Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Morrison v. United States (No. 06-749)

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Supreme Court. j

Pre es US.

06-749° Av 22 2006

No. ____ OPFICE OF THE CLERK

In the

Supreme Court of the United States

JOSEPH and ALICE MORRISON,

Petitioners,

Y.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

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On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to

the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

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PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

a.

4

DAMIEN M. SCHIFF M. REED HOPPER

Of Counsel Counsel of Record

Pacitic Legal Foundation Pacific Legal Foundation

3900 Lennane Drive, Suite 200 3900 Lennane Drive, Suite 200

Sacramento, California 95834 Sacramento, California 95834

Felephone: (916) 419-7111 Telephone: (916) 419-7111

Facsimile: (916) 419-7747 Facsimile: (916) 419-7747

Counsei for Petitioners

QUESTION PRESENTED

Did the Court of Appeals err by failing to assess whether

jurisdiction under the Clean Water Act extends to Petitioners’

property in light of this Court’s decision in Rapanos v. United

States?

li

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTION PRESENTED

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

OPINIONS BELOW

JURISDICTION

STATUTORY AND REGULATORY

PROVISIONS AT ISSUE

I. THIS COURT SHOULD GRANT THE

PETITION TO REQUIRE THE COURT OF

APPEALS TO APPLY CURRENT AND BINDING

PRECEDENT TO DETERMINE WHETHER

PETITIONERS’ PROPERTY FALLS WITHIN

CLEAN WATER ACT JURISDICTION

CONCLUSION

iti

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Gerke Excavating, Inc. v. United States,

126 S. Ct. 2964 (2006)

Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332 (1975)

Jaffree v. Bd. of Sch. Comm’rs of Mobile County,

459 U.S. 1314 (1983)

Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188 (1977)

Rapanos v. United States,

126 S. Ct. 2208 (2006)

Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc.,

511 U.S. 298 (1994)

Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. United

States Army Corps of Engineers,

531 U.S. 159 (2001)

United States v. Chevron Pipe Line Co.,

437 F. Supp. 2d 605 (N.D. Tex. 2006)

United States v. Morrison,

178 Fed. Appx. 481 (2006)

United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc.,

474 U.S. 121 (1985)

United States v. Williams,

435 F.3d 1148 (9th Cir. 2006)

Statutes

28 U.S.C. § 1254(1)

33 U.S.C. § 1311(a)

§ 1344(a)

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

§ 1362(5)-(7)

Federal Regulations

BF ae © POE peng nesses

§ 328.3(c)

S. Ct. R. 10(a)

Miscellaneous

Kimura, Ken, A Legitimacy Model for the

Interpretation of Plurality Decisions,

77 Cornell L. Rev. 1593 (1992)

I

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Petitioners Joseph and Alice Morrison (Morrisons),

respectfully petition this Court for a Writ of Certiorarito review

the judgment of the United Siates Court of Appeals for the

Sixth Circuit.

—

as

OPINIONS BELOW

The panel opinion of the Court of Appeals is unofficially

published at 178 Fed. Appx. 481 (6th Cir. 2006), and is included

in Appendix (App.) A. The panel opinion of the Court of

Appeals denying the petition for rehearing and rehearing en banc

is not published but is included in App. G. The opinion of the

district court adopting the magistrate judge’s report and

recommendation is not published but is included in App. B,

along with the report and recommendation.

JURISDICTION

On March 29, 2005, the district court adopted the

magistrate judge’s report and recommendation finding

jurisdiction under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act

Amendments of 1972 (“Clean Water Act” or “CWA”). App. B.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

affirming the district court was entered on April 26, 2006.

App. A. That court’s denial of the Petition for Rehearing and

Rehearing En Banc was entered on August 25, 2006, App. G.

This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

A

2

STATUTORY AND

REGULATORY PROVISIONS AT ISSUE

The Clean Water Act (CWA) provides in pertinent part:

Except as in compliance with this section and

section[] . . . 1344 of this title, the discharge of any

pollutant by any person shall be unlawful.

33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (CWA § 301(a)).

The Secretary may issue permits, after notice and

opportunity for public hearings for the discharge of

dredged or fill material into the navigable waters at

specified disposal sites.

33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (CWA § 404(a)).

(5) The term “person” means an individual,

corporation, partnership, association, State,

municipality, commission, or political subdivision of

a State, or any interstate body.

(6) The term “pollutant” means dredged spoil,

solid waste, incinerator residue, sewage, garbage,

sewage sludge, munitions, chemical wastes,

biological materials, radioactive materials, heat,

wrecked or discarded equipment, rock, sand, cellar

dirt and industrial, municipal, and agricultural waste

discharged into water. ...

(7) The term “navigable waters” means the

waters of the United States, including the territorial

seas.

33 U.S.C. § 1362(5)-(7) (CWA § 502(5)-(7)).

3

Federal regulations define “waters of the United States” to

mean:

(1) All waters which are currently used, or

were used in the past, or may be susceptible to use in

interstate or foreign commerce, including all waters

which are subject to the ebb and flow of the tide;

(2) All interstate waters including interstate

wetlands;

(3) All other waters such as intrastate lakes,

rivers, streams (including intermittent streams),

mudflats, sandflats, wetlands, sloughs, prairie

potholes, wet meadows, playa lakes, or natural

ponds, the use, degradation or destruction of which

could affect interstate or foreign commerce including

any such waters:

(1) Which are or could be used by interstate or

foreign travelers for recreational or other purposes;

Or

(1) From which fish or shellfish are or could be

taken and sold in interstate or foreign commerce; or

(iii) Which are used or could be used for

industrial purpose by industries in interstate

commerce;

(4)- All impoundments of waters otherwise

defined as waters of the United States under the

definition;

(5) Tributaries of waters identified in

paragraphs (a)(1)-(4) of this section;

(6) The territorial seas;

4

C YVetlands adjacent to waters (other than

waters that are themselves wetlands) identified in

paragraphs (a)(1)-(6) of this section.

33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a).

Federal regulations define “adjacency” as “bordering,

contiguous, or neighboring.” 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(c).

7%

a od

INTRODUCTION

This case concerns the statutory scope of the CWA and,

specifically, whether a court of appeals may ignore the binding

precedent of this Court when determining the extent of federal

jurisdiction under the CWA. On June 19, 2006, this Court

decided Rapanos vy. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2208 (2006),

reversing the Sixth Circuit’s determination that CWA

jurisdiction extends to any wetland that bears a mere

hydrological connection to a traditional navigable waterway.

The Morrisons have been found liable for a civil penalty of

$25,000 for discharging a pollutant into “navigable waters”

without a Corps permit. In Rapanos, this Court rejected the

Corps’s basis for jurisdiction over the Morrisons’ property.

Hence, the Sixth Circuit’s failure to cite, let alone discuss,

Rapanos in denying the Morrisons’ petition for rehearing and

rehearing en banc constitutes such a “depart{ure] from the

accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings . . . as to call

for an exercise of this Court’s supervisory power.” S. Ct. R.

10(a).

Further, the Morrisons respectfully suggest that certiorari

is appropriate here given that their case is essentially

indistinguishable from Gerke Excavating, Inc. v. United States,

126 S. Ct. 2964 (2006) (mem. opinion), in which the Seventh

Circuit had affirmed CWA jurisdiction over Gerke’s property

under pre-Rapanos standards. After Rapanos was issued, the

5

Court granted Gerke’s petition for certiorari, vacated the

Seventh Circuit’s judgment, and remanded the case for further

proceedings consistent with Rapanos. Because the Sixth Circuit

decided against the Morrisons prior to Rapanos and failed to

cite Rapanos in its denial of the Morrisons’ petition for

rehearing and rehearing en banc, this Court should grant the

Morrisons’ petition for certiorari to vacate the judgment of the

Sixth Circuit and remand the case for further proceedings in

light of Rapanos.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The Morrisons own and live on property on Harsens

Island, Michigan, near the mouth of the St. Clair River, a

navigable waterway. Some twelve years ago, the Morrisons

attempted to repair a malfunctioning water supply line on their

property, in the vicinity of which runs a canal that empties into

the St. Clair, approximately one quarter mile away. The United

States sued the Morrisons in a civil enforcement action for

violating Section 404 of the Clean Water Act, alleging that their

water line repair entailed the unpermitted discharge of dredge

and fill material into jurisdictional wetlands.

_ The CWA prohibits discharges of “fill material into

“navigable waters” unless permitted by the federal government.

See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311](a) and 1344(a) (CWA § 301(a) and

404(a)). The Act defines “navigable waters” only as “waters of

the United States.” 33 U.S.C. § 1362(5)-(7). Although the

CWA does not mention “wetlands” in any relevant provision,

federal agencies have defined “waters of the United States” to

include wetlands the “use, degradation or destruction of which

could affect interstate or foreign commerce” or any wetland

“adjacent” to a tributary of a “navigable water.” 33 C.F.R.

§ 328.3(a). In this case, the government and the courts have

determined that these regulations authorize federal regulation

over any “adjacent” wetland, regardless of whether the wetland

6

is distinguishable from the navigable water or whether the

wetland significantly affects the chemical, physical, or biological

integrity of the navigable water. See Apps. A and B.

The District Court Decision

The United States brought this action for injunctive and

monetary relief in the United States District Court for the

Eastern District of Michigan. The government contended

before the district court that the Morrisons had violated the

CWA by depositing “fill” material into jurisdictional wetlands.

The fill was placed there in the process of replacing a buried

water line. These actions, the government argued, amounted to

the discharge of a pollutant into a “navigable water” of the

United States. On the government’s renewed motion for

summary judgment, App. J, the district court found for the

United States and assessed a civil penalty of $25,000 against the

Morrisons, App. I. The district court subsequently vacated sua

sponte the civil penalty, App. I, but the Sixth Circuit on appeal

reversed the district court and directed it to reimpose the civil

penalty, Apps. D and E, which the district court did, App. C.

The Morrisons later moved to dismiss the entire action and for

relief from judgment. The magistrate judge recommended that

the motions be denied. App. B-3. The district court affirmed

the magistrate’s report. App. B-1.

The Sixth Circuit’s Decision

The Morrisons appealed the district court’s adoption of the

report and recommendation to the Sixth Circuit. The

government, in response to the Morrisons’ appeal, did not

address the appeal’s merits but rather limited the answering brief

to the position that the Morrisons’ notice of appeal was

untimely. Specifically, the government argued that the

Morrisons had no procedural right to contest, within the context

of a garnishment proceeding to collect the $25,000 fine, the

merits of the action several years after summary judgment had

been entered against them.

7

The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court without

addressing the government’s timeliness argument. The Circuit

determmed that because the St. Clair is navigable-in-fact and the

Morrisons’ property is “adjacent” thereto, CWA jurisdiction is

present. The Morrisons moved for rehearing and rehearing en

banc on the grounds, inter alia, that their property lacked the

requisite “significant nexus” to the St. Clair. This Court decided

Rapanos a few weeks after the rehearing petition had been

filed. Thereafter the Morrisons submitted a notice of

supplemental authority to the Sixth Circuit, alerting it of this

Court’s decision. See App. H. Approximately two months

later, the Circuit denied the Morrisons’ rehearing petition

because “the issues raised in the petition were fully considered

upon the original submission and decision of the case.” App. G.

The petition denial contains no mention of this Court’s decision

in Rapanos and no legal analysis as to why pre-Rapanos

adjacency jurisdiction is equivalent to post-Rapanos adjacency

jurisdiction.

In Rapanos, both the plurality opinion of Justice Scalia and

the concurring opinion of Justice Kennedy rejected the

hydrological connection test for establishing jurisdiction (and

adjacency). See Rapanos, 1268S. Ct. at 2227 (plurality opinion);

id. at 2248 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). Below,

the government did not contend that the Morrisons’ property

qualifies as “adjacent” wetlands under the plurality’s or Justice

Kennedy’s test; and neither the district court nor the Sixth

Circuit made that finding.

8

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

I

THIS COURT SHOULD

GRANT THE PETITION TO

REQUIRE THE COURT OF APPEALS

TO APPLY CURRENT AND BINDING

PRECEDENT TO DETERMINE WHETHER

PETITIONERS’ PROPERTY FALLS

WITHIN CLEAN WATER ACT JURISDICTION

The court of appeals determined that the Morrisons’

property is covered under the CWA because it is “adjacent” to

the navigable-in-fact St. Clair. The Sixth Circuit cited to Solid

Waste Agency of Northern Cook County vy. United States Army

Corps of Engineers (SWANCC), 531 U.S. 159 (2001), and

United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121

(1985), for the proposition that jurisdiction obtains where there

is a significant nexus between the wetlands and the

jurisdictionally sufficient waterbody; and that a significant nexus

is present where wetlands are “adjacent” to the jurisdictional

waterbody. 178 Fed. Appx. at 483, App. at A-4. The court of

appeals accepted as undisputed that the Morrisons’ wetlands are

adjacent to the St. Clair. Jd. at 482, App. at A-2. Because the

court of appeals’s opinion contains no substantive discussion of

the nature of the connection between the Morrisons’ property

and the St. Clair, it is appropriate to conclude that the Sixth

Circuit approved sub silentio the reasoning of the district court

(subsequently reaffirmed by the magistrate judge and district

court) in determining that the Morrisons’ property is adjacent to

the St. Clair.

The district court relied upon Riverside Bayview for the

rule that wetlands “adjacent” to waters covered under the CWA

are themselves subject to CWA jurisdiction. App. at F-5 to F-

6. The district court also concluded that the government had

carried its burden for summary judgment on this issue through

9

the declarations of Jean Battle, a Corps biologist, and

Dr. Donald Tilton, a botanist and wetlands scientist. App. at F-

6.

The Tilton Declaration is wholly concerned with

establishing that the Morrisons’ property qualifies as wetlands.

See Tilton Decl. {11-12 (App. at K-4). The declaration is

silent as to the type or quality of connection between the

Morrisons’ property and the St. Clair. The Battle Declaration is

similarly unilluminating. Although it discusses how the

Morrisons’ property qualifies as wetlands, it simply declares

without explanation that the property comprises jurisdictional

wetlands. See Battle Decl. J 8 (App. at L-3). The declaration

contains no discussion of the quantity or quality of connection

between the Morrisons’ property and the St. Clair.

Thus, the declarations upon which the district court relied,

and upon which the court of appeals affirmed, are insufficient in

themselves to support CWA jurisdiction after Rapanos. Under

the Rapanos plurality test, a wetland can be adjacent to a

jurisdictional body of water, and thus itself subject to

jurisdiction, if and only if the wetland has a continuous surface

water connection with the jurisdictional body of water such that

one cannot tell where the water ends and the wetland begins.

Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2227 (plurality opinion). In contrast,

under the test announced in Justice Kennedy's concurring

opinion, a wetland is adjacent and jurisdictional “if the wetlands,

either alone or in combination with similarly situated lands in the

region, significantly affect the chemical, physical, and biological

integrity of other covered waters more readily understood as

‘navigable.’ Jd. at 2248 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the

judgment).

Although the Rapanos majority did not agree upon a single

legal standard for determining CWA jurisdiction, the rule

announced by the Court in Marks v. United States, 430 U.S.

188 (1977), for determining the holding of the Court when no

opinion gamers a majority of justices’ votes suggests that the

10

Rapanos plurality opinion authored by Justice Scalia is

controlling. Under the Marks rule,

[when a fragmented Court decides a case and no

_ single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent

of five Justices, the holding of the Court may be

viewed as that position taken t |’ those Members who

concurred in the judgments on the narrowest

grounds....

Id. at 193 (quotations marks omitted).

Among the Rapanos majority opinions, the plurality

Opinion constitutes the “narrowest grounds” because its

rationale is a logical subset of Justice Kennedy’s concurrence.

See United States v. Williams, 435 F.3d 1148, 1157 n.9 (9th

Cir. 2006). The Marks rule is founded upon the principle that

[t]he Justices supporting the broader legal rule must

necessarily recognize the validity of the narrower

legal rule. That is, if a statute is found to be

constitutionally permissible pursuant to a strict

scrutiny standard of review, then it is necessarily

permissible pursuant to a rational basis standard of

review. From the text of the alternative concurring

opinions, it is possible to determine that if all of the

Justices apply the narrower rule, the outcome would

have been the same.

Ken Kimura, A Legitimacy Model for the Interpretation of

Plurality Decisions, 77 Cornell L. Rev. 1593, 1603-04 (1992)

(footnote omitted). According to this understanding, in

Rapanos the plurality opinion functions as a strict scrutiny

standard of review and Justice Kennedy’s concurrence as a

rational basis standard of review. That is so because a wetland

passing the plurality’s jurisdictional test—i.e., a wetland that is

“indistinguishable” from a traditional river, lake, or stream that

is connected to a navigable-in-fact waterway—will almost

certainly be found to have a “significant nexus” with a

1]

traditional navigable water, especially given that Justice

Kennedy’s concurrence does not require a hydrological

connection to establish jurisdiction. See 126 S. Ct. at 2251

(Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).

Although Justice Kennedy’s test would find jurisdiction in

all cases where the plurality opinion would, the converse is not

true. That is to say, the scope of jurisdiction under the plurality

test is not coextensive with the scope of jurisdiction under

Justice Kennedy’s test, but rather is narrower than Justice

Kennedy’s test. The plurality opinion made clear that it would

not find jurisdiction in the typical application of Justice

Kennedy’s test:

Wetlands are “waters of the United States” if they

[are]... as a practical matter indistinguishable from

waters of the United States. ... [Whereas, under]

Justice Kennedy’s test[, jurisdictional wetlands are

those that,] “either alone or in combination with

similarly situated lands in the region, significantly

affect . . . other covered waters more readily

understood as ‘navigable.’ But what possible

linguistic usage would accept that whatever (alone or

in combination) affects waters of the United States

is waters of the United States?

Id. at 2234 (plurality opinion). Given that the aquatic flow

between a wetland and jurisdictional waterbody must be so great

as to render the two indistinguishable to support jurisdiction

under the plurality test, whereas there need not even be a

hydrologic connection between wetland and waterbody to justify

jurisdiction under Justice Kennedy’s test, it is evident that the

plurality opinion 1s the logical subset and thus the controlling

opinion under Marks,

' Additional, practical reasons as to why the plurality opinion ought

to be controlling include that the plurality test has the virtue of ease of

—(continued...)

12

Under the plurality test, the declarations of Ms. Battle and

Dr. Tilton do not support a finding of jurisdiction. Given that

the Morrisons’ property is located on the landward edge of a

residential subdivision, see Battle Decl. Exhs. C and D (App. at

L-8 to L-9), their wetlands are easily distinguishable from the

river itself and thus do not meet the plurality test.

Even if jurisdiction may be proved under Justice Kennedy’s

test, the evidence offered by the government in this case is still

insufficient. Neither the Battle nor Tilton Declaration contains

any mention of the quantity or quality of the chemical, physical,

or biological connection between the Morrisons’ wetlands (or

all similarly situated wetlands on Harsens Island) and the St.

Clair.’ That finding is required for jurisdiction under Justice

Kennedy’s test.

The Sixth Circuit denied the petition for rehearing and

rehearing en banc even though, during the pendency of the

petition, the relevant rule for ascertaining jurisdiction had

changed. Assuming arguendo that the “significant nexus” test

intimated by Riverside Bayview and suggested by SWANCC

remains the standard today, the contents of that standard

after Rapanos have changed considerably. The government

measured “significant nexus” in Rapanos by the hydrological

' (...continued)

application for landowners and regulators alike, while also hewing

more closely to the government’s original interpretation of “waters of

the United States” as navigable-in-fact waters. See SWANCC, 531

U.S. at 168. One district court has already adopted the plurality

opinion as containing the controlling jurisdictional test. United States

v. Chevron Pipe Line Co., 437 F. Supp. 2d 605, 613 (N.D. Tex.

2006).

? In fact, the Corps stated in its environmental assessment reviewing

the Morrisons’ after-the-fact CWA permit application that the

Morrisons’ fill activity would have only “a minor, long term, negative

impact on water quality.” App. at M.

13

connection rule; presumably the government intended to use the

same rule to establish jurisdiction over the Morrisons’ property.

Yet in Rapanos a majority of this Court found the hydrological

connection rule to be legally insufficient for ascertammg CWA

. jurisdiction. Thus, the government has not established CWA

jurisdiction; and the Sixth Circuit’s failure to apply the correct

jurisdictional rule constitutes such a gross abdication of an

appellate court’s duty as to merit the invocation of this Court’s

supervisory power. Cf. Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 511

U.S. 298, 312 (1994) (“It is this Court’s responsibility to say

what a statute means, and once the Court has spoken, it is the

duty of other courts to respect that understanding of the

governing rule of law.”’).

CONCLUSION

This Court should grant the Petition for Certiorari to

ensure that its decision in Rapanos is applied to all pending and

future cases concerning the extent of federal jurisdiction under

the Clean Water Act. In this case, the Sixth Circuit failed to

provide any. analysis regarding the effect of Rapanos on the

jurisdictional question presented. Rapanos was decided just two

weeks after the Morrisons filed their petition for rehearing and

rehearing en banc. The Sixth Circuit denied the Morrisons’

petition over two months after Rapanos was decided,

notwithstanding the Morrisons’ submission of a notice of

supplemental authority alerting the Circuit to this Court’s

decision. The Sixth Circuit’s failure even to acknowledge the

precedent—let alone its failure to explain the precedent’s

application—constitutes a gross dereliction and abdication of

the duty of a court of appeals faithfully to apply the binding

precedent of this Court. Cf. Jaffree v. Bd. of Sch. Comm'rs of

Mobile County, 459 U.S. 1314, 1316 (Powell, Circuit Justice

1983) (district court as well as Supreme Court Justice sitting as

Circuit Justice bound to apply decisions of Supreme Court);

14

Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 344-45 (1975) (lower courts

bound to apply even summary decisions of Supreme Court).

For these reasons, this Court should grant the Morrisons’

Petition for Writ of Certiorari.

DATED: November, 2006.

Respectfully submitted,

DAMIEN M. SCHIFF M. REED HOPPER

Of Counsel Counsel of Record

Pacific Legal Foundation Pacific Legal Foundation

3900 Lennane Drive, Suite 200 3900 Lennane Drive, Suite 200

Sacramento, California 95834 Sacramento, California 95834

Telephone: (916) 419-7111 Telephone: (916) 419-7111

Facsimile: (916) 419-7747 Facsimile: (916) 419-7747

Counsel for Petitioners

Appendix A-1

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF

AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

No. 05-1552

Vz.

JOSEPH and ALICE PAULEY;

MORRISON,

Defendants-Appellants.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Michigan at Detroit

Filed: April 26, 2006

Before: DAUGHTREY and GILMAN, Circuit Judges;

RUSSELL, District Judge.*

Jennifer J. Peregord, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Detroit, MI,

for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Keay Fallowfield, Keay Fallowfield Assoc., Croswell, MI,

for Defendants-Appellants.

* Honorable Thomas B. Russell, United States District Judge for the

Western District of Kentucky, sitting by designation.

Appendix A~2

RUSSELL, District Judge.

Defendants-Appellants Joseph and Alice Pauley Morrison

(“Morrisons”) appeal the decision of the Eastern District of

Michigan in upholding the recommendation by the Magistrate

Judge that the Plaintiff-Appellee United States of America

(“Government”) had territorial jurisdiction over the Morrisons’

property located on Harsens Island, Michigan.

BACKGROUND

In its complaint, the Government asserts that in June of

1994, the Morrisons either “performed or caused to be

performed” actions within U.S. waters by either “trenching,

grading or filling wetlands” on their property located at

3010 Green Drive, Harsens Island, Michigan. Specifically, the

Government alleges that the Morrisons conducted an illegal fill

in the wetlands by depositing and grading fill material into that

area, and by digging, repairing and then reburying a broken

water line located in that area. The United States Army Corps

of Engineers determined that the land in question qualified as a

“wetland” as defined by the Clean Water Act.

The wetlands in question are adjacent to the St. Clair River.

The Morrisons do not dispute that fact in this appeal. In its

complaint, the Government also claims that the wetlands are

considered part of the United States for purposes of 33 U.S.C.

§ 1344 of the Clean Water Act. The Morrisons dispute that fact

in this appeal, claiming the land does not fall under U.S.

jurisdiction for purposes of the Clean Water Act.

The land in question involves territory that was disputed in

the past between the United States and British Canada. In 1828,

following an agreement on a border between the United States

and British Canada, the American Land Board recognized the

claim of Jacob Harsens (“Harsens”) to the upper part of the

island (“surveyed land”), providing him with patents that he

accepted at that time. In 1837, Michigan became a state

Appendix A-3

of the union. Thirteen years later in 1850, the U.S. Congress

passed the Swamp Land Act, which granted certain states title

to all swamp lands within their borders; Michigan was one of the

states included by Congress in that Act. In 1910, the Supreme

Court of Michigan determined that the “unsurveyed land,” or

lower part of Harsens Island, belonged to the State of Michigan

as set forth by the Swamp Land Act.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Court reviews the district court’s grant of summary

judgment de novo, using the same standards applicable to the

district court. City Management Corp. v. U.S. Chem. Co.,

43 F.3d 244, 250 (6th Cir. 1994). Summary judgment is proper

if the evidence submitted shows that there is no genuine issue of

material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment

as a matter of law. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,

322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). This Court

must view the entire record in the light most favorable to the

non-moving party. Smith v. Chrysler Corp., 155 F.3d 799, 804

(6th Cir. 1998). On appeal, the Court will not generally

consider new arguments that were not presented to the district

court unless such failure to consider the issue will result in a

miscarriage of justice. Roush v. KFC Nat’l Management Co.,

10 F.3d 392, 397 (6th Cir. 1993).

ANALYSIS

In 1828, when Harsens received his patents from the federal

government for the land, the federal government held title to the

surveyed wetlands. The fact that the patents provided to

Harsens came from the United States demonstrates that the

United States had made its claim to the island. Today, all of the

island is part of the territorial jurisdiction of the United States as

it has been a part of the State of Michigan since 1837, when

Michigan joined the union. As such, the United States has

territorial jurisdiction under the Clean Water Act over the

Appendix A-4

surveyed lands because these wetlands belong to the United

States.

The title for the unsurveyed wetlands belongs to the State

of Michigan. The State of Michigan is a part of the territorial

jurisdiction of the United States for purposes of the Clean Water

Act. Consequently, title to the unsurveyed wetlands in question

belongs to the State of Michigan, and Michigan falls within the

territorial jurisdiction of the United States for purposes of

enforcing the Clean Water Act.

The United States Supreme Court has held that there must

be a “significant nexus” between a wetland and navigable waters

in order for the Clean Water Act to apply. Solid Waste Agency

of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 531

U.S. 159, 167 & 173, 121 S.Ct. 675, 148 L.Ed.2d 576 (2001)

_(“SWANCC”). The Court in SWANCC stated that “Congress’

concern for the protection of water quality and aquatic

ecosystems indicated its intent to regulate wetlands ‘inseparably

bound up with the “waters” of the United States.”” SWANCC

at 167, 121 S.Ct. 675; quoting United States v. Riverside

Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 134, 106 S.Ct. 455, 88

L.Ed.2d 419 (1985) (“Riverside”). The Court held that there

must be a “significant nexus” between the wetlands and

navigable waters in order for the United States to have

jurisdiction over the wetlands in question. SWANCC at 167,

121 S.Ct. 675. A significant nexus between a wetland and a

body of water occurs when a wetland is adjacent to a navigable

body of water. /d.; Riverside at 133-135, 106 S.Ct. 455. The

Clean Water Act, under 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) & (8) defines

“navigable waters” as “the waters of the United States.” In

Riverside, the United States Supreme Court specifically

mentioned wetlands that are adjacent to a river as falling within

the coverage of the Clean Water Act. Jd. at 134, 106 S.Ct. 455.

In the instant matter, regardless of whether or not the

property of the Morrisons is a part of the unsurveyed or

Appendix A-5

surveyed wetlands, both wetlands are adjacent to the St. Clair

River. Under the definition of a navigable body of water as

defined by the Clean Water Act and noted by the Supreme

Court in Riverside, the St. Clair River is a navigable body of

water within the United States. Accordingly, a significant nexus

exists between the wetlands and the St. Clair River. Therefore,

the United States has territorial jurisdiction over the Morrisons’

property for purposes of enforcing the Clean Water Act.

CONCLUSION

The District Court did not err when it adopted the report

and recommendation of the Magistrate Judge in determining

the matter of territorial jurisdiction. Therefore, we AFFIRM

the order of the District Court adopting the report and

recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, and hold that the

Government has territorial jurisdiction over the Morrisons’

property.

Appendix B-1

FILED MAR. 29, 2005

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

EASTERN DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF

AMERICA, Case No. 99-71069

Plaintiff, HONORABLE DENISE

PAGE HOOD

VS.

ALICE MORRISON, and

JOSEPH MORRISON,

Defendants.

ORDER ACCEPTING

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This matter is before the Court on Magistrate Judge Steven

D. Pepe’s Report and Recommendation dated November 3,

2004. An objection has been filed to the Report and

Recommendation.

This Court has had an opportunity to review the Report

and Recommendation and finds that the Magistrate Judge

reached the correct conclusion for the proper reasons. The

Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that Defendants [sic}

motion under Rule 12(b)(6) is without merit. The Court further

Appendix B--2

agrees with the Magistrate Judge that there were sufficient facts

to establish a violation of the Clean Water Act and that the

United States and this Court unquestionably have jurisdiction

over Harsens Island and all matters related to it stemming from

this case.

The Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that final

judgment was entered almost four years ago and it was found

then, as it is found now, that there were sufficient facts to

establish a violation of the Clean Water Act. The Court also

agrees that Defendants have specified no reason, nor have they

stated an “extraordinary ground”, for relief from judgment under

Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(6). Defendants claim that a mistake has

been made regarding the Court’s jurisdiction of Harsens Island.

The Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that Defendants’

claim of mistake is unfounded.

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that Magistrate Judge Steven D. Pepe’s

Report and Recommendation Denying Defendants’ Motion to

Dismiss dated November 3, 2004 is ACCEPTED and

ADOPTED as this Court’s finding of fact and conclusions of

law.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to

Dismiss (Docket No. 167, filed July 14, 2004) is DENIED.

/s/ Denise Page Hood

DATED: MAR 28 2005 DENISE PAGE HOOD

United States District Judge

Appendix B-3

FILED NOV. 3, 2004

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF

AMERICA, Case No. 99-71069

Plaintiff, Honorable Denise Page Hood

Honorable Steven D. Pepe

VS.

ALICE MORRISON, and

JOSEPH MORRISON,

Husband and Wife,

Defendants.

Report and Recommendation Denying

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (#167)

I. Background

On March 5, 1999, the United States filed a complaint

against Alice Pauley and her father, Samuel Pauley, who

together owned certain real property on Harsens Island,

Michigan; Joseph Morrison, who claimed to have an ownership

interest in the property; and John Horvath, a construction

contractor. The complaint alleged that the defendants violated

Appendix B-4

the Clean Water Act', which requires permits for the discharge

of dredged or fill material, by trenching, grading, and filling

wetlands on the Pauleys’ property without a permit. The

complaint sought a civil fine and an injunction requiring the

defendants to restore the property to its natural condition.

On October 31, 2000, summary judgment was awarded to

the United States. The court found that the defendants had

“discharged a pollutant, from a source point, into navigable

waters of the United States, without a permit” within the

meaning of the Clean Water Act. On March 30, 2001, a civil

penalty of $25,000 was entered against Joseph Morrison and

Alice Pauley pursuant to 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d). This penalty was

vacated sua sponte on June 7, 2001. The U.S. appealed and on

February 26, 2003, a slip opinion from the U.S. Court of

Appeals was issued reversing and remanding the case for

reimposition of the fine. On March 17, 2003, the $25,000 fine

was reinstated. On October 22, 2003, the U.S. Supreme Court

denied a writ of certiorari. On April 22, 2004, the undersigned

denied Defendants’ motion to stay execution of garnishment and

Defendants’ motion for a hearing regarding the attempted

garnishment and claim for exemptions. On September 16, 2004,

Defendants filed the current motion to dismiss, which was

referred to the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 636(b)(1)(A)

and (B). For the following reasons, Defendants’ motion should

be DENIED.

Il. Standard of Review

1. Dismissal pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)

In deciding a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.

P. 12(b)(6), a court must accept all well-pleaded allegations

as true and construe them in the light most favorable to plaintiff.

Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 117 (1990); SA

CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL

' Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq. (1977).

Appendix B-5

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1357, at 304 (2d ed. 1990).

See also Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421-22 (1969);

Westlake v. Lucas, 537 F.2d 857 (6th Cir. 1976). A complaint

will not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears

beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in

support of his claim which would entitle him to relief. Conley v.

Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). Moreover, pro se

complaints are to be construed liberally, Haines v. Kerner, 404

U.S. 519, 520 (1972). It is also well established, however,

that conclusory, unsupported allegations of constitutional

deprivation do not state a claim.

2. Relief from final judgment

Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) provides in pertinent part:

On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court

may relieve a party or a party’s legal representative

from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the

following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence,

surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered

evidence which by due diligence could not have been

discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule

59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated

intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresenta-tion, or other

misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is

void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or

discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is

based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is

no longer equitable that the judgment should have

prospective application; or (6) any other reason

justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.

Appendix B-6

The “catch-all” category of “any other reason justifying

relief” is reserved for extraordinary circumstances.”

Ii. Analysis

Defendant motion under Rule 12(b)(6) is without merit.

Defendants maintain, once again, that there are no facts which

would show a violation of the Clean Water Act and there are no

facts to show that this Court has jurisdiction over Harsens

Island. Both of these issues have been addressed extensively in

previous orders. Final judgment was entered almost four years

ago and it was found then, as it is found now, that there were

sufficient facts to establish a violation of the Clean Water Act.

Additionally, the issue of jurisdiction has been addressed in a

order by the undersigned of April 22, 2004; the United States

and this Court unquestionably have jurisdiction over Harsens

Island and all matters related to it stemming from this case.

Defendants have specified no reason, nor have they stated

an “extraordinary ground”, for relief from judgment under

F.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(6). Defendants claim that a mistake has been

made regarding the Court’s jurisdiction of Harsens Island. As

stated above, this issue has been rejected by all of the courts that

have been involved in this case. Defendants claim of mistake is

unfounded.

? See, e.g., Pierce v United Mine Workers, 770 F.2d 449, 451 (6th

Cir. 1985), cert. denied, (the court should allow relief under Rule

60(b)(6) only in exceptional or extraordinary circumstances which are

not addressed by the other five subsections of the rule); Reform Party

of Allegheny County v. Allegheny County Dep’t of Elections, 174

F.3d 305, 311 (3d Cir. 1999) (available only in extraordinary

circumstances, and commenting that intervening developments in the

law will, by themselves, rarely constitute basis for relief under Rule

60(b)(6); Lehman v. United States, 154 F.3d 1010, 1017 (9th Cir.

1998), cert. denied, (used “sparingly” as equitable remedy to prevent

manifest injustice).

Appendix B—7

IV. Recommendation

For the reasons stated above, it is recommended that

Defendants’ motion be DENIED.

Any objections to this Report and Recommendation

must be filed within ten (10) days of its service. 28 U.S.C.

§ 636(b)(1); E.D. Mich. LR 72.1(d)(2). Failure to file

objections within the specified time constitutes a waiver of any

further right of appeal. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985);

Ivey v. Wilson, 832 F.2d 950, 957-58 (6th Cir. 1987); United

States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981). Pursuant to

E.D. Mich. LR 72.1(d)(2), a copy of any objections is to be

served upon this Magistrate Judge.

SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 3, 2004 — s/Steven D. Pepe

Ann Arbor, Michigan United States Magistrate Judge

Appendix C1

FILED MAR. 17, 2003

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF

AMERICA, Case Number: 99-CV-71069-DT

Plaintiff, HON. GEORGE E. WOODS

v.

SAMUEL PAULEY,

ALICE PAULEY, JOSEPH

MORRISON, and JOHN

HORVATH, jointly and

severally,

Defendants.

ORDER REINSTATING $25,000 FINE

On February 24, 2003, the United States Court of Appeals

for the Sixth Circuit held that this Court lacked the power to

vacate, sua sponte, a $25,000 fine imposed against Defendants

Alice Pauley and Joseph Morrison. The appellate court

remanded the matter for reimposition of the fine.

IT 1S HEREBY ORDERED that the March 30, 2001, civil

penalty entered against Defendant Alice Pauley Morrison and

Appendix C--2

Joseph Morrison, jointly and severally, in the amount of $25,000

shall be, and hereby is, REINSTATED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Alice Pauley Morrison

and Joseph Morrison shall pay the penalty by a check made

payable to the United States of America, in care of Geneva

Halliday, Assistant United States Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s

Office, 211 W. Fort Street, Suite 2001, Detroit Michigan,

48226. Plaintiff shall be entitled to interest as provided by law.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/ George E. Woods

GEORGE E. WOODS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Dated: March 17, 2003

Detroit, Michigan

Copies mailed this date to:

James K. O’Brien, Esq.

Geneva S. Halliday, Esq.

Alice Pauley Morrison and Joseph Morrison

United States Marshal Service

Appendix D-1

FILED FEB. 24, 2003

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

No. 01-2107

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

V.

SAMUEL PAULEY; JOHN HORVATH,

Defendants,

ALICE PAULEY; JOSEPH MORRISON,

Defendants-Appellees.

Before: GUY and MOORE, Circuit Judges; BECKWITH,

District Judge.

JUDGMENT

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Michigan at Detroit.

THIS CAUSE was heard on the record from the district

court and was submitted on briefs without ora] argument.

IN CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, it is ORDERED that

the judgment of the district court is REVERSED and the cause

is REMANDED for reimposition of the $25,000 fine.

ENTERED BY ORDER OF THE COURT

/s/ Leonard Green

Leonard Green, Clerk

Appendix E-1

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF

AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

No. 01-2107

v.

SAMUEL PAULEY; JOHN

HORVATH,

Defendants,

ALICE PAULEY; JOSEPH

MORRISON,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Michigan at Detroit

No. 99-71069—George E. Woods, District Judge

Submitted: January 28, 2003

Decided and Filed: February 24, 2003

Before: GUY and MOORE, Circuit Judges; BECKWITH,

District Judge.*

* The Honorable Sandra S. Beckwith, United States District Judge

for the Southern District of Ohio, sitting by designation.

Appendix E-2

COUNSEL

ON BRIEF: Jennifer J. Peregord, ASSISTANT UNITED

STATES ATTORNEY, Detroit, Michigan, for Appellant. Alice

Pauley, Joseph Morrison, Harsens Island, Michigan, pro se.

OPINION

KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge. The United

States, which had been granted summary judgment cn its Clean

Water Act action against defendants Alice Pauley and Joseph

Morrison, appeals from the district court’s sua sponte order that

vacated the $25,000 fine that the district court had previously

imposed. Because the district court lacked the power to grant

such relief sua sponte, we REVERSE the district court.

I. BACKGROUND

On March 5, 1999, the United States filed a complaint

against Alice Pauley and her father, Samuel Pauley, who

together owned certain real property on Harsens Island,

Michigan; Joseph Morrison, who claimed to have an ownership

interest in the property; and John Horvath, a construction

contractor. The complaint alleged that the defendants violated

the Clean Water Act by trenching, grading, and filling wetlands

on the Pauleys’ property without a permit. The complaint

sought a civil fine and an injunction requiring the defendants to

restore the property to its natural condition.

On October 31, 2000, U.S. District Judge Cleland awarded

summary judgment to the United States. The court found that

the defendants had “discharged a pollutant, from a source point,

into navigable waters of the United States, without a permit,”

Appendix E-3

Joint Appendix (“J.A.”) at 29, within the meaning of the Clean

Water Act. Accordingly, the court scheduled a penalty hearing

on February 8, 2001, to determine the scope of any relief. At

the hearing, the government presented a consent decree between

the United States and defendant Samuel] Pauley. Samuel Pauley,

who had quit-claimed his interest in the property to Alice Pauley

and Joseph Morrison on January 26, 2001, shortly before the

scheduled penalty hearing, agreed to hire a contractor to restore

the property. According to the consent decree, Samuel Pauley

would hire a contractor to remove all fill material from the

wetland by May 15, 2001. The consent decree was contingent

on either Samuel Pauley receiving permission from the new

owners, Alice Pauley and her husband, Joseph Morrison, to

enter the property and complete the restoration or on a court

order requiring the new owners to permit him the necessary

access. On February 8, 2001, the court ordered Alice Pauley to

“allow access to the property by the Contractor and Corps of

Engineers to complete the restoration as set forth in the Consent

Decree.” J.A. at 81.

Before considering a civil penalty, the court adjourned the

penalty hearing for six weeks so that Alice Pauley and Joseph

Morrison could retain counsel. When the hearing resumed, and

the defendants informed the court that they would proceed pro

se, Judge Cleland imposed a $25,000 fine against Alice Pauley

and Joseph Morrison for their Clean Water Act violations. The

fine was imposed pursuant to 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d), which

authorizes civil penalties up to $25,000 per day of violation and

requires the court to consider the seriousness of the violation,

any history of violations, good-faith efforts to comply with

requirements, the impact of the fine on the offender, and any

other factors that “justice may require.” 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d).

Granting the United States’s request to impose the maximum

fine allowed for one day of violation, Judge Cleland noted that

the land had been in violation for approximately six years.

Although the scope of the violation was not huge, Judge

Appendix E-+4

Cleland said, as it affected only a small piece of land, Alice

Pauley’s and Joseph Morrison’s history of refusing to comply

with the law warranted the fine. Judge Cleland said that they

had failed to keep their promises that they would remedy the

violation, and he cited the “strong indications that the

defendants were, essentially, stringing the Corps along, and

trying to see if . . . the Corps would simply give up after a

period of time,” J.A. at 245. The court also considered Alice

Pauley’s and Joseph Morrison’s economic situations and the

costs to the government of their intransigence before imposing

the $25,000 fine.

Despite the injunction, Alice Pauley refused Samuel

Pauley, the contractor, and the Army Corps of Engineers access

to the property to comply with the terms of the settlement.

According to the United States, Alice Pauley sent the

government a letter in late February stating that “we have

decided that we will NOT allow ANY .. . ONE on our

property,” and that “we do not plan on being bullied into

anything especially by the Court or the Plaintiff(s).” J.A. at 83-

84. On May 9, 2001, the government received a letter from

Samuel Pauley’s attorney, who stated that on at least five

separate occasions, Alice Pauley had told Samuel Pauley that

she would not allow him or his contractor access to the

property. That day, the United States filed an emergency

motion to enforce the consent decree. Judge Cleland

disqualified himself, and the case was reassigned to U.S. District

Judge Woods.

At the hearing on the United States’s emergency motion,

Judge Woods appears to have succeeded in convincing Alice

Pauley to comply with the court’s order. However, Judge

Woods also vacated sua sponte the $25,000 fine that Judge

Cleland had levied against Alice Pauley and Joseph Morrison.

Judge Woods announced early in the hearing, “The Court

expects the imposition of fines will not motivate Alice Pauley[]

to comply. I told you I’m not impressed with fines. I’m not

Appendix E~-5

interested in fines being imposed.” J.A. at 263. Then, after

recounting the case’s history, Judge Woods invited Alice Pauley

to the lectern and announced, “Tell you what I’m going to do

right now. I’m setting aside [the] $25,000 fine. I don’t think it

serves any purpose at all and I do not feel that it. is a sword

hanging over your head at all.” J.A. at 273. In denying the

United States’s motion to reconsider, Judge Woods said, “I’ve

set aside the $25,000 fine which may have had something to do

with getting this baby settled. .So be it. It’s set aside.” J.A. at

288. Judge Woods entered an order vacating the civil penalty.

The United States timely appealed from the order vacating

the civil penalty, and we have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1291.

Il. ANALYSIS

As Judge Cleland’s comments in imposing the $25,000 fine

indicate, Alice Pauley and Joseph Morrison have a history of

obstructing the Corps’s efforts to enforce the Clean Water Act

and to remedy the violations on Alice Pauley’s property.

Accordingly, when the case came before Judge Woods on the

United States’s emergency motion to compel compliance, Judge

Woods was understandably prepared to use whatever tools he

had available to accomplish compliance with the court’s earlier

injunction. However, vacating sua sponte one order in an effort

to encourage a party to comply with another order was not,

under our precedent, an available tool.

Judge Woods did not explicitly indicate the basis on which

he vacated the $25,000 civil penalty, but we interpret the district

court as having relieved the defendants from a final judgment

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6), as this

rule most nearly describes the district court’s action. Rule

60(b)(6) provides that, “{o}n motion and upon such terms as are

just, the court may relieve a party or a party’s legal

representative from a final judgment” for “any . . . reason

Appendix E-6

justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 60(b)(6). The civil fine from which the district court

granted relief constituted a final judgment, as it had been

imposed in connection with a judgment granting summary

judgment with respect to all of the plaintiff's claims against ail

remaining defendants. That the district court had maintained

jurisdiction to ensure that the injunctive relief was properly

accomplished is irrelevant for purposes of determining whether

the grant of summary judgment and imposition of a civil penalty

constituted final judgment, as “the court may enter a final and

appealable judgment and still retain jurisdiction over the action

sO as to make sure that its order ts applied correctly.” 10

Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, & Mary Kay Kane,

Federal Practice and Procedure § 2651 at 14 (3d ed. 1998)

(interpreting Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(a), which defines “judgment” as

used in Federal Rules of Civil Procedure). Accordingly, the

question is whether the Rule 60(b) relief was properly granted.

We review orders granting relief from a prior order under

Rule 60(b) for abuse of discretion, but we review questions of

law de novo. Blackard v. Memphis Area Med. Ctr. for Women,

Inc., 262 F.3d 568, 572 (6th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, -- U.S. --,

122 S. Ct. 1908 (May 13, 2002).

We have held that a district court may not sua sponte grant

relief pursuant to Rule 60(b).' In Eaton v. Jamrog, 984 F.2d

' Circuits are split on the question whether a district court may grant

Rule 60(b) relief sua sponte. The Tenth Circuit agrees with our view

that such relief is impermissible. See Dow v. Baird, 389 F.2d 882,

884-85 (10th Cir. 1968) (noting that whereas Rule 60(a) permits the

district court to correct clerical errors “of its own initiative,” Rule

60(b) permits corrections only upon motion). The Second, Fourth,

Fifth, and Ninth Circuits have held that such sua sponte relief is

permissible. See Fort Knox Music Inc. v. Baptiste, 257 F.3d 108, 111

(2d Cir. 2001) (“While normally such relief is sought by motion of a

party, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b), nothing forbids the court to grant

(continued...)

Appendix E~7

760 (6th Cir. 1993), we reasoned that because Rule 60(b)

explicitly requires relief under the rule to occur “on motion,”

courts may not grant such relief except upon “a motion from the

affected party.” Jd. at 762; accord Lewis v. Alexander, 987

F.2d 392, 396 (6th Cir. 1993) (“Eaton decided . . . that a district

court may not act sua sponte to grant relief from judgment

through Rule 60(b).”). Here, no motion for Rule 60(b) relief

was made. Accordingly, under our precedents the order

vacating the relief exceeded the district court’s authority.

We also note that even if the district court had the

authority to vacate the order, district courts should not use their

authority under Rule 60(b) to reward parties’ contempt of prior

orders. The initial district judge had imposed the fine after

carefully considering the factors required under 33 U.S.C.

§ 1319(d), and the fine’s purpose was to punish violations of the

Clean Water Act, not to induce these offenders to remedy the

violation. Of course, if any of the considerations listed in

§ 1319(d), such as the economic impact that the judgment

would have on the offenders, had changed, relief from the

judgment might have been appropriate. Similarly, upon motion

of a party, the district court might have used its Rule 60(b)

authority to grant relief in the presence of “exceptional or

extraordinary circumstances” that this court held are necessary

for relief under Rule 60(b)(6) in Hopper v. Euclid Manor

' (...continued)

such relief sua sponte.”’); Kingvision Pay-Per-View Ltd. y. Lake Alice

Bar, 168 F.3d 347, 351 (9th Cir. 1999) (reasoning that although rule

says “on motion,” it “does not explicitly say ‘by a party,’” suggesting

that the relief could be on the court’s own motion); McDowell v.

Celebrezze, 310 F.2d 43, 44 (Sth Cir. 1962) (“The Court could

initiate this on its own motion.”’); United States v. Jacobs, 298 F.2d

469, 472 (4th Cir. 1961) (“The rule need not necessarily be read as

depriving the court of the power to act in the interest of justice in an

unusual case in which its attention has been directed to the necessity

for relief by means other than a motion.”’).

Appendix E-8

Nursing Home, Inc., 867 F.2d 291, 294 (6th Cir. 1989).

However, those circumstances are not present here. Rather, the

only unusual circumstance present was that the defendants

intransigently refused to comply with the district court’s order

to allow access to the property for remediation. Vacating a

prior order for the sole purpose of inducing compliance with

another order would reward contempt.

This case is somewhat analogous to the circumstances that

we faced in Hopper. There, a prevailing plaintiff was required

to pay certain costs pursuant to Rule 68, because the plaintiff

had refused the defendant’s offer to settle for an amount that

turned out to be greater than the nominal damages that the

plaintiff was ultimately awarded. The district court then used

Rule 60(b)(6) to vacate the earlier judgment in favor of the

plaintiff, and the court entered judgment in favor of the

defendant, a move that rendered Rule 68 inapplicable. See

Hopper, 867 F.2d at 293. We reversed, because the district

court had “sought to negate the operation of Rule 68,” which

encourages plaintiffs to consider settlement offers seriously lest

the plaintiff win a smaller judgment and be forced to pay costs,

and because granting Rule 60(b) relief would reward the

plaintiff's refusal to accept an appropriate settlement offer. /d.

at 294-95. Similarly, here, granting relief from the civil penalty

served to reward the defendants’ refusal to comply with court

orders.

The district court’s sole purpose in vacating the civil fine

here was not, of course, to reward the defendants’ disregard of

the law. The district court’s primary purpose appears to have

been to remedy the violation of the Clean Water Act. That

purpose was appropriate, and Judge Woods noted that the

hearing on the emergency motion to comply had resulted in a

new settlement. There was, however, nothing to settle: Judge

Cleland had already determined that Alice Pauley and Joseph

Morrison had an obligation to permit contractors to remedy a

violation, and he had ordered them to comply. The problem

Appendix E~9

was not that the parties failed to agree on an appropriate

resolution, but that Alice Pauley and Joseph Morrison

had refused to fulfill their court-ordered obligations. Alice

Pauley’s and Joseph Morrison’s blatant refusal to comply with

a court order would have warranted contempt proceedings, but

certainly not a reward for their obstruction.

lif. CONCLUSION

Because the district court did not have the power to vacate

the civil penalty sua sponte, we REVERSE and REMAND for

reimposition of the fine.

Appendix F-1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF

AMERICA, Case No. 99-CV-71069-DT

Plaintiff,

v.

SAMUEL PAULEY;

ALICE PAULEY; JOSEPH

MORRISON; and JOHN

HORVATH,

Defendants.

ORDER GRANTING “PLAINTIFF’S RENEWED

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT”

Plaintiff United States of America (“the Government’)

brought this action against Defendants Samuel Pauley, Alice

Pauley, and Joseph Morrison, alleging that they had violated

Section 404 of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1344, by

placing, or causing to be placed, fill material in a wetland

adjacent to a water of the United States without first securing a

permit from the United States Army Corps of Engineers. The

instant motion for summary judgment was filed by the

Appendix F-2

Government on August 25, 2000. Defendants failed to file a

timely response.

I. BACKGROUND

Defendants own property located at 3010 Green Drive,

Harsens Island, Michigan. At the front of the site is a

grandfathered fill area, on which a building that was formerly a

gas station is situated. The Corps of Engineers, however,

alleges that in June 1994 it discovered a recent, unpermitted fill

in the wetland behind the gas station. Specifically, the

Government alleges that Defendants violated the Clean Water

Act (1) by depositing and grading fill material into the wetland

area and (2) by digging up, repairing, and then reburying a

broken water line located in the wetland area.

Ii, STANDARD

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, summary

judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). “Where the moving party

has carried its burden of showing that the pleadings, depositions,

answers to interrogatories, admissions and affidavits in the

record construed favorably to the non-moving party, do not

raise a genuine issue of material fact for trial, entry of summary

judgment is appropriate.” Gutierrez y. Lynch, 826 F.2d 1534,

' After the hearing on this matter had been cancelled, counsel for

Defendants did fax to the court a one-page “Summary of Oral

Argument to be Given in Open Court.” The facsimile, however, was

both untimely and in violation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5.

Moreover, the substance of Defendants’ proposed argument—that the

entire property is grandfathered out of the Clean Water Act—was

unavailing. Under the Act’s grandfather clause, only certain activities

occurring prior to 1977, not property itself, are excluded from the

Act’s coverage. See 33 C.F.R. § 330.3. The activities alleged in this

case do not qualify under this grandfather provision.

Appendix F-3

1536 (6th Cir. 1987) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.

317 (1986)).

Failure by the non-moving party to respond to a motion for

summary judgment is not necessarily fatal to that party’s case.

The movant bears the initial burden on summary judgment and

to prevail must demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue as to

all material facts. Only then does the burden shift to the non-

movant and the failure to respond become fatal. Accordingly,

if the Government can demonstrate that all elements of its cause

of action are satisfied, summary judgment should be granted

based on Defendants’ failure to respond. If, on the hand, the

Government’s prima facie case is incomplete, summary

judgment should be denied. See Carver v. Bunch, 946 F.2d

451, 454-55 (6th Cir. 1991).

Ii. DISCUSSION

The Clean Water Act prohibits the discharge of any

pollutant, from a point source, into navigable waters. 33 U.S.C.

§§ 1311(a), 1344, 1362(12) (1986). The Secretary of the Army

is authorized, however, to grant permits authorizing the

discharge of “dredged material” and “fill material” under certain

conditions. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a), 1344. Therefore, to satisfy

its burden under Rule 56, the Government must show that no

material questions of fact remain as to whether (A) Defendants

discharged a pollutant, (B) from a source point, (C) into

navigable waters, (D) without a permit. Because the United

States has satisfied this burden, and because Defendants have

failed to otherwise raise a genuine issue of material fact, the

Government’s motion for summary judgment will be granted.

A. Defendants Discharged a Pollutant

The phrase “discharge of a pollutant” is defined under the

Clean Water Act as “the addition of any pollutant.” 33 U.S.C.

§ 1362(12). “Pollutant” is defined to include, among other

Appendix F—4

things, dredged spoil,’ biological materials, rock, sand, and

cellar dirt. The Government alleges that Defendants discharged

a pollutant in essentially two ways: (1) by placing and grading

fill material into the wetlands and (2) by digging a trench in the

wetland area, sidecasting the dirt, and then refilling the trench.

These actions unquestionably constitute the “discharge of

a pollutant” within the meaning of the Clean Water Act. First,

bringing fill material and dumping and grading it into a wetland

is the core example of “adding a pollutant.” Second, while

initially it may be less clear that sidecasting material dredged

from a wetland area back into the wetland is “the addition of a

pollutant,” all federal courts addressing the issue have concluded

that such acts indeed violate the Clean Water Act. See, e.g.,

Avoyelles Sportsmen’s League, Inc. v. Marsh, 715 F.2d 897,

923-35 (Sth Cir. 1983) (holding that interpretation of “addition”

to include “redeposit” of trees and vegetation dredged or

excavated from the wetland itself is consistent with both the

purposes and legislative history of the Clean Water Act);

National Mining Assoc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 145 F.3d

1399, 1405 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (quoting Avoyelles, 715 F.2d at

924 n.43 (“‘[D]redged’ material is by definition materia] that

comes from the water itself. A requirement that all pollutants

must come from outside sources would effectively remove the

dredge-and-fill provision from the statute.”)); United States v.

Deaton, 209 F.3d 331 (4th Cir. 2000) (adopting similar

holding).

Defendants have acknowledged in deposition testimony

their responsibility for the alleged acts. All three Defendants

have ownership interests in the property, (Answer {fj 2, 3), and

deposition testimony shows that Defendants Samuel Pauley and

Joseph Morrison either performed, or hired Defendant John

Horvath to perform, the work done in the wetland area,

? Dredged spoil is “material that is excavated or dredged from waters

of the United States.” 33 C.F.R. § 323.2.

Appendix F—5

(Morrison Dep. at 15, 19, 23; Horvath Dep. at 13). In the

absence of exculpatory evidence from Defendants, this is

sufficient to satisfy the Government’s burden under summary

judgment of showing that Defendants discharged a pollutant.

B. From a Point Source

To constitute a violation of the Clean Water Act, a

pollutant must be discharged from a “point source,” which is

defined as “any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance,

including but not limited to any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel,

conduit, well, discrete fissure, container, rolling stock,

concentrated animal feeding operation, or vessel or other

floating craft, from which pollutants are or may be discharged.”

33 U.S.C. § 1362(12), (14). Courts unanimously have held that

earthmoving equipment such as dump trucks, bulldozers, and

backhoes qualify as “discernible, confined and discrete

conveyance[s]” and are thus point sources of pollution. United

States v. Weisman, 489 F. Supp. 1331, 1337 (M.D. Fla. 1980);

Avoyelles Sportsmen’s League, Inc. v. Alexander, 473 F. Supp.

525 (W.D. La. 1979).

The Government alleges that Defendants discharged

pollutants using a backhoe and a plow blade attached to a truck.

These allegations are supported by the deposition testimony.

(Morrison Dep. at 19, 22-23.) Accordingly, this element has

been satisfied for purposes of summary judgment.

C. Into Navigable Waters

Defendants can be liable under the Clean Water Act only

if they discharged pollutants into “navigable waters.” 33 U.S.C.

§ 1362(12). Navigable waters is defined as “waters of the

United States,” which in turn is defined to include “wetlands . . .

which could affect interstate or foreign commerce,” including

wetiands which are adjacent to interstate waters or their

tributaries. 343 C.F.R. § 328.3(a). In United States v.

Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121 (1985), the

Appendix F—6

United States Supreme Court upheld this definition as within the

scope of authority granted by Congress.

The Government has satisfied its burden of showing that

the land on which the pollutants were dumped is a wetland

covered by the Clean Water Act. The Government has

submitted the declarations of Jean Battle, a Corps of Engineers

biologist, and Donald Tilton, a doctor of botany and a Certified

Professional of Wetland Scientist. Both testify that the subject

property is a wetland as defined by the regulations and support

their testimony with factual data. In addition, the wetland is

adjacent to the St. Clair River, which is an interstate water or a

tributary of interstate waters. Accordingly, for purposes of

summary judgment, the Government has satisfied its burden of

showing that the pollutants were discharged into navigable

waters.

D. Without a Permit

It is undisputed that no permit was issued authorizing the

discharge of pollutants. No recorded permit has been located

with the Corps of Engineers. And, although in their Answer

Defendants neither denied nor admitted the absence of a permit,

Defendant Morrison testified in deposition that “I never applied

for a permit at any time, expressed an interest for applying for

a permit because I believe the property is not a wetland.”

(Morrison Dep. at 33.)

Il. CONCLUSION

Because the Government has demonstrated that no genuine

issue of material fact exists with regard to whether Defendants

discharged a pollutant, from a point source, into navigable

waters of the United States, without a permit, it has satisfied its

burden imposed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56.

Appendix F~7

Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff's motion for

summary judgment against Defendants Samuel Pauley, Alice

Pauley, and Joseph Morrison is GRANTED.

FURTHER IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff shall file a brief

regarding the scope and necessity of an injunctive order and the

amount of a civil penalty by November 13, 2000. Defendants

shall file a response brief by November 27, 2000. A hearing on

the matter will be held on December 13, 2000 at 2:00.

/s/ Robert H. Cleland

ROBERT H. CLELAND

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Dated: Oct. 31, 2000.

Appendix G-1

No. 05-1552

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )

.

J

Plaintiff-Appellee, ORDER

)

)

) Filed

) August 25, 2006

)

)

)

v.

ALICE MORRISON, ET AL.,

Defendants-Appellants.

BEFORE: DAUGHTREY and GILMAN, Circuit

Judges; and RUSSELL,’ District Judge.

The court having received a petition for rehearing en banc,

and the petition having been circulated not only to the original

panel members but also to all other active judges of this court,

and no judge of this court having requested a vote on the

suggestion for rehearing en banc, the petition for rehearing has

been referred to the original panel.

The panel has further reviewed the petition for rehearing

and concludes that the issues raised in the petition were fully

considered upon the original submission and decision of the

case. Accordingly, the petition is denied.

ENTERED BY ORDER OF THE COURT

/s/ Leonard Green

Leonard Green, Clerk

“Hon. Thomas B. Russell, United States District Judge for the

Western District of Kentucky, sitting by designation.

Appendix H-1

CITATION OF SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITY

FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURES

RULE 28(J)

Case Number 05-1552

Decided April 26, 2006

United States Court of Appeals

for the Sixth Circuit

United States of America

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Alice Morrison: Joseph Morrison

Defendants-Appellants.

This is [sic] inform the Court of the recent decision made

by the United States Supreme Court in Ramanos [sic] vs.

U.S.A., 8. C. Docket number 04-1034, argued Feb 21, 2006 -

Decided June 19, 2006 that may help the Court render it’s

decision. In the appellants brief page 4, and pages 6-9 the

defendants argue the “Nexus Theory.”

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Keay Fallowfield

Keay Fallowfield

Attorney at Law

60 N. Howard Street

P.O. Box 162

Croswell, Mi. 48422

810-679-3660

Counsel for Appellant

Appendix I-1

Text from the United States District Court’s docket report.

* * * *

03/30/2001

ORDER by Judge Robert H. Cleland,

assessing a civil penalty as to defendants

Alice Pauley Morrison and Joseph

Morrison, only with proof of mailing

[EOD Date 4/2/01] (dh) (Entered:

04/02/2001)

03/30/2001

JUDGMENT entered by Judge

Robert H. Cleland for USA against

Joseph Morrison, Alice Pauley with

proof of mailing [EOD Date: 4/2/01]

(dh) (Entered: 04/02/2001)

06/07/2001

ORDER by Judge George E. Woods,

vacating the judgment awarding plaintiff

a civil penalty from defendants Alice

Pauley Morrison and Joseph Morrison

in the amount of $25,000.00 entered

by Judge Cleland on 03/30/01, is

vacated, plaintiffs oral motion for

reconsideration of the vacating of the

judgment of $25,000.00 is denied.

Defendants Alice and Joseph Morrison’s

motion for a stay pending appeal is

denied. (see order for further details)

[EOD Date 6/28/01] (dh) (Entered:

06/28/2001)

Appendix J-1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT CF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF

AMERICA, CIVIL NO. 99-71069

Plaintiff, HON. ROBERT H.

CLELAND

VS.

SAMUEL PAULEY,

ALICE PAULEY, JOSEPH

MORRISON, and JOHN

HORVATH, Jointly and

Severally,

Defendants.

PLAINTIFF’S RENEWED MOTION

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS TO

DEFENDANTS PAULEY AND MORRISON

NOW COMES Plaintiff, United States of America, by and

through its attorneys, Saul A. Green, United States Attorney

and Geneva S. Halliday, Assistant United States Attorney, and

moves for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 56 as to Defendants Samuel Pauley, Alice Pauley and

Joseph Morrison, only. Plaintiff relies on the attached brief,

declarations of Dr. Tilton and Jean Battle with attachments,

and the depositions of Joseph Morrison and John Horvath

Appendix J—2

previously filed in this matter in support of Plaintiff's Motion for

Summary Judgment.

Respectfully submitted,

SAUL A. GREEN

United States Attorney

/s/ Geneva S. Halliday

GENEVA S. HALLIDAY (P28140)

Assistant U.S. Attorney

211 W. Fort Street, Suite 2001

Detroit, MI 48226-3211

(313) 226-9778

Dated: August 25, 2000

Appendix K~1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF

AMERICA, CIVIL NO. 99-71069

Plaintiff, HON. ROBERT H.

CLELAND

vs.

SAMUEL PAULEY,

ALICE PAULEY, JOSEPH

MORRISON, and JOHN

HORVATH, Jointly and

Severally,

Defendants.

DECLARATION OF DONALD L. TILTON, Ph.D.

I, Donald L. Tilton, in lieu of an affidavit as permitted by

28 U.S.C. § 1746, do hereby declare and state as follows:

1. From 1996, to the present I have been President of

Tilton & Associates, Inc. which is a private consulting firm that

specializes in wetland management, ecological restoration, and

resource policy. In 1975, I received my Ph.D. in botany from

the University of Minnesota. In 1996, I became a Certified

Professional of Wetland Scientist.

2. Attached to this declaration is my curriculum vitae

which ts hereby incorporated by reference.

Appendix K-2

3. I was retained by the United States of America to

conduct a wetland delineation for a parcel of land located at the

corner of M-154 and LaCroix Road on Harsen’s Island,

Michigan. The property I was retained to do the wetland

delineation on were Lots 1249 and 1250 of Supervisor Roy T.

Gilbert’s Plat No. 14, Clay Township, County of St. Clair;

commonly known as 3010 Green Drive, Harsens Island,

Michigan.

4. On November 1, 1999, I visited the site commonly

known as 3010 Green Drive, Harsens, Island, Michigan, and

conducted an investigation in order to do a wetland delineation.

5. As part of this investigation the following resources

were used. Aerial photographs of the site, Corps of Engineers

Wetlands Delineation Manual, Waterways Experiment Station,

U.S. Department of Army, Corps of Engineers, 1987; Hydric

Soils of the State of Michigan, National Technical Committee

for Hydric Soils, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Soil

Conservation Service, 1985; Soil Survey of St. Clair County,

Soil Conservation Service, United States Department of

Agriculture; Wetland Plants of the State of Michigan (1988),

Fish and Wildlife Service, United States Department of Interior;

and field inspection reports (various dates) by Corps of

Engineers personnel.

6. The methods I used to delineate wetlands are

described in the 1987 Corps of Engineers Wetland Delineation

Manual. The methods used in the field include evaluation of

plant species dominance, soil characteristics and observations of

the evidence of hydrology. This particular delineation required

use of techniques developed for disturbed or atypical sites

because the site had been filled and the vegetation

was maintained in a mowed condition. The procedures

described include evaluation of plant species, soil characteristics

and evidence of temporary or seasonal hydrology. These

Appendix K-3

procedures are typically utilized in all Tilton & Associates, Inc.

wetland determinations in the State of Michigan.

7. The property at 3010 Green Drive, Harsens Island,

Michigan, consisted primarily of mowed open fields with a few

scattered trees. There is a building on the road frontage. My

wetland delineation identified two wetlands on the property that

are separated by a layer of fill that had been placed in the

wetlands. It appears from the soil profile and characteristics

thai the wetlands were once a single wetland until the wetland

was divided by the fill activities. The delineation lines were

marked with pink “Wetland Delineation” flagging on pin stakes.

The wetlands identified on the property is an emergent wetland

type.

8. The vegetation on the site was a strong indicator of

wetland presence. Plant species observed in the disturbed

wetland area included: Reed canary grass (Phalaris

arundinacea) FACW+; Purple loosestrife (Lythrum salicaria)

OBL; Soft stem bulrush (Juncus effusus) OBL; Common reed

(Phragmites australis) FACW+. Wetland species observed in

the wetland adjacent to the disturbed area included the above

species as well as silky dogwood (Comus amomum) and a

species of sedge (Carex sp.). The dominant plants in the

wetland area were all considered hydrophytic plant species.

9. Standing water was not observed in the wetland area

at the time of field investigation in November 1999, but there

was visible evidence of saturation in the soil borings taken in the

wetland area. In most instances, soil auger tests indicated

saturated soils beneath the fill within twelve inches of the

surface wetland soil horizon.

10. Soils on the site tended to be uniform except for

variation in the thickness of fill placed over hydric soils (see

attached photographs). A total of four soil pits and soil borings

were investigated in the undisturbed wetland and seven soil pits

and soil borings were observed in the fill area. The soil profile

Appendix K-4

in the undisturbed wetland area showed a black organic muck

surface horizon six inches thick. Beneath the organic muck

surface horizon there was a layer of silty fine sand with organic

streaking. The soil color of the silty fine sand was 10 YR 7/3.

Live roots were observed in the soil horizons. Soil borings

taken in the till area showed an unconsolidated layer of fill

consisting of mostly silty sand. The silty sand fill layer

overlayed a dark black organic soil that was typically 6-8 inches

thick. Beneath the organic soil layer there was a soil with a silty

sand character with organic streaking similar to the soil

observed in the undisturbed wetland. Within the buried organic

soil horizon, live roots were observed indicating that the soil

horizon was recently buried.

11. My investigation of this property indicated that based

on the observance of a predominance of hydrophytic plant

species, hydric soils and evidence of wetland hydrology, there

are wetlands on this property that meet the criteria of wetlands

under Section 404 of the Clean Water Act.

12. My investigation, including my soil investigation,

further showed that fill material had been placed in-wetland

areas on the property in question. A sketch of the fill area that

I prepared on November 1, 1999 is attached hereto.

I affirm that the information contained herein is true and

accurate.

[no signature]

DONALD L. TILTON, Ph.D.

Appendix L~I

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF

AMERICA, CIVIL NO. 99-71069

Plaintiff, HON. ROBERT H.

CLELAND

VS.

SAMUEL PAULEY,

ALICE PAULEY, JOSEPH

MORRISON, and JOHN

HORVATH, Jointly and

Severally,

Defendants.

DECLARATION OF JEAN BATTLE

I, Jean Battle, in lieu of an affidavit as permitted by

28 U.S.C. § 1746, do hereby declare and state as follows:

1. From 1992 to 1999, I was employed by the U.S.

Army Corps of Engineers, Detroit District. From 1992 to 1997,

I was a Biologist in the Enforcement Section of the Regulatory

Branch, Corps of Engineers. I graduated from the University of

Michigan in 1988 with a Bachelor of Science in Natural

Resources.

2. OnJune 16, 1994, having completed an inspection of

another property on Harsens Island, Michigan, I was on my way

to the ferry when I observed recent fill material on a site

Appendix L~2

vegetated with wetland plants. The site was on M-154 behind

a Mobile Gas Station on Harsens Island.

3. I observed fresh, sandy subsoil material with no

vegetation, that did not conform to the contours of the

vegetated land surrounding it on the site. The material was

mounded in some areas in piles and had been flattened in other

areas, and was above the grade of the surrounding vegetated

landscape. The material was a light color that indicated that it

was a mineral subsoil layer, not a dark organic soil that would

normally be found as the surface soil layer of a wetland in the

Harsens Island area. The bare material had been placed in an

area heavily vegetated with wetland species of sedges and

grasses. I also observed fresh track marks of heavy equipment

on some of the fill.

4. OnJune 16, 1994, I took the photographs of the fill

area. At the time I placed the photographs together to show the

area. Copies of these photographs are attached to this

declaration as Exhibit A and incorporated by reference.

5. The address of the property where the fill had been

placed in a wetland was 3010 Green Drive, Harsens Island,

St. Clair County, Michigan. The register of deeds indicated that

the owners were defendants Samuel and Alice Pauley.

6. I spoke with defendant Alice Pauley who indicated

that the fill had come from the removal of an underground

storage tank. Defendant Joseph Morrison, originally told me

that the fill material was already on site. When I pointed out

that the fill was obviously new, he recanted this statement. He

indicated that the property deed did not say that the property

was a wetland. See Conversation Record dated June 16, 1994,

and attached as Exhibit B to this Declaration.

7. I advised Alice Pauley I would conduct an inspection

to determine if the site was a wetland. On July 8, 1994, I

Appendix L-3

inspected the site. The report I prepared on July 13, 1994 of my

July 8, 1994 inspection is attached as Exhibit C.

8. J determined that the property was a wetland within

the Corps of Engineers jurisdiction under Section 404 of the

Clean Water Act and Section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act.

9. Hydrophytic vegetation was present in the area of the

fill. The wetland was an Emergent (cattail, rushes, etc.) and

Wet Meadow (wetland grasses, sedges, and herbaceous

vegetation) type wetland. One hundred percent of the dominant

species in the areas adjacent to and under the fill material were

wetland indicators.

10. Wetland hydrology was also present. I dug several

test pits and the water was within 10" of the surface in the

undisturbed areas or 20" of the surface in the filled areas.

11. Hydric soils, which are wetland indicators, were

present under the sandy land fill material on the site and next to

it, in adjacent undisturbed portions of the site.

12. I examined previous aerial photos of the site area

including 1984 aerial photographs, copies attached. The 1984

aerial photographs showed existing (“grandfathered”) fill on the

east side of the building. Also, there was some fill on the north

and west sides of the building that showed only in five year old

photographs; however, I also considered this fill grandfathered

for purposes of my inspection and enforcement action. Based

on my evaluation of the aerial photos and my inspection of the

site on June 16, 1994 and July 8, 1994, I determined that

approximately .65 acres and approximately | ,020 cubic yards of

new, unauthorized fill had been recently placed in the wetland,

north and west of the mobile station on the property owned by

Samuel and Alice Pauley.

13. Based on my inspection of aerial photographs from

prior to 1994 and my inspection of the site, I, at the time,

prepared the sketch that is attached to my inspection report and

Appendix L4

the sketch that is attached hereto as Exhibit D. The area marked

“unauthorized fill,” outlines the area of the obviously new,

freshly placed unauthorized fill that I observed on June 16,

1994, on the property on Harsens Island, Michigan owned by

defendants Samuel and Alice Pauley.

14. I reviewed the Corps of Engineers permit files and

determined that no permits had been issued for fill on the

property in question.

15. By letter dated July 25, 1994, Alice Pauley indicated

that it was their intention to voluntarily restore the property to

the satisfaction of the Corps of Engineers. See letter attached

as Exhibit E.

16. I met and spoke several times with Alice and Samuel

Pauley regarding this restoration of the site. Alice Pauley

indicated that some of the fill also came from the installation of

a water line that had occurred in the winter of 1994 and that the

contractor had done a poor job of refilling the trench, instead

spreading the material across the wetland. The Pauleys had

several excuses over the ensuing years for delaying voluntarily

restoring the site including: could not find a contractor; wanted

to get the same contractor, John Horvath, who placed the fill to

remove it; and financial hardship. Eventually, they stopped

responding to letters and phone calls.

I affirm that the mformation contained herein is true and

accurate.

/s/ Jean Battle

JEAN BATTLE

Date: _ 8/17/00

Appendix L-5

—— es ae

Exhibit C

CENCE-CO-L 94-012-073-0 July 14, 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR: File

SUBJECT: Pauley property, Section 404 violation, Harsen’s

Island, MI

1. Inspection on 16 June 94 and 8 July 94 showed discharge

of fill material and grading in wetland adjacent to St. Clair

River. Some material came from excavation of leaking

underground storage tanks at the old gas station on the

property. Filled and graded area is irregular in shape and fill

depth, approx. .65 acres, and 1020 cubic yards.

2. 1984 Aerial shows some existing fill on the east side of the

building. In addition, some fill near the north and west sides of

the building appears to be at least five years old.

3. Recommendation: Send violation letter. Grandfather area

of fill as shown on field sketch and have owner either apply for

remainder or restore site.

/s/ Jean Battle

JEAN BATTLE

Project Manager

Regulatory Functions Branch

* *

Appendix L-6

CENCE-CO-94-012-073-0 DATE 13 July 94

MEMORANDUM FOR Chief, Regulatory Functions Branch

SUBJECT: Inspection Report of Mobile Service Station,

Harsen’s Island, MI

1. Owner/Permittee Alice Pauley

* *« * *

{x} Jurisdiction [ ] No work/wetlands in Corps jurisdiction

[ | Section 10

[x] Section 404

[x] Wetlands (Determination Forms

attached)

[x] Adjacent to: St. Clair River

[x] Below Headwaters

[ ] Above Headwaters

{ ] Isolated: Size of Wetland

Complex ___

* * * *

Appendix L-7

16 June 94

DATE OF INSPECTION 8 July 94

DATE REPORT PREPARED 13 July 94

INSPECTORS REPORT

Waterway (County) St. Clair River File No. 94-012-073-0

(No. 012)

Name(s) of Land Owner(s) Alice Pauley

a ar *

X_ Wetland Adjacent to Section 10 Water

Tributary to Navigable Water

Signature of Investigator _/s/ Jean Battle

JOB TITLE

* * * *

Appendix L-8

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Appendix L-9

Exhibit D

x St Mark cy

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/ “4 P

Appendix M-1

Detroit District

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers

File Number 94-012-073-0

Department of the Army Permit Evaluation

MORRISON - ATF FILL

* * * *

b. Operational Impacts:

The existing work adversely impacts an area that filters

rainfall, runoff, groundwater, and floodwaters by eliminating

0.65 acres of wetlands, and would replace it with a new source

area for runoff pollutants. Pollutants from this area may include

lawn fertilizers, herbicides, and pesticides. This would cause a

long-term negative impact on water quality, as more water with

less filtering time enters the road side ditches and goes directly

into the canal system. The cumulative impact of similar

discharges in wetlands along the waterway wil] increase the

minor adverse impacts to water chemistry, temperature, and

turbidity. Overall, the operation and use of the activity has a

minor, long term, negative impact on water quality.

* * * *

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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