Opposition Brief — Environmental Protection Agency v. New York, 127 S. Ct. 2127 (2007) (No. 06-736)

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IN THE JAN 25 2607

Supreme Court of the United PUREE. or

| Supasertc

UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL

PROTECTION AGENCY,

Petitioner,

v,

STATE OF NEW YORK, et ai.,

Respondents.

UTILITY AIR REGULATORY GROUP,

Petitioner,

v.

STATE OF NEW YORK, et al.,

Respondents.

On PETITIONS FOR Writs OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES CourT OF APPEALS FOR THE

District OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION FOR RESPONDENTS

STATE OF NEW YORK, ET AL.

J. JARED SNYDER ANbrREw M. Cuomo

MicuaeL J. Myers Attorney General of the

Assistant Attorneys General State New York

Office of the Attorney General Barpara D. UNDERWOOD*

The Capitol Solicitor General

Albany, NY 12224 DANIEL SMIRLOCK

(518) 474-8010 Deputy Solicitor General

ANDREW D. BING

Assistant Suiicitor General

120 Broadway, 25" Floor

New York, NY 10271

* Counsel of Record (212) 416-8016

Counsel for Respondents State of New York, et al.

(Additional Counsel listed on signature page)

i

COUNTER STATEMENT OF

QUESTION PRESENTED

The Clean Air Act requires that “any physical change”

to a “stationary source” of air pollution that increases

emissions from the source undergo the “New Source Review”

permitting process. The question presented is whether the

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) can exempt from

this process substantial replacements of plant equipment that

produce large, non-de minimis emissions increases.

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

COUNTER STATEMENT OF QUESTION

DCM UGes Gus udevverctceeeerecees.s

Dame emon) OF THE CASE .....cccccccccces

EE OUI go ccc cco ccccecccevesees

I con csheaccevccecrccepeves

The Court of Appeals’ Decision ..............

REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION .....

I. THE DECISION BELOW IS A ROUTINE

APPLICATION OF ESTABLISHED PRINCIPLES

OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION .......

A. EPA’s Claim That the Court of Appeals

Created a New Rule of Statutory

Construction Is Incorrect. ...........

B. The Court of Appeals’ Decision is

Consistent With this Court’s Precedent

Regarding the Meaning of the Word

ES eG de Wale ¥.iu n5.40 0 646 9 68%

Page

iil

Contents

Page

C. The Court of Appeals’ Decision Does Not

Conflict With This Court’s Decisions

Regarding Congressional Ratification of

Regulatory Interpretations. .......... 12

Il. THE DECISION BELOW DOES NOT HAVE

THE ADVERSE CONSEQUENCES

CLAIMED BY THE PETITIONERS ...... 16

A. The Decision of the Court Below Does

Not Prevent EPA From Administering the

NSR Program in a Way That Promotes Its

Peet MONS cx venue ved enn eeueess 16

B. The Rule Vacated by the Court of Appeals

Would Not Benefit the Environment. ... 18

C. The Utility Industry’s Equitable

Arguments Are Legally Irrelevant and

oe B. 20

ee rrr rr eee rT ame 22

iv

TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIFS

Page

CASES

Alabama Power v. Costle,

6360 F.26 323 (D.C. Cat. 1979). nce ccccces 4,5, 16, 17

BP America Production Co. v. Burton,

No. 05-669, slip op. (U.S. Dec. 11, 2006) ...... 10

Brown v. Gardner,

Ee ae DR Rete <b bees i eee eee eeus 8, 14

Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources

Defense Council, Inc.,

ek pet | rer tere passim

. Department of Housing & Urban Development v.

Rucker,

pe BTR GE. Fs” + SORA rape meemt mere eeneconirease en 8,9

Flora v. United States,

BE a PO EEE abd ceawvansitieriee i)

Harrison v. PPG Industries, Inc.,

ae re ss as oka bees Chae 9

In re: Tennessee Valley Authority,

9 E.A.D. 357 (Env.App. Bd. 2000),

rev'd on jurisdictional grounds, Tennessee Valley

Authority v. Whitman, 336 F.3d 1236 (4th Cir. 2003)

iis dime ale Caras gis ora a nae oar aay 2,19

New York v. EPA (“New York I’’),

413 F.3d 3, reh. denied 431 F.3d 801 (D.C. Cir.

I oe eee ee or re eer aia ade ohana he 12, 14,17

Cited Authorities

Page

Norfolk S. Rwy. Co. v. Kirby,

ee th Oe EE son tak VR eae ewer 9

Puerto Rican Cement Co. v. EPA,

S89 F.2d 292 (ist Cir. 1989)... cece ewes 19

Red Lion Broadcasting v. FCC,

Be ss SE COE is ho S59 a ae 13

SEC v. Sloan,

436 U.S. 103 (1978) ......... cece eens. 13, 14, 15

Small v. United States,

ee es Se GOED bk 2 ab eae aes 10

State of New York v. U.S. Environmental

Protection Agency,

443 F.3d 880 (D.C. Cir. 2006) ....... cece ceee

TWA v. Hardison,

ee ee PPT he ee Sc aes cane 13

United States v. Gonzales,

ate NER 8 65 oe oad a ee 5,9, 10

United States v. S. Ind. Gas and Electric Co.,

245 F. Supp. 2d 994 (S.D. Ind. 2003) ......... 20-21

United States v. Ohio Edison,

276 F. Supp. 2d 829 (S.D. Ohio 2003) ......... Pout

vi

Cited Authorities

Page

FEDERAL STATUTES

Ce ade t,t ae ae aa 1

AZUGC. GTAIIGKO . «oo noc ccc cccececee: 2,9, 18

Pk ae yo. | re 14

eo le, ena a ee eee

Pet oe pa eas 13,14

SEUGDC. STATOANO) 2.00. occ cccceccccsves 1,2

42 U.S.C. § T501(4) ........ ccc cece eeeceeeee: 1,2

Pe ae yar es

Py od Ge eee eo

FEDERAL REGULATIONS

40 C.ER. § 51.166(b)(23)(i) .....---- cece eee ee. 16

40. CFR. § 52.21(b\X2M i) ...........eeeeeeeees 2

MOIR. § S22UUNII) occ cc ccccvecce: 2

40 C.ER. § 52.21(b{56) ............eeeeeeeee 3

40 C.ER. § 52.21(cc) (2005) .........eeeeeeeee 3

40 CER. § 52.21 (cc)(1) (2005)... .... eee eee. 3

Vil

Cited Authorities

Page

MISCELLANEOUS

Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting

Reversal in Engine Mfrs. Assn. v. South Coast Air

Quality Management District, S. Ct. Case

No. 02-1343 (Aug. 2003), 2003 WL 22068761 ... 12

Brief of United States Amicus Curiae in South Florida

Water Management District v. Miccosukee Tribe,

S.Ct. No. 02-626 (Sept. 2003), 2003 WL 22137034

ta ECT REM CREM AREER EE ROSCOE eek ee Kan 11,12

FEDERAL REGISTER

Pe CU SE hon 64 Rees ee eens has 15

oF WOE. TO, Farle CANE «ce ccancvecsacaceweens 2

Oy PG Se Ee 8 bs Seka cacclosiewepeces 17

OE Fa GU OE oa 5.0.8 bo 5 44 bee seaeseeeds 19

PO PGE, BA: FRO coceckescvescsevaveses i tee Ee

H.R. Rep. No. 91-1146, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1970)

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Respondents are thirteen states, the District of Columbia,

various municipalities and environmental organizations that

filed petitions for review of a rule (the “Rule”) that EPA

promulgated in 2003 under the new source review (NSR)

provisions of the Clean Air Act. NSR is a permitting process

that applies to a plant “modification,” which includes “any

physical change” that increases emissions. The Rule

interprets “modification” to exclude from the NSR

requirements substantial equipment replacement projects that

produce large, non-de minimis emission increases. In a

unanimous decision, the United States Court of Appeals for

the District of Columbia Circuit vacated the Rule as contrary

to the plain language of the statute. State of New York v. U.S.

Environmental Protection Agency, 443 F.3d 880 (D.C. Cir.

2006).

The NSR Program

Congress enacted the 1970 amendments to the Clean Air

Act “to speed up, expand, and intensify the war against air

pollution in the United States with a view to assuring

that the air we breathe throughout the Nation is wholesome

once again.” H.R. Rep. No. 91-1146, 91* Cong., 2d Sess. 1

(1970). Because of insufficient progress toward clean air,

Congress added the NSR provisions in 1977 to govern the

construction and “modification” of existing major sources.

42 U.S.C. §§ 7479(2)(C) and 7501(4).' To obtain a permit, a

' NSR consists of two programs: one for areas “in attainment”

with the national ambicnt air quality standards (NAAQS) and one

for nonattainment areas. In attainment areas, a new or modificd

source must comply with prevention of significant deterioration

(PSD) requirements designed to prevent air quality from deteriorating

significantly. See 42 U.S.C. § 7475. In nonattainment areas, new or

modified sources must comply with nonattainment NSR requirements

that are designed to ensure reasonable progress toward attainment

of the NAAQS. See 42 U.S.C. § 7503; Pet. App. 3a n.1.

2

source must satisfy specified air-quality-based and

technology-based requirements. See Pet. App. 3a n.1.

A “modification” that triggers NSR requirements is

defined in the statute as “any physical change in, or change

in the method of operation of, a stationary source which

increases the amount of any air pollutant emitted by such

source or which results in the emission of any air pollutant

not previously emitted.” See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7479(2)(C) and

7501(4) (referencing definition of “modification” found in

42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(4)). Regulations adopted in 1980 limit

the scope of the modification provision to “significant”

emission increases. See 40 CFR § 52.21(b)(2)({i) and (b)(23).

In addition, the EPA’s implementing regulations have always

included a regulatory exemption for “routine maintenance,

repair and replacement,” which EPA consistently has viewed

as limited to de minimis circumstances. See 70 Fed. Reg.

33,841/1 (acknowledging that, before the present rulemaking,

EPA “generally had interpreted the [routine maintenance]

exclusion as being limited to de minimis circumstances’’).

The Rule at Issue

In issuing the Rule, EPA abandoned its longstanding

interpretation of the statutory definition of modification as

encompassing the replacement of equipment.’ The Rule

> See, e.g., 57 Fed. Reg. 32,316/2 (1992) (EPA “has always

recognized that the definition of physical or operational change in

section | 1 1(a)(4) could, standing alone, encompass the most mundane

activities at an industrial facility (even the repair or replacement of

a single leaky pipe, or a change in the way that pipe is utilized).”)

(italics supplied); /n re: Tennessee Valley Authority, 9 E.A.D. 357,

390 (Env. App. Bd. 2000) (hereafter “Jn re TVA”) (EPA’s

Environmental Appeals Board (EAB) concluded that “TVA’s

replacement of various boiler components and elements clearly

constituted physical changes”), reversed on jurisdictional grounds,

Tennessee Valley Authority v. Whitman, 336 F. 3d 1236 (4" Cir. 2003).

3

expands the routine maintenance exemption to encompass

activities that EPA concedes cannot be characterized as de

minimis. 68 Fed. Reg. 61,272/3. It exempts “equipment

replacement” activities that cost up to 20 percent of the entire

process unit’s replacement cost, as long as the new

component “serve[s] the same purpose” as the

replaced component, does not change the unit’s “basic

design parameters,” and does not exceed otherwise

applicable limitations on the unit’s emissions.’ 40 C.F.R.

§§ 52.21(b)(56) and 52.21(cc) (2005). See Pet. App. 41a,

17la-175a. The Rule would allow a plant to use the

exemption repeatedly, with each component replacement

judged independently against the 20 percent threshold. See

40 C.F.R. § 52.21(cc)(1) (2005). See Pet. App. 172a.

Thus, for example, at a typical 1,000 megawatt power

plant with a replacement cost of $800 million, the Rule would

exempt the replacement of plant components that cost as

much as $160 million. See Government Accountability

Office, “New Source Review Revisions Could Affect Utility

Enforcement Cases and Public Access to Emissions Data”

(“GAO Report”) at 18 (Joint App. 1280). EPA concedes that

the Rule would exempt almost all of the emission-increasing

activities at issue in several of its own enforcement cases

against power plants. See 68 Fed. Reg. 61,258/1 (stating that

“we now believe that such activities, if conducted in the

future, should be excluded from major NSR”).4

> The limitation of the exemption to activities that do not result in

emission increases that exceed otherwise applicable limitations does

not prevent substantial emission increases because many plants are not

subject to limits on annual emissions and, where such limits exist, they

are often well in excess of the plant’s actual emissions. See, e.g., United

States v. Ohio Edison Co., 276 F. Supp. 2d 829, 876 (S.D. Oh. 2003)

(hourly emission limits in plant’s permit did not prevent substantial

emission increases resulting from physical changes).

* The 20 percent threshold would have exempted 95 to 98

percent of the violations at issue in EPA’s NSR enforcement cases

(Cont'd)

4

The Court of Appeals’ Decision

In a unanimous decision, the court of appeals vacated

the Rule because it would unlawfully exempt from NSR

emissions-increasing activities that fall within the plain

meaning of the statutory phrase “any physical change.” The

court applied the test established by this Court in Chevron,

U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467

U.S. 837 (1984), which provides that, when “Congress has

directly spoken to the precise question at issue,” an agency

“must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of

Congress.” Jd. at 842-43. The court of appeals concluded

that the plain language of the statutory definition of

“modification” clearly encompasses the replacement of

equipment that leads to an emission increase. Pet. App. Sa.

The court began its interpretation with the statutory phrase

“any physical change.” Observing that EPA conceded that

the “real-world, common-sense usage” of the term “physical

change” includes the replacement of plant equipment,

Pet. App. 6a, the court held that Congress intended the

statutory definition to cover “any” such change that increases

emissions. /d. at 7a (“Because Congress used the word ‘any,’

EPA must apply NSR whenever a source conducts an

emission-increasing activity that fits within one of the

ordinary meanings of ‘physical change.’”).

In its ruling, the court of appeals followed precedent

established more than a quarter-century earlier when it struck

down a similar EPA attempt to limit the scope of NSR. See

Alabama Power v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323 (D.C. Cir. 1979).

The court reiterated its determination in Alabama Power that

the statutory NSR mandate “‘is nowhere limited to physical

changes exceeding a certain magnitude.’” /d. at 9a (quoting

(Cont'd)

had the Rule been in place at the time. GAO Report, supra, at 18-19

(Joint App. 1280-81).

5

Alabama Power, 636 F.2d at 400). It also noted that although

one Senator proposed to limit NSR to “major expansion

programs,” the court determined in Alabama Power that “‘the

language of the statute clearly did not enact such limit into

law.’” Jd. (quoting Alabama Power, 636 F.2d at 400).

The court reyected EPA’s argument that because “physical

change” is capable of multiple meanings, Congress

authorized EPA to exclude some pirysical changes from the

definition, whether or not they increase emissions, and to

apply NSR only to “any” of the changes it chooses not to

exclude. Pet. App. 6a-7a. The court relied on this Court’s

prior decisions holding that “[r]ead naturally, the word ‘any’

has an expansive meaning, that is, ‘one or some

indiscriminately of whatever kind.’” Jd. at 7a (quoting United

States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 5 (1997)). Considering the

broad, inclusive meaning of the word “any,” the court ruled

that Congress need not spell out the types of changes that

would trigger NSR requirements with a “phrase such as

‘regardless of size, cost, frequency, [or] effect.’” /d. at lla.

In other words, said the court, there is “no reason why ‘any’

should not mean ‘any.’” /d. at 8a.

The court concluded that “the scope of the definitional

phrase is limited only by Congress’s determination that such

changes be linked to emission increases.” /d. at 1la-12a.

Therefore, the court determined that the Rule was unlawful:

“Congress defined ‘modification’ in terms of emission

increases, but the [Rule] would allow equipment

replacements resulting in non-de minimis emission increases

to avoid NSR.” /d. at 17a.

On June 30, 2006, the court of appeals unanimously

denied EPA’s petition for rehearing, Pet. App. 18a-19a, and

petition for rehearing en banc, with no judge seeking a vote.

UARG Pet. App. 191a-192a.

6

REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION

I. THE DECISION BELOW IS A ROUTINE

APPLICATION OF ESTABLISHED PRINCIPLES

OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

The decision below is an unexceptional, case-specific

application of the statutory interpretation principles

articulated by this Court in Chevron. Contrary to EPA’s

contention, the court of appeals did not create a new

exemption from those principles. Nor did it depart from this

Court’s precedent regarding the meaning of the word “any.”

Simply put, the court’s interpretation of the statutory text

does not break any new ground and does not merit the Court’s

review.

A. EPA’s Claim That the Court of Appeals Created

a New Rule of Statutory Construction Is

Incorrect.

Recognizing the absence of any conflict among the courts

of appeals, EPA tries to manufacture a question deserving of

this Court’s review by claiming that the court of appeals

“announced a sweeping rule of construction that would

operate to deprive administrative agencies of discretion to

construe ambiguous statutory terms whenever those terms

are preceded by the word ‘any’.” EPA Pet. 9. EPA is incorrect

because the court of appeals’ decision is nothing more than

a routine application of Chevron. Rather than departing from

the precedent of this Court, the court correctly applied

Chevron, finding, under Chevron’s first step,’ that Congress

* Chevron requires a court, applying “traditional tools of

statutory construction,” first to determine “whether Congress has

directly spoken to the precise question at issue.” Chevron, 467 U.S.

at 842, 843 n.9. If Congress has spoken, then “that is the end of the

matter,” and both agencies and courts musi give cffect to Congress's

(Cont'd)

j

clearly intended the definition of modification to encompass

equipment replacement activities that cause more than a

de minimis increase in emissions. Pet. App. 5a-12a.

In its petition, EPA attempts to create a conflict with

Chevron by conflating Chevron’s separate questions. Thus,

EPA attempts to explain away this Court’s prior decisions

interpreting the word “any” expansively, arguing that these

_ cases “generally involved the Court’s own determination of

the best meaning of the language at issue, not the clearly

distinct question presented in the Chevron context, namely

whether an agency interpretation of statutory text is

reasonable.” EPA Pet. at 12. But EPA is wrong because

Chevron step one, which is what applies here, entails judicial

determination of a statute’s meaning. In this inquiry, the court,

not the agency, has the last word:

The judiciary is the final authority on issues of

statutory construction and must reject

administrative constructions which are contrary

to clear congressional intent. If a court, employing

traditional tools of statutory construction,

ascertains that Congress had an intention on the

precise question at issue, that intention is the law

and must be given effect.

Chevron, 476 U.S. at 843 n.9 (citations omitted).°

(Cont'd)

intent. Jd. at 842. If, applying traditional tools of statutory

construction, a court is unable to determine Congressional intent,

then, under Chevron’s sccond step, the court must determine whether

the agency’s conclusion is based on a permissible construction of

the statute. /d. at 842-43.

* Petitioners’ contrary approach to statutory construction is itself

at odds with Chevron’ principle that courts have the primary role in

(Cont'd)

8

EPA also mischaracterizes the decision below in claiming

that the court relied solely on the word “‘any” in finding the

“modification” definition to be unambiguous, without

considering the statutory context. EPA Pet. at 9. Thus, in

attempting to distinguish this Court’s decision in Department

of Housing & Urban Development v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125,

130-31 (2002), EPA states “that the Court expressly relied

on a combination of factors — not merely the word “any”

alone — to support its conclusion. ...” EPA Pet. at 12. But

here too, the court of appeals relied on a combination of

factors, and not solely on the meaning of the word “any.”

Instead, noting that “the sort of ambiguity giving rise to

Chevron deference ‘is a creature not of definitional

possibilities, but of statutory context,” id. at 5a-6a (internal

quote from Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 118 (1994)),

the court of appeals found that the context and purpose of

the Act’s NSR provisions establish that Congress “intended

NSR to apply to any type of physical change that increases

emissions.” /d. at 8a. In particular, the court pointed to

Congress’s evident intent to regulate all changes that increase

emissions, including the replacement of equipment:

After using the word “any” to indicate that

“physical change” covered all such activities, and

was not left to agency interpretation, Congress

limited the scope of “any physical change” to

changes that “increase [] the amount of any air

pollutant emitted by such source or which result

[] in the emission of any air pollutant not

(Cont'd)

interpreting statutes and, if accepted, would effect a substantial

transfer of policy-making authority from Congress to administrative

agencies. See Pet. App. 11a (“Only in a Humpty Dumpty world would

Congress be required to use superfluous words while an agency could

ignore an expansive word that Congress did use. We decline to adopt

such a world-view.”).

9

Pet. App. | la-12a (quoting from 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(4)).

This one express limitation indicated to the court that

Congress intended no others, and that “any” therefore

encompasses a// physical changes that increase emissions.

By construing the phrase “any physical change” in the

full statutory context, instead of adopting EPA’s narrow focus

on the meaning of the single word “change,” the court of

appeals correctly concluded that Congress made its intentions

clear in the statute, and thus followed this Court’s decision

in Chevron. EPA may disagree with how the court interpreted

the statutory language, but that disagreement is not a basis

for this Court to hear this case.

B. The Court of Appeals’ Decision is Consistent

With this Court’s Precedent Regarding the

Meaning of the Word “Any.”

EPA also errs in claiming that the court of appeals’

decision is contrary to this Court’s precedent regarding the

meaning of the word “any.” EPA Pet. at 12-13. To the

contrary, the court of appeals’ treatment of the word “any”

in the statutory definition is consistent with decisions of this

Court holding that “[rJead naturally, the word ‘any’ has an

expansive meaning, that is, ‘one or some indiscriminately of

whatever kind.’” United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 5

(1997); see also Norfolk S. Rwy. Co. v. Kirby, 543 U.S. 14,

31-32 (2004); Rucker, 535 U.S. at 130-31. The court of

appeals appropriately relied on these precedents in

determining that Congress’s use of the word “any” establishes

that Congress denied EPA discretion to limit the scope of

the modification provisions to just some types of physical

changes. See, e.g., Harrison v. PPG Industries, Inc. ,446 U.S.

578 (1980) (in another case construing the 1977 amendments

to the Act, this Court held that Congress made clear that the

term “any final action” reviewable in the U.S. courts of

appeals could not be limited to certain types of final actions).

10

See Pet. App. 7a. Accordingly, the court below adhered to

this Court’s precedent in holding that the phrase “any physical

change” refers “indiscriminately” to any of the various

physical changes, “of whatever kind,” that may be undertaken

at an industrial facility, as long as they increase emissions.

See Gonzales, 520 U.S. at 5.

The cases EPA cites in support of its restrictive

interpretation of the language following “any” involve

statutes where contextual factors not present here supported

a narrower construction. For example, in Small v. United

States, 544 U.S. 385 (2005), a broad interpretation of “any

court” to include foreign courts would have been inconsistent

with traditional principles of sovereignty. Jd. at 388-90.

Likewise, the broad reading of “any sum” advocated by the

taxpayer in Flora v. United States, 362 U.S. 145 (1960),

would have abrogated the traditional principle allowing

taxpayer suits for refunds only if the disputed tax had been

paid. Jd. at 157-58.’ In contrast, the statutory context here

establishes Congress’s concern with the effect of increased

emissions and supports the natural reading of the statute as

applying to any type of physical change that increases

emissions.

EPA’s attempt to show that the court of appeals’ decision

is contrary to the Court’s construction of another Clean Air

Act provision in Chevron itself (EPA Pet. at 14) is also

’ The Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers, et a/.’s reliance,

in their brief supporting the petition, on this Court’s recent decision

in BP America Production Co. v. Burton, No. 05-669, slip op. (U.S.

Dec. 11, 2006), is likewise misplaced. In that case, this Court held

that the general six-year statute of limitations for government contract

actions docs not apply to administrative pay orders issued by the

Minerals Management Service. It held that the language of the statute

of limitations clearly did not refer to administrative actions, and

therefore had no occasion to defer to the agency’s construction of

the statutory term “any contract.”

i]

unfounded. In Chevron, the Court considered the definition

of “stationary source,” which the Act defines as including

“any building, structure, facility or installation which emits

or may emit any pollutant.” See id., 467 U.S. at 846. Chevron

did not concern EPA’s authority to construe the “stationary

source” definition to exclude buildings or facilities falling

within the usual scope of the statutory language. Instead, the

question before the Court was whether the statutory language

specified how EPA must treat a facility that consists of

multiple buildings: as one source (because it is one “facility’’)

or as multiple sources (because the facility consists of

multiple “buildings”). The Court concluded that the

definition of “stationary source” was not designed to answer

that question, explaining that “the terms [any building,

structure, facility or installation] are overlapping and the

language is not precisely directed to the question of the

applicability of a given term in the context of a larger

operation.” /d. at 862. Here, in contrast, Congress plainly

intended for section 1 11(a)(4) to answer the question of what

types of physical changes constitute a modification: those

that increase emissions.

Therefore, the court below broke no new ground in

construing the Act, and its decision is consistent with

decisions of this Court interpreting the word “any.” Indeed,

the court’s reading of “any” follows the approach repeatedly

urged on this Court by the Solicitor General himself. For

example, in 2003, the United States submitted an amicus

brief in South Florida Water Management District v.

Miccosukee Tribe, S.Ct. No. 02-626 (Sept. 2003), regarding

the proper construction of 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12), which

governs “any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters

from any point source.” In that brief, the United States

contended that Congress’s “use of the modifier ‘any’ with

reference to ‘addition,’ ‘pollutant,’ and ‘point source’

expresses Congress’s understanding that the various types

of additions, pollutants, and point sources are all within the

12

Clean Water Act’s regulatory reach.” /d., Brief of United

States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, 2003 WL

22137034, at 19 (italics supplied).* In the same way, the

“various types” of physical changes are covered by the statute

here, as long as they result in increased emissions. The court

of appeals’ straightforward application of this Court’s

caselaw regarding “any” does not present a question

warranting this Court’s review.

C. The Court of Appeals’ Decision Does Not Conflict

With This Court’s Decisions Regarding

Congressional Ratification of Regulatory

Interpretations.

In an effort to circumvent the plain language of the

statute, EPA claims now, for the first time, that Congress

“ratified” the preexisting exclusion of some activities that

might otherwise have fallen within the broad definition of

“modification” under the distinct new source performance

standards (NSPS) program when it enacted the NSR

provisions in 1977. EPA Pet. at 16-20. In its brief in the court

of appeals and in its regulatory decision, however, EPA

“explicitly disclaimed” any “ratification” argument. See EPA

Brief in New York v. EPA (January 16, 2006), at 19 (“EPA

does not contend that ... Congress ‘ratified’ [the routine

maintenance| exclusion; in fact, EPA has explicitly

disclaimed any such argument”); 70 Fed. Reg. 33,841/2

(“we do not believe Congress intended to ratify the then-

* Accord, Bricf for the United States as Amicus Curiae

Supporting Reversal in Engine Mfrs. Assn. v. South Coast Air Quality

Management District, S. Ct. Case No. 02-1343 (Aug. 2003), 2003

WL 22068761, at 13-15 (concerning a Clean Air Act provision

encompassing “any standard,” the United States argued: “Congress

did not define the term ‘standard’ for purposes of Section 209(a),

but it also expressed no intent in Section 209(a) to limit that

provision’s preemptive effect to particular types of standards”).

13

the court of appeals committed egregious error by eschewing

an approach that the agency itself disclaimed.

To the contrary, this Court’s own ratification

jurisprudence demonstrates that the error lies in EPA’s

eleventh-hour ratification argument, not the court of appeal’s

decision. To show ratification, petitioners must demonstrate

that Congress was aware of, and intended to incorporate, the

preexisting regulatory exemptions. SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S.

103, 120-21 (1978).? Indeed, in its petition, EPA

acknowledges that mere Congressional “silence” does not

constitute ratification. EPA Pet. at 16 (citing TWA, 432 U.S.

at 76 n.11). But in this case, silence is all that EPA has; there

is no evidence that Congress was even aware of the

preexisting exemptions, let alone that it approved them.

Petitioners cite nothing in the language of the statute or

the legislative history to support their claim that “Congress

in 1977 had before it EPA’s preexisting PSD rules, and °

Congress reviewed those rules provision-by-provision,

adopting some elements and changing others,” Petition of

Utility Air Regulatory Group (UARG) at 16. EPA cites only

the savings clause of 42 U.S.C. § 7478(a), in which Congress

provided that existing regulations will remain in place until

states submit their plans to implement the new statutory

program. See EPA Pet. at 19. But this provision refutes, rather

than supports, petitioners’ ratification argument. Specifically,

§ 7478(a) states that EPA’s preexisting PSD regulations were

to apply only “[u]ntil such time as an applicable

implementation plan is in effect for any area,” and

° The cases that EPA relics upon are distinguishable because

they involve agency interpretations that are “expressly accepted” by

Congress. Red Lion Broadcasting v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 382 (1969);

see also TWA vy. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 73-74 (1977) (incorporating

much of the agency guidance verbatim, including concepts of

“reasonable accomodat|ion]” and “undue hardship”).

14

emphasized that the implementation plan must “meet/] the

requirements of this part to prevent significant deterioration

of air quality with respect to any air pollutant.” /d. (emphasis

added). Thus, as the court of appeals held in rejecting a

similar EPA argument in New York v. EPA (“New York I’),

413 F.3d 3 (D.C. Cir.), reh. denied, 431 F.3d 801 (D.C. Cir.

2005), Congress adopted EPA’s preexisting regulation “only

provisionally,” indicating that it saw that interpretation “not

as necessarily complying with the new statute but as merely

filling a gap that would have existed before its

implementation.” 431 F.3d at 802-03 (emphasis in original)

(rejecting EPA’s argument that § 129(a)(1) of the 1977

Amendments approved EPA’s pre-1977 nonattainment NSR

regulation).’°

Nor can EPA persuasively argue that even if Congress

did not expressly approve the pre-1977 regulatory exemptions

from the NSPS definition of “modification,” when Congress

“elects to use statutory language that has already been given

an interpretive gloss by the administering agency, it should

ordinarily be presumed to intend to allow the agency to

continue to employ that regulatory gloss.” EPA Pet. at 16.

The argument fails here, because “[w]here the law is plain,

subsequent reenactment does not constitute an adoption of a

previous administrative construction.” Brown, 513 U.S. at

121 (internal quotation and citation omitted); Sloan, 436 U.S.

at 121. Thus, whatever was EPA’s pre-1977 interpretation of

“modification” in the NSPS regulations, that interpretation

cannot justify an NSR exemption that contravenes the plain

statutory language defining “modification” to include “any

physical change” that increases emissions.

' In New York J, the D.C. Circuit rejected UARG’s argument

that Congress incorporated the regulatory definition of modification

from the NSPS program when it cross-referenced the statutory

definition of modification in the NSR provisions. /d., 413 F.3d at

36-39. No party petitioned for certiorari of that decision and it cannot

be challenged in this case.

15

Finally, even if Congress had ratified the pre-1977

exclusion of routine maintenance from the definition of

“modification,” that would not authorize EPA to carve out

the far broader exemption at issue here. 68 Fed. Reg. 61270/

3 (acknowledging that the Rule expands the routine

maintenance exemption).'’ While EPA “generally had

interpreted the [routine maintenance] exclusion as being

limited to de minimis circumstances,” 70 Fed. Reg. 33,841/

1, the Rule would allow multimillion dollar activities — in

the case of power plants, activities costing over $100 million

— to evade NSR review even if they increase emissions by

thousands of tons a year, well in excess of any de minimis

threshold. Therefore, the language of the pre-1977 exemption

did not clearly signal to Congress that EPA intended to

exempt “physical changes” producing larger-than-de minimis

emissions increases.

As for the other three pre-1977 exemptions, see EPA Pet.

at 16-17, they construed statutory language not at issue here,

and thus could not have alerted the 1977 Congress to EPA’s

reading of “physical change.” See 39 Fed. Reg. 42,514

(expressing EPA’s view that an “increase in the production rate”

or in “hours of operation” or the “use of an alternative fuel or

raw material,” “shall not be considered a change in the method

of operation.” (emphasis added))."* In short, petitioners fall far

short of demonstrating the congressional awareness necessary

to show ratification. See Sloan, 436 U.S. at 121.

'' In fact, if EPA is now correct that Congress intended to ratify

the routine maintenance exemption, such ratification would, to use

EPA’s own words, “congeal” the routine maintenance exclusion, 70

Fed. Reg. 33841/2, thereby barring EPA from promulgating the

substantially broader exclusion at issue here.

'2 Because these activities are not changes in the method of

operation ~— and would not be covered by the definition of

modification regardless of the resulting emission increases — it does

not matter whether the resulting emission increases would not, in

all cases, be de minimis. See EPA Pet. at 17.

16

Il. THE DECISION BELOW DOES NOT HAVE THE

ADVERSE CONSEQUENCES CLAIMED BY THE

PETITIONERS

As explained above, the court of appeals’ decision is a

routine, case-specific interpretation of a statute, and therefore

does not implicate any important questions of federal law.

For that reason, the petitions should be denied, and

petitioners’ policy arguments should be disregarded. Even if

those policy arguments are considered, however, they are

factually incorrect.

A. The Decision of the Court Below Does Not

Prevent EPA From Administering the NSR

Program in a Way That Promotes Its Policy

Goals.

Contrary to petitioners’ suggestions, the court of appeals’

decision does not place EPA in a “regulatory straitjacket,”

depriving it of the ability to tailor the NSR program to

“changing conditions and policies.” EPA Pet. at 21-22;

see also UARG Pet. at 21. Instead, the court of appeals’

decision simply recognizes that EPA lacks authority to

exempt physical changes that increase emissions by

non-de minimis amounts. EPA’s authority otherwise to

structure the NSR program to effectuate its policy goals is

unaffected by the decision.

First, under the statutory definition of modification, as

implemented by 1980 regulations not at issue here, not all

physical changes trigger NSR, but only those changes that

increase actual emissions by amounts exceeding specific

de minimis thresholds. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 51.166(b)(23)(1);

see also Alabama Power, 636 F.2d at 400 (EPA possesses

authority to exempt from NSR “some emission increases on

grounds of de minimis or administrative necessity”). Indeed,

17

under regulatory language added in 2002 and not at issue

here, NSR is triggered only if the emissions increase exceeds

the highest average level emitted by the source during any

two-year period in the previous five years (for electric

utilities) or ten years (for non-utilities). New York I, 413 F.3d

at 22. According to EPA itself, this “lookback” provision

“promotes economic growth and administrative efficiency”

by “affording sources the flexibility to respond rapidly to

market changes” and “focusing-limited regulatory resources

on changes most likely to harm the environment.” /d. at 24.

Second, under other regulations upheld by the court of

appeals, emissions increases are measured plantwide, thus

allowing increases at individual components of a polluting

facility to be “offset by contemporaneous decreases of

pollutants” elsewhere in the facility. Alabama Power, 636

F.2d at 400 (emphasis added). “Within the terminology of

the Act,” changes that do not produce a net increase in any

pollutant “are not ‘modifications’ at all.” /d. at 401. Alabama

Power noted that this “bubble” approach “is precisely suited

to preserve air quality within a framework that allows cost-

efficient, flexible planning for industrial expansion and

improvement.” /d. at 402; see also id. at 400 (explaining

that the operating flexibility provided by the bubble approach

and by EPA’s de minimis authority “will allow for

improvement of plants, technological changes, and

replacement of depreciated capital stock.”) (emphasis

added).”

'* In addition, EPA’s “plantwide applicability limit” provision,

added in 2002 and previously upheld by the court of appeals, creates

an alternative mechanism for taking advantage of a plant-wide

bubble. See 67 Fed. Reg. 80,189/3; New York I, 413 F.3d at 37-38

(deferring to EPA’s finding that plantwide applicability limits

“encourage sources to iniplement physical or operational changes

that improve efficiency and reduce emission rates”).

18

Finally, EPA’s contention that the decision below

jeopardizes the validity of the existing routine maintenance

exemption and other exclusions from the definition of

modification is incorrect. EPA Pet. at 23-24. The decision

does not affect the validity of the routine maintenance

exemption as long as EPA continues to apply it to de minimis

circumstances, rather than to exempt the massive

multimillion-dollar projects exempted by the Rule. Likewise,

existing regulations providing that fluctuations in hours of

operation or production rate do not constitute changes in the

method of operation are unaffected by the decision below.

See supra at 15.

B. The Rule Vacated by the Court of Appeals Would

Not Benefit the Environment.

EPA contends that the Rule would benefit the

environment by increasing the efficiency of industrial

operations and therefore reducing “the amount of pollution

generated per product produced.” EPA Pet. at 22-23. See also

UARG Pet. at 21 (claiming that the court’s decision will be

“devastating” to the environment). But in enacting the NSR

provisions, Congress intended to protect public health and

the environment by guarding against increases in total facility

emissions, not just emissions “per product produced.”

To the extent that an activity designed to improve efficiency

will not significantly increase a facility’s total emissions,

that activity is already exempt from NSR. See 42 U.S.C.

§ 7411(a)(4); 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(b)(2)(i) (only changes that

increase emissions significantly trigger NSR). Therefore, the

sole effect of the Rule is to exempt physical changes that do

produce significant increases. Allowing facilities to make

such emissions-increasing changes without installing up-to-

date air pollution controls and without ensuring that ambient

19

air quality is protected would degrade rather than benefit the

environment.'*

Indeed, the record of EPA’s enforcement cases addressing

violations of the NSR modification requirements establishes

that the large-scale plant refurbishments exempted by the

Rule can increase emissions substantially. For example, in

an enforcement action against the Tennessee Valley Authority,

EPA identified thirteen plant refurbishments that would

increase emissions significantly. See Jn re TVA, 9 E.A.D. at

451-52. EPA’s Environmental Appeals Board rejected TVA’s

claim that the projects were simply “routine maintenance,”

because “TVA’s view of the breadth of the exception would

. swallow the rule that subjects existing sources to the

requirement to install modern pollution controls when

physical changes that increase emissions are made to these

plants.” Jd. at 378. Nevertheless, all but one of these

expansive, emission-increasing equipment replacement

projects would have been exempt under the Rule. See 68

Fed. Reg. 61,257/2.'°

' Projects that improve efficiency can increase cmissions if

the modified unit is utilized more afterwards. In that case, NSR

requirements remain applicable. See Puerto Rican Cement Co. v.

EPA, 889 F.2d 292, 297 (Ist Cir. 1989) (upholding EPA’s

interpretation that efficiency project triggered NSR because “a firm’s

decision to introduce new, more efficient machinery may Icad the

firm to decide to increase the level of production, with the result

that, despite the new machinery, overall emissions will increase”).

'S By way of example, the rule would exempt the $23 million

equipment replacement project undertaken by TVA at Unit | of its

coal-fired Cumberland Plant. Schocngold Dec., Att. K (Joint App.

1322) (2.4% of unit’s replacement cost). That project, which required

a three-month shutdown of the unit, resulted in an emissions increase

of 21,187 tons of nitrogen oxides per year, Jn re TVA, 9 E.A.D. at

443, 491 — more than the total annual NOx emissions from all sources

in the District of Columbia. See www.cmissionsonline.org/nei99v3/

state/stindex.htm.

20

C. The Utility Industry’s Equitable Arguments Are

Legally Irrelevant and Factually Incorrect.

Finally, the Court should reject UARG’s reliance on the

briefs submitted to this Court in Environmental Defense v.

Duke Energy Corp., No. 05-848, to support UARG’s claim

that the court of appeals’ decision will expand the application

of NSR requirements and thwart industry reliance on its prior

understanding of those requirements. UARG’s arguments are

irrelevant to this proceeding, which addresses only the

definition of “physical change,” and does not attempt to

define how emissions increases are to be calculated. See Pet.

App. at 15a (industry’s maximum emissions argument

“is irrelevant because it,does not address what constitutes a

‘physical change’””’).

In any event, UARG’s claim of ignorance cannot be

supported. As the United States explained in Duke Energy,

UARG’s claim that the utility industry has always understood

EPA’s emissions increase test under NSR to be identical to

the agency’s NSPS emissions test is false.'° Furthermore,.the

record of the present rulemaking, and of EPA’s enforcement

cases, establishes that industry understood that replacement

of plant equipment in order to extend a plant’s life would

trigger NSR requirements.'’ See United States v. S. Ind. Gas

'© Responding to a similar contention made by Duke Energy,

the United States pointed out that the utility industry industryhas

long understood that EPA’s regulatory test for NSR emissions

increases — turning on actual emissions — does not restrict NSR

coverage to cases in which there is an increase in “capacity” measured

by hourly emission rates. See, e.g., United States Reply Br. in No.

05-848 at 14 & n.11 (citing UARG documents); Brief for the United

States in No. 05-848 at 32-33 (discussing 1982 settlement agreement

requiring EPA to consider substituting an hourly rate test for the

actual annual test EPA had adopted in 1980).

'’ For example, the administrative record includes a 1989 power

company memorandum reporting on advice provided by UARG that

pany p £ p y

(Cont'd)

21

and Electric Co., 245 F.Supp. 2d 994, 1018-19 (S.D. Ind.

2003) (noting that defendant utility received notice of the

narrow scope of the routine maintenance exemption from,

among other things, a 1989 UARG memorandum stating that

‘routine’ activities include only those that (1) are frequently

done at that plant, (2) involve no major equipment, (3) are

inexpensive, and (4) do not extend the life of a plant”);

Ohio Edison, 276 F.Supp. 2d at 888 (finding that language

of statute, regulations and preambles made it “ascertainably

certain that only de minimis activities would serve to trigger

the routine maintenance exemption”).

Cont’d)

tees “UARG believes that under the present EPA policy, in order

to qualify for the routine maintenance exemption, the activity would

have to be: frequent; inexpensive; able to be accomplished at a

scheduled outage; will not cxtend the normal economic life of the

unit; [and] be of standard industry design.” See Comments of New

York Attorney Gencral Eliot Spitzer, ef a/., on Proposed Amendments

to Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Non-attainment New

Source Review Requirements, Docket No. A-2002-04 (May 2, 2003),

Ex. 14, pg. 4 (Joint App. 1077).

22

CONCLUSION

The petitions for writ of certiorari should be denied.

Dated: January 26, 2007

Respectfully submitted,

ANDREW M. Cuomo

Attorney General

of the State New York

BarBARA D. UNDERwoop*

Solicitor General

DANIEL SMIRLOCK

Deputy Solicitor General

Anprew D. BING

Assistant Solicitor General

120 Broadway, 25" Floor

New York, NY 10271

(212) 416-8016

J. JARED SNYDER

MicHAEL J. Myers

Assistant Attorneys General

Office of the Attorney General

The Capitol

Albany, NY 12224

(518) 474-8010

* Counsel of Record

Counsel for Respondents State of

New York, et al.

23

EDMUND G. Brown Jr.

Attorney General of California

Department of Justice

$300 I Street

Mo. Box 944255

Sacramento, CA 94244

(916) 324-4223

RICHARD BLUMENTHAL

Attorney General

of Connecticut

55 Elm Street

P.O. Box 120

Hartford, CT 06141

(860) 808-5250

JOSEPH R. Bipen, Ill

Attorney General of Delaware

Department of Justice

102 W. Water Street, 3 Floor

Dover, DE 19904

(302) 739-4636

LINDA SINGER

Acting Attorney General

of the District of Celumbia

One Judiciary Square

441 4th Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20001

(202) 724-1305

LisA MADIGAN

Attorney General of Illinois

188 West Randolph, Suite 2001

Chicago, IL 60601

(312) 814-3772

G. STteveN Rowe

Attorney General of Maine

6 State House Station

Augusta, ME 04333

(207) 626-8800

DouGLas F. GANSLER

Attorney General

of Maryland

200 Saint Paul Place

Baltimore, MD 21202

(410) 576-6300

MARTHA COAKLEY

Attorney General

of Massachusetts

1 Ashburton Place

Boston, MA 02108

(617) 727-2200

Ke.t_y A. AYOTTE

Attorney General

of New Hampshire

33 Capitol Street

Concord, NH 03301

(603) 271-3679

STUART RABNER

Attorney General

of New Jersey

Richard J. Hughes

Justice Complex

P.O. Box 093

Trenton, NJ 08625

(609) 292-6945

24

Gary KING BARBARA BAIRD

Attorney General Principal Deputy

of New Mexico District Counsel

Ron Curry South Coast Air Quality

Secretary of the Management District

Environment Department 21865 Copley Dr.

P.O. Drawer 1508 Diamond Bar, CA 91765

Santa Fe, New Mexico 87504 (909)396-2302

(505) 827-6010

MicHaAeEL A. Carpozo

SUSAN SHINKMAN Corporation Counsel of the

Chief Counsel City of New York

RoBertT A. REILEY 100 Church Street

Assistant Counsel New York, NY 10007

Commonwealth of (212) 788-1145

Pennsylvania, Department

of Environmental Protection For City of New York

RCSOB, POB 8464

Harrisburg, PA 17105 Dennis J. HERRERA

(717) 787-7060 City Attorney

City Hall, Room 234

Patrick C, LYNCH 1 Dr. Carlton B.

Attorney General Goodlett Place

of Rhode Island San Francisco, CA 94102

150 South Main Street (415) 554-4700

Providence, RI 02903

(401) 274-4400 DANIEL C. Esty

Esty & ASSOCIATES

WILLIAM H. SorRELL 213 Preston Road

Attorney General of Vermont Cheshire, CT 06410

Office of the Attorney (203) 271-3248

General

109 State Street For the City of Hartford, City

Montpelier, VT 05609 of New Haven, City of New

(802) 828-3171 London, City of Waterbury,

Town of Westport,

Connecticut

25

RosBert W. ALLEN

TYLER Cooper &

ALcorn, LLP

205 Church Street

New Haven, CT 06509

(203) 784-8200

For the City of Groton,

City of Middletown, City

of Stamford, Town of

Cornwall, Town of East

Hartford, Town of Easton,

Town of Greenwich,

Town of Hebron, Town of

Lebanon, Town of Newtown,

Town of North Stonington,

Town of Pomfret, Town of

Putnam, Town of Rocky Hill,

Town of Salisbury, Town of

Thompson, Town of

Wallingford, Town of

Washington, Town of

Westbrook, Town of Weston,

and Town of Woodstock,

Connecticut

Keri N. POWELL

Earthjustice

8 Whitehall Place

Cold Spring, NY 10516

(845) 265-2445

For Natural Resources

Defense Council,

Environmental Defense,

Sierra Club, American

Lung Association, Communities

for a Better Environment

and United States Public

Interest Research Group

Lead counsel for

Environmental Group

Respondents

LEAH WALKER CASEY

CarTER, CoNBOY, CASE,

BLACKMORE, MALONEY

& Lairp, PC

Corporate Woods Blvd.

Albany, NY 12211

(518) 465-3484

Attorney for

Adirondack Mountain Club

26

MIcHAEL D. FIORENTINO

Mid-Atlantic Environmental

Law Center

4601 Concord Pike

Wilmington, DE 19803

(302) 477-2072

Attorney for

Delaware Nature Society

JONATHAN F. Lewis

ANN BREWSTER WEEKS

Clean Air Task Force

18 Tremont Street, Suite 530

Boston, MA 02108

(617) 624-0234

For Alabama

Environmental Council,

Clean Air Council, Group

Against Smog

and Pollution, Michigan

Environmental Council,

the Ohio Environmental

Council, Scenic Hudson,

and Southern Alliance for

Clean Energy

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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