Opposition Brief — City of New York, New York v. Catskill Mountain Chapter of Trout Unlimited (No. 06-729)

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No. 06-729

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IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

Crry of New York, New York City DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL

PROTECTION, AND JoeL A. MIELE, Sr., COMMISSIONER OF DEPARTMENT

OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION.

Petitioners,

Vv.

CATSKILL MOUNTAINS CHAPTER OF TROUT UNLIMITED, INC., THEODORE

GORDON FLYFISHERS, INC., CATSKILL-DELAWARE NATURAL WATER

ALLIANCE, INC., FEDERATED SPORTSMEN’S CLUBS OF ULSTER COUNTY,

Inc., RIVERKEEPER, INC., STATE OF NEw York, New York STATE

DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONSERVATION, AND ERIN M. Crotty,

COMMISSIONER OF THE NEw York STATE DEPARTMENT OF

ENVIRONMENTAL CONSERVATION,

Respondents.

On PETITION FOR A Writ OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UnitTep STATES COuRT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION FOR

NEW YORK STATE RESPONDENTS

BarBaRA D. UNDERWOOD* ANpDREW M. Cuomo

Solicitor General Attorney General of the

MICHELLE ARONOWITZ State of New York

Deputy Solicitor General 120 Broadway, 25" Floor

JAMES M. TIERNEY New York, NY 10271

Assistant Attorney General (2i2) 416-8016

Attorneys for New York State

* Counsel of Record Respondents

i

COUNTERSTATEMENT OF

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether the permit requirement of the federal Water

Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq. (the “Clean

Water Act”), which places controls on pollutant discharges

and is triggered by “any addition of any pollutant to navigable

waters from any point source,” applies when a point source

conveys water containing pollutants from one distinct water

body to another in circumstances where the receiving water

body would not otherwise be burdened with additional

pollutants but for the transfer through the point source.

il

TABLE OF CONTENTS

COUNTERSTATEMENT OF

El ye a Bg oC, yl >

AS GPE GAIN EINE DS oo cc ccc cece see cerens

TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES ............

SE ee eT ee eee Te

REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION .....

CONCLUSION

Page

lil

TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES

Page

CASES

Arkansas v. Oklahoma,

BS UR, PU Care v0 kon bees s eanaense scien |

Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout

Unlimited, Inc. v. City of New York,

27S F.3G Ei C26 CO. TOO) oo obese nvecvns 4,5,6

Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout

Unlimited, Inc. v. City of New York,

SS FSG Tt CRBC, BOO sacs cuscccsasewss< 6

Committee to Save Mokelumne River v. East Bay

Municipal Utility District,

13 F.3d 305 (9" Cir. 1993), cert. denied,

ERC R Be | Perr rr errr rr rrr s» 15

Del-AWARE Unlimited, Inc. v.

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Department

of Environmental Resources,

508 A.2d 348 (Pa. Commw. Ct.),

appeal denied, 523 A.2d 1132 (Pa. 1986) ...... 10

Dubois v. United States Department of Agriculture,

NGS 36 1273 CE" Cet. FORO) go vc wncicennees 10, 13

Friends of the Everglades, Inc. v. South Florida

Water Management District,

No. 02-80309-civ, 2006 WL 3635465 (S.D. Fla.

ee | re eee rere 9,19

iv

Cited Authorities

Page

Miccosukee Tribe of Indians v. South Florida

Water Management District,

280 F.3d 1364 (11" Cir. 2002) vacated and

remanded, 541 U.S. 95 (2004) .............. 10, 12

Morris v. Weinberger,

a ee PO TE 56 in ors 6S Ds ene ceee du 8

National Cable & Telecommunications

Association v. Brand X Internet Services,

Be.) Sep fe. er erry 8

National Wildlife Federation v. Consumers

Power Co.,

ee Fe Sete CM, TUE a ccincdcucs. 13, 14, 15

National Wildlife Federation v. Gorsuch,

OPS F.26 156 GO.C. Cir. 1962) 2. ence eee. 13, 14, 15

Northern Plains Resource Council v. Fidelity

Exploration & Development Co.,

325 F.3d 1155 (9% Cir.),

cert. denied, 540 U.S. 967 (2003) ........... 10, 11

People to Save the Sheyenne River, Inc. v.

North Dakota Department of Health,

G97 N.W.20 319 (N.D. 2005) . 2. ccc cece cee. 10

Prosolino v. Nastri,

291 F.3d 1123 (9" Cir. 2002),

cert. denied, 539 U.S. 926 (2003) ............ 17

Cited Authorities

Page

PUD No. | v. Washington Department of Ecology,

DA SE FREED ci NW HeLa hoe eres eo Ro aS 16

Quinn v. Muscare,

EP Wises POCO TTOR cee beh ae hoes been oe Oe 8

Riverside Irrigation District v. Andrews,

FOO Rae OO Ge TUG) cick kee eeaases 16

S.D. Warren Co. v. Maine Board of

Environmental Protection,

NSO a Re COGS LOND 6 ose ncceveseasey 1,15, 18

Skidmore v. Swift & Co.,

pg A Sd rr ee 6

South Florida Water Management District v.

Miccosukee Tribe of Indians,

PEF Bs PPE 6 Cha 8 aw Ode eh N OAD passim

United States v. Earth Sciences, Inc.,

599 -F.26 368 (107 Cir, 1979) onc civccvesesen 17

United States v. Law,

979 F.2d 977 (4" Cir. 1992), cert. denied,

EE Ue ic FE LEE 0.3 60 65h ne eee reaenes 15

United States v. Mead Corp.,

ee ls COE es ono ae eek doe eens 9

vi

Cited Authorities

Page

FEDERAL STATUTES

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pots | a es | Snr ee eee y EY

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ee OEE nave eek 00s ensdnserecaars 1

a RE. 4 sus Sa soe Was ASK Res 1,2

ERE AIOE 83 ore oe oy ee awh eeeees 16

FEDERAL REGULATIONS

i e OOEe 5c code tees wha skeen eae l

gee RR Bo 2 SR ae er nang ya

a WEIS peak a Ce aons kaw hues 12

Ee SOR uA aurea eWay tikes vee enon uun es 3

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RS PELE og oes ds ee oe aa we 2

vil

Cited Authorities

Page

STATE REGULATIONS

N.Y. Compilation of Codes Rules & Regulations,

title 6 §§ 624.1-624.13 (2006) ............... 19

MISCELLANEOUS

71 Fed. Reg. 32887 (June 7, 2006)

OW tg So.) Pere rer 17

United States Envornmental Protection Agency,

Agency Interpretation on Applicability of Section

402 of the Clean Water Act to Water Transfers

CF PRT oo Vcaeibecdseusevaues 9

USEPA Website: Wetlands, Oceans & Watersheds

http://www.epa.gov/owow/tmdl/sediment/pdf/

SD es oo Wwe eae os ee ceeen neues 17

http://www.epa.gov/owow/tmdl/examples/

SEINE Wir 6k 65555 bc ed ewnesescabeeen 17

l

STATEMENT

1. Congress adopted the Clean Water Act (“CWA” or

“the Act”) “to restore and maintain the chemical, physical,

and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.” 33 U.S.C.

§ 1251(a). The national goal of the Act is “to achieve ‘water

quality which provides for the protection and propagation of

fish, shellfish, and wildlife and provides for recreation in

and on the water.’” S.D. Warren Co. v. Me. Bd. of Envil.

Prot., 126 S.Ct. 1843, 1852 (2006) (quoting 33 U.S.C.

§ 1251(a)(2)). To serve these ends, the CWA prohibits the

discharge of any pollutant by any person unless done

in compliance with some provision of the CWA. 33 U.S.C.

§ 1311(a).

At issue here is the scope of the CWA’s National

Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (“NPDES”) permit

requirement, 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a), (b), which is the “primary

means” for protecting and improving water quality within

the “comprehensive regulatory regime” established by

Congress. Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 99, 101

(1992). The NPDES requires a permit for the “discharge of

any pollutant” from a “point source” into “navigable waters.”

33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a), 1342(a)-(b), 1362(6), (7), (12), (14);

see also 40 C.F.R. § 122.1(b). “[D]ischarge of a pollutant”

is defined in pertinent part as “any addition of any pollutant

to navigable waters from any point source.” 33 U.S.C.

§ 1362(12). “Point source,” in turn, is defined as “any

discernible, confined and discrete conveyance, including but

not limited to any .. . tunnel .. . from which pollutants are

or may be discharged.” 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14). “The term

‘pollutant’ means dredged spoil, solid waste, incinerator

residue, sewage, garbage, sewage sludge, munitions,

chemical wastes, biological materials, radioactive materials,

2

heat, wrecked or discarded equipment, rock, sand, cellar dirt

and industrial, municipal, and agricultural waste ....”

33 U.S.C. § 1362(6). “The term ‘navigable waters’ means

the waters of the United States, including the territorial seas.”

33 U.S.C. § 1362(7).

An NPDES permit sets forth the conditions for the

discharge of pollutants consistent with various other

provisions of the CWA, including the requirement that

pollutant limitations be set so as to assure that each receiving

water will achieve or continue to achieve the “water

quality standards” applicable to the receiving water.

33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(b)(1)(C), 1313(a)-(c); 40 C.F.R.

§ 122.44(d)(1). “Water quality standards” consist of two

major elements: (i) “the designated uses of the navigable

waters involved”; and (11) “the water quality criteria for such

waters based upon such uses.” 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(2)(A);

40 C.F.R. §§ 131.10, 131.11.

The United States Environmental Protection Agency

(“EPA”) or a delegated State must establish the designated

use, “tak[ing] into consideration the use and value” of each

water body “for public water supplies, protection and

propagation of fish, shellfish and wildlife, recreation in and

on the water, agricultural, industrial, and other purposes

including navigation.” 40 C.F.R. § 131.10(a). The CWA

further requires States to assess their waters and identify

individual waters that have not achieved compliance with

water quality standards, despite controls contained in the

applicable NPDES permit. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1313(d)(1)(A)-(B),

1315. For each noncompliant body, the EPA or delegated

State must develop water pollution budgets and remedial

pollutant loading allocations, known as “total maximum daily

load{[s}” (“TMDLs”), to identify both piped (“point”) and

3

diffuse (“nonpoint”) sources of excessive pollutants that

cause the contravention of water quality standards. 33 U.S.C.

§ 1313¢d)(1)(C), (D); 40 C.F.R. § 130.7. Once established,

the pollutant loading reductions assigned to point sources in

the TMDL process are generally incorporated as more

stringent limitations within the relevant individual NPDES

permits. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d); 40 C.F.R. § 122.44(d)(1)(vii);

see S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians,

541 U.S. 95, 107 (2004).

2. As part of its system for delivering drinking water to

New York City and the surrounding area, the City maintains

the Schoharie Reservoir in the Catskill Mountains. Water is

discharged from the Schoharie Reservoir, diverted through

the 18-mile Shandaken Tunnel, and discharged into the

Esopus Creek, a trout stream used for fly fishing and other

recreational activities. Pet. App. AS-A6.' The Creek’s water,

in turn, flows through a series of reservoirs, aqueducts, and

tunnels until it eventually reaches New York City. “Absent

the man-made diversion through the [Shandaken] Tunnel,

water from the Schoharie Reservoir would never reach the

Esopus Creek.” Pet. App. A6. “Because water in the

Schoharie Reservoir contains suspended solids from both

natural and man-made causes, discharges from the Tunnel

into the Creek are more turbid than the waters of the Esopus.”

Pet. App. A26. “This turbidity impairs use of the Esopus for

fly fishing and other recreational activities.” Pet. App. A6.

Also, “discharge from the Shandaken Tunnel periodically

contains elevated temperatures that stress trout populations

in Esopus Creek.” Pet. App. A28.

' “Pet. App.” refers to the Appendix to Petition for a Writ of

Certiorari.

4

3. Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc.

and other recreational users of the Esopus Creek (“Private

Party Respondents”) brought this citizens’ suit alleging that

Petitioners had violated the CWA by discharging pollutants

into “waters of the United States” without an NPDES permit.

Pet. App. A4.

The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to

state a claim, holding that because there was no evidence

that Petitioners “added anything to the water in the Reservoir

before releasing it through the Shandaken tunnel,” Private

Party Respondents failed to establish that Petitioners’

“diversion of water from the Schoharie Reservoir to Esopus

Creek through the Shandaken tunnel constitutes an ‘addition’

of pollutants ‘from’ a point source.” Pet. App. A38-A39.

The Court of Appeals reversed (“Catskill Mountains I’),

holding that Petitioners’ conveyance of water that contains

pollutants from the Schoharie Reservoir through the 18-mile-

long Shandaken Tunnel and into the Esopus Creek requires

a permit. Pet. App. A60. It explained that “the transfer of

water containing pollutants from one body of water to

another, distinct body of water is plainly an addition and thus

a ‘discharge’ that demands an NPDES permit.” Pet. App. A71.

The court rejected Petitioners’ reliance on the cases involving

the recirculation of water held back by a dam as factually

distinguishable from this case because here, the Schoharie

Reservoir and the Esopus Creek are hydrologically distinct

and thus water and any pollutants from one are an “addition”

to the other; in contrast, in the dam context, water is taken

from a water source and released back into that same source,

and thus the water and pollutants are not an “addition.”

Pet. App. A71-A73. The court analogized the “dams cases”

to pouring a ladle of soup back into the same pot, in which

5

case “one has not ‘added’ soup or anything else to the pot.”

Pet. App. A72.

The Court of Appeals also rejected Petitioners’ “singular

entity” theory of navigable waters, which posits that “an

addition to one water body is deemed an addition to ali of

the waters of the United States.” Pet. App. A75.

Such a theory would mean that movement of water

from one discrete water body to another would

not be an addition even if it involved a transfer of

water from a water body contaminated with

myriad pollutants to a pristine water body

containing few or no pollutants. Such an

interpretation is inconsistent with the ordinary

meaning of the word “addition.”

Pet. App. A75. Finally, the court rejected Petitioners’

arguments from the CWA’s broad purposes and structure:

“Where a statute seeks to balance competing policies,

congressional intent is not served by elevating one policy

above the others, particularly where the balance struck in

the text is sufficiently clear to point to an answer.” Pet. App.

A76.

On remand from Catskill Mountains I, the district court

granted partial summary judgment for Respondents with

respect to liability and, after a bench trial, imposed civil

penalties and ordered Petitioners to seek a permit promptly.

Pet. App. A83, A118, Al22. The court joined State

Respondents as third-party defendants and ordered them to

process the permit application in a timely fashion. Pet. App.

A122.

6

On appeal from the district court’s remedial order,

Petitioners challenged the amount of the civil penalty and

sought to reargue liability. On June 13, 2006, the Court of

Appeals reiterated its holding from Catskill Mountains I that

an NPDES permit is required for the interbasin transfer of

polluted water under the plain language of the CWA. Pet.

App. A23 (“Catskill Mountains IT’). The court rejected

Petitioners’ argument that a different result was required by

this Court’s decision in Miccosukee, 541 U.S. at 109-10,

because in Miccosukee, the Court did not eliminate the

distinction between inter- and intrabasin transfers, and even

cited with approval the Second Circuit’s “soup ladle” analogy.

Pet. App. Al2. Nor did the Court of Appeals find persuasive,

applying the degree of deference appropriate under Skidmore

v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944), the 2005 EPA

interpretation cited by Petitioners concluding that the NPDES

permit requirement is inapplicable to interbasin water

transfers. Pet. App. Al2-A15 & n.5; see also Pet. App. A205-

A237. Finally, the court found Petitioners’ “plea for

reconsideration” based on the assumption that regulating the

discharge “would effectively require that the flow be stopped

altogether” to be “exaggerated.” Pet. App. Al6. The court

provided a “detailed and technical accounting” of the

flexibility built into the NPDES permit scheme. Pet. App.

Al16-A19.

Petitioners’ request for rehearing and rehearing en banc

was denied on August 25, 2006. Pet. App. Al41.

4. On June 7, 2006, the EPA issued a Notice of Proposed

Rulemaking embodying the legal analysis in the EPA’s 2005

legal memorandum. Pet. App. A182. As of this date, the EPA

has not acted to finalize the Proposed Rule.

7

5. Effective September 1, 2006, Respondent New York

State Department of Environmental Conservation (“DEC”)

issued a CWA permit to the New York City Department

of Environmental Protection with respect to the discharge

from the Shandaken Tunnel into the Esopus Creek. Pet. 13.”

See N.Y. State Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation, State Pollutant

Discharge Elimination System Discharge Permit, No. NY-

0268151 (“SPDES Permit”). Petitioners have not challenged

any aspect of this permit.

REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION

The Court of Appeals correctly held that interbasin

transfers of polluted water require a permit under the CWA,

and that decision does not warrant this Court’s review.

Petitioners seek a writ of certiorari to correct a supposed

error in interpreting the CWA, despite acknowledging that

the EPA — the agency charged with interpreting the Act — has

initiated rulemaking on the very topic of whether water

transfers are subject to the CWA permitting process. There

is thus a distinct possibility that any decision by this Court

would be called into question following publication of a final

rule. Nor do Petitioners identify a circuit conflict or any other

reason to invoke this Court’s jurisdiction. The Second

Circuit’s decision is fully consistent with those of this Court,

the First, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits, as well as the two

state appellate courts to have addressed the question. In the

face of this consistent body of case law, Petitioners argue

that this case merits review because of its unique factual

context — the movement of water for drinking, as opposed to

for commercial or industrial use. Pet. 15. Petitioners present

a factual distinction without legal significance.

“Pet.” refers to the Petition for a Writ of Certiorari.

8

1. Petitioners seek to support their request for review

by pointing to the EPA’s proposal to exempt interbasin

transfers from the NPDES permit requirement, but the fact

that the regulatory setting for this case is in flux is a primary

reason to deny review here. While the proposed rule was

published on June 7, 2006, and the comment period closed

July 24, 2006, a final rule is still pending. Pet. App. A171. If

a final rule issues at all, the rule itself or its legal rationale

may be substantially revised as the rulemaking process moves

forward. This change could occur during, or even after, Court

review. It would be premature for the Court to accept review

of this case on the promise of a regulatory change that may

not materialize.

Moreover, if the EPA does complete formal notice and

comment rulemaking, certiorari review of this case may turn

out to be futile because a decision by the Court interpreting

the scope of the CWA permitting process could be supplanted,

or at least called into question, by the formal agency rule.

See Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet

Servs., 125 S.Ct. 2688, 2700 (2005). Given the prospect of

formal agency action, prudentia! principles of judicial

economy make this case a particularly poor vehicle for

certiorari. Cf Quinn v. Musca MS US. 560. 563 | 1976)

(writ of certiorari dismissed due to, inter alia, a subsequent

change in the challenged municipa! regulation); Morris v.

-~ >

Weinberger, 410 U.S. 422, 422 (1973) (wnt of certiorari

dismissed due to congressional amendment of relevant

statutory provisions); see also Brand X, 125 S.Ct. at 2719-

20 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (discussing the unseemliness of a

Supreme Court decision being overruled by an agency acting

through formal rulemaking).

9

Finally, the Court of Appeals did not depart from routine

application of established agency deference principles, as

Petitioners repeatedly suggest. See Pet. i, 4, 14, 27-30. The

proposed rule was issued by the EPA some six months after

this matter was argued and submitted to the Second Circuit,

and a week before the court rendered its decision. Pet. App.

A2, A171. While the court did not specifically address that

eleventh-hour preliminary rulemaking, it did discuss the

August 5, 2005, agency interpretation on which the proposed

rule was based. Pet. App. Al181-A182; A205-A237 (“Agency

Interpretation on Applicability of Section 402 of the Clean

Water Act to Water Transfers”). The court reviewed the

agency interpretation, Pet. App. Al2-A15, correctly applied

Skidmore deference as Petitioners conceded, Pet. App. All,

and held that “we do not find the argument persuasive and

therefore decline to defer to EPA.” Pet. App. Al2 n.5.

Because neither the proposed rule nor the agency

interpretation are embodied in final, forma] notice and

comment rulemaking, neither is entitled to more than

Skidmore deference. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533

U.S. 218, 227-38 (2000). Finally, the Court of Appeals had

the opportunity to consider the proposed rule, upon

Petitioners’ invitation to rehear the case.’

2. This pet tow presents no conflict with any decision

of this Court nor any split of authority among the circuits.

Every court to consider the issue has agreed with the Court

> The only other court to have reviewed the EPA’s proposed

rule and agency interpretation rejected them (and held that an

interbasin transfer required a NPDES permit) on the grounds that

the EPA’s positions were inconsistent with the “unambiguous” terms

of the CWA. Friends of the Everglades, Inc. v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt.

Dist., No. 02-80309-civ, 2006 WL 3635465, at *34-*36, *42-*48

(S.D. Fla. Dec. 11, 2006).

10

of Appeals in this case. See Dubois v. United States Dept of

Agric., 102 F.3d 1273, 1296-99 (1* Cir. 1996); N. Plains

Res. Council v. Fid. Exploration & Dev. Co., 325 F.3d 1155,

1163 (9" Cir.), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 967 (2003);

Miccosukee, 280 F.3d 1364, 1368-69 (11" Cir. 2002), vacated

and remanded, 541 U.S. 95 (2004).*

a. No court has ever held that the transfer of

pollutants from one distinct body of water to another is

exempt from the NPDES permit requirement. In Dubois, a

First Circuit case, a ski area sought to pump water from the

East Branch of the Pemigewasset River up into Loon Pond,

a high-altitude water body considered to be “unusual for its

relatively pristine nature” and which served as a drinking

water supply. 102 F.3d at 1277-78. New Hampshire classified

Loon Pond “as a Class A waterbody, protected by demanding

water quality standards under a variety of criteria.” Jd. The

East Branch, by contrast, was “a relatively unprotected Class

B waterway.” /d. at 1279. The First Circuit took judicial

notice that for years the East Branch was “one of the most

polluted rivers in New England.” /d. at 1297. Because East

Branch water, which otherwise would not have flowed into

Loon Pond, id. at 1297, contained “bacteria, other aquatic

organisms such as Giardia lambia, phosphorus, turbidity and

heat,” id. at 1278, the First Circuit held that an NPDES permit

was required for the transfer, id. at 1296-99. The court

* The state appellate courts that have revicwed this issue have

reached the same conclusion as did the Court of Appeals in this case.

See Del-AWARE Unlimited, Inc. v. Commonwealth of Pa. Dep t of Envti.

Res., 508 A.2d 348, 359 (Pa. Commw. Ct.), appeal denied, 523 A.2d

1132 (Pa. 1986); cf People to Save the Sheyenne River, Inc. v. North

Dakota Dep t of Health, 697 N.W.2d 319, 323-25 (N.D. 2005) (holding

that a state-issued NPDES permit for the interbasin transfer of polluted

water must comply with various provisions of the CWA).

11

concluded that “[t]he proposed transfer of water from one

{body of water] to the other constitutes an ‘addition.’” Jd. at

1299. The EPA itself issued an NPDES permit in response

to Dubois. Pet. App. A208 n.4.

In Northern Plains, a company extracted methane gas

and, in the process, drew large quantities of deep groundwater

to the surface. 325 F.3d at 1158. The company did not add

any chemicals to the groundwater before dumping it into the

Tongue River. Jd. In its “natural state,” however, the water

contained suspended solids, calcium, magnesium, sodium,

potassium, bicarbonate, carbonate, sulfate, chloride, fluoride,

aluminum, arsenic, barium, beryllium, boron, copper, lead,

iron, manganese, strontium, and radium. /d. Further, the

groundwater was “salty,” raising concerns by those using the

Tongue River for agricultural irrigation that the salt would

break down the soil structure on farms and ranches. /d. The

Ninth Circuit held that an NPDES permit was required under

the “plain language” of the CWA. /d. at 1160.

Were we to conclude otherwise, and hold that the

massive pumping of salty, industrial waste water

into protected waters does not involve discharge

of a ‘pollutant,’ even though it would degrade the

receiving waters to the detriment of farmers and

ranchers, we wouid improperly undermine the

integrity of [the CWA’s} prohibitions.

Id. at 1162 (internal quotation marks omitied).

The Eleventh Circuit in Miccosukee similarly held that

the transfer of polluted water from one distinct water body

into another would constitute an addition that triggers the

12

CWA’s permit requirement. 280 F.3d at 1366, 1368-69; see

also id. at 1368 n.5. This Court subsequently reversed

summary judgment and remanded for further fact finding on

whether the bodies of water at issue — a drainage canal and

an impoundment area in the Everglades - are realiy two

distinct bodies of water, or are instead two parts of the same

water body. Miccosukee, 541 U.S. at 112. Here, all parties

agree that the Schoharie Reservoir and Esopus Creek are

hydrologically distinct water bodies. The decision below,

therefore, is fully consistent with this Court’s opinion in

Miccosukee.

This Court in Miccosukee declined to rule on the South

Florida Water Management District’s so-called “unified

waters” (or “singular entity”) theory of navigable waters

because it had not been raised below. /d. at 109. The theory,

also pressed by Petitioners here as a reason to grant certiorari

(Pet. 17-19 & nn.13-i5), posits that all waters of the United

States are a unified whole that may be freely mixed without

NPDES implications. See Miccosukee, 541 U.S. at 105-09.

While not deciding the issue, the Court in Miccosukee did

raise a number of pointed concerns about this theory. The

Court questioned whether it would be proper to place a water

transfer from a “polluted” water body to one that is “pristine”

outside the scope of the NPDES program, id. at 106, as well

as whether this legal theory is valid in light of NPDES

provisions of the CWA that appear to “protect[] individual

water bodies as well as the ‘waters of the United States’ as a

whole,” id. at 107 (citing 33 U.S.C. §§ 1313(c)(2)(A),

1313(d)). Miccosukee also discussed one EPA-promulgated

NPDES regulation that “appears to address the movement

of pollutants among water bodies, at least at times.” /d. at

107-08 (citing 40 C.F.R. § 122.45(g)(4)).

13

The United States originally presented its “unitary waters”

theory to the Miccosukee Court in a brief amicus curiae, id. at

105-06, and represented that its approach was the “longstanding

EPA view,” id. at 107. The Court was unpersuaded on this point,°

and notably, the EPA did not rely on the theory in its subsequent

interpretation and rulemaking on water transfers. Pet. App.

A171-A204, A205-A237. Considering the skepticism expressed

by this Court as to both the substance and the pedigree of the

“unitary waters” theory, the fact that no court has adopted the

theory and a number have rejected it,° and that the United States

itself seems to have abandoned it, it can hardly be considered

an issue worthy of this Court’s attention.

b. The “dams cases” relied upon by Petitioners are

not in conflict with this case. Pet. App. A8-A9, All, A71-A73.

These cases, National Wildlife Federation v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d

156 (D.C. Cir. 1982), and National Wildlife Federation v.

Consumers Power Co., 862 F.2d 580 (6" Cir. 1988), held that

discharges of water containing pollutants from dams which re-

circulated the same water into the same water body through a

pump storage facility or sent water down stream within the same

watershed did not require an NPDES permit. A key premise of

the Gorsuch and Consumers Power decisions was the

“sameness” of the water and water body -- as in something may

not be “added” to itself — a premise that may not reasonably be

stretched to encompass polluted water transfers between

* The Miccosukee Court noted that the Denartment of Justice had

failed to “identify any administrative documents in which EPA has

espoused that position.” 541 U.S. at 107. Further, the Court remarked

that an amicus brief filed by several former EPA officials had argued

“that the agency once reached the opposite conclusion.” /d.

* See, e.g., Dubois, 102 F.3d at 1296-97 (rejecting the singular

entity theory).

14

completely distinct water bodies. Pet. App. A71-A73. The

Court of Appeals in Catskill Mountains IT expounded the

important distinction between the intrabasin transfers in the

dams cases and the interbasin transfers at issue here:

[Gorsuch and Consumers Power] held that water

taken from a water source and then released back

into that same source was not an “addition” to

navigable waters under the CWA, despite the fact

that the water so released contained “pollutants.”

This case differed from the dams cases. . . because

the Tunnel discharges water into the Creek from

a source that is a different, distinct body of

water .... [W]e analogized the dams cases to a

soup ladle scooping soup out of a pot and

returning it to that pot, a type of water transfer

known as an intrabasin transfer. The Tunnel’s

discharge, in contrast, was like scooping soup

from one pot and depositing it in another pot,

thereby adding soup to the second pot, an

interbasin transfer.

Pet. App. A8-A9 (citations omitted). As the court further

explained, “despite the presence of pollutants in both

interbasin and intrabasin transfers, interbasin transfers are

properly distinguished [from those in Gorsuch and

Consumers Power| because they ‘add’ pollutants to the

navigable waters.” Pet. App. All.

The Court in Miccosukee did not discuss or cite the dams

cases, indicating their lack of relevance to the question of

whether NPDES permits are required for interbasin transfers.

The Miccosukee Court, however, did favorably cite the

15

Catskill Mountains I “soup ladle” analogy and the distinction

between inter- and intrabasin transfers. 541 U.S. at 109-10.

The Court remanded the case to the district court to determine

whether the water bodies in question were “two pots of soup,

not one.” Jd. at 112; cf. S.D. Warren, 126 S.Ct. at 1850 n.6.

This remand would be unnecessary if there were no legally

significant distinction between inter- and intrabasin transfers.

The important distinctions between inter- and intrabasin

transfers recognized by both Miccosukee and the court below

completely undercut Petitioners’ reliance on Gorsuch and

Consumers Power for a circuit split.’ In fact, the EPA itself,

in its agency interpretation, was careful to distinguish

between inter- and intrabasin transfers. See Pet. App. A235

n.18.

c. Petitioners’ remaining legal contentions similarly

amount to no more than a series of requests for individualized

error correction, and with respect to these, too, the decision

of the Court of Appeals is entirely consistent with the

precedent of this and other courts. For example, Petitioners

assert, Pet. 22-27, that the court below erred when it held

that a provision of the CWA with respect to state allocations

of quantities of water does not obviate the NPDES permit

requirement with respect to water quality. Pet. App. Al3-

Al4; see 33 U.S.C. § 1251(g). Petitioners also cite to a

provision of the CWA which provides that nothing in the

? Petitioners wrongly imply, Pet. 18, that a conflict arises from

United States v. Law, 979 F.2d 977, 978 (4" Cir. 1992), cert. denied,

507 U.S. 1030 (1993), and Committee to Save Mokelumne River v.

East Bay Municipal Utility District, 13 F.3d 305, 307 (9" Cir. 1993),

cert. denied, 513 U.S. 873 (1994). These cases merely held that an

NPDES permit is required for the discharge of mine wastes from a

waste detention impoundment to a creek.

16

Act should impair any right of the “States with respect to the

waters .. . of such States.” 33 U.S.C. § 1370(2). The Second

Circuit’s decision is, however, consistent with the holdings of

this Court and the one other circuit to address this issue. In

PUD No. I v. Washington Department of Ecology, this Court

held that “[{s]ections 101(g) [33 U.S.C. § 1251(g)] and 510(2)

[33 U.S.C. § 1370(2)] preserve the authority of each State to

allocate water quantity as between users; they do not limit the

scope of water pollution controls that may be imposed on users

who have obtained, vursuant to state law, a water allocation.”

511 U.S. 700, 720 (1994) (emphasis added); see also Riverside

Irrigation Dist. v. Andrews, 758 F.2d 508, 513 (10" Cir. 1985)

(“[W here both the state’s interest in allocating water and the

federal government’s interest in protecting the environment are

implicated, Congress intended an accommodation. Such

accommodations are best reached in the individual permit

process.”). Putting aside the fact-bound state law issue of

whether an “allocation” even exists here, there is no conflict

among the courts on this legal issue.*

Similarly, Petitioners assert error on the part of the court

below due to its holding, Pet. App. A1l4, that a provision of

the CWA dealing with nonpoint pollution, 33 U.S.C.

§ 1314(f)(2), does not limit the NPDES requirement as it

relates to point source discharges. Pet. 21-22. The Second

Circuit’s position, however, is consistent with the holding

of this Court in Miccosukee that “§ 1314(f)(2)(F) does not

* Petitioners seek to distinguish between intcrbasin transfers

that involve drinking water and polluted water transfers for other

purposes. Pet. 15. As they did before the court below, however,

Petitioners provide no explanation under the CWA, or any other

statute, as to why the NPDES program would treat transfers

involving drinking water differently from any other water transfers.

See Pet. App. AIS.

17

explicitly exempt nonpoint pollution sources from the NPDES

program if they a/so fall within the ‘point source’ definition” of

the CWA. 541 U.S. at 106. Similarly, in United States v. Earth

Sciences, Inc., 599 F.2d 368, 373 (10" Cir. 1979), the Tenth

Circuit held that § 1314(f)(2) does not create nonpoint source

exemptions from the Act’s NPDES requirement: “Mining and

other categories listed in § 1314(f)(2) may involve discharges

from both point and nonpoint sources, and those from point

sources are subject to regulation.” Indeed, the EPA admits that

“{m]ere mention of an activity in section 304(f) [33 U.S.C.

§ 1314(f)] does not mean it is exclusively nonpoint source in

nature.” 71 Fed.Reg. 32887, 32890 (June 7, 2006) (citing

Miccosukee, 541 U.S. at 106).° Thus, there is no conflict here

either.'° And one circuit court has specifically approved aTMDL

pollutant reduction budget for sediment that was developed by

the EPA pursuant to the CWA. See Prosolino v. Nastri, 291

F.3d 1123, 1126-27, 1129-30 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 539

U.S. 926 (2003).

Petitioners also make the perplexing assertion that the

Court of Appeals “ignored the plain language of the statute,”

* Pct. App. A185 inaccurately quotes this language from the Federal

Register.

' Petitioners also assert that turbidity and sediment are not

“pollutants” under the CWA. Pet. 20. This issue, however, was not

presented to the court below and, thus, cannot serve as a basis for a

grant of certiorari. See Pet. App. A6 n.1 (“The parties do not contest

that turbidity qualifies as a pollutant under the CWA.”). In any event,

Petitioners’ assertion is not only meritless, but absurd. The EPA has

developed an entire protocol on how to establish sediment TMDLs under

the CWA, see http://www. epa.gov/owow/tmdl/sediment/pdf/sediment. pdf

(last visited Jan. 25, 2007), and has listed numerous examples of EPA-

approved TMDLs for water bodies impaired by sediment pollution, see

http://www. epa.gov/owow/tmdl/examples/sediment. html (last visited Jan.

25, 2007).

18

Pet. 21, even though both decisions below were expressly

based on the plain text of the CWA and, in particular, the

meaning of the term “addition.” Pet. App. A15, A73. Indeed,

the Court of Appeals’ method of statutory construction was

fully consistent with that recently undertaken by this Court

when interpreting terms from the CWA that are “neither

defined in the statute nor a term of art” so that they are given

their “ordinary or natural meaning.” $.D. Warren, 126 S.Ct.

at 1847 (interpreting “discharge” in the CWA according to

its “ordinary or natural meaning”).

3. Finally, Petitioners assert that review is appropriate

because the Second Circuit’s decision will “wreak havoc”

on traditional water management functions. Pet. 14, 25-27.

After carefully reviewing similar claims raised by Petitioners

below, the Court of Appeals correctly called them

“exaggerated,” and “alarmist and unwarranted.” Pet. App.

A16, A18. The NPDES permitting process contains flexible

administrative mechanisms and variance procedures to assure

that important water transfers occur as measures to

appropriately control pollutant discharges are implemented.

Pet. App. Al6-A18. To the extent there is any basis for

Petitioners’ generalized concerns, they are best addressed

within the individualized permitting process itself, as was

done here.

As the Court of Appeals concluded after a detailed

examination of this issue: “We think the flexibility built into

the CWA and the NPDES permit scheme ... will allow

federal authority over quality regulation and state authority

over quantity allocation to coexist without materially

impairing either.” Pet. App. A16. Indeed, DEC issued a CWA

permit to Petitioners for the Shandaken Tunnel discharge,

Pia. 13, and while Petitioners had an opportunity to challenge

19

the terms of the permit as overly burdensome, either

administratively or in state court, they did not do so. See

N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 6, §§ 624.1-624.13 (2006).

Rather, the only challenge came from the Private Party

Respondents, who claimed the permit was too permissive. It

seems that Petitioners’ only real complaint with the

permitting process is the fear that the exemption that they

now benefit from might someday be taken away. The time to

complain about that eventuality, however, is if and when it

comes to pass.

In addition, this Court itself recognized Pennsylvania’s

long-standing NPDES program to regulate all interbasin

transfers. 541 U.S. at 108-09. And the one other court to

specifically address the issue of permit flexibility in this

context squarely agreed with the Second Circuit. See Friends

of the Everglades, 2006 WL 3635465, at *46.

For their part, the Petitioners make no effort to review

the adverse impacts associated with certain interbasin

transfers of water containing pollutants: Salt water could be

transferred into fresh water; sediment-laden water could be

sent into clear drinking water reservoirs; warm waters could

be pumped into cold water habitats; chemical laden waters

could be dumped into waters employed in farm and ranch

irrigation; and invasive species could be transferred into

waters not yet infested. Petitioners do not explain how leaving

such transfers unregulated by NPDES permits would be

consistent with the fundamental “objective” of the CWA

“to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and

biological integrity of the Nation’s waters,” 33 U.S.C.

§ 1251(a).

20

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.

* Counsel of Record

Respectfully submitted,

ANDREW M. Cuomo

Attorney General of the

State of New York

BarBARA D. UNDERWOOD*

Solicitor General

MICHELLE ARONOWITZ

Deputy Solicitor General

JAMES M. TieRNEY

Assistant Attorney General

120 Broadway, 25" Floor

New York, NY 10271

(212) 416-8016

Attorneys for New York State

Respondents

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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