Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Environmental Protection Agency v. New York, 127 S. Ct. 2127 (2007) (No. 06-736)

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Suprame Court, U.S.

FILED

06-73 6N0V 27 2006

In the Supreme Court of the United States

UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION

AGENCY, PETITIONER

Vv.

STATE OF NEW YORK, ET AL.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

PAUL D. CLEMENT

Solicitor General

Counsel of Record

SUE ELLEN WOOLDRIDGE

oe ny pensdny sain J we Assistant Attorney General

cting General Counse ;

Counsel of Record THOMAS G. HUNGAR

Biciorr B. Zenice Deputy Solicitor General

Assistant General Counsel JAMES A. FELDMAN

: ove Assistant to the Solicitor

yyy ac C. AVERBACK Fae

United States Environmental THOMAS A. LORENZEN

Protection Agency pyr rs — PURDY

Washington, D.C. 20460 eocihiote ad ;

Department of Justice

Washington, D.C. 20530-0001

(202) 514-2217

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether the court of appeals erred in invalidating an

EPA rule on the ground that the phrase “any physical

change” in the definition of “modification” in Section

111(a)(4) of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7411(a)(4),

unambiguously requires EPA to adopt the, broadest

meaning of the phrase.

(I)

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS

The United States Environmental Protection

Agency is the petitioner in this Court and was the re-

spondent in the court of appeals. :

The following parties are respondents in this Court

and were petitioners in the court of appeals: State of

New York; People of the State of California ex rel. Bill

Lockyer, Attorney General of California, and California

Resources Board; State of Connecticut; State of Dela-

ware; State of Illinois; State of Maine; State of Mary-

land; Commonwealth of Massachusetts; State of New

Hampshire; State of New Jersey; State of New Mexico

ex rel. Patricia Madrid, Attorney General and Ron

Curry, Secretary of the Environment Department; Com-

monwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Environ-

mental Protection; State of Rhode Island; State of Ver-

mont; State of Wisconsin; District of Columbia; City of

New York; City of San Francisco; City of Groton, Con-

necticut; City of Hartford, Connecticut; City of

Middletown, Connecticut; City of New Haven, Connecti-

cut; City of New London, Connecticut; City of Stamford,

Connecticut; City of Waterbury, Connecticut; Town of

Cornwall, Connecticut; Town of East Hartford, Connect-

icut; Town of Greenwich, Connecticut; Town of Hebron,

Connecticut; Town of Lebanon, Connecticut; Town of

Newtown, Connecticut; Town of North Stonington, Con-

necticut; Town of Pomfret, Connecticut; Town of

Putnam, Connecticut; Town of Rocky Hill, Connecticut;

Town of Salisbury, Connecticut; Town of Thompson,

Connecticut; Town of Wallingford, Connecticut; Town of

Washington, Connecticut; Town of Westbrook, Connecti-

cut; Town of Westport, Connecticut; Town of Weston,

Connecticut; Town of Woodstock, Connecticut; South

(If)

Coast Air Quality Management District; Natural Re-

sources Defense Council; Environmental Defense; Si-

erra Club; American Lung Association; Communities for

a Better Environment; United States Public Interest

Research Group; Alabama Environmental Council;

Clean Air Council; Group Against Smog and Pollution;

Michigan Environmental Council; The Ohio :Environ-

mental Council; Scenic Hudson; Southern Alliance for

Clean Energy; Delaware Nature Society.

The following were intervenors in the court of ap-

peals: Adirondack Mountain Club; Commonwealth of

Virginia; State of Alabama; State of Alaska; State of

Arkansas; State of Kansas; State of Missouri; State of

Nebraska; State of North Dakota; State of South Da-

kota; State of Utah; State of Wyoming; Clean Air Imple-

mentation Project; Utility Air Regulatory Group; Na-

tional Environmental Development Association’s Clean

Air Regulatory Project; Equipment Replacement Rule

Coalition; Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers; Illinois

State Chamber of Commerce; Illinois Environmental

Regulatory Group; Steel Manufacturers Association;

Specialty Steel Industry of North America; American

Tron and Steel Institute.

(IIT)

IV

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

I 55 die hs'0-6.05 hed ne bape dneeneeesens veeunee 1

0 ERE Oe aE ED an eaD Pe eS Sines 2

Statutory and regulatory provisions involved ..... Ceuwanins 2

ee ee cle ey ae Qhcawn eed eens 2

Reasons for granting the petition ....................000- 9

A. — The decision below is incorrect ................. 11

B. The question presented is important and war-

rants review at this time ............. naweewes 20

SEL Sindee ta dvieeeurcGecaueeewons wea PRE Rte 26

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

Bragdon v. Abbott, 542 U.S. 624 (1998) ................ 20

Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837

OS Os ce gai 9,11, 14, 15

Davis v. Michigan Dep't of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803

DMN oes ra cic fesse ees sdeeveanens Wieawed Gas 12

Department of Housing & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535

Bee OD ohh 4) eons bess ba eange ‘eves day ay 14

FDIC v. Philadelphia Gear Corp., 476 U.S. 426 (1986) .. 20

Flora v. United States, 362 U.S. 145 (1960) ............ 13

Harrison v. PPG Indus., 446 U.S. 578 (1980) .......... 12

Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea

Clammers Ass’n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981) ...... Késceehenba 13

National Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X

Internet Servs., 125 S.Ct. 2688 (2005) .............. 11

Nixon v. Missouri Mun. League, 541 U.S. 125

RIG REISE Sate MER Seg oer ema em RGD PER? 7, 13

Cases—Continued: Page

Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) ....... 16

Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus, 344 F.Supp. 253 (D.D.C.

1972), aff'd, 4 Env’t Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1815 (D.C.

Cir. Nov. 1, 1972), aff’d by an equally divided

oust, GEE The GA I kk ka hk Kio och eed kes 3

Small v. United States, 544 U.S. 385 (2005) ............ 13

TWA v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (2004) .......... 16, 19, 20

United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1 (1997) ........... 12

United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 610

CRN ka Mac ckake save ees ol tete caus 12, 13

Wisconsin Elec. Power Co. v. Reilly, 893 F.2d 901

FRU Ga, DOE vs ong Sap wrens eae cece een ewan 5

Young v. Community Nutrition Inst., 476 U.S. 974

Ss hoa oka dk oes ae hbk cha a ee 16

Statutes and regulations:

Act of Nov. 16, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-190,

De Fe es PON von do Sk ted ee teakaddneews 3

Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7430 ef weg, 066 cece ccervesvces 2

GE IE bos hile dace oak ecaes bene easue car 2

Oe A Oe hts Soave valacu caw shehnsaneels 2

SEA ria COO i bance ee ed Aves keen esenner oases 2

GE STAs FE a Sinise chek ceca khawes ee 2,4

Se Ark PRR has Fe ckavnny cerenseeuen enews 4

Ue. Fe ee CS Aisi ieee 14

Ge Si sReei WOR UNCED cede bk 0d sae hnndiaa ches passim

Oe Shs FET has io a cone E8 oo Ree eae 3

MUSE Te Oe ee: ia

VI

Statutes and regulations—Continued: Page

UE FO os sk i seria eet: 19

WO Fe a hb bs dosti Oia 4

SEULBL, TOFINO?) oso ce dodcdanticistinns eee

EUG: TER: oe ws Hike ee eee eet 3

OU, PEE he kciccaceeneidwaredene keris wes 3

PRES ER IN ee ier petites reno ae aac 4

ME TSR TD ven chek lneseephansss bc bene eee 3

Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-

A eR rer er rrr: Po es 4

Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-

96, 91 Stat. 685 ........ cc sceceveccecccsbeccccceees 3

40 C.F.R.:

Barta GERSON) cave cebecdcsbccdue POP en re 18

Section GRZUBNONED) .. ccc ce dewscvce pealte eee 17

Bact TE TIO vdo i dic chao ba savektas eabataaas 18

Sectiots GOAIMINOAE) 22 csc csrscesecsvessvesne 16

Section GOAT) 2... ivccecevcseses ee leicees 4

ok : Ee Papen aren man pars» Serre 17

Seti... ee 17

es GAGE co Si ins vb da leetes toueeres 17

Miscellaneous:

DO FOR I PEt AIR 65 Seve ce ci sveindeees 4,16

39 Fed. Reg. (1974):

Ef Oey er rer Tee nnn res 3

Vil

Miscellaneous—Continued: Page

41 Fed. Reg. (1976):

PS 2 eee ee 5

EE rik ee 5

43 Fed. Reg. 26,403 - 26,404 (1978) .. 0.0... - eee eee ees 4

67 Fed. Reg. (2002):

ASE OPPS ree eee ee Cee ee 5

In the Supreme Court of the Gnited States

No.

UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION

AGENCY, PETITIONER

Vv.

STATE OF NEW YORK, ET AL.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

The Solicitor General, on behalf of the United States

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), respectfully

petitions for a writ of certiorari to review the judgment

of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of

Columbia Circuit in this case.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App. 1a-17a)

is reported at 443 F.3d 880. The order of'the court of

appeals denying rehearing (Pet. App. 18a-19a) is unre-

ported. The order of the Environmental Protection

Agency (Pet. App. 20a-175a) is reported at 68 Fed. Reg.

61,248.

- (1)

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on

March 17, 2006. A petition for rehearing was denied on

June 30, 2006. On September 21, 2006, Justice Stevens

extended the time within which to file a petition for a

writ of certiorari to and including October 30, 2006. On

October 23, 2006, Justice Stevens further extended the

time to November 27, 2006. The jurisdiction of this

Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).

STATUTORY AND REGULATORY

PROVISIONS INVOLVED

The relevant sections of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.

7401 et seq., and of EPA’s rules are set forth in the ap-

pendix to this petition at 176a-181a.

STATEMENT

1. Under the Clean Air Act, each State must estab-

lish a plan for attaining, and then maintaining, nation-

ally established standards for airborne levels of six “cri-

teria” pollutants. Specifically, the Act directs EPA to

promulgate National Ambient Air Quality Standards

(NAAQS) specifying allowable concentrations of each

criteria pollutant in the ambient air. 42 U.S.C. 7409.

Each State must adopt State Implementation Plans

(SIPs) for attaining and maintaining the NAAQS in all

areas within the State. 42 U.S.C. 7407(a), 7410.

Each SIP must include a program requiring precon-

struction review of “the modification and construction

of any stationary source within the areas covered by the

[SIP] as necessary to assure that national ambient

air quality standards are achieved.” 42 U.S.C.

7410(a)(2)(C). Depending on the attainment or nonat-

tainment status of the area and the results of the pre-

»

ee ee ee

3

construction review, the source may be required to in-

stall pollution controls as part of the construction or

modification.’ Those preconstruction review and permit-

ting requirements are known collectively as the New

Source Review (NSR) program. Congress adopted the

statutory major source NSR program as part of the 1977

amendments to the Act. Clean Air Act Amendments of

1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685.” Prior to enact-

ment of the statutory NSR program, EPA had promul-

gated a regulatory PSD program in response to a law-

suit claiming that the Act required EPA to ensure that

air quality did not deteriorate in areas meeting the

NAAQS. See Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus, 344 F. Supp.

253 (D.D.C. 1972), aff’d without opinion, 4 Env’t Rep.

Cas. (BNA) 1815 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 1, 1972), aff’d by an

equally divided court, 412 U.S. 541 (1973); see also 39

Fed. Reg. 42,510 (1974).

Since 1977, when Congress created the statutory

NSR program, the Act has defined “modification” by

cross-reference to the-statutory definition of that term

in the Act’s New Source Performance Standards (NSPS)

' In areas meeting the NAAQS (attainment areas) and in “unclassi-

fiable” areas, the “Prevention of Significant Deterioration” (PSD)

requirements under Part C of Title I of the Act apply. See 42 U.S.C.

7470-7479. Permits for major sources subject to PSD must require the

facility to employ the “best available control technology,” or BACT. 42

U.S.C. 7475(a)(4). In areas not meeting the NAAQS (nonattainment

areas), the nonattainment NSR requirements of Part D of Title I of the

Act apply. See 42 U.S.C. 7501-7515. Permits for major sources subject

tononattainment NSR must require that the facility achieve the “lowest

achievable emission rate,” or LAER. 42 U.S.C. 7501(8), 7503(a)(2).

* Initially, only the nonattainment NSR program was made appli-

cable to “modified” sources. In a later technical amendment, Congress

clarified that the PSD program also applies to such sources. Act of

Nov. 16, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-190, § 14(a)(54), 91 Stat. 1402.

4

program, originally included as part of the 1970 amend-

ments to the Act.* Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970,

Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676. Under that definition,

a modification is “any physical change in, or change in

the method of operation of, a stationary source which

increases the amount of any air pollutant emitted by

such source or which results in the emission of any air

pollutant not previously emitted.” 42 U.S.C. 7411(a)(4)

(NSPS definition); see 42 U.S.C. 7479(2)(C) (for PSD,

“‘construction’ * * * includes the modification (as de-

fined in section 7411(a) of this title) of any source or fa-

cility”), 7501(4) (for nonattainment NSR, “‘modifica-

tions’ and ‘modified’ mean the same as the term ‘modifica-

tion’ as used in section 7411(a)(4) of this title.”).

EPA regulations have long excluded some activities

from the definition of “modification.” For instance,

since 1971, EPA regulations elucidating what constitutes

a “modification” for purposes of NSPS have provided

that “[rjoutine maintenance, repair, and replacement”

(RMRR) of equipment at a source is not a “modifica-

tion.” See 36 Fed. Reg. 24,887; see also 40 C.F.R.

60.14(e)(1); Pet. App. 119a. The regulations that EPA

promulgated in 1974 to implement the original regula-

tory PSD program defined “modification” in largely the

same way as it was defined for the existing NSPS pro-

gram, and they treated RMRR comparably to its treat-

‘ In those 1970 amendments, Congress defined a “new source” to

include stationary sources “the construction or modification of which”

began after a specified time. 42 U.S.C. 7411(a)(2) (emphasis added).

Major stationary sources are stationary sources that exceed annual

emission tonnage thresholds in the CAA, 42 U.S.C. 7479(1), 7602().

For sources below the major thresholds, the 1977 amendments did not

impose the provisions of parts C and D. For those “minor” sources,

Section 110(a)(2)(C) alone controls. See 42 U.S.C. 7410(ay(2(C).

5

ment in the NSPS program. See 39 Fed. Reg. 42,514.‘

EPA’s 1978 regulations that first implemented the stat-

utory PSD program again excluded RMRR from the

scope of what constituted a “change” for purposes of the

definition of “modification.” 43 Fed. Reg. 26,403-26,404;

see Pet. App. 121a.

“Routine maintenance” is not defined in any of those

regulations. Rather, the RMRR exclusion has, since its

inception, relied on a “case-by-case determination * * *

weighing the nature, extent, purpose, frequency, and

cost of the work as well as other factors to arrive at a

common sense finding” of whether the work involved

amounted to routine maintenance. Pet. 'App. 3a-4a

(quoting 67 Fed. Reg. 80,292-80,293 (2002)); see Wiscon-

sin Elec. Power Co. v. Reilly, 893 F.2d 901, 910 (7th Cir.

1990).

2. EPA has historically interpreted the RMRR ex-

clusion narrowly, and it has often found that replace-

ment of plant components with identical or functionally

equivalent components does not qualify as RMRR. See

Pet. App. 31a, 34a. Over time, however, EPA concluded

that a narrow interpretation, while reasonable, produced

undesirable results.

In 2002, EPA proposed making changes to the

RMRR exclusion, 67 Fed. Reg. 80,290, and in 2003, EPA

adopted the new Equipment Replacement Provision

(ERP) at issue in this case. Pet. App. 20a-175a. EPA

noted that, under its pre-ERP approach, “it can be diffi-

cult for the owner or operator to know with reasonable

certainty whether a particular activity constitutes

RMRR.” /d. at 32a. EPA concluded that its pre-ERP

7

* The pre-statutory PSD program was followed by the first pre-

statutory nonattainment NSR program in 1976. 41 Fed. Reg. 55,524-

55,525, 55,558.

6

approach, and the uncertainties associated with it,

“tends to have the effect of leading sources to refrain

from replacing components, to replace them with infe-

rior components, or to artificially constrain production

in other ways,” without significant environmental bene-

fits over an alternative approach. /d. at 35a. EPA found

that its pre-ERP approach “can discourage replace-

ments that would promote safety, reliability and effi-

ciency even in instances where, if the matter were

brought to EPA, [the agency] would determine that the

replacement in question was RMRR.” Jbid. In EPA’s

view “[s]uch discouragement results in lost capacity and

lost opportunities to improve energy efficiency and re-

duce air pollution.” /bid.

The ERP, as adopted by EPA, provides that RMRR

includes, but is not limited to, an activity if “(1) [iJt in-

volves replacement of any existing component(s) of a

process unit with component(s) that are identical or that

serve the same purpose as the replaced component(s);

(2) the fixed capital cost of the replaced component(s),

plus costs of any activities that are part of the replace-

ment activity * * * , does not exceed 20 percent of the

current replacement value of the process unit; and (3)

the replacement(s) does not alter the basic design pa-

rameters of the process unit or cause the process unit to

exceed any emission limitation or operational limitation

* * * that is legally enforceable.” Pet. App. 41a (foot-

note omitted); see id. at 4a. EPA reasoned that equip-

ment replacements that satisfy those requirements

would be understood as maintaining existing functions

rather than as making a physical change. They would

thus satisfy Congress’s intent to generally exclude exist-

ing plants from the need to obtain NSR permits and “to

avoid the need to impose costly retrofits, but require

7

replacement of new control technology at a time when it

makes the most sense for it to be installed.” Jd. at 123a;

see id. at 126a.

3. The court of appeals held that the ERP violates

the Clean Air Act, and it vacated the rule. Pet. App. la-

17a. .

The dispute between the parties has to do with the

construction of the phrase “any physical change” in Sec-

tion 7411(a)(4) of the Act.” The court of appeals ac-

cepted that the phrase “physical change’ is susceptible

to multiple meanings.” Pet. App. 5a. The court con-

cluded, however, that the “essential disagreement” in

the case “centers on the effect of Congress’s decision in

defining ‘modification’ to insert the word ‘any’ before

‘physical change.” Jd. at 6a.

The court of appeals noted that “[iJn a series of cases,

the Supreme Court has drawn upon the word ‘any’ to

give the word it modifies an ‘expansive meaning’ when

there is ‘no reason to contravene the clause’s obvious

meaning.” Pet. App. 7a (quoting Norfolk S. Ry. v.

Kirby, 543 U.S. 14, 31-32 (2004)). Although the court

recognized that “EPA is correct that the meaning of

‘any’ can differ depending upon the statutory setting,”

the court concluded that “the context of the Clean Air

Act warrants no departure” from what it believed was

“the word’s customary effect.” Jd. at 8a (citation omit-

ted). The court noted that, unlike in Nixon v. Missour

Municipal League, 541 U.S. 125, 132 (2004), where a

statute with the term “any” was construed less broadly,

“the question of statutory interpretation here does not

» The meaning of a different part of the definition of modification in

Section 7411(a)(4)—the phrase. “increases the amount of any air

pollutant emitted”— is currently before the Court in Environmental

Defense v. Duke Energy Corp., No. 05-848 (argued Nov. 1, 2006).

8

arise in a setting in which the Supreme Court has re-

quired heightened standards of clarity to avoid upset-

ting fundamental policies,” and no “strange and indeter-

minate results * * * would emerge from adopting” what

the court believed was “the natural meaning of ‘any’ in

section [7411(a)(4)].” Pet. App. 8a.

In the court’s view, other considerations supported

its conclusion. The court noted that it “has construed

the definition of ‘modification’ broadly” in other re-

spects. Pet. App. 9a. The court also believed that the

term “any” would be rendered superfluous if it were not

construed to require an expansive interpretation of the

words that follow. /d. at 10a. Finally, the court noted

that the statute itself imposes limitations on the “physi-

cal changes” that are covered; they must “increase|] the

amount of any air pollutant emitted * * * or * * * result||

in the emission of any air pollutant not previously emit-

ted.” 42 U.S.C. 7411(a)(4). The court stated that,

“{blecause Congress expressly included one limitation,

the court must presume that Congress acted intention-

ally and purposely when it did not include others.” Pet.

App. 12a (citations and internal quotation marks omit-

ted); see id. at 17a (“As Congress limited the broad

meaning of ‘any physical change,’ directing that only

changes that increase emissions will trigger NSR, no

other limitation (other than to avoid absurd results) can

be implied.”).

The court concluded that “when Congress places the

word ‘any’ before a phrase with several common mean-

ings, the statutory phrase encompasses each of those

meanings” and “the agency may not pick and choose

among them.” Pet. App. 12a; see id. at 14a (“Congress’s

use of the word ‘any’ indicates the intent to cover all of

the ordinary meanings of the phrase.”); id. at 17a (“Con-

9

gress’s use of the word ‘any’ in defining a ‘modification’

means that all types of ‘physical changes’ are covered.”).

In the court’s view, the pre-existing RMRR exclusion

did not contravene that principle, because it was “based

on ade minimis rationale.” Jd. at 15a. The court held,

however, that because “the ERP would allow equipment

replacements resulting in non-de minimis emission in-

creases to avoid NSR,” the ERP rule “violates the Act.”

Id. at 17a.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

The court of appeals vacated the results of a signifi-

cant rulemaking initiative by EPA that was designed to

remedy problems with the former, case-by-case RMRR

approach, and thereby ease compliance by regulated

entities, lighten administrative burdens on state and

federal enforcement agencies, and, ultimately, encour-

age investment in newer, more efficient, and cleaner

facilities. The court of appeals reached that result by

holding that, although “physical change” is ambiguous,

the phrase “any physical change” is unambiguously

broad. In so holding, the court not only invalidated a

critically important rulemaking but also announced a

sweeping rule of construction that would operate to de-

prive administrative agencies of discretion to construe

ambiguous statutory terms whenever those terms are

preceded by the word “any”; in the court’s view, Con-

gress’s use of the word “any” generally compels adop-

tion of the broadest construction of whatever follows,

effectively eliminating ambiguities that would otherwise

be left for agency interpretation...That holding, with its

premise that the single word “any” effectively eliminates

agency discretion, is inconsistent with Chevron U.S.A.

Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984), and with this Court’s

10

repeated admonitions that statutes must de construed in

context and as a whole. Moreover, it threatens to put

both EPA and other agencies charged with administer-

ing statutes that employ the term “any” in an unwar-

ranted straitjacket.

While the term “any” may be used to connote

breadth, it does not express the “clear intent” of Con-

gress to adopt one and only one meaning—namely, the

broadest reasonable construction—of the words that

follow. It therefore does not preclude the exercise of

discretion by EPA to define the phrase “physical

change” in a way that reasonably differentiates between

routine maintenance (which, as the phrase suggests,

maintains rather than changes an entity) and physical

changes. Indeed, the logic of the D.C. Circuit’s con-

struction of the word “any” would endanger far more

than just the EPA’s current rulemaking. Before EPA’s

promulgation of the ERP, there was a long history of a

variety of exclusions—including in the regulatory pro-

gram on which Congress modeled the PSD provisions of

the Act—from the scope of a “physical change * * * or

change in the method of operation,” 42 U.S.C.

7411(a)(4). Those exclusions cannot be justified on the

rationale that they cause only a de minimis increase in

emissions (and even a de minimis exclusion itself would

be hard to square with the court of appeals’ construction

of “any,” taken to its logical extreme). Accordingly, all

of those exclusions (including applications of even the

original RMRR exclusion itself) are placed into jeopardy

by the court of appeals’ holding in this case.

Absent this Court’s review, the court of appeals’ deci-

sion on this petition for review will be the final word on

this important regulatory initiative, and it will threaten

related and similarly significant Clean Air Act exclu-

1]

sions. Equally important, given the role of the D.C. Cir-

cuit in review of agency regulations generally, that

court’s unjustifiably broad reading of the common statu-

tory term “any” to eliminate virtually all ambiguity in

the terms that follow will needlessly and improperly

limit agency action in a wide variety of areas. Further

review is warranted.

A. The Decision Below Is Incorrect

1. The court of appeals acknowledged that, in pro-

mulgating the ERP, EPA was construing the definition

of “modification” in the Clean Air Act, and that the va-

lidity of EPA’s interpretation was accordingly governed

by the principles of Chevron. See Pet. App. 5a. Under

those principles, “{i]f the intent of Congress is clear,

that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the

agency, must give effect to the unambiguously ex-

pressed intent of Congress.” 467 U.S. at 842-843. If

the intent of Congress is not “unambiguously ex-

pressed,” however, Chevron “requires a federal court to

accept the agency’s construction of the statute, even if

the agency’s reading differs from what the court be-

lieves is the best statutory interpretation.” National

Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs.,

125 S. Ct. 2688, 2699 (2005). 7

The court of appeals in this case correctly recognized

that the phrase “physical change” is ambiguous, and it

did not dispute that the ERP would represent a permis-

sible construction of that phrase. See Pet. App. 5a-6a

(citing various dictionary definitions of “change,” includ-

ing “make over to a radically different form”). Relying

almost exclusively on Congress’s use of the word “any,”

however, the court concluded that the phrase “any phys-

ical change” is unambiguous, and that it necessarily en-

12

compasses everything covered by “all of the ordinary

meanings of the phrase.” /d. at 14a. That conclusion

contravenes this Court’s consistent recognition that a

statutory term must be construed not in isolation, but in

light of its entire context. E.g., Davis v. Michigan Dep't

of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 809 (1989). The mere addi-

tion of the word “any” is insufficient to establish that

Congress had a clear intent that the phrase “physical

change” must necessarily be given its broadest meaning.

This Court has a long history of considering the im-

port of the word “any,” beginning with United States v.

Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 610, 631 (1818) (Marshall,

C.J.). In some cases, the Court has concluded that use

of the word “any” was intended to give the term that

follows an “expansive meaning.” See, e.g., Norfolk S.

Ry. v. Kirby, 543 U.S. 14, 31-32 (2004); Department of

Housing & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 130-131

(2002); United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 5 (1997);

Harrison v. PPG Indus., 446 U.S. 578, 588-589 (1980).

Those cases, however, generally involved the Court’s

own determination of the best meaning of the language

at issue, not the clearly distinct question presented in

the Chevron context, namely, whether an agency inter-

pretation of statutory text is reasonable. In Norfolk

Southern, for example, the Court addressed “a simple

question of contract interpretation,” 543 U.S. at 30; in

Gonzales, a criminal sentencing statute; and in Harri-

son, the jurisdiction of federal courts of appeals. An

agency interpretation of a statute was involved in

Rucker, but the Court agreed with the agency construc-

tion at issue, see 535 U.S. at 130, and, as in the other

cases cited above, the Court expressly relied on a combi-

nation of factors—not merely the word “any” alone—to

support its conclusion that the phrase “any drug-related

13

criminal activity” did not contain an implicit knowledge

requirement. /d. at 130-131 (“Congress’ decision not to

impose any qualification in the statute, combined with

its use of the term ‘any’ to modify ‘drug-related criminal

activity,’ precludes any knowledge requirement.”) (em-

phasis added).

Moreover, the Court has concluded in other cases

that, while the word “any” does suggest breadth, it does

not necessarily mandate the broadest interpretation of

what follows. See, e.g., Nixon v. Missouri Mun. League,

541 U.S. 125, 132 (2004) (“‘any’ can and does mean dif-

ferent things depending upon the setting”); Middlesex

County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers

Ass’n, 453 U.S. 1, 15 (1981); Palmer, supra. More re-

cently, in Small v. United States, 544 U.S. 385, 388

(2005), the Court noted that “a speaker who says, ‘T’ll

see any film,’ may or may not mean to include films

shown in another city.” The Court concluded that “even

though the word ‘any’ demands a broad interpretation,

* * * we must look beyond that word itself.” bid. (cita-

tion omitted); see zd. at 391 (“statutory language, con-

text, history, [and] purpose”); Nixon, 541 U.S. at 182

(meaning of the word “any” “depend[s] upon the set-

ting”). As the Court said in Flora v. United States, 362

U.S. 145, 149 (1960), in connection with the phrase “any

sum,” “[a] catchall the phrase surely is; but to say this is

not to define what it catches.”

° The court of appeals suggested that, if “any” does not serve the

function of requiring the broadest construction of what follows, it would

be superfluous. Pet. App. 10a. That would no more be true in this case

than in Nixon, Sea Clammers, Palmer, Small, and Flora, in each of

which this Court did not adopt the broadest construction of the statute

at issue. In all of those settings, the term “any” continues to serve its

ordinary function of suggesting the absence of any other limitation once

14

Indeed, the rule of construction announced by the

court of appeals—that “any” ordinarily requires the

phrase it modifies to be construed to encompass all of its

possible “ordinary meanings,” Pet. App. 7a—is irrecon-

cilable with this Court’s decision in Chevron itself, which

involved the same statute and the same definitional sec-

tion at issue here. This Court’s analysis in Chevron fo-

cused on the scope of EPA’s discretion to interpret the

term “stationary source,” which is defined in the Clean

Air Act’s NSPS provision to mean “any building, struc-

ture, facility, or installation which emits or may emit any

air pollutant.” 42 U.S.C. 7411(a)(3) (emphasis added).

Referring to that definition, this Court emphatically

rejected the argument that the statutory text deprived

EPA of discretion to adopt an interpretation of “station-

ary source” that was less inclusive than its broadest pos-

sible construction. Even though the Court agreed with

the respondents’ argument that the text “could be read

to impose the [NSR] permit conditions on an individual

building that is a part of a plant,” 467 U.S. at 860, the

Court nonetheless concluded that EPA’s narrower inter-

pretation was also reasonable. /d. at 861. The Court

simply was “not persuaded that parsing of general terms

in the text of the statute will reveal an actual intent of

the agency has settled on a reasonable interpretation of the phrase

following “any”—here, “physical change.” Indeed, it appears that “any”

served precisely that function in Rucker, for example, where the

question was whether to add an extra-statutory knowledge requirement

to the statutory phrase “any drug-related criminal activity.” See 535

U.S. at 130-131. There was no indication in Rucker, by contrast, that

HUD would not have discretion to determine whether a crime designed

to raise funds to purchase drugs would be sufficiently “drug-related” to

satisfy the statute.

15

Congress,” ibid., and instead upheld the agency’s view

that “the definition itself is flexible,” id. at 864.

The decision below thus stands in flagrant opposition

to Chevron. Under the court of appeals’ approach, the

phrase at issue in Chevron would have had to encompass

the broadest meaning of “any building,” including a

building that was part of a larger plant. This Court held

the opposite. If the phrase “any building, structure,

facility, or installation,” 42 U.S.C. 7411(a)(3), need not

be given the widest possible meaning, as Chevron

squarely concludes, it begs credulity to suggest that

such breadth is required by the use of “any” in the very

next paragraph of the same Section of the same Act.

This Court’s Chevron decision compels the conclusion

that the rule of construction announced by the court of

appeals is wrong, and egregiously so.

2. In the context presented here, the word “any” is

plainly not sufficient to establish that Congress had an

“unambiguously expressed intent,” Chevron, 467 U.S. at

843, to adopt the broadest meaning of the phrase that

follows (“physical change * * * or change in method of

operation”) and to permit a narrower reading only when

justified on the ground that such a reading would lead to

a de minimis impact on emissions. To the contrary, the

statutory context demands that a distinction be made

between routine efforts to maintain a facility’s current

method of operation and efforts to change the facility or

its method of operation. Not only is there inherent am-

biguity in the phrase “physical change * * * or change in

the method of operation” in this context—whether or not

modified by “any”—but there is also other evidence that

Congress wanted to permit a degree of administrative

flexibility.

16

a. As this Court has explained, “where ‘Congress has

not just kept its silence by refusing to overturn [a prior]

administrative construction, but has ratified it with posi-

tive legislation,” that agency’s prior construction must

be accepted “as a defensible construction of the * * *

statute.” 7WA v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 638, 76 n.11 (1977)

(quoting Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 381-

382 (1969)). See, e.g., Young v. Community Nutrition

Inst., 476 U.S. 974, 983 (1986). Congress is presumed to

legislate with awareness of prior administrative regula-

tions, and when it elects to use statutory language that

has already been given an interpretive gloss by the ad-

ministering agency, it should ordinarily be presumed to

intend to allow the-agency to continue to employ that

regulatory gloss.

That inference of congressional approval is fully ap-

plicable here. When Congress enacted the statutory

NSR program in 1977, cross-referencing the pre-exist-

ing NSPS statutory definition of “modification,” it acted

in a context in which EPA had already interpreted that

key provision to exclude some activities that would fall

within the broadest conception of “physical change * * *

or change in the method of operation,” 42 U.S.C.

7411(a)(4), including activities that unquestionably could

increase emissions in non-trivial ways. When EPA origi-

nally promulgated regulations to effectuate the NSPS

program in 1971, it had, subject to certain conditions,

excluded “{al|n increase in the production rate,” “[{a]n

increase in hours of operation,” and “[uJse of an alterna-

tive fuel or raw material” from the scope of what consti-

tutes a “modification.” See 36 Fed. Reg. 24,877 (40

C.F.R. 60.2(h)(2)(i)-(iii).1972)). When EPA established

the regulatory PSD program in 1974, it again provided

for the same exclusions, this time expressly tying them

17

to the terms “physical change * * * or change in the

method of operation.” See 39 Fed. Reg. 42,514 (provid-

ing that “[a]n increase in the production rate” or in

“hours of operation,” or “[u]se of an alternative fuel or

raw material,” “shall not be considered a change in the

method of operation.”). The agency could presumably

~ have construed the statutory phrase “any physical

change * * * or change in the method of operation” to be

sufficiently broad to cover those excluded activities.

But, from the beginning, it has not done so. | 7

Although even the court of appeals suggested (with-

out fully justifying) that Congress’s use of the word

“any” could co-exist with an exclusion for activities that

had a de minimis impact on emissions, none of the above

exclusions were, or could have been, justified on that

ground. See Pet. App. 13la-132a. For example, as EPA

noted, “by doubling hours of operation, a 500 [tons per

year] emitting plant could conceivably double its emis-

sions,” an increase that would be “far above any level

EPA has ever thought justifiable as de minimis.” Id. at

134a. The same could easily be true of a source that in-

creased its production rate or switched to an alternative,

and more polluting, fuel. Yet those exclusions have

nonetheless been embodied in both the NSR program

and the NSPS program since their creation, and their

modern-day successors remain in those programs today.

See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. 52.21(b)(2)(iii) (NSR); 40 C.F.R.

60.14(e)(2), (3) and (4) (NSPS).

The same has been true of the treatment of RMRR

itself. The terms of the RMRR provision focus on

whether an activity is “routine,” not whether the in-

crease in emissions caused by the activity would be more

than de minimis, and EPA has never construed the ex-

clusion to encompass only de minimis emissions in-

18

creases. Rather, under the RMRR as it was applied

prior to promulgation of the ERP, EPA used a five-fac-

tor test to determine whether an activity constituted

RMRR, considering the activity’s nature, extent, fre-

quency, purpose, and cost. See Pet. App. 3a-4a. Only

one of those factors—the project’s extent—can be read

to refer even indirectly to the effect on emissions caused

by the project, and even that factor is properly read to

refer to the extent of the work required on the project,

not the extent of increase in emissions that would re-

sult.’

Thus, all of EPA’s longstanding regulatory exclu-

sions allow, and some necessarily contemplate, exclud-

ing from NSR and NSPS at least some activities that

could lead to more than de minimis increases in emis-

sions.” Those exclusions date from before Congress

‘ The court of appeals is correct that EPA stated that it had

“generally interpret{ed|” the RMRR exclusion—as well as other

related provisions—narrowly. Pet. App. 15a (emphasis added) (quoting

id. at 136a). But EPA has never taken the position that all of those

exclusions are categorically limited to activities that will result in only

de minimis emissions increases, nor can they plausibly be read in that

manner. Indeed, if the exclusions were limited to only activities of that

nature, there would have been little if any reason to create or retain

them, because the NSR program, which applies only to activities that

result in “significant” emissions increases, already excludes activities

that result in de minimis emissions increases. 40 C.F.R. 52.21(b)(2)(i)

and (23). To be sure, it has always been reasonable, and thus open to

EPA, to interpret the pre-ERP RMRR rule narrowly. But nothing in

EPA's past general practice precludes the agency from improving or

adjusting its regulatory approach in response to current conditions, as

it did in adopting the ERP.

* The court of appeals was mistaken insofar as it relied on the theory

that, “[a]s Congress limited the broad meaning of ‘any physical change,

directing that only changes that increase emissions will trigger NSR,

no other limitation (other than to avoid absurd results) can be implied.”

19

adopted the statutory NSR program in 1977. Yet Con-

gress did not repudiate EPA’s settled understanding of

those terms. To the contrary, Congress defined “modifi-

cation” for the NSR program through a cross-reference

to the preexisting NSPS statutory definition that EPA

had already construed to include those exclusions. See

42 U.S.C. 7479(2)(C). And the new NSR program that

Congress adopted was modeled on the pre-existing PSD

regulatory program, which also included those exclu-

sions. See 39 Fed. Reg. 42,514 (1974). The court of ap-

peals disregarded the fact that Congress’s acceptance of

the prior regulatory constructions, which clearly applied

to activities that had more than a de minimis effect on

emissions, necessarily confirms the permissibility of

those exclusions in the NSR context.

Indeed, Congress specifically demonstrated its

awareness and approval of the prior regulations (includ-

ing the exclusions) by mandating that most of the pre-

existing regulations (including the cited exclusions)

“shall remain in effect” until implementation plans are

put in place. 42 U.S.C. 7478(a). While Congress made

clear that EPA would have discretion to change the reg-

ulations after that time, its awareness of the prior regu-

latory program, and its evident satisfaction with that

program in pertinent part, establishes that the prior

program, with its exclusions that cannot be justified on

the basis of a de minimis rationale, is at the very least “a

defensible construction” of the Act. TWA, 432 U.S. at

Pet. App. 17a. The fact that a “modification” is limited to a “change”

that results in an increase in emissions provides no guidance whatever

as to which of the several permissible meanings of “change” was

intended by Congress.

20

76 n.11." It necessarily follows that, contrary to the

court of appeals’ holding, the term “any physical change

* * * or change in the method of operation” does contain

ambiguities that the agency may reasonably resolve, and

that those ambiguities encompass interpretations that

exclude some activities that have more than a de

minimis impact on emissions.

B. The Question Presented Is Important And Warrants Re-

view At This Time

This Court’s review is warranted in this case because

the court of appeals’ ruling conflicts with Chevron, an-

nounces an erroneous and harmful rule of statutory con-

struction that unduly constrains agency discretion, and

overturns an important regulatory initiative that affects

a broad range of industrial activity and that sought to

bring greater certainty—and, ultimately, both environ-

mental and economic benefits—to a complex regulatory

scheme. The breadth of the court’s ruling suggests that,

even aside from the specific ERP rule, EPA may be

hamstrung in developing other approaches in the future

to remedy the deficiencies of the current RMRR exclu-

” That the 1977 Amendments render EPA’s pre-1977 approach a

“defensible construction” of the Act. see TWA, 432 U.S. at 76n.11, does

not mean that it is the only permissible interpretation. See U.S. Br. at

47 n.18, Environmental Defense v. Duke Energy Corp., No. 05-848

(argued Nov. 1, 2006). This Court has concluded that Congress's use of

a pre-existing statutory term demonstrated its intent to freeze a pre-

existing regulation only when it has found additional clear demonstra-

tions of such congressional intent inthe statute or legislative history.

See, ¢.g., Bragdon vy. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 631-632 (1998) (citing

statutory language prohibiting use of lesser standard than that

incorporated in agency regulations); FDIC v. Philadelphia Gear Corp.,

476 U.S. 426, 437-438 (1986) (noting legislative history specified that

statutory definition included prior existing regulatory definition).

21

sion. More generally, the court of appeals’ broad hold-

ing threatens a number of other pre-existing exclusions

under the Clean Air Act. It also threatens to put EPA

into a regulatory straitjacket that Congress did not in-

tend, with few if any options to tailor the program to

changing conditions and policies, and thereby to achieve

environmental benefits. Given the primacy of the D.C.

Circuit in review of administrative action generally, the

court of appeals’ decision in this case similarly threatens

the ability of other agencies that administer statutes

employing the word “any” to adapt their regulatory pro-

grams to the needs and policies of the governing statute.

1. In adopting the ERP, EPA concluded that a

“bright-line rule that would obviate the need for case-

by-case review under our multi-factor test of appropri-

ate categories of equipment replacements would be ex-

tremely useful in addressing many of the problems that

we have identified with the current operation of the

NSR program.” Pet. App. 57a. EPA concluded that the

policy of the NSR program “is not to cut back on emis-

sions from existing major stationary sources through

limitations on their productive capacity, but rather to

ensure that they will install state-of-the-art pollution

controls at a juncture where it otherwise makes sense to

do so.” Id. at 35a. Yet EPA noted criticisms of its pre-

ERP RMRR approach, which often “disallows replace-

ment of significant plant components with identical or

functionally equivalent components,” such that “the ef-

fect is to discourage plant owners or operators from en-

gaging in replacements that are important to restoring,

maintaining and improving plant safety, reliability, and

efficiency.” /d. at 31a; see id. at 35a (RMRR approach

has led “sources to refrain from replacing components,

22

to replace them with inferior components, or to artifi-

cially constrain production in other ways”).

The problems of the pre-ERP approach were exacer-

bated by the uncertainties inherent in its case-by-case,

multifactor nature. EPA noted that, under the pre-ERP

rule, “it takes a year, on average, to obtain a determina-

tion whether a proposed replacement is routine.” Pet.

App. 57a. Such a delay “creates perverse disincentives

to refrain from equipment replacements and instead

repair existing equipment or find some other solution.”

Ibid. It is “also problematic for State and local review-

ing authorities,” who must “devote scarce resources to

make complex determinations” that “are consistent with

determinations made for similar circumstances in other

jurisdictions.” /d. at 34a. Indeed, the uncertainties act

to “discourage replacements that would promote safety,

reliability and efficiency even in instances where, if the

matter were brought to EPA, we would determine that

the replacement in question was RMRR.” /d. at 35a.

The ERP “significantly reduce[s}” those problems.

Pet. App. 35a. Its effect “should be to remove disincen-

tives to undertaking RMRR activities falling within the

rule, thereby enhancing key operational elements such

as efficiency, safety, reliability, and environmental per-

formance.” /d. at 36a. The ERP’s effects include “pro-

viding the certainty needed to plan and undertake effi-

ciency investments,” encouraging firms “to take advan-

tage of * * * new, innovative pollution-reducing technol-

ogies,” and “preserv|ing|] powerful incentives * * * to

adopt ‘leap-frog’ technologies,” all of which will lead to

reduced costs and reduced pollution. /d. at 107a-108a

(emphases omitted). Indeed, EPA concluded that the

ERP’s effect of “promoting proper operational planning

to facilitate safe, reliable, and efficient operations,” “will

23

have the corresponding environmental benefit of reduc-

ing the amount of pollution generated per product pro-

duced,” as well as “reduc{ing] the resource burden on

reviewing authorities” under “the existing, case-by-case

process.” /d. at 44a.

2. The court of appeals’ decision invalidating the

ERP thus negated a very substantial EPA regulatory

initiative to resolve deep-seated problems in the NSR

program and the RMRR exclusion, while achieving both

economic and environmental benefits. If not reversed,

the decision below also threatens to eliminate EPA’s

ability to address those problems in the future. The

court ruled that the agency must choose the broadest

reading of the phrase “any physical change,” because

“Congress’s use of the word ‘any’ indicates the intent to

cover all of the ordinary meanings of the phrase.” Pet.

App. 14a. That ruling casts into doubt even the pre-ex-

isting RMRR exclusion, which by its terms and as his-

torically construed encompasses activities that are

within the broadest meaning of “physical change.”

To be sure, the court of appeals did concede that a

narrower construction could be used if the broadest con-

struction would lead to “strange and indeterminate” or

“absurd” results, Pet. App. 8a, 14a, or if the narrower

construction would have a de minimis effect on emis-

sions, 7d. at 13a-14a. Those qualifications, however, do

not alleviate the problems created by the court of ap-

peals’ mistaken reading of the statute. The pre-existing

RMRER exclusion, and the multifactor test that has been

employed to apply it, have never expressly been limited

to activities that have a de minimis effect on emissions,

nor have they been limited to the avoidance of “absurd”

results. Instead, the agency has engaged in a reason-

able effort to differentiate routine efforts designed to

24

maintain an existing facility from activities that amount

to a change in the physical plant or its method of opera-

tion. Any other means that EPA may consider to ad-

dress the basic problems targeted by the RMRR exclu-

sion would likely be problematic or impracticable in view

of the severe constraints imposed by the court of ap-

peals.

Moreover, as noted above, both the NSPS and NSR

programs have included since their inception additional

exclusions for hours of operation increases, production

rate increases, and fuel and raw material switching. The

court of appeals’ conclusion places in doubt those other

longstanding exclusions as well, because they may be

found to exclude activities that fit within “one of the or-

dinary meanings” of “physical change * * * or change in

the method of operation.” Pet. App. 7a. The de minimis

exception recognized by the court of appeals is of no

avail, because none of those exclusions can be justified

on the ground that it will have only a de minimis effect

on emissions. See pp. 16-19, supra. Without further

review, the court of appeals’ decision will cast a shadow

over even those exclusions and long-settled expectations

regarding the scope and coverage of the NSR and NSPS

programs. ;

3. Finally, even aside from its effects on EPA’s abil-

ity to tailor the NSR and NSPS programs to changed

circumstances and policies, the court of appeals’ decision

poses a substantial threat to every regulatory agency

entrusted with administering a statute that uses the

word “any.” The court of appeals stated that, aside from

settings “in which the Supreme Court has required

heightened standards of clarity to avoid upsetting fun-

damental policies,” Pet. App. 8a, “when Congress places

the word ‘any’ before a phrase with several common

25

meanings, the statutory phrase encompasses each of

those meanings; the agency may not pick and choose

among them,” id. at 12a. Thus, although this Court has

never used the mere presence of the word “any” in a

statute to reject an agency’s choice among several per-

missible meanings of the words that follow, and indeed

took the opposite approach in Chevron itself, the court

of appeals’ reasoning threatens to eliminate all agency

discretion whenever the word “any” appears before an

ambiguous word or words in a statute.

It is entirely consistent with this Court’s decisions,

common sense, and the Chevron doctrine to acknowl-

edge that the word “any” has a generally expansive

meaning, while also acknowledging that it does not elim-

inate all statutory ambiguities that would otherwise be

open to agency interpretation. As this Court’s frequent

cases construing statntes that use the word “any” under-

score, the court of appeals’ non-contextual interpreta-

tion of that term threatens agency authority in a broad

range of areas. Further review is warranted to correct

the court of appeals’ failure to abide by the dictates of

this Court’s decision in Chevron, and to remedy the

harms caused by its drastic and unjustifiable constric-

tion of agency discretion.

26

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully. submitted.

PAUL D. CLEMENT

Solicitor General

ROGER R. MARTELLA, JR. SUE ELLEN WOOLDRIDGE

Acting General Counsel Assistant Attorney General

ELLIOTT B. ZENICK THOMAS G. HUNGAR

Assistant General Counsel Deputy Solicitor General

JONATHAN C. AVERBACK - JAMES A. FELDMAN

Attorney Assistant to the Solicitor

General

United States Environmental

Protection Agency THOMAS A. LORENZEN

ANGELINE PURDY

Attorneys

NOVEMBER 2006

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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