Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Brooks v. American General Financial Services Services, Inc. (No. 06-25)

Supreme Court, U.S.

. re eB

06-257 JAN19 2006

No. OFFICE OF THE CLERK

In the

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

JACKIE BROOKS,

Petitioner

V

AMERICAN GENERAL FINANCE, INC

Respondent

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE UNITED STATES OF APPEALS

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

JACKIE BROOKS, Pro Se

$240 Jackson Street

St. Louis, Missouri 63114

314-428-5498

On this 19th day of January, 2006

i

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

l. The bankruptcy court abused its discretion pursuant to 11 U.S.C.

§ 362 when it deprived the petitioner of his constitutional right of due

process by misapplying the bankruptcy code to grant Respondent a relief

from the automatic stay pursuant to Bankr. R. 362(d) when Respondent

had not filed a motion to reopen the bankruptcy case (No. 95-42416-399;

April 2000) after the case was closed for over year. On April 13, 2001,

Respondent's attorney filed a motion for foreclosure without a motion to

reopen the dismissed bankruptcy case of April 2000. 11 U.S.C. § 350(b)

governing these procedures 11 U.S.C. § 350(b) states:

“Subsection (b) permits reopening of a case to adminis-

ter assets, to accord relief to the debtor, or for other cause.

Though the court may permit reopening of so that the

trustee may administer exercise an avoiding power,

laches may constitute a bar to an action that has been

delayed too long.”

2. The Bankruptcy Court abused its discretion when it lacks sub-

ject matter Jurisdiction to grant a relief from an automatic stay of a dis-

missed bankruptcy case. So under what authority does it have within the

bankruptcy statute granted by U.S. congress if there was not timely objec-

tion or an appeal file of the dismissal?

T

LIST OF PARTIES

Petitioner Jackie Brooks is a resident and citizen of the State of Mis-

souri and of the United States of America.

Respondent real party in interest American General Finance (Second

Mortgage) was at all pertinent times, a corporate office located in the State

of Missouri and of the United States of America.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

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REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION ..........0cecceceeeeees 6-10

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INDEX TO APPENDICES

Apendix |

United States Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals opinion issued

on October 21, 2005 denying petition for rehearing and

Fe I iraiihsiertiesiethcicruterbelniadhinmaddihaisiieceeneieloks la

Apendix 2

United States Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals issued judgment

on August 17, 2005 denying Petitioners Appeal ....................... 2a

Apendix 3

United States District Court of Eastern District of Missoun

issued order denying Petitioners motion for reconsideration

I Ga Fe Bs BAe scone aniston secsiipcin icsestnvcctodetianedie 3a

Apendix 4

United States District Court of Eastern District of Missoun issued

order denying Petitioners Appeal on March 28, 2005 ................. 4a

Apendix 5

United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit issued

opinion and remanded the case back to lower court for

clarification while retaining jurisdiction on March 24, 2003....... 8a

Apendix 6

United States Bankruptcy Court of Eastern District of

Missoun issued order dismissing the bankruptcy and denying

Respondent motion for relief from the automatic stay

PE Fs ED sss.sinic picts <andiislasgielaae niteeobnsvatabaathjosadvatings 13a

Apendix 7

United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit issued

a judgment on January 8, 2004 ruling the bankruptcy

I I seaistdiictepseiedactecticin cpeinedlaestinintslnnssninsiectaniciesdangins 15a

Apendix 8

United States Bankruptcy Court of the Eastern District of

Missouri issued an order dismissing the 1995 Bankruptcy

I IN BO eins snectsnedcaosuacctebouiusentcabacoiaee 16a

Apendix 9

United States Trustee’s Bankruptcy Final Report and

Account filed on August 13, 2000

Rn Snes RI I ois ora ai chictcaheinccen ennditganilorneniiumencd 18a

Apendix 10

In the Circuit Court of St. Louis Missoun issued

Respondent a default judgment on April 10, 1995 0.0000... 20a

vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

2 Cases

In re Klein, 940 F.20 1072 (7th Cir. 1991) oo... cceceeeccccecseeeseceesees

In re Ibl Sec. Serv. Inc., 174 B.R. 664, 668

8 "ik dh, | ROCCE RI ABS RIE UO, SE REEL Fak Kae oP BS Re ee ree

In re Hammer, | 12 B.R. 341, 345 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1991 000000...

In re Kenk Funding Corp., 290 B.R. 471, 275

SINE, Sas Hix ED hess sccscicatintekctibenaduechictuiminciidiebcninecmiececicns

Rooker v. Fidelty Trust, Co., 263 U.S. 413, 416,

OB 5 a es 8 GA, CE CE IaE re cscesnsvivnnccantonighoveciensncni

District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460

US. 462, 75 ©. Be. 28 DOG, (SUS (IDG) «2c cccscccrcsevecsoseccsosees

Walnut Associates v. Saidel, 164 B.R. 487, 491

rs BN Se ircncecceoninneecsnesepinnirevhechtectepuicamionansenaattli

In the Matter of Statistical Tabulating Corp., 60 F. 3d 1286;

i Cs ee I ee

In re Woodhaven, Ltd., 139 Bankr. 745

DEER FIRE: SID xnevaccssnenencrilciensenntivsaninseastnininsacwusibanicddinabecaiin

Matter of Garcia, 115 Bankr. 169 (N.D. Ind. 1990) .000.......0.00..

Virgin Islands Bureau of Internal Revenue V. St. Croix

Hotel Corporation, 60 B.R. 412 1986

ts Pe RE CI iicethvbicintintediincipetetovilimnsaveaesiaiabannixtonaeces

In re Income Property Builders, Inc. v. The Lomas &

Nettleton Company, 699 F. 2d 963 (9th Cir. 1982) .............

Rook v. Rook, 223 VA. 92, 95, 353 S.E. 2d 756, 758 (1987).......

eeeteee

hast 5

pact 5

ainsi 7

entbiei 8

vil

Rocker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 411, 44

ee EE EOD... ececensonvposdesencergereernroressoeores 8

Magee v. Exxon Cprop | 35 F. 3599, 60!

a espemesibelioboveseceanereess 8

Berger Levee Dist. V. United States, 128 F. 2d 679,

aS ssieuinduvwovenunccetsnouviers 8

Bueford v. Resolution Trust Corp., 991 F. 2d 481, 485

I oanedevveverybonveeceensees 8

Bechtod v. City of Rosemount, F.2d 1062, 1065 |

EES SES RA SLE 8

Hatcher v. U.S. Trustee (In re Hatcher) 218 B.R. 441, 447

ce casentoitivebononncsesesa 8

Vonsmith v. Vonsmith, 66 S.W. 2d 424 (Mo. Banc 1984) 0.000000... )

First Commercial Trust Co. v. Colt’s Mfg. Co., 77 F.3d

ce sesuntevunnpenssusevenveceees 9

Postma V. First Fed. Sev. & Loan, 74 F. 3d 160,

ESSE ES OU ee 9

Rose v. Himely (1808) 4 Cranch 242, 2 L. ed. 608 «0.00.00... )

Penniyer v. Neff (1877) 95U.S. 714, 24 LED 565................cccceeeeees 9

Thompson v. Whitman (1873) 18 Wall 457, 21 L.ed 897 0000.0... 9

Windsor v. McVeigh (1876) 93 U.S. 274, 23 L.ed 914.0000... ~)

McDonal v. Mabee (1917) 243 US 90, 37 S. Ct. 343,

aac cienhatvcerereveimrnseveeveswepswrveuvosevers 9

Vill

Judon v. Gilligan, 500 F. 2d 701, 710

OI a a a ace ea ea 10

Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Co., 459 U.S.

56, 58, 74 L. Ed 2d 225 103 S. Ct. 400 (1982)... ee eeeseeeeees 10

In re Alwan Bros. Co., | 15 Bankr. 148, 150

Sy Bik i eccictivianinvcnehitpineincinndet iene tmmeiiinpilitia 10

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Jackie Brooks respectfully petitions for a writ of certiorari to review

the judgment of the United States Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the United States Court for the Eighth Circuit Court

summarily affirming the District Court decision is reproduced in the Ap-

pendix at (Pet. App. Al). The opinion denying rehearing petition rehear-

ing en banc is reproduced in Appendix at (Pet. App. A2). The opinion of

the district court is reproduced in the Appendix at (Pet. App. A3). None of

the opinions are reported.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the Court of appeals was entered on August 17, 2005

(Pet. App. A2). A Petition for rehearing en banc and the petition for hearing

by the panel was also denied on October 21, 2005 (Pet. App. A3). The

petition for writ of certiorari was filed on January 18, 2006. The jurisdic-

tion of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1245(1).

STATUTE PROVISIONS INVOLVED

Bank. uptcy Rule § 350(b) motion to reopen bankruptcy case

Bankruptcy Rule § 341(a) Meeting of creditors

Bankruptcy Rule § 62

Bankruptcy Rule § 362(h)

Bankruptcy Rule § 349

Fed. Bankr. R. 7012

Fed. Civ. P. 12(h)(3)

Missouri Revised Statute 525.170

Missouri Civil Rules of Procedure 74.05(d)

3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

1. Petitioner used his primary residence to secure a second mortgage

with Respondent (American General Finance, Inc.) in August of 1994 for

$23,697.34 (principal). Petitioner failed to make timely payment; there-

fore, Respondent filed a petition for a judgment before the Missouri State

Court to collect on the debt. The Missouri State Court granted Respondent

a default judgment on April 10, 1995 for the amount of $24,303.28 in prin-

cipal, plus —_attorney’s fees and court cost for a total of $24,953.28. The

State court granted the Respondent the am_ unt principal amount he sworn

to. The RSMo. 525.170 states:

Such judgment by default may be proceeded on to final

judgment, in like manner as in case of defendants in other

civil actions; but no final judgment shall be rendered against

the garnishee until there shall be final judgment against the

defendant, and in no case for a greater amount than the amount

sworn to by plaintiff, with interest and cost, or for greater

amount than the garnishee shall appear to be liable for to the

defendant.

2. The Respondent then filed a wage garnishment against the Petitioner.

In May of 1995 Petitioner filed a bankruptcy petition under Chapter 13

pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 362(a). The Bankruptcy Court confirmed the plan

without objections from the Creditors in the plan. The plan paid Respon-

dent $381.00 each month until the plan ended, and any balance due was to

be treated as an unsecured debt.

3. On December 9, 1999 the Bankruptcy Court granted Petitioner’s mo-

tion to dismiss his Chapter 13 Petition and ordered the Bankruptcy Trustee

to disburse all remaining funds left in the escrow to all creditors and to file

its final report. On April 13, 2000 the Bankruptcy Trustee filed its final

Report that Respondent had a zero balance when the bankruptcy case was

dismissed. In April 2000 the Bankruptcy Court confirmed the Trustee’s

4

Final Report and dismissed the case. The effect of the dismissal was with-

out prejudice.

4. The Respondent made continuous efforts to collect interest on a dis-

missed debt from the Petitioner’s 1995-closed bankruptcy. So the Peti-

tioner on March 30, 2001 filed a third Chapter 13 Petition pursuant to

Bankruptcy Code 11 U.S.C. § 362(a).

5. On April 12, 2001 Respondent filed a notice of a foreclosure sale

thirty days (30) after the Petitioner filed his bankruptcy petition. On April

13,2001 Respondent filed a motion for expedited hearing and a relief from

the automatic stay. The Respondent argued that Petitioner lack adequate

protection and abuse of bankmuptcy filing. No evidence was presented to

support Respondent’s argument. Respondent’s failure to file a claim is sup-

ported by Bankruptcy Trustee’s Final Report of the 2001 Bankruptcy case

(#01-43603-399).

6. On April 19, 2001 the Bankruptcy Court granted the Respondent’s

motion and the property was brought and sold by American General Fi-

nance through their attorney on April 19, 2001. The automatic stay is a

statutory injunction that takes effect when a bankruptcy petition is filed

and protects the debtor, the property of the estate, and property of the debtor

from certain actions by creditor. The stay applies to all entities. See [B.C §§

362, 101(5); See surpra. §29).

7. The Petitioner filed an appeal to the U.S. Eastern District Court. The

District Court confirmed the Bankruptcy Court’s judgment and the case

were appealed to Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. On March 24, 2003 the

8th Circuit remanded the case back while retaining jurisdiction. The Eighth

Circuit remanded the case back for clarification that the lower courts con-

duct a specific fact finding on whether Petitioner still owed from the 1995

bankruptcy case (No. 95-42416-399) a debt to Respondent when he fore-

closed on the subject property, and if so how much, and under what legal

authority. The 8th circuit court asked for three things:

5

A. Whether a Petitioner paid Respondent in full, or in part, and

received a discharge, as the trustee indicated-in the final report

B. If Petitioner was stil] indebted to Respondent.

C. What rate of interest, if any applied?

8. On August 20, 2003 the Bankruptcy Court held a hearing and dis-

missed the Bankruptcy case by denying the Respondent’s continuous mo-

tion for Relief from the Automatic Stay because there was no stay because

the bankruptcy case was dismissed. The 8th Circuit Court accepted the

Bankruptcy Court’s justification and dismissed the case as moot. The Bank-

ruptcy Court never addressed any of the concerns stated in the remand

order by the 8th Circuit Court of Appeals. Most courts have looked at con-

tested matters and adversary proceedings as “stand alone units of litiga-

tion” and determine whether the order appealed from disposed of all the

claims of all the parties. see Fed. R. Civ. P. .54(b), Fed. R. Bankr. P.

7054(a), 9014. In re Klein, 940 F. 2d 1075, 1077 (7th Cir. 1991), In re IbI

Sec. Serv. Inc., 174 B.R. 664, 668 (E.D.N.Y. 1994).

9. Petitioner filed a motion to reopen the Bankruptcy case for clarifica-

tion pursuant to 11 U.S.C. Bankr. R. 350(b) and to determine if relief from

the automatic stay was violated under the 11 U.S.C. Bankr. R. 362(h). The

Bankruptcy Court denied Petitioner’s motion by affixing “denied” seal on

Petitioners motion. Legal points of authority or a conclusion of law did not

support this denial.

10. Petitioner filed an appeal before the U.S. Eastern District Court. The

8th Circuit confirmed the District Court judgment because the Bankruptcy

Court did not abuse its discretion in reopening the bankruptcy case.

11. The District Court denied Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration on

the grounds that there was no new evidence to consider after Respondent

filed a res judicate motion to dismiss. A trial court abuses its discretion

when it rests its conclusion on clearly erroneous factual findings or an

6

incorrect legal standard In re Hammer, | 12 B.R. 341, 345 (Bankr. 9th Cir.

1991).

12. Petitioner filed a second appeal before the 8th Cir. Court of Appeals.

The 8th Circuit summarily affirmed the District Court’s judgment and dis-

missed the Appeal pursuant to Eighth Circuit Local Rule 47A(a). The Ap-

peals Court’s denial was never based on (a) lacks jurisdiction, (b) the ap-

peal was frivolous, or that the base was without merit. Local rule states:

The court will dismiss the appeal if is not within the courts

jurisdiction or is frivolous and entirely without merit. The

Court may confirm or reverse when the questions pre-

sented do not require further consideration.

The issue on appeal is whether the appeals court reviewed the whole

record to determine if the bankruptcy court had jurisdiction of the April

2000 dismissed bankruptcy case or to modify a state’s court judgment and

if the bankruptcy procedures were violated on the 2000 bankruptcy case of

the Petitioner’s. Respondent received a relief from the automatic stay to

foreclose on the petitioner’s property while there was “no stay” (emphasis

added here). The courts have held that a motion pursuant to 11 U.S.C.A.

350(b) must be filed to reopen a bankruptcy case that has been closed and

‘fully administered by the bankruptcy trustee, See, In re Kenk Funding

Corp., 290 B.R. 471, 475 (Bankr. E.D. N.Y. 2003)

13. Petitioner’s motion for rehearing and rehearing en banc was denied

on October 21, 2005. A reason for denial was not given.

REASON FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

Statutory laws restrict the Bankruptcy Court of jurisdiction to those

proceedings that could affect the administration of a bankruptcy estate by

litigating a prior 1995 dismissed bankruptcy case that was fully adminis-

tered and released by the trustee and closed by the Bankruptcy Court, pur-

suant to 28 U.S.C. § 1334. Once a court has dismissed or discharged a

3

bankruptcy case the prior claim is barred by principles of res judicate and

the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine. See Rooker v. Fidelity Trust, Co. 263 U.S.

413, 416, 68 L. Ed 362. 44 S. Ct. 149 (1923); District of Columbia Court

of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 75 L. Ed. 2d 206, 103 S. Ct. 1303

(1963). The Bankruptcy Court is without jurisdiction to entertain any pro-

ceedings if a bankruptcy case has been closed and the estate no longer

exists, and where the Respondent has failed to have the bankruptcy case

reopened pursuant to |! U.S.C. § 350(b) and Rule 5010 for good cause.

Walnut Associates v. Saidel, 164 B.R. 487, 491 (E.D. Pa. 1994) Until a

Bankruptcy Case is reopened the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction

over a closed bankruptcy case. When a case has been dismissed and not

closed it could not be reopened. Statistical Tabulating Corp., Inc. v. United

States of America, 60 F.3d 1286; 1995 U.S. App. Lexis 20471. To resurrect

a dismissed bankruptcy case that has been dismissed can never be

“undismissed”. In Matter of Statistical Tabulating Corp., (quoting) In re

Woodhaven, LTd., 139 Bankr. 745 (N.D. Ala. 1992) and Matter of Garcia,

115 Bankr. 169 (N.D. Ind. 1990).

Respondent's motion for relief from the automatic stay was barred by

laches. If an objection is not made of a motion to dismiss a Bankruptcy

Chapter 13 Petition, it is inexcusable for one to wait for more than a year

after the case has been dismissed. See, Virgin Islands Bureau of Internal

Revenue V. St. Croix Hote} Corporation, 60 B.R. 412, 1986 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 2662. Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 350a closed the bankruptcy case and

It U.S.C. § 350(b) reopens the case but does not restore the prebankruptcy

Status. There is no provision in the statute that a motion for expedited hear-

ing acts as a motion to reopen a bankruptcy case. The Bankruptcy Court

granted the Petitioner’s motion to dismiss his 1995 bankruptcy petition on

April 13, 2000.

Bankruptcy Court who had jurisdiction over the 2001 bankruptcy case

abused its discretion in granting a relief from automatic stay in a prior case

that was dismissed for over a year.

8

The Respondent’s motion for relief from the automatic stay on April

13, 2001 is barred because there was not stay to get such a relief from. The

Bankruptcy Trustee’s Final Report showed Respondent was paid in full with

a zero balance when the case was dismissed. The Bankruptcy Court con-

firmed the Bankruptcy Trustee’s Final Report and the case were dismissed

in April of 2000.

Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 349, treating the effect of a bankruptcy that is

dismissed is reinvested with the estate, subject to all encumbrances, which

existed prior to the bankruptcy. In re Income Property Builders, Inc. v.

The Lomas & Nettleton Company,-699 F. 2d 963 (9th Cir. 1982).

A void judgment is one that has been procured by extrinsic or collat-

eral fraud or entered by a court that did not have jurisdiction over the subject

matter or parties. Rook v. Rook, 223 VA, 92, 95, 353 S.E. 2d 756, 758

(1987).

The state court granted a default judgment that was litigated before

the state court proceeding. The United States Circuit Courts Of Appeals has

always applied the (Rocker-Feldman doctrine) Rocker v. Fidelity Trust

Co., 263 U.S. 411, 44 S. Ct. 149, 68 L. Ed. 362 (1923) and denied any

attempt to alter the decision of the state courts. Lack of subject matter juris-

diction is insusceptible to waiver, and may be raised at any time during the

course of an action by a party thereto, the court sua sponte (quoting) the

Magee v. Exxon Corp. 135 F. 3d 599, 601 (8th Cir. 1998); Berger Levee

Dist. V. United States, |28 F. 3d 679, 680 (8th Cir. 1997); Bueford v. Reso-

lution Trust Corp., 991 F. 2d 481, 485 (8th Cir. 1993); Fed. R. Bankr. P.

7012(b); Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). The Rooker-Doctrine “derives from the

prohibition on federal appellate review of state court proceedings” Bechtod

v. City of Rosemount, F.2d 1062, 1065 (8th Cir. 1997): see Hatcher v.

U.S. Trustee (In re Hatcher), 218 B.R. 441, 447 (B.A. P. 8th Cir. 1998).

The Missouri Civil Rules of Procedure provides under 74.05(d) that a

default judgment can be set aside *[u] pon motion stating facts constituting

9

a meritorious defense and for good cause shown See Vonsmith v. Vonsmith,

66 S.W. 2d 424 (Mo. Banc 1984). Respondent failed to file such a motion to

set aside the state cuurt’s judgment, therefore, the Bankruptcy Court lacks

jurisdiction to alter the court’s judgment by granting interest that was not

within the confirmed Petitioners 1995 Chapter 13 plan. Granting the Re-

spondent a relief from the automatic stay and to foreclose on Petitioner's

property denies Petitioner of his constitutional rights under the bankruptcy

States that were provided by congress.

The review of state court’s decisions lies exclusively in the United

States Supreme Court, First Commercial Trust Co. v. Colt’s Mfg. Co. 77

F.3d 1081, 1083 (8th Cir. 1996); Postma v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan, 74 F.3d

160, 162 (8th Cir. 1996). The Eighth Circuit has the obligation to conduct a

jurisdictional inquiry to determine if jurisdiction has been applied in this

case. Bankruptcy court pursuant to the Rule 7012(b) of the Federal Rules of

Bankruptcy Procedure, provides that when it appears by suggestion of the

parties or otherwise that the court lacks suject matter, the court shall dismiss

the action. “Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).

The state court’s judgment is final once a party fails to file a motion

objecting to the court's judgment and fails to raise a defense when it had the

opportunity to pursue its claim in the state proceeding.

This court has rule “an order that exceeds the jurisdiction of the court

is void, and can be attacked in any proceeding in any court where the valid-

ity of the judgment comes into issue”. (See Rose v. Himely (1808) 4 Cranch

242, 2 Led 608; Pennover v. Neff (1877) 95 US 714, 24 L ed 565; Thomp-

son v. Whitman (1873) 18 Wall 457, 21 | ED 897; Windsor v. McVeigh

(1876) 93 US 274, 23 Led 914; McDonal v. Mabee (1917) 243 US 90, 37

S. Ct 343,61 L. ed 608.

“If a court grants relief, which under the circumstances it has not any

authority to grant, its judgment is to that extent void.” Courts must vacate

any judgment entered in excess of its jurisdiction in Judon v. Gilligan, 500

F. 2d 701, 710 (6th Cir).

When the Circuit Court remanded the Bankruptcy Case No. 43603-

399 back to the Bankruptcy Court for clarification of an order it no longer

has jurisdiction if the Appeals Court retains jurisdiction on remand. The

Bankruptcy Court dismissed the underlying case but the issue on appeal was

still vested in the Appeals Court. This Court has supported the general rule

that filing of a notice of appeals divests the lower court of jurisdiction over

the matter on appeal. Statistical Tabulating Corp., Inc. 60 F. 3d 1286 (cit-

ing) Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Co., 459 U.S. 56, 58, 74 L.

Ed.2d 225 103 S. Ct. 400 (1982); In re Alwan Bros. Co., 115 Bankr. 148,

150 (Bankr. C.D. Ill, 1990) (“upon the filing of a notice of appeal from an

order of the bankruptcy court, the bankruptcy court loses jurisdiction over

matters involved in the appeal”).

The 8th Circuit Court retained jurisdiction over the 200! bankruptcy

case but lacked jurisdiction over the 1995 bankruptcy case which was fully

administered by the Bankruptcy.

Trustee was dismissed. For the Bankruptcy Court to grant a relief

from the automatic stay of the 1995 Bankruptcy case is an abuse of discre-

tion.

—~ 11

CONCLUSION

The Petition for a writ of Certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted.

Jackie Brooks, Petitioner

Pro Se

Jackie Brooks

8240 Jackson

St. Louis, Missouri 63114

(314) 428-5498

la

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

No. 05-2330 :

In re: Jackie Brooks, Order Denying Petition for

Appellant. * Rehearing and for Rehearing

¥ + En Bane

American General Financial Services, °

Inc., "

Appellee,

The petition for rehearing en banc is denied. The petition for rehear-

ing by the panel ts also dented.

(5128-010199)

October 21, 2005

Order Entered at the Direction of the Court:

ls/ Michael G. Oaus

MICHAEL G. QAUS

Clerk, U.S. Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit

2a

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

No. 05-2330

In re: Jackie Brooks, ‘

Debtor. :

Jackie Brooks, : Appeal from the United States

Appellant. * Distnct Court for the

™ , Eastern District of Missouri

American General Financial Services. *

Inc., ‘

Appellee,

Peter Lumaghi,

Trustee.

JUDGMENT

This court has reviewed the original file of the United States District

Court. It is ordered by the court that the judgment of the district court is

summarily affirmed. See Eighth Circuit Rule 47A(a).

(5361-010199)

August 17, 2005

Order Entered at the Direction of the Court:

/s/ Michael G. Oaus

MICHAEL G. QAUS

Clerk, U.S. Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit

3a

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

‘EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI

EASTERN DIVISION eieene

JACKIE BROOKS May 6, 2005

U. S. DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MO

ST. LOUIS

Case No. 4:04CV526 RWS

Appellant,

Vv.

AMERICAN GENERAL FINANCIAL

SERVICES, INC.,

Appellee,

ei

ORDER

This matter before me on Appellant’s motion for reconsideration of

my order denying his bankruptcy appeal. Appellant’s motion fails to offer

any new facts or legal argument that were not before me when the order

was issued.

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Appellant’s motion for recon-

sideration [#13] is DENIED.

W. Sippel

RODNEY W. SIPPEL

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Dated this 8th day of April, 2005.

4a

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI

EASTERN DIVISION

RECEIVED

May 6, 2005

JACKIE BROOKS, ) U.S. Shee COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MO

Appellant, ‘ ST. LOUIS

v. . Case No. 4:04CV526 RWS

AMERICAN GENERAL FINANCIAL ?

SERVICES, INC.,

APPELLEE, ,

ORDER

This matter is an appeal of two orders of the bankruptcy court denying

Appellant Brooks’ motions to reopen his bankruptcy case entered by the

bankruptcy court. Brooks’ appeal will be denied because the bankruptcy

court did not abuse its discretion when rendering these decisions.

Background

During the past ten years Brooks filed three separate bankruptcy cases

under Chapter 13 of the United States Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§

1301, ef seg., case numbers 95-424 16-399; 00-50682-399 and 01 -43603-

399. All three cases were dismissed prior to Brooks’ completion of his plan

payments and, as a result, Brooks did not receive a discharge.

This appeal concerns case number 01-43603-399 filed on March 30,

2001. The bankruptcy court dismissed this case on March 14, 2002 based

on Brooks’ failure to make plan payments to the Chapter 13 trustee. Brooks’

filed a motion to vacate the dismissal order which was denied by the bank-

ruptcy court on April 8, 2002, because Brooks failed to become current

with his payments to the trustee which is required before a dismissal can be

vacated.

5a

When the case was closed, an appeal of a ruling by the bankruptcy

court made in the case in 2001 was pending before the United States Cir-

cuit District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri. The ruling con-

cerned the bankruptcy court’s grant of a relief from stay and a ratification

of a foreclosure sale to Appellee American General Finance. American

General had foreclosed on real property owned by Brooks. Brooks ap-

pealed the bankruptcy court’s order and raised the issue of whether he owed

any money to American General. On July 12, 2002, the case was adminis-

tratively reopened to docket the District Court’s order affirming the bank- _

ruptcy court’s decision. The case was reclosed on the same day.

On August 29, 2002, Brooks appealed the District Court’s decision to

the United States Court of Appeals for Eighth Circuit. On March 24, 2003,

the Eighth Circuit did not find error in the bankruptcy court’s ratification

of American General’s foreclosure but remanded the case for the bank-

ruptcy court to clarify some factual issues regarding any debt that Brooks

may still owe American General.

After remand the bankruptcy court held a hearing on August 20, 2003.

Instead of addressing the factual questions posed by the Eighth Circuit, the

bankruptcy court determined that American General’s motion for relief

from stay, which was at issue in the appeal before the Eighth Circuit, had

become moot because Brooks’ bankruptcy had already been dismissed on

March 14, 2002 for failure to make plan payments. The bankruptcy court

issued an order on August 20, 2003, denying General American’s motion

for relief from stay because the case had been dismissed. The bankruptcy

court’s order was filed with the Eighth Circuit which, in turn, dismissed

Brooks’ appeal as moot on January 8, 2004.

On March 31, 2004, Brooks filed two motions to reopen his bank-

ruptcy case which the bankruptcy court summarily denied on April 7, 2004.

This appeal followed

6a

Analysis

Brooks appeals the bankruptcy court’s orders denying his motions to

reopen his bankruptcy case. A bankruptcy judge is granted the power to

reopen a case under 1] U.S.C. § 350(b). A bankruptcy court’s decision not

to reopen a case is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Jn_re

Canal Street Lid. Partnership, 269 B.R. 375, 379 (8th Cir. BAP 2001).

Under an abuse of discretion standard the bankruptcy court’s ruling should

not be reversed unless the appellate court has a definite and firm convic-

tion that the bankruptcy court committed a clear error of judgment in the

conclusion it reached. Id.

Brooks is not a stranger to the bankruptcy process. He filed two Chap-

ter 13 bankruptcies that were both dismissed before he filed the present

bankruptcy at issue in this appeal. The bankruptcy case at issue was dis-

missed on March 14, 2002 for his failure to make plan payments. He again

waived the possibility of having the case reinstated when he failed to be-

come current on his payments to the trustee in a timely manner after he

filed his motion to vacate the bankruptcy dismissal on March 24, 2002.

His appeal to the Eighth Circuit dealt with the question of whether the

bankruptcy court properly ratified Amercan General’s foreclosure sale of

Brooks’ real property. That appeal has been dismissed as moot because his

bankruptcy case was dismissed. The only question before me is whether

the bankruptcy court abused-its discretion.in declining to grant Brooks’

motions to reopen is bankruptcy case. Because of Brooks’ failure to com-

ply with the rules and requirements of a debtor in Chapter 13, I cannot

conclude that the bankruptcy court’s decisions denying Brooks’ motions to

reopen his bankruptcy case were an abuse of discretion.

Accordingly,

7a

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the bankruptcy court’s orders de-

nying Appellant Jackie Brooks’ motions to reopen his bankruptcy case are

affirmed.

/s/ Rodney W. Sippc]

RODNEY W. SIPPEL

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Dated this 28th day of March, 2005.

8a

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

No. 02-3041

In re: Jackie Brooks,

Debtor.

Jackie Brooks,

Appeal from the United States

District Court for the Eastern

District of Missouri

Appellant,

Vv.

American General Financial Inc.,

Appellee,

* © © ete &#@HHeHee*AREeiNRiBAiRHi RE &H &

Peter Lumaghi,

Trustee.

Submitted: February 7, 2003

Filed: March 24, 2003

Before BYE, FAGG, and RILEY, Circuit Judges.

RILEY, Circuit Judge.

Jackie Brooks (Brooks) appeals the district court’s orders af-

firming the bankruptcy court’s grant of relief from automatic stay, and

denying disqualification and a rehearing. We remand this matter for factual

9a

findings and clarification, while retaining jurisdiction over the appeal.

I. BACKGROUND

In August 1994, Brooks and his wife, Mary, signed a note to American

General Finance (AGF) for $68,750.84, securing it with a second mort-

gage on a residence occupied by Brooks’s brother. The note represented a

principal amount of $23,697.34 plus 18% interest for fifteen years (amount-

ing to $45,053.50). After Brooks ceased making payments, AGF sued in

March 1995 and received a state court default judgment for $24,303.28 in

principal, plus fees and costs, for a total of $24,953.28. The judgment con-

tained dashes next to the line titled “interest.” Brooks filed for Chapter 13

bankruptcy shortly thereafter, and between July 1995 and December 1999,

the bankruptcy trustee made $21,370.72 in payments to AGF. The bank-

ruptcy case was dismissed on Brooks’s motion, tne a “‘Trustee’s Final Re-

port and Account” indicated that AGF had been paid $21,370.72 in princi-

pal, and no balance was due. The trustee’s report also stated the case had

been fully administered, and requested entry of a discharge order. Thereaf-

ter, AGF twice sought to foreclose on the property, with Brooks filing bank-

ruptcy each time and halting the sale. This appeal arises out of AGF’s sec-

ond foreclosure attempt.

On March 16, 2001, AGF mailed its notice of intent to conduct a fore-

closure sale on April 12. After Brooks filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy,

AGF agreed to postpone the sale until April 19, and moved for relief from

the automatic stay. At an Apnil 17 relief-from-stay hearing, the parties agreed

to postpone the sale and to continue the hearing until] May 14, conditioned

upon Brooks signing a consent form before the scheduled time for the sale.

However, the consent form AGF presented to Brooks to sign required Mary’s

signature as well. When AGF refused to remove Mary’s name, Brooks

refused to sign the form. On April 19, AGF’s counsel appeared ex parte

before the bankruptcy court to report that Brooks had not signed the con-

sent form. The court gave AGF permission to proceed with the sale, and

AGF brought the property for $30,000 later that day.

10a

Brooks moved for a rehearing or to set aside the grant of relief from

the stay, arguing the foreclosure had been obtained by deceit. The court set

aside the foreclosure sale, even though it ultimately concluded AGF’s con-

duct was a mistake. The court also granted AGF’s renewed motion for

relief from the stay and its motion to ratify the sale. During the hearing on

the motion, Brooks argued the trustee’s final report reflected all of the plan

payments had gone toward principal, contending AGF was not entitled to

recover interest under either the default judgment or the Chapter 13 confir-

mation plan. AGF countered that Brooks still owed a substantial sum be-

cause the default judgment had accrued interest at the contract rate, and the

payments Brooks’s trustee had made in the bankruptcy proceeding had

gone primarily to interest. The court agreed with AGF, concluding that a

“substantial balance” of $29,946.00 remained due because of “relentless

interest.” Further, because no payments had been made for eighteen months,

the court found cause to lift the stay. Brooks appealed to the district court,

which affirmed. This appeal followed.

I. DISCUSSION

Brooks raises numerous arguments on appeal. A number of these argu-

ments clearly lack merit, and we reject them seriatim as follows: (1) Brooks

received adequate written notice, of the foreclosure sale under Mo. Rev.

Stat. § 443.325 (2000); in any case, he has not shown prejudice from any

such lack of notice; (2) the bankruptcy court cured any error in conducting

the April 19, 2001, ex parte hearing-including any due process violation,

cf. In re Banks, 299 F.3d 296, 302 (4th Cir. 2002) (due process generally

entitles party to notice specified by Bankruptcy Code)—by reversing its

earlier decision and requiring AGF to move anew for relief from the stay,

see In re Wieseler, 934 F.2d 965, 968 (8th Cir. 1991) (even if bankruptcy

court erred in failing to hold hearing on motion to lift the stay, court cured

error by holding hearing on reconsideration motion); (3) Brooks presented

no evidence to support his argument that the district cour was biased, or

lla

that the court’s summary rulings on his motions violated due process or

were otherwise erroneous, see Primary Care Investors, Seven, Inc. v. PHP

Healthcare Corp., 986 F.2d 1208, 1212 (8th Cir. 1993); (4) Brooks did not

object to the admission of the transcript of the ex parte April 19 hearing in

his appeal to the district court, and, in any case, the transcript is part of the

record an appellate court may review, cf. Fed. R. App. P. 10(a); (5) the

April 19 order granting relicf from the stay stated, “Movant is entitled to ...

foreclose ... and ... is specifically allowed to conduct its foreclosure sale of

said property on ... April 19, 2001 at 12:00 Noon;” thus, no ten-day stay

was in effect, see Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4001(a)(3) (order granting relief from

stay is stayed for 10 days, unless court orders otherwise); and (6) no basis

exists for challenging the bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction, see generally 28

U.S.C. §§ 157(b), 1334.

The issues of the debt and interest on the debt are not easily resolved.

The bankruptcy court concluded AGF’s judgment accrued interest at the

contract rate during Brooks’s 1995 bankruptcy. The district court affirmed |

based on Mo. Rev. Stat. § 408.040. 1 (interest shall be allowed on judgment

from day of rendering until satisfaction; judgments upon contracts bearing

more than 9% interest shall bear same interest borne by such contracts).

However, bankruptcy law governs the issue. See Bursch v. Beardsley &

Piper, 971 F.2d 108, 114 (8th Cir. 1992) (federal law determines creditor’s

rights after filing of bankruptcy petition). Bankruptcy law generally does

not provide for collection of interest accruing after the filing of a bank-

ruptcy petition. See, e.g., In re Hanna,-872 F.2d 829, 831 (8th Cir. 1989)

(post petition interest is disallowed against estate under section 502). The

Bankruptcy Code does allow collection of interest or its functional equiva-

lent under certain circumstances, see, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 506(b), 1325 (2000);

In re Milham, 141 F.3d 420, 423-24 (2d Cir. 1998), but we cannot deter-

mine from the record before us whether these provisions were applied by

the bankruptcy court or the district court.

12a

On appeal, AGF maintains Brooks’s 1995 Chapter 13 plan provided

for long-term payments under 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(5), and, thus, Brooks

agreed to pay interest at the contract rate and the debt was excepted from

discharge. See 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a)(1). AGF further asserts Brooks did not

complete his payments or receive a discharge, and the interest in the prop-

erty thus revested in AGF as a creditor under 11 U.S.C. § 349(b)(3). Yet

Brooks has repeatedly claimed he paid AGF in full and received a dis-

charge. The trustee’s final report supports Brooks’s claim of full payment.

The courts below did not conduct specific fact finding on whether Brooks

still owed a debt to AGF when it foreclosed on the subject property, and, if

so, how much, and under what legal authority.

Even assuming the debt was not paid in full or discharged and AGF

was entitled to collect interest on its judgment, it is not clear what rate of

interest would apply. See, e.g., In re Milham, 141 F.3d at 423-24 (under

section 1325, plan must provide for payment of present value of allowed

secured claim; present value is achieved by payment of interest calculated

according to a formula); 11 U.S.C. § 1322(e) (calculation of amount neces-

sary to cure default); In re Cabrera, 99 F.3d 684, 685 (Sth Cir. 1996) (rec-

ognizing Bankruptcy ACt of 1994 amended section 1322, but only for agree-

ments entered into after October 22, 1994).

Hl. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, we retain jurisdiction over this appeal, but remand for

findings to determine (1) whether Brooks paid AGF in full, or in part, and

received a discharge, as the trustee indicated in the final report; and (2) if .

Brooks was still indebted to AGF, what rate of interest, if any, applied.

13a

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI

EASTERN DIVISION

In re

JACKIE BROOKS,

Debtor,

Case No. 01-43603-399

Chapter 13

Vv.

AMERICAN GENERAL FINANCE, INC.,

i i

Movant.

ORDER

At Saint Louis, in this Distrct, this 20th day of August, 2003.

This mornings hearing was called in response to the Order of Remand

issued by the Order of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth

Circuit, dated March 24, 2003, and the Order of the United States District

Court, dated May 1, 2003. American General Finance appeared through its

counsel Gerard A. Neiters and Jackie Brooks appeared pro-se. The matter

before the court is a continuation of the hearing of the motion of American

General Finance relief from stay. The Court noted that Mr. Brooks’ Chap-

ter 13 case was dismissed on March 14, 2002. Accordingly, it is

ORDERED that Motion For Relief is DENIED. Since there is no Chap-

ter 13 case pending there is no stay from which relief may be sought.

/s/ Barry S. Schermer

BARRY S. SCHERMER

United States Bankruptcy Judge

14a

Copy mailed to:

Jackie Brooks

Debtor

8240 Jackson

St. Louis, MO 63114

Christi S. Fingal

Attorney for Debtor

211 North Broadway, Suite 2410

St. Louis, MO 63102

Gerard A. Neiters

Attorney for American General Finance, Inc.

113 Triad Center

O’ Fallon, MO 63366-7542

Office of the United States Trustee

Thomas F. Eagleton Federal Court House

111 S. 10th Street, Suite 6353

St. Louis, MO 63102

15a

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

No. 02-3041

In re: Jackie Brooks, : ” Ronen

Debtor. ppeal trom t nite tates

District Court for the

Eastern District of Missouri

Jackie Brooks,

Appellant,

Vv.

American General Finance, Inc.;

Appellee,

# # @&@ 8 &# &e HHH HE HD HH HH

JUDGMENT

Upon consideration of the bankruptcy court’s order of August 20,

2003, entered on remand from this court, the appeal is dismissed as moot.

(5361-010199)

January 8, 2004

Order Entered at the Direction of the Court:

i »

MICHAEL G. QAU

Clerk, U.S. Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit

16a

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT

EASTERN DIVISION OF MISSOURI

EASTERN DIVISION

In re:

JACKIE BROOKS,

Debtor

Case No. 95-42416-399

Chapter 13

MOTION TO DISMISS

Motion #52

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

wee ee ee ee ee ee ee

At Saint Louis, in this District, this 9th day of December, 1999.

The Debtor’s Motion To Dismiss was filed December 6, 1999.

Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the Debtor’s Motion to Dismiss

be and it hereby is GRANTED, in that this Chapter 13 case be and it

hereby is DISMISSED, and the stays of 11 U.S.C. §362 are hereby termi-

nated.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this Court’s Order To Deduct From

Wages Or Other Income, filed May 22, 1995, directed to Ferguson-Florissant

Schoo} District, be and hereby is terminated and Ferguson-Florissant School

District is directed to cease withholding from Debtor’s wages in respect of

Debtor’s Chapter 13 case.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that John V. LaBarge, Jr., Chapter 13

Trustee, is directed to disburse the remaining funds in accordance with the

Debtor's confirmed plan.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Trustee shall promptly file his

final report and upon so doing is discharged as Trustee and is relieved of

and discharged from his bond.

IS IS FURTHER ORDERED that all pending Motions and Applica-

tions, if any, are

17a

hereby DENIED, as moot.

/

BARRY S. SCHERMER

United States Bankruptcy Judge

Copy mailed to:

Christi S. Fingal

Attorney for Debtor

211 North Broadway, Suite'2410

St. Louis, MO 63102

Jackie Brooks

Debtor

8240 Jackson

St. Louis, MO 63114

John V. LaBarge, Jr.

Chapter 13 Trustee

P.O. Box 430908

St. Louis, MO 63143

Attn: Payroll Department

Ferguson-Florissant Schoo! District

1005 Waterford

St. Louis, MO 63033

Office of the United States Trustce

815 Olive Street, Room 412

St. Louis, Missouri 6310]

18a

IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT

EASTERN DIVISION RECEIVED & FILED

2000 APR 13 P 2:24

U. S. DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MO

RE: ST. LOUIS

oe : : CASE NO. 95-42425-399

) CHAPTER 13

ST. LOUIS, MO. 63114-0000 ) DATE: 04/10/00

SSI: 492-45-3431 000-00-0000

TRUSTEE’S FINAL REPORT AND ACCOUNT

JOHN V. LABARGE. JR., TRUSTEE FOR THE ABOVE CASE, SUBMITS THE FOL-

LOWING FINAL REPORT AND ACCOUNT OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE ES-

TATE PURSUANT TO 11 USC: 1302 (S) (1).

1. THE CASE WAS FILED ON MAY |. 1995 AND CONFIRMED ON JUL 13, 1995

THE CASE WAS SUBSEQUENTLY DISMISSED AFTER CONFIRMATION ON DEC 9

1999.

2. THE AMOUNT PAID TO THE TRUSTEE BY OR ON BEHALF OF THE

DEBTOR(S) WAS $59.300.00.

3. THE TRUSTEE MADE DISBURSEMENTS AS FOLLOWS:

CREDITOR NAME / TYPE CLAIM AMT PRIN PD INT PD BAL DUE

AMERICAN GENERAL FINANCE 00 21370.72 00 00

HOME MORTGAGE PAYMENT CONTINUING DEBT

CLERK. US BANKRUPTCY COURT 130.00 130,00 00 00

CLERK COSTS

EDUCATIONAL EMPLOYEES CREDIT 13925.39 12033.70 5240.23 1891.60

SECURED

EQUALITY SAVINGS & LOAN 00 10632.21 00 00

HOME MORTGAGE PAYMENT CONTINUING DEBT

EQUALITY SAVINGS & LOAN 2627.13 2270.29 996.09 3558.30

HOME MORTGAGE ARREARAGE

2777 CONSUMER FINANCIAL __ 1065.20 1005.20 134.15 00

HOME MORTGAGE ARREARAGE

JOHN V LABARGE JR 10.00 10.00 .00 00

NOTICING FEES-TRUSTEE

MERCANTILE BANK 1029.00 $34.03 400.23 144.90

SECURED

ST LOUIS CO COLLECTOR OF REV 4553.57 1429.81 1275.95 312.00

SECURED

PAGE | - CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE

19a

CHAPTER 13 CASE NO. 95-424 15-399

JOHN V. LABARGE. JR. 00 1977.24 00 00

TRUSTEE FEES

TOTAL DISBURSED: 59.300.00 $1703.25 3096.75

4. SUMMARY OF DISBURSEMENTS TO CREDITORS:

i eee aa ae ae ae

CLAIM AMOUNT 15769.66 4771.74 62100.50 32641.90

PRINCIPAL PAID 00 00 49686.0! 49686.01

INTEREST PAID 00 .00 8096.75 8096.75

5. COSTS OF ADMINISTRATION:

CLERK 130.00

TRUSTEE 1.327.24

ATTORNEY 00

REFUNDS TO DEBTOR OR CHAPTER 7 TRUSTEE 00

JOHN V. LABARGE. JR., STANDING TRUSTEE FOR THE ABOVE NAMED CASE.

CERTIFIED TO THE COURT AND THE UNITED STATES TRUSTEE, THAT HE HAS

FAITHFULLY AND PROPERLY FULFILLED THE DUTIES OF THE STANDING

TRUSTEE, AND THAT THE CHAPTER THIRTEEN CASE HAS BEEN FULLY AD-

MINISTERED.

WHEREFORE THE TRUSTEE REQUESTS AN ORDER BE ENTERED WHICH

DISCHARGES THE CHAPTER THIRTEEN TRUSTEE AND ITS SURETY FROM ANY

AND ALL LIABILITY ON ACCOUNT OF THE ABOVE CASE. CLOSES THE CHAP-

TER THIRTEEN ESTATE. AND GRANTS SUCH OTHERS RELIEF AS MAY BE JUST

AND PROPER.

(s/ John V, LaBarge. Jr.

JOHN V. LABARGE. JR.

CHAPTER 13 TRUSTEE

P.O. BOX 430908

ST. LOUIS, MO 63143

CC JACKIE BROOKS

8240 JACKSON

ST. LOUIS, MO. 63114

CHRISTI FINGAL

211 N BROADWAY

STE 2050

ST LOUIS MO 63102-0000

20a

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ST. LOUIS COUNTY, MISSOURI

FILED

/s/ American General APR 10 1995 4-10-95

PLAINTIFFS GENE OVERALL DATE

EASTERN DISTRICT 21695-4612

7 en ante CASE NUMBER

isi Jackie Brooks & Mary Brooks 22

DEFENDANTS TEAM/DIVISION

JUDGMENT IN DEFAULT Jackie Brooks only

The plaintiff(s) appears in person and/or by attorney. The defendant(s)

although called three times appear(s) not. The court finds that the

defendant(s) is in default. This cause now being submitted to the court

upon the pleadings and evidence, and the court being fully advised in the

premises finds that the piaintiff(s) is entitled to a default judgment.

Wherefore, it is ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the

plaintiff(s) have and recover from the defendant(s) as follows:

$ 24,303.28 Principal

$ 650.00 Interest

$ Attorney’s fees

$ 24,953.28 Total plus court costs

DWOPPC Mary Brooks “That to the best of affiant’s knowledge and belief.

the defendant(s) is employed in civilian life and that

the defendant(s) is not now engaged in the military

service of the United States.

Attorney Kenneth Bini

SO ORDERED Bini Sicib. Reid & Kobe PO

Address 1034 S. Brentwood Blvd

St.Louis, MO 63117-1223

Is Colleen Dok: me

Judges: Colleen Dolaw - 3434 Phone No. Jd:862-2805

4/10/95 ee

Deputy Clerk MB.