (SNFPA)—a special framework applicable to

several forest plans —requires some level of population moni-

toring for two of the species, the HAW and the WSS. App.

7la-72a. But it noted that the SNFPA expressly contem-

plated varying levels of monitoring and “may consequently be

read as envisioning a lower level of monitoring, and some flex-

ibility,” for species identified in the SNF PA as being of “low”

vulnerability, such as the HAW and WSS. /d. at 72a. The

court concluded that the Forest Service had obtained suffi-

cient information on those species from a Breeding Bird Sur-

vey. Id. at 70a-74a.

The district court further determined that, even assuming

some monitoring violation had occurred, Earth Island had

failed to show irreparable harm. The court explained:

[E]ven if the Power and Freds projects proceed without

proper population monitoring for the two woodpecker

species at issue, that does not necessarily mean that any

immediate and irreparable injury will occur in the absence

of that monitoring. Any preference by those birds for

severely burned habitat may be more than satisfied by the

untreated/unharvested portions of the project areas,

which total some 36 percent for Freds and 40 percent for

Power. Additionally, even within areas to be harvested

some snags will be retained, and acreage for cavity-nest-

ing habitat is set aside in both projects * * *.

10

App. 74a (footnote omitted).

Finally, the court concluded that Earth Island had not

shown a likelihood of success with respect to possible impacts

on the CASPO. App. 75a-77a. The court noted that each of

the fire areas contained designated protected activity centers

(PAC) for the owls, but that it appeared undisputed that much

of the area occupied by those PACs was severely burned.

“Nonetheless,” the court explained, “in an effort to accommo-

date the needs of the CASPO, the [Forest Service] not only

retained as much suitable owl habitat that remained within

the project area, but also attempted to retain many of the

previously constituted PACs by including some burned habi-

tat.” Jd. at 75a. The court also pointed out that the Forest

Service had demonstrated that “prevailing scientific evidence

supports the notion that preferred spotted owl habitat entails

two canopy layers and between 40 and 70 percent canopy

cover, depending on whether the use in question is for nesting

or foraging,” id. at 76a—features that typically would not be

present in burned areas. Although Earth Island pointed to a

study indicating that spotted owls in southwestern Oregon

had spent a significant amount of time roosting and foraging

in burned areas, id. at 75a, the court noted that both FEISs

explained why that study was “preliminary and not dispositive

as to suitability,” 7d. at 76a.

ii. The district court further concluded that “(elven if

[respondents] were successful in demonstrating some envi-

ronmental harm, in balancing the relative hardships there is

no presumption that environmental harm should outweigh

other potential harm to the public interest.” App. 77a. Here,

the court observed, the projects serve important public inter-

ests, including protecting the Forest and its surrounding com-

munities from the threat of future devastating fires, protect-

ing forest workers and the public from the danger of falling

trees, and generating funds for future reforestation. Jd. at

+

77a-78a. The court thus concluded that the balance of hard-

ships did not tip sharply in Earth Island’s favor. /d. at 77a.

3. a. On March 24, 2006, the court of appeals reversed the

district court and directed it to issue a preliminary injunction.

App. la-58a. The court first determined that Earth Island’s

challenges to the projects were not moot, despite the substan-

tial progress that had been made to implement the projects

and harvest in the burned areas. The court reasoned that

some timber harvest remained and, in any event, “revising the

tree mortality guidelines, monitoring of the California spotted

owl, and obtaining more accurate population surveys of MIS

bird species” could provide “some effective relief” to Earth

Island. /d. at 13a. The court then proceeded to address the

four factors that must be considered in determining whether

a preliminary injunction would be proper.

In first addressing the likelihood of success on the merits,

the court conducted an essentially de novo review and reached

a conclusion contrary to that of the district court, based pri-

marily on Earth Island’s non-administrative-record declara-

tions. The Forest Service again objected to consideration of

those declarations, but the court dismissed that objection,

stating without elaboration that it could consider them to

“determine whether the agency has considered all relevant

factors and has explained its decision.” App. 22a (quoting

Southwest Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. USFS, 100 F.3d

1443, 1450 (9th Cir. 1996)). Crediting Earth Island’s experts,

the court concluded that Earth Island had shown a strong

likelihood of success on its NEPA challenges to the accuracy

of the tree mortality guidelines and to its related challenge to

the adequacy of the FEISs’ analyses of the projects’ effects

on the CASPO. /d. at 18a-33a, 38a-46a. The court also de-

cided that Earth Island was likely to succeed on its NFMA

claim that the Forest Service failed to conduct MIS monitor-

ing allegedly required under the SNFPA. /d. at 46a-54a.

With respect to a showing of irreparable injury, the court

of appeals held that the district court erred in requiring a

12

plaintiff to show a “significant threat of irreparable injury” in

order to obtain preliminary injunctive relief. App. 13a-16a.

Instead, the panel interpreted prior Ninth Circuit decisions

to require a plaintiff to show only a “mere possibility of irrep-

arable harm” if it demonstrates a probability of success on the

merits. /d. at 15a. Here, the court held that Earth Island had

made such a showing, because the projects “may result in the

unnecessary cutting of trees that would otherwise survive, in

harm to the [CASPO], and * * * to several MIS bird spe-

cies.” Id. at 54a-55a.

The court also concluded, contrary to the district

court, that “the balance of hardships * * * tips in Earth Is-

land’s favor.” App. 55a. The court characterized the injuries

to the Forest Service and intervenor Sierra Pacific Industries

(SPI) as merely “economic losses”—presumably referring to

the lost economic value of the deteriorating timber—and

ruled that the public interest in prevention of potential irrepa-

rable environmental damage was paramount. /bid. In consid-

ering the public interest, the court did not mention the fire

prevention, public safety, and forest reforestation benefits of

the projects that the Forest Service had identified and that

the district court cited as supporting the denial of injunctive

relief.

b. Judge Noonan filed a concurring opinion. App. 57a-

58a. Judge Noonan suggested that the Forest Service has a

financial conflict of interest when it sells timber from Na-

tional Forests. \/d. at 57a. He reiterated his previously stated

view that if the Forest Service is a “biased adjudicator,” then

“its determination is a nullity.” /bid. (citation omitted). How-

ever, unlike the panel majority, Judge Noonan was uncertain

as to Earth Island’s likelihood of success. He observed that

it is difficult for a reviewing court to master the large record

in an environmental case “and to be confident in its discrimi-

nation between expert opinions.” /bid. Therefore, he would

have remanded the case to the district court to conduct an

“investigation and evaluation” of the Forest Service’s finan-

13

cial interest in the timber sales, to apply the correct legal

standard, and “to make its own estimate of the probability of

Earth Island’s success on the merits.” /bid.

4. After the court of appeals denied the government’s

petition for rehearing en banc, the case was remanded to the

district court. That court entered the required preliminary

injunction on August 31, 2006. Order Granting Prelim. Inj. 1-

5 (Aug. 31, 2006).’ The court allowed the Forest Service to

remove logs that have already been cut and hazard trees, but

enjoined further timber harvest. Although some of the timber

has deteriorated in value, timber not yet harvested retains

economic value and would be harvested if the injunction is

vacated.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

In reversing the district court’s decision denying a prelim-

inary injunction, the court of appeals seriously erred with

respect to the showing a plaintiff must make to justify the

entry of a preliminary injunction. First, in determining that

respondents had demonstrated a likelihood of success on the

merits, the court of appeals relied on its own de novo review _

of declarations and appended material filed by respondents in

the district court, rather than confining itself to determining

whether the Forest Service’s decisions were arbitrary and

capricious on the basis of the administrative record. Second,

the court also held that respondents could satisfy the irrepa-

rable injury prong by demonstrating a “mere possibility of

irreparable harm,” App. 15a, expressly rejecting any require-

ment that they must show at least a significant risk of irrepa-

rable harm, id. at 15a-16a. Those rulings are fundamentally

wrong and squarely conflict with decisions of this Court and

other courts of appeals.

* The court of appeals had granted an emergency injunction pending appeal

on January 11,2006. App. 59a-60a. A motions panel of the court had previously

denied such an injunction. /d. at 6la-62a.

14

In addition, the court of appeals erred in evaluating the

third and fourth factors, the balance of harms and the public

interest. On both factors, the court gave dispositive weight to

impacts it perceived on habitat of certain species of birds,

none of which is listed as endangered or threatened under the

Endangered Species Act of 1973, without addressing whether

there would be any resulting significant impact on the viabil-

ity of the species themselves. At the same time, the court

discounted or ignored entirely other interests that, by statute,

must be considered by the Forest Service in the administra-

tion of National Forests under principles of multiple use and

sustained yield. The net effect was to deprive the Forest Ser-

vice of its statutorily conferred role in weighing competing

objectives.

Review by this Court is warranted to correct the Ninth

Circuit’s significant legal errors and resolve the resulting

conflicts with decisions of this Court and other courts of ap-

peals. Review is also warranted because of the decision’s

considerable practical importance, given the vast tracts of

public land in the Ninth Circuit and the disruption to manage-

ment of those lands and circumvention of orderly administra-

tive processes that it allows. Review will enable this Court to

restore a workable standard for preliminary injunctions in the

Ninth Circuit for actions brought under the APA.

I. The Ninth Circuit Erred With Respect To Each Of The Four

Factors To Be Considered In Ruling On A Motion For A

Preliminary Injunction

A. Likelihood of success on the merits. The court of ap-

peals departed dramatically from this Court’s precedents and

those of other courts of appeals by relying on evidentiary

submissions outside the administrative record to hold that

Earth Island had established a likelihood of success on the

merits. The “scope of review under the ‘arbitrary and capri-

cious’ standard is narrow and a court is not to substitute its

judgment for that of the agency.” Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n

15

v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). And

as the Court has repeatedly stressed, “the focal point for judi-

cial review should be the administrative record already in

existence, not some new record made initially in the reviewing

court.” FPC v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 423

U.S. 326, 331 (1976) (quoting Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142

(1973) (per curiam)). The court therefore must review the

agency’s decision under the APA’s arbitrary and capricious

test on the basis of the administrative record, Florida Power

& Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 743-744 (1985); Citizens

to Preserve Overton Park Inc. v. Volpe, 401 US. 402, 415,

419-420 (1971) (Overton Park), and must sustain the agency’s

factual determinations unless any reasonable fact-finder

would be compelled to reach a contrary conclusion under the

standards applicable to a directed verdict or judgment not-

withstanding a jury verdict in court. See /NS v. Elias-

Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992).

The rule limiting judicial review to the administrative

record on which the agency made its decision applies with

equal force to NEPA cases, see Vermont Yankee Nuclear

Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 553-555 (1978), and to

rulings on preliminary injunction motions, see American

Biosci., Ine. v. Thompson, 243 F.3d 579, 582 (D.C. Cir. 2001).

By confining judicial review to the administrative record, the

APA precludes the reviewing court from substituting its opin-

ion for that of the agency, United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S.

409, 422 (1941), and maintains the integrity and primacy of

the administrative process by requiring a party who wishes to

oppose the agency’s proposed action to submit his evidence

and arguments to the agency in the first instance, Depart-

ment of Transportation v. Public Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 764-

765 (2004).

The Ninth Circuit nonetheless held that it could consider

Earth Island’s new evidentiary submissions in court to “de-

termine whether the agency has considered all relevant fac-

tors and has explained its decision.” App. 22a (quoting South-

16

west Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 100 F.3d at 1450). In fact,

Earth Island offered the non-record declarations of Dr.

Edwin Royce and Monica Bond as new grounds for attacking

the Forest’s Service’s data and evaluations, and that is the

purpose for which they were used by the court of appeals. /d.

at 19a-45a. The court of appeals performed a detailed, side-

by-side comparison of those declarations and the competing

expert declarations the government felt compelled to file to

respond to those of Earth Island, decided that the opinions of

Earth Island’s experts were more persuasive, and found on

the basis of that exercise that Earth Island was likely to suc-

ceed on the merits. /bid.

The court of appeals’ approach finds no support in this

Court’s decisions and is fundamentally incompatible with

standard principles of deferential review of agency action.

This Court has made clear that supplementing the adminis-

trative record is allowed only when that record is so inade-

quate that the reviewing court cannot understand the

agency’s decision or the basis of that decision. And even in

that situation, any supplementation of the record would be in

the form of an explanation by the agency of the basis for its

decision. See Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. at 142-143 (“If * * *

there was such failure to explain administrative action as to

frustrate effective judicial review, the remedy [is] * * * to

obtain from the agency, either through affidavits or testi-

mony, such additional explanation of the reasons for the

agency decision as may prove necessary.”); Overton Park, 401

U.S. at 420 (stating that where there are no formal findings,

examining the decisionmakers themselves may be the only

way there can be effective judicial review).*

* The preferable course where the agency’s explanation is inadequate might

instead often be to remand to the agency to afford it an opportunity to furnish

a more complete explanation within the established procedures for agency

decisionmaking.

—_—

17

That limited exception would not apply in a case like this,

in which the agency record includes a ROD and FEIS for each

project, as well as extensive administrative record material.

Those materials are far more than sufficient for the reviewing

court to understand the basis of the agency’s decision. And in

any event, the limited exception identified in Camp v. Pitts

and Overton Park would not permit consideration of new evi-

dentiary materials submitted in court by parties challenging

the agency’s decision.”

Other courts of appeals limit the exception to those cases

in which the agency’s decision is inadequately explained. £.g.,

Voyageurs Nat. Park Ass'n v. Norton, 381 F.3d 759, 766 (8th

Cir. 2004); Commercial Drapery Contractors, Inc. v. United

States, 133 F.3d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 1998). When there is “a con-

temporaneous administrative record and no need for addi-

tional explanation of the agency decision, ‘there must be a

strong showing of bad faith or improper behavior’ before the

reviewing court may permit discovery and evidentiary

supplementation of the administrative record.” Newton

County Wildlife Ass’n v. Rogers, 141, F.3d 803, 807-808 (8th

Cir. 1998) (quoting Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 420). Consis-

tent with these principles, most courts of appeals do not per-

mit plaintiffs to attack the agency's decision on the basis of

materials outside the administrative record. See, e.g., Amer-

can Coke & Coal Chems. Inst. v. EPA, 452 F.3d 930, 945 (D.C.

Cir. 2006); NVE, Inc. v. Department of Health & Human

* The Ninth Circuit itself has, in other cases, recognized the prohibitions on

the use of extra-record materials to attack the substantive basis of the agency's

decisfon. See, e.g., Center for Biological Diversity v. United States Fish &

Wildlife Serv., 450 F.3d 930, 943-944 (9th Cir. 2006); Southwest Ctr. for

Biological Diversity, 100 F.3d at 1450-1451; Association of Pac. Fisheries v.

EPA, 615 F.2d 794, 811-812 (9th Cir. 1980).

18

Serv., 436 F.3d 182, 189 (8d Cir. 2006); Custer County Action

Ass'n v. Garvey, 256 F.3d 1024, 1028 n.1 (10th Cir. 2001).°

The court of appeals’ decision to consider such extra-re-

cord materials here thus was wrong, inconsistent with this

Court’s decisions, and in conflict with decisions of other courts

of appeals. The court’s consideration of those materials

tainted virtually its entire analysis of respondents’ likelihood

of success on the merits. If review is confined to the adminis-

trative record, under the arbitrary and capricious standard,

Earth Island has not begun to make the required showing of

a likelihood of success on the merits.

The court of appeals believed that the two projects must

be enjoined because the Forest Service had not conducted

adequate monitoring of certain MIS species of birds. See

App. 46a-54a. The general framework applicable to the Eldo-

rado National Forest under the SNFPA does contemplate

some degree of monitoring for the HAW and WSS, although

as the district court noted, it also contemplates flexibility in

the case of such species, whose vulnerability is “low.” See

Resp. C.A. E.R., Tab 1, at E-62 to E-64. More fundamentally,

however, the Forest Service interprets the monitoring provi-

sion as a plan-level goal dependent upon future funding, not

a binding commitment. See Pet. C.A. Br. 25-26 n.8. As this

Court made clear in Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness

Alliance, 542 U.S. 55, 72 (2004), such “‘will do’ projections of

agency action set forth in land use plans” are “not a legally

binding commitment.” But even if the Forest Service had an

* In National Audubon Soc’y v. Hoffman, 132 F.3d 7, 15 (2nd Cir. 1997), the

Second Circuit suggested that the scope of a court’s authority to allow

supplementation of the record might be greaterin NEPA cases, reasoning that

the court needs to understand whether the agency has ignored significant

environmental impacts of its action and the agency record itself may not

answer that question. That suggestion cannot be squared with this Court's

decision in Public Citizen, 541 U.S. at 764-765, which requires that objections

to the NEPA analysis be provided to the agency during the comment period.

19

obligation to conduct greater monitoring than it did, nothing

in the SNFPA purports to condition the Forest Service’s au-

thority to approve site-specific actions on the performance of

such general monitoring. Moreover, as the district court

ruled, the data from the Breeding Bird Survey, on which the

Forest Service relied, furnished an adequate evidentiary basis

for the Forest Service’s decisions for these two projects.

With respect to the possible impact on the CASPO, the

court of appeals acknowledged the extensive mitigation mea-

sures undertaken by the Forest Service to protect areas for

those birds. See App. 40a-43a. In nevertheless finding that

respondents had established a likelihood of success on the

merits, the court relied almost entirely on factual assertions

made in respondents’ declarations concerning the CASPO, 7d.

at 39a-40a, 45a, and on the court’s criticism of the Forest Ser-

vice’s mortality guidelines for selecting which trees to cut, id.

at 44a-45a, which in turn was also based.on such assertions

and was itself confused and seriously flawed. Moreover, as

the district court pointed out, App. 75a-76a, the FEISs specif-

ically addressed the study cited by respondents suggesting

that spotted owls might use burned habitat, and explained

why the Forest Service did not find it sufficiently probative.

B. Irreparable injury. The Ninth Circuit’s decision also

waters down the irreparable harm component of the

plaintiff’s burden in seeking a preliminary injunction to the

point that the requirement is effectively meaningless. On that -

ruling as well, the Ninth Circuit’s decision conflicts with deci-

sions of this Court. It also conflicts with decisions of other

courts of appeals, which have held that at least a significant

likelihood of irreparable harm must be shown regardless of

the plaintiff’s likelihood of success on the merits.

1. The Ninth Circuit has generally applied a sliding scale

approach to preliminary injunctions, under which the re-

quired degree of irreparable harm increases as the probabil-

ity of success decreases. See, e.g., Clear Channel Outdoor

Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 340 F.3d 810 (2003); Los Angeles

20

Mem’ Coliseum Comm’n v. NFL, 634 F.2d 1197, 1200-1201

(1980). The district court in this case held that no matter

where the case falls on the sliding scale, “plaintiffs must dem-

onstrate a significant threat of irreparable injury.” App. 67a.

The court of appeals expressly disagreed, holding that a show-

ing of a “mere possibility” of irreparable harm was sufficient

for Earth Island to carry its burden. /d. at 15a.’

a. The Ninth Circuit’s dilution of the irreparable harm

requirement conflicts with decisions of this Court. “The basis

of injunctive relief in the federal courts has always been irrep-

arable harm and inadequacy of legal remedies.” Sampson v.

Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 88 (1974) (quoting Beacon Theatres, Inc.

v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 506-507 (1959), and citing Virginia

Petroleum Jobbers Ass’n v. FPC, 259 F.2d 921 (9th Cir.

1958)); accord Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972

(1997); Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312

(1982). In Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 931 (1975),

the Court held that “(t]he traditional standard for granting a

preliminary injunction requires the plaintiff to show that in

the absence of its issuance he will suffer irreparable injury

and also that he is likely to prevail on the merits.” (emphasis

added). The Court has continued to apply that test. See

Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 666 (2004); Grupo Mexicano

‘ This express disavowal of a “significant risk” requirement marks the

resolution of two lines of decisions in the Ninth Circuit. In one line, the court

had held that a preliminary injunction may be issued based on nothing more

than a possibility of harm. See Earth Island Inst. v. USF'S,351 F.3d 1291, 1298

(9th Cir. 2003); Kootenai Tribe v. Veneman, 313 F.3d 1094, 1115 (9th Cir. 2002);

Sammartano v. First Judicial Dist. Court, 303 F.3d 959, 972-973 (9th Cir.

2002); Idaho Sporting Cong. v. Alexander, 222 F.3d 562, 565 (9th Cir. 2000). In

another line of cases, however, the Ninth Circuit had held that under any

formulation of the sliding scale, “plaintiff must demonstrate that there exists

a significant threat of irreparable injury.” Simula, Inc. v. Autoliv, Inc., 175

F.3d 716, 725 (1999); Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal, Inc. v. Coalition for

Econ. Equity, 950 F.2d 1401, 1410 (1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 985 (1992); Big

Country Foods v. Board of Educ., 868 F.2d 1085, 1088 (1989); Oakland Tribune

Inc. v. Chronicle Publ’g Co., 762 F.2d 1374, 1376 (1985).

21

de Desarrollo S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308,

340 (1999) (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting)

(citing Doran, 422 U.S. at 931); Amoco Prod. Co. v. Village

of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 545 (1987). See also eBay Inc. v.

MercExch., L.L.C., 1268. Ct. 1837, 1839 (2006).*

This is not the first time the Ninth Circuit has departed

from that requirement. In Gambell, the Ninth Circuit had

ruled that “[iJrreparable damage is presumed when an agency

fails to evaluate thoroughly the environmental impacts of a

proposed action.” 774 F.2d 1414, 1423 (1985). It further de-

cided that injunctive relief was the appropriate remedy for

violation of an environmental statute “absent rare or unusual

circumstances.” /bid. This Court reversed, reiterating its

ruling in Romero-Barcelo that courts should apply traditional

equitable principles in deciding whether to enjoin violations

of environmental statutes absent an express limitation placed

on those principles by Congress. 480 U.S. at 541-543. The

Court also rejected the Ninth Circuit’s presumption of irrepa-

rable harm and stated that irreparable injury must be “suffi-

ciently likely” before an injunction is issued. Jd. at 545 (em-

phasis added).

The Ninth Circuit’s “possibility of irreparable harm” stan-

dard in some ways strays even farther from traditional equi-

table principles than the Gambell presumption, since a pre-

sumption of harm can be rebutted, while disproving a “mere

possibility” of harm is rarely feasible, particularly in land-use

cases where a site-specific action will almost always have

some impact on the physical environment. Thus, the Ninth

Circuit’s “mere possibility” standard is akin to no standard at

all. See Beltran v. Smith, 458 U.S. 1303, 1305 (1982) (mere

possibility of additional risk did not rise to the level of irrepa-

rable injury necessary to obtain a preliminary injunction).

* eBay involved a permanent injunction, but the test for irreparable harm

is essentially the same when the plaintiff seeks a preliminary injunction. See

Gambell, 480 U.S. at 546 n.12.

22

b. Consistent with this Court’s requirements, the courts

of appeals have generally insisted that a plaintiff seeking a

preliminary injunction show that it will be irreparably harmed

absent relief from the court, not just that such harm is possi-

ble. See, e.g., Globe Nuclear Servs. & Supply GNSS, Ltd. v.

AO Techsnabexport 376 F.3d 282, 287 (4th Cir. 2004); Siegel

v. LePore, 234 F.3d 1163, 1176 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc);

AlliedSignal, Inc. v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 183 F.3d 568, 573 (7th

Cir. 1999); Rushia v. Town of Ashburnham, 701 F.2d 7, 9 (ist

Cir. 1983). Accordingly, other courts of appeals have held

that a mere possibility of irreparable harm is insufficient to

justify an injunction, either by expressly so stating, see Borey

v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 934 F.2d 30, 34 (2d Cir.

1991), or by holding that the plaintiff must show a “realistic

prospect” or “significant risk” or “substantial likelihood” of

irreparable injury, see, e.g., Matos ex rel. Matos v. Clinton

Sch. Dist., 367 F.3d 68, 73 (1st Cir. 2004); Greater Yellowstone

Coal. v. Flowers, 321 F.3d 1250, 1258 (10th Cir. 2003); Adams

v. Freedom Forge Corp., 204 F.3d 475, 484-485 (3d Cir. 2000);

Siegel, 234 F.3d at 1179. Under those decisions, the plaintiff

must at a minimum show a significant risk of irreparable

harm in order to obtain an injunction. That standard is de-

manding. See Adams, 204 F.3d at 485.

Some circuits have adopted a version of a sliding scale, but

their tests retain the requirement that the plaintiff show at

least a significant risk of irreparable harm as the ticket for

admission to the enjoining of an action, regardless of the ac-

tion’s illegality. For example, in the Fourth Circuit a plaintiff

who raises serious questions on the merits, but cannot estab-

lish a likelihood of success on the merits, may obtain a prelim-

inary injunction by showing that the balance of hardships

strongly favors relief. See Rum Creek Coal Sales, Inc. v.

Caperton, 926 F.2d 353 (4th Cir.1991); Blackwelder Furniture

Co. v. Seilig Mfg. Co., 550 F.2d 189 (4th Cir. 1977). But the

plaintiff still “must show that it will sustain irreparable harm

without a preliminary injunction. The ‘balance of hardship’

23

test does not negate the requirement that the [plaintiff] show

some irreparable harm.” Rum Creek Coal Sales, 926 F.2d at

360. Similarly, the Tenth Circuit has adopted a sliding scale

but requires the plaintiff to show at least a significant risk of

irreparable harm. See Greater Yellowstone Coal., 321 F.3d

at 1258, 1261-1262.

The Second Circuit has endorsed a sliding-scale approach

in some circumstances (with a showing of irreparable harm as

a necessary component), but it will not apply that approach

when injunctive relief is sought “against government action

taken in the public interest pursuant to a statutory or regula-

tory scheme.” Forest City Daly Housing, Inc. v. Town of N.

Hempstead, 175 F.3d 144, 149 (2d Cir. 1999). That rule re-

flects appropriate judicial deference to “legislation or regula-

tions developed through presumptively reasoned democratic

processes.” /bid. (quoting Able v. United States, 44 F.3d 128,

131 (2d Cir. 1995) (per curiam)). The Second Circuit also will

not apply that approach when “an injunction will provide the

movant with substantially all the relief sought and that relief

cannot be undone even if the defendant prevails at a trial on

the merits.” /d. at 150 (citation omitted). Thus, the Second

Circuit would not apply the sliding scale here, where the pro-

jects were undertaken pursuant to statutory directive to serve

public interests identified by Congress. Moreover, for sal-

vage logging projects such as these, which attempt to derive

some value from a wasting asset, a preliminary injunction may

grant the plaintiff substantially all the relief it seeks because

the fire-damaged timber may deteriorate in value so much

prior to final judgment that the Forest Service may have to

cancel the timber sale even if it ultimately prevails.

2. Not only did the court of appeals base its ruling on a

mere possibility of injury, the court did not identify any injury

to any member of either of the respondents. Instead, the

court pointed merely to the general possibility of environmen-

talinjury. App. 55a. That is insufficient to justify an injunc-

tion. In Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. 167 (2000),

24

the Court explained that in cases alleging environmental in-

jury, the relevant showing for purposes of Article ITI standing

“is not injury to the environment, but injury to the plaintiff.”

Id. at 180-181 (emphasis added). “(T]he ‘injury in fact’ test

requires more than an injury to a cognizable interest. It re-

quires that the party seeking review be himself among the

injured.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 563

(1992) (quoting Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734-735

(1972)) (emphasis added).

Here, Earth Island’s burden was much greater because

“{a] plaintiff must do more than merely allege imminent harm

sufficient to establish standing; a plaintiff must demonstrate

immediate threatened injury as a prerequisite to preliminary

injunctive relief.” Caribbean Marine Servs. Co. v. Baldrige,

844 F.2d 668, 674 (9th Cir. 1988) (citation omitted). The plain-

tiff organizations failed to show that their members face any

such threat from implementation of the projects. Their

amended complaint alleged only generalized interests in pub-

lic forest lands. Compl. paras. 8, 9. Even assuming that the

record showed a possible risk of irreparable harm to Forest

resources, the organizations failed to show that their mem-

bers actually use those Forest resources, and that the mem-

bers’ use and enjoyment of those resources is in imminent

- danger of being irreparably injured if operations continue.

3. Had the court of appeals required Earth Island to dem-

onstrate a significant threat of irreparable harm rather than

a mere possibility of injury, Earth Island could not have pre-

vailed. The court of appeals concluded that Earth Island had

shown a “possibility” of injury to “several MIS bird species,”

without explaining the nature of that possible harm. App.

54a-55a. None of the MIS bird species for which the court of

appeals found monitoring violations (the HAW, WSS, and

BBW) is listed as an endangered or threatened species under

the Endangered Species Act of 1973 (ESA), 16 U.S.C. 1531

et seq.; nor are they designated as sensitive species in Forest

Service Region 5, C.A. E.R. Tab 9, at 184, Table 3-44. The

25

mere cutting of trees that a non-listed, non-sensitive bird

species might otherwise use as habitat is not irreparable

harm. See Fund for Animals v. Frizzell, 530 F.2d 982, 987

(D.C. Cir. 1975).? Moreover, as the district court noted with

respect to the HAW and WSS, “[aJny preference by those

birds for severely burned habitat may be more than satisfied

by the untreated/unharvested portions of the project areas”

and by burned habitat outside of the project areas. App. 73a-

74a & n.2."°

As for the CASPO, while it is not a federally listed threat-

ened or endangered species, it is designated as a “sensitive

species” for the Eldorado National Forest.'’ The district

court correctly concluded that, “in an effort to accommodate

the needs of the CASPO, the [Forest Service] not only re-

tained as much suitable owl habitat that remained within the

project area, but also attempted to retain many of the previ-

ously constituted [protected activity centers for the CASPO]

* In addition, the WSS is a "forest associate," a species “found to be less

abundant in recent high intensity burned forest as compared to unburned

forest.” Power FEIS, C.A.E.R. Tab A at 197 & Table 3-51.

' The district court did not make any specifie determination concerning

harm to the BBW. It did not need to do so because population monitoring is not

required for that species. The document the district court accepted as

requiring population monitoring for the HAW and the WSS does not mention

the BBW. Resp. C.A. E.R. Tab 1, Table E-9. In any event, the court of appeals

failed to identify any irreparable injury to the BBW, and the record rebuts any

such theory. See Power FEIS, C.A.S.E.R.249, Table 3-77 (showing that, while

timber harvest will reduce the heavily burned habitat added by the 2004 fires,

the estimated available habitat and number of BBW individuals in the Power

project area will still be greater after the timber harvest than before the fires).

" In June of 2005, the United States Fish and Wildlife Service issued a

“90-day finding” under the ESA, 16 U.S.C. 1533(b)\(3)(A), determining that

sufficient information existed to warrant a review of whether the CASPO

should be listed under the Act. 70 Fed. Reg. 35,607 (June 21, 2005). The

Service has since determined that listing is not warranted. 71 Fed. Reg. 29,886

(May 24, 2006).

26

by including some burned habitat.” App. 74a; see also App.

40a-43a.

C. Balance of harms and the public interest. Finally, the

court of appeals erred in its cursory discussion of the balance

of harms and the public interest insofar as it bears on the

issuance of an injunction. The court acknowledged that, “with

some reason,” both the Forest Service and SPI contend that

“they will suffer economic losses if we enjoin the timber

sales.” App. 55a. But the court pointed to what it regarded

as the importance of “the public’s interest in preserving pre-

cious, unreplenishable resources,” and concluded that loss of

anticipated revenues did not outweigh the potential irrepara-

ble damage to the environment. /bid. (quotation omitted).

Similarly, the eourt concluded that a preliminary injunction

would advance the public interest, stating simply that “[t]he

preservation of our environment, as required by NEPA and

the NFMA, is clearly in the public interest.” /bid. The

court’s analysis was divorced from both the statutory scheme

and the record in this case.

The Forest Service is charged with managing National

Forests under principles of multiple use and sustained yield

of resources. “Multiple use management is a deceptively sim-

ple term that describes the enormously complicated task of

striking a balance among the many competing uses to which

land can be put.” Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542

U.S. at 58. Any consideration of the balance of harms and

public interest in determining whether a court should exercise

its equitable discretion to issue a preliminary injunction must

be consistent with the governing statutory framework that

itself establishes that all of these competing uses, not merely

the use of some trees as habitat by certain non-endangered

species of birds, are in the public interest. See Gambell, 480

U.S. at 545-546; Virginia Ry. Co. v. System Fed’n No. 40, 300

U.S. 515, 551 (1937). Indeed, because Congress has vested in

the Secretary of Agriculture, through the Forest Service, the

responsibility for balancing the various competing uses under

27

principles of multiple use and sustained yield, there is a de-

cided public interest in respecting the balance that has been

struck by the Forest Service, absent a clear showing at the

preliminary-injunction stage of the case that the Forest Ser-

vice’s decision was arbitrary and capricious and that specifi-

cally identified and substantial irreparable injury will very

likely ensue. A court should not be able to use its sense that

some of the factors the agency must balance have at least the

possibility of causing irreparable injury to allow it to frustrate

the agency’s decision and ultimately the entire statutory

scheme.

Here, moreover, the court of appeals made no effort to

ascertain the wezght that should be accorded to the “possible”

irreparable injuries to burned trees and the bird species that

might use some of the habitat, much less the weight that

should be accorded to the as-of-yet unidentified injuries to

any of respondents’ members that might result from any

incremental impact on bird habitat. The court instead viewed

the possibility of irreparable injury to those interests to be

determinative.

The areas at issue in this case were already badly dam-

aged by severe fires, and the Forest Service adopted projects

having a variety of goals in response, including reducing fuel

loading to decrease the risk of future fires, alleviating erosion,

reducing safety hazards, and removing certain dead trees

while they still had economic value. See pp. 5, 10, supra. In

balancing harms, the court considered only the last factor,

and dismissed it on the ground that it was a mere economic

consideration. That approach, aside from focusing too nar-

rowly on just one of the projects’ goals, ignores the reality

that the damaged timber was a wasting asset that the Forest

Service, as a good steward of the public’s resources, had an

obligation to take into account, and that the loss of that asset

would be irreparable if not harvested within a reasonable time

after the fires. The court’s approach also ignores the direc-

tive of Congress itself, in the statutes governing management

28

of the National Forests, that such competing uses should be

taken into account by the Forest Service,” and therefore must

be taken into account by a reviewing court as well when con-

sidering whether to enjoin the Forest Service from proceed-

ing.

For these reasons, the court of appeals erred not only with

respect to the likelihood that respondents would succeed on

the merits and the mere “possibility” of irreparable harm, but

also in weighing competing harms and considering the public

interest.”

* NFMA encourages salvage logging. 16 U.S.C. 1604(k), 1611(b). NFMA

and related legislation also encourage the prevention of forest fires, public

safety protection, and reforestation. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. 475, 551, 1601(d)(1),

1604(g)(3)B), 1606a.

'° The court of appeals also disregarded the deferential standard of review

applicable to appellate review of preliminary injunction rulings, see eBay, 126

S. Ct. at 1839; Doran, 422 U.S. at 931-932 (citing Brown v. Chote, 411 U.S. 452,

457 (1973)), repeatedly ignoring the district court’s evaluation of the evidence

and substituting its judgment without pointing to any factual errors committed

by the district court. A vivid example of that disregard is the manner in which

it substituted its balancing of the hardships and interpretation of the public

interest for the district court’s exercise of its discretion. The district court

concluded that “lelven if plaintiffs were successful in demonstrating some

environmental harm,” important public interests favored the denial of

injunctive relief. App. 76a-77a. See pp. 27-28 & note 12. The court of appeals

ignored the public interests the district court relied upon and substituted its

view that the mere possibility of environmental injury outweighed the injuries

to the government and SPI (which it incorrectly claimed are limited to

“economic losses”). App. 55a. The abuse-of-discretion standard of review

required the court of appeals to defer to the district court’s reasonable

balancing of the hardships. Its refusal to do so reflects a hostility to the Forest

Service that it laid bare at the conclusion of its opinion, where it accused the

Forest Service of putting financial considerations above compliance with the

law. Id. at 57a.

29

II. Review By This Court Is Warranted

Review by this Court is warranted. As explained above,

the Ninth Circuit erred with respect to the showing respon-

dents were required to make on all four of the factors that

must be considered in determining whether a preliminary

injunction is proper. Moreover, as we have also explained, its

decision conflicts with decisions of this Court and other courts

of appeals.

In addition, the decision below is of substantial practical

importance, especially given the vast tracts of public land in

the Ninth Circuit that are now subject to the rules announced

by that court. The Ninth Circuit encompasses more than 120

million acres of the 192.7 million acres in the National Forest

System, and an additional 197 million acres of public lands

under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Land Management.

The Ninth Circuit’s decision opens up a wide avenue for

wholesale circumvention of orderly agency processes by al-

lowing parties challenging land-use decisions to rely in court

on evidentiary materials never submitted to the agency. It

also invites broad disruption of the ongoing management of

federal lands by providing for the entry of a preliminary in-

junction on the basis of nothing more than a mere possibility

of irreparable injury. And it disregards the substantial public

interest in the balance struck by the agency, pursuant to stat-

utory mandate, among the various potential competing consid-

erations involved in the management of public lands. The

Court should grant review to restore the proper standards for

issuing preliminary injunctions in APA actions.

30

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted.

PAUL D. CLEMENT

Solicitor General

SUE ELLEN WOOLDRIDGE

Assistant Attorney General

EDWIN S. KNEEDLER

Deputy Solicitor General

JONATHAN L. MARCUS

Assistant to the Solicitor

General

RONALD M. SPRITZER

Attorney

DECEMBER 2006

APPENDIX

Ts

No. OFFICE OF THE ULEAK

In the Supreme Court of the Gnited States

UNITED STATES FOREST SERVICE, ET AL.,

PETITIONERS

U.

EARTH ISLAND INSTITUTE AND THE CENTER FOR

BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

APPENDIX TO THE

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

PAUL D. CLEMENT

Solicitor Genera!

Counsel of Record

SUE ELLEN WOOLDRIDGE

Assistant Attorney General

EDWIN S. KNEEDLER

Deputy Solicitor General

JONATHAN L. MARCUS

Assistant to the Solicitor

General

RONALD M. SPRITZER

Attorney

Department of Justice

Washington, D.C. 20530-0001

(202) 514-2217

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Appendix A (court of appeals’ opinion, dated Mar. 24,

BOG) vncesanesscavdueevuasusuastegueeessen eee la

Appendix B (court of appeals’ order granting injunction

pending appeal, dated Jan. 11, 2006) .................. 59a

Appendix C (court of appeals’ order, dated Sept. 21,

ED aw oucedichavdneadens344issbuner arene 6la

Appendix D (district court memorandum and order,

oo me Ee Pe err eee 63a

Appendix E (Record of Decision Power Fire

RNG ks don kcnwesdugauguuuessesenseeeeel 79a

Appendix F (Record of Decision Freds Fire

POTRGUGEIOE) 5 vis ndveessnesditvcnesnssapeeeeee 112a

Appendix G (court of appeals’ denial of rehearing,

PR | Perrrrrerr erie err errr 146a

APPENDIX A

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

No. 05-16776

EARTH ISLAND INSTITUTE, A CALIFORNIA NON-

PROFIT ORGANIZATION; CENTER FOR BIOLOGICAL

DIVERSITY, A NON-PROFIT ORGANIZATION,

PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS

U.

UNITED STATES FOREST SERVICE; DALE BOSWORTH,

)HIEF OF THE UNITED STATES FOREST SSERVICE;

JOHN BERRY, FOREST SUPERVISOR FOR EL DORADO

NATIONAL FOREST, DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES

SIERRA PACIFIC INDUSTRIES,

DEFENDANT-INTERVENOR-APPELLEE

Filed: Mar. 24, 2006

BEFORE: NOONAN, TASHIMA, and W. FLETCHER,

Circuit Judges.

WILLIAM A. FLETCHER, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiffs Earth Island Institute and the Center for

Biological Diversity (collectively, “Earth Island”) appeal

the district court’s denial of their motion for a pre-

liminary injunction enjoining the implementation of two

(la)

2a

United States Forest Service (“USFS”) post-fire resto-

ration projects in the El Dorado National Forest. Sierra

Pacific Industries (“SPI”) has joined defendants USFS,

Dale Bosworth, and John Berry as an intervenor.

Earth Island contends that the Final Environmental

Impact Statements (“FEISs”) for both projects fail to

meet the requirements set forth in the National

Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”), 42 U.S.C. § 4321

et seqg., because the USFS used faulty scientific meth-

odology in developing its tree mortality guidelines, and

because the FEISs failed to consider adequately the

adverse impacts of the projects on the California spotted

owl. Earth Island also contends that the FEISs fail to

comply with the National Forest Management Act

(““NFMA”), 16 U.S.C. § 1600 et seq., because the USFS

did not compile sufficient population data for certain

bird Management Indicator Species (“MIS”).

The district court denied Earth Island’s request,

finding (1) that the methodology employed in the FEISs

with respect to the tree mortality guidelines was not

arbitrary and capricious; (2) that the FEISs took a

“hard look” at the adverse impacts of the projects on the

California spotted owl, and (3) that the USFS had

gathered sufficient population monitoring data for

certain bird species that have been categorized as MIS.

For the reasons set forth below, we hold that Earth

Island has shown a “strong likelihood of success on the

merits” of its NEPA and NFMA claims, and that it has

otherwise satisfied the requirements for a preliminary

injunction. We reverse and remand to the district court

for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

3a

I. Statutory and Factual Background

In October 2004, two substantial fires burned por-

tions of the El Dorado National Forest. The first,

known as the Power Fire, consumed 16,993 acres of

National Forest as well as additional acres of private

land. The Power Fire burned at varying levels of intens-

ity. According to the FEIS prepared for the Power Fire

Restoration Project, approximately 38% of the forest

area burned at low intensity; approximately 13% burned

at moderate intensity, killing 25% to 75% of the trees;

and approximately 48% burned at high intensity, killing

75% to 100% of the trees as well as burning the duff and

litter protecting the soil. Several Protected Activity

Centers (“PACs”), Home Range Core Areas (““HRCAs’”),

and Riparian Conservation Areas (“RCAs”) for the

California Spotted Owl were located in the Power Fire

area. Certain MIS cavity-nesting birds, notably the

hairy woodpecker, black-backed woodpecker, and

Williamson’s sapsucker, were present in Power Fire

area.

The second fire, known as the Freds Fire, burned

7,700 total acres, 4,600 of which were in the National

Forest. Like the Power Fire, the Freds Fire burned at

varying levels of intensity. According to the FEIS,

approximately 12% burned at low intensity; approxi-

mately 11% burned at moderate intensity, killing 33% to

66% of the trees; and approximately 61% burned at high

intensity, killing 66% to 100% of the trees as well as

burning the duff and litter protecting the soil. An

additional 16% of young plantations also burned at high

intensity. California spotted owl PACs, HRCAs, and

RCAs were located in the Freds fire area. The

hairy woodpecker, black-backed woodpecker, and

4a

Williamson’s sapsucker were also present in the Freds

Fire area.

In response to the two fires, the USFS undertook the

Power Fire Restoration Project and the Freds Fire

Restoration Project. Both projects must comply with

federal statutes as well as the relevant regional forest

plans.

Under NEPA, federal agencies must prepare de-

tailed environmental impact statements on every pro-

posed action that “significantly affects the quality of the

human environment.” 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C). These

statements must include a description and analysis of

the environmental impact of the proposed action, any

adverse environmental effects that cannot be avoided if

the action is implemented, alternatives to the proposed

action, the relationship between short-term uses and

long-term productivity, and any irreversible or irre-

trievable commitment of resources that would be

involved if the action were to be implemented. /d. In

short, NEPA requires that a federal agency “consider

every significant aspect of the environmental impact of

a proposed action” and “inform the public that it has

indeed considered environmental concerns in its de-

cisionmaking process.” Kern v. U.S. Bureau of Land

Mgmt., 284 F.3d 1062, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002) (internal

. quotations omitted). NEPA does not contain substan-

tive environmental standards but instead establishes

procedural requirements designed to ensure that

agencies take a “hard look” at the environmental conse-

quences of their actions. /d.

Under the NF'MA, the USFS must develop land and

resource management plans for each unit of the

National Forest System. 16 U.S.C. § 1604(a). In de-

5a

veloping such plans, “a systematic interdisciplinary ap-

proach to achieve integrated consideration of physical,

biological, economic, and other sciences” must be used.

The NFMA and regulations promulgated thereunder

impose substantive environmental requirements. See 36

C.F.R. § 219.12. Each forest plan must also comply

with NEPA. 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(1).

The Sierra Nevada Framework Plan Amendment

(the 2001 Framework) is the relevant NFMA forest plan

for the E] Dorado National Forest. The 2001 Frame-

work is a comprehensive forest plan that establishes a

“comprehensive conservation strategy” for national

forests in the Sierra Nevada Mountains, including the

- establishment of PACs for the California spotted owl,

defined as the best available 300 acres of owl habitat

surrounding a known or suspected nesting site. Karth

Island Inst. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 351 F.3d 1291, 1296

(9th Cir. 2003). Logging within PACs under the 2001

Framework is severely restricted, “generally to the

reduction of surface and ladder fuels.” Jd. In addition,

the 2001 Framework requires that HRCAs, defined as

1000-acre foraging grounds for the California spotted

owl, be maintained surrounding each PAC. /d.

In 2004, the 2001 Framework was supplemented by

a Final Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement

(the 2004 Supplement) that included a revised plan to

improve fire prevention and suppression, reduce fuel

loads, restore fire-adapted ecosystems, and promote

community assistance. The Record of Decision (“ROD”)

implementing the 2004 Supplement provides that “|s|ite-

specific decisions [regarding timber sales] will be made

on projects in compliance with NEPA, [the Endangered

Species Act], and other environmental laws following

6a

applicable public involvement and administrative appeal

procedures.”

The El Dorado National Forest is also managed

under the El] Dorado National Forest Land and Re-

source Management Plan (the “LRMP”). The LRMP

identifies certain bird Management Indicator Species

(“MIS”) that aid the USFS in establishing objectives for

improving habitat and for evaluating the quantity and

quality of habitat and species population trends, in

accordance with the NFMA.

Both the Power and Freds Project must conform

with the 2001 Framework, the 2004 Supplement, and the

LRMP, each of which must in turn comply with NEPA

and the NFMA. The USFS identified four key goals for

the two post-fire restoration projects:

(1) to reduce long-term fuel loading in order to

reduce future fire severity and resistance to control;

(2) improve roads and establish effective ground

cover in severely burned areas to reduce erosion and

sedimentation to streams in the short term, and to

contribute to long term soil productivity; (3) recover

the economic value of timber killed or severely

injured by the fire, in an expeditious manner, for the

purpose of generating funds to offset the cost of

future restoration activities; and (4) reduce safety

hazards to the public and forest workers.

Freds Fire Restoration, 69 Fed. Reg. 77,175-02 (Dec. 27,

2004).

In furtherance of the third goal, the Power Project

was divided into six timber sales. One of these, the Fast

Panther sale, was awarded to SPI, which contracted to

remove dead trees from 1,363 acres of the Power Fire

7a

area. The Freds Project was divided into two sales.

One of these, the Fred Fire Salvage sale, was also

awarded to SPI, which contracted to remove dead trees

from 1,363 acres of the Freds Fire area.

A Notice of Intent to prepare an Environmental

Impact Statement for the Power Fire was published in

the Federal Register on December 22, 2004, and for the

Freds Fire on December 27, 2004. Power Fire Re-

storation, 69 Fed. Reg. 76,686-01 (Dec. 22, 2004); Freds

Fire Restoration, 69 Fed. Reg. 77,175-01 (Dec. 27, 2004).

After a comment period, Draft Environmental Impact

Statements were published in the Federal Register on

March 25, 2005. Environmental Impact Statements;

Notices of Availability, 70 Fed. Reg. 15,315-01 (Mar. 25,

2005).

On June 16, 2005, the Forest Supervisor for the El

Dorado National Forest, John Berry, requested an

Emergency Situation Determination from the Regional

Forester pursuant to 36 C.F.R. § 215.10. According to

the request, “substantial loss of economic value to the

Federal Government will occur if implementation of the

[Record of Decision] were delayed. Loss of economic

value wil! in turn jeopardize the implementation of the

project(s} resulting in long term consequences to the

environment.” The request noted that with an Emer-

gency Determination, RODs for the two projects could

be issued as early as August 1, 2005, but without such a

determination, the RODs might not be issued until the

end of October. A delay would have the consequence of

postponing large portions of the logging operations until

summer 2006.

Such a delay would cause deterioration of the timber

to be salvaged, which would thereby reduce USFS’s

8a

revenues from those sales. The Forest Supervisor anti-

cipated that the loss from delay would be $11.3 million

for the Power Project and $800,000 for the Freds

Project. On July 1, 2005, the Regional Forester granted

the requests for Emergency Situation Determinations

for both Projects.

On July 1, 2005, the USFS issued FEISs for both

Projects. Both FEISs used mortality guidelines to

predict which trees will eventually die from their fire-

related injuries, and which trees should therefore be

logged. The guidelines are based on a draft study by

Sharon M. Hood, Sheri L. Smith, and Daniel R. Cluck

(the Hood Study). The Hood Study estimated the

probability of mortality for different tree species based,

according to the study, “on an analysis of the largest

dataset available in terms of numbers of trees and

species from wild-fires in California.”

On August 1, 2005, the final RODs for both projects

were issued. The Power ROD chose Alternative Four;

the Freds ROD chose Alternative One. Both RODs

stated that the risk of cutting trees that would otherwise

survive is mitigated by relying upon the data contained

in the Hood Study, which provides models “that allow

managers to select the desired level of predicted

mortality based on land management objectives.”

Among the stated reasons put forth for having chosen

Alternatives Four and One was the fact that each Alter-

native would generate the greatest revenue for the

USFS: $19,056,425 for the Power Project, and

$3,345,872 for the Freds Project.

Earth Island brought suit in federal district court

seeking a preliminary and permanent injunction against

the implementation of the Power and Freds Projects.

9a

On August 18, 2005, the district court granted Earth

Island’s motion for a Temporary Restraining Order

(“TRO”) pending that court’s determination of whether

a preliminary injunction should issue. On August 25,

2005, the district court vacated its August 18 TRO and

denied Earth [sland’s motion for a preliminary injunc-

tion.

In this expedited appeal, Earth Island argues that

the district court (1) applied an erroneous legal standard

for preliminary injunctions by requiring a showing of

significant irreparable harm; (2) applied an erroneous

legal standard to Earth Island’s claim that the USFS

failed to ensure scientific integrity in its tree mortality

guidelines; (3) erred as a matter of law by concluding

that both FEISs met NEPA’s requirement that they

take a “hard look” at the adverse effects of the projects

on the California spotted owl; (4) erred as a matter of

law by concluding that the USFS did not violate the

NFMaA by failing to conduct population surveys of cer-

tain MIS bird species; (5) erred as a matter of law by

concluding that Earth Island had not shown the

possibility of irreparable harm to the California spotted

owl and certain bird species; and (6) erred as a matter of

law by concluding that the balance of hardships did not

tip in Earth Island’s favor., On September 15, 2005,

Earth Island filed an emergency motion for an injunc-

tion pending appeal with this court, which was denied by

a motions panel on September 22, 2005. After oral

argument, we sua sponte reconsidered our September

22 denial and, in an order filed January 11, 2006, issued

an injunction pending the issuance of this opinion.

We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1291(a)(1). We now reverse the decision of the district

10a

court and hold that Earth Island has met the require-

ments for a preliminary injunction. We remand to the

district court for further proceedings consistent with

this opinion.

II. Standard of Review

A district court’s decision granting or denying pre-

liminary injunctive relief may be reversed only if the

court abused its discretion. See Harris v. Bd. of

Supervisors, 366 F.3d 754, 760 (9th Cir. 2004); Earth

Island, 351 F.3d at 1298. A court abuses its discretion

if it based its decision on an erroneous legal standard or

clearly erroneous findings of fact. Earth Island, 351

F.3d at 1298. We review findings of fact for clear error

and conclusions of law de novo. See Hawkins v.

Comparet-Cassani, 251 F.3d 1230, 1239 (9th Cir. 2001);

Brown v. Cal. Dep’t of Transp., 321 F.3d 1217, 1221 (9th

Cir. 2003). We “typically will not reach the merits of a

case when reviewing a preliminary injunction .... By

this we mean we will not second guess whether the court

correctly applied the law to the facts of the case, which

may be largely undeveloped at the early stages of

litigation. As long as the district court got the law right,

it will not be reversed simply because the appellate

court would have arrived at a different result if it had

applied the law to the facts of the case.” Karth Island

Inst., 351 F.3d at 1298(quoting Rucker v. Davis, 237

F.3d 1113, 1118 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc)).

We view Earth Island’s challenges through the lens

of the Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”). Under

the APA, agency decisions may be set aside only if

“arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or other-

wise not in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).

Review under this standard is narrow, and the reviewing

lla

court may not substitute its judgment for that of the

agency. See U.S. Postal Serv. v. Gregory, 534 U.S. 1, 6-

7, 122 S. Ct. 431, 151 L. Ed. 2d 323 (2001). The agency,

however, must articulate a rational connection between

the facts found and the conclusions reached. Midwater

Trawlers Co-op v. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 282 F.3d 710, 716

(9th Cir. 2002). We reverse under the arbitrary and

capricious standard only if the agency has relied on

factors that Congress has not intended it to consider,

has entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the

problem, or has offered an explanation for that decision

that runs counter to the evidence before the agency or

is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a

difference in view or the product of agency expertise.

See Sierra Club v. U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, 346

F.3d 955, 961 (9th Cir. 2003), amended by 352 F.3d 1187

(9th Cir. 2003).

III. Mootness

In light of the extensive logging that has already

taken place pursuant to the Power and Freds RODs, we

asked the parties to advise us whether this appeal may

have become moot. The USFS concedes that this appeal

is not moot with respect to the Power Project. For the

Power Project, the USFS reported that 100% of the

timber harvest has been completed for the East Panther

and Camp Creek sales, but that only 77% of harvesting

has been completed on the Cole Creek sale, only 73%

has bee completed for the Ellis sale, only 29% has been

completed for the Bear River sale, and only 15% has

been completed for the Rocky Knob sale. The USFS

indicated that due to winter weather conditions, logging

operations on the uncompleted projects has now ceased

but are expected to resume during the spring of 2006.

12a

According to the USFS, as of January 5, 2006, the

timber harvesting that had been authorized for the

Freds Project was completed, and it was expected that

all harvested timber would be removed from the land

and transported to mills by January 9, 2006. However,

Earth Island argues that even if current logging

operations have been completed for the Freds Project,

the logging sales contracts were issued for a term of two

years, meaning that SPI has a continuing right to cut

trees that meet the tree mortality guidelines contained

in the FEIS.

“A case becomes moot whenever it loses its character

as a present, live controversy of the kind that must exist

if we are to avoid advisory opinions on abstract pro-

positions of law . . . [T]he question is not whether the

precise relief sought at the time of the application for an

injunction was filed is still available. The question is

whether there can be any effective relief.” Cantrell v.

City of Long Beach, 241 F.3d 674, 678 (9th Cir. 2001)

(internal quotations and alterations omitted). In Neigh-

bors of Cuddy Mountain v. Alexander, 303 F.3d 1059

(9th Cir. 2002), we concluded that challenges brought

under NEPA and the NFMA were not moot simply

because logging operations had already been completed.

There, we noted that remedial measures continued to be

available. For example, the USFS could still study and

mitigate the impact of the sales on species viability,

adjust future timber sales to compensate for the

allegedly unlawful sale, and directly monitor bird popu-

lation trends. /d. at 1066. In Cantrell, we evaluated

mootness under NEPA and concluded that although

historic buildings with important bird habitats had

already been torn down, the defendants in that case

could still consider alternatives and develop ways to

13a

mitigate the damage to the birds’ habitat. Cantrell, 241

F.3d at 678-79.

Similarly, we conclude in this case that the com-

pletion of current logging operations in the Freds Fire

area does not render the controversy about the Freds

Project moot. Not only is it possible that SPI might cut

more trees. In addition, as in Neighbors of Cuddy

Mountain and Cantrell, there are a variety of measures

that could provide some effective relief, including

revising the tree mortality guidelines, monitoring of the

California spotted owl, and obtaining more accurate

population surveys of MIS bird species.

IV. Preliminary Injunction Standard

Earth Island seeks to enjoin logging operations in

the Power and Freds Project areas until its NF MA and

NEPA claims are adjudicated in federal court. It argues

that the district court applied an erroneous legal

standard by requiring something beyond the “possibility

of irreparable harm” when it denied Earth Island’s

request for a preliminary injunction. Specifically, Earth

Island points out that in analyzing the USFS’s obliga-

tion to monitor certain woodpecker species, the district

court found that “immediate and irreparable” injury had

not been shown. With respect to the California spotted

owl, the district court did not discuss harm at all;

instead, it simply concluded that Earth Island had

shown no probability of success on the merits.

A district court “necessarily abuses its discretion

when it bases its decision on an erroneous legal standard

or on clearly erroneous findings of fact.” Rucker v.

Davis, 237 F.3d 1113, 1118 (9th Cir. 2001) (en bance),

rev'd on other grounds, Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev. v.

Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 122 S. Ct. 1230, 152 L. Ed. 2d 258

14a

(2002). In this case, we conclude that the district court

applied an improper legal standard when assessing

whether a sufficient level of injury had been shown.

We recently had occasion to pass upon the proper

legal standard governing preliminary injunctive relief in

a case involving the same parties, the same district court

judge, and a very similar set of facts. Harth Island, 351

F.3d 1291. In that case, Earth Island sought a pre-

liminary injunction against logging operations provided

for in the USFS’s Star Fire Restoration Project after

the 2001 Star Fire in the Sierra Nevadas. /d. at 1295.

We identified two sets of criteria for preliminary

injunctive relief. Under the “traditional” criteria, a court

may grant a preliminary injunction if a plaintiff shows

“(1) a strong likelihood of success on the merits, (2) the

possibility of irreparable injury to plaintiff if pre-

liminary relief is not granted, (3) a balance of hardships

favoring the plaintiff, and (4) advancement of the public

interest (in certain cases).” Jd. at 1297 (internal quota-

tions omitted). Alternatively, a court may grant a pre-

liminary injunction if a plaintiff “demonstrates either a

combination of probable success on the merits and the

possibility of irreparable harm or that serious questions

are raised and the balance of hardships tips sharply in

his favor.” Jd. at 1298 (internal quotations omitted).

In Earth Island, we held that the district court had

applied an improper legal standard by requiring that

Earth Island demonstrate “actual harm . . . as op-

posed to speculation that some such harm could possibly

occur.” Jd. In that case, the district judge noted that

Earth Island had “failed to show that measures already

in place . . . will not afford sufficient protection” and

that Earth Island had “failed to identify any concrete

15a

probability of irreparable harm in any other respect.”

Id. We concluded that “[eJach of these statements

places a higher burden of proof on the plaintiff than is

warranted.” /d. We emphasized that a preliminary

injunction “only requires plaintiffs to show probable

success on the merits and the possibility of irreparable

harm.” /d.

In its August 25, 2005 order in this case, the district

judge stated, correctly, that in order to prevail on a

motion for a preliminary injunction, a party must de-

monstrate either “(1) a combination of probable success

on the merits and the possibility of irreparable harm; or

(2) that serious questions are raised and the balance of

hardships tips sharply in favor of granting the requested

injunction.” However, the district judge continued,

stating that under either standard, a party must show a

“significant threat of irreparable injury.” During the

hearing, the district judge stated that “even if there is

shown to be a probability of success on the merits by the

plaintiffs, the plaintiffs have not shown at this time that

there is a significant threat of irreparable injury by

clear and convincing evidence, which is the standard.”

The USFS argues that the district court applied the

appropriate legal standard as set forth in our decision in

Oakland Tribune, Inc. v. Chronicle Publ’g Co., 762 F.2d

1374 (9th Cir. 1985), because the words “significant

threat of irreparable injury” are not the equivalent of

the “concrete probability of irreparable harm” standard

we held to be erroneous in Earth Island. While it is true

that “significant threat” and “concrete probability” are

different words, what matters is that both standards

impose a higher burden of proof on Earth Island by

going beyond the “mere possibility of irreparable harm”

16a

standard. In Oakland Tribune, we first determined that

the plaintiff had shown a very low likelihood on the

success of the merits of its claim, thereby justifying the

higher standard of harm. Here, the district court ap-

plied the higher standard from the outset without first

determining the probability of Earth Island’s success on

the merits.

We conclude that the district court applied an

erroneous legal standard. As we discuss below, we

conclude that Earth Island has shown a “strong likeli-

hood of success on the merits,” and has also satisfied the

other criteria of degree of injury, balance of hardships,

and advancement of the public interest.

V. Diseussion

A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits of Earth

Island’s NEPA Challenges

NEPA’s procedural requirements require agencies

to take a “hard look” at the environmental consequences

of their actions. A hard look includes “considering all

foreseeable direct and indirect impacts.” [daho Sporting

Cong. v. Rittenhouse, 305 F.3d 957, 973 (9th Cir. 2002).

In addition to direct and indirect impacts, NEPA also

requires that agencies assess the cumulative impacts of

their actions, defined as the “incremental impact of the

action when added to past, present, and reasonably

foreseeable future actions.” 40 C.F.R.§ 1508.7.

A hard look should involve a discussion of adverse

impacts that does not improperly minimize negative side

effects. Native Ecosytems Council v. U.S. Forest Serv.,

428 F.3d 1233, 1241 (9th Cir. 2005). Thus, the USFS

must “undertake a thorough environmental analysis

before concluding that no significant environmental

17a

impact exists.” /d. at 1239 (internal quotations omitted).

We review whether the USFS has taken a hard look

under the arbitrary and capricious standard. When re-

viewing the adequacy of an FEIS’s hard look, we follow

a “rule of reason” approach, which requires “a prag-

matic judgment whether the [FEIS’s| form, content and

preparation foster both informed decision-making and

informed public participation.” Native Ecosystems

Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 418 F.3d 953, 960 (9th Cir.

2005); see also Dep’t of Transp. v. Public Citizen, 541

U.S. 752, 767, 124 8. Ct. 2204, 159 L. Ed. 2d 60 (2004).

Under NEPA, “[ajgencies shall insure the pro-

fessional integrity, including scientific integrity, of the

discussions and analyses in environmental impact state-

ments. They shall identify any methodologies used and

shall make explicit reference by footnote to the scientific

and other sources relied upon for conclusions in the

statement.” 40 C.F.R. § 1502.24. Agencies have wide

discretion in assessing scientific evidence, but they must

“take a hard look at the issues and respond{ | to reason-

able opposing viewpoints.” Earth Island, 351 F.3d at

1301. “Because analysis of scientific data requires a

high level of technical expertise, courts must defer

to the informed discretion of the responsible federal

agencies.” Jd. “When specialists express conflicting

views, an agency must have discretion to rely on the

reasonable opinions of its own experts, even if a court

may find contrary views more persuasive. At the same

time, courts must independently review the record in

order to satisfy themselves that the agency has made a

reasoned decision based on its evaluation of the evi-

dence.” Jd. (quoting Marsh v. Or. Natural Res.

Council, 490 U.S. 360, 378, 109 S. Ct. 1851, 104 L.Ed.2d

377 (1989)). If an agency has failed to make a reasoned

18a

decision based on an evaluation of the evidence, we may

properly conclude that an agency has acted arbitrarily

and capriciously. /d. at 1301.

The primary purpose of an FEIS is to allow for

informed public participation and informed decision

making. See Native Ecosystems, 418 F.3d at 965. In

furtherance of this purpose, 40 C.F.R.§ 1502.8 requires

that FEISs “be written in plain language and may use

appropriate graphics so that decisionmakers and the

public can readily understand them.” As we have

interpreted this regulation, an FEIS “must be organized

and written so as to be readily understandable by

governmental decisionmakers and by interested non-

professional laypersons likely to be affected by actions

taken under the [FEIS].” Or. Envtl. Council v.

Kunzman, 817 F.2d 484, 494 (9th Cir. 1987).

1. NEPA Challenges to FEISs’ Analyses of Logging

Activities

Earth Island challenges various aspects of the

analyses of logging contained in the two FEISs. Most

significantly, it challenges the analysis of tree mortality

and the use of the proposed mortality guidelines con-

tained in the Power and Freds FEISs. It also challenges

the FEISs’ conclusions that there is a lack of adequate

soil cover in the project areas, and that the retention of

large snags (dead trees) would result in a hazardous

level of surface fuels.

a. Tree Mortality Guidelines

Earth Island argues that the FEISs’ guidelines for

cutting burned and scorched trees substantially over-

predict tree mortality, with the result that many more

trees will be cut than are necessary to meet the

19a

legitimate objectives of the Power and Freds Projects.

Earth Island argues that by cutting many trees that will

not die, the USFS will unnecessarily destroy valuable

habitat for the California spotted owl and certain MIS

bird species.

The tree mortality guidelines contained in the FEISs

are based upon the 2005 draft Hood Study. That study

predicts post-fire mortality for trees burned or scorched

in forest fires. The guidelines for both projects are

keyed to the percentage of the tree’s green crown that

has been scorched by the fires.

Based on data contained in the Hood Study, the

USFS chose two different marking guidelines, one for

areas to be logged by tractor and one for areas to be

logged by helicopter or skyline. Table 3-5 of both of the

FEISs is entitled “Mortality Guidelines for marking as

applied to [various alternatives].” For simplicity of

explanation, we will describe the guidelines only as they

apply to yellow pine and white fir, and only as to

helicopter and skyline logging. Yellow pine with 65% or

more of the length of their crown scorched are con-

sidered dead, and are to be marked for cutting. The

same crown length scorch percentages apply to white fir

over 20" in diameter.

For the convenience of the reader, we reproduce

Table 3-5:

20a

PP/JP/SP White White

[yellow Fir Fir Incense Red _ Douglas

pine] <20" >20" Cedar Fir Fir

Tractor Logging System

Crown

Seorch* 75% 95% 80% 100% ? ?

Crown Scorch

+ RTB

or Ambrosia

Beetle ?

Helicopter and Skyline Logging Systems

Crown

Seorch* 65% 85% 65% 95% ? ?

Crown Scorch

+ RTB

or Ambrosia

Beetle ?

* As a percentage of the original live crown. Percentage of green foliage

would not be used for ponderosa or Jeffrey pine until the 2005 needle flush

is visible. Any marking prior to needle flush would be limited to pines with

100% black crown.

Table 3-6 of the FEISs is entitled “Probability of Tree Mortality.” Both

FEISs state, “Table 3-6 indicates the probability of tree mortality to

individual trees meeting the Power (and Freds| Fire marking guidelines

(Correctly Predicted Mortality) and the predicted survival of trees with

less fire damage than the minimum requirements of the marking

guidelines (Correctly Predicted Survival).” According to Table 3-6, a

yellow pine cut in accordance with the 65% crown length scorch guideline

of Table 3-5 has a 90% “Correctly Predicted Mortality.” A white fir over

20" in diameter cut in accordance with the guidelines has a 87% “Correctly

Predicted Mortality.”

2la

For the convenience of the reader, we reproduce Table 3-6. We have

italicized the numbers 90 and 87 to indicate the “correctly predicted

mortality” percentages for yellow pine and white fir cut in accordance

with the 65% crown length scorch guideline:

PP/JP/SP White Incense Red Douglas

[yellow pine] Fir Cedar Fir Fir

Tractor Logging System

Correctly

Predicted

Mortality (%) 96 95 100 100

Correctly

Predicted

Survival (%) 51 63 88 _ _

Helicopter and Skyline Logging Systems

Correctly

Predicted

Mortality (%) 90 87 85 100 —

Correctly

Predicted

Survival (%) 65 74 89 _ uate

Earth Island contends that the findings contained in

the draft Hood Study, as well as in other studies, have

substantially different percentage estimates of tree

mertality from the percentages contained in Table 3-6.

F.arth Island relies upon the declaration of Dr. Edwin B.

Royce in support of its contention. Royce has a Ph.D. in

Botany with a specialization in Forest Plant Ecology

from the University of California at Davis, and a Ph.D.

in Applied Physics from Harvard University. Royce has

had twelve years of experience in the characterization of

forest vegetation.

22a

The USFS challenges the admissibility of Royce’s

declaration, as well as other expert declarations offered

by Earth Island, because they were not before the

agency during the administrative review process. We

allow extra-record materials if necessary to “determine

whether the agency has considered all relevant factors

and has explained its decision.” Sw. Ctr. for Biological

Diversity v. U.S. Forest Serv., 100 F.3d 1443, 1450 (9th

Cir. 1996). Because Earth Island’s expert declarations

are offered for this purpose, they were properly before

the district court and are properly before this court on

review.

According to Royce, yellow pine and white fir are

both “thick bark trees” whose bark provides significant

protection of the living tissue beneath the bark.

According to Royce, “|c|rown kill is commonly the do-

minant source of fire-induced mortality in large trees

having thick bark, such as white fir or yellow pine.”

However, “[flall fires, such as the Power and Fred’s

fires, are least damaging to conifers. In part this is

because reserves of stored products of photosynthesis

are high and because new growth throughout the trees

is less vulnerable to damage then, as compared to that

same growth during the summer growing season.” “A

low-intensity surface fire commonly produces only

partial crown kill and only minimal mortality in larger

trees. Trees tolerate partial crown kill in a surface fire

in part because only the lower part of the crown is

normally killed. The lower part of the crown is less

photosynthetically productive than is the upper part.”

For yellow pine, Royce states, “[t|he mortality

guidelines for yellow pine (ponderosa and Jeffrey pine)

will permit the harvest of trees with a substantial

23a

probability of surviving if they were not harvested.”

The Royce declaration contains tables showing pre-

dicted tree mortality in the Hood Study, as well as in

three other studies. Those other studies were by Ryan

and Reinhardt, by Stephens and Finney, and by

McHugh and Kolb. Royce states as to yellow pine, “[{fJor

helicopter and skyline logging, mortalities from

the{ Hood Study] models are 60% and 70%, as compared

to a 90% mortality claimed in the FEIS and ROD.”

Mortalities predicted by the three other studies are even

more at variance from the mortality predicted in the

FEISs. Royce states,

[T]he guidelines for helicopter and skyline logging

will allow the cutting of small trees that have

probabilities of mortality between 12% and 57% and

large trees with mortality probabilities between 11%

and 32% (compared with 90% mortality claimed by

the FEIS’s). Even if one accepts only the largest of

the probabilities of mortality—that given by the Ryan

and Reinhardt paper—this still translates into a

worst case probability of survival of up to 68% for

trees that could be cut (meaning 68% of the trees

logged would otherwise survive). (emphasis in

original.)

In addition, Royce states that he personally evaluated 39

yellow pine that were part of the data base for the Hood

Study, and “found evidence of measurement errors that

would lead to the development of models that over

predict mortality.” According to Royce,

I measured the average amount of crown kill on these

trees to be 88%, whereas, the [Hood Study] field

workers evaluated the same damage to average 64%.

A small part of this difference may be due to the fact

that my measurements were crown volume measure-

24a

ments, whereas, the [Hood Study] measurements

were linear measurements. However, as discussed

[earlier in my declaration], this should produce only

a few percent difference between the two measure-

ments. I suggest that at least a substantial part of

the difference between the two measurements is a

result of the [Hood Study] field workers underesti-

mating crown kill. This will result in a model that

over predicts mortality when correct crown kill values

are used. A corrected [Hood Study] model yielding

lower mortality predictions would make the proposed

guidelines even less defensible.

For white fir, Royce states, “[t]he mortality guidelines

for large white fir will permit the harvest of trees with

a substantial probability of surviving if they were not

harvested.” As he does for yellow pine, Royce presents

tables showing predicted tree mortality in the Hood

Study, as well as in the three other studies. He states as

to white fir, “[fJor the helicopter and skyline logging of

large trees, mortalities from the[ Hood Study] models

are between 25% and 45%, as compared to an 87%

mortality claimed in the FEIS and ROD.” Just as with

yellow pine, mortalities predicted by the three other

studies are even more at variance from the mortalities

predicted in the FEISs. Royce states,

the guidelines for helicopter or skyline logging will

allow the cutting of large trees with mortality

probabilities between 7% and 50%, as compared to

the 87% mortality claimed in the FEIS’s. Even if one

accepts only the largest of these predictions of

mortality—that given by the Ryan and Reinhardt

paper—this still translates into a worst case pro-

bability of survival (in helicopter units) of up to 50%

for trees that could be cut. (emphasis in original).

25a

In response, the USFS relies on a declaration of Sheri

L. Smith. Smith is one of the three co-authors of the

draft Hood Study. She has B.S. and M.S. degrees in

Biology and Entomology from Utah State University.

She has been an USFS employee for 15 years. She has

been “involved in evaluating fire-injured trees in

California since 1991.”

Smith makes three points in response to the Royce

declaration. First, she contends that Royce misunder-

stood Table 3-6. As noted above, that table is entitled

“Probability of Tree Mortality.” Royce understood the

percentages contained in that table as indicating the

probability that a tree will die. For example, Table 3-6

indicates that a yellow pine with a minimum of 75%

scorched crown (the guideline for tractor logging) has a

“correctly predicted mortality” of 96%, and a “correctly

predicted survival” of 51%. Royce understood the table

to mean that 96% of yellow pine with a minimum of 75%

scorched crown will die.

Smith responds,

The marking guidelines used for the Power and

Freds fire are based on models that use percent

crown kill. . . . I attach a true and correct copy of

an excerpt of the models which are the basis for the

Power and Freds marking guidelines (Attachment A).

Mr. Royce states that Table 3-6 represents that

96% of trees with 75% crown kill will die. This is

simply incorrect. The 96% in Table 3-6 (classification

table) shows that the marking guideline model used

by the Forest Service is correct in predicting mortal-

ity 96% of the time when our individual study trees

are run through the model. In other words, the 96%

is an estimate of the accuracy of the model, not of the

26a

percentage of mortality as Mr. Royce states. Both

FEISs accurately interpret the findings of our paper

in light of the specific marking guideline model

selected by the Forest Service.

The percentages shown in Table 3-6 (classifi-

cation table) of both the Power and Freds FEIS are

derived from the entire [Hood Study] dataset, which,

for yellow pine, is based on measurements of 1,969

trees. The models in our paper take these percent-

ages to arrive at a statistical probability of mortality

for an individual tree. The probability of mortality

(Pm) ranges from 0.0 to 1.0, with 1.0 being certain

mortality. The Forest Service selected a Pm of 0.90

for all ground-based harvest units. For yellow pine,

a Pm of 0.90 corresponds to a crown length kill of

75%. Using this criterion, the marking guideline

model correctly predicted mortality for yellow pine

trees in the [Hood Study] dataset 96% of the time and

correctly predicted survival 50% of the time. In other

words, using a Pm of 0.90 (75% crown kill), only 4% of

the trees the model predicts will die, actually

survived, but 50% of the trees predicted to survive

eventually died... .

This means that there is a high likelihood of cor-

rectly predicting mortality, but a lower likelihood of

correctly predicting survival using the 75% crown

scorch model, which means that it is much more

likely that the Forest Service is leaving trees behind

that will later die, than it is taking trees that would

have survived. This is directly contrary to Mr.

Royce’s assertions [.] . . The same misinterpreta-

tion of the data is true for Mr. Royce’s discussion of

yellow pine on helicopter and skyline harvest units

27a

and all white fir, all of which misinterpret the

percentages in Table 3-6 to be something other than

what they are—a verification of the accuracy of the

marking guideline model using the [Hood Study]

dataset.

(emphasis in original).

Second, Smith responds that Royce estimated the

probability that a tree will die based on the percentage

volume of crown kill. By contrast, the Hood Study

estimated the probability based on the percentage

length of crown kill. Therefore, according to Smith,

Royce’s comparisons are “problematic.”

Third, Smith responds that two of the three other

studies upon which Royce relies for his comparison—the

studies of Stephens and Finney, and of McHugh and

Kolb—are based on “prescribed fires.” According to

Smith, “[m|]ost often, the objective of a prescribed fire is

to limit the mortality of the overstory while reducing

fuel loadings and ingrowth of smaller trees. Our model

is more appropriate to the type of fire represented by

the Freds and Power fires, which killed not only the

ingrowth of smaller trees, but also resulted in high

levels of crown kill of larger trees.”

We analyze Smith’s three points in turn. First, Smith

contends Royce has misunderstood Table 3-6. Accord-

ing to Smith, the percentage figures given for “correctly

predicted mortality”—such as 96% for yellow pine with

a minimum of 75% crown length scorch—do not predict

the percentage of trees that will die. Rather, these

figures predict the accuracy of the prediction of the

percentage of these trees that will die. Similarly,

according to Smith, the percentage figures for “cor-

rectly predicted survival”—such as 51% for yellow pine

28a

with a minimum of 75% crown length scorch—do not

predict the percentage of trees that will live. Rather,

they predict the aceuracy of the prediction of the

percentage of these trees that will live. Smith may well

be correct. Indeed, it appears from the face of Table 3-6

that she may be, for if the table predicted the

percentage of trees that will die or live, as distinct from

predicting the accuracy of the predictions of these

percentages, the percentages given in the table should

add up to 100%. Instead, in the example given for

yellow pine with 75% crown length scorch, they add up

to 147% (96% plus 51%).

But even if Smith is correct, this does not solve the

problem. Table 3-6 is, to say the least, misleading. Its

title is “Probability of Tree Mortality,” rather than

“Probability that Predictions of Probability of Tree

Mortality and Survival are Correct.” Second, there is no

other table in the FEISs providing the probability of

tree mortality. The absence of such a table is signifi-

cant. The single most important aspect of the FEISs is

their estimate of the likelihood that trees with certain

amounts of fire damage will die. This is so for the

obvious reason that the justification for cutting burned

or scorched trees is the likelihood that they will die.

Any reader of the FEISs will therefore look for a table

providing probability of tree mortality. The only table

in the FEISs that appears to provide that information is

Table 3-6. It is not unforeseeable that a reader—even

an expert reader such as Royce—would misunderstand

the table. Further, the explanation for Table 3-6 pro-

vided by Smith’s declaration in the district court is

nowhere provided in the FEISs. For example, Attach-

ment A to Smith’s declaration is not provided, or even

referred to, in the FEISs. The absence of such an

29a

explanation in the FEISs obviously increases the chance

that the table will be misunderstood.

Further, the Royce declaration provides tree

mortality percentages given in the draft Hood Study,

and he compares those percentages to those given in

Table 3-6. The Hood Study percentages provided by

Royce are not contested by Smith. (This is not

surprising, given that Smith is a co-author of the Hood

Study.) The Hood Study mortality percentages are

substantially lower than the percentages given in Table

3-6. Yet those percentages are not provided in the text

of the FEISs. If the USFS had been truly interested in

educating the reader as to the actual percentages of

trees likely to die from scorch damage, it would have

provided those percentages in the FEISs. Instead, it

provided Table 3-6 (entitled “Probability of Tree

Mortality”) giving percentages of “correctly predicted

mortality.” Even if the USFS could properly rely on the

draft Hood Study instead of other tree moriality

studies—a question we do not here decide—it should

have provided the mortality percentage figures in the

Hood Study rather than, or in addition to, the figures in

Table 3-6.

Second, Smith responds that the comparisons used by

Royce to estimate tree mortality are based on percen-

tage volume of crown kill rather than percentage length

of crown kill. We note initially that Smith’s response

has no application to the comparison between the per-

centage numbers given in Table 3-6 and those given in

the Hood Study. Both Table 3-6 and the Hood Study

were based on the same methodology—correlating

percentage length of crown kill with likelihood of tree

death. Further, we note that with respect to studies

30a

that relied on percentage volume rather than percentage

length of crown kill, Royce had explained in his declara-

tion why the FEISs’ emphasis on the difference in the

two type of crown kill measurements is misleading. He

wrote:

Tables 3-4 in both the Power and Fred’s fire

FEIS’s show a relationship between these two mea-

sures of crown kill in which the volume measure is

much larger than the linear measure for the same

amount of damage. However, these tables are valid

only for young trees with a tapered shape, similar to

the classic conical Christmas tree shape shown in

figure F-1 of the Powers FEIS or figure A-1 of the

Fred’s FEIS. Large, mature trees growing in a forest

surrounded by other trees have a shape more like a

cylinder, tapered only in the topmost branches. . . .

It is to mature trees that the guidelines [in the

FEIS’s] are to be applied to determine if the trees are

dying and hence subject to salvage harvest. In the

context of the salvage of mature trees, the inclusion

of these tables and figures in the FEIS’s is

completely misleading.

My experience measuring mature trees on the

Eldorado-Star fire site . . . was that, within the

uncertainty with which these determinations can be

made in the field, the two measures give the same

numerical value for crown kill.

Third, Smith responds that two of the three other

studies used by Royce for comparison were based on

“prescribed fires.” According to Smith, reliance on

these two studies—the Stephens and Finney study and

the McHugh and Kolb study—was inappropriate

because the Power and Freds Fires “resulted in high

3la

levels of crown kill of larger trees” compared with the

levels of crown kill in the prescribed fires. It may well

be that, as Smith says, the prescribed fires resulted in

lower levels of crown kill in larger trees. But Smith

does not explain why that makes a difference. As those

two studies are described by Royce, they predict tree

mortality based on the actual percentage of crown kill in

particular trees. The fact that fewer trees have that

degree of crown kill in a prescribed fire should not make

any difference in the predicted mortality of those trees

that actually have a high level of crown kill.

Further, Smith does not mention the third study upon

which Royce relies—the Ryan and Reinhardt study. Of

the three studies, this one gives the highest probability

of tree mortality. Royce explicitly discusses and relies

on the Ryan and Reinhardt study in his conclusion that

the FEISs overpredict tree mortality. For example, as

indicated above, Royce writes with respect to yellow

pine, “[e]ven if one accepts only the largest of these

probabilities of mortality—that given by the Ryan and

Reinhardt paper—this still translates into a worst case

probability of survival of up to 68% for trees that could

be eut[.}”

We recognize that the FEISs discount two of the

studies—those by Stephens and Finney and by Ryan

and Reinhardt. The Power and Freds FEISs both

discount the Stephens and Finney study on the ground

that its purpose was not to provide salvage guidelines,

and that some of its data were obtained pre-rather than

post-fire. The Powers FEIS discounts the Ryan and

Reinhardt study as involving only one of the species

(Douglas fir) that occurs in the Power Fire area. The

Freds FEIS discounts that study in slightly different

32a

terras, stating, “[rJesults from the Ryan and Reinhardt

1988 study were obtained mostly for tree species not

found in, and geographic regions not related to, the

Sierra Nevada.” But even if we must discount both of

these studies—a question we do not decide—the

McHugh and Kolb study remains. That study was not

discussed, or discounted, in either of the FEISs.

In the end, we conclude that the USFS abused its

discretion in its estimates of likely tree mortality in both

the Power and Freds FEISs. We will assume, for

purposes of our analysis, that the Smith declaration

correctly states what the percentage numbers in Table

3-6 really mean. But even if the Smith declaration is

correct, Table 3-6 is, for the reasons given above,

extremely misleading. A casual, or even a careful,

reader of the FEISs and of Table 3-6 could easily con-

clude that 96% of yellow pine with a minimum of 75%

crown length scorch will die, or that 90% with a mini-

mum of 65% crown length scorch will die. If those were,

in fact, the percentages of yellow pine with that degree

of fire damage that will die, it would be easy to conclude

that the USFS is justified in cutting all yellow pine that

satisfy those criteria. But those are not the percentages

of trees that will die.

The Hood Study itself estimates a substantially lower

tree mortality than the percentage numbers provided in

Table 3-6. The other three studies estimate even lower

tree mortalities. It is possible that those who prepared

the FEISs, and the Forest Supervisor who signed the

RODs based on the FEISs, understood Table 3-6 in the

way Royce understood it. If this is so, the USFS abused

its discretion, for it failed to take the requisite “hard

look” at the data underlying their analysis and decision.

33a

Kern, 284 F.3d at 1066. It is also possible that those

who prepared the FEISs, and the Forest Supervisor,

understood Table 3-6 in precisely the way Smith

described it in her declaration. If this is so, the USFS

also abused it discretion, for it failed to reveal the actual

percentages upon which it relied and it drafted highly

misleading FEISs. Native Ecosystems Council, 418

F.3d at 965. Under the first alternative, the USFS

misunderstood the data; under the second, it under-

stood but concealed and misrepresented the data.

Under either alternative, it abused its discretion.

b. Soil Cover

Goth the Power and the Freds FEISs state that a

goai of the restoration projects is to provide effective

ground cover as a means of reducing erosion and stream

sedimentation. Both FEISs specify that the average soil

cover should be between 50% to 60%. The FEISs

propose to achieve this amount of soil coverage by using

debris from trees that are logged according to the

mortality guidelines discussed above—in their words, by

using “tops and limbs of dead and dying trees.”

According to the Power F'EIS, there was an average

of 11% to 30% ground cover in areas of moderate-

severity burns after the fire. There was an average of

0% to 10% ground cover in areas of high-severity burns.

The average projected ground cover after needles

scorched by the fire had fallen to the ground was

estimated to be 51% to 70% in modcrate-severity burn

areas, and 20% to 30% in high-severity burn areas.

According to the Freds FEIS, there was an average of

17% ground cover in moderate-severity burn areas, and

an average of 9% in high-severity burn areas. Following

needlecast, the projected ground cover was 46% in

34a

moderate-severity burn areas, and 19% in high-severity

burn areas.

Earth Island argues that these figures for soil

coverage are based on information obtained in site visits

immediately after the fire, and that more recent visits

show that effective soil cover already exceeds 50% to

60% in severely burned areas. In support of this

argument, Earth Island offers the declaration of

Jonathan J. Rhodes. Rhodes has a B.S. in Hydrology

and Water Resources from the University of Arizona,

and an M.S. in Hydrology and Hydrogeology from the

University of Nevada-Reno. He has also finished all

required academic work toward a Ph.D. in forest

hydrology at the University of Washington. He has had

more than twenty-two years of experience as a

hydrologist.

Rhodes visited what he described as six high-severity

burn areas within the Power Fire area on August 11,

2005. He found that needles, twigs, and branches that

had fallen since the fire, as well as new vegetative

growth, had increased soil cover substantially. He

stated in his declaration:

I measured soil cover in areas where my visual

estimates indicated that soil cover was lowest. Thus,

my measurements include those in areas with soil

cover that is well below the average within the pro-

posed Power project area as a whole. My measure-

ments and evaluation of soil cover conditions within

the areas of the proposed Power logging project

unequivocally demonstrate that as of August 11, 2005,

soil cover is well-distributed and greater than 60% in

the overwhelming majority of areas burned at high

severity. In the areas that I measured soil cover, the

35a

lowest level of soil cover that I measured was 59%;

soil cover in the other five areas measured ranged

from 66-91%. Even this lowest level of measured soil

cover exceeds the 50% target that Power and Freds

FEIS state should be exceeded.

Rhodes continued, “{b]ased on conditions within the

area, it is unquestionable that soil cover from {conifer

regeneration, and needles, branches, and logs from

burned trees] will continue to steadily increase over the

next several years.” He concluded, “there is not a

pressing need to try to increase soil cover via logging in

order to reduce soil erosion. This is especially true

because logging always causes increased soil damage

and elevated erosion.” (emphasis in original).

The USFS responded with a declaration by Jeffrey

TenPas. TenPas has a M.S. in Soil Science from the

University of California, Davis. He is an employee of

the USFS. He has had more than fifteen years of

experience in soil science. TenPas assessed soil cover

immediately after the Power Fire. He then revisited the

Power Fire area on August 19, 2005, after reading the

Rhodes declaration. TenPas wrote, “|cjontrary to Mr.

Rhodes findings, portions of the high severity burned

areas in the Power Project area have existing ground

cover much less than 50%.” He suggested that Rhodes

might have been examining a “more moderately burned

area that received significant needle cast,” rather than

a high-severity burn area. TenPas stated:

The pattern of recovery [in the Power Project area]

was consistent with expectations. Needle cast had

provided adequate ground cover in low and moderate

severity burned areas. Bear clover, where it was

present, covered an estimated 0 to 70% cover at the

36a

scale of 200 transects. In high severity burned areas,

bear clover was the predominant component in

vegetative recovery in areas I visited. Various forbs

provided a trace to 5% cover. In high severity burned

areas without bear clover, ground cover was as low as

1%, that from a trace of needles.

He concluded, “liJn sum, my observations indicate that

there remain portions of high severity burned areas

where soil cover is deficient . . . . Timber harvest can

contribute additional cover in these areas.”

As in Earth Island, we conclude that “[a]t this stage,

the record does not allow us to conclude that the Forest

Service acted arbitrarily and capriciously in relying on

its own data and discounting the alternative evidence

offered by the Plaintiffs.” Farth Island, 351 F.3d at

1302. This is especially so in light of the deference given

to the “reasonable opinions of [an agency’s] own ex-

perts.” /d. at 1301.

c. Fuel Loading

Both the Power and Freds FEISs state that a goal of

the restoration projects is to reduce fuel loading on the

ground so as to reduce the risk of future catastrophic

fires, and to avoid safety hazards to workers and recrea-

tion visitors. Specifically, the Power FEIS rejected an

alternative that would have retained four large snags

per acre outside PACs for the California spotted owl.

The Freds FEIS rejected an alternative that would have

retained four to eight large snags per acre outside

PACs. Earth Island challenges the FEISs’ rejection of

these alternatives, arguing that retaining this number of

large snags would not impede the goals of reducing long-

term fuel loading and safety hazards.

37a

According to the Power FEIS, in areas where four

large snags per acre would be retained, fuel levels 25

years after the fire would be approximately 38 to 40 tons

per acre. According to the Freds FEIS, in areas where

four to eight snags per acre would be retained, fuel loads

would be 16 to 50 tons per acre by year 25. The USFS

contends that these levels of fuel loading would provide

significant fuel, contribute to severe soil heating, and

impede effective fire suppression efforts.

As with soil cover, above, we cannot confidently

discern from the present record whether Earth Island’s

contentions about fuel-loading have validity. We

therefore cannot say, at this point, that the USFS has

acted arbitrarily and capriciously in rejecting the

alternatives that would have retained four snags per

acre in the Power Fire area.and four to eight snags per

acre in the Freds Fire area.

2. NEPA Challenge to Analysis of Effects of

Logging on California Spotted Owls

Earth Island argues that the USFS has failed to take

a “hard look” at the effects of the Power and Freds

Projects on the California spotted owl. The California

spotted owl was identified as a “species at risk” in the

2001 Framework. “Species at risk are those with a high

level of concern whose ranges are not peripheral to the

Sierra Nevada and that occur in old forest ecosystems.”

As reported in the 2004 Supplement, the Fish and:

Wildlife Service (“FWS”) declared in February 2003

that the California spotted owl would not be listed as an

endangered species under the Endangered Species Act

because there was “no definite evidence that the

population is decreasing across its range, and various

analytical results of the individual study areas are not

38a

wholly supportive of conclusions regarding declines in

any given study area.”

However, because changes in the Sierra Nevada

Framework could affect the California spotted owl, the

FWS has stated that it will continue to monitor the

owl. Within the last year, the FWS issued a “90-day

finding” under the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C.

§ 1533(b)(2)(A), as a prelude to a possible determination

that the California spotted owl should be listed under

the Act. 90-Day on a Petition to List the California

Spotted Owl as Threatened or Endangered, 70 Fed.

Reg. 35,607 (June 21, 2005). The FWS stated that “the

petition presents substantial scientific or commercial

evidence that listing the species may be warranted.”

Id. The FWS is currently engaged in a 12-month review

of the California spotted ow] as required by 16 U.S.C. §

4(b)(3)(B). Jd. Among the factors prompting the 12

month review was the 2004 Supplement, as well as new

evidence concerning the effects of fires on the owls. /d.

at 35,612.

Under the 2004 Supplement, PACs for California

spotted owls must be maintained regardless of actual

occupancy by owls. After a stand-replacing event such

as a major fire, habitat conditions within a 1.5-mile

radius around the PAC must be evaluated in order to

identify opportunities for re-mapping a destroyed or

diminished PAC. Only if there is insufficient suitable

habitat for designating a PAC within this 1.5-mile radius

can a PAC be delisted.

Earth Island argues that the FEISs allow for exces-

sive cutting of trees that would otherwise survive in

areas used by California spotted owls, do not adequately

t#ke into account studies showing the owls’ use of

39a

already-burned areas, allow the creation of isolated

islands of habitat, and fail to retain sufficient numbers

of large snags for use by owls. Earth Island relies upon

the declaration of Monica Bond, who has a B.A. in

Biology from Duke University and an M.S. in Wildlife

Science from Oregon State University. She is the lead

author of two peer reviewed studies of the California

spotted owl published in 2002 and 2004. Bond contends

that the Power and Fred Projects

will have significant negative effects on the California

spotted owl by substantially reducing the amount of

potential foraging habitat within the project sites, by

a) utilizing inaccurate mortality guidelines (see

Declaration of Edwin Royce) which incorrectly

categorize some areas withing the Power and Fred’s

project areas as high-severity burn (and thus unsuit-

able for owls) when they are in fact live tree areas

available to the owl for foraging purposes; b) ignoring

significant new scientific information which indicates

that spotted owls actually utilize forests burned at

even high severities; c) by allowing pockets of forest

unburned or burned at low- to moderate severity

within a severe burn area to become isolated islands

of habitat and reducing their value to the spotted owl;

and d) failing to maintain large snags throughout the

areas designated to be logged, for recruitment as

legacy trees when the forest regenerates in the

future. In addition, these projects call for extensive

clearcut logging of habitat elements important to

spotted owls (large trees and snags) within currently

occupied spotted owl Protected Activity Centers

(“PACs”) and Home Range Core Areas (“HRCAs’”).

All of these activities will result in the loss of

potentially critical foraging grounds that are neces-

40a

sary to maintain the population of California spotted

owls in the Eldorado National Forest.

The USFS responds with a declaration by Chuck

Loffland, a wildlife biologist employed by the USFS.

Loffland does not describe his academic background.

He states that he has been conducting surveys of the

California spotted owl and performing analyses of

effects on the owl since 1989. He concedes that “it

appears from the few studies cited by Ms. Bond that

owls may use burned habitat to some degree,” but that

“the scope and duration of that use are not well studied

or well understood.” He notes that Bond herself states

that more scientific study is needed. He states further:

Ms. Bond claims that most or all of the PACs will be

clearcut . . . . This is simply untrue. First, there

will be no salvage activity within suitable habitat.

For the non-core (unsuitable) portion of PACs within

the Power project area, salvage will only remove

hazard trees and trees that are dead with 100% crown

kill in excess of the 4 largest size class snags per acre

retained. This will leave behind 4 large snags/acre

and all trees that have any green needles and even a

remote chance of surviving . . . . Although Ms.

Bond characterizes project activity in the PACs as

wholly detrimental to the owl, the Forest Service

decided to remove dead and hazard trees from non-

core PAC areas in order to provide protection against

stand-destroying fire. (emphasis in original).

Loffland also disputes some of Bond’s characteri-

zations of the logging that will take place within speci-

fied PACs.

According to the Power FEIS, there were approxi-

mately 5,880 acres of suitable owl habitat before the

4la

Power Fire; this habitat was reduced to 2,750 acres as

a result of the fire. Ten PACs were in the Power Fire

area before the fire. One was not affected by the fire and

no treatment was proposed; one was burned at high and

moderate intensity, and the USFS determined that not

enough suitable habitat remained to support a PAC;

and the boundaries of the remaining eight were redrawn

to encompass the best remaining habitat within a 1.5

mile radius of the center of the area. Within seven of

these redrawn PACs, the USFS determined that certain

areas were unsuitable for spotted owl habitat (deemed

“non-core” areas) and that salvage logging in these non-

core areas could proceed, but leaving standing the four

largest snags (dead trees) per acre. No logging is

permitted within the “core,” or suitable habitat, areas of

any PAC.

An analysis of the direct effects of the Power Project

was limited to the area that currently remains suitable

for nesting or foraging. Because no logging is allowed

in core areas, the Power FEIS notes that any direct

effects would be limited to hazard zone areas, meaning

roads, power line corridors, and the fire flume. Thus,

the potential direct effects were limited to the removal

of roadside hazard trees on 295 acres of key habitat

within PACs. In addition, the Power Project is esti-

mated to affect 660 acres of the 10,560 total suitable

HRCA acres that are within or adjacent to the Power

Project area.

In discussing the indirect effects, the Power FEIS

states that in high- and moderate-intensity burn areas

in HRCAs, the largest 5.8 snags per acre will be re-

tained, but that salvage harvesting will proceed

according to the tractor-harvesting mortality guidelines.

42a

The cumulative effects analysis in the Power FEIS

focused on logging activities proposed for 540 acres of

private land within the Power Fire area and 873 acres of

private land outside the area; on a project to thin trees

in order to reduce fuel loads; and on the planned

replanting of 700 acres of burned plantation areas.

The Power FEIS states that the effect of the Power

Project may be to reduce the quality of owl habitat, but

that the project would not reduce the overall amount of

owl habitat. The Power FEIS predicts that to the extent

the Power Project increases future fire resiliency, it may

have the effect of increasing the amount of available

habitat in the long run. It concludes that there would be

no trend resulting in the federal listing of the California

spotted owl as an endangered species.

In the Freds Fire area, all or portions of three

spotted owl PACs were present before the fire. One

PAC burned at high and moderate intensity, and the

USFS determined that insufficient habitat remained to

support this PAC. The boundaries of the remaining two

PACs were redrawn to encompass the best 1.5 miles of

habit surrounding the center of the area. The Freds

FEIS proposed logging in non-core areas of the redrawn

PACs.

According to the Freds FEIS, approximately 3,255

acres of suitable owl habitat existed on both national

forest and private land before the Freds Fire. After the

fire, only 285 suitable acres remained in areas of low-

intensity burn, while approximately 1,848 acres

remained in areas of moderate- and high-intensity burn.

In addition, some 332 acres of green trees are scattered

across the moderate- and high-intensity burn areas.

43a

According to the direct and indirect effects analysis

in the Freds FEIS, no logging would take place in core

areas within the PACs; no logging would be proposed in

areas of low-intensity burn; and hardwoods and green

trees would not be harvested in areas of moderate- and

high-intensity burn. The FEIS also notes that while the

332 acres of remaining scattered green trees provide

some post-fire habitat for the owls, suitability in those

332 acres would “likely be reduced over time as more

fire-weakened trees die. Dead trees lose foliage and

therefore would reduce canopy closure to levels below

what is preferred by owls.”

The USFS argues that it adopted a conservative

approach to logging in both FEISs in order to ensure

that the California spotted owl is protected. It points to

the fact that it assumed the presence of owls in PACs

pending the completion of surveys. It also argues that

it considered the information concerning the owl’s use of

post-fire habitat and determined that the findings were

too inconclusive to affect its impact analysis.

We have elsewhere interpreted the “hard look” re-

quirement as entailing both a complete discussion of

relevant issues as well as meaningful statements re-

garding the actual impact of proposed projects. In

Native Ecosystems Council, we held that where an EIS

used a calculation for determining the summer range of

elk herd that was inconsistent with a specific require-

ment contained in the regional forest plan, the USFS

had not taken a hard look because it did not “provide a

full and fair discussion of the potential effects of the

project . . . and did not inform decisionmakers and the

public of the reasonable alternatives which would avoid

or minimize adverse impacts {to the elk at issue].” 418

44a

F.3d at 965(internal quotations and alterations omitted).

Likewise, in Klamath-Siskiyou Wildlands Center v.

Bureau of Land Management, 387 F.3d 989, 994-95 (9th

Cir. 2004), we held that an environmental assessment

(“EA”) did not take a “hard look” at the cumulative

impacts of a proposed action where the EA had sections

devoted to discussing direct, cumulative, and foresee-

able actions, but gave no objective or qualified assess-

ment of the combined environmental impacts of the

information presented. Most recently, we concluded

that where an EIS stated without meaningful explana-

tion that a post-fire salvage project would have a

negative impact on black-backed woodpeckers but would

not result in a trend toward federal listing, this did not

constitute a “hard lock.” Ecology Ctr., Inc. v. Austin,

430 F.3d 1057, 1067 (9th Cir. 2005).

In Earth Island, Earth Island claimed that the FEIS

for the Star Fire Restoration Project did not adequately

analyze the cumulative impact of the project’s destruc-

tion of an HRCA on the California spotted owl. Earth

Island, 351 F.3d at 1306-07. While the FEIS in Harth

Island had acknowledged that spotted owls exhibit

“high site fidelity” and that a pair of owls had returned

to the project area, it “never assessed the potential role

of the remaining suitable habitat within the former

HRCA for a maintained [PAC] despite the acknowl-

edged presence of owls in the area.” Jd. at 1307. For

this reason, we held that the “omission amounts to an

insufficient consideration of cumulative impact under

NEPA.” Id.

We conclude that the Power and Freds FEISs have

not taken the requisite “hard look” at the effects of the

two projects on the California spotted owl. We con-

45a

cluded above that the FEISs did not adequately analyze

probable tree mortality. The likely consequence of the

apparent overprediction of tree mortality is excessive

logging. This likely excessive logging, in turn, is likely

to produce adverse effects on the California spotted owl

that are not adequately analyzed in the FEISs.

Further, it is likely that the projects will substantially

reduce potential foraging habitat because the FEISs’

designation of non-core areas, where logging will occur,

is based upon the USFS’s determination that because

these areas were heavily burned they are not likely to be

suitable owl habitat. According to Bond—both in her

declaration and in her published work—the California

spotted owl uses burned areas for foraging in the short-

term, and these areas may also provide important

benefits in the long-term.

The FEISs cannot assume that simply because the

owl habitat studies are preliminary, the adverse impacts

discussed therein will not occur. Rather, the FEISs

must respond explicitly and directly to conflicting views

in order to satisfy NEPA’s procedural requirements. By

removing trees that might survive in areas it assumes to

be unsuitable for California spotted owl habitat, the

FEISs allow logging in what could well be suitable

habitat. The FEISs do not explain in any detail how

their determinations that habitat was “unsuitable” were

made, and do not investigate or analyze how redrawing

the boundaries of the PACs and HRCAs might

negatively impact the owls. We therefore conclude that

the FEISs do not satisfy the requirement under NEPA

that the agency take a “hard look” and that there be a

“full and fair discussion” allowing informed public

participation and informed decision-making.

46a

B. Likelihood of Success on the Merits of Earth

Island’s Challenge under the NFMA

Earth Island argues that the FEISs’ reliance on the

Breeding Bird Survey (“BBS”) does not satisfy its

obligations under the NFMA to conduct populatien

surveys for certain Management Indicator Species

(“MIS”) bird species. The NFMA requires that a forest

plan “comply with substantive requirements of the

{NFMA] designed to ensure continued diversity of plant

and animal communities and the continued viability of

wildlife in the forest ... .” Austin, 430 F.3d at 1063;

see also 16 U.S.C. § 1604(¢)(3)(B). The 2001 Framework

identifies certain birds as MIS species, for which

increased population monitoring is required. The 2004

Supplement incorporates the 2001 Framework’s

population-monitoring requirements.

The El! Dorado National Forest Land and Resource

Management Plan (“LRMP”), as well as both the Freds

and Power FEISs, list cavity-nesting birds, including

the black-backed woodpecker, hairy woodpecker, and

Williamson’s sapsucker, as MIS species. An MIS

species is a bellwether, or class representative, “for

other species that have the same special habitat needs of

population characteristics.” Inland Empire Pub. Lands

Council v. U.S. Forest Serv.,88 F.3d 754, 762 n. 11 (9th

Cir. 1996). The 2001 Framework states, “[p]opulation

and/or habitat monitoring will be conducted for all MIS

and species at risk. Varying levels of monitoring will be

conducted depending on the level of concern associated

with each species; as the level of concern about a species

increases, the investment in monitoring increases.” The

2001 Framework allows for a very limited degree of

habitat monitoring in lieu of actual population moni-

47a

toring, stating that “coarse habitat relationships

constitute a relatively insensitive index to the status of

populations and would only be appropriate for species

with a lower level of concern or for which the status of

the population were also being monitored.”

According to the 2001 Framework, the hairy wood-

pecker and Williamson’s sapsucker are low-vulnerability

MIS species. Low-vulnerability species are monitored

to determine changes in their distribution. Distribution

data consist of “changes in the presence of species

across a number of sample locations” and is a “spatially

explicit version of frequency of occurrence data.” In

addition, the 2001 Framework notes that in an area as

' large as the Sierra Nevadas, “changes in the distribution

of species represent ecologically significant information

on the status and change of populations.” Appendix E of

the 2001 Framework makes explicit that population data

must be collected for the hairy woodpecker and

Williamson’s sapsucker. The black-backed woodpecker

is not specifically mentioned in the 2001 Framework, but

it is designated as an MIS species in the LRMP and in

the two FEISs.

As a preliminary matter, we conclude that NFMA

regulations promulgated in 1982 apply to the 2001

Framework and 2004 Supplement. These regulations

require population monitoring. See 36 C.F.R. § 219.

Because the 2001 Framework and 2004 Supplement

were developed based on regulations in effect before

November 9, 2000, transitional rules, now contained at

36 C.F.R. § 219.14, govern this case. The applicable

regulation provides:

For units with plans developed, amended, or revised

using the provisions of the planning rule in effect

48a

prior to November 9, 2000, the Responsible Official

may comply with any obligations relating to manage-

ment indicator species by considering data and

analysis relating to habitat wnless the plan specifi-

cally requires population monitoring or population

surveys for the species. Site-specific monitoring or

surveying of a proposed project or activity area is not

required, put may be conducted at the discretion of

the Responsible Official.

36 C.F.R. § 219.14(f) (emphasis added).

The district court found that in light of the hairy

woodpecker and Williamson’s sapsucker’s classification

as “low vulnerability” species, a lower level of moni-

toring is envisioned for these birds, and that the use of

BBS data satisfies this lower level of monitoring. Earth

Island argues that the district court erred because the

BBS data are insufficient and inaccurate.

The BBS is a cooperative program sponsored by the

governments of the United States and Canada to

monitor several North American bird species. Under

the BBS, the Williamson’s sapsucker and black-backed

woodpecker are listed in the “red” category, meaning

that the results are “very imprecise” and the data suffer

from low regional abundance and small sample sizes.

The hairy woodpecker is listed in the “blue” category,

which reflects data of “moderate precision” and of

“moderate abundance,” but which still “may not provide

valid results.” The BBS notes other potential problems

in its overall data collection, specifically that the trends

do not take into account activity outside of the range of

the survey; that the surveys are only conducted by

roadside, and “may not be representative of regional

habitat changes”; and that within the range of the

49a

survey, many habitats are not well covered and that

species within those habitats are consequently “poorly

sampled.”

Although not controlling on this court, Sierra Club v.

Eubanks, 335 F. Supp. 2d 1070 (E.D. Ca. 2004), is

instructive. In Eubanks, the same district judge as in

this case granted a preliminary injunction against the

logging and proposed timber sale provided in the Red

Star Restoration Project. Jd. at 1073. The Tahoe

Forest Plan expressly provided for annual population

monitoring of MIS species, and it listed each species

“‘for which population trend data is expected to be

obtained.’ “ /d. at 1081 (quoting the administrative

record). The USFS argued that population survey

information was not required as long as MIS habitats

were adequately analyzed, and that because the Red

Star Restoration Project would not diminish the habitat

for MIS species, actual monitoring was not required.

Id. The district court agreed with this premise, stating

that “[h]abitat analysis is an acceptable substitute for

population trend data if there is enough underlying data

to support such an analysis . .. .” Jd. at 1082.

Nevertheless, the district court concluded that the Red

Star Restoration Project failed to comply with the El

Dorado LRMP, the Sierra Nevada Framework, and the

NFMA because underlying data for MIS species that

could provide the necessary information for a habitat

analysis did not exist. /d.

In its order denying Earth Island’s request for a

preliminary injunction, the district court distinguished

Eubanks by concluding that in this case, such under-

lying data, in the form of the BBS, do exist. In support

of this conclusion, the district court relied upon Forest

50a

Conservation Council v. Jacobs, 374 F. Supp.2d 1187,

1207 (N.D. Ga. 2005). In Jacobs, the district court found

that the BBS provided sufficient data. However in

Jacobs, the USFS relied on other data in addition to the

BBS. /d. at 1205.

We do allow the USFS to conduct habitat analyses in

place of population monitoring under certain circum-

stances. In Inland Empire Public Lands Council,

various environmental groups claimed that an EIS did

not perform a proper population analysis under the

NFMA for several sensitive species living in a project

area, including the black-backed woodpecker. 88 F.3d

at 759. We upheld the USF%S’s use of a habitat manage-

ment analysis where the USFS had (1) consulted field

studies showing how many acres of territory an

individual species needed; (2) assumed that the amount

of acreage remained constant no matter the actual size

of the individual species’ territory; and then (3)

examined the proposed alternatives to see how many

acres of necessary habitat remained after the timber

was harvested. Jd. We also upheld the USFS’s decision

to not engage in a detailed analysis of one species be-

cause nesting and feeding habitat requirements were

not available, stating that “an analysis that uses all the

scientific data currently available is a sound one.” /d. at

762.

The USFS relies upon /nland Empire to argue that

by analyzing the amount of habitat affected, rather than

direct population counts of the birds, it has satisfied the

NFMA. This argument fails for two reasons. First, a

plain reading of the regulations does not support the

USFS’s argument. The transitional rules state that the

USFS may use habitat analysis in lieu of population

5la

monitoring only when a forest plan does not specifically

require population monitoring. The 2001 Framework

and 2004 Supplement provide that the USFS may use

“population monitoring and/or habitat analyses.” How-

ever, in discussing the hairy woodpecker and William-

son’s sapsucker, the Framework expressly requires

“population monitoring,” specifically in the form of

“distribution data.” It is difficult to see how distribution

data could effectively be gathered in the absence of

actual population monitoring, and we reject the USFS’s

argument that it is under no obligation to determine

population trends for the hairy woodpecker or

Williamson’s sapsucker.

Second, although we agree that the USFS could have

relied on habitat monitoring for the black-backed

woodpecker, the USFS has not conducted a habitat

analysis on the level of that found satisfactory in Inland

Empire. See Idako Sporting Cong. v. Thomas, 137 F.3d

1146 (9th Cir. 1998) (allowing habitat analysis under the

NFMA in certain circumstances). The FEISs discuss

various studies of black-backed woodpeckers that

confirm their preference for burned forest habitat.

Table 3-52 of the Power FEIS groups cavity-nesting

birds into three different species groups, lists the areas

included in the project areas that are “assumed to

provide high and moderate capability habitat,” and then

lists the number of available acres of high and moderate

capability habitat. There is no indication that the USFS

consulted current or accurate field studies to arrive at

these numbers, and there is no identification of the

methodology used in determining what constitutes

suitable habitat.

52a

As we stated in Native Ecosystems Council, “(ojur

case law permits the Forest Service to meet the wildlife

species viability requirements by preserving habitat, but

only where both the Forest Service’s knowledge of what

quality and quantity of habitat is necessary to support

the species and the Forest Service’s method for mea-

suring the existing amount of that habitat are rea-

sonably reliable and accurate.” 428 F.3d at 1250. In

Austin, we noted that the black-backed woodpecker is

“particularly dependent upon post-fire landscapes.” 430

F.3d at 1065. There, we concluded that the USFS had

failed to provide a factual basis sufficient to satisfy the

NFMA because the EIS did not indicate how the USFS

determined that habitat levels were not critically low or

how it planned to generate additional habitat to coun-

teract losses from logging. Jd. at 1068. We likewise

conclude here that because the USFS’s habitat analysis

of the black-backed woodpecker has not provided a

factual basis for determining the quantity or quality of

suitable habitat, its analysis does not satisfy the NFMA.

We also conclude that the USFS’s reliance on BBS

data to meet its population monitoring obligation was

arbitrary and capricious. Table 3-53 in the Power FEIS

(Table 3-54 in the Freds FEJS) is entitled “Population

trend of cavity-nesting birds.” Immediately beneath the

table, the FEIS states, “NOTE: based upon Breeding

Bird Survey routes in the Sierra Nevada physiographic

province, from 1996-2003.” Table 3-53 then proceeds to

list the population status of the hairy woodpecker

as “Decreasing” and the population status of the

Williamson’s sapsucker as “Unknown.” The population

status of the black-backed woodpecker is also listed as

“Unknown.” A footnote to the hairy woodpecker figure

states, “Data is not statistically significant; tendency is

53a

estimated using the population trend classification

system described in Siegel and deSante (1999).”

The 2004 Supplement specifically mentions the need

for annual monitoring of MIS species, stating that only

after a period of annual monitoring will there be

“sufficient understanding of important habitat char-

acteristics tha

This text is long and has been trimmed here. Open the source document for the complete record.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.