Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Rhodes v. Town of Alexander, New York (No. 06-664)
Supreme Court brief2006
Ask Donna
What actually matters in this document.
Text
Supreme Car Court U.S.
t) 06-664 SEP 8 - 2006
No, @FFIGE OF THE CLERK
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM 2006
DENNY RHODES - PETITIONER
VS.
THE TOWN OF ALEXANDER,
EDWYN HISE and KARL BENDER
“RESPONDENTS
ON APPEAL FROM COURT OF
APPEALS - STATE OF NEW YORK
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
RICHARD D. GRISANTI, ESQ.
ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONER
1925 GALAXY DRIVE
ARCADE, NY 14009
(716) 492-3113
~ GALLO & IACOVANGELO, LLP
~ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENTS
39 STATE STREET, SUITE 700
ROCHESTER, NEW YORK 14614
(585) 454-7145
STATEMENT -
The Petitioner was convicted by the Justice Respondent when
Petitioner pled “not guilty” to violating a zoning ordinance; didn’t
~ withdraw that plea and also not afforded a trial; that said Petitioner
was sentenced to jail for 10 days and fined. He then complained to
- the Judicial Conduct Commission resulting in sacting of admonition .
The lower courts apparently felt the Judge was immuned for his
unlawful and illegal acts, as was contended by Respondents.
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
Did the New York State Courts wrongfully deny the Petitioner
relief after his civil rights and due process rights under the United
States Constitution were violated in the Town Justice; and after the
Respondent Judge was sanctioned by the Judicial Conduct
Commission?
5 St. —.
JURISDICTION
The Decision of the Appellate Division Fourth Department
was dated April 28, 2006. Subsequently, an application for
permission for leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeal was
denied by decision dated July 5, 2006. Petitioner has 90 days to file
this petition. Decisions herein have not as yet been reported.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
. Questions Presented
. Table of Authorities
. Statement of the Case and
Conclusion
. Appendix State Court
Decisions and Orders
Page i
Pages iii - iv
Pages 1 - 5
Pages i - ix
TABLES OF AUTHORITIES
In re Elsworthy 77 NY 2d 280
. Mc Gee vs. State 59 NY 2d 870
. Sardino vs. State 58 NY 2d 36
. Davidson vs. Scully 69 F 2d 50
. Reese vs. Nelson 598 F 2d 822
. Marks vs. Groff 521 F 2d 1376
_ Brisk vs: City of Miami 726 F Supp 1305
. Mason vs. Melendez 525 F Supp 27
. Pierce vs. Mullnomah Grinty Or. 76 F 3d 1032
. Hafer vs. Melo 502 US 21
. Berman Enterprise Inc vs. Joiling 3 F 3d 602 (2™ Circuit)
12. Buckley vs. Fitzsimmons 509 US 259
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
Scotlo vs. Amenos
Marty’s Adult World of New Britian,
Inc vs. Gruda
Mandell vs. County of Suffolk
Locurto vs. State
Sheppard vs. Berman
42 USC § 1983 -
Moneel vs. Department of Social
Security of NYC
Dangler vs. New York City
Off Track Betting Corp.
Pembaner vs. City of Cincinnati
iv
143 F 3d 105 (2 Circuit)
453 F Supp 810
316 F 3d 368 (2™ Circuit)
164 F 3d 169-70
948 3d 823 (2™ Circuit)
436 US 694
F 3d 130 (2™ Circuit)
475 US 469
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
POINT 1
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING
PETITIONERS CIVIL RIGHTS ACTION AND GRANTING
* SUMMARY JUDGEMENT ON THE GROUNDS OF JUDICIAL
AND QUASI-JUDICIAL IMMUNITY
The Petitioner DENNY RHODES served Notice of Claim on
the Respondent TOWN OF ALEXANDER and the action which was
commenced against all Respondents on August 30, 2003. Issue was
joined by service of an Motion of lieu of an answer and subsequently
by service of an Answer.
That an argument on the motion in lieu of an answer was
heard before Hon. Robert C. Noonan, Acting Supreme Court Justice
of Genesee County, New York, which resulted in his dismissal of the
State Court actions as contained in the complaint but upheld the
action based on a violation of Federal Civil Rights statutes, on
December 8, 2003.
After full discovery herein a further motion was made by
Respondents to dismiss the Federal Civil Rights action and said
Justice granted summary judgement on April 29, 2005.
A notice of appeal was timely and duly served and filed herein
from both orders.
That the Petitioner was charged with a violation of zoning
ordinances of the Respondent TOWN OF ALEXANDER and by the
zoning inspector Respondent CARL BENDER on March 30, 2000;
that Petitioner felt and still feels that Respondents set upon a pattern
of harassment in view of the fact that the so called junk and debris
was not junk and debris but consisted basically of 6 operable
automobiles, two of them registered and other items of property
belonging to other persons which Petitioner was repairing for them as
an electrician and welder and which were still to be claimed by
various owners; that further there were also valuable pieces of metal.
These were located on 280 acres of land owned by Petitioner,
concentrated near his home and adjacent barns approximately 100’
from the roadway; that none of these items bothered any neighbors,
nor did they create anything hazardous or unsightly; nor did neighbors
complain to authorities.
During various appearances before the Respondent EDWYN
HISE, Petitioner did make a bonafide removal of various items, even
though he didn’t agree with the charges, including the removal of a 32
foot trailer; even though the Respondent BENDER would report to
the Court that Petitioner did nothing. ;
The result was that after the Petitioner pled “not guilty”, to the
charge and without a trial, the Respondent EDWYN HISE found him
guilty and sentenced him to 10 days in jail and imposed a fine of
$350; even though he never changed his plea to “guilty”. The
Petitioner then filed a complaint with the Judicial Conduct
Commission who found in his favor, issuing a decision which resulted
in a sanction of admonition against said Respondent.
_The Petitioner, thereafter, commenced Action against all three
Respondents alleging causes of actions for negligence, intentional
torts of malicious prosecution, false arrest, and imprisonment and
civil rights violations.
The Lower Court on December 8, 2003 dismissed the state
court actions as being untimely and after allowing the Federal Civil
Rights actions to proceed as having been commenced with in the 3
year Federal statute, dismissed that action, subsequently, on April 29,
2005 and granted summary judgement.
The authorities are uniform in holding that summary
judgement shall not be granted if there is any issue of fact to be
determined by the triers of the facts. To hold otherwise would block a
plaintiff having his day in Court with such a drastic summary
dismissal. This principal of law is so well established that counsel
submits it does not require the setting forth of any citations.
The first issue is that of “probable cause” which always has
been a question of fact. The lower court found as-a matter of law that
the Respondent BENDER had “probable cause” in issuing the
summons for town zoning law violations. The Petitioner claims that
the Respondent TOWN and BENDER have been harassing him since
1993, which culminated in the violation, in question. Even though he
disagreed with the zoning ordinances in relation to his situation, after
appearances in court, he each time removed some of the items set
forth in the violation summons. Further, BENDER at one point
informed the Court that nothing was removed when a 32’ trailer had
been removed by RHODES; hardly unnoticeable!
The Petitioner was so cooperative that he even gave BENDER
his pager number but the latter never contacted him.
Further again, all items were contained in Petitioner’s 280 acre —
tract, 100' from the road near his house and bar, not interfering with
. neighbors nor creating an unsightly hazzard. Even the Deputy who
served him with the summons commented he didn’t see anything
wrong with his property.
Counsel submits, therefore, that there certainly is a question of
fact on the probable cause issue herein.
With regards to the second issue the court further found
privilege, quasi-privilege and absolute or qualified immunity. None
of these protect a judge, a municipality or quasi-judicial officer where
illegal or unlawful acts were committed. In the ease of a judge that has
never been considered to be within his jurisdiction.
None of the Cases cited by the Lower Court apply to the facts
in our case; nor does counsel have any quarrel with those cases.
There are many cases where judges have been removed for
routinely failing to advise defendants of their constitutional rights. In
Re Elsworthy 77 N.Y. 2d. 280; McGee vs. State 59 N.Y. 2d. 870;
Scardino vs. State 58 N.Y. 2d. 36 cases hold that immunity is an
affirmative defense and does not go to the existence of a cause of
action under § 1983 prohibiting the deprivation of civil rights under
color of law. Davidson vs. Scully 69 F. 2D.50.
Further, as a general proposition the question of qualified
immunity of a State official is a matter for factual resolution Reese vs.
Nelson 598 F. 2D. 822; Marks vs. Groff 521 F. 2d. 1376; Brisk vs.
City of Miami Beach Florida 726 F. Supp. 1305; Mason vs. Melendez
525 F. Supp. 27.
See also Pierce vs. Mullnomah County Or. 76 F. 3 1032;
certiorari denied.
Cases also hold that an action against an official in his
individual capacity rather than his official capacity is not barred by the
11" Amendment even though the State or Municipality may
ultimately reimburse him. Hafer vs. Melo 502 U.S. 21; Berman
Enterprises Inc. Vs. Jorling 3 F. 3" 602 (2™ Circuit). Also many of
the authorities have held the absolute immunity under § 1983 is rare
Buckley vs. Fitzsimmons 509 U.S. 259 113 S. Ct. 125; Scotto vs.
Almenos 143 F. 3 105 ( 2™ Circuit); Marty’s Adult World of New
Britain, Inc. Vs. Guida 453 F. Supp 810.
In the case’ ~ ‘andell vs. County of Suffolk 316 F 3d 368 (2™
Circuit), Judge Car. .* one wrote the majority opinion and reversed
and remanded the case for further proceedings and said with regards
to “qualified immunity” that:
“Under the doctrine of qualified immunity, a government
official performing discretionary functions is shielded from liabilites
for civil damages if his conduct did not violate plaintiff's clearly
established rights or if it would have been objectively reasonable for
the official to believe that his conduct-did not violate the plaintiff s
rights. Where specific intent of a defendant is an element of
plaintiff's claim under clearly established law, and plaintiff has
adduced sufficient evidence of that intent to defeat summary
judgement, summary judgement on qualified immunity grounds is
inappropriate. See Locurto, 264 F. 3d. At 169-70; Sheppard v.
Beerman, 94 F 3d. 823, 828 (2d Cir. 1996). In the present case
retaliatory intent is an element of plaintiff's claim, and we have
already noted that plaintiff's evidence of retaliatory animus is
sufficient to make defendants’ motivation a triable issue of fact. Until
that issue is resolved by a fact finder, therefore, the retaliation claim
against defendant Gallagher cannot be dismissed on qualified
immunity grounds.” and with regards to municipal liability the Court
stated:
“A municipal entity may be liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 only
if the alleged constitutional violation was caused as the entities
“policy or custom.” Monell vs. Department of Social Services of the
City of New York 436 U.S. at 694, 98 S. Ct. 2018. The “policy or
custom” requirement, however, is intended simply to distinguish acts
of the municipality from acts of its employees in order that the
municipal liability be related to conduct for which the municipality is
actually responsible. Dangler v. New York City Off Track Betting
Corp., F 3 130, 142 (2d Cir. 1999). Thus, if the challenged action is
directed by an official with “final policymaking authority,” the -
municipally may be liable even in the absence of a broader policy.
See Pembauer v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 481-83, 89 L. Ed.
2d 452 (1986) (“municipal liability attaches only where the decision
maker possesses final authority to establish municipal policy with _
regards to the action ordered.”) Here, plaintiff challenges as retaliatory
4
employment decisions made by Gallagher, who, as the Suffolk County
Police Commissioner, had authority to set department-wide personal
policies. Gallagher’s position provides a sufficient basis for holding
the county liable for his adverse decisions with respect to plaintiff.”
I respectfully submit to this Court that this was a flagrant error
on the part of the New York State Courts and that this court ought to
accept this case for review.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the within, this Court should grant the Writ of Certiorari
herein on the grounds that no one is imntune from unlawful and illegal
violations of a persons civil rights.
| Respectfully Submitted,
RICHARD D. GRISANTI, ESQ.
STATE OF NEW YORK
SUPREME COURT : COUNTY OF GENESEE
DENNY RHODES, -
Plaintiff,
V. Index No. 51380
THE TOWN OF ALEXANDER,
EDWYN HISE AND KARL BENDER,
Defendants.
RICHARD D. GRISANTI, ESQ.
Attorney for Plaintiff
AMY R. COTE, ESQ.
Attorney for Defendants
DECISION AND ORDER
ROBERT C. NOONAN, J.
Plaintiff brought the captioned action against the Town of
Alexander, defendant Hise as Town Justice, and defender Bender as
Town Zoning Enforcement Officer, alleging negligence and/or the
intentional torts of malicious prosecution, false arrest and false
imprisonment. By Decision and Order of
December 8, 2003, this Court previously granted defendants’ motion
to dismiss the complaint as time-barrred (CPLR 321 1(A\(5)) to the
extent of the state law claims, but permitted the comparable federal
‘claims to go forward (42 USC § 1983). Issue having been joined and
discovery conducted, defendants now move for summary judgment
dismissing the balance of the complaint on the merits (CPLR §3212).
Plaintiff opposes upon the affidavit and memorandum of counsel.
Argument was heard at the April 28, 2005 Special Term of this Court.
The limited record submitted on motion reveals that on
defendant Bender’s complaint, plaintiff was cited; by both appearance
ticket and criminal summons, to appear in Town Court for failure to
remedy unsightly conditions and unregistered motor vehicles on his
property, an alleged violation of the Town Zoning Ordinance. On
June 27, 2000, plaintiff appeared without counsel before defendant
Justice Hise and, without entering a plea, indicated only that he had
been working on cleaning up his property. The matter was then
adjourned in contemplation of defendant’s compliance with the
Zoning Ordinance.
After failing to satisfactorily remedy the situation by
September of 2000, the Court was notified by Zoning Enforcement
Officer Bender and plaintiff was again directed to appear in Court on
October 17, 2000. On that occasion, defendant acknowledged that he
had not yet cleaned up his property. In view of what the Court
considered an
admission to the underlying allegations, defendant Justice Hise then
summarily sentenced plaintiff to a fine of $350.00 and 10 days in jai’,
without benefit of counsel, plea or trial. Defendant then spent
approximately 28 hours in jail before obtaining his release.
While state common law rights may parallel constitutional
claims, only the violation of a constitutional right is actionable under
42 USC §1983 (Ruggiero v. Phillips, 292 AD2d 41). “To prevail
against a government entity or employee in a claim under that section,
a plaintiff must demonstrate the existence of ‘(1) an official policy or
custom that (2) causes [the plaintiff] to be subjected to (3) a denial of
a constitutional right’ “ (Linen v. County of Rensselaer, 274 AD2d
911, 913; quoting, Howe v. Village of Trumansburg, 199 AD2d
749, 751).
While plaintiff undoubtedly had a protected constitutional
right to his liberty (Linen v. County of Renssealaer, supra),
plaintiff's defense to the underlying criminal proceeding was his
disagreement in principle with the zoning laws. Piaintiff has failed to
raise a genuine issue of fact that defendant Bender did’not, as put
forward by defendants, have probable cause to lodge a complaint
under the existing ordinance based upon the condition of plaintiff's
premises. Such probable cause is a complete defense to the federal
civil rights action against defendant Bender (Restey v. Higgins
252AD2d 954
For his part, respondent Justice Hise was subsequently admonished by
the State Judicial Conduct Commission for convicting and sentencing
defendant in violation of “fundamental statutory procedures”.
Nonetheless, although his actions were unauthorized, it does not
. appear that Justice Hise acted completely outside his jurisdiction since
he was the local magistrate having jurisdiction over both the subject
matter and person of the defendant. Defendant Justice Hise is
therefore immune from personal liability (cf. Alvarez v. Snyder, 264
AD2d 27; Mullen v. State of New York, 122 AD2d 300; Word v.
City of Mt. Vernon, 65 AD2d 622; 62ANYJur2d, Government Tort
Liability §144). :
Finally, absent an official custom or policy, a municipality
such as the Town of Alexander cannot be held liable for violation of
an individual’s federal civil rights solely because it employs a
torfeasor (Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 US 658;
Brown v. City of New York, 289 AD2d 95; Schulik v. County of
Monroe, 202 AD2d 960; Howe v. Village of Trumansburg, supra).
Accordingly, defendants are entitled to summary judgment
dismissing the balance of plaintiff's complaint. Submit Judgment
accordingly. ~
Dated: April 29, 2005 *s/ vs
Batavia, New York HON. ROBERT C. NOONAN
GRANTED: ~ Acting Supreme Court Justice
Date: 4/29/05
“s/ 26
COURT CLERK
iV
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department
479
CA 05-01927
PRESENT: PIGOTT, JR., P.J. HURLBUTT, GORSKI,
MARTOCHE, AND HAYES, JJ.
DENNY RHODES, PLAINTIFF-APPLANT,
V
TOWN OF ALEXANDER, EDWYN HISE AND
CARL BENDER, DEPFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS.
RICHARD D. GRISANTI, ARCADE, FOR PLAINTIFF-
APPEALLANT.
GALLO & IACOVANGELO, LLP, ROCHESTER (CHRISTIAN A.
CATALANO OF COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANTS-
RESPONDENTS.
Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Genesee County
(Robert C. Noonan, A.J.), dated April 29, 2005. The order granted
defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from be and
the same hereby is unanimously affirmed without costs for reasons
stated in decision at Supreme Court. _
Entered: April 28,2006 JoAnn M. Wahl
sy Clerk of the Court
Supreme Court
APPELLATE DIVISION, ‘
Fourth Judicial Department, .
Clerk’s Office, Rochester, N.Y. }
I, JOANN M. WAHL, Clerk of the Appellate Division of the
~
Supreme Court in the Fourth Judicial Department, do hereby certify
that this is a true copy of the original order, now on file in this office.
SUPREME COURT IN WITNESS WHEREOPF, I have
APPELLATE DIVISION hereunto set FOURTH
DEPARTMENT my hand and affixed the
seal of said Court in the City of
Rochester, New York, this APR 28
2006
*e/ ”
Clerk
vi
State of New York,
Court of Appeals
At a session of the Court, held at Court of
Appeals Hall in the City of Albany
on the .....:........ + ER day
Present, HON. JUDITH S. KAYE, Chief Judge, presiding.
4-10 Mo. No. 607
Denny Rhodes,
Appellant,
v.
Town of Alexander, et al.,
Respondents.
A motion for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals in the
above cause having heretofore been made upon the part of the
appellant herein and papers having been submitted thereon and due
deliberation having been thereupon had, it is
ORDERED, that the said motion be and the same hereby is
denied with one hundred dollars costs and necessary reproduction
disbursements.
“o/ ”
Stuart M. Cohen
Clerk of the Court
Vil
At a special term of the Supreme
Court of the State of New York
held in and for the County of
Genesee, Bativia, New York on
the 28" day of April, 2005.
. PRESENT : Honorable Robert C. Noonan
Supreme Court Justice
STATE OF NEW YORK
SUPREME COURT : COUNTY OF GENESEE
DENNY RHODES,
Plaintiff,
V. Index No. 51380
THE TOWN OF ALEXANDER,
EDWYN HISE AND KARL BENDER,
Defendants.
Upon reading the Notice of Motion, dated March 4, 2005, of
the Defendants, THE TOWN OF ALEXANDER, EDWYN HISE, and
KARL BENDER, seeking summary judgment dismissing the
Plaintiffs Complaint, with supporting Affirmation of Amy R. Cote,
Esq., dated March 4, 2005, and the exhibits annexed thereto, served in
support of the Motion; and the Opposing Affidavit of Richard D.
Grisanti, Esq., dated “April _, 2005,” served on behalf of the
Plaintiff in opposition to the Motion;
And, the Motion having duly come before the Court for oral
argument, at the above-referenced Special Term thereof, and the
Plaintiff having appeared by Richard D. Grisanti, Esq.; and the
Defendants having appeared by Gallo & Iacovangelo, LLP, Amy R.
Cote. Esq., Of Counsel; and after due deliberation the Court having
rendered its Decision and Order, dated April 29, 2005, a copy of which
is annexed hereto as Exhibit “A;” it is hereby
ORDERED that the Defendants motion is granted dismissing
Viil
the Plaintiff's Complaint in its entirety; and it is further
ORDERED that the requirement for filing of papers considered
in connection with this motion is hereby dispensed with pursuant to
CPLR §2220.
Dated: Batavia, NY ENTER
May12, 2005
-— is
Hon Robert C. Noonan
Supreme Court Justice(Acting)
GRANTED
May i2, 2005
we s/ 39
COURT CLERK
1X
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.