Appendix — Houk v. Franklin (No. 06-513)

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(9), Suoreme Cour, US.

06-5130CT 6 - 2006

OFFICE OF THE CLERK

In the Supreme Court of the Anited States

MARC C. HOUK, Warden,

Petitioner,

Vv.

GEORGE T. FRANKLIN,

Respondent.

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

APPENDIX

RECEIVED

OCT 11 2008

OFFICE OF THE

SUPREME COU U.S.

JIM PETRO

Attorney General of Ohio

DOUGLAS R. COLE

State Solicitor

STEPHEN P. CARNEY*

Senior Deputy Solicitor

*Counsel of Record

ELIZABETH T. SCAVO

Assistant Solicitor

CHARLES L. WILLE

Assistant Attorney General

30 E. Broad Street, 17th Floor

Columbus, Ohio 43215

614-466-8980

614-466-5087 tax

Counsel for Petitioner

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Appendix A: Opinion, United States Court of Appeals

for the Sixth Circuit, 434 F.3d 412, January 9, 2006............ la

Appendix B: Order Denying Rehearing En Banc,

United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit,

Appendix C: Decision and Entry, United States District

Court for the Southern District of Ohio, Western

Division, 267 F. Supp. 2d 768, March 31, 2003 ................ 38a

Appendix D: Magistrate Report and Recommendations,

United States District Court for the Southern District of

Ohio, Western Division, August 21, 2002 ..................:0002- 88a

Appendix E: Magistrate Amended Supplemental Report

and Recommendations, United States District Court for

the Southern District of Ohio, Western Division,

TR I oko cudukpsoncneutvodesedsieetete 342a

la

APPENDIX A

GEORGE T. FRANKLIN,

Petitioner-Appellee/Cross-Appellant,

v.

CARL S. ANDERSON, Warden, Respondent-

Appellant/Cross-Appellee.

Nos. 03-3636/03-3697

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

SIXTH CIRCUIT

434 F.3d 412

January 9, 2006, Decided

BEFORE: BOGGS, Chief Judge; and BATCHELDER and

CLAY, Circuit Judges.

BOGGS, Chief Judge. In December 1988, George

Franklin was found guilty of two counts of aggravated

burglary and one count of aggravated murder and was

sentenced to death. He began a long process of appeals, with

each state court affirming his convictions or dismissing his

claims as res judicata. On petition for habeas corpus to the

Southern District of Ohio, however, [**2] Franklin was

found to have two viable claims: service of a biased juror and

ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, neither of which

the court found to be procedurally defaulted. The court

granted a [***2] conditional writ of habeas corpus on these

two issues. In addition, although denying Franklin’s petition

on the remaining 26 claims, the district court granted a

certificate of appealability (COA) on three issues: ineffective

assistance of trial counsel, discriminatory use of peremptory

challenges by the prosecutor, and the prosecutor’s failure to

2a

provide the defense with material exculpatory and

impeachment evidence at trial. Because Franklin did not

object to the district judge’s denial of habeas on any other

- issues, all other claims are forfeited on appeal and are not

before this court. United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947,

949-50 (6th Cir. 1981). The State appeals the conditional

grant of habeas, and Franklin cross-appeals the denial of

habeas on the three issues certified for appeal.

I

Franklin was convicted of the brutal murder of Gerald

Strauss in his Cincinnati home on the evening of July 23,

1988 and of the theft of a television from the [**3] nearby

apartment of Rosha Winston seventeen days earlier. The jury

recommended the death penalty, and the judge sentenced

Franklin to death in addition to two consecutive ten- to

twenty-five-year terms of imprisonment for the aggravated

burglaries at Strauss’s and Winston’s homes. State v.

Franklin, 62 Ohio St. 3d 118, 580 N.E.2d 1, 3-5 (Ohio 1991).

Represented by new counsel, Franklin appealed his

conviction through the Ohio courts. After the Ohio Supreme

Court affirmed his conviction and sentence on direct appeal,

a third set of attorneys took up his case and further attempted

to secure relief in the Ohio courts, first by requesting that the

Ohio Supreme Court recall its mandate and permit

supplemental briefing on direct appeal and, when that request

was denied without an opinion, State v. Franklin, 63 Ohio St.

3d 1402, 585 N.E.2d 424 (1992), by seeking post-conviction

relief. The Hamilton County Common Pleas Court denied the

petition for post-conviction relief without an evidentiary

hearing, a decision that was affirmed by the Hamilton County

Court of Appeals. See State v. Franklin, 1995 Ohio App.

LEXIS 183, 1995 WL 26281 (Ohio App. [**4] ), appeal not

allowed, 72 Ohio St. 3d 1538, 650 N.E.2d 479, cert. denied,

516 U.S. 950, 116 S. Ct. 394, 133 L. Ed. 2d 315 (1995).

3a

Franklin also sought delayed reconsideration in the Ohio

Court of Appeals, and his motion was denied for failure to

file within the ninety-day time limit. State v. Franklin, No.

C-890028 (Ohio App. Mar. 3, 1994).

Franklin then sought a writ of habeas corpus in federal

district court. The district court referred the matter to a

magistrate judge for a report and recommendations. The

magistrate judge held an evidentiary hearing and issued a

comprehensive report. After amending the report slightly in

response to objections filed by the parties, the magistrate

judge recommended that the court grant the requested writ of |

habeas corpus with respect [*417] to Franklin’s claim that

his convictions and sentences were unconstitutional because

one of the jurors could not impartially apply the law, a claim

the magistrate found was not procedurally barred because

Franklin had received ineffective assistance of appellate

counsel on direct appeal. The district court adopted the report

and recommendation, granting a conditional writ of habeas

corpus on the biased juror and ineffective assistance [**5] of

appellate counsel claims and dismissing all other claims as

meritless. In this appeal, we are asked to consider five issues:

(1) whether a juror, who was unable to follow the law, sat on

Franklin’s jury; (2) whether the prosecution dismissed

prospective jurors for reasons of race; (3) whether the

prosecution failed to provide Franklin with exculpatory

material and impeachment evidence; (4) whether Franklin’s

trial counsel was ineffective for failing to conduct adequate

investigations during the trial and the mitigation phases; and

(5) whether his appellate counsel was ineffective.

As Franklin filed his Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus on November 14, 1995, prior to the April 24, 1996

effective date of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death

Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214

(1996) (AEDPA), we apply a pre-AEDPA standard of

review. Sowell v. Bradshaw, 372 F.3d 821, 828 (6th Cir.

4a

2004). We review the district court’s judgment de novo

[***3] and its findings of fact for clear error. Carter v. Bell,

218 F.3d 581, 590 (6th Cir. 2000). In addition, absent clear

and convincing evidence, we presume the state court’s

findings [**6] of fact to be correct. See Wainwright v.

Goode, 464 U.S. 78, 85, 104 S. Ct. 378, 78 L. Ed. 2d 187

(1983). We may issue a writ of habeas corpus only if we find

that the state court proceedings were fundamentally unfair

due to a violation of the Constitution or other federal law.

Sowell, 372 F.3d at 828.

tt

Franklin did not raise the issues under consideration in

this appeal on his direct appeal in the state courts, but rather

raised them for the first time in his Motion to Recall the

Mandate before the Ohio Supreme Court and then later in his

post-conviction proceedings. Therefore, the post-conviction

courts refused to consider the merits of all of the claims,

other than several of the ineffective assistance of counsel

claims, on the ground that they were barred by res judicata .

In Ohio, res judicata bars state courts from considering

constitutional claims in post-conviction collateral attacks

when those claims have already or could have been fully

litigated on direct appeal. Monzo v. Edwards, 281 F.3d 568,

576 (6th Cir. 2002). Absent cause or prejudice, when a

habeas petitioner fails to obtain consideration of a claim by

the state [**7] courts due to a state procedural rule that

prevents the state courts from reaching the merits of the

petitioner’s claim, the claim is procedurally defaulted and

may not be considered by the federal court on habeas review.

Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 84, 97 S. Ct. 2497, 53 L.

Ed. 2d 594 (1977); Lancaster v. Adams, 324 F.3d 423, 436

(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1004, 124 S. Ct. 535, 157 L.

Ed. 2d 409 (2003); Seymour v. Walker, 224 F.3d 542, 549-50

(6th Cir. 2000). Demonstrating cause requires showing that

an “objective factor external to the defense impeded

5a

counsel’s efforts to comply” with the state procedural rule.

Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488, 106 S. Ct. 2639, 91 L.

Ed. 2d 397 (1986). Demonstrating prejudice requires

showing that the trial was infected with constitutional error.

See United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 169, 102 S. Ct.

1584, 71 L. Ed. 2d 816 (1982).

{[*418] Consequently, we must first decide whether

Franklin can show cause and prejudice to excuse his

procedural default. We focus on Franklin’s claim of

ineffective assistance of counsel, because such a claim can

serve as both cause and prejudice, excusing a procedural

[**8] default in an underlying substantive claim, as long as

the petitioner can also show cause and prejudice to excuse

the procedural default of the ineffective assistance claim

itself. Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 450-52, 120 S.

Ct. 1587, 146 L. Ed. 2d 518 (2000).

To determine whether Franklin had cause for his

procedural default, we apply the four-part test set forth in

Maupin v. Smith.

First, the court must determine that there is a state

procedural rule that is applicable to the

petitioner’s claim and that the petitioner failed to

comply with the rule.

Second, the court must decide whether the state

courts actually enforced the state procedural

sanction.

Third, the court must decide whether the state

procedural forfeiture is an “adequate and

independent” state ground on which the state can

rely to foreclose review of a federal constitutional

claim.

6a

Once the court determines that a state procedural

rule was not complied with and that the rule was

an adequate and independent state ground, then

the petitioner must demonstrate . . . that there was

“cause” for him to not follow the procedural rule

and that he was actually prejudiced by [**9] the

alleged constitutional error.

785 F.2d 135, 138 (6th Cir. 1986) (citations and footnote

omitted). We agree with the district court that Franklin’s

ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim is not barred

from review under the [***4] Maupin test because at the

time he filed his Motion for Delayed Reconsideration, in

which he raised the claims he makes on appeal in the instant

case, the Ohio courts did not have a “firmly established and

regularly followed” procedural rule governing the timeliness

of such motions. James v. Kentucky, 466 U.S. 341, 348, 104

S. Ct. 1830, 80 L. Ed. 2d 346 (1984).

Franklin filed a Motion for Delayed Reconsideration

with the Ohio Court of Appeals on June 30, 1993, advancing

thirty-four assignments of error, including the claim of

ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. On that date, the

Ohio rules controlling the filing of claims of ineffective

assistance of appellate counsel through Motions for Delayed

Reconsideration were somewhat unclear. One year earlier,

the Ohio Supreme Court had decided State v. Murnahan, 63

Ohio St. 3d 60, 584 N.E.2d 1204 (1992), holding that

ineffective assistance of appellate [**10] counsel claims had

to be brought under Ohio R. App. P. 26 (later to become Rule

26(A)), through an application for delayed reconsideration in

the court of appeals in which the alleged error took place, id.

at 1208-09. Prior to Murnahan, such claims had been brought

in the regular post-conviction hearings before the trial court.

7a

Ibid. However, Murnahan did not establish a time period for

filing Rule 26 motions.

Under Rule 26, as it existed at the time Murnahan was

filed, a petitioner had ten days from the date the previous

opinion was filed to file an application for reconsideration of

any cause or motion submitted on appeal. Ohio R. App. P.

26(A). However, in deciding Murnahan, the Ohio Supreme

Court had opined that the courts should take a more lenient

attitude toward timeliness in ineffective assistance of counsel

claims:

[*419] Since claims of ineffective assistance of

appellate counsel may be left undiscovered due to

the inadequacy of appellate counsel or the

inability of the defendant to identify such errors

within the time allotted for reconsideration in the

court of appeals or appeal to this court, it may be

necessary for defendants to request delayed

{**11] consideration. Therefore, in an individual

case where a defendant has put forth a colorable

claim of ineffective assistance of appellate

counsel, where the circumstances render the

application of res judicata unjust, and the time

periods for reconsideration in courts of appeals

and direct appeal to this court have expired, he or

she must: (1) apply for delayed reconsideration in

the court of appeals where the alleged error took

place pursuant to App. R. 26 and 14(B), and if

delayed reconsideration is denied, then (2) file for

delayed appeal in this court pursuant to Section 8,

Rule II of the Rules of Practice of the Supreme

Court. Before granting reconsideration, the court

of appeals should determine whether there are

substantive grounds for relief.

8a

Murnahan, 584 N.E.2d at 1209 (footnotes omitted); see also

Henderson v. Collins, 101 F. Supp. 2d 866, 887 (S.D. Ohio

1999) (concluding that “neither the Murnahan decision nor

Ohio App. R. 14(B) set an outer limit or absolute deadline

that would have alerted Petitioner to a certain deadline for

filing a Murnahan Application pursuant to the rule

{announced in Murnahan }.”), vacated [**12] in part on

other grounds, 262 F.3d 615 (6th Cir. 2001). Furthermore,

the Murnahan court specifically noted that the state appellate

rules as then written may have been insufficient to provide

the remedy set forth in its opinion. The opinion stated:

In light of the fact that Ohio has no statutory

authority or court rules dedicated to the procedure

to be followed by defendants who allege

ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, we

recommend that the Rules Advisory Committee

appointed by this court review whether an

amendment to App. R. 14(B) or a new rule should

be adopted to better serve claimants in this

position.

584 N.E.2d at 1209 n.6. [***5]

Murnahan \ed to the creation of a special Application to

Reopen procedure, codified at Ohio R. App. P. 26(B). This

rule includes a timeliness provision that requires the

application to reopen to be filed within ninety days of the

journalization of the appellate judgment unless the applicant

shows good cause for filing at a later time. R. 26(B)(1). Rule

26(B) went into effect on July 1, 1993-the day after Franklin

filed his Motion for Reconsideration under R. 26.

Nonetheless, the [**13] Ohio Court of Appeals applied the

26(B) standard to Franklin’s motion, dismissing it because he

had not filed within 90 days of the journalization of his initial

appellate judgment, and notwithstanding the fact that he was

represented by the same counsel at his appeals before the

9a

Ohio Court of Appeals and the Ohio Supreme Court. In a

footnote to the decision, the court noted that applying App.

R. 26(B) was not unreasonable, even though it had not been

in force on the day Franklin filed his motion, because under

the previous rule, he would only have had 10 days to file,

whereas under the new rule he had 90 days.

If we follow the reasoning of this footnote, and take as

our procedural starting point the rules that were actually in

place on the day that Franklin filed his Motion for

Reconsideration, there would be no procedural default. As

discussed above, Murnahan placed no time limit on

applications and specifically noted that the 10-day limit in

the then-current Rule 26 was too short. The State points to

Hicks v. Collins, {*420] 384 F.3d 204 (6th Cir. 2004), as

holding that in the area of the Ohio First District Court of

Appeals, in which Franklin filed his Motion for [**14]

Reconsideration, the rule was established that (1) ineffective

assistance of appellate counsel claims had to be brought

according to the then-current Rule 26 (later 26(A)), and (2)

Rule 26 had an enforced 10-day limit on filing. However,

Hicks is inapposite here because it applies to a time before

Murnahan. In Hicks, the defendant brought his ineffective

assistance of counsel claim in a post-conviction proceeding,

even though it was established in that District that the claim

should have been brought in a Motion for Reconsideration.

His claim was dismissed, and he waited approximately 18

months to file the Motion correctly. In the interim, the Ohio

Supreme Court ruled on Murnahan, and the Appeals Court

dismissed Hicks’s motion as untimely. We, in upholding the

procedural default, relied on the fact that pre-Murnahan there

was a procedure that Hicks could have followed in a timely

fashion, so his failure to do so could not constitute cause for

his later procedural default. 384 F.3d at 212.

If, on the other hand, we consider the Ohio Court of

Appeal’s application of the new Rule 26(B) to Franklin’s

10a

motion, we must also find that the State does not fulfill

{[**15] the elements of Maupin test necessary to bar review.

The first Maupin factor requires that there was a “state

procedural rule that is applicable to the petitioner’s claim and

that the petitioner failed to comply with the rule.” 785 F.2d at

138. For the Rule 26(B) requireiment to be applicable to

Franklin, it would have to have been applied retroactively.

However, the United States Supreme Court has held that a

petitioner relying on prior rulings cannot be held to new

procedural requirements that go into effect after petitioner

raised his claim. Ford v. Georgia, 498 U.S. 411, 424, 111 S.

Ct. 850, 112 L. Ed. 2d 935 (1991). Furthermore, even if we

were to find that the new Rule 26(B) procedures were

applicable to Franklin, the Supreme Court in Ford concluded

that because the new rule had not been announced by the

time Ford could have raised his claim in a timely manner, it

was inadequate to serve as an independent state ground for

procedural default purposes because it was not “‘firmly

established and regularly followed’ by the time as of which it

[was] to be applied.” Jbid. (quoting James v. Kentucky, 466

U.S. 341, 348, 104 S. Ct. 1830, 80 L. Ed. 2d 346 (1984)).

[**16] Therefore, the application of Rule 26(B) would not

meet the third prong of the Maupin test that the rule be an

“adequate and independent” state ground for foreclosing

review.

Rule 26(B) also fails to meet the second part of the

Maupin test, that courts “actually enforced the state

procedural sanction.” 785 F.2d at 138. A review of the

relevant case law reveals that the Ohio Supreme Court has

been erratic in its handling of untimely Rule 26(B)

applications in capital cases. For several years following the

enactment of amended Rule 26(B), the Ohio Supreme Court

regularly enforced the rule’s timeliness requirements. See,

e.g., State v. Mason, 90 Ohio St. 3d 66, 2000 Ohio 14, 734

N.E.2d 822, 822-23 (Ohio 2000); State v. Dunlap, 89 Ohio

lla

St. 3d 277, 2000 Ohio 159, 730 N.E.2d 985, 986 (Ohio

2000); State v. Ballew, 89 Ohio St. 3d 204, 2000 Ohio 134,

729 N.E.2d 753, 754-55 (Ohio 2000); State v. Davis, 86 Ohio

St. 3d 212, 1999 Ohio 160, 714 N.E.2d 384, 385-86 (Ohio

1999); [***6] State v. Dennis, 86 Ohio St. 3d 201, 1999

Ohio 94, 713 N.E.2d 426, 427 (Ohio 1999); State v. Fox, 83

Ohio St. 3d 514, 1998 Ohio 517, 700 N-E.2d 1253, 1254

(Ohio 1998); State v. Hill, 78 Ohio St. 3d 174, 1997 Ohio

293, 677 N.E.2d 337, 338 (Ohio 1997); [**17] State v.

Whalen, 74 Ohio St. 3d 633, 1996 Ohio 6, 660 N.E.2d 1174,

1175 (Ohio 1996); State v. Reddick, 72 Ohio St. 3d 88, 1995

Ohio 249, 647 N.E.2d 784, 786 (Ohio 1995). However, in

2000 it began ignoring the lower courts’ dismissals of Rule

26(B) applications as untimely and [*421] affirming the

dismissal of the applications on the merits. See State v. Mack,

101 Ohio St. 3d 397, 2004 Ohio 1526, 805 N.E.2d 1108,

1109 (Ohio 2004); State v. Goff, 98 Ohio St. 3d 327, 2003

Ohio 1017, 784 N.E.2d 700, 701 (Ohio 2003); State v. Mitts,

98 Ohio St. 3d 325, 2003 Ohio 1007, 784 N.E.2d 698, 699-

700 (Ohio 2003); State v. Bryant-Bey, 97 Ohio St. 3d 87,

2002 Ohio 5450, 776 N.E.2d 480, 481-82 (Ohio 2002); State

v. Sneed, 96 Ohio St. 3d 348, 2002 Ohio 4768, 774 N.E.2d

1216, 1217-18 (Ohio 2002); State v. Davie, 96 Ohio St. 3d

133, 2002 Ohio 3753, 772 N.E.2d 119, 120-21 (Ohio 2002);

State v. Smith, 95 Ohio St. 3d 127, 2002 Ohio 1753, 766

N.E.2d 588, 589-90 (Ohio 2002); State v. Sanders, 94 Ohio

St. 3d 150, 2002 Ohio 350, 761 N.E.2d 18, 19-20 (Ohio

2002). See State v. Moore, 93 Ohio St. 3d 649, 2001 Ohio

1892, 758 N.E.2d 1130, 1132-33 (Ohio 2001); State v.

Carter, 93 Ohio St. 3d 581, 2001 Ohio 1614, 757 N.E.2d

362, 363-64 (Ohio 2001); [**18] State v. Biros, 93 Ohio St.

3d 250, 2001 Ohio 1339, 754 N.E.2d 805, 806-07 (Ohio

2001); State v. Brooks, 92 Ohio St. 3d 537, 2001 Ohio 1278,

2001 Ohio 1323, 751 N.E.2d 1040, 1042-43 (Ohio 2001);

State v. Jalowiec, 92 Ohio St. 3d 421, 2001 Ohio 164, 751

N.E.2d 467, 467-68 (2001); State v. Palmer, 92 Ohio St: 3d

12a

241, 2001 Ohio 188, 749 N.E.2d 749, 751-52 (Ohio 2001);

State v. Hooks, 92 Ohio St. 3d 83, 2001 Ohio 150, 748

N.E.2d 528, 530-31 (Ohio 2001); State v. Bradley, 91 Ohio

St. 3d 570, 2001 Ohio 116, 747 N.E.2d 819, 820 (Ohio

2001); State v. Sheppard, 91 Ohio St. 3d 329, 2001 Ohio 52,

744 N.E.2d 770, 771 (Ohio 2001); State v. Hill, 90 Ohio St.

3d 571, 2001 Ohio 20, 740 N.E.2d 282, 283-84 (Ohio 2001);

State v. Jells, 90 Ohio St. 3d 454, 2000 Ohio 93, 739 N.E.2d

345, 346 (Ohio 2000). Recently, in yet another reversal of

practice, the Ohio Supreme Court has renewed affirming the

dismissal of Rule 26(B) applications in capital cases as

untimely. See State v. Gumm, 103 Ohio St. 3d 162, 2004

Ohio 4755, 814 N.E.2d 861, 862-63 (Ohio 2004); State v.

LaMar, 102 Ohio St. 3d 467, 2004 Ohio 3976, 812 N.E.2d

' 970, 971-72 (Ohio 2004); see also State v. Myers, 102 Ohio

St. 3d 318, 2004 Ohio 3075, 810 N.E.2d 436, 437-38 (Ohio

2004) [**19] (court affirms dismissal as the application was

both untimely and meritless).

In light of the fluctuating treatment of Rule 26(B)

applications by the Ohio Supreme Court, we cannot hold that

the state courts have regularly followed and enforced the

Rule’s timeliness requirement. The Ohio Supreme Court’s

treatment of Rule 26(B) applications does not constitute on

“occasional act of grace” in excusing the Rule’s

requirements, Hutchison v. Bell, 303 F.3d 720, 737 (6th Cir.

2002) (quoting Coleman v. Mitchell, 268 F.3d 417, 429 (6th

Cir. 2001)), nor is the Supreme Court applying a clearly

delineated exception to the timeliness requirement in these

capital cases. See Hutchison, 303 F.3d at 738-39. While it

could be argued that the rule was regularly established and

followed at the time that the Ohio Supreme Court ruled on

Franklin’s Rule 26(B) application, such an interpretation

would render an injustice as the Ohio Supreme Court

apparently would not have applied the timeliness bar if

Franklin had delayed even further in filing his Rule 26(B)

1?a

application and submitted it for review to the Ohio Supreme

Court after 2000. Therefore, Rule 26(B) [**20] is not an

adequate and independent state rule that can preclude

consideration of Franklin’s ineffective assistance of appellate

counsel claim.

lil

As Franklin has shown cause for procedurally

defaulting his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, we turn

now to the question of whether any of his claims rise to the

level of constitutional defects such that appellate counsel’s

failure to raise them amounted to ineffective assistance of

counsel. We first consider the claim that a juror who was

biased because she could not follow the law sat on Franklin’s

jury. As explained below, we affirm the district court’s

judgment that this case warrants a grant of a conditional writ

of habeas corpus. Since all of the claims on petitioner’s

cross-appeal relate to claims of trial-type error, those claims

are rendered [*422] moot by a grant of habeas corpus, and

we will not consider them further.

Franklin contends that one juror, Patricia Arthur, was

biased because she misunderstood the presumption of

innocence, Franklin’s right not to testify, and the burden of

proof in the case. Franklin also asserts that Arthur was

predisposed to find that he had committed the crime just

because he was the defendant [**21] in the case. The label

“biased” is applied to two sorts of jurors. In the usual sense, a

biased juror is one who has a predisposition against or in

favor of the defendant. In a more limited sense, a biased juror

is one who cannot “conscientiously apply the law and find

the facts.” Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 423, 105 S. Ct.

844, 83 L. Ed. 2d 841 (1985). While we do not agree with

Franklin that [***7] Juror Arnold was “biased,” in the sense

of having a predisposition or prejudice against him, we,

nonetheless, do find that she was not an impartial juror

14a

because she demonstrated that she could not comprehend the

legal standard she was supposed to apply.

To understand Franklin’s claim, it is necessary to quote

at length the voir dire and later questioning of Juror Arthur:

Defense: Most people have a feeling somebody’s

charged with a crime-you all watch television and

you’ve seen L.A. Law. Some of you put it down

as your favorite program, so to speak. Pretty good

show. You see somebody charged get up there

and say I didn’t do it and here’s my side of the

story. Fairly common reaction for everybody. In

this case is there anybody here that feels George

[Franklin] [**22] should get on that stand, testify

and tell you his side of the story or whatever he

may feel to be appropriate? Anybody feel that

way? Nobody wants to hear George say anything?

Arthur: To prove he’s innocent.

Defense: Do you feel he should get on the stand to

prove he’s innocent?

Arthur: To me, I do, you know. I do.

Court: Let me interject. Three of the jurors have

said what you have said and what you think. The

law is that Mr. Franklin doesn’t have to do

anything at a trial, except be here. He’s not

required to prove that he’s innocent. He’s not

required to put on any evidence and if he chooses

to follow that route, you’re not allowed, under the

law, to consider that against him because the

burden of proof is upon the prosecution. The three

of you that answered the way you did, could you

accept my explanation of that?

15a

JA 1021-23. The record does not reflect that any of the

prospective jurors responded to the court’s question. During

the subsequent individual questioning of Arthur by the

prosecutor, the following exchange occuired:

Prosecutor: Considering all the questions that

were briefly asked by counsel [**23] and the

judge, do you have any answers at this point in

time that would cause you to hold up your hand,

anything different than before?

Arthur: No, I don’t.

Prosecutor: You understand it’s our burden of

proof and we must prove each and every element

of the crimes and specification charged beyond a

reasonable doubt, do you understand that?

Arthur: Yes, I do.

Prosecutor: Do you have any problem with that?

Arthur: No, I don’t have any problem with it.

Frere)

{[*423] Prosecutor: If we fail to prove one or

more of the elements of the offense, you would

acquit the defendant or find him not guilty, is that

correct?

Arthur: Yes, that’s right, if it’s proven, yes.

_ Prosecutor: If we prove each and every one of

those elements beyond a reasonable doubt, can

you join with the rest of the panel and sign a

verdict of guilty?

Arthur: Yes, if it’s proven, if it’s proven guilty.

l6a

Prosecutor: So, if the facts warrant and the law

allows it, can you join with eleven other jurors in

a verdict of guilty, knowing that the verdict would

lead to this man’s death?

[**24] Arthur: Yeah, if he’s proven it’s the right

thing, I can.

Prosecutor: Do you know of any reason, searching

your mind at this point, why you could not be a

fair and impartial juror in this case?

Arthur: No, I don’t.

Prosecutor: You can be just as fair to the State of

Ohio as you can to the defendant?

Arthur: Yes, I can. :

Prosecutor: And you’ll listen to all the evidence?

Arthur: Yes, I will, closely to them.

JA 1085-91. The State then passed Arthur for cause. The

foilowing dialog took place between Juror Arthur and

defense counsel:

Defense: As you sit there now, you consider

George, well, he’s just George. He’s sitting there,

he’s on trial. We’re officers of the court. He’s

sitting there he’s the defendant, but as to being

guilty, you have no idea whether he’s guilty of

this crime? Arthur: No, I don’t have no idea. But,

just like the counselor said before, I would have to

listen closely to why it happened.

Defense: Or how it happened?

Arthur: Yes, that’s right.

17a

Defense: Or whether George had anything to do

with it?

Arthur: Yes, that’s [**25] right.

Defense: In other words, one of the elements is to

prove George has something to do with this

crime; do you understand that? [***9]

Arthur: Uh huh.

Defense: And, although, if the prosecution was

just to put on those pictures [of the victim] and

say he’s dead, I mean George was sitting here,

that, alone, would not bring you to an opinion of

his guilt or innocence?

Arthur: No, because like I said, I mean like he

says, testimony, but ' would just wonder why

would he do it, you know?

Defense: Well, you say why would he do it, or if

he did it, would you like to know that, too?

Arthur: If he did it or why did he do it.

Defense: First of all, you’d like to know if he did

it?

Arthur: Yes, if he did it.

Defense: If you saw those pictures and the

prosecutor pointed and said he did it, would that

be enough to convince you?

Arthur: No.

Defense: In other words, you want to know more,

some evidence?

Arthur: That’s why I said what I did.

18a

Defense: I guess what we’re asking for is just a

fair trial.

Arthur: That’s right. [**26]

[*424] Defense: And as I say that, there’s this

innocence, presumption of innocence, and you

can accept that? In other words, you said that one

of the things you said that, I think, on the general

questions was you sort of require George to get on

the stand and prove his innocence. Would you do

that? Do you mean that really?

Arthur: I believe that he should bring himself out,

if he didn’t do it, just testify, tell what happened,

you know.

Defense: And that is -

Court: It’s time for the court to interrupt. Ms.

Arthur, that’s not the law, okay? I’ve sat here

plenty of times with a jury and I said to myself it

would be nice if this guy would tell what

happened. That’s not the law. He’s not required to

do that and he’s not required to do anything. He

comes in here cloaked with the presumption of

innocence. As he sits here now he’s presumed

innocent and under the Constitution, he’s not

required to do anything at all. Now, having told

you that, can you abide by that and in your mind

not require him to do anything? [***10]

Arthur: No, I don’t require, but I just think, to tell

you the truth, Judge, I don’t require, but I just

{[**27] think if the jury would listen, like

everybody says, he wants to have a fair trial. If the

jury would listen to both of the lawyers, you

19a

know, and whatever evidence they had to prove

him not guilty, I’d sit here and listen to it.

Court: Okay, but my point is that some point the

prosecution will stop presenting evidence. At that

point, once the state has stopped producing

evidence, then the defense may produce evidence,

if they so desire.

Arthur: Please?

Court: Once the state has stopped producing

evidence, then the defense, I’m talking about Mr.

Franklin, through his lawyers, may _ start

producing evidence, if they wish, but they’re not

required to do that. They’re not required to do

anything. They could stop right there, if they

wanted, have me give them the final instructions

and have you go out and make your decision on

the case. Arthur: Even if the evidence is not

against him, that they have brought evidence to

find that he’s not guilty.

Court: I missed that. I’m missing out.

Arthur: You said if the law would provide, stop

providing evidence. I said even if they’re for him

and they’re not against him, not saying he’s not

[**28] guilty, but they’re proving, have brought

evidence? You see what I’m talking about?

Court: I see what you’re talking about, but do you

see what I’m talking about? That is, they’re not

required to produce anything. The defendant isn’t

required to do anything in the trial except show

up, do you understand that?

Arthur: Uh huh.

20a

Court: And you’re not allowed to hold it against

him if he doesn’t produce anything. You might be

sitting there thinking maybe he could clear

something up or maybe another witness could

clear something up, but they’re not required to do

a thing. Can you abide by that and understand

that?

Arthur: I guess so, if that’s the law.

Court: That’s the law. Mr. Schmidt, do you have

any further questions?

Defense: I’m still not quite sure, Your Honor. In

other words, I guess, Mrs. Arthur, and, again, this

is in fairness, being fair to you, too, if we were to

try the case and the state put on evidence and

_ George didn’t take the stand, would you hold that

against him?

Arthur: No, I wouldn’t hold it against him.

[*425] Defense: Would you think that would

have something to do with his guilt?

{**29] Arthur: No.

Defense: You would think you wouldn’t consider

that at all? [***11]

Arthur: No, I wouldn’t.

Defense: .. . The way this goes, Mrs. Arthur, by

law and by rules of the court, the State of Ohio

has the burden of proving the elements of the

crime, all right?

Arthur: Uh huh.

2la

Defense: The state will go first and the law also

says that they will go last. They will have the final

argument and then the judge will give you the

law: do you understand?

Arthur: Uh huh.

Defense: Actually, they will paint a very dark

picture or try to paint a dark picture, if they’re

able. That’s their duty. But you’ve got to keep an

open mind until you hear the defense, or you hear

the law as it applies to what you heard. Can you

do that?

Arthur: Yes, I could.

Defense: And if the right thing, if [the death

penalty] was the right thing, you would do it,

right?

Arthur: That’s right.

Defense: What do you consider to be the right

thing?

Arthur: Well, what I consider to be the right thing

is if justice is done, either way. If he’s proven

guilty, [**30] then justice is done. If he’s proven

not guilty, then justice is done.

JA 1093-1108. Defense counsel later passed Juror Arthur for

cause.

After the jury was impaneled, a jury view of the scene

of the crime was conducted. During the viewing, Juror

Arthur asked where “he” got into the house. Afterward, the

judge called her into chambers, with the attorneys, and the

following conversation took place:

22a

Court: Okay, Mrs. Arthur, the reason we called

you in here is because it’s been reported back to

me that when the jurors were out on the view that

you might have asked some questions while you

were out there and specifically the way it was put

to me was that you may have asked a question

something like this: How did he get in? Did he get

in through the window downsiairs?

Arthur: No, the only thing I asked, I said, I didn’t

ask if he got in the window downstairs, I asked

was that the window he got in, the window when

they showed. That’s the only thing I asked.

Court: The thing I need to know from you is when

you say he, when you’re talking about he getting

in. I need to know have you formed a

predisposition in your mind about this man out

here, [**31] Mr. Franklin? [***12]

Arthur: No, I hadn’t formed no position. All I just

want to know is that was the house. I hadn’t

formed anything.

Court: Who were you talking about when you said

that he?

Arthur: I was talking about him, but I hadn’t

formed anything yet.

Court: When you talk about him, are you already

assuming he broke into the house, Mr. Franklin,

the man out here?

Arthur: All I know is they told me he burglarized

two places and I didn’t know if those were the

houses or not.

Court: Well, the fact, if somebody told you he

burglarized two places, can you accept the fact

23a

that doesn’t mean the man did it, just because

somebody said he did it?

Arthur: All I know is what I was told. That’s all I

know.

[*426] Court: Mr. Schmidt [defense counsel],

_ you want to tell us what your version of it is?

Schmidt: Yes, sir. When we were upstairs Mrs.

Arthur said where did he break in and that was all

she said.

Arthur: That’s all I said. That’s all I said. I didn’t

say anything else.

Court: Okay, are you able to keep an open mind in

this case and wait until you hear all the evidence

[**32] in this case?

Arthur: Yes, I will, because I hadn’t formed

nothing.

Court: Counsel, want to ask her any questions?

Mr. Rosenwald [defense counsel]?

Rosenwald: . . . . Miss Arthur, who told you he

burglarized two places?

Arthur: The only thing I heard, and I might have

misunderstood it, I thought she said when we

were talking in the room that he had burglarized

two places.

Rosenwald: When we were asking the questions

of the jurors?

Arthur: That’s all I know. Nobody did tell me.

That’s just what I got from you all.

24a

Rosenwald: Do you have the impression, feeling,

from what you’re saying that George did break

into two places?

Arthur: I really don’t know, sir.

Rosenwald: All right, that’s all.

Court: Anything further? Anything you gentlemen

want to ask her?

Prosecutor: We were saying that, also. Do you

understand that’s what he’s charged with and now

the evidence will show whether he did it or not?

Arthur: Right, that’s all I know, I don’t know, sir.

That’s all I know.

[***13]

JA 1551-54. Defense counsel made a motion for a mistrial

based upon [**33] Arthur’s comments at the jury view. The

judge denied the motion, saying, “I believe this jury can be

fair and impartial and I heard her answers to the questions

and I observed her demeanor... .”

Relying on this record, the district court found that

Juror Arthur was biased and that therefore a new trial was

warranted. We agree with the district judge’s conclusion but

point out that Juror Arnold was biased because she could not

understand the law rather than because she had a preexisting

opinion about Franklin.

The Supreme Court has repeatedly held, pre-AEDPA,

that juror bias is a factual issue and that reviewing courts

must give the factual assessments of the trial judge a

presumption of correctness subject to the exceptions

enumerated in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). See Thompson v.

Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 111, 116 S. Ct. 457, 133 L. Ed. 2d

383 (1995); Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 431, 105 S.

Ct. 844, 83 L. Ed. 2d 841 (1985); Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S.

25a

1025, 1036, 104 S. Ct. 2885, 81 L. Ed. 2d 847 (1984). The

exception relevant in this case is whether “the factual

determination is not fairly supported by the record... .” 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d)(8)(1994), [**34] amended by 28 U.S.C. §

2254(d)(2).

Under this standard, we cannot hold that the trial

judge’s decision that Juror Arthur’s statement at the jury

viewing and her subsequent statements in the conversation

with the judge did not indicate bias was not fairly supported

by the record. Juror Arthur stated unequivocally that she had

not made up her mind about Franklin’s guilt. As the Warden

points out, Juror Arthur’s comments at the viewing could

well be understood to indicate that she was asking whether

this was the window the prosecution said the defendant had

climbed through, without that question indicating that she

believed the prosecution’s story. After discussing the matter

with Juror Arthur, observing her demeanor, and listening to

her responses, the trial [*427] judge specifically stated that

he believed she could be impartial and fair. As nothing on the

record demands that we find otherwise, we are bound to

defer to the trial judge’s finding.

Juror Arthur’s statements at voir dire, however, require

a different conclusion because they leave us with the

conviction that she so completely misunderstood the

presumption of innocence and burden of [**35] proof that

she could not have made a fair assessment of the evidence of

Franklin’s guilt. In her voir dire testimony, Juror Arthur

made at least five statements indicating that she did not

understand that Franklin was not required to prove himself

not guilty:

1. {I think he needs to] prove he’s innocent.

2. I believe that he should bring himself out, if he

didn’t do it, just testify, tell what happened, you

know.

26a

3. I just think, to tell you the truth, Judge, I don’t

require, but I just think if the jury would listen,

like everybody says, he wants to have a fair trial.

If the jury would listen to both of the lawyers, you

know, and whatever evidence they had to prove

him not guilty, I’d sit here and listen to it.

4. Even if the evidence is not against him, that

they have brought evidence to find that he’s not

guilty.

5. If he’s proven guilty, then justice is done. If

he’s proven not guilty, then justice is done.

Three times the judge intervened to explain the law to her.

The second two times, during her individual voir dire, she

professed-albeit somewhzat reluctantly, saying, “I guess so, if

that’s the law”-to understand the judge’s explanations. Yet

despite the [**36] judge’s repeated attempts to rehabilitate

her, the last thing she said in her voir dire was: “If he’s

proven guilty, then justice is done. If he’s proven not guilty,

then justice is done.” Juror Arthur assured counsel and the

judge that she would consider all of the evidence before

making a decision, and there is no reason to [***14]

disbelieve her. Yet, that she would consider all of the

evidence does not remove the fact that she also seemed to

expect some of that evidence to come from Franklin by way

of proof of his innocence.

In the Witherspoon line of cases, the United States

Supreme Court has addressed the question of prospective

jurors excluded because of their insistence upon or

unwillingness to find a sentence of death. Wainwright v. Witt,

469 U.S. 412, 105 S. Ct. 844, 83 L. Ed. 2d 841 (1985) ;

Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 100 S. Ct. 2521, 65 L. Ed. 2d

581 (1980); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 98 S. Ct. 2954, 57

L. Ed. 2d 973 (1978); Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510,

88 S. Ct. 1770, 20 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1968). Although these

27a <

cases dealt with the exclusion of jurors who expressed the

opinion that they could not, or might not be able to, follow

the law, they [**37] also made the more general point that a

jury should be composed of jurors who “will consider and

decide the facts impartially and conscientiously apply the law

as charged by the court.” Adams, 448 U.S. at 45. Jurors who

cannot apply the law are not impartial. Wainwright, 469 U.S.

at 423.

Although we normally defer to the assessment of the

trial judge, who hears the prospective juror’s tone of voice

and sees her demeanor, in this case, the cold record alone is

so extensive and so persuasive that it outweighs our

presumptive deference. Juror Arnold five times gave the

definite impression that she could not faithfully apply the law

concerning the burden of proof because she failed to

understand it. Even after she was corrected [*428] three

times by the judge, she still insisted with her last statement

that the defendant had to be proven innocent. C/

Wainwright, 469 U.S. at 434 (juror who displayed inability to

follow the law four separate times was correctly excused).

While we appreciate the juge’s attempts to rehabilitate this

juror, he had a duty to dismiss a prospective juror who could

not follow the law. Hughes v. United States, 258 F.3d 453,

464 (6th Cir. 2001). [**38] As such, the trial court’s failure

to dismiss her constituted manifest error and does not merit

the presumption of correctness normally due trial court

factual findings. See Hill v. Brigano, 199 F.3d 833, 844-45

(6th Cir. 1999).

“The seating of a biased juror who should have been

dismissed for cause requires reversal of the conviction.”

Hughes v. United States, 258 F.3d 453, 463 (6th Cir. 2001)

(citing United States v. Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. 304, 316,

120 S. Ct. 774, 145 L. Ed. 2d 792 (2000)). “‘Failure to

remove biased jurors taints the entire trial, and therefore . . .

{the resulting] conviction must be overturned.’” Jbid.

28a

(quoting Wolfe v. Brigano, 232 F.3d 499, 503 (6th Cir.

2000)). There is no situation under which the impaneling of a

biased juror can be excused. “The impaneling of a biased

juror warrants a new trial. . . . The ‘presence of a biased juror

cannot be harmless; the error requires a new trial without a

showing of actual prejudice.’” Jbid. (quoting United States v.

Gonzalez, 214 F.3d 1109, IL111 (9th Cir. 2000)).

Accordingly, the State can make no argument that Franklin’s

trial counsel [**39] acted strategically in keeping Juror

Arthur on the panel because she was, like Franklin, African-

American. To permit this would be to allow trial counsel to

waive the defendant’s right to an impartial jury. ' Ibid.

The service of a biased juror was a constitutional defect

that should have been, but was not, raised [**40] on direct

appeal. Consequently, the failure of Franklin’s appellate

counsel to appeal this issue amounted to ineffective

assistance of counsel and allows Franklin to show the

prejudice required to overcome his procedural default.

[***15]

IV

' However, we note that this holding should not be construed

so broadly as to eliminate our usual deference to trial

counsel’s assumed voir dire strategy. Counsel may well have

reasons for wanting perors who are confused or ignorant, and

we do not intend here to give defendants a free pass to argue

for ineffective assistance of counsel any time a prospective

juror is seated who demonstrates some lack of clarity about

the law. We consider the circumstances in this case to merit

particular scrutiny because of the length the judge and

counsel went to attempt to explain the burden of proof to

Juror Arthur and her continued inability to understand that

Franklin did not have to prove himself innocent.

29a

The district court found that Franklin’s appellate

counsel provided ineffective assistance to him during his

direct appeal to the Ohio Court of Appeals and to the Ohio

Supreme Court by (1) failing to consult with their client, (2)

failing to provide hirn with any real opportunity to participate

or have input in his appeal, and (3) failing to raise the issue

respecting Juror Arthur’s bias on direct appeal.

A criminal appellant is constitutionally entitled to the

effective assistance of counsel in his direct appeal. Evitts v.

Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 396, 105 S. Ct. 830, 83 L. Ed. 2d 821

(1985); Joshua v. DeWitt, 341 F.3d 430, 441 (6th Cir. 2003).

In Mapes v. Coyle, 171 F.3d 408, 427-28 (6th Cir. 1999), the

court attempted to provide a non-exclusive list of factors to

consider when defining deficient performance:

[*429] 1. Were the omitted issues “significant and

obvious?”

2. Was there arguably contrary [**41] authority

on the omitted issues?

3. Were the omitted issues clearly stronger than

those presented? )

4. Were the omitted issues objected to at trial?

5. Were the trial court’s rulings subject to

deference on appeal?

6. Did appellate counsel testify in a collateral

proceeding as to his appeal strategy and, if so,

were the justifications reasonable?

7. What was the appellate counsel’s level of

experience and expertise?

8. Did the petitioner and appellate counsel meet

and go over possible issues?

30a

9. Is there evidence that counsel reviewed all the

facts?

10. Were the omitted issues dealt with in other

assignments of error?

ll. Was the decision to omit an issue an

unreasonable one which only an incompetent

attorney would adopt?

Ibid. In addition to the Mapes factors, a habeas court may

also consider “prevailing norms of practice as reflected in

American Bar Association standards and the like.” Strickland

v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed.

2d 674 (1984). The ABA Standards for Criminal Justice

instruct that “[a]ssigned counsel has a special responsibility

to develop a relationship of trust and confidence with the

client so that the client will [**42] appreciate that the lawyer

knows the case and has the client’s best interests clearly in

mind.” Comment to ABA Standard for Criminal Justice 4-3.8

(2d ed. 1980). Standard 4-8.3 itself states that, “the lawyer

has a duty to keep the client informed of the developments in

the case and the progress of preparing the defense.”

Franklin’s appellate counsel made many of the errors

included in the Mapes list. First, counsel failed to raise the

juror bias issue or any of the other issues for which the

district court issued a COA. Appellate counsel is, of course,

not required to raise every non-frivolous issue on appeal. “As

the Supreme Court has recently observed, it is difficult to

demonstrate that an appellate attorney has violated the

performance prong where the attorney presents one argument

on appeal rather than another. In such cases, the petitioner

must demonstrate that the issue not presented ‘was clearly

stronger than issues that counsel did present.*” Caver v.

Straub, 349 F.3d 340, 348 (6th Cir. 2003) (quoting Smith v.

Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 289, 120 S. Ct. 746, 145 L. Ed. 2d

756 (2000)) (internal citations omitted); see also McFarland

3la

v. Yukins, 356 F.3d 688, 710-12 (6th Cir. 2004). [**43] Just

as in Caver, “in the instant case, there can be little doubt but

that the omitted issue . . . was much stronger than the issues

[petitioner’s} appellate counsel presented.” Ibid. (footnote

omitted). Franklin himself suggested fourteen issues for his

attorneys to raise on appeal. Each of these issues found its

way into his habeas petition, including the biased juror,

Batson, and ineffective assistance of trial counsel errors that

are on appeal here, while none of the issues counsel raised on

appeal made it past the magistrate judge below. His attorneys

ignored his suggestions, telling him they were frivolous, had

already been litigated, or could be raised on post-conviction .

review. They also failed to tell Franklin that he could file a

pro se supplementary brief raising additional issues they

refused to include. [***16]

More egregious, appellate counsel never met Franklin

or even spoke to him over the telephone. His lead counsel,

Roxann Dieffenbach, only corresponded with him through

letters. His other counsel, Candace [*430] Greenham, had no

contact with him at all. Between December 4, 1989, and

November 26, 1991, Dieffenbach’s total communication with

Franklin consisted [**44] of 26 letters, none longer than one

page. Her first letter, sent on December 4, 1989, and thus her

first contact with Franklin, came eleven months after she had

been appointed to represent him and three weeks before she

had to file his brief with the Court of Appeals. Although she

asked him for input on the brief, she failed to respond to his

December 19, 1989, request for a copy of his transcript until

April 22, 1990, and she only sent him a copy of the Court of

Appeals brief one month after it had been submitted to the

court.

Twice Franklin asked Dieffenbach to withdraw from

his case. The first time she responded only by saying the she

had argued his case before the Court of Appeals. The second

time she responded only by saying that she had argued his

32a

case before the Ohio Supreme Court. At no point, therefore,

did Franklin’s counsel meet the ABA guidelines of keeping

Franklin “informed of the developments in the case” or of

developing a relationship of trust with him.

Counsel also failed adequately to represent Franklin at

oral argument before the Ohio Court of Appeals. The night

before the argument before the Court of Appeals, Greenham

had a family emergency and could not attend [**45] the

argument. The court denied Dieffenbach’s request for an

extension. At oral argument, Dieffenbach refused to discuss

Or answer questions on any part of the brief that Greenham

had prepared. Having counsel refuse to address half of the

issues raised before the appellate court is like having trial

counsel refuse to attend half the trial. On those issues,

therefore, Franklin suffered a total lack of meaningful

advocacy. Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 697, 122 S. Ct. 1843,

152 L. 2d. 2d 914 (2002).

Before the Ohio Supreme Court, counsels’ behavior

was unprofessional. As the magistrate judge wrote,

The transcript of their arguments include five

instances of wholly inappropriate laughing on the

part of both of Franklin’s lawyers, an admission

by Dieffenbach that she may be wrong about one

of her contentions, equivocal responses to

questions from the justices, and Greenham’s

introductory statement that she “wished we had

more to say on Mr. Franklin’s behalf.” In

addition, Franklin’s counsel displayed a lack of

familiarity with the facts relevant to the arguments

she made to the court. For instance, Greenham did

not recall the length of the videotape she argued

was gruesome and prejudicial, [**46] and stated

that “apparently it was very graphic,” strongly

suggesting she had not even viewed the allegedly

33a

offending videotape herself. Dieffenbach did not

know how many points of identification existed

between Franklin’s fingerprint and the print lifted

from the champagne bottle found in the Strauss

apartment. Greenham displayed an astounding

lack of solemnity under the circumstances when

she employed the term “overkill” to describe the

photographic and videographic evidence, then

laughed and said “Excuse the pun.”

JA 615.

There is, thus, no question that Franklin’s appellate

counsels’ performance was deficient. Although we do not

believe that appellate counsels’ shortcomings at oral

argument necessarily prejudiced Franklin, we find that

counsel did not meet the ABA standards in their dealings

with him concerning his appeals, and we hold that the failure

to raise the biased juror issue on appeal was prejudicial, since

no claims of [*431] strategy can excuse the seating of a

juror unable to follow the law. [***17]

V

In sum, Franklin’s ineffective assistance of counsel

claim is not procedurally defaulted because the Ohio Court of

Appeals’s refusal to hear Franklin’s Motion [**47] for

Reconsideration was not based on an adequate and

established state procedural rule and because his appellate

counsels’ failure to raise the constitutionally defective

service of a biased juror rose to the level of prejudice.

Therefore, we AFFIRM the district court’s grant of habeas

corpus and decline to consider Franklin’s cross-appeals on

the three issues certified for appeal.

DISSENTBY: ALICE M. BATCHELDER

ALICE M. BATCHELDER, dissenting. I respectfully

dissent. I would hold that Franklin’s claims shouid be

34a

dismissed for procedural default under Maupin v. Smith

because Ohio’s First District Court of Appeals relied on

independent and adequate state grounds when it denied

Franklin’s Application for Delayed Reconsideration. 785

F.2d 135 (6th Cir. 1986). Franklin clearly failed to comply

with a state procedural rule that was both applicable to his

case and enforced by Ohio courts.'

The majority holds that the third prong of the Maupin

test was not satisfied due to uneven application of the good

cause exception, but prior Sixth Circuit cases suggest

otherwise. Under that prong of the test, this court must decide

whether the procedural rule relied upon by the state is an

‘adequate and independent’ state ground on which the state

can rely to foreclose review of a federal constitutional

claim.” Maupin, 785 F.2d at 138. To be “independent,” the

procedural rule must rely in no part on federal law. Coleman

v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 732-33, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 115 L.

Ed. 2d 640 (1991). To be “adequate,” the rule must have

been firmly established and regularly followed by state courts

at the time of its application to Franklin. Ford v. Georgia,

498 U.S. 411, 423-24, 111 S. Ct. 850, 112 L. Ed. 2d 935

(1991). A rule is firmly established if, at the time of the

petitioner’s actions giving rise to the default, the petitioner

could be deemed to have been apprised of the rule’s

' Although the majority asserts that the Murnahan rule was

not enforced by Ohio courts, it cites nearly a dozen cases

enforcing the rule over the five-year period immediately

following Franklin’s motion. Furthermore, Sixth Circuit

precedent establishes that the rule was applied in Hamilton

County, where Franklin appeared, as early as 1983. See

Sowell v. Bradshaw, 372 F.3d 821, 827 n.2 (6th Cir. 2004)

(citing Ohio v. Rone, 1983 Ohio App. LEXIS 11867, No. C-

820640, 1983 WL 5172, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 31,

1983)).

35a

existence. Hutchison v. Bell, 303 F.3d 720, 737 (6th Cir.

2002). Finally, whether a rule is regularly followed is

determined as of the date of the petitioner’s [**49]

conviction. Rogers v. Howes, 144 F.3d 990, 994 n.5 (6th Cir.

1998).

This circuit’s precedent reveais that the rule applied to

Franklin was both independent and adequate at the time of its

application. Significantly, Franklin’s case arose in Hamilton

County. In Sowell v. Bradshaw, this court declined to review

an ineffective assistance claim based on a Rule 26 procedural

bar. 372 F.3d 821, 827 n.2 (6th Cir. 2004). We held that “the

procedure required by Murnahan was the procedure that had

been required since at least 1983 by the Ohio Court of

Appeals in Hamilton County, where [the petitioner’s] trial

and appeal were conducted.” /d. (citing Ohio v. Rone, 1983

Ohio App. LEXIS 11867, No. C-820640, 1983 WL 5172, at

*4 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 31, 1983)). In Coleman v. Mitchell,

we held that “before the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in

Murnahan, it was well established in [Hamilton County],

[*432] the appellate district in which Coleman’s appeal was

heard, that claims of ineffective assistance of appellate

counsel were to be raised in a delayed motion for

reconsideration and were not cognizable in state post-

conviction proceedings.” 244 F.3d 533, 540 (6th Cir. 2001).

[**50] In Hicks v. Collins, we held that a petitioner had

procedurally defaulted his ineffective assistance of appeliate

counsel claim because Murnahan’s rule was “well settled” in

Hamilton County by September of 1992 and was therefore an

independent and adequate state ground. 384 F.3d 204, 212

(6th Cir. 2004). Based on the foregoing, there is no question

that Ohio courts’ application of Murnahan’s good cause

exception does nct fail the third prong of the Maupin test.

The majority attempts to distinguish Hicks by noting

that the petitioner in that case filed his motion prior to the

Murnahan decision, which the majority views as overriding

36a

the ten-day period allotted to motions for reconsideration. I

think the majority over-states Murnahan. That case explicitly

stated that motions such as Franklin’s should be filed “in the

court of appeals where the [***19] alleged error took place

pursuant to App. R. 26... .” State v. Murnahan, 63 Ohio St.

3d 60, 584 N.E.2d 1204, 1209 (Ohio 1992). In light of the

court’s directive, it cannot be said that Franklin was not

apprised of the rule for purposes of the Hutchison and Ford

cases. [**51] The fact that Rule 26 was later amended to

extend the filing period is irrelevant. Consequently, there is

little to distinguish Franklin’s case from the Hicks case. I

would hold that his claims are procedurally barred.

37a

APPENDIX B

GEORGE T. FRANKLIN,

Petitioner-Appellee/Cross-Appellant,

Vv.

CARL S. ANDERSON, Warden, Respondent-

Appellant/Cross-Appellee.

Nos. 03-3636/03-3697

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

SIXTH CIRCUIT

434 F.3d 412

May 9, 2006, Decided

The court having received a petition for rehearing en

banc, and the petition having becn circulated not only to the

original panel members but also to all other active judges of

this court, and no judge of this court having requested a vote

on the suggestion for rehearing en banc, the petition for

rehearing has been referred to the original panel.

The panel has further reviewed the petition for

rehearing and concludes that the issues raised in the petition

were fully considered upon the original submission and

decision of the cases. Accordingly, the petition is denied.

Judge Batchelder would grant rehearing for the reasons stated

in her dissent.

38a

APPENDIX C

GEORGE T. FRANKLIN,

Petitioner,

v.

CARL S. ANDERSON, WARDEN,

Respondent.

Case No. C-1-95-1007

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO, WESTERN DIVISION

267 F. Supp. 2d 768

March 31, 2003, Decided

Petitioner George Franklin (“Franklin” or “Petitioner”’)

was charged with one count of aggravated murder, with death

penalty specifications, arising out of the homicide of Gerald

Strauss (“Strauss”), as well as two counts of burglary. His

case was assigned to Judge Ralph Winkler of the Hamilton

County Common Pleas Court. On December 7, 1988, a jury

in Hamilton County convicted him of those offenses. On

December 12, 1988, the penalty phase of Franklin’s trial

occurred, with the jury finding that the state had proved

beyond a _ reasonable doubt that the aggravating

circumstances outweighed the mitigating factors and

returning a recommendation that the death penalty be

imposed. Thereafter, Judge Winkler conducted his own

independent review of the evidence and found that the state

had proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the aggravating

circumstances outweighed the mitigating factors.

Accordingly, the trial court sentenced Franklin to death.

39a

In accordance with Ohio law as it [**4] then stood,

Petitioner appealed to the Hamilton County Court of

Appeals. That appellate court rejected Franklin’s assignments

of error and, after conducting its own independent review of

the evidence, concluded that the state had proved beyond a

reasonable doubt that the aggravating circumstances

outweighed the mitigating factors. State v. Franklin, 1990

Ohio App. LEXIS 3385, 1990 WL 117140 (Ohio App.

1990). Thus, the court of appeals affirmed Franklin’s

conviction and the death penalty imposed upon him. The

Petitioner appealed that decision to the Ohio Supreme Court,

which affirmed the Hamilton County Court of Appeals. State

v. Franklin, 62 Ohio St.3d 118, 580 N.E.2d 1 (1991), cert.

denied, 504 U.S. 960, 119 L. Ed. 24 235, 112 S. Ct. 2315

(1992). The Ohio Supreme Court also independently

weighed the aggravating circumstances and mitigating

factors, concluding that the state had met its burden of proof

in that regard. In its decision, the Ohio Supreme Court

summarized the facts and circumstances surrounding the

crimes for which the Petitioner was convicted:

About 4:00 p.m. on July 21, 1988, Rosha Winston

returned to her one-room apartment on Eden

Avenue in Cincinnati to [**5] find that her TV

set had been taken. A framed picture and some

decorative glass dishes had been moved from the

top of the TV and placed on the kitchen table. A

window screen at the rear of the apartment had

been partly [*772] torn out and the windowsill

had mud on it.

The window that had a torn screen was about six

feet off the ground from the outside. Police

noticed a circular imprint made in the muddy

ground under the window. The circle was thought

to have been made by a metal garbage can, on

which the burglar stood to reach the window.

40a

Several metal cans sat on concrete across the.

driveway separating Winston’s apartment from

the building next door. One of the cans had mud

around the top. A large barking dog, chained to a

nearby handrail, prevented police from

approaching the cans.

Winston told police she suspected George

Franklin, a neighbor, of the burglary. Franklin

lived in an apartment next door with his

grandfather. When questioned by police on the

same day as the burglary, Franklin used the name

of George Fichtel. Franklin appeared nervous, and

wanted to know what evidence the police had. He

admitted that the dog belonged to his grandfather,

and controlled it long enough for the [**6] officer

to inspect the garbage cans.

Police found Franklin’s fingerprint on the picture

that had been on top of the stolen TV. By the time

police identified Franklin as the burglar, he had

disappeared.

On or about July 23, 1988, Gerald R. Strauss and

his fiancee Karen Strain moved into a townhouse

on Corry Street in Cincinnati. On Saturday,

August 6, 1988, Strauss and Strain picked up

Richard Thompson, a friend of Strauss, at the

airport. The next morning, Strain left on a

business trip. Thompson and Strauss spent the day

in various activities, including a cookout on the

apartment patio. Strauss dropped Thompson off in

downtown Cincinnati at around 10:00 that

evening.

At about 10:30 p.m. a neighbor, Leonard Bass,

saw Strauss cleaning the patio and apartment.

Shortly after 11:00 Bass saw Strauss go upstairs,

4la

and saw lights turned. off in the apartment.

Another neighbor, Catherine Schaffner, while out

walking her dog between 11:00 and 11:30, heard a

“horrible,” “very loud, very forceful” scream that

lasted two or three seconds. The sound seemed to

come from the direction of Strauss’s building. A

few minutes later, after Schaffner got home, her

dog started barking which usually indicated [**7]

a stranger passing close to the house.

The next morning Mitch Walker, a co-worker at

Proctor & Gamble, tried to call Strauss when he

did not show up for work. After getting busy

signals, Walker asked the operator to break in.

The operator determined that the phone was off

the hook. Walker then drove to Strauss’s

townhouse, and found the front door ajar. He

asked a police officer to investigate. The officer

entered the townhouse and found Strauss’s body

in an upstairs bedroom.

The coroner arrived that morning and concluded

that Strauss had been dead six to eighteen hours.

Upon laboratory examination, the body revealed

bruises on the right hand; lacerations, broken

bones and a crushed eyeball from two blows to

the face; and lacerations and broken bones from a

large number of blows to the back of the head.

The cause of death was bone fragments driven

into the brain. The wounds were described by the

coroner as consistent with having been caused by

a claw hammer.

According to both Thompson and Strain, Strauss

had left a Marion brand claw hammer in the

upstairs guest bedroom. The hammer was not

found in the house. Other, items were missing

42a

[*773] from the house, including Strauss’s

money clip [**8] with several twenties, his credit

cards, his watch, a VCR, and a briefcase with

personal papers. In a wooded area a few blocks

away, police found the briefcase and personal

papers, credit cards, and a placemat that matched

others in the townhouse. Assisted by a tracking

dog, the police found a bloodstained Marion

brand claw hammer in the woods. The VCR,

watch, money clip and money were never

recovered, despite the offer of a reward.

A screen had been torn out in a patio window of

the townhouse. Karen Strain testified that she and

Strauss kept an empty champagne bottle as a

souvenir on the inside sill of that window. When

police found the body, the bottle had been carried

upstairs and left in the guest bedroom.

The police noticed a similarity to the Winston

burglary. Both crimes occurred in the same

neighborhood, within seventeen days of each

other. A TV was taken from Winston, a VCR

from Strauss, and both entries had been obtained

by tearing or cutting a screen from a rear window.

A latent fingerprint lifted from the champagne

bottle in the Strauss townhouse matched

Franklin’s known prints.

Police traced Franklin to the apartment of a Glenn

Davis. When officers arrived on August [**9] 18,

Davis answered the door and said he lived there

with his cousin, Gerald Evans. The police

recognized “Gerald Evans” as Franklin and

arrested him.

Michael lumibolt, who spent the evening of the

Strauss murder, August 7, with Franklin, testified

43a

that both had been using drugs. Franklin left at

about 10:30 p.m., at which time he apparently had

no money. Franklin returned and woke Turnbolt

at about 2:30 a.m. Tumbolt described this as

unusual. Franklin had changed his shirt, and had $

100 to $ 150, which he later sed to purchase a

gram of cocaine.

Id. at 118-20, 580 N.E.2d at 3-4.

Thereafter, Franklin continued to attempt to secure

relief in the Ohio courts, by seeking post-conviction relief

pursuant to Ohio Revised Code § 2953.21, as well as by

requesting that the Ohio Supreme Court recall its mandate

and permit supplemental briefing. The Ohio Supreme Court

denied Petitioner’s requests, without an opinion. State v.

Franklin, 63 Ohio St.3d 1402, 585 N.E.2d 424 (1992). In

addition, Franklin’s petition for post-conviction relief was

denied by the Hamilton County Common Pleas Court

without an evidentiary hearing, [**10] a decision which was

affirmed by the Hamilton County Court of Appeals. See State

v. Franklin, 1995 WL 6281 (Ohio App.), appeal not allowed,

72 Ohio St. 3d 1538, 650 N.E.2d 479, cert. denied, 516 U.S.

950, 133 L. Ed. 2d 315, 116 S. Ct. 394 (1995).

After having exhausted his available state remedies,

Petitioner initiated this action, requesting a writ of habeas

corpus, alleging that his convictions and sentences violated a

number of provisions of the United States Constitution. In his

Petition (Doc. # 5) and Amended Petition (Doc. # 25), the

Petitioner set forth 28 separate grounds or claims for relief.

This Court referred the matter to Magistrate Judge Michael

Merz for a Report and Recommendations. On August 21,

2002, after having conducted an evidentiary hearing, Judge

Merz issued his Report and Recommendations. See Doc. #

105. In particular, that judicial officer recommended that the

Court grant the requested writ of habeas corpus on the Sixth

44a

Claim and that it deny such relief with [*774] respect to the

other 27 claims.’ Both the Respondent (Doc. # 106) and the

' With his Sixth Claim, the Petitioner alleged that his

convictions and sentences are unconstitutional, as a result of

the fact that one of the jurors was biased, rather than being

impartial. Although the Petitioner had not raised that claim

during his direct appeals, Judge Merz concluded that this

claim was not barred by procedural default, because

Petitioner's appellate counsel were constitutionally

ineffective as a result of their failure to raise that issue during

Petitioner's direct appeals. The ineffective assistance of

counsel provided cause and prejudice, excusing the

procedural default. With his First Claim, the Petitioner

asserted that his convictions and sentences violated the

constitution because of the failure of his appellate counsel to

render effective assistance. The First Claim was based, inter

alia, upon the failure of appellate counsel to raise the issue of

the biased juror during his direct appeals. Judge Merz also

recommended that the Court grant Petitioner the requested

relief on that aspect of his First Claim. Judge Merz also noted

that appellate counsel had failed to consult with their client

and by failing to afford him an opportunity to have input in

_ his appeals. Since both this aspect of the Petitioner’s First

Claim and his Sixth Claim are predicated upon the assertions

that he was denied effective assistance by his appellate

counsel and that his constitutional right to an impartial jury

was infringed by the presence of a biased juror on the panel

which convicted him and recommended that he be sentenced

to death, the Court wil! discuss those issues only in

connection with the Sixth Claim. If it concludes that the

Petitioner is entitled to the requested relief on his Sixth

Claim, it will also award him relief on the corresponding

aspect of his First Claim, without expressly discussing that

claim further. [**12]

45a

Petitioner (Doc. # 108) filed Objections to that judicial

filing. Thereafter, Judge Merz filed an Amended [**11]

Supplemental Report and Recommendations,’ in which he

reaffirmed his earlier judicial filing and recommended that

the Court overrule both parties’ Objections. See Doc. # 112.

The Petitioner, in turn, filed Objections to the Amended

Supplemental Report and Recommendations of the

Magistrate Judge. See Doc. # 114.

{**12]

The Court begins by setting forth the standard of

review it must apply when it reviews Reports and

Recommendations of a Magistrate Judge in a habeas corpus

proceeding. The Sixth Circuit has indicated that a District

Court must apply a de novo standard of review to such a

judicial filing. Flournoy v. Marshall, 842 F.2d 875 (6th Cir.

1988). Accordingly, this Court reviews both Judge Merz’

factual findings and his legal conclusions de novo.

Herein, the Court rules upon the parties’ Objections to

the Report and Recommendations and the Petitioner’s

Objections [**13] to the Amended Supplemental Report and

Recommendations. In addition, the Court decides whether

Petitioner is entitled to a certificate of appealability on any

claims upon which he is deemed to be not entitled to relief.

? Each of the parties filed a memorandum in opposition to the

other’s Objections. See Docs. # 109 (Respondent’s Reply to

Petitioners Objections) and # 110 (Petitioner’s Reply to

Respondent’s Objections).

> That judicial filing was preceded by Judge Merz’s

Supplemental Report and Recommendations (Doc. # 111).

Since Judge Merz’s Amended Supplemental Report and

Recommendations (Doc. # 112) superceded his Supplemental

Report and Recommendations (Doc. # 111), the Court does

not discuss the latter filing further.

46a

The requirement for such a certificate is found in 28 U.S.C. §

2253(c), which provides:

(c)(1) Unless a circuit justice or judge issues a

certificate of appealability, an appeal may not be

taken to the court of appeals from-

(A) the final order in a habeas corpus proceeding

in which the detention complained of arises out of

process issued by a State court; or .

[*775] (B) the final order in a proceeding under

section 2255.

(2) A certificate of appealability may issue under

paragraph (1) only if the applicant has made a

substantial showing of the denial of a

constitutional right.

(3) The certificate of appealability under

paragraph (1) shall indicate which specific issue

or issues satisfy the showing required by

paragraph (2).

In Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 146 L. Ed. 2d 542,

120 S. Ct. 1595 (2000), the Supreme Court explained that an

applicant for a certificate of appealability could make “a

substantial showing [**14] of the denial of a constitutional

right,” as required by § 2253(c)(2), in accordance with the

standard adopted in Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 77 L.

Ed. 2d 1090, 103 S. Ct. 3383 (1983).* 529 U.S. at 483-84.

* In Slack, the Supreme Court also held that the Antiterrorism

and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), with

its requirement that a petitioner obtain a certificate of

appealability, was applicable when a appeal was sought after

the effective date of that statute, even though the petition for

a writ of habeas corpus had been requested before that

effective date. 529 U.S. at 481-82. Since an appeal of this

47a

The Slack Court explained that when the District Court has

rejected a petitioner’s constitutional claim on the merits, he

must show that “reasonable jurists would find the district

court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or

wrong.” Jd. at 484. With respect to instances in which the

District Court denies relief on procedural grounds, the Slack

Court held:

When the district court denies a habeas petition on

procedural grounds without reaching the

prisoner’s underlying constitutional claim, a

[certificate of appealability] should issue when the

prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of reason

would find it debatable whether the petition states

a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional nght

and that jurists of reason would find it debatable

whether the district court was correct in its

procedural ruling.

Id. In Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 123 S. Ct. 1029,

154 L. Ed. 2d 931 (2003), [**15] the Supreme Court

reaffirmed the standards for the granting of a certificate of

appealability that had been established in Slack.

Initially, this Court must decide whether the version of

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), added by the Antiterrorism and

Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (““AEDPA”), 110 Stat.

1214, is applicable herein. In Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320,

138 L. Ed. 2d 481, 117 S. Ct. 2059 (1997), the [**16]

Supreme Court held that the amended version of § 2254(d)

did not apply to a request for habeas corpus which was

already pending on the day that the AEDPA became

effective, April 24, 1996. Herein, Franklin’s request for such

Court’s decision will occur after the effective date of the

AEDPA, the requirement that a certificate of appealability be

obtained is applicable herein.

48a

relief was pending on that date, given that he filed his

Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. # 5) on

November 14, 1995. Consequently, the version of § 2254(d)

added with the AEDPA is inapplicable, and this Court

applies the pre-amendment version of § 2254(d). In Mapes v.

Coyle, 171 F.3d 408 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 946,

145 L. Ed. 2d 284, 120 S. Ct. 369 (1999), the Sixth Circuit

reiterated that under the pre-AEDPA version of § 2254(d),

state court findings of historical facts are presumed to be

correct and are rebuttable only in certain circumstances. /d. at

413. Moreover, an individual seeking a writ of habeas corpus

must rebut the presumption of correctness by clear and

convincing evidence. Id.

As a means of analysis, the Court will initially rule

upon Petitioner’s Objections, [*776] following which it will

turn to those submitted by the Respondent. However, since

there is a question as to whether the Petitioner’s [**17]

claims are barred by procedural default, the Court will set

forth the standards it must apply to decide whether a claim is

barred by the doctrine of procedural default, before

addressing the Objections.

I. Standards to Determine Procedural Default

In Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 53 L. Ed. 2d 594,

97 S. Ct. 2497 (1977), the Supreme Court held that, in the

absence of cause and prejudice, a District Court cannot grant

a writ of habeas corpus, when the state courts have refused to

address the merits of a federal constitutional argument, on the

ground that the defendant failed to follow a state procedural

requirement. Thus, in Boyle v. Million, 201 F.3d 711, 716

(6th Cir. 2000), the Sixth Circuit noted that “we have

consistently held that, absent cause and prejudice, ‘a federal

habeas corpus petitioner who fails to comply with a state’s

rules of procedure waives his right to federal habeas corpus

review.’ Gravley v. Mills, 87 F.3d 779, 784-85 (6th Cir.

49a

1996).” In Wickline v. Mitchell, 319 F.3d 813 (6th Cir.

2003), the Sixth Circuit reiterated the four part test, adopted

in Maupin v. Smith, 785 F.2d 135, 138 (6th Cir. 1986),

{[**18] by which a court determines whether a claim has

been procedurally defaulted:

First, the court must determine whether there is a

state procedural rule that is applicable to the

petitioner’s claim and with which the petitioner

failed to comply.[Maupin, 785 F.2d] at 138.

“Second, the court must decide whether the state

courts actually enforced the state procedural

sanction.” /d. Third, the court must determine

whether the state procedural rule “is an adequate

and independent state ground on which the state

can rely to foreclose: review of a_ federal

constitutional claim.” Jd. (internal quotation

marks omitted). “A procedural rule is adequate

only when it is firmly established and regularly

followed at the time it was applied ... [and is] an

independent basis for disposition of a case if the

state courts actually relied on the procedural bar.”

Williams v. Coyle, 260 F.3d 684, 693 (6th Cir.

2001). Finally, if the court answers the first three

questions in the affirmative, it will not review the

procedurally defaulted claim unless the petitioner

can show cause for not following the procedural

rule and actual prejudice resulting from the

alleged constitutional [**19] violation. Maupin,

785 F.2d at 138-39.

Id. at 818 n. 2. Accord, Jamison v. Collins, 291 F.3d 380,

385-86 (6th Cir. 2002); Cooey v. Coyle, 289 F.3d 882, 897-

98 (6th Cir. 2002). This Court must look to the last,

explained state court decision to determine whether a claim

has been procedurally defaulted. Wickline, 319 F.3d at 818.

50a

Il. Petitioner’s Objections (Doc. # 108) to Report and

Recommendations (Doc. # 105) and Petitioner’s Objections

(Doc. # 114) to Amended Supplemental Report and

Recommendations (Doc. # 112)

As is indicated above, the Magistrate Judge

recommended that this Court deny 27 of Petitioner’s 28

claims. The Petitioner has objected to the Magistrate Judge’s

recommendations concerning six of his claims. He has not

objected to Judge Merz’ recommended denial cf the Fourth,

Seventh, Ninth through Twelfth, Fourteenth through

Nineteenth and Twenty-First through Twenty-Eighth

Claims.’ [*777] Based upon its own, independent review of

the record, this Court concurs with Judge Méerz’s

recommendation that the Petitioner be denied relief on those

20 claims. Accordingly, the Court adopts the Report [**20]

and Recommendations (Doc. # 105), as that judicial filing

relates to the Petitioner’s Fourth, Seventh, Ninth through

Twelfth, Fourteenth through Nineteenth and Twenty-First

through Twenty-Eighth Claims. In addition, since the

Petitioner has not shown that reasonable jurists would find

this Court’s assessment of those 20 claims debatable or

* As is indicated previously, Judge Merz recommended that

the Court grant relief to the Petitioner on the aspect of his

First Claim with which he raised the issue of juror bias. See

Footnote |, supra. The Petitioner has not objected to the

recommendation of the Magistrate Judge that he be denied

the requested relief on the remaining aspects of that claim.

Based upon its independent review of the record, this Court

concurs with that recommendation and will decline to issue a

certificate of appealability on same.

Sla

wrong, the Court will not award a certificate of appealability

for any one or more or all of those 20 claims.°

[**21]

The Petitioner has objected to the Initial and Amended

Supplemental Reports and Recommendations with regard to

the Second, Third, Fifth, Eighth, Thirteenth and Twentieth

Claims. As a means of analysis, the Court addresses the

parties’ argument relating to those six claims in the above

order, discussing the Eighth and Thirteenth Claims together,

as does Franklin.

A. Second Claim

With this claim, Petitioner contends that his convictions

and sentences were obtained in violation of the Fifth, Sixth,

Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, because the attorneys

representing him during his trial failed to provide effective

assistance of counsel. In his Objections, the Petitioner

contends that the performance of his trial counsel was

deficient in preparation for the guilt phase of his trial,

because they failed to canvass the neighborhood where

Strauss lived and was murdered. Doc. # 108 at 1-3; Doc. #

114 at 2-4. According to Franklin, such a canvassing would

have led to the discovery of Jay Lazarus, who would have

testified that he had seen someone on the east side of Strauss’

condominium around the time that he was murdered and that

he thinks he saw another individual in the vicinity [**22] of

° Parenthetically, it would be futile to grant a certificate of

appealability on any one or more or all of those 20 claims,

since objecting to a Magistrate Judge’s Report and

Recommendations is a predicate to appellate review. See

Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 88 L. Ed. 2d 435, 106 S. Ct.

466 (1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947, 949-50

(6th Cir. 1981).

S$2a

Strauss’ condominjum later that night. /d. Petitioner states

that neither of the individuals seen by Jay Lazarus looked

like him. In addition, Petitioner contends that his trial counsel

was ineffective because they failed to obtain an expert who

could have challenged the Prosecution’s evidence relating to

the fingerprint retrieved from the champagne bottle in

Strauss’ condominium. Doc. # 108 at 3-6; Doc. # 114 at 4-7.

Franklin also challenges the performance of his counsel

during the penalty phase of his trial. He charges them with

failing to conduct a meaningful investigation prior to the

penalty phase and, thus, failing to introduce the following

evidence, to wit:

1. Franklin’s parents separated when he was an

infant, and his father has had a number of

girlfriends, fathering children with a number of

those relationships. Additionally, Petitioner had

minimal contact with his father during his

childhood, who was uninvolved in his discipline.

2. Franklin also had minimal contact with his

mother, who worked full-time [*778] for Ford

Motor Company as well as other jobs on a part-

time basis. As a consequence, she did not have the

energy to discipline her son and tended to [**23]

give him money and other material objects to

compensate for her lack of personal contact with

him.

3. Since his mother and father did not spend t'me

with Petitioner during his childhood, he was

raised by his grandmother and great grandmother,

who used a “switch” to discipline him.

4. Franklin was a hyperactive child who would

attempt to put sugar on his vegetables. His mother

had to keep him away from sweets.

53a

5. Franklin had a bowel control disorder, which

' persisted into his teenage years and required him

to wear a diaper. This subjected him to ridicule,

and he occasionally skipped school to avoid the

ridicule. ;

6. Petitioner’s mother has a history of psychiatric

illness, including two _ hospitalizations for

depression which occurred after the Petitioner had

been convicted and the jury had recommended

that he be sentenced to death. ’

7. At the age of 15, Franklin was referred to a

rehabilitation program, after having been arrested

for selling marijuana.

8. Petitioner’s mother sent him to live with his

grandfather during his junior year, since she did

not believe that she was abie to provide him with

appropriate discipline. Moving to live with his

grandfather [**24] caused Franklin to transfer

schools. He was unable to keep up with the

demands of his new school, which resulted in his

failing. His failure made him ineligible to

participate in sports which infuriated him.

Franklin lost all motivation for school and began

spending time with his cousin who was no longer

in school and was involved in criminal activities.

Petitioner dropped out of school at the end of his

junior year.

’ The Petitioner was convicted and the jury recommended

that he be sentenced to death in December, 1988. His mother

was hospitalized in 1989 and 1991.

54a

9. The administration of the Wechsler Adult

Intelligence Scale-Revised showed that the

Petitioner’s intellectual functioning fell in the low

average range. In addition, his vocabulary and

mathematical skills are limited. He tends to have

difficulty with abstract concepts, and his poor

performance in school reflects both limited ability

~ and limited skills. An area of potential strength is

Petitioner’s ability to understand social situations

and to establish a conventional response to a

social dilemma. In light of his _ overall

performance, however, it is likely that Petitioner

may have difficulty applying this knowledge and

may act inappropriately in spite of his social

awareness.

10. Petitioner’s employment history included a

stint with a bakery and brief periods [**25] with

different fast food restaurants. His longest period

of employment was for approximately one year in

the dietary department of a nursing home.

Petitioner enjoyed working with and talking to the

elderly residents of that facility. As a

consequence, he pursued certification as a nursing

assistant when he joined the Job Corps.

Doc. # 108 at 7-9; Doc. # 114 at 7-9.

As a means of analysis, the Court will initially set forth

the standards which it must apply to determine whether the

Petitioner’s convictions and sentences are unconstitutional,

due to the alleged ineffectiveness of his trial counsel,

following which it will apply those standards to the [*779]

alleged shortcomings of counsel set forth above.

In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d

674, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984), the Supreme Court set forth the

standards which must be applied whenever [**26] a person

55a

convicted of a crime asserts that he was denied effective

assistance of counsel:

A convicted defendant’s claim that counsel’s

assistance was so defective as to require reversal

of a conviction or death sentence has two

components. First, the defendant must show that

counsel’s performance was deficient. This

requires showing that counsel made errors so

serious that counsel was not functioning as the

“counsel” guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth

Amendment. Second, the defendant must show

that the deficient performance prejudiced the

defense. This requires showing that counsel’s

errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant

of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.

Unless a defendant makes both showings, it

cannot be said that the conviction or death

sentence resulted from a breakdown in the

adversary process that renders the result

unreliable.

Id. at 687. In United States v. Fortson, 194 F.3d 730 (6th Cir.

1999), the Sixth Circuit elaborated upon the first prong of

that test: .

We “presume from the outset that a lawyer is

competent, and[,] therefore, ‘the burden rests on

the accused to demonstrate a constitutional [**27]

violation.’“ Pierce, 62 F.3d 818, 833 (quoting

United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658, 80 L.

Ed. 2d 657, 104 S. Ct. 2039 (1984)). Moreover, in

applying Strickland, “a court must indulge a

strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls

within the wide range of reasonable professional

assistance.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.

56a

The trial process contains a myriad of complex

decisions that, for strategic reasons, are sound

when made, but may appear unsound with the

benefit of hindsight. The defendant, thus, must

“overcome the presumption that, under the

circumstances, the challenged action ‘might be

considered sound trial strategy.” Jd. (citation

Omitted).

Id. at 736.

The Court cannot conclude that the failure of trial

counsel to canvass the neighborhood in which the murder

occurred and, thus, their failure to discover Jay Lazarus,

rendered their performance deficient. As is discussed below,

Petitioner’s trial counsel requested on two occasions that an

investigator be appointed at public expense. However, those

requests were rejected by Judge Winkler. The Petitioner has

cited no authority for the proposition that, [**28] in order to

avoid being deemed to be constitutionally deficient, counsel,

who have unsuccessfully attempted to secure the services of

an investigator, must themselves canvass the neighborhood

in which a crime occurred, in order to discover unknown

witnesses who may be able to provide exculpatory testimony.

This is not an instance where a criminal defendant’s trial

counsel neglect to interview witnesses who have been

identified to them. On the contrary, trial counsel did not

know that Jay Lazarus existed or that he could have provided

testimony which the Petitioner believes to be exculpatory.®

® As is discussed below, the prosecution was aware of Jay

Lazarus. Petitioner contends that the prosecution violated its

obligations under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 10 L. Ed.

2d 215, 83 S. Ct. 1194 (1963), and its progeny, by failing to

disclose the information Jay Lazarus gave to police officers.

That failure is part of the Petitioner’s Eighth and Thirteenth

57a

[**29]

[*780] With respect to the failure of trial counsel to

obtain an expert to challenge the fingerprint evidence, the

Petitioner suggests that the state’s evidence concerning the

fingerprint went unchallenged, as a result of trial counsel’s

failure to secure an expert. Judge Merz concluded that,

assuming for sake of argument that this claim was not

procedurally defaulted, the representation by trial counsel

was not deficient, because they adequately challenged that

evidence through the cross-examuination of the prosecution

witnesses. Doc. # 105 at 203. The Magistrate Judge also

pointed out that the Petitioner had failed to explain what

favorable evidence would have been brought out, if a

fingerprint expert had been retained. /d. Thus, the prejudice

prong of Strickland was not met. /d. This Court agrees with

Judge Merz’s reasoning in that regard and concludes that,

assuming the Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of trial

counsel claim predicated upon their failure to obtain a

fingerprint expert has not been procedurally defaulted, trial

counsel’s performance was not deficient and there is no

showing that the failure to obtain such a witness caused the

Petitioner to suffer prejudice. [**30]

With respect to the alleged shortcomings of trial

counsel in the penalty phase of the trial, some of the

information which Petitioner claims his counsel should have

presented during the penalty phase was presented during that

Claims, which are discussed below. Parenthetically, the

Court concludes that the prosecution did not violate Brady in

that regard, because the information Jay Lazarus would have

provided was not material. Based upon that same reasoning,

the Jay Lazarus information would not be mate: al under a

Strickland analysis.

58a

phase of the trial. Thus, as Judge Merz pointed out, the jury

was informed during the penalty phase that Franklin’s

parents were separated when he was young, that he had a

bowel disorder, that he had moved in with his grandfather

during his teen years as a result of his mother’s inability to

control him and that he enjoyed his job in the nursing home

working with the elderly residents. In addition, the jury was

informed about his overall work history. Doc. # 105 at 209.

The fact that trial counsel failed to present evidence during

the penalty phase of the hospitalizations of Petitioner’s

mother for depression does not constitute deficient

performance, since those hospitalizations occurred, after the

penalty phase of the trial occurred. With respect to the other

alleged shortcomings of counsel, Judge Merz pointed out that

Franklin had the burden of: proving that the performance of

his trial counsel was deficient, as a result of their failure to

conduct an adequate [**31] investigation. Doc. # 105 at 210.

Even though trial counsel testified during the evidentiary

hearing, Judge Merz noted that they were not asked to

describe the steps they took to investigate the mitigation

factors which could be presented to the jury during the

penalty phase or whether any tactical or strategic reasons had

caused them to omit any of these matters from their

presentation to the jury. Jd. Thus, the. Magistrate Judge

concluded that the Petitioner had failed to show that trial

counsel failed to “make some effort at an independent

investigation in order to make a reasoned, informed decision”

(Carter v. Bell, 218 F.3d 581, 596 (6th Cir. 2000)) respecting

the presentation of such evidence during the penalty phase.

This Court concurs fully with the Magistrate Judge’s

reasoning in that regard. Moreover, even if it disagreed, the

Petitioner would not be entitled to the requested relief. A

claim of ineffective assistance of counsel requires that

prejudice be demonstrated, in addition to showing that

counsel’s performance was deficient. Simply stated, this

Court [*781] cannot conclude that the alleged shortcomings

59a

of trial counsel during the penalty phase resulted [**32] ina

trial the result of which was not reliable.

In sum, the Court concludes that the Petitioner was not

denied effective assistance of counsel during his trial.

Accordingly, the Court overrules Petitioner’s Objections

(Docs. # 108 and # 114) to the Report and Recommendations

(Doc. # 105) and Amended Supplemental Report and

Recommendations (Doc. # 112), as they relate to the Second

Claim. However, since “reasonable jurists could find the

district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims

debatable or wrong,” the Court will grant a certificate of

appealability on this claim.

B. Third Claim

With his Third Claim, the Petitioner contends that his

convictions and death sentence are void, because the trial

court refused to appoint an investigator, in violation of the

Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.’ Judge

* In support of this claim, the Petitioner also cites the Equal

Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as

the Fifth, Sixth and Eighth Amendments. Given that this

claim is based upon Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 84 L. Ed.

2d 53, 105 S. Ct. 1087 (1985), wherein the Supreme Court

held that the Due Process Clause requires that the

prosecution provide expert assistance to an indigent

defendant under certain circumstances, and, further, since the

Petitioner has failed to cite authority in support of the other

constitutional provisions, the Court limits its discussion to

the question of whether the denial of an investigator

constituted a denial of due process in violation of the

Fourteenth Amendment. The Petitioner also cites provisions

of Ohio law to support this claim. However, since a federal

court cannot issue a writ of habeas corpus on the basis of “a

perceived error of state law,” (Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37,

60a

Merz recommended that the Court deny this claim, because

the Petitioner had not exhausted it and could not demonstrate

cause and prejudice, given that the failure to appoint an

expert did not deprive him of due process of law. See Doc. #

105 at 53-57. For reasons which follow, this Court agrees.

The Court begins by examining the right the Petitioner

f**33] seeks to enforce with this claim.

[**34]

In Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 84 L. Ed. 2d 53, 105

S. Ct. 1087 (1985), Ake was charged and convicted of two

counts of capital murder. Prior to his trial, Ake’s counsel had

indicated that his client wanted to raise an insanity defense

and requested that the court appoint a psychiatrist or provide

funds for one, since his client was indigent and without funds

to hire such an expert. The trial court denied that request and

the Oklahoma appellate court affirmed. Upon further appeal,

the Supreme Court held that the Due Process Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment mandates that the state provide a

psychiatrist’s assistance to an indigent defendant who “has

made a preliminary showing that his sanity at the time of the

offense is likely to be a significant factor at tral.” Jd. at 74.

Ake had made such a showing, since he was found to be

incompetent to stand trial shortly after having been arrested,

being diagnosed as a paranoid schizophrenic, and was

returned to competence as a result of being prescribed an

antipsychotic drug. In Mason v. Mitchell, 320 F.3d 604 (6th

Cir. 2003), the Sixth Circuit noted that Ake was one of a

number of cases which stand [**35] for the proposition that

“indigent prisoners are constitutionally entitled to the basic

tools of an adequate defense or appeal, when those tools are

41, 79 L. Ed. 2d 29, 104 S. Ct. 871 (1984)), the Court does

not discuss the state law cited by the Petitioner.

6la

available for a price to other prisoners.” Jd. at 615 (internal

quotation ~““782] marks and citation omitted).'°

In C well v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 86 L. Ed. 2d

231, 105 S. Ct. 2633 (1985), a case decided about four

months after Ake, the Supreme Court revisited the issue of

when due process requires that the state pay for expert

assistance to an indigent defendant.'' Therein, the Supreme

Court wrote:

Petitioner also raises a challenge to his conviction,

arguing that there was constitutional infirmity in

the trial court’s refusal to appoint various experts

[**36] and investigators to assist him.

Mississippi law provides a mechanism for state

appointment of expert assistance, and in this case

the State did provide expert psychiatric assistance

to Caldwell at state expense. But petitioner also

requested appointment of a criminal investigator,

a fingerprint expert, and a ballistics expert, and

those requests were denied. The State Supreme

Court affirmed the denials because the requests

were accompanied by no showing as to their

reasonableness. For example, the defendant’s

request for a ballistics expert included little more

than “the general statement that the requested

expert ‘would be of great [necessity].’"“ 443 So.2d

'0 In Mason, a death penalty habeas case, the Sixth Circuit

held that the Ohio Supreme Court had not unreasonably

applied Ake when it denied the petitioner a soil and debris

expert, a shoe-print expert, a mitigation investigator and an

independent mental health expert.

'! Both Ake and Caldwell were written by Justice Marshall.

62a

806, 812 (1983). Given that petitioner offered

little more than undeveloped assertions that the

requested assistance would be beneficial, we find

no deprivation of due process in the trial judge’s

decision. Cf Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 82-

83, 84 L. Ed. 2d 53, 105 S. Ct. 1087(1985)

(discussing showing that would entitle defendant

to psychiatric assistance as matter of federal

constitutional law). We therefore have no need to

determine as a matter of federal constitutional law

what if any showing would have entitled [**37] a

defendant to assistance of the type here sought.

Id. at 323-24 n. 1.

Herein, the Petitioner requested the assistance of an

investigator with a pretrial motion, which indicated, in its

entirety:

Now comes the Defendant, George T. Franklin,

by and through his undersigned counsel, and

hereby states that he is indigent and does so move |

the Court to appoint investigative services, experts’

and any other services as are reasonably necessary

to assist in the proper representation of the

Defendant in the above captioned cause.

Furthermore, Defendant moves the Court that

payment of fees and expenses for said services be

paid at public expense.

Trial Court Docket No. 6. Judge Winkler overruled that ~

motion, and the Petitioner renewed his request during a

pretrial proceeding conducted on November 17, 1988. At that

time, Petitioner’s counsel argued:

The final motion I want to bring to the court’s

attention that’s been previously [**38] overruled

is the motion for investigative services. Quite

63a

frankly, this county doesn’t have the investigative

services that the Public Defender’s Office

probably should have. It’s our position we have

done the best we can do with the limited resources

available to Mr. Schmidt [Petitioner’s co-counsel]

and myself to conduct an investigation and

contact witnesses and check things out, if you

will, but I think in a capital case that there’s no

question when you have a defendant who’s

indigent, who [*783] has appointed counsel, that

investigative services can be extremely beneficial

in tracking down people we can’t find who could

be very essential witnesses to the defense.

In comparison, we have the State of Ohio,

represented by the prosecution, and I don’t

remember exactly how many law enforcement

officials there are in this county anymore,

somewhere around a thousand Cincinnati police

officers who can or could be available to the state

through the auspices of whatever officer they

want to ask. That puts the defense, obviously, at a

distinct disadvantage. So we’re asking the court to

reconsider the granting of the motion for

investigative services so we can, even at this date,

get proper [**39] assistance to help us prepare the

case. ee

Transcript of November 17, 1988 Proceeding at 12-13.

As can be seen, Petitioner’s counsel merely indicated

during the November 17th proceeding that an investigator

could be beneficial in tracking down witnesses who might be

essential. Simply stated, the oral and written statements of

Petitioner’s counsel are “little more than undeveloped

assertions that the requested assistance would be beneficial”

(Caldweil), rather than constituting the preliminary showing

64a

required by Ake. In any criminal prosecution, defense counsel

might state that an investigator could be helpful, as did

Petitioner’s trial counsel. If that constituted the preliminary

showing required in Ake, then the Due Process Clause would

require the appointment of an investigator-to assist every

indigent defendant charged with a crime. In Moore v. Kemp,

809 F.2d 702 (ilth Cir.) (En banc), cert. denied, 481 US.

1054, 95 L. Ed. 2d 847, 107 S. Ct. 2192 (1987), the Eleventh

Circuit rejected such a proposition, writing:

Ake and Caldwell, taken together, hold that a

defendant must demonstrate something more than

a mere possibility of assistance [**40] from a

requested expert; due process does not require the

government automatically to provide indigent

defendants with expert assistance upon demand.

Rather, a fair reading of these precedents is that a

defendant must show the trial court that there

exists a reasonable probability both that an expert

would be of assistance to the defense and that

denial of expert assistance would result in a

fundamentally unfair trial.

Id. at 712. In Thacker v. Rees, 841 F.2d 1127, 1988 WL

19179 (6th Cir. 1988), the Sixth Circuit followed the

analytical framework set forth in Moore. Accord, Frazier v.

Mitchell, 188 F. Supp. 2d 798, 849 (N.D.Ohio 2001).

Since the Petitioner failed to make a preliminary

showing that he needed the assistance of an investigator, this

Court cannot conclude that he suffered a deprivation of due

process, as a result of being denied the appointment of such

assistance at public expense. Accordingly, the Court

overrules Petitioner’s Objections (Docs. # 108 and # 114) to

the Report and Recommendations (Doc. # 105) and

Amended Supplemental Report and Recommendations (Doc.

# 112), as they relate to the Third Claim. Moreover, since no

65a

[**41] “reasonable jurists would find the district court’s

assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong,”

the Court declines to grant a certificate of appealability on

this claim.

C. Fifth Claim

With his Fifth Claim, the Petitioner alleges that his

convictions and sentences are void because he was denied his

right to a representative jury under the Sixth and Fourteenth

Amendments. In particular, he contends that the prosecution

violated [*784] Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 90 L. Ed.

2d 69, 106 S. Ct. 1712 (1986), by using two of its

peremptory challenges to exclude prospective jurors who are

African-Americans. Judge Merz recommended that the Court

deny this claim, because the Petitioner had not exhausted

same, due to his failure to raise it in his direct appeals, and

could not demonstrate cause and prejudice for that default.

The Petitioner had argued that the ineffective assistance of

his appellate counsel, in failing to raise the Batson claim

during his direct appeals, established cause and prejudice.

Judge Merz disagreed, concluding that Franklin had failed to

meet the prejudice prong of a claim of inefft ‘ive assistance

since the prosecution had not violated equal [**42]

protection by exercising those two challenges. See Doc. #

105 at 63-76. For reasons which follow, this Court agrees.

The Court begins by setting forth the standard it must apply

to resolve this claim, following which it examines the facts

and circumstances giving rise to it.

In Batson, the Supreme Court held that the prosecution

violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment, by challenging prospective jurors solely on the

basis of their race. In United States v. Copeland, 321 F.3d

$82, 2003 WL 431897 (6th Cir. 2003), the Sixth Circuit

reviewed the standards which are applicable to a Batson

challenge:

66a

In Ratsan the Synreme Court held that a

prosecutor is precluded from exercising a

peremptory challenge on the basis of race. Under

Batson, once the opponent of a peremptory

challenge has made out a prima facie case of

racial discrimination, the burden shifts to the

government to demonstrate a race-neutral reason

for the exclusion of the juror. The government is

not required to persuade the court that its reasons

for dismissing the juror were well-founded; rather,

it need only demonstrate that its reasons were

race-neutral. United States v. Humphrey, 287 F.3d

422, 438 (6th Cir. 2002). [**43] Once the

government offers a race-neutral justification,

“the challenging party must demonstrate that the

purported explanation is merely a pretext for a

racial motivation.” McCurdy v. Montgomery

County, 240 F.3d 512, 521 (6th Cir. 2001). The

burden of persuasion always rests with the

opponent of the strike. /d.

321 F.3d 582, 599, [WL] at *10. Herein, since the

prosecution was required to identify the race-neutral reasons

for challenging the two prospective jurors and the trial court

ruled on the ultimate question of whether there was

intentional discrimination, the preliminary issue of whether

the Petitioner made a prima facie showing of discrimination

becomes moot. Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 359,

114 L. Ed. 2d 395, 111 S. Ct. 1859 (1991); Lancaster v.

Adams,324 F.3d 423, 2003 WL 1524231 (6th Cir. 2003).

Moreover, it bears emphasis that this Court is ruling upon a

request for a writ of habeas corpus, predicated in part on the

allegation that the prosecution violated Batson by

peremptorily challenging two prospective jurors who are

African-Americans. In Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 131 L.

Ed. 2d 834, 115 S. Ct. 1769 (1995), a habeas [**44] action

67a

raising a Batson challenge, the Supreme Court noted that the

state court’s factual finding of no discrimination is presumed

to be correct. /d. at 769. Accord, Johnson v. Gibson, 169 F.3d

1239, 1248 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 972, 145 L. Ed.

2d 324, 120 S. Ct. 415 (1999); Kelly v. Withrow, 25 F.3d

363, 367 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1061, 130 L. Ed.

2d 607, 115 S. Ct. 674 (1994).

During Petitioner’s trial, at the conclusion of the voir

dire, the parties exercised their peremptory challenges. The

prosecution exercised twu of its challenges to exclude

prospective African-American jurors, Mr. Colston

(“Colston”) [*785] and Mrs. Fowler (“Fowler”).'?

Franklin’s trial counsel objected, and requested that Judge

Winkler require the prosecution put its reasons for exercising

those challenges on the record. Judge Winkler acceded to that

request. The prosecutor explained that, during the first day of

voir dire, Colston had indicated that serving on a jury could

cause him a problem with his employment, that he had heard

something about the case in the media which could cause him

a problem and that he knew some police officers. Trial

Transcript [**45] at 658. However, those problems

'2 The prosecution did not exercise a preemptive challenge to

exclude a third African-American juror. Of course, the

presence of an African-American on the jury does not

preclude a finding that the prosecution excluded other jurors

because of their race. United States v. Harris, 192 F.3d 580,

587 (6th Cir. 1999). Therein, the Sixth Circuit indicated that

the fact that one African-American was seated on the jury,

standing alone, did not warrant the finding that the defendant

had failed to prove that the prosecution had intentionally

discriminated against other jurors on the basis of their race.

Id. The Harris court did not, however, suggest that the fact

that the prosecution allowed one African-American to remain

on the jury was irrelevant to that question.

68a

seemingly disappeared on the second day, when Colston

appeared to the prosecutor to be unusually anxious to be

selected as a juror. Jd. Simply stated, Colston was challenged

because he seemed to be unusually anxious to serve as a

juror. Jd. The prosecutor explained that Fowler had been

challenged because she immediately indicated that she felt

sorry for the defendant, when she learned that she might be

sitting on a death penalty case. /d. at 661. The prosecutor also

explained that Fowler had been challenged, because she had

worked as a cook for a number of years in a synagogue. /d.

Although the prosecutor did not know how she had been

treated in that employment, he assumed that she had been

treated badly at times. Jd. Since the victim was Jewish, the

__ prosecutor decided to challenge Fowler. /d. Based upon the

prosecution’s explanations, Judge Winkler excused each of

the challenged jurors, thus indicating that the prosecution had

not engaged in intentional discrimination by exercising those

peremptory challenges.

[**46]

__ With respect to Colston, the Petitioner argues that other

jurors who expressed similar problems were not the subject

of peremptory challenges exercised by the prosecution. Juror

Bostic admitted that he had an employment conflict, that he

knew police officers and that he had been exposed to media

coverage of the case. Juror Sikorski admitted to the

possibility of employment problems and to exposure of

media coverage. Juror Bergh stated that he had been exposed

to the case at Proctor & Gamble, where he and Strauss had

worked in different divisions of the advertising department,

and that his brother-in-law was a police officer. As the

Petitioner argues, the prosecution did not challenge those

prospective jurors, who were not African-Americans. The

flaw in the Petitioner’s argument is that it is based upon a

misperception of the nature of the prosecutor’s explanation

for challenging Colston. The prosecutor did not challenge

69a

Colston because serving on the jury could cause him an

employment problem, he knew police officers and had been

exposed to the case through pretrial publicity. Rather, the

prosecutor excused Colston because he indicated during the

first day of voir dire that the foregoing [**47] might cause

him problems with jury service, while those problems

seemingly disappeared the second day, which caused the

prosecution to believe that he had an unusual desire to be on

the jury. The Petitioner has not pointed to a single white juror

who underwent a transformation similar to Colston’s, yet was

not peremptorily [*786] challenged by the prosecution. As a

consequence, the Court concludes that the Petitioner has

failed to overcome the presumption of correctness with

respect to Judge Winkler’s decision to permit the prosecutor

to exercise a peremptory challenge and excuse Colston.

With respect to Fowler, the Petitioner has failed to

identify a white, prospective juror who was not peremptorily

challenged by the prosecution after indicating that he or she

felt sorry for the defendant because the death penalty was

being sought. Nevertheless, the Petitioner points out that

Fowler also indicated that she felt sorry for the victim.

However, the Petitioner has not pointed to a white,

prospective juror who was not challenged by the prosecution,

after indicating that he or she felt sorry for both the Petitioner

and the victim. Thus, the prosecution’s initial reason for

challenging Fowler [**48] was race-neutral. It bears

emphasis that, in Batson, the Supreme Court said that a

prosecutor’s explanation for exercising a particular

peremptory challenge need not rise to the level justifying the

exercise of a challenge for cause. 476 U.S. at 97. See also,

United States v. Tucker, 90 F.3d 1135, 1142-43 (6th Cir.

1996). Therefore, the fact that Fowler may have been

impartial, due to her feeling sorry for both the Petitioner and

the victim, is not dispositive of the Batson question. The

other stated reason for challenging Fowler, that she may have

70a

been treated badly during her employment in synagogues,

thus causing her to be unsympathetic to Strauss, the Jewish

victim, is in part a product of the prosecutor’s imagination,

since he conceded that he did not know how she had been

treated in her employment. Nevertheless, that reason is race-

neutral, given that the Petitioner has not identified a similarly

situated white, prospective juror who was not peremptorily

challenged by the prosecutor. Accordingly, the Court

concludes that the Petitioner has failed to overcome the

presumption of correctness with respect to Judge Winkler’s

decision to permit [**49] the prosecutor to exercise a

peremptory challenge and excuse Fowler.

Accordingly, the Court overrules Petitioner’s

Objections (Docs. # 108 and # 114) to the Report and

Recommendations (Doc. # 105) and Amended Supplemental

Report and Recommendations (Doc. # 112), as they relate to

the Fifth Claim. However, since “reasonable jurists could

find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional

claims debatable or wrong,” the Court grants a certificate of

appealability on this claim.

D. Eighth and Thirteenth Claims

With these two claims, the Petitioner contends that the

prosecution violated its obligations under Brady v. Maryland,

373 U.S. 83, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215, 83 S. Ct. 1194 (1963), and its

progeny, by withholding favorable evidence from him. Judge

Merz recommended that this Court reject the Respondent’s

assertion that these claims are procedurally defaulted and

deny them on the merits.'? As a means of analysis, this Court

will briefly review the jurisprudence pertaining to Brady and

13

The Respondent has not objected to the Magistrate

Judge’s recommendation that the Court decline to find these

claims procedurally defaulted.

Tla:

its progeny, following which it will turn to the parties’

arguments concerning this issue.

[**50]

As the Sixth Circuit has noted, Brady did not create a

general constitutional right to discovery in criminal cases;

rather, the rule established therein “is concerned only with

cases in which the government possesses information which

the defendant does not, and the government’s [*787] failure

to disclose the information deprives the defendant of a fair

trial.” United States v. Mullins, 22 F.3d 1365, 1371 (6th Cir.

1994). Brady imposes upon the government “an obligation

‘to turn over evidence in its possession that is both favorable

to the accused and material to guilt ... ““ United States v.

Phillip, 948 F.2d 241, 249 (6th Cir. 1991) (quoting

Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 57, 94 L. Ed. 2d 40,

107 S. Ct. 989 (1987)) (emphasis supplied by the Sixth

Circuit). In Schledwitz v. United States, 169 F.3d 1003 (6th

Cir. 1998), the Sixth Circuit elaborated upon the materiality

requirement of Brady:

When the defendant, as in this case, asserts that

the newly discovered Brady evidence is

exculpatory, the defendant will be entitled to a

new trial if he shows that the favorable evidence

at issue was “material.” United States v. Frost,

125 F.3d 346, 382 (6th Cir. 1997). [**51] In

Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 131 L. Ed. 2d 490,

‘115 S. Ct. 1555 (1995), the Supreme Court

clarified the “materiality” analysis. The Court

explained that a showing of materiality does not

require the suppressed evidence in question

establish the defendant’s innocence by a

preponderance of the evidence. Rather, the

“question is not whether the defendant would

more likely than not have received a different

72a

verdict with the evidence, but whether in its

absence he received a fair trial, understood as a

trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence.”

Id. at 434; Frost, 125 F.3d at 382-83. Nor does the

defendant need to “demonstrate that after

discounting the inculpatory evidence in light of

the undisclosed evidence, there would not have

been enough left to convict.” Kyles, 514 U.S. at

434-35; United States v. Smith, 316 U.S. App.

D.C. 199, 77 F.3d 511, S515 (D.C.Cir. 1996)

(materiality requirement is not a sufficiency-of-

the-evidence test).

Instead, any favorable evidence, regardless of

whether the defendant has made a request for such

evidence, is “material” if “there is a reasonable

probability that, had the [**52] evidence been

disclosed to the defense, the result of the

proceeding would have been different.” Kyles,

514 U.S. at 433-34 (quoting United States v.

Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682, 87 L. Ed. 2d 481, 105

S.- Ct. 3375 (1985)); Frost, 125 F.3d at 382. A

“reasonable probability” is “a probability

sufficient to undermine confidence in_ the

outcome.” Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682; United States

v. Presser, 844 F.2d 1275, 1281 (6th Cir. 1988).

Moreover, in determining whether undisclosed

evidence is material, the suppressed evidence is

considered collectively, rather than item-by-item,

to determine if the “reasonable probability” test is

met. Kyles, 514 U.S. at 436; Frost, 125 F.3d at

383.

Id. at 1011-12. In addition, “Brady recognizes no distinction

between evidence which serves to impeach a government

witness’ credibility and evidence which is_ directly

exculpatory of the defendant. Both are ‘evidence favorable to

73a

the accused’ and must be disclosed.” Mullins, 22 F.3d at

1372. See also Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154, 31

L. Ed. 2d 104, 92 S. Ct. 763 (1972) [**53] (“When the

‘reliability of a given witness may well be determinative of

guilt or innocence,’ nondisclosure of evidence affecting

credibility falls within [Brady]’’). The Sixth Circuit has said

that “no Brady violation exists where a defendant ‘knew or

should have known the essential facts permitting him to take

advantage of any exculpatory information.”“ United States v.

Clark, 928 F.2d 733, 738 (6th Cir.) (quoting United States v.

Grossman, 843 F.2d 78, 85 (2nd Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488

U.S. 1040, 102 [*788] L. Ed. 2d 988, 109 S. Ct. 864 (1989)),

cert. denied, 502 U.S. 846, 116 L. Ed. 2d 110, 112 S. Ct. 144

(1991). See also, Mullins, 22 F.3d at 1371-72 (“Brady is

concerned only with cases in which the government

possesses information which the defendant does not, and the

government’s failure to disclose the information deprives the

defendant of a fair trial’); United States v. Todd, 920 F.2d

399, 405 (6th Cir. 1990). Moreover, the Sixth Circuit has

indicated that there is no violation of Brady, unless the

undisclosed materials would have led directly to the

discovery of admissible evidence. Phillip, 948 F.2d at 249-

50. [**54]

The Petitioner argues that the prosecution violated

Brady and its progeny, by failing to disclose exculpatory

information and information which he could have used to

impeach prosecution witnesses. In his Objections, the

Petitioner asserts that the prosecution violated Brady by

withholding evidence that someone other than himself was

spotted near the scene of the murder around the time it

occurred, evidence which could have been used to impeach

important witnesses and by withholding evidence that a

jailhouse informant was offered a deal in exchange for his

testimony. Doc. # 108 at 22; Doc. # 114 at 22. The Petitioner

contends that the cumulative effect of this evidence

74a

undermines confidence in the verdict and, therefore, warrants

habeas relief. Jd. As a means of analysis, the Court will

address these contentions in the above order.

During their investigation of the murder of Strauss,

police officers interviewed Jay Lazarus (“Lazarus”), a

student at Cincinnati Technical College who lived near

Strauss’ residence. Lazarus stated that he had walked to a

local grocery store at about midnight on Sunday, August 7,

1988, although he was not positive about the time.'* On the

[**55] way back to his apartment, Lazarus had seen an

African-American male on the east side of Strauss’

condominium.’ Lazarus described that individual as being

about thirty years of age and 5’6”, as well as having a stocky

build and curly middle length hair. Lazarus also reported that

he believed that he was awakened by a noise later that night

and looked out and saw a different African-American male in

a wooded area behind Strauss’ residence, where some

property which had been stolen therefrom was subsequently

found.

Petitioner argues that the prosecution violated Brady by

failing to disclose the information Lazarus had provided to

police, because that information could have been used to

convince the jury [**56] that someone else had murdered

Strauss. Judge Merz recommended that the Court reject this

aspect of Petitioner’s Brady claim, because the information

provided by Lazarus was not material. Doc. # 105 at 105-06.

'4 Strauss was last seen by a neighbor around 11:00 p.m., on

Saturday, August 6, 1988; therefore, Lazarus may have seen

the individual on the east side of Strauss’ condominium

around the time of the murder.

'S One could enter Strauss’ condominium from the east side

where the patio was located.

75a

Judge Merz pointed out that there is nothing in the record

which indicates that the description of the first person seen

by Lazarus was incompatible with Franklin in August, 1988.

- Although Franklin was only twenty-two years of age during

that month and Lazarus indicated that the first person he saw

appeared to be thirty, there is no evidence in the record that

the Petitioner did not appear to be a thirty year old person in

August, 1988. In. other words, Petitioner’s premise that the

first person Lazarus saw was someone other than himself is

not borne out by the record. Lazarus was not certain of the

date upon which [*789] he saw the other individual,

although he thought he saw that individual on August 8th, as

well. Since it is not known whether the first person seen by

Lazarus matched the Petitioner’s description and on what

date he saw the second person, the Court agrees with Judge

Merz that “there is [no] reasonable probability that, had the

evidence [provided by Lazarus] [**57] been disclosed to the

defense, the result of the proceeding would have been

different.” Kyles, 514 U.S. at 433-34. Accordingly, that

information is not material and the failure to disclose it did

not violate Brady.

During the trial, Michael Turnbolt (“Turnbolt”) testified

on behalf of the prosecution that he spent the evening, upon

which Strauss was murdered, doing drugs with the Petitioner,

who left around 10:30 p.m. Turnbolt next saw the Petitioner

the following morning around 2:30. At that time, the

Petitioner had changed his shirt and had a number of $ 20

bills, which he had not’ possessed earlier that

evening. “Turnbolt did not inform police officers of the

'© Turnbolt’s testimony that Franklin possessed a number of

$ 20 bills implicated the Petitioner in the murder of Strauss,

because other evidence introduced at trial established that a

money clip and currency belonging to Strauss had been

stolen during the burglary of his condominium.

76a

matters about which he testified until shortly before the

Petitioner’s trial commenced. The Petitioner contends that

the prosecution violated Brady by failing to disclose

information which could have been used to impeach

Turnbolt. In particular, Franklin points out that officers were

told by Ron Jones (“Jones”) that Steve Boseman

(“Boseman”) had indicated that he was an acquaintance of

Franklin and that property stolen from Strauss’ residence was

located in an apartment on Woodburn Avenue. Turnbolt

[**58] lived in an apartment located at 2712 Woodburn

Avenue. Petitioner contends that the information that

someone had indicated that property stolen from Strauss was

located in an apartment on Woodburn Avenue could have

been- used to impeach Turnbolt, since it might have shown

that Turnbolt had a motive to provide false testimony against

the Petitioner. Although the Petitioner does not identify

Turnbolt’s motive to testify falsely, the Court assumes that it

would be to implicate the Petitioner and, thus, to direct the

officers’ attention away from his (Turnbolt’s) connection

with the theft of Strauss’ possessions and, perhaps, his

murder.

Judge Merz concluded that the information Jones had

supplied to police officers was not material. [**59] See

Doc. # 105 at 104-05. This Court agrees with that conclusion

and adopts same. The information police had received from

Jones was hearsay, and did not mention Turnbolt. Moreover,

Petitioner has not supplied any admissible evidence, tending

to establish that property stolen from Strauss’ apartment was

stored at Turnbolt’s apartment on Woodburn. Thus, it bears

emphasis that the prosecution failed to disclose speculation

supported only by hearsay. The Petitioner has failed to

suggest how that speculation could have been used at trial.

See Phillip, supra (indicating that there is no violation of

77a

Brady, unless the undisclosed materials would have led

directly to the discovery of admissible evidence). Petitioner

could have asked Turnbolt if property stolen from Strauss

was located in his apartment on Woodburn. However, it

should be noted that the Petitioner’s theory is that Turnbolt

testified falsely during the trial and that the information

supplied by Jones could be used to impeach him. Accepting

for present purposes that Turnbolt testified falsely in order to

direct police [*790] attention away from his participation in

the burglary of Strauss’ residence, there is [**60] no reason

to believe that Turnbolt would have experienced an epiphany

' and decided to tell the truth merely because Petitioner’s

counsel asked him on cross-examination whether property

taken from Strauss’ residence was located in his apartment

on Woodburn. Thus, the Court cannot conclude that “there is

a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed

to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been

different.” Ky/es, 514 U.S. at 433-34.

During Petitioner’s trial, Larry Weaver (“Weaver”),

who was incarcerated with Franklin prior to his trial, testified

on behalf of the prosecution. Petitioner contends that the

prosecution violated Brady, because it failed to disclose that

Weaver had been offered consideration in exchange for his

testimony. At trial, Weaver testified that the prosecution had

not offered him anything in exchange for his testimony.

Judge Merz recommended that the Court reject the

Petitioner’s claim based upon Weaver, because there was no

evidence that Weaver had lied during his testimony or that

the prosecution had offered him anything in exchange for

it.'’ Doc. # 105 at 116-17. This Court agrees with the

'’ The Petitioner had supported this claim with an affidavit

from Warren Coaston, who was also incarcerated with

Franklin. Coaston indicated that he had testified falsely

before the Grand Jury that Franklin had confessed, in

78a

reasoning of the [**61] Magistrate Judge in that regard and

adopts same. Accordingly, it rejects the Petitioner’s argument

that the prosecution violated Brady by failing to disclose

promises made to Weaver in exchange for his testimony.

Considering the foregoing information withheld by the

prosecution both individually and collectively, the Court

concludes that “there is [no] reasonable probability that, had

the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the

proceeding would have [**62] been different.” Kyles, 514

U.S. at 433-34. Therefore, the information which the

prosecution withheld was not material. Consequently, the

prosecution did not violate its obligations under Brady.

Accordingly, the Court overrules Petitioner’s Objections

(Docs. # 108 and # 114) to the Report and Recommendations

(Doc. # 105) and Amended Supplemental Report and

Recommendations (Doc. # 112), as they relate to the Eighth

and Thirteenth Claims. However, since “reasonable jurists

could find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional

claims debatable or wrong,” the Court grants a certificate of

appealability on these claims.

E. Twentieth Claim

With this claim, the Petitioner alleges that his

convictions and sentences are void, because the trial court

improperly instructed the jury during the guilt phase of the

trial, in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth

exchange for help from the prosecutor concerning the

charges pending against him (Coaston). Coaston did not

testify during Petitioner’s trial. The Petitioner also provided

an affidavit from Robert Penebaker, who indicated that he

had been threatened by prosecutors because he had refused to

testify against Franklin.

79a

Amendment.'* The Petitioner initially set forth four alleged

errors in jury instructions. In [*791] his Objections,

however, he challenges only the manner in which Judge

Winkler instructed the jury on the meaning of “purpose.” See

Doc. # 108 at 31-32; Doc. # 114 at 32-33. Based upon [**63]

its own independent review of the record, this Court concurs

with Judge Merz’s recommendation that the Petitioner be

denied relief on the other three grounds of the Twentieth

Claim. Accordingly, the Court adopts the Report and

Recommendations (Doc. # 105), as that judicial filing relates

to the assertions in Petitioner’s Twentieth Claim that the trial

court improperly defined “foreseeability,” and “reasonable

doubt,” and that its preliminary instruction on the capital

specification was improper. In addition, since the Petitioner

has not shown that reasonable jurists would find this Court’s

assessment of those issues claims debatable or wrong, the

Court will not award a certificate of appealability for any one

or more or all of them. The Court now turns to the

Petitioner’s one objection on this claim, that Judge Winkler

unconstitutionally defined “purpose.”

[**64]

Judge Merz recommended that the Court reject the

Respondent’s assertion that the Petitioner had procedurally

defaulted this claim and that the Court deny relief to the

Petitioner on the merits. The Respondent has failed to object

=

'8 In support of this claim, the Petitioner also cites the Fifth,

Sixth and Eighth Amendments. However, since this claim is

based upon Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 512, 61 L.

Ed. 2d 39, 99 S. Ct. 2450 (1979), which held that jury

instructions which create conclusive presumptions of an

element of an offense violate the Due Process Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment, the Court need not address the other

constitutional provisions further.

80a

to the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge that this

claim is not procedurally defaulted. For reasons which

follow, the Court concurs with the recommendation of Judge

Merz on the merits of this claim.

Under Ohio Revised Code § 2903.01(B), the

prosecution was obligated to prove, beyond a reasonable

doubt, that the Petitioner acted with the purpose to kill.

Petitioner contends that Judge Winkler’s instructions created

a conclusive presumption on that mens rea element. Judge

Winkler instructed the jury that to find the Defendant guilty,

the jury would be required to find that Franklin “purposely

caused the death of Gerald R. Strauss.” Trial Transcript at

1261. Judge Winkler then defined “purpose:”

Purpose to cause death is an essential element of

the crime of aggravated murder. A person acts

purposely when it is his specific intention to cause

a certain result. It must be established in this case

that at the time in question [**65] there was

present in the mind of the defendant a specific

intention to kill Gerald R. Strauss while the

defendant was committing aggravated burglary.

A person acts purposely when the gist of the

offense is a prohibition against conduct of a

certain nature, regardless of what the offender

intends to accomplish thereby, if it is his specific

intention to engage in conduct of that nature.

Purpose is a decision of the mind to do an act with

a conscious objective of producing a specific

result or engaging in specific conduct. To do an

act purposely is to do it intentionally and not

accidentally. Purpose and intent mean the same

thing.

8la

Now the purpose with which a person does an act

is known only to himself, unless he expresses it to

others or indicates it by his conduct.

So, the purpose with which a person does an act

or brings about a result is determined from the

manner in which it was done, the means or

weapon used and all of the other facts and

circumstances in evidence.

However, if a wound is inflicted upon a person

with a deadly weapon in a manner calculated to

destroy life or inflict great bodily harm, the

purpose to kill may be inferred from the use of the

weapon.

Proof of [**66] motive is not required. The

presence or absence of motive is one of [*792]

the circumstances bearing upon purpose. Where

an act is a crime, a good motive or purpose is not

a defense.

Id. at 1261-63. The Petitioner argues that the foregoing

instruction told the jury that “purpose is determined: from the

use of a weapon.” Doc. # 108 at 31; Doc. # 114 at 32

(emphasis in the original).'? Since this Court does not

interpret the language employed by Judge Winkler in the

same manner as does the Petitioner, he is not entitled to relief

on this claim. Rather, the only fair interpretation of Judge

Winkler’s jury instruction is that purpose may be inferred

from the use of the weapon, rather than being determined

'? The Petitioner also argues that the second paragraph from

the instructions on purpose, quoted above, was unnecessary

under state law. Since this Court 1s without authority to grant

a writ of habeas corpus for violations of state law (Pulley v.

Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 41, 79 L. Ed. 2d 29, 104 S. Ct. 871

(1984)), it declines to address that argument.

82a

from same. Moreover, as is discussed below, this claim lacks

legal support.

[**67]

According to Franklin, such an instruction created a

conclusive presumption on the question of whether he acted

with the purpose to kill Gerald Strauss. In support of this

assertion, he relies upon Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S.

510, 61 L. Ed. 2d 39, 99 S. Ct. 2450 (1979). Therein,

Sandstrom was convicted of deliberate homicide, which was

defined by Montana law as purposely or knowingly taking

the life of another. Over Sandstrom’s objection, the trial

court instructed the jury that “the law presumes that a person

~antends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts.”

After the Montana Supreme Court had affirmed the

conviction, Sandstrom appealed to the United States

Supreme Court, arguing that the quoted instruction had

denied him the right to due process of law, because it created

a conclusive presumption on the mens rea element. In

Sandstrom, the United States Supreme Court agreed that the

jury instruction had violated due process by creating a

conclusive presumption. In accordance with Roberts v.

Marshall, 736 F.2d 1126 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469

U.S. 1193, 83 L. Ed. 2d 974, 105 S. Ct. 970 (1985), this

Court concludes that Sandstrom is [**68] distinguishable. In

Roberts, the petitioner, after having been convicted of murder

in violation of Ohio law, sought a writ of habeas corpus,

arguing, inter alia, that the manner in which the trial court

had defined “purpose” violated Sandstrom. The instruction

given in Roberts was virtually identical to that utilized by

Judge Winkler, except that the Roberts instruction also told

\UCthe jury that “[a] person is presumed to have a purpose or

design behind his voluntary acts, unless his actions are

otherwise explained by the evidence.” 736 F.2d at 1127. The

Sixth Circuit held that this instruction was distinguishable

from that given in Sandstrom, since the jury was not

83a

informed that it must apply a presumption or that the

petitioner had a burden of proof. Jd. at 1128.

Since Sandstrom is distinguishable in accordance with

Roberts, this Court cannot conclude that Petitioner suffered a

deprivation of due process, as a result of the manner in which

“purpose” was defined in the instructions given to the jury

during his trial. Accordingly, the Court overrules Petitioner’s

Objections (Docs. # 108 and # 114) to the Report and

Recommendations [**69] (Doc. # 105) and Amended

Supplemental Report and Recommendations (Doc. # 112), as

they relate to the Twentieth Claim. Moreover, since no

“reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment

of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong,” the Court

declines to [*793] grant a certificate of appealability on this

claim.

III]. Respondent’s Objections (Doc. # 106)

Judge Merz recommended that the Court grant the

Petitioner a writ of habeas corpus on his Sixth Claim, with

which he alleged that his convictions and sentences were

void, because service on the jury by a biased juror deprived

him of the right to a fair and impartial jury, as guaranteed by

the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The

Petitioner failed to present this claim during his direct

appeals in_ state court. Nevertheless, Judge Merz

recommended that this Court find that the Petitioner had

shown cause and prejudice to excuse this procedural default,

as a result of the ineffective assistance rendered by his

appellate counsel in failing to raise the issue during

Franklin’s direct appeals. Judge Merz also recommended that

the Court conclude that the Petitioner is entitled to the

requested relief on this [**70] claim, because his convictions

and sentences were unconstitutional due to the presence of a

biased juror. The Respondent has objected to the Magistrate

Judge’s recommendations, arguing both that the Petitioner’s

84a

Sixth Claim is barred by procedural default and that he is not

entitled to relief on the merits of this claim, even if it has not

been defaulted.

The Magistrate Judge wrote twenty pages on this claim

in his Report and Recommendations (See Doc. # 105 at 76-

96) and an additional five pages on it in his Amended

Supplemental Report and Recommendations (See Doc. # 112

at 2-6). He also wrote twenty-five pages, resolving the

question of whether Franklin’s appellate counsel failed to

provide effective assistance of counsel, imcluding a

discussion of the question of whether appellate counsel were

ineffective in failing to raise the biased juror issue during

Petitioner’s direct appeals. See Doc. # 105 at 174-99. The

discussion of the Petitioner’s Sixth Claim and the ineffective

assistance of appellate counsel, set forth in the Magistrate

Judge’s Report and Recommendations and Amended

Supplemental Report and Recommendations, is thorough,

comprehensive, well written and adequately [**71]

addresses the arguments raised by the Respondent in his

Objections (Doc. # 106). Therefore, although this Court has

conducted a de novo review of those arguments and the

record before it, there is no need to “reinvent the wheel”

through a written discussion of the Petitioner’s Sixth Claim

and the parties’ arguments in support of and in opposition to

same. Rather, based upon the reasoning, citations of authority

and reference to the record in this matter set forth by Judge

Merz in his Report and Recommendations (Doc. # 105) and

in his Amended Supplemental Report and Recommendations

(Doc. # 112), the Court overrules the Respondent’s

Objections (Doc. # 106). The Magistrate Judge’s judicial

filings are adopted as they relate to the Sixth Claim and to the

aspect of the First Claim which is predicated on the presence

of a biased juror. The Court will, however, briefly comment

on one of the Petitioner’s arguments.

85a

The Respondent argues that the Magistrate Judge was

incorrect in his recommendation that the procedural default

of the Sixth Claim is excused by cause and prejudice,

because raising a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate

counsel is not the same as raising the underlying [**72]

biased juror claim. See Doc. # 106 at 6-7. Although the Court

agrees with Respondent that raising a claim of ineffective

assistance of counsel is not the same as raising the underlying

claim, it cannot agree that this is the basis for concluding

[*794] that procedural default of the Petitioner’s Sixth Claim

is not excused. In Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 146

L. Ed. 2d 518, 120 S. Ct. 1587 (2000), the Supreme Court

reiterated that a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel can

serve as cause and prejudice, excusing a procedural default

on the underlying claim (i.e., the sequela of the ineffective

assistance), as long as the ineffective assistance claim itself

has not been procedurally defaulted. Based upon the

reasoning and citations of authority set forth by Judge Merz

in his Report and Recommendations, this Court concludes

that the Petitioner did not procedurally default his ineffective

assistance of appellate counsel claim. Moreover, since the

Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that Franklin’s

appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to

raise the juror bias issue during his direct appeals, it

concludes that Petitioner has demonstrated cause and

prejudice, [**73] excusing the failure to raise the issue

during his direct appeals. Additionally, the decisions relied

upon by the Respondent, Lott v. Coyle, 261 F.3d 594, 612

(6th Cir. 2001) and Buell v. Mitchell, 274 F.3d 337, 361 (6th

Cir. 2001), do not cause this Court to conclude that the

Petitioner failed to establish cause and prejudice. Thus, the

merits of his Sixth Claim may be addressed and resolved.

Based upon the foregoing, the Court overrules the

Respondent’s Objections (Doc. # 106) to the Report and

Recommendations (Doc. # 105) of the Magistrate Judge.

86a

| In sum, the Court concludes that, based upon his Sixth

Claim and the aspect of his First Claim predicated upon

failure of appellate counsel to raise the biased juror issue

during his direct appeals, the Petitioner is entitled to a

conditional writ of habeas corpus, which will result in his

release from custody if he is not retried within 180 days. The

Court adopts the Report and Recommendations (Doc. # 105)

and Amended Supplemental Report and Recommendations

(Doc. # 112) of the Magistrate Judge, as supplemented

herein.

The Court directs that judgment be entered in favor of

the Petitioner and against [**74] the Respondent on the

Sixth Claim and the aspect of his First Claim predicated upon

failure of appellate counsel to raise the biased juror issue

during his direct appeals, and in favor of the Respondent and

against the Petitioner on all other claims.

It is anticipated that Petitioner will seek leave to appeal

in forma pauperis. Such a motion will be granted. The

Petitioner is granted a certificate of appealability on his

Second, Fifth, Eighth and Thirteenth Claims.

The captioned cause is hereby ordered terminated upon

the docket records of the United States District Court for the

Southern District of Ohio, Western Division, at Dayton.

March 31, 2003

WALTER HERBERT RICE,

CHIEF JUDGE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

JUDGMENT IN A CIVIL CASE

DECISION BY COURT: This action came to trial or

hearing before the Court. The issues have been tried or heard

and a decision has been rendered.

87a

IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED: that judgment is

entered in favor of the Petitioner and against the Respondent

on the sixth claim and a portion of the first claim and in favor

of the Respondent and against the Petitioner on the remaining

claims.

Date: March 31, 2003

88a

APPENDIX D

GEORGE T. FRANKLIN,

Petitioner,

v.

CARL S. ANDERSON, Warden,

Respondent.

Case No. C-1-95-1007

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO, WESTERN DIVISION

2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26814

August 21, 2002, Decided

Petitioner George T. Franklin brings this habeas corpus

action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. [*2] In 1988, Franklin

was tried and convicted of one count of aggravated murder

with a capital specification in violation of Ohio Rev. Code §

2903.01(B) and 2929.04(A)(7), and two counts of aggravated

burglary in violation of Ohio Rev. Code § 2911.11. The trial

court adopted the jury’s recommendation that Franklin be

sentenced to death on the aggravated murder conviction.

State v. Franklin, No. B-884127 (Court of Common Pleas,

Hamilton County filed Jan. 11, 1989). He was also sentenced

to two consecutive terms of ten to twenty-five years of

imprisonment with ten years’ actual incarceration on each of

the burglary convictions.

89a

In his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and its

amendment, Franklin pleads the following twenty-eight

grounds for relief: '

1. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment guarantees a habeas corpus petitioner

effective assistance of appellate counsel.

Prejudicially deficient performance by appellate

counsel during Petitioner’s direct appeals violates

Petitioner’s rights to effective assistance of

counsel as guaranteed by the Eighth and

Fourteenth Amendments.

2. Petitioner Franklin’s [*3] convictions and

sentence are void or voidable because he was

denied the effective assistance of trial counsel in

violation of his Sixth Amendment rights to

counsel and his rights to due process guaranteed

by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United

States Constitution.

3. Petitioner Franklin’s conviction and sentence

are void and/or voidable because the trial court

failed to appoint an investigator in Mr. Franklin’s

capital case. The trial court denied Petitioner

Franklin his nght{s] due process, equal protection,

effective assistance of counsel, statutory rights

and rights under the Ohio Supreme Court’s Rules

of Superintendence for Courts of Common Pleas,

1

Here, and in the account of the issues raised in the state

court proceedings that follows, the Court has, for ease of

reading, converted issues presented in all capital letters to

lower case with appropriate capitalization. All other

corrections or changes to the text of the issues are indicated

within each claim or ground for relief, assignment of error, or

proposition of law.

90a

under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth

Amendments to the United States Constitution

when it failed to provide him with expert

assistance as those services were reasonably

necessary to insure adequate trial representation.

4. Petitioner Franklin’s death sentence is

unreliable and inappropriate because he was

denied the procedural safeguard of a meaningful,

independent review of the jury’s death

recommendation by the trial court in violation of

the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth

Amendments to the United States [*4]

Constitution.

5. Petitioner Franklin’s convictions and sentences

are void or voidable because the trial court denied

him his right to a representative jury and equal

protection under the Sixth and Fourteenth

Amendments to the United States Constitution.

6. Petitioner Franklin’s convictions and sentences

are void or voidable because the service of a

biased juror on the jury in Petitioner’s case

violated his right[s] to trial by a fair and impartial

jury and to due process as guaranteed by the Sixth

and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States

Constitution.

7. Petitioner Franklin’s convictions and sentences

are void or voidable because the trail [sic] court

denied Petitioner’s motion to sever the charge of

aggravated burglary . . . [of] Rosha Winston[‘s

apartment] from the charges of aggravated murder

and aggravated burglary . . . [of] Gerald Strauss

[and his apartment, respectively]. The trial court

denied Petitioner his rights under the Sixth,

9la

Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United

States Constitution.

8. Petitioner Franklin’s conviction and sentence

are void and/or voidable because the State of Ohio

failed to provide relevant discovery of [*5]

potentially exculpatory evidence and

impeachment evidence at the guilt phase of his

trial.

9. Petitioner Franklin’s conviction and sentence

are void and/or voidable because Ohio’s

reviewing courts failed to fulfill their statutory

obligation to meaningfully review the

proportionality of Petitioner Franklin’s death

sentence.

10. Petitioner Franklin’s conviction and sentence

are void and/or voidable because the policies

adopted and procedures employed by the

Hamilton County Prosecutor’s Office in seeking

and securing capital convictions and death

sentences violate [the] Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and

Fourteenth Amendments to the United States

Constitution. As a result, Petitioner Franklin’s

convictions and death sentence are

constitutionally infirm.

11. Petitioner Franklin’s conviction and sentence

are void and/or voidable because the Ohio death

penalty scheme, on its face and as applied in this

case, violates the United States Constitution.

12. Petitioner Franklin’s convictions and

sentences are void and/or voidable because he was

convicted and sentenced on insufficient State’s

evidence in violation of his nghts under the

92a

Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United

[*6] States Constitution ...

13. Petitioner Franklin’s conviction and sentence

are void and/or voidable because the State of Ohio

failed to disclose impeaching information which

undermined the credibility of its witnesses

including jailhouse informant Larry Weaver.

14. Petitioner Franklin’s convictions and

sentences are void or voidable because the trial

court violated Petitioner’s right against self-

incrimination in violation of the Fifth and

Fourteenth Amendments.

15. Petitioner Franklin’s conviction and sentence

are void and/or voidable because the procedures

and instructions of the trial court during voir dire

skewed this entire capital proceeding in favor of

guilt verdicts and of the death penalty in violation

of the Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments

to the United States Constitution.

16. Petitioner Franklin’s convictions and

sentences are void or voidable because he was

denied the procedural safeguard of a meaningful,

independent review of the Jury’s. death

recommendation, and of the trial court’s review

by the Court of Appeals in violation of the Fifth,

Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the

United States Constitution.

17. Petitioner Franklin’s [*7] conviction and

sentence are void and/or voidable because the trial

court and the State of Ohio interfered with

Petitioner’s right to effective assistance of counsel

by denying access to and failing to disclose

93a

exculpatory information material to the guilt

phase of the proceedings.

18. Petitioner Franklin was denied his right to a

fair trial by an impartial jury as guaranteed by the

Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United

States Constitution because the trial court failed to

excuse for cause several biased jurors.

19. Petitioner Franklin’s convictions and

sentences are void or voidable because the trial

court denied Petitioner’s request for lesser

included offense instructions on murder and

involuntary manslaughter in violation of the Sixth,

Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United

States Constitution.

20. Petitioner’s convictions and sentences are void

or voidable because the trial court improperly

instructed the jury at the trial phase in violation of

the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth

Amendments to the United States Constitution.

21. Petitioner Franklin’s convictions and

sentences are void and/or voidable because the

trial court failed to keep [*8] a complete record

of the proceedings.

22. Petitioner Franklin’s convictions and

sentences are void or voidable because the

admission of prejudicial evidence of prior bad acts

at the trial phase violated Petitioner’s right to due

process and a fair trial [sic] as guaranteed by the

Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments

to the United States Constitution.

23. Petitioner. Franklin’s convictions and

sentences are void or voidable because the trial

court improperly excluded several prospective

94a

jurors under the wrong standard in violation of

Petitioner’s rights under the Fourteenth

Amendment.

24. Petitioner Franklin’s convictions and

sentences are void or voidable because the State

interjected irrelevant and prejudicial evidence

about the victim into Petitioner’s trial phase in

violation of State Rules of Evidence and the Sixth,

Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United

States Constitution.

25. Petitioner Franklin’s convictions and

sentences are void or voidable because the

admission of hearsay evidence violated

Petitioner’s rights of confrontation of witnesses

and due process under the Sixth and Fourteenth

Amendments to the United States Constitution.

26. [*9] Petitioner Franklin’s rights to a fair trial,

a reliable death sentence and to due process under

the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and _ Fourteenth

Amendments were violated because prejudicial

evidence was introduced at his tral. Petitioner’s

convictions and sentences are therefore void or

voidable.

27. Petitioner Franklin was denied his rights to a

fair trial, to due process and to a reliable death

sentence by the State’s improper arguments and

tactics throughout this trial. Accordingly,

Petitioner’s rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth

and Fourteenth Amendments were violated and

his convictions and sentences are void or

voidable.

28. Petitioner Franklin’s death sentence is void or

voidable because of erroneous instructions to the

95a

jury at the penalty phase of his capital trial that

violated Petitioner’s rights under the Sixth, Eighth

and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States

Constitution.

(Docket Nos. 5 and 25.)

[*10]

Some familiarity with the facts in Franklin’s case will

facilitate an understanding of and provide context for the

Court’s description of the proceedings in the state courts and

the analysis that follows. Thus, the Court will set forth some

of the relev

This text is long and has been trimmed here. Open the source document for the complete record.

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Appendix — Houk v. Franklin (No. 06-513) | Frix