Petition for Writ of Certiorari — District of Columbia Water and Sewer Authority Authority Authority v. Friends of the Earth, Inc. (No. 06-119)

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FILED

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No. 05-5015 {6-119 JUL 21 2006

In T he OFFICE OF Tine CLEAK

Supreme Court of the Anited States

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

WATER AND SEWER AUTHORITY,

Petitioner,

Vv.

FRIENDS OF THE EARTH, INC.,

Respondent.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals

for the District of Columbia Circuit

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Avis Marié Russell David E. Evans |

General Counsel E. Duncan Getchell, Jy.

District of Columbia Water Stewart T. Leeth

and Sewer Authority (Counsel of Record)

5000 Overlook Avenue, SW MCGUIREWOODS LLP

Washington, D.C. 20032 One James Center

901 East Cary Street

Richmond, Virginia 23219

(804) 775-1000

Counsel for Petitioner

LANTAGNE LEGAL PRINTING

801 East Main Street Suite 100 Richmond, Virginia 23219 (800) 847-0477

Se ee I ee eee ee ingest

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

Zs Whether the decision below. barring the

Environmental Protection Agency and the states from

establishing TMDLs on an annual, seasonal or other

appropriate basis, which rests on the appearance of the

word “daily” in the undefined term “total maximum daily

load,” contravenes. basic principles of statutory

interpretation as reflected in the decisions of this Court and

those of other circuit courts.

é Whether the decision below _ barring the

Environmental Protection Agency and the states from

expressing maximum pollution loads for impaired water

bodies on an annual, seasonal or other appropriate basis

leads to absurd and unjust results.

ii

PARTIES TOC THE PROCEEDINGS

Friends of the Earth, Inc. appeared as plaintiff in the

proceedings below, the judgment in which veview is sought.

The United States Environmental Protection Agency

appeared as defendant. The District of Columbia Water and

Sewer Authority (“WASA”) appeared as_ intervenor-

defendant. National Association of Clean Water Agencies

and the CSO Partnership appeared as amici curiae. All

parties, intervenors and amici appearing before this Court

are the same as those before the courts below.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

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PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI ..........000. 1

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CONSTITUTIONAL, STATUTORY, AND

REGULATORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED IN THE CASE

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REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION ................. 10

I. The D.C. Circuit’s Decision Barring The Environmental

Protection Agency And The States From Establishing

TMDLs On An Annual, Seasonal Or Other Appropriate

Basis Conflicts With Principles Of Statutory Interpretation

Adopted By This Court And Is In Direct Conflict With A

Decision of the Second Circuit. ....................ccccsccseseesesencesseee 10

II. The D.C. Circuit’s Decision Barring The Environmental

Protection Agency And The States From Establishing

TMDLs On An Annual, Seasonal Or Other Appropriate

Basis Leads To Absurd Results As Concluded By The

UN COMIN ens icsiesSsi ces cisiv aside naira stasis Neebensisactpinvicsanconss 17

III. This Case Involves An Important Question of Federal

Law Concerning the Breadth and Scope of the TMDL

Requirement That Has Not Been, But Should Be, Settled

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Organization,

MMS NTs QR) CIE Oh inenacoxisonstnosiccastenaovaconeplinienongindnginusaespinobon 21

Chem. Mfrg. Ass'n. v. NRDC,

META dhe AO ENDO E scretocitncs eoiiucsonnicepasotban oereciominbagones iSopnetion 22

Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States,

RR i BOT Ce vsisgnackicccssssca bea tuctdinksecelsuesssoontocsdastarniesavss 17

Comm'r. of Internal Revenue v. Engle,

Te, De CEI is icin tases cies Ue bccpc cents tiopleschlpsecdaspeteecaedaaen 21

Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Costle,

is 2g) fos ge egos ¢ BA te Mes oe 8 8 Menon ceoerammrinc ore pier rn 754)

FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,

Rt ADs RAAT MMO Fo oserrscdns icons cuanlssogapanentadesaneunseaesanneoians 11,5

Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Environmental Protection Agency,

De Me LEIS CAE ZIG) crc crcsscnsisssatsenennssinvicnevaipbintbovenies 8

Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Environmental Protection Agency,

346 F. Sapp. 2d 182 (DDC. 2004) vnecsovesessissdeotasssiorsencone 9, 12

Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Environmental Protection Agency,

446 F.3d 140 (D.C. Cir. 2006).......:ccceccseesees 159, 10; 32, 35, 23

Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc.,

UES Oink cacecec ecsestdes Sane anicas ides 18

Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Muszynski,

268 FS 92 (28 Cir, 2OG1) ac scsicssesecossnsossorsannis 9, 10, 16, 18, 22

Vv

United States v. Haggar Apparel Co.,

SD Bris TER CRP) visveiivoesniisinendtinmsbaitirnccecedtcenbiveiectinnenteelianes 12

United States v. Kirby, 74 U.S. 482 (1869).........cecsccseeseees 17-18

United States v. Riverside Homes, Inc.,

eth BR CAD ich chscntesaia canis hicavceadinsabeoieadscbcludbadiaustscisois 22

STATUTES AND REGULATIONS

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MUSt BO. 7

SSUSC. CIDINOIION) se 7

WOUGC BUS 27

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SURO BS 6

US. Daa Boos AR Sr arses Reco Sata 13, 15

SC. S190. 8

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MISCELLANEOUS

Combined Sewer Overflow Control Policy,

59 Fed. Reg. 18,688 (Apr. 19, 1994).......c.cvczsessssssesseesss 13, 14,15

U. S. Environmental Protection Agency, Report to

Congress -- Implementation and Enforcement of the

Combined Sewer Overflow Control Policy at ES-5,

EPA B33-R-O1-00S, (Dec. 2007) onic ce scceossancinssnsshccoocscacsvencs 13

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

WASA petitions for a writ of certiorari to review the

decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the

District of Columb*a Circuit in Friends of the Earth, Inc. v.

Environmental Pr » on Agency, 446 F.3d 140 (D.C. Cir.

2006). WASA .. an independent authority of the

Government of the District of Columbia created in 1996 by

the United States and the Government of the District of

Columbia to distribute drinking water and _ provide

wastewater collection and treatment to citizens and

businesses in the metropolitan Washington, D.C. area.

WASA operates the wastewater collection and treatment

system for the District of Columbia, including the Blue

Plains advanced wastewater treatment plant. Blue Plains

serves portions of surrounding areas, including Fairfax

County, Virginia, Loudoun County, Virginia, Montgomery

County, Maryland, and Prince Georges County, Maryland,

in addition to the District of Columbia. The service area for

Blue Plains covers approximately 735 square miles.

OPINION BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals (App. 1a-13a) is

reported at 446 F.3d 140. WASA did not request panel and

en banc rehearing. The court of appeals’ mandate is

included in the Appendix (App. 1c).

JURISDICTION

This case was filed in the district court pursuant to

the Administrative Procedure Act. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551, et seq.

The APA entitles “[a] person suffering legal wrong because

of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by

agency action . . . to judicial review thereof.” Id. § 702.

Under the APA, a reviewing court must set aside an agency

2

action only where it is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of

discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” Id. §

706(2)(A). Jurisdiction was under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

Friends of the Earth appealed the district court's

decision to the court of appeals, which entered its judgment

on April 25, 2006.

This Court has jurisdiction to review the decision of

the court of appeals by way of certiorari pursuant to 28

~ USC. § 1254(1).

CONSTITUTIONAL, STATUTORY, AND

REGULATORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

IN THE CASE

Article I, § 1, of the United States Constitution

provides in pertinent part that “{alll legislative Powers

herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United

States...”

Clean Water Act § 303(d), 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)

provides:

(d) Identification of areas with insufficient

controls; maximum daily load; certain

effluent limitations revision.

(1)(A) Each State shall identify those waters

within its boundaries for which the effluent

limitations required by section 1313(b)(1)(A)

and section 1313(b)(1)(B) are not stringent

enough to implement any water quality

standard applicable to such waters. The State

shall establish a priority ranking for such

waters, taking into account the severity of the

3

pollution and the uses to be made of such

waters.

(B) Each State shall identify those waters or

parts thereof within its boundaries for which

controls on thermal discharges under section

1311 of this title are not stringent enough to

assure protection and propagation of a

balanced indigenous population of shellfish,

fish, and wildlife.

(C) Each State shall establish for the waters

identified in paragraph (1)(A) of this

subsection, and in accordance with the

priority ranking, the total maximum daily

load, for those pollutants which the

Administrator identifies under section

1314(a)(2) of this title as suitable for such

calculation. Such load shall be established at

a level necessary to implement the applicable

water quality standards with seasonal

variations and a margin of safety which takes

into account any lack of knowledge

concerning the relationship between effluent

limitations and water quality.

(D) Each State shall estimate for the waters

identified in paragraph (1)(B) of this

subsection the total maximum daily thermal

load required to assure protection and

propagation of a balanced, indigenous

population of shellfish, fish and wildlife.

Such estimates shall take into account the

normal water temperatures, flow rates,

seasonal variations, existing sources of heat

input, and the dissipative capacity of the

identified waters or parts thereof. Such

estimates shall include a calculation of the

maximum heat input that can be made into

each such part and shall include a margin of

safety which takes into account any lack of

knowledge concerning the development of

thermal water quality criteria for such

protection and propagation in the identified

waters or parts thereof.

(2) Each State shall submit to the

Administrator from time to time, with the

first such submission not later than one

hundred and eighty days after the date of

publication of the first identification of

pollutants under section 1314(a)(2)(D) of this

title, for his approval the waters identified

and the loads established under paragraphs

(1)(A), (1)(B), (1)(C), and (1)(D) of this

subsection. The Administrator shall either

approve or disapprove such identification

and load not later than thirty days after the

date of submission. If the Administrator

approves such identification and load, such

State shall incorporate them into its current

plan under subsection (e) of this section. If

the Administrator disapproves such

identification and load, he shall not later than

thirty days after the date of such disapproval

identify such waters in such State and

establish such loads for such waters as he

determines necessary to implement the water .

quality standards applicable to such waters

and upon ‘uch _ identification and

establishment the State shall incorporate

5

them into its current plan under subsection

(e) of this section.

(3) For the specific purpose of developing

information, each State shall identify all

waters within its boundaries which it has not

identified under paragraph (1)(A) and (1)(B)

of this subsection and estimate for such

waters the total maximum daily load with

seasona] variations and margins of safety, for

those pollutants which the Administrator

identifies under section 1314 (a)(2) of this title

as suitable for such calculation and for

thermal discharges, at a level that would

assure protection and propagation of a

balanced indigenous population of fish,

shellfish and wildlife.

(4) Limitations on revision of certain effluent

limitations. )

(A) Standard not attained. For waters

identified under paragraph (1)(A) where the

applicable water quality standard has not yet

been attained, any effluent limitation based

on a total maximum daily load or other waste

load allocation established under this section

may be revised only if (i) the cumulative

effect of all such revised effluent limitations

based on such total maximum daily load or

waste load allocation will assure the

attainment of such water quality standard, or

(ii) the designated use which is not being

attained is removed in accordance with

regulations established under this section.

6

(B) Standard attained. For waters identified

under paragraph (1)(A) where the quality of

such waters equals or exceeds levels

necessary to protect the designated use for

such waters or otherwise required by

applicable water quality standards, any

effluent limitation based on a total maximum

daily load or other waste load allocation

established under this section, or any water

quality standard established under this

section, or any other permitting standard

may be revised only if such revision is subject

to and consistent with the antidegradation

policy established under this section.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This case involves the important question of the

EPA’s and the states’ statutory authority to control the levels

of pollutants that may be released into lakes, rivers and

streams where Clean Water Act permit limitations and other

controls imposed on localities and commercial activities do

not bring those water bodies into attainment with the water

quality standards.

Congress adopted the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C.

§§ 1251, et seq., “to restore and maintain the chemical,

physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters,”

id. at § 1251 and, to that end, created two overarching, but

complementary, strategies within the statute. The primary

strategy focuses upon limiting the amounts of pollutants

discharged from a pollution source through the issuance of

permits containing technology-based effluent limitations.

Id. at § 1342.

7

The other, secondary, strategy is the Act’s focus on

water quality standards. See Environmental Defense Fund,

Inc. v. Costle, 657 F.2d 275, 279 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (noting that

the Clean Water Act “assigned secondary priority to the

standards and placed primary emphasis upon both a point

source discharge permit program and federal technology-

based effluent limitations”). Sections 303(a) through (c) of

the Act direct the states, with federal approval and

oversight, to adopt and maintain water quality standards for

surface waters. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1313(a)-(c). States designate the

use or uses for which each waterway is to be protected (e.g.,

recreation, propagation of fish) ai d determine the levels of

water quality need to support the designation. Id. at §

1313(c)(2)(A).

Section 303(d), the provision at issue in this case,

requires each state to identify those waters that will not

achieve water quality standards after application of

technology-based controls and effluent limitations. Id. at §

1313(d). For such waters (known as “water quality limited

segments” or “WQLS”), states must establish pollutant

loadings - called “Total Maximum Daily Loads” (“TMDLs”)

- for each pollutant of concern at a level necessary to

implement the applicable water quality standard. Id. at §

1313(d)(1)(A), (C).

Congress did not define the term TMDL but did

recognize that it equals the maximum concentration of a

pollutant in a waterbody and is calculated “at a level

necessary to implement the applicable water quality

standards with seasonal variations and a margin of safety

which takes into account any lack of knowledge concerning

the relationship between effluent limitations and water

quality.” Id. at § 1313(d)(1)(C). EPA's regulations define a

TMDL for a pollutant as the sum of (1) the “wasteload

8

allocations” allocated to point sources;! (2) the “load

allocations” allocated to nonpoint sources or natural

background; and (3) a margin of safety. 40 C.F.R. § 130.2(i).

EPA regulations allow TMDLs to be expressed “in terms of

_ either mass per time, toxicity, or other appropriate

measure,” 40 C.F.R. § 130.2(i), including, for example,

annual or seasonal measures. EPA’s approval of TMDLs is

based upon a detailed scientific analysis and modeling of

the particular pollutants of concern and water bodies at

issue.

In 1998, the District of Columbia determined that the

Anacostia River was in violation of the District’s water

quality standards for dissolved oxygen and_ turbidity

(muddy or cloudy conditions). After assessing the

conditions of the river, the pollutants of concern -

biochemical oxygen demand (“BOD”) and total suspended

solids (“TSS”) - and after complex scientific modeling, the

District adopted, and EPA approved, a BOD TMDL

measured on an annual basis and EPA established a TSS

TMDL measured on seasonal average daily concentrations.

In 2003, Friends of the Earth filed suit against the

EPA in the D.C. Circuit, claiming that both the BOD and the

TSS TMDLs were insufficient for achieving the District's

water quality standards and that EPA acted arbitrarily in

approving them. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Environmental

Protection Agency, 333 F.3d 184 (D.C. Cir. 2003). The D.C.

Circuit dismissed the action for lack of subject-matter

jurisdiction. Friends of the Earth then filed suit in the

district court for review pursuant to the APA. On

consideration of that complaint and of the parties’ cross-

' A “point source” is “any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance

... from which pollutants are or may be discharged.” 33 U.S.C.

§ 1362(14). “Nonpoint sources” are sources of pollutants that are not

“point sources,” such as runoff from fields.

9

motions for summary judgment, the district court held the

“TMDL locution ambiguous in the context of the Clean

Water Act as a whole” and, “because sufficient evidence

exists [in the Administrative Record] that the TMDLs [at

issue] were reasonably calculated to achieve daily water

quality standards,” EPA and WASA’s motions for summary

judgment should be granted. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v.

Environmental Protection Agency, 346 F. Supp. 2d 182, 185

(D.D.C. 2004).

On appeal of the district court’s decision, the D.C.

Circuit found that all TMDLs must be expressed only as a

quantity of a pollutant over a 24-hour day, despite the

recognition in the Act that some events are seasonal and

despite EPA’s and the States’ longstanding and previously _

unchallenged interpretation of the TMDL requirement,

reversing the district court. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v.

Environmental Protection Agency, 446 F.3d 140, 148 (D.C. Cir.

2006).

As discussed below, the D.C. Circuit’s decision is in

direct conflict with basic principles of statutory construction

as reflected in prior decisions of the Supreme Court. The

decision is also is in direct conflict with the decision of the

United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in

Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Muszynski, 268 F.3d

91 (2d Cir. 2001). There, the Second Circuit held on virtually

identical facts that the application of pollutant load on a

strictly daily basis, based merely on the use of the word

“daily” in the phrase “total maximum daily load,” is

“absurd.” Id. at 99. The Second Circuit held that TMDLs

may be “expressed by another measure of mass per time,

where such an alternative measure best serves the purpose

of effective regulation of pollutant levels in waterbodies.”

Id. Of course, any such alternative expression results in a

10

daily average even though that daily average is too blunt an

instrument to itself serve as an effective regulatory standard.

The D.C. Circuit’s decision creates an intercircuit

conflict on an issue of substantial public importance —- the

ability of EPA and each State to regulate literally “hundreds

of different pollutants in thousands of different

waterbodies” in the United States. Id. at 97. The decision

also places into irreconcilable dispute the ability of

businesses and government agencies that treat and

discharge wastewater to obtain consistent and reasonable

regulation. In particular, requirements imposed upon

dischargers in the District of Columbia could be different

from those imposed by neighboring states for the very same

water bodies.

WASA now seeks the review of this Court.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

I. The D.C. Circuit’s Decision Barring The

Environmental Protection Agency And The States

From Establishing TMDLs On An _ Annual,

‘Seasonal Or Other Appropriate Basis Conflicts

With Principles Of Statutory Interpretation

Adopted By This Court And Is In Direct Conflict

With A Decision of the Second Circuit.

The panel below found that the appearance of the

word “daily” in the phrase “total maximum daily load”

means that Congress expressly intended that all TMDLs be

measured on a 24-hour basis. 446 F.3d at 146 (App. 2a). This

semantic assessment violates basic principles of statutory

construction espoused by the Court. When read in context,

the circuit court’s decision cannot be sustained.

11

This Court has held that “i]t is a ‘fundamental canon

of statutory construction that the words of a statute must be

read in their context and with a view to their place in the

overall statutory scheme.” FDA v. Brown & Williamson

Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000) (citation omitted). “In

determining whether Congress has specifically addressed

the question at issue, a reviewing court should not confine

itself to examining a particular statutory provision in isolation.

The meaning - or ambiguity — of certain words or phrases

may only be evident when placed in context.” Id. at 132

(emphasis added). For example, in Brown & Williamson, the

Court looked at the “core objectives” of the Food, Drug &

Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”) before finding that the FDA did not

have jurisdiction or authority to regulate tobacco as a

“drug” under the FDCA. Id. at 133, 161. Both this Court

and the D.C. Circuit have held that the complexity of the

Clean Water Act militates in favor of judicial deference to

EPA's statutory construction. Environmental Defense Fund,

Inc. v. Costle, 657 F.2d 275, 292 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (“Courts have

held that the Clean Water Act is to be given a reasonable

interpretation which is not parsed and dissected with the

meticulous technicality applied in testing other statutes and

instruments.”).

Contrary to these principles, the D.C. Circuit

plucked a single word - “daily”- from its context as an

undefined term in § 303(d) and elevated it to the definitive

standard. When placed in context with the rest of § 303 as

well as the entire Clean Water Act, and not reviewed in

isolation, the word “daily” cannot have the seminal

meaning and importance attached to it by the circuit court.

As the district court correctly concluded, “the term ‘daily’

from ‘total maximum daily load’ should not be read in

isolation as a sacred signifier and bring an end to judicial

review.” Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Enviremental Protection

Agency, 346 F. Supp. 2d 182, 190 (D.D.C. 2004).

12

When read in context with of the rest of section

303(d)(1)(C), a TMDL must be established at a “level

necessary to implement the applicable water quality

standards” and must take “seasonal variations and a margin

of safety” into account. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1)(C). Thus, the

statute expressly provides that TMDLs must be expressed in

terms that are appropriate for the characteristics of both the

waterbody at issue and the particular pollutant(s) of

concern. This simply does not ordain that “daily” is the

exclusive measurement for all possible pollutants for all

waterbodies throughout the United States.

The D.C. Circuit did not directly address this

argument. Instead, it said only that this “cannot be night.”

Friends of the Earth v. Environmental Protection Agency, 446

F.3d 140, 145 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (App. 6a). On the contrary,

when placed in context with the rest of the section, EPA’s

interpretation is reasonable. An agency's construction of its

governing statute is given “controlling weight” not only

where the agency attempts to “fill{] a gap” in the statute, but

also where the agency “’defines a term in a way that is

reasonable in light of the legislature's revealed design.’”

United States v. Haggar Apparel Co., 526 U.S. 380, 392 (1999)

(citations omitted). The Haggar Court observed that a

statute may still “be ambiguous, for purposes of Chevron

analysis, without being inartful or deficient,” noting that

“Congress need not, and likely cannot, anticipate all

circumstances in which a general policy must be given

specific effect.” Id.

Also, when read in context with other sections of the

Clean Water Act, the D.C. Circuit’s new, judicially-created

TMDL definition could preclude implementation of

substantial portions of that Act. For example, Congress

adopted section 402(q) of the Clean Water Act to regulate

13

discharges of pollutants from combined sewer systems? and

directed that each permit, order or decree issued pursuant

to the Clean Water Act for a discharge from a combined

sewer must conform to the Combined Sewer Overflow

Control Policy (“CSO Policy”).3 33 U.S.C. § 1342(q)(1). The

D.C. Circuit’s decision, if sustained, is fundamentally

inconsistent with Congress’ approach to combined sewer

overflow (“CSO”) control, as reflected in the CSO Policy.

The CSO Policy provides that each local government

with a combined storm and sanitary sewer system - like the

District - must develop and implement a Long Term CSO

Control Plan (“LTCP”) that achieves compliance with

applicable water quality standards. Combined Sewer

Overflow Control Policy, 59 Fed. Reg. 18,688, 18,691 (Apr.

19, 1994). The CSO Policy recognizes that CSO discharges

are intermittent, rainfall-driven events, and, therefore, the

CSO Policy promotes and encourages a flexible, site-specific

approach to CSO control. Id. This approach is designed to

2 A combined sewer system (“CSS”) carries both sewage, and during wet

weather, storm water run off. Like many older cities in the United States,

the District’s sewer system consists of both separate and combined

systems. Approximately one-third of the District (12,487 acres) is served

by the CSS, which is located mostly in the older, central portion of the

city.

3 The Record before the lower courts showed there are nearly 800 CSO

communities nationwide, including the District of Columbia. U. S.

Environmental Protection Agency, Report to Congress -- Implementation

and Enforcement of the Combined Sewer Overflow Control Policy at ES-

5, EPA 833-R-01-003, (Dec. 2001) (“CSO Report to Congress”). When EPA

developed the CSO Policy, it acknowledged that CSOs were a substantial

water quality challenge which had been in existence for well over a

century in most older, urban areas in the United States. The CSO Policy

established for the first time a consistent national framework that

recognized the site-specific controls needed to address CSO impacts on

local waterbodies, and the financial challenges facing cities to cost-

effectively control CSOs. Combined Sewer Overflow Control Policy, 59

Fed. Reg. 18,688 (Apr. 19, 1994).

14

take into account site-specific conditions such as individual

sewer system characteristics, topography, geology, and

rainfall that affect CSO discharge volume, frequency,

duration, intensity, and pollutant loads. See, e.g., id. at

18,691-92.

The D.C. Circuit’s decision requiring that TMDLs be

expressed only on a daily basis directly conflicts with the

CSO Policy. For example, a basic element of the CSO

Policy’s permit provisions is a requirement that permits

issued after LTCP development include “numeric

performance standards for the selected CSO controls, based

on average design conditions.” Id. at 18,696. (Emphasis added).

Further, the CSO Policy’s long term control planning

process requires an evaluation of control alternatives

leading up to the selection of a final control plan:

[T]he long-term CSO control plan [should]

consider a reasonable range of alternatives.

The plan should, for example, evaluate

controls that would be necessary to achieve

zero overflow events per year, an average of

one to three, four to seven, and eight to

twelve overflow events per year.

Alternatively, the long-term plan could

evaluate controls that achieve 100% capture,

90% capture, 85% capture, 80% captuze, and

75% capture for treatment.

Id. at 18,692. Also, the CSO Policy gives CSO communities

the option of developing a LTCP that, when implemented,

provides for (1) no more than an average of four overflow

events per year; (2) elimination or capture for treatment of

no less than 85 percent by volume of the combined sewage;

or (3) elimination or removal of no less than 85 percent of

the mass of pollutants in the combined discharge. Id. at

15

18,692-93. Nationwide, only one half of the documented

LTCPs identify sewer separation as one of the anticipated

CSO control measures to be implemented. More than 200

CSO communities will employ CSO control measures that,

consistent with Congressiona] intent, contemplate some

continued CSO discharges after LTCP implementation. See

CSO Report to Congress at 6-19 and 6-20.

Thus, the control alternatives and options in the CSO

Policy authorize continued CSO discharges following LTCP

implementation provided water quality standards are

attained. None of these alternatives are consistent with the

concept of a 24-hour load because they recognize that in the

case of wet weather-driven discharges such as CSOs, water

quality standards compliance is not dependent on the

amount of pollutants discharged over a 24-hour period.

The D.C. Circuit discounted § 402(q) as “’post-

enactment legislative history’” because it was not part of the

original enactment of the Clean Water Act. Friends of the

Earth, Inc., 446 F.3d at 147 (citation omitted) (App. 11a). In

fact, § 402(q) is not legislative history; rather, it is a part of

the fabric of the Clean Water Act. Moreover, the court’s

interpretation runs directly contrary to this Court’ analysis

in Brown & Williamson, where the Court examined several

statutes governing tobacco products enacted subsequent to

the FDCA in order to determine whether the FDCA

provided authority to regulate tobacco as a “drug.” Brown

& Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. at 137-38.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second

Circuit has rejected the interpretation of the term “daily”

adopted by the D.C. Circuit and the notion that TMDLs can

only be expressed in terms of a 24-hour day. Natural

Resources Defense Council, Inc., v. Muszynksi, 268 F.3d 91, 98

(2d Cir. 2001). There, the Second Circuit said:

16

We believe, however, that the term “total

maximum daily load" is susceptible to a

broader range of meanings. Indeed,

NRDC’s overly narrow reading of the

statute loses sight of the overall structure

and purpose of the CWA. The CWA

contemplates the establishment of TMDLs

for an open-ended range of pollutants that

are susceptible to effective regulation by

such means. See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1)(c)

(noting that states must establish TMDLs

for all "pollutants which the Administrator

identifies . . . as suitable for such

calculation"). In the case of each pollutant,

effective regulation requires agencies to

determine how the pollutant enters,

interacts with, and, at a certain level or

under certain conditions, adversely impacts

an affected waterbody. In the case of highly

toxic pollutants that may work harmful

effects upon a _ waterbody almost

immediately when present at small levels,

close regulation at a daily level may be most

appropriate. In the case of other pollutants,

like phosphorus, the amounts waterbodies

can tolerate vary depending upon the

waterbody and the season of the year, while

the harmful consequences of excessive

amounts may not occur immediately. In

short, the CWA's effective enforcement

requires agency analysis and application of

information concerning a broad range of

pollutants. We are not prepared to say

Congress intended that such far-ranging

agency expertise be narrowly confined in

17

application to regulation of pollutant loads

on a Strictly daily basis. Such a reading

strikes us as absurd, especially given that

for some pollutants, effective regulation

may best occur by some other periodic

measure than a diurnal one.

Id. at 98-99. WASA submits that the Second Circuit's

analysis is correct and, unlike the D.C. Circuit’s opinion

below, is consistent with this Court’s rules for statutory

construction.

Il. The D.C. Circuit’s Decision Barring The

Environmental] Protection Agency And The States

From Establishing TMDLs On An Annual,

Seasonal Or Other Appropriate Basis Leads To

Absurd Results As Concluded By The ‘Second

Circuit.

Another basic principle virtually ignored in the D.C.

Circuit’s opinion is that a court must avoid statutory

interpretations that lead to absurdities or unjust results, if

alternate, reasonable interpretations may be found. See

Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 460

(1892). “General terms should be so limited in their

application as not to lead to injustice, oppression, or an

absurd consequence. It will always, therefore, be presumed

that the legislature intended exceptions to its language,

which would avoid results of this character.” United States

v. Kirby, 74 U.S. 482, 486-87 (1869). See Griffin v. Oceanic

Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 575 (1982). (“It is true that

interpretations of a statute which would produce absurd

results are to be avoided if alternative interpretations

consistent with the legislative purpose are available.”) As

explained above, the Second Circuit has already found that

18

a 24-hour interpretation is “absurd.” Muszynski, 268 F.3d at

99.

Here, the D.C. Circuit’s decision leads to the same

absurd and unjust results described by the Second Circuit.

In particular, the decision could result in drastically

different water quality-based requirements for discharges in

the District of Columbia (which is in the D.C. Circuit) from

those originating in adjacent states (which are in the Fourth

Circuit) for the very same water bodies.

Moreover, the decision could lead to dramatically

increased costs for ratepayers, extended and widespread

disruptions, and poorer water quality if it is applied to require

daily load caps on CSO discharges. For example, the

Administrative Record before the lower courts in the

present case demonstrated that, in accordance with the CSO

Policy, WASA identified a number of control alternatives

during the development of its LTCP. Studies conducted in

connection with preparation of the LTCP found that in order

to totally eliminate CSO discharges and thereby achieve a

BOD waste load allocation which imposed a daily load cap,

the combined sewer system would have to be completely

separated. WASA’s LTCP also concluded that complete

separation of the combined sewer system would not be

economically or technically feasible as it would lead, in part,

to the following.

° Disruption — Separation essentially

involves constructing a duplicate

sewer system for the central one

third of the District. Sewer

construction would be necessary in

every neighborhood and in the vast-

majority of streets in each

neighborhood. Disruption

associated with construction would

19

be significant, widespread, and long

lasting...

Impacts to Private Property — the

majority of buildings in_ the

combined sewer area have roof

drains and gutters discharging to the

building sanitary system, which in

turn discharges to the combined

sewer system. Separation on private

property would thus be required.

Past separation experience in the

District and in other cities has

shown that obtaining access and

permission from private property

owners can be difficult, time

consuming, and, in some cases, not

achievable....

Technical Difficulty - Other cities

have discovered some separation

projects to be much more difficult to

construct that [sic] originally

anticipated. In some cases, the

efforts to separate sewer systems

have been abandoned. Part of the

reason for this is that there are many

unknowns involved in working with

sewer systems which have been

constructed over a long period of

time. Records showing the location

and nature of existing facilities may

not exist. Costs and difficulties of

construction can be much greater

than originally anticipated

depending on what is actually

20

discovered. Public opposition to

such a. program may increase as

actual construction proceeds.

JA 529-530; pp. 8-23 to 8-24.

WASA’s LTCP found also that complete separation

of the combined sewer system would provide less water

quality benefit to the Anacostia than the final plan because

separation diverts more water to the storm water system.

The LTCP explains how this, in turn, can adversely affect

water quality.

[T]he separate storm water system delivers

pollutants to the receiving waters

practically every time it rains, thereby

adversely impacting water quality a great

many times per year. With a high degree of

CSO control, the loads is [sic] only delivered

to the receiving water between 2 and 12

times per year (depending on the degree of

control selected). Even though the overall

load may be somewhat higher, CSO

discharges have a more limited impact

because they are occurring far less

frequently than storm water discharges

which occur more than 70 times per average

year.

JA 530; p. 8-24.

Thus, the D.C. Circuit’s interpretation could result in

increased pollutant loadings to the Nation’s waters and

contravene the basic purposes of the Clean Water Act,

which is “to restore and maintain the chemical, physical,

and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters,” 33 U.S.C. §

2)

1251. See, e.g., Comm'’r of Internal Revenue v. Engle, 464 U.S.

206, 217 (1984) (internal citation omitted) (“Our duty then is

‘to find that interpretation which can most fairly be said to

be imbedded in the statute, in the sense of being most

harmonious with its scheme and with the general purposes

that Congress manifested.’”); Chapman v. Houston Welfare

Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 608 (1979) (“As in all cases of

statutory construction, our task is to interpret the words of

[the statute] in light of the purposes Congress sought to

serve.”).

The D.C. Circuit ignored the Administrative Record,

_holding that its own prior decisions for demonstrating an

absurdity apply an “exceptionally high burden.” Friends of

the Earth, Inc. , 446 F.3d at 146 (App. 9a). And, according to

the court, EPA failed to meet that burden because it

conceded that daily loads make sense in some

circumstances. This analysis circumvents this Court’s long-

standing requirement that statutory interpretations should

not result in an absurdity.

Iii. This Case Involves An Important Question of

Federal Law Concerning the Breadth and Scope of

the TMDL Requirement That Has Not Been, But

Should Be, Settled by this Court.

This Court has determined that the Clean Water Act

should be liberally construed in conformance with its

remedial purposes to avoid harsh and incongruous results

and that the complexity of the Clean Water Act militates in

favor of judicial deference to EPA's statutory construction.

See Chem. Mfrg. Ass'n v. NRDC, 470 U.S. 116, 125 (1985);

United States v. Riverside Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 131-134

(1985).

22

The Court has yet to address the issue of what

properly constitutes a valid TMDL. As such, the issue

remains unsettled and the circuits have now created

disparate interpretations in an effort to resolve the issue.

The immediate case presents this Court with an opportunity

to resolve the important federal question of what constitutes

the appropriate measure for a TMDL, which will effect how

each state and EPA will control literally “hundreds of

different pollutants in thousands of different waterbodies”

in the United States. 268 F.3d at 97.

23

CONCLUSION

The D.C. Circuit’s decision that TMDLs must be

expressed only as a quantity of pollutant over a 24-hour day

fails to apply basic principles of statutory construction

required by this Court and is in direct conflict with the

Clean Water Act. If allowed to stand, there will remain an

intercircuit split that could undermine CSO control planning

and implementation to the detriment of water quality.

Therefore, WASA requests that this Court grant WASA‘s

petition and resolve this conflict between the circuits.

Respectfully Submitted,

AVIS MARIE RUSSELL David E. Evans

General Counsel E. Duncan Getchell, Jr.

District of Columbia Water Stewart T. Leeth

and Sewer Authority (Counsel of Record)

5000 Overlook Avenue,S.W. McGuireWoods, LLP

Washington, D.C. 20032 One James Center

901 East Cary Street

Richmond, VA 23219-4030

(804) 775-1000

Counsel for~ District of

Columbia Water and Sewer

Authority

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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Petition for Writ of Certiorari — District of Columbia Water and Sewer Authority Authority Authority v. Friends of the Earth, Inc. (No. 06-119) | Frix