Opposition Brief — City of New York, New York v. Catskill Mountain Chapter of Trout Unlimited (No. 06-729)
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No. 06-729
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IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
Crry of New York, New York City DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION, AND JoeL A. MIELE, Sr., COMMISSIONER OF DEPARTMENT
OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION.
Petitioners,
Vv.
CATSKILL MOUNTAINS CHAPTER OF TROUT UNLIMITED, INC., THEODORE
GORDON FLYFISHERS, INC., CATSKILL-DELAWARE NATURAL WATER
ALLIANCE, INC., FEDERATED SPORTSMEN’S CLUBS OF ULSTER COUNTY,
Inc., RIVERKEEPER, INC., STATE OF NEw York, New York STATE
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONSERVATION, AND ERIN M. Crotty,
COMMISSIONER OF THE NEw York STATE DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENTAL CONSERVATION,
Respondents.
On PETITION FOR A Writ OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UnitTep STATES COuRT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION FOR
NEW YORK STATE RESPONDENTS
BarBaRA D. UNDERWOOD* ANpDREW M. Cuomo
Solicitor General Attorney General of the
MICHELLE ARONOWITZ State of New York
Deputy Solicitor General 120 Broadway, 25" Floor
JAMES M. TIERNEY New York, NY 10271
Assistant Attorney General (2i2) 416-8016
Attorneys for New York State
* Counsel of Record Respondents
i
COUNTERSTATEMENT OF
QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether the permit requirement of the federal Water
Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq. (the “Clean
Water Act”), which places controls on pollutant discharges
and is triggered by “any addition of any pollutant to navigable
waters from any point source,” applies when a point source
conveys water containing pollutants from one distinct water
body to another in circumstances where the receiving water
body would not otherwise be burdened with additional
pollutants but for the transfer through the point source.
il
TABLE OF CONTENTS
COUNTERSTATEMENT OF
El ye a Bg oC, yl >
AS GPE GAIN EINE DS oo cc ccc cece see cerens
TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES ............
SE ee eT ee eee Te
REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION .....
CONCLUSION
Page
lil
TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES
Page
CASES
Arkansas v. Oklahoma,
BS UR, PU Care v0 kon bees s eanaense scien |
Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout
Unlimited, Inc. v. City of New York,
27S F.3G Ei C26 CO. TOO) oo obese nvecvns 4,5,6
Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout
Unlimited, Inc. v. City of New York,
SS FSG Tt CRBC, BOO sacs cuscccsasewss< 6
Committee to Save Mokelumne River v. East Bay
Municipal Utility District,
13 F.3d 305 (9" Cir. 1993), cert. denied,
ERC R Be | Perr rr errr rr rrr s» 15
Del-AWARE Unlimited, Inc. v.
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Department
of Environmental Resources,
508 A.2d 348 (Pa. Commw. Ct.),
appeal denied, 523 A.2d 1132 (Pa. 1986) ...... 10
Dubois v. United States Department of Agriculture,
NGS 36 1273 CE" Cet. FORO) go vc wncicennees 10, 13
Friends of the Everglades, Inc. v. South Florida
Water Management District,
No. 02-80309-civ, 2006 WL 3635465 (S.D. Fla.
ee | re eee rere 9,19
iv
Cited Authorities
Page
Miccosukee Tribe of Indians v. South Florida
Water Management District,
280 F.3d 1364 (11" Cir. 2002) vacated and
remanded, 541 U.S. 95 (2004) .............. 10, 12
Morris v. Weinberger,
a ee PO TE 56 in ors 6S Ds ene ceee du 8
National Cable & Telecommunications
Association v. Brand X Internet Services,
Be.) Sep fe. er erry 8
National Wildlife Federation v. Consumers
Power Co.,
ee Fe Sete CM, TUE a ccincdcucs. 13, 14, 15
National Wildlife Federation v. Gorsuch,
OPS F.26 156 GO.C. Cir. 1962) 2. ence eee. 13, 14, 15
Northern Plains Resource Council v. Fidelity
Exploration & Development Co.,
325 F.3d 1155 (9% Cir.),
cert. denied, 540 U.S. 967 (2003) ........... 10, 11
People to Save the Sheyenne River, Inc. v.
North Dakota Department of Health,
G97 N.W.20 319 (N.D. 2005) . 2. ccc cece cee. 10
Prosolino v. Nastri,
291 F.3d 1123 (9" Cir. 2002),
cert. denied, 539 U.S. 926 (2003) ............ 17
Cited Authorities
Page
PUD No. | v. Washington Department of Ecology,
DA SE FREED ci NW HeLa hoe eres eo Ro aS 16
Quinn v. Muscare,
EP Wises POCO TTOR cee beh ae hoes been oe Oe 8
Riverside Irrigation District v. Andrews,
FOO Rae OO Ge TUG) cick kee eeaases 16
S.D. Warren Co. v. Maine Board of
Environmental Protection,
NSO a Re COGS LOND 6 ose ncceveseasey 1,15, 18
Skidmore v. Swift & Co.,
pg A Sd rr ee 6
South Florida Water Management District v.
Miccosukee Tribe of Indians,
PEF Bs PPE 6 Cha 8 aw Ode eh N OAD passim
United States v. Earth Sciences, Inc.,
599 -F.26 368 (107 Cir, 1979) onc civccvesesen 17
United States v. Law,
979 F.2d 977 (4" Cir. 1992), cert. denied,
EE Ue ic FE LEE 0.3 60 65h ne eee reaenes 15
United States v. Mead Corp.,
ee ls COE es ono ae eek doe eens 9
vi
Cited Authorities
Page
FEDERAL STATUTES
5 EE 2 ak ob | SP eee Sea eren want 1, 15,19
Pe EOER. ob lee ENS ahh Ubes te eeneeees 1,2
pots | a es | Snr ee eee y EY
Dar ae ns BE noe ee stage dea v bead tawenens 16, 17
PC OE on eer e re ckhoean oe een ane eon 2
ee OEE nave eek 00s ensdnserecaars 1
a RE. 4 sus Sa soe Was ASK Res 1,2
ERE AIOE 83 ore oe oy ee awh eeeees 16
FEDERAL REGULATIONS
i e OOEe 5c code tees wha skeen eae l
gee RR Bo 2 SR ae er nang ya
a WEIS peak a Ce aons kaw hues 12
Ee SOR uA aurea eWay tikes vee enon uun es 3
oe RE a ee er ee ee ere a ee 2
RS PELE og oes ds ee oe aa we 2
vil
Cited Authorities
Page
STATE REGULATIONS
N.Y. Compilation of Codes Rules & Regulations,
title 6 §§ 624.1-624.13 (2006) ............... 19
MISCELLANEOUS
71 Fed. Reg. 32887 (June 7, 2006)
OW tg So.) Pere rer 17
United States Envornmental Protection Agency,
Agency Interpretation on Applicability of Section
402 of the Clean Water Act to Water Transfers
CF PRT oo Vcaeibecdseusevaues 9
USEPA Website: Wetlands, Oceans & Watersheds
http://www.epa.gov/owow/tmdl/sediment/pdf/
SD es oo Wwe eae os ee ceeen neues 17
http://www.epa.gov/owow/tmdl/examples/
SEINE Wir 6k 65555 bc ed ewnesescabeeen 17
l
STATEMENT
1. Congress adopted the Clean Water Act (“CWA” or
“the Act”) “to restore and maintain the chemical, physical,
and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.” 33 U.S.C.
§ 1251(a). The national goal of the Act is “to achieve ‘water
quality which provides for the protection and propagation of
fish, shellfish, and wildlife and provides for recreation in
and on the water.’” S.D. Warren Co. v. Me. Bd. of Envil.
Prot., 126 S.Ct. 1843, 1852 (2006) (quoting 33 U.S.C.
§ 1251(a)(2)). To serve these ends, the CWA prohibits the
discharge of any pollutant by any person unless done
in compliance with some provision of the CWA. 33 U.S.C.
§ 1311(a).
At issue here is the scope of the CWA’s National
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (“NPDES”) permit
requirement, 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a), (b), which is the “primary
means” for protecting and improving water quality within
the “comprehensive regulatory regime” established by
Congress. Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 99, 101
(1992). The NPDES requires a permit for the “discharge of
any pollutant” from a “point source” into “navigable waters.”
33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a), 1342(a)-(b), 1362(6), (7), (12), (14);
see also 40 C.F.R. § 122.1(b). “[D]ischarge of a pollutant”
is defined in pertinent part as “any addition of any pollutant
to navigable waters from any point source.” 33 U.S.C.
§ 1362(12). “Point source,” in turn, is defined as “any
discernible, confined and discrete conveyance, including but
not limited to any .. . tunnel .. . from which pollutants are
or may be discharged.” 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14). “The term
‘pollutant’ means dredged spoil, solid waste, incinerator
residue, sewage, garbage, sewage sludge, munitions,
chemical wastes, biological materials, radioactive materials,
2
heat, wrecked or discarded equipment, rock, sand, cellar dirt
and industrial, municipal, and agricultural waste ....”
33 U.S.C. § 1362(6). “The term ‘navigable waters’ means
the waters of the United States, including the territorial seas.”
33 U.S.C. § 1362(7).
An NPDES permit sets forth the conditions for the
discharge of pollutants consistent with various other
provisions of the CWA, including the requirement that
pollutant limitations be set so as to assure that each receiving
water will achieve or continue to achieve the “water
quality standards” applicable to the receiving water.
33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(b)(1)(C), 1313(a)-(c); 40 C.F.R.
§ 122.44(d)(1). “Water quality standards” consist of two
major elements: (i) “the designated uses of the navigable
waters involved”; and (11) “the water quality criteria for such
waters based upon such uses.” 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(2)(A);
40 C.F.R. §§ 131.10, 131.11.
The United States Environmental Protection Agency
(“EPA”) or a delegated State must establish the designated
use, “tak[ing] into consideration the use and value” of each
water body “for public water supplies, protection and
propagation of fish, shellfish and wildlife, recreation in and
on the water, agricultural, industrial, and other purposes
including navigation.” 40 C.F.R. § 131.10(a). The CWA
further requires States to assess their waters and identify
individual waters that have not achieved compliance with
water quality standards, despite controls contained in the
applicable NPDES permit. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1313(d)(1)(A)-(B),
1315. For each noncompliant body, the EPA or delegated
State must develop water pollution budgets and remedial
pollutant loading allocations, known as “total maximum daily
load{[s}” (“TMDLs”), to identify both piped (“point”) and
3
diffuse (“nonpoint”) sources of excessive pollutants that
cause the contravention of water quality standards. 33 U.S.C.
§ 1313¢d)(1)(C), (D); 40 C.F.R. § 130.7. Once established,
the pollutant loading reductions assigned to point sources in
the TMDL process are generally incorporated as more
stringent limitations within the relevant individual NPDES
permits. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d); 40 C.F.R. § 122.44(d)(1)(vii);
see S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians,
541 U.S. 95, 107 (2004).
2. As part of its system for delivering drinking water to
New York City and the surrounding area, the City maintains
the Schoharie Reservoir in the Catskill Mountains. Water is
discharged from the Schoharie Reservoir, diverted through
the 18-mile Shandaken Tunnel, and discharged into the
Esopus Creek, a trout stream used for fly fishing and other
recreational activities. Pet. App. AS-A6.' The Creek’s water,
in turn, flows through a series of reservoirs, aqueducts, and
tunnels until it eventually reaches New York City. “Absent
the man-made diversion through the [Shandaken] Tunnel,
water from the Schoharie Reservoir would never reach the
Esopus Creek.” Pet. App. A6. “Because water in the
Schoharie Reservoir contains suspended solids from both
natural and man-made causes, discharges from the Tunnel
into the Creek are more turbid than the waters of the Esopus.”
Pet. App. A26. “This turbidity impairs use of the Esopus for
fly fishing and other recreational activities.” Pet. App. A6.
Also, “discharge from the Shandaken Tunnel periodically
contains elevated temperatures that stress trout populations
in Esopus Creek.” Pet. App. A28.
' “Pet. App.” refers to the Appendix to Petition for a Writ of
Certiorari.
4
3. Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc.
and other recreational users of the Esopus Creek (“Private
Party Respondents”) brought this citizens’ suit alleging that
Petitioners had violated the CWA by discharging pollutants
into “waters of the United States” without an NPDES permit.
Pet. App. A4.
The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to
state a claim, holding that because there was no evidence
that Petitioners “added anything to the water in the Reservoir
before releasing it through the Shandaken tunnel,” Private
Party Respondents failed to establish that Petitioners’
“diversion of water from the Schoharie Reservoir to Esopus
Creek through the Shandaken tunnel constitutes an ‘addition’
of pollutants ‘from’ a point source.” Pet. App. A38-A39.
The Court of Appeals reversed (“Catskill Mountains I’),
holding that Petitioners’ conveyance of water that contains
pollutants from the Schoharie Reservoir through the 18-mile-
long Shandaken Tunnel and into the Esopus Creek requires
a permit. Pet. App. A60. It explained that “the transfer of
water containing pollutants from one body of water to
another, distinct body of water is plainly an addition and thus
a ‘discharge’ that demands an NPDES permit.” Pet. App. A71.
The court rejected Petitioners’ reliance on the cases involving
the recirculation of water held back by a dam as factually
distinguishable from this case because here, the Schoharie
Reservoir and the Esopus Creek are hydrologically distinct
and thus water and any pollutants from one are an “addition”
to the other; in contrast, in the dam context, water is taken
from a water source and released back into that same source,
and thus the water and pollutants are not an “addition.”
Pet. App. A71-A73. The court analogized the “dams cases”
to pouring a ladle of soup back into the same pot, in which
5
case “one has not ‘added’ soup or anything else to the pot.”
Pet. App. A72.
The Court of Appeals also rejected Petitioners’ “singular
entity” theory of navigable waters, which posits that “an
addition to one water body is deemed an addition to ali of
the waters of the United States.” Pet. App. A75.
Such a theory would mean that movement of water
from one discrete water body to another would
not be an addition even if it involved a transfer of
water from a water body contaminated with
myriad pollutants to a pristine water body
containing few or no pollutants. Such an
interpretation is inconsistent with the ordinary
meaning of the word “addition.”
Pet. App. A75. Finally, the court rejected Petitioners’
arguments from the CWA’s broad purposes and structure:
“Where a statute seeks to balance competing policies,
congressional intent is not served by elevating one policy
above the others, particularly where the balance struck in
the text is sufficiently clear to point to an answer.” Pet. App.
A76.
On remand from Catskill Mountains I, the district court
granted partial summary judgment for Respondents with
respect to liability and, after a bench trial, imposed civil
penalties and ordered Petitioners to seek a permit promptly.
Pet. App. A83, A118, Al22. The court joined State
Respondents as third-party defendants and ordered them to
process the permit application in a timely fashion. Pet. App.
A122.
6
On appeal from the district court’s remedial order,
Petitioners challenged the amount of the civil penalty and
sought to reargue liability. On June 13, 2006, the Court of
Appeals reiterated its holding from Catskill Mountains I that
an NPDES permit is required for the interbasin transfer of
polluted water under the plain language of the CWA. Pet.
App. A23 (“Catskill Mountains IT’). The court rejected
Petitioners’ argument that a different result was required by
this Court’s decision in Miccosukee, 541 U.S. at 109-10,
because in Miccosukee, the Court did not eliminate the
distinction between inter- and intrabasin transfers, and even
cited with approval the Second Circuit’s “soup ladle” analogy.
Pet. App. Al2. Nor did the Court of Appeals find persuasive,
applying the degree of deference appropriate under Skidmore
v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944), the 2005 EPA
interpretation cited by Petitioners concluding that the NPDES
permit requirement is inapplicable to interbasin water
transfers. Pet. App. Al2-A15 & n.5; see also Pet. App. A205-
A237. Finally, the court found Petitioners’ “plea for
reconsideration” based on the assumption that regulating the
discharge “would effectively require that the flow be stopped
altogether” to be “exaggerated.” Pet. App. Al6. The court
provided a “detailed and technical accounting” of the
flexibility built into the NPDES permit scheme. Pet. App.
Al16-A19.
Petitioners’ request for rehearing and rehearing en banc
was denied on August 25, 2006. Pet. App. Al41.
4. On June 7, 2006, the EPA issued a Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking embodying the legal analysis in the EPA’s 2005
legal memorandum. Pet. App. A182. As of this date, the EPA
has not acted to finalize the Proposed Rule.
7
5. Effective September 1, 2006, Respondent New York
State Department of Environmental Conservation (“DEC”)
issued a CWA permit to the New York City Department
of Environmental Protection with respect to the discharge
from the Shandaken Tunnel into the Esopus Creek. Pet. 13.”
See N.Y. State Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation, State Pollutant
Discharge Elimination System Discharge Permit, No. NY-
0268151 (“SPDES Permit”). Petitioners have not challenged
any aspect of this permit.
REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION
The Court of Appeals correctly held that interbasin
transfers of polluted water require a permit under the CWA,
and that decision does not warrant this Court’s review.
Petitioners seek a writ of certiorari to correct a supposed
error in interpreting the CWA, despite acknowledging that
the EPA — the agency charged with interpreting the Act — has
initiated rulemaking on the very topic of whether water
transfers are subject to the CWA permitting process. There
is thus a distinct possibility that any decision by this Court
would be called into question following publication of a final
rule. Nor do Petitioners identify a circuit conflict or any other
reason to invoke this Court’s jurisdiction. The Second
Circuit’s decision is fully consistent with those of this Court,
the First, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits, as well as the two
state appellate courts to have addressed the question. In the
face of this consistent body of case law, Petitioners argue
that this case merits review because of its unique factual
context — the movement of water for drinking, as opposed to
for commercial or industrial use. Pet. 15. Petitioners present
a factual distinction without legal significance.
“Pet.” refers to the Petition for a Writ of Certiorari.
8
1. Petitioners seek to support their request for review
by pointing to the EPA’s proposal to exempt interbasin
transfers from the NPDES permit requirement, but the fact
that the regulatory setting for this case is in flux is a primary
reason to deny review here. While the proposed rule was
published on June 7, 2006, and the comment period closed
July 24, 2006, a final rule is still pending. Pet. App. A171. If
a final rule issues at all, the rule itself or its legal rationale
may be substantially revised as the rulemaking process moves
forward. This change could occur during, or even after, Court
review. It would be premature for the Court to accept review
of this case on the promise of a regulatory change that may
not materialize.
Moreover, if the EPA does complete formal notice and
comment rulemaking, certiorari review of this case may turn
out to be futile because a decision by the Court interpreting
the scope of the CWA permitting process could be supplanted,
or at least called into question, by the formal agency rule.
See Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet
Servs., 125 S.Ct. 2688, 2700 (2005). Given the prospect of
formal agency action, prudentia! principles of judicial
economy make this case a particularly poor vehicle for
certiorari. Cf Quinn v. Musca MS US. 560. 563 | 1976)
(writ of certiorari dismissed due to, inter alia, a subsequent
change in the challenged municipa! regulation); Morris v.
-~ >
Weinberger, 410 U.S. 422, 422 (1973) (wnt of certiorari
dismissed due to congressional amendment of relevant
statutory provisions); see also Brand X, 125 S.Ct. at 2719-
20 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (discussing the unseemliness of a
Supreme Court decision being overruled by an agency acting
through formal rulemaking).
9
Finally, the Court of Appeals did not depart from routine
application of established agency deference principles, as
Petitioners repeatedly suggest. See Pet. i, 4, 14, 27-30. The
proposed rule was issued by the EPA some six months after
this matter was argued and submitted to the Second Circuit,
and a week before the court rendered its decision. Pet. App.
A2, A171. While the court did not specifically address that
eleventh-hour preliminary rulemaking, it did discuss the
August 5, 2005, agency interpretation on which the proposed
rule was based. Pet. App. Al181-A182; A205-A237 (“Agency
Interpretation on Applicability of Section 402 of the Clean
Water Act to Water Transfers”). The court reviewed the
agency interpretation, Pet. App. Al2-A15, correctly applied
Skidmore deference as Petitioners conceded, Pet. App. All,
and held that “we do not find the argument persuasive and
therefore decline to defer to EPA.” Pet. App. Al2 n.5.
Because neither the proposed rule nor the agency
interpretation are embodied in final, forma] notice and
comment rulemaking, neither is entitled to more than
Skidmore deference. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533
U.S. 218, 227-38 (2000). Finally, the Court of Appeals had
the opportunity to consider the proposed rule, upon
Petitioners’ invitation to rehear the case.’
2. This pet tow presents no conflict with any decision
of this Court nor any split of authority among the circuits.
Every court to consider the issue has agreed with the Court
> The only other court to have reviewed the EPA’s proposed
rule and agency interpretation rejected them (and held that an
interbasin transfer required a NPDES permit) on the grounds that
the EPA’s positions were inconsistent with the “unambiguous” terms
of the CWA. Friends of the Everglades, Inc. v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt.
Dist., No. 02-80309-civ, 2006 WL 3635465, at *34-*36, *42-*48
(S.D. Fla. Dec. 11, 2006).
10
of Appeals in this case. See Dubois v. United States Dept of
Agric., 102 F.3d 1273, 1296-99 (1* Cir. 1996); N. Plains
Res. Council v. Fid. Exploration & Dev. Co., 325 F.3d 1155,
1163 (9" Cir.), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 967 (2003);
Miccosukee, 280 F.3d 1364, 1368-69 (11" Cir. 2002), vacated
and remanded, 541 U.S. 95 (2004).*
a. No court has ever held that the transfer of
pollutants from one distinct body of water to another is
exempt from the NPDES permit requirement. In Dubois, a
First Circuit case, a ski area sought to pump water from the
East Branch of the Pemigewasset River up into Loon Pond,
a high-altitude water body considered to be “unusual for its
relatively pristine nature” and which served as a drinking
water supply. 102 F.3d at 1277-78. New Hampshire classified
Loon Pond “as a Class A waterbody, protected by demanding
water quality standards under a variety of criteria.” Jd. The
East Branch, by contrast, was “a relatively unprotected Class
B waterway.” /d. at 1279. The First Circuit took judicial
notice that for years the East Branch was “one of the most
polluted rivers in New England.” /d. at 1297. Because East
Branch water, which otherwise would not have flowed into
Loon Pond, id. at 1297, contained “bacteria, other aquatic
organisms such as Giardia lambia, phosphorus, turbidity and
heat,” id. at 1278, the First Circuit held that an NPDES permit
was required for the transfer, id. at 1296-99. The court
* The state appellate courts that have revicwed this issue have
reached the same conclusion as did the Court of Appeals in this case.
See Del-AWARE Unlimited, Inc. v. Commonwealth of Pa. Dep t of Envti.
Res., 508 A.2d 348, 359 (Pa. Commw. Ct.), appeal denied, 523 A.2d
1132 (Pa. 1986); cf People to Save the Sheyenne River, Inc. v. North
Dakota Dep t of Health, 697 N.W.2d 319, 323-25 (N.D. 2005) (holding
that a state-issued NPDES permit for the interbasin transfer of polluted
water must comply with various provisions of the CWA).
11
concluded that “[t]he proposed transfer of water from one
{body of water] to the other constitutes an ‘addition.’” Jd. at
1299. The EPA itself issued an NPDES permit in response
to Dubois. Pet. App. A208 n.4.
In Northern Plains, a company extracted methane gas
and, in the process, drew large quantities of deep groundwater
to the surface. 325 F.3d at 1158. The company did not add
any chemicals to the groundwater before dumping it into the
Tongue River. Jd. In its “natural state,” however, the water
contained suspended solids, calcium, magnesium, sodium,
potassium, bicarbonate, carbonate, sulfate, chloride, fluoride,
aluminum, arsenic, barium, beryllium, boron, copper, lead,
iron, manganese, strontium, and radium. /d. Further, the
groundwater was “salty,” raising concerns by those using the
Tongue River for agricultural irrigation that the salt would
break down the soil structure on farms and ranches. /d. The
Ninth Circuit held that an NPDES permit was required under
the “plain language” of the CWA. /d. at 1160.
Were we to conclude otherwise, and hold that the
massive pumping of salty, industrial waste water
into protected waters does not involve discharge
of a ‘pollutant,’ even though it would degrade the
receiving waters to the detriment of farmers and
ranchers, we wouid improperly undermine the
integrity of [the CWA’s} prohibitions.
Id. at 1162 (internal quotation marks omitied).
The Eleventh Circuit in Miccosukee similarly held that
the transfer of polluted water from one distinct water body
into another would constitute an addition that triggers the
12
CWA’s permit requirement. 280 F.3d at 1366, 1368-69; see
also id. at 1368 n.5. This Court subsequently reversed
summary judgment and remanded for further fact finding on
whether the bodies of water at issue — a drainage canal and
an impoundment area in the Everglades - are realiy two
distinct bodies of water, or are instead two parts of the same
water body. Miccosukee, 541 U.S. at 112. Here, all parties
agree that the Schoharie Reservoir and Esopus Creek are
hydrologically distinct water bodies. The decision below,
therefore, is fully consistent with this Court’s opinion in
Miccosukee.
This Court in Miccosukee declined to rule on the South
Florida Water Management District’s so-called “unified
waters” (or “singular entity”) theory of navigable waters
because it had not been raised below. /d. at 109. The theory,
also pressed by Petitioners here as a reason to grant certiorari
(Pet. 17-19 & nn.13-i5), posits that all waters of the United
States are a unified whole that may be freely mixed without
NPDES implications. See Miccosukee, 541 U.S. at 105-09.
While not deciding the issue, the Court in Miccosukee did
raise a number of pointed concerns about this theory. The
Court questioned whether it would be proper to place a water
transfer from a “polluted” water body to one that is “pristine”
outside the scope of the NPDES program, id. at 106, as well
as whether this legal theory is valid in light of NPDES
provisions of the CWA that appear to “protect[] individual
water bodies as well as the ‘waters of the United States’ as a
whole,” id. at 107 (citing 33 U.S.C. §§ 1313(c)(2)(A),
1313(d)). Miccosukee also discussed one EPA-promulgated
NPDES regulation that “appears to address the movement
of pollutants among water bodies, at least at times.” /d. at
107-08 (citing 40 C.F.R. § 122.45(g)(4)).
13
The United States originally presented its “unitary waters”
theory to the Miccosukee Court in a brief amicus curiae, id. at
105-06, and represented that its approach was the “longstanding
EPA view,” id. at 107. The Court was unpersuaded on this point,°
and notably, the EPA did not rely on the theory in its subsequent
interpretation and rulemaking on water transfers. Pet. App.
A171-A204, A205-A237. Considering the skepticism expressed
by this Court as to both the substance and the pedigree of the
“unitary waters” theory, the fact that no court has adopted the
theory and a number have rejected it,° and that the United States
itself seems to have abandoned it, it can hardly be considered
an issue worthy of this Court’s attention.
b. The “dams cases” relied upon by Petitioners are
not in conflict with this case. Pet. App. A8-A9, All, A71-A73.
These cases, National Wildlife Federation v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d
156 (D.C. Cir. 1982), and National Wildlife Federation v.
Consumers Power Co., 862 F.2d 580 (6" Cir. 1988), held that
discharges of water containing pollutants from dams which re-
circulated the same water into the same water body through a
pump storage facility or sent water down stream within the same
watershed did not require an NPDES permit. A key premise of
the Gorsuch and Consumers Power decisions was the
“sameness” of the water and water body -- as in something may
not be “added” to itself — a premise that may not reasonably be
stretched to encompass polluted water transfers between
* The Miccosukee Court noted that the Denartment of Justice had
failed to “identify any administrative documents in which EPA has
espoused that position.” 541 U.S. at 107. Further, the Court remarked
that an amicus brief filed by several former EPA officials had argued
“that the agency once reached the opposite conclusion.” /d.
* See, e.g., Dubois, 102 F.3d at 1296-97 (rejecting the singular
entity theory).
14
completely distinct water bodies. Pet. App. A71-A73. The
Court of Appeals in Catskill Mountains IT expounded the
important distinction between the intrabasin transfers in the
dams cases and the interbasin transfers at issue here:
[Gorsuch and Consumers Power] held that water
taken from a water source and then released back
into that same source was not an “addition” to
navigable waters under the CWA, despite the fact
that the water so released contained “pollutants.”
This case differed from the dams cases. . . because
the Tunnel discharges water into the Creek from
a source that is a different, distinct body of
water .... [W]e analogized the dams cases to a
soup ladle scooping soup out of a pot and
returning it to that pot, a type of water transfer
known as an intrabasin transfer. The Tunnel’s
discharge, in contrast, was like scooping soup
from one pot and depositing it in another pot,
thereby adding soup to the second pot, an
interbasin transfer.
Pet. App. A8-A9 (citations omitted). As the court further
explained, “despite the presence of pollutants in both
interbasin and intrabasin transfers, interbasin transfers are
properly distinguished [from those in Gorsuch and
Consumers Power| because they ‘add’ pollutants to the
navigable waters.” Pet. App. All.
The Court in Miccosukee did not discuss or cite the dams
cases, indicating their lack of relevance to the question of
whether NPDES permits are required for interbasin transfers.
The Miccosukee Court, however, did favorably cite the
15
Catskill Mountains I “soup ladle” analogy and the distinction
between inter- and intrabasin transfers. 541 U.S. at 109-10.
The Court remanded the case to the district court to determine
whether the water bodies in question were “two pots of soup,
not one.” Jd. at 112; cf. S.D. Warren, 126 S.Ct. at 1850 n.6.
This remand would be unnecessary if there were no legally
significant distinction between inter- and intrabasin transfers.
The important distinctions between inter- and intrabasin
transfers recognized by both Miccosukee and the court below
completely undercut Petitioners’ reliance on Gorsuch and
Consumers Power for a circuit split.’ In fact, the EPA itself,
in its agency interpretation, was careful to distinguish
between inter- and intrabasin transfers. See Pet. App. A235
n.18.
c. Petitioners’ remaining legal contentions similarly
amount to no more than a series of requests for individualized
error correction, and with respect to these, too, the decision
of the Court of Appeals is entirely consistent with the
precedent of this and other courts. For example, Petitioners
assert, Pet. 22-27, that the court below erred when it held
that a provision of the CWA with respect to state allocations
of quantities of water does not obviate the NPDES permit
requirement with respect to water quality. Pet. App. Al3-
Al4; see 33 U.S.C. § 1251(g). Petitioners also cite to a
provision of the CWA which provides that nothing in the
? Petitioners wrongly imply, Pet. 18, that a conflict arises from
United States v. Law, 979 F.2d 977, 978 (4" Cir. 1992), cert. denied,
507 U.S. 1030 (1993), and Committee to Save Mokelumne River v.
East Bay Municipal Utility District, 13 F.3d 305, 307 (9" Cir. 1993),
cert. denied, 513 U.S. 873 (1994). These cases merely held that an
NPDES permit is required for the discharge of mine wastes from a
waste detention impoundment to a creek.
16
Act should impair any right of the “States with respect to the
waters .. . of such States.” 33 U.S.C. § 1370(2). The Second
Circuit’s decision is, however, consistent with the holdings of
this Court and the one other circuit to address this issue. In
PUD No. I v. Washington Department of Ecology, this Court
held that “[{s]ections 101(g) [33 U.S.C. § 1251(g)] and 510(2)
[33 U.S.C. § 1370(2)] preserve the authority of each State to
allocate water quantity as between users; they do not limit the
scope of water pollution controls that may be imposed on users
who have obtained, vursuant to state law, a water allocation.”
511 U.S. 700, 720 (1994) (emphasis added); see also Riverside
Irrigation Dist. v. Andrews, 758 F.2d 508, 513 (10" Cir. 1985)
(“[W here both the state’s interest in allocating water and the
federal government’s interest in protecting the environment are
implicated, Congress intended an accommodation. Such
accommodations are best reached in the individual permit
process.”). Putting aside the fact-bound state law issue of
whether an “allocation” even exists here, there is no conflict
among the courts on this legal issue.*
Similarly, Petitioners assert error on the part of the court
below due to its holding, Pet. App. A1l4, that a provision of
the CWA dealing with nonpoint pollution, 33 U.S.C.
§ 1314(f)(2), does not limit the NPDES requirement as it
relates to point source discharges. Pet. 21-22. The Second
Circuit’s position, however, is consistent with the holding
of this Court in Miccosukee that “§ 1314(f)(2)(F) does not
* Petitioners seek to distinguish between intcrbasin transfers
that involve drinking water and polluted water transfers for other
purposes. Pet. 15. As they did before the court below, however,
Petitioners provide no explanation under the CWA, or any other
statute, as to why the NPDES program would treat transfers
involving drinking water differently from any other water transfers.
See Pet. App. AIS.
17
explicitly exempt nonpoint pollution sources from the NPDES
program if they a/so fall within the ‘point source’ definition” of
the CWA. 541 U.S. at 106. Similarly, in United States v. Earth
Sciences, Inc., 599 F.2d 368, 373 (10" Cir. 1979), the Tenth
Circuit held that § 1314(f)(2) does not create nonpoint source
exemptions from the Act’s NPDES requirement: “Mining and
other categories listed in § 1314(f)(2) may involve discharges
from both point and nonpoint sources, and those from point
sources are subject to regulation.” Indeed, the EPA admits that
“{m]ere mention of an activity in section 304(f) [33 U.S.C.
§ 1314(f)] does not mean it is exclusively nonpoint source in
nature.” 71 Fed.Reg. 32887, 32890 (June 7, 2006) (citing
Miccosukee, 541 U.S. at 106).° Thus, there is no conflict here
either.'° And one circuit court has specifically approved aTMDL
pollutant reduction budget for sediment that was developed by
the EPA pursuant to the CWA. See Prosolino v. Nastri, 291
F.3d 1123, 1126-27, 1129-30 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 539
U.S. 926 (2003).
Petitioners also make the perplexing assertion that the
Court of Appeals “ignored the plain language of the statute,”
* Pct. App. A185 inaccurately quotes this language from the Federal
Register.
' Petitioners also assert that turbidity and sediment are not
“pollutants” under the CWA. Pet. 20. This issue, however, was not
presented to the court below and, thus, cannot serve as a basis for a
grant of certiorari. See Pet. App. A6 n.1 (“The parties do not contest
that turbidity qualifies as a pollutant under the CWA.”). In any event,
Petitioners’ assertion is not only meritless, but absurd. The EPA has
developed an entire protocol on how to establish sediment TMDLs under
the CWA, see http://www. epa.gov/owow/tmdl/sediment/pdf/sediment. pdf
(last visited Jan. 25, 2007), and has listed numerous examples of EPA-
approved TMDLs for water bodies impaired by sediment pollution, see
http://www. epa.gov/owow/tmdl/examples/sediment. html (last visited Jan.
25, 2007).
18
Pet. 21, even though both decisions below were expressly
based on the plain text of the CWA and, in particular, the
meaning of the term “addition.” Pet. App. A15, A73. Indeed,
the Court of Appeals’ method of statutory construction was
fully consistent with that recently undertaken by this Court
when interpreting terms from the CWA that are “neither
defined in the statute nor a term of art” so that they are given
their “ordinary or natural meaning.” $.D. Warren, 126 S.Ct.
at 1847 (interpreting “discharge” in the CWA according to
its “ordinary or natural meaning”).
3. Finally, Petitioners assert that review is appropriate
because the Second Circuit’s decision will “wreak havoc”
on traditional water management functions. Pet. 14, 25-27.
After carefully reviewing similar claims raised by Petitioners
below, the Court of Appeals correctly called them
“exaggerated,” and “alarmist and unwarranted.” Pet. App.
A16, A18. The NPDES permitting process contains flexible
administrative mechanisms and variance procedures to assure
that important water transfers occur as measures to
appropriately control pollutant discharges are implemented.
Pet. App. Al6-A18. To the extent there is any basis for
Petitioners’ generalized concerns, they are best addressed
within the individualized permitting process itself, as was
done here.
As the Court of Appeals concluded after a detailed
examination of this issue: “We think the flexibility built into
the CWA and the NPDES permit scheme ... will allow
federal authority over quality regulation and state authority
over quantity allocation to coexist without materially
impairing either.” Pet. App. A16. Indeed, DEC issued a CWA
permit to Petitioners for the Shandaken Tunnel discharge,
Pia. 13, and while Petitioners had an opportunity to challenge
19
the terms of the permit as overly burdensome, either
administratively or in state court, they did not do so. See
N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 6, §§ 624.1-624.13 (2006).
Rather, the only challenge came from the Private Party
Respondents, who claimed the permit was too permissive. It
seems that Petitioners’ only real complaint with the
permitting process is the fear that the exemption that they
now benefit from might someday be taken away. The time to
complain about that eventuality, however, is if and when it
comes to pass.
In addition, this Court itself recognized Pennsylvania’s
long-standing NPDES program to regulate all interbasin
transfers. 541 U.S. at 108-09. And the one other court to
specifically address the issue of permit flexibility in this
context squarely agreed with the Second Circuit. See Friends
of the Everglades, 2006 WL 3635465, at *46.
For their part, the Petitioners make no effort to review
the adverse impacts associated with certain interbasin
transfers of water containing pollutants: Salt water could be
transferred into fresh water; sediment-laden water could be
sent into clear drinking water reservoirs; warm waters could
be pumped into cold water habitats; chemical laden waters
could be dumped into waters employed in farm and ranch
irrigation; and invasive species could be transferred into
waters not yet infested. Petitioners do not explain how leaving
such transfers unregulated by NPDES permits would be
consistent with the fundamental “objective” of the CWA
“to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and
biological integrity of the Nation’s waters,” 33 U.S.C.
§ 1251(a).
20
CONCLUSION
The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.
* Counsel of Record
Respectfully submitted,
ANDREW M. Cuomo
Attorney General of the
State of New York
BarBARA D. UNDERWOOD*
Solicitor General
MICHELLE ARONOWITZ
Deputy Solicitor General
JAMES M. TieRNEY
Assistant Attorney General
120 Broadway, 25" Floor
New York, NY 10271
(212) 416-8016
Attorneys for New York State
Respondents
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.