Opposition Brief — Orzechchowskii v. York International International Corp. (No. 05-1651)

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No. 05-1651 FILED

OFFICE OF Thee

In The GER

Supreme Court of the Gnited States

S

JAY E. ORZECHOWSKI

Petitioner,

V.

YORK INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION,

Respondent.

S

On Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari

To The United States Court Of Appeals

For The Sixth Circuit

a

RESPONDENT YORK INTERNATIONAL

CORPORATION’S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

°

CHRISTINA HENAGEN PEER

(Counsel of Record)

Wo. MICHAEL HANNA

SQUIRE, SANDERS & DEMPSEY LLP

4900 Key Tower

127 Public Square

Cleveland, Ohio 44114

Phone: (216) 479-8500

Fax: (216) 479-8780

~———— -—-- —--—

cain

COCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING CU (800) 225-4964

OR CALL COLLECT (402) 342-2831

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether the Sixth Circuit heightened the evidentiary

requirements to survive summary judgment on disability

discrimination claims under § 4112.02 of the Ohio Revised

Code by (1) requiring a plaintiff alleging a substantial

limitation of the major life activity of working to present

evidence that he is precluded from a broad range or class

of jobs or (2) by requiring a plaintiff alleging a disability

due to a “record of impairment” to present evidence of a

substantial limitation of a major life activity.

il

RULE 29.6 CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 29.6, Respondent

YORK International Corporation states that it is a wholly

owned subsidiary of Johnson Controls International which

is publicly traded on the New York Stock Exchange as JCI.

ill

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Cane N GI FIIs os dacicrnns cdedentanieecenennientasevininwbetenes i

Rule 29.6 Corporate Disclosure Statement ............... ii

EN Ole I ire cv st cadoinneniieataniauasetnndiimcesdgiie ili

IE Or I ic veccids caesar cosecsancecsmnnctinupeicenastiviacen vi

SF iti ica abensthinjtsietecrtntmdiistaiannigiets 1

Statutory Provisions Involved...................:cccseseeeeeeees 1

SOD hiss i iiiviscisticnsecctesnanttatcieiabetintes aes 1

I NG inibcdewineé+cdenvtdviniesdvchimunliasbtcorend 2

Reasons for Denying the Petition...........................44. 6

I. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT ALLEGED BY PETI-

TIONER DOES NOT EXIST ........................4. 6

A. This Court Has Defined The Term “Sub-

stantially Limits” In Relation To The

Major Life Activity Of Working As Being

Precluded From A Class Of Jobs Or

Broad Range Of Jobs In Various Classes. 7

B. The First, Third And Sixth Circuits Uni-

formly Apply This Cowrt’s Definition Of

“Substantially Limits” .................cccccsecceees 8

C. The Cases Cited By Petitioner Do Not

Evidence A Circuit Split... ................eeee 9

i. The First Circuit Cases Cited By Pe-

titioner Are Inapposite And Do Not

Evidence A Circuit Split...................... 9

ii. The Third Circuit Case Cited By Peti-

tioner Does Not Evidence A Circuit

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS - Continued

Page

D. Courts In Other Circuits Do Not Allow

Plaintiffs Who Merely Establish A Physi-

cal Impairment To Proceed To Trial ......... 12

E. The First, Third And Sixth Circuits Util-

ize The Same Test When Reviewing “Re-

cord Of Impairment” Claims.................... 13

Il. PETITIONER FAILED TO PRESENT EVI-

DENCE SUFFICIENT TO OVERCOME RE-

SPONDENT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY

a oN i ak a 16

EOLA LDS LN ORAM PD ILL AN ABS OE 17

APPENDIX:

Appendix A Farkas v. Carpenter Technology Corp.,

Civil Action No. 05-CV-2741, 2006 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 9170 (E.D. Pa. March 6, 2006) (unpub-

NEED nib ith ui th oc scierisiycotnbabistinliakcydinidoccegupbbaeumeetetealanseaies App. 1

Appendix B Olds v. U.PS., Inc., 127 Fed. Appx.

779 (6th Cir. 2005) (unpublished) ................0...0... App. 16

Appendix C Sebest v. Campbell City Sch. Dist. Bd.

Of Educ., 94 Fed. Appx. 320 (6th Cir. 2004) (un-

S| ESRI Sarma A Sao R Peper NOREEN Ti EAE App. 26

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

FEDERAL CASES

Alberson’s Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555 (1999)......... 13

Clemente v. Executive Airlines, Inc., 213 F.3d 25

Cie Fae iain iusttiness icenabnacolneovbaconaes canto alctneiiadhdaks 15

Farkas v. Carpenter Technology Corp., Civil Action

No. 05-CV-2741, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9170

CER Fc UI WO, MED cin stevens cuted ocadacassencecavananelon 15

LeBron-Torres v. Whitehall Labs., 251 F.3d 236 (1st

Se FD uicistises sascidwadscsdcbniieny iecedbuahtnctinbesnttnaiiaaaeuniansaetoinues 9

Lowry v. Cabletron Systems, Inc., 973 F. Supp. 77

CER Pe UE Bika au casnincccepneplanbudcanads snlakcesbiveamainaies 9, 10, 16

McKay v. Toyota Motor Mfg., Inc., 110 F.3d 369 (6th

SIE LOOT seciuntnsonisacheiassubNeaspsoidachevtbaudovsuwuncanciia 9, 10, 11, 12

Murphy v. UPS, 527 U.S. 516 (1999)... ereeneeseneeees 8

Olds v. UPS, Inc., 127 Fed. Appx. 779 (6th Cir.

MMOD kcsvhavensvedscaviéna vests tticceinteeepipeicuspinimecnbvexgdacanredent oie: 15

Quint v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 172 F.3d 1 (1st Cir.

ET sp isticiscinigtnntecdied bein ds sindiniind tidplebbomiccenazionibiies 9, 10, 16

Sebest v. Campbell City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 94

Ped. Apna: 320 (6th Cir, 2006) .........ccccsnsseserresesrereesssesss 15

Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (2999)........... 7

Tice v. Centre Area Trans. Auth.. 247 F.3d 506 (3d

NS SDs ccsalavsiadcccokatasaioscinasstocasdadacsipsiauadnaaerconans 8, 14

Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky. Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S.

PI IE chisadceidisicdsietesdaconainindccesacvindiae tatters deallckinhdas 12

Whitfield v. Pathmark Stores, Inc., 39 F. Supp. 434

ER BIE Be Ricthnaskdnseoabsccciscdchswoibeotsantneds 10, 11, 12, 13, 16

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ~— Continued

Page

STATUTES AND REGULATIONS

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RULES

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RESPONDENT’S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

¢

JURISDICTION

Petitioner invokes this Court’s jurisdiction pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 1254. This case was decided by the Sixth

Circuit Court of Appeals based on diversity jurisdiction

and does not raise a federal question. Rather, the Sixth

Circuit’s application of federal law principles to a state

statute is at issue.

¢

STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

In addition to § 4112.02 of the Ohio Revised Code,

cited by Petitioner, 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2), and 29 C.F.R.

§ 1630.2 are germane to this matter.

¢

INTRODUCTION

Because this case involves the consistent and correct

application of well-settled law, it is a textbook example of a

matter that does not warrant this Court’s review.

Throughout this litigation, Petitioner has repeatedly failed

to present evidence that he is disabled within the meaning

of § 4112.02 of the Ohio Revised Code. Now, in a last-dit#h

attempt to salvage his case, he asserts the Sixth Circuit

utilized an inappropriate evidentiary standard in review-

ing the district court’s decision to grant Respondent’s

motion for summary judgment. However, in requiring that

he demonstrate a substantial limitation of the major life

activity of working by presenting evidence that he was

2

precluded from a broad range or class of jobs, the Sixth

Circuit and the district court adhered to well-settled and

consistently applied principles established by this Court.

Petitioner’s argument that this requirement created a

circuit split is without merit. First, while the Sixth Circuit

applied Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) princi-

ples, this case was not brought under the ADA. Rather,

Petitioner’s claim was brought and decided under Ohio

law. Second, the Sixth Circuit’s application of ADA princi-

ples and Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

(“EEOC”) regulations which require a showing of preclu-

sion from a broad range or class of jobs to Petitioner’s

state law claims did not create a split between the First

and Third Circuits and the Sixth Circuit. Rather, a review

of applicable case law demonstrates the First, Third and

Sixth Circuits uniformly apply these principles and

regulations. Likewise, contrary to Petitioner’s claims, the

First, Third and Sixth Circuits all require evidence of a

substantial limitation of a major life activity to demon-

strate a disability due to a “record of impairment.”

For these reasons, this Court should deny the Peti-

tion.

+

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Respondent employed Petitioner at its Valley View,

Ohio facility as a warehouseman. Pet. App. 16a. His duties

included preparing UPS and Airborne packages, coordinat-

ing inbound freight, pulling orders from trucks, customer

pickups, imputing orders, answering customer questions

and minor maintenance. Jd. On August 25, 1999, Peti-

tioner injured his back while at work. Jd. Despite his

3

injury, he continued to work his regular duties and hours

until approximately October 8, 1999, when his doctor

diagnosed a herniated disk and indicated he could not

work. Jd. Petitioner returned to work on approximately

October 25, 1999 and worked through October 27, 1999.

Id. Petitioner was placed on leave and did not return to

work after this time.’ Id.

Respondent’s leave policy allows an employee to take

up to twelve consecutive months of leave. Pet. App. 17a. If

an employee’s leave extends beyond the twelve months

allowed by the policy, the employee’s employment is

terminated. Jd. On October 18, 2000, Petitioner was

advised that, because he would be absent from work for

twelve consecutive months as of October 28, 2000, he

would be receiving a termination letter. Jd. In accordance

with its leave policy, Respondent terminated Petitioner’s

employment effective October 31, 2000.* Pet. App. 18a.

On July 8, 2002, almost two years after his termina-

tion, Petitioner contacted Respondent seeking part-time

work through the Part-Time Work Incentive Program

administered by Aetna, Respondent’s third-party insurance

’ On October 28, 1999, Respondent placed Petitioner on leave

under the Family and Medical Leave Act. Pet. App. 16a. Petitioner

initially received eight weeks of salary continuation and later short-

term disability benefits. Jd. In February 2000, Petitioner had back

surgery. Jd. Petitioner began receiving long-term disability benefits on

May 1, 2000. /d.

* Petitioner alleges he attempted to return to work in August 2000

by inquiring about part-time employment. Pet. App. 17a. Petitioner was

informed that no part-time positions were available. Jd. However, even

had a position been available, because he had not been released by his

doctor to return to work, Petitioner could not have been hired. Pet. App.

30a.

4

carrier. Pet. App. 18a. Under this program, an individual

who is medically released to work may work part-time

with any employer and continue to receive long-term

disability benefits. Jd.

Respondent informed Petitioner that, although he

could work part-time for any employer, part-time employ-

ment with Respondent was possible under certain circum-

stances. Pet. App. 18a. To be considered for a part-time

position with Respondent, Petitioner was advised he must

be medically released to return to work and a part-time

position had to be available. Jd. Petitioner was medically

released to work on July 11, 2002. Pet. App. 30a. However,

because no part-time positions were available, Respondent

did not re-hire Petitioner.’ Pet. App. 18a. Since October

2002, Petitioner has worked as a projectionist at a movie

theater. Pet. App. 28a.

On October 25, 2002, Petitioner filed a Complaint in

the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas which

asserted claims for breach of contract, promissory estop-

pel, violation of good faith and fair dealing, intentional

and negligent infliction of emotional distress, discharge in

violation of public policy and handicap discrimination in

violation of Ohio Revised Code § 4112.02.‘ Respondent

removed the case to the United States District Court for

* The lack of part-time positions was not surprising as no part-time

positions were available during Petitioner’s ten-year employment with

Respondent. Pet. App. 23a.

* As the docket in this matter is “capable of accurate and ready

determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably

be questioned,” this Court may take judicial notice of it. Fep. R. Evin.

201(b\2). In the interest of brevity, Respondent will not continue to

recite the text of the rule each time it cites to the docket of this case but

instead will merely cite to the judicial notice rule.

5

the Northern District of Ohio based on diversity of citizen-

ship.’ The district court granted Respondent’s motion to

dismiss Petitioner’s claims of promissory estoppel, inten-

tional and negligent infliction of emotional distress and

violation of good faith and fair dealing.® Petitioner’s claims

for breach of contract, discharge in violation of public

policy and disability discrimination survived dismissal.

Petitioner claimed to be disabled within the meaning

of Ohio Revised Code § 4112.02 due to a substantial

limitation of the major life activity of working.’ Pet. App.

26a. Petitioner asserted his back condition limited his

ability to do repetitive work because he needed to “sit

down for a little while” and “stand up for a little while”

and needed to keep moving. Jd. Dr. James Faremouth

opined Petitioner could not perform a job involving repeti-

tive bending from the waist to the floor or a job that

involved heavy lifting of more than twenty pounds on a

regular or occasional basis. Pet. App. 27a.

After the completion of discovery, Respondent filed a

motion for summary judgment on the remaining claims.’

On December 3, 2004, the Magistrate Judge entered a

Report and Recommendation recommending that Respon-

dent’s motion for summary judgment be granted. Pet. App.

D. The Magistrate Judge found Petitioner’s evidence, as

cited above, to be insufficient to raise a genuine issue of

material fact regarding whether he was disabled due to a

* Feb. R. Evin. 201(b\2).

* Feb. R. Evin. 201(b)(2).

” As Petitioner's other causes of action are not at issue here, the

~ ~~ basis of these claims will not be discussed.

* Fen. R. Evin. 201(bX2).

6

substantial limitation of the major life activity of working.

Pet. App. 28a. The district court adopted the Magistrate

Judge’s Report and Recommendation in its entirety on

February 3, 2005. Pet. App. B; Pet. App. C. Petitioner

timely appealed the decision to the United States Court of

Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.’ After briefing and oral

argument, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the decision of the

district court. Pet. App. A. This Petition followed.

i’

vv

REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION

I. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT ALLEGED BY PETI-

TIONER DOES NOT EXIST.

This Court should reject the Petition because the

“split” alleged by Petitioner does not exist. Contrary to

Petitioner’s arguments, the Sixth Circuit does not require

an individual alleging a substantial limitation of the major

life activity of working to produce more evidence to survive

summary judgment than is required in the First and Third

Circuits. Rather, consistent with other circuits, the Sixth

Circuit merely requires such a plaintiff to present evidence

that would allow a reasonable jury to find that he cannot

perform a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various

classes. Similarly, in line with the First and Third Cir-

cuits, the Sixth Circuit requires an individual claiming a

disability due to a “record of impairment” to demonstrate

both a “record” of the impairment and that the impair-

ment “substantially limits a major life activity.” Thus,

Petitioner’s assertion that a circuit split exists is errone-

ous.

* Feo. R. Ww. 201(b)\ 2).

Further, Petitioner did not allege discrimination based

on a “record of impairment” with the district court, nor did

he argue on appeal that the district court somehow erred

in not addressing this issue. Pet. App. A; Pet. App. D.

Rather, as the Sixth Circuit noted, Petitioner did not cite

any legal error on the part of the district court. Pet. App.

8a. Therefore, Petitioner should not be given the opportu-

nity to seek review based on an alleged “circuit split”

regarding an issue that he never raised.

A. This Court Has Defined The Term “Sub-

stantially Limits” In Relation To The Ma-

jor Life Activity Of Working As Being

Precluded From A Class Of Jobs Or Broad

Range Of Jobs In Various Classes.

The fundamental premise of Petitioner’s argument in

support of certiorari is flawed. In fact, this Court has

defined the term “substantially limits” as it applies to the

major life activity of working. In Sutton v. United Airlines,

Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 491 (1999), when addressing the major

life activity of working, this Court stated that the statu-

tory phrase “‘substantially limits’ requires, at a minimum,

that plaintiffs allege they are unable to work in a broad

class of jobs.” This Court then explained:

To be substantially limited in the major life activ-

ity of working, then, one must be precluded from

more than one type of job, a specialized job, or a

particular job of choice. If jobs utilizing an indi-

vidual’s skills (but perhaps not his or her unique

talents) are available, one is not precluded from

a substantial class of jobs. Similarly, if a host of

8

different types of jobs are available, one is not

precluded from a broad range of jobs.

Id. at 492.

This definition comports with the regulations promul-

gated by the EEOC. In its regulations, the EEOC defines

“substantially limits” in the context of the major life

activity of working as “significantly restricted in the

ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of

jobs in various classes compared to the average person

having comparable training, skills or abilities.” 29 C.F.R.

§ 1630.2(jX3)G). The EEOC further notes that the “inabil-

ity to perform a single, particular job does not constitute a

substantial limitation in the major life activity of work-

ing.” Id. See also Murphy v. UPS, 527 U.S. 516 (1999)

(assuming, without deciding, the validity of the EEOC

regulation). Thus, this Court has provided ample guidance

regarding the definition of “substantially limits” as it

applies to the major life activity of working.

B. The First, Third And Sixth Circuits Uni-

formly Apply This Court’s Definition Of

“Substantially Limits.”

Not only has this Court clearly defined “substantially

limits,” the First, Third and Sixth Circuits all consistently

adhere to this definition, requiring an ADA plaintiff alleg-

ing a substantial limitation of the major life activity of

working to present evidence that he or she is precluded

from a class or broad range of jobs in various classes to

survive summary judgment. See Tice v. Centre Area Trans.

Auth., 247 F.3d 506 (3d Cir. 2001) (holding a plaintiff's

inability to drive a bus did not preclude him from a broad

class of jobs as necessary to demonstrate a substantial

9

limitation of the major life activity of working because

evidence demonstrated the plaintiff’s ability to engage in

other employment); Lebron-Torres v. Whitehall Labs., 251

F.3d 236 (1st Cir. 2001) (finding a plaintiff with a back

injury did not demonstrate a substantial limitation on the

major life activity of working because she continued to

work full-time at her manufacturing job after her injury

and later almost full-time as a hairstylist); McKay v.

Toyota Motor Mfg., Inc., 110 F.3d 369 (6th Cir. 1997)

(holding the plaintiff did not produce sufficient evidence to

survive summary judgment because evidence only demon-

strated her inability to perform a narrow range of jobs

requiring repetitive motion, not a broad class of jobs).

Thus, Petitioner’s alleged circuit split regarding the

“substantially limits” definition is nonexistent.

C. The Cases Cited By Petitioner Do Not

Evidence A Circuit Split.

Although Petitioner alleges the absence of a definition

of “substantial limitation” with respect to the major life

activity of working has created a circuit split, he does not

set forth any cases supporting this proposition.

i. The First Circuit Cases Cited By Peti-

tioner Are Inapposite And Do Not Evi-

dence A Circuit Split.

The cases relied on by Petitioner to evidence a split of

authority between the First and Sixth Circuits are inappo-

site. First, neither Quint v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 172 F.3d

1 (1st Cir. 1999) nor Lowry v. Cabletron Systems, Inc., 973

F.Supp. 77 (D. N.H. 1997), address the First Circuit

standard for demonstrating a “record of impairment”

10

under the ADA. Second, neither Quint nor Lowry address

the evidence necessary to survive summary judgment in

the First Circuit as neither case was decided on summary

judgment. Rather, in Quint, the defendant appealed the

district court’s finding that it had discriminated against

the plaintiff in violation of the ADA. Quint, 172 F.3d at 5.

In Lowry, the district court denied the defendant’s motion

to dismiss the plaintiff’s ADA claim pursuant to Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Lowry, 973 F. Supp. at 84.

Thus, neither Quint nor Lowry support Petitioner’s con-

tention that a circuit split exists between the First and

Sixth Circuits regarding “record of impairment” or the

evidentiary standard required for an ADA plaintiff to

survive summary judgment.”

ii. The Third Circuit Case Cited By Peti-

tioner Does Not Evidence A Circuit

Split.

In support of the contention that a circuit split exists

between the Third and Sixth Circuits, Petitioner relies

solely on Whitfield v. Pathmark Stores, Inc., 39 F. Supp.

434 (D. Del. 1999). In Whitfield, the plaintiff argued she

was disabled under the ADA because she had “an impair-

ment that ‘substantially limit[ed) one or more of [her]

major life activities’ or, in the alternative, because she

‘(had] a record of such impairment.’” Jd. at 436. The court

first addressed whether the impairment substantially

*° Interestingly, both Quint and Lowry utilize the court’s holding in

McKay v. Toyota Motor Mfg., U.S.A., Inc., 110 F.3d 369 (6th Cir. 1997) -

the Sixth Circuit case Petitioner claims is at the heart of the “circuit

split.” Quint, 172 F.3d at 12-13; Lowry, 973 F. Supp. at 81.

11

limited one or more of the plaintiff’s major life activities."

Id. Regarding the major life activity of working, the court

applied the EEOC definition of “substantial limitation”

and found that evidence from the plaintiff’s vocational

expert that her job options were “greatly diminished,” was

sufficient to survive summary judgment. Jd. at 440-43,

citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3).

The court next considered whether the plaintiff had

presented sufficient evidence of a “record of impairment”

to survive summary judgment. Id. at 444. In concluding

that sufficient evidence existed, the court relied on two

factors: (1) evidence the defendant knew the plaintiff’s

medical restrictions were permanent when it began its

allegedly discriminatory treatment and (2) the court’s

previous finding that the restrictions caused by the plain-

tiff’s physical impairment could substantially limit a

major life activity. Id. at 444-45. Thus, the court also

allowed the “record of impairment” claim to proceed to

trial. Id.

Although Petitioner asserts that comparing Whitfield

to McKay v. Toyota Motor Mfg. U.S.A., Inc., 110 F.3d 369

(6th Cir. 1997) evidences a circuit split, the basis for this

assertion is unclear. In McKay, like Whitfield, there was

no dispute regarding the existence of a physical impair-

ment. Jd. at 371. Rather, the district court in McKay

granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment as

it concluded that the plaintiff’s carpal tunnel syndrome

did not substantially limit the major life activity of work-

ing. Id. The district court noted that “a diagnosis of carpal

“ It was uncontested that the plaintiff’s back injury constituted a

“physical impairment.” Jd. at 436,

12

tunnel syndrome, by itself, [is] insufficient to raise a

genuine issue of material fact concerning whether plaintiff

was disabled within the contemplation of the ADA.” Id.

Unlike Whitfield, the McKay plaintiff did not set forth

sufficient evidence of a “substantial limitation of the major

life activity of working” to raise an issue of material fact.

Id. The Sixth Circuit, utilizing the same EEOC regula-

tions as the Whitfield Court, affirmed this decision. Id. at

371-73. Because the McKay plaintiff did not allege dis-

crimination based on a “record of impairment”, the court

did not address the issue. Thus, comparing Whitfield to

McKay does not evidence a circuit split.

D. Courts In Other Circuits Do Not Allow

Plaintiffs Who Merely Establish A Physi-

cal Impairment To Proceed To Trial.

Petitioner erroneously asserts that, in “the First and

Third Circuit Court of Appeals, plaintiffs who are able to

establish physical impairments are able to proceed to trial

in the district courts.”” Pet. at 5. This statement runs

contrary to this Court’s well-settled precedent. In Toyota

Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 198 (2002),

this Court found:

It is insufficient for individuals attempting to

prove disability status under this test to merely

submit evidence of a medical diagnosis of an

impairment. Instead, the ADA requires those

‘claiming the Act’s protection ... to prove a dis-

ability by ofering evidence that the extent of the

” As previously noted, Petitioner has waived any “record of

impairment” argument by failing to raise this issue with the district

court or Sixth Circuit.

13

limitation [caused] by their impairment’ in terms

of their own experience.

Id. at 198, quoting Alberson’s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S.

555, 567 (1999). Petitioner also asserts that, in the First

and Third Circuits, ADA claims will survive summary

judgment if the plaintiff produces evidence that he or she

has a “record of disability.” Pet. at 4-5. However, none of

the cases cited by Petitioner support this propzsition.

Rather, as discussed below, a review of case law shows

courts in the First and Third Circuits do not allow cases to

proceed to trial simply because an individual has pre-

sented records documenting a “physical impairment.”

E. The First, Third And Sixth Circuits Utilize

* The Same Test When Reviewing “Record

Of Impairment” Claims.

Petitioner’s assertion of a circuit split regarding the

evidence “required to survive summary judgment on a

“record of impairment” claim is based on a misreading of

Whitfield. Petitioner seems to assert that a “record of

impairment,” standing alone, is evidence that will allow an

ADA plaintiff to survive summary judgment. This asser-

tion is contrary to the ADA which defines “disability” as:

(A) a physical or mental impairment that sub-

stantially limits one or more of tte major life

activities of such individual;

(B) a record of such an impairment [an im-

pairment that substantially limits one or

more of the major life activities]; or

(C) being regarded as having suck an impair-

ment.

14

42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (emphasis added). Under the plain

language of the statute, it is insufficient to demonstrate a

“record of impairment”; rather, the individual must also

demonstrate that the impairment in the record substan-

tially limits a major life activity.

The EEOC further amplifies this point in its regula-

tions which state that an individual has a “record of

impairment” when he or she “has a history of, or has been

misclassified as having, a mental or physical impairment

that substantially limits one or more major life

activities.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k) (emphasis added). As

these regulations make clear, the recorded impairment

must be one that substantially limits a major life activity.

Contrary to Petitioner’s assertion, the First, Third

and Sixth Circuits all apply the statute and regulations in

this manner. In Tice v. Centre Area Transp. Auth., 247 F.3d

506 (3rd Cir. 2001), the court examined a claim based on

the “record of disability” prong of the ADA and stated:

In the alternative, Tice submits that he has a

“record of disability” based on his back injuries.

This contention fails for the same reason that we

hold Tice is not currently disabled. A plaintiff

attempting to prove the existence of a “re-

cord” of disability must still demonstrate

that the recorded impairment is a “disabil-

ity” within the meaning of the ADA. Tice has

only presented evidence that his impairment lim-

ited his ability to drive a bus — once again, be-

cause an impairment that limits only bus

driving is not a “disability,” Tice has not

demonstrated the existence of a record of

disability.

15

Id. at 513 (emphasis added). See also Farkas v. Carpenter

Technology Corp., Civil Action No. 05-CV-2741, 2006 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 9170 (E.D. Pa. March 6, 2006) (unpublished)

(holding the plaintiff’s record of having suffered a stroke

insufficient to establish a “record of impairment” as there

was no evidence his ability to work was substantially

limited).

Similarly, in Clemente v. Executive Airlines, Inc., 213

F.3d 25, 33 (1st Cir. 2000), the court held the plaintiff

failed to establish a “record of impairment” because there

was no evidence of an impairment that substantially

limited a major life activity. Likewise, in Sebest v. Camp-

bell City Sch. Dist. Bd. Of Educ., 94 Fed. Appx. 320, 327

(6th Cir. 2004) (unpublished), the court held the plaintiff

did not establish a “record of impairment.” As in this case,

the Sebest plaintiff proceeded under a misinterpretation of

the requirements to demonstrate a “record of impairment.”

The court noted:

While Sebest has presented evidence to show

that he has suffered from leukemia in the past,

he has not presented evidence demonstrating

that he has a record of an impairment that sub-

stantially limits a major life activity. Sebest ap-

pears to assume that by having leukemia, he

necessarily has a record of a disability. This un-

derstanding, however, is in conflict with the lan-

guage of the ADA.

Id. See also Olds v. UPS, Inc., 127 Fed. Appx. 779 (6th Cir.

2005) (unpublished) (holding plaintiff did not establish a

record of impairment because there was no evidence of a

substantial limitation of the major iife activity of working).

Thus, there is no evidence to support Petitioner’s conten-

tion that a circuit split exists with respect to this issue.

16

Il, PETITIONER FAILED TO PRESENT EVIDENCE

SUFFICIENT TO OVERCOME RESPONDENT'S

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

Petitioner’s claims failed because he did not present

evidence of a substantial limitation of the major life

activity of working — not because of an illusory circuit split

or error on the part of the Sixth Circuit. As previously

noted, to survive summary judgment, an ADA plaintiff

must present evidence demonstrating a _ substantial

limitation of a major life activity. When the major life

activity is working, a plaintiff must demonstrate that he

was precluded from occupying a class or broad range of

jobs in various classes as compared to the average person

with similar skills, training and abilities. 29 C.FR.

§ 1630.2(j)(3)(i). Unless such a showing is made, summary

judgment is appropriate. FED. R. Civ. Pro. 56(c).

Here, Petitioner alleged a substantial limitation of the

major life activity of working based entirely on: (1) Dr.

Faremouth’s diagnosis of chronic lumbar radiculopathy —

post surgical therapy lumbar spine which limited his

ability to bend repeatedly from the waist or regularly lift

more than twenty pounds; and (2) his own testimony that

due to his back injury, he needs to “sit down for a little

while” and “stand up for a little while” and needs to keep

moving. Pet. App. 26a-27a. Unlike the situation in Whit-

field, Quint and Lowry, Petitioner did not present any

evidence in the form of expert testimony or otherwise that

he was precluded from a class of jobs or broad range of jobs

in various classes. Indeed, Petitioner has been employed

since shortly after being medically released to return to

work. Pet. App. 28a. Thus, the district court did not err in

granting Respondent’s motion for summary judgment. In

upholding the district court, the Sixth Circuit noted that

17

Petitioner did not “cite any legal error in the district

court’s determination, nor [did] he allege that there [were]

disputed issues of fact.” Pet. App. 8a. Thus, the outcome of

this Petition will not alter the disposition of this case.

+

CONCLUSION

For all of the foregoing reasons, the Petition for a Writ

of Certiorari should be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

CHRISTINA HENAGEN PEER

(Counsel of Record)

WM. MICHAEL HANNA

SQUIRE, SANDERS & DEMPSEY LLP

4900 Key Tower

127 Public Square

Cleveland, Ohio 44114

Phone: (216) 479-8500

Fax: (216) 479-8780

July 28, 2006

App. 1

APPENDIX A

DAVID FARKAS v. CARPENTER

TECHNOLOGY CORP.

CIVIL ACTION, NO. 05-CV-2741

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9170;

17 Am. Disabilities Cas. (BNA) 1831

March 8, 2006, Decided

March 8, 2006, Filed; March 9, 2006, Entered

COUNSEL: For DAVID FARKAS, Plaintiff: DONALD P.

RUSSO, DONALD P. RUSSO, ESQUIRE, BETHLEHEM,

PA.

For CARPENTER TECHNOLOGY CORPORATION,

Defendant: JOSEPH P. HOFMANN, STEVENS & LEE,

LANCASTER, PA.

JUDGES: R. Barclay Surrick, Judge.

OPINION BY: R. Barclay Surrick

OPINION:

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

SURRICK, J.

March 8, 2006.

Presently before the Court is Defendant’s Motion For

Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 7). For the following rea-

sons, Defendant’s Motion will be granted.

)

\|

App. 2

I. BACKGROUND

A. Facts

Plaintiff David Farkas worked as a metallurgist for

Defendant Carpenter Technology Corporation (“Carpen-

ter”) since 1982. On May 28, 2001, Plaintiff suffered a

stroke, which caused him to be hospitalized for approxi-

mately one week. Plaintiff then applied for and was

granted leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act

(“FMLA”). He returned to work on July 5, 2001. At first,

Plaintiff’s physician restricted Plaintiff’s work schedule

to three days per week, to be spent in the office only and

not in the steel mill. On August 22, 2001, his physician

increased his work schedule to four days per week. Plain-

tiff was permitted to work with these restrictions. On

October 12, 2001, Plaintiff’s physician lifted all restric-

tions on Plaintiff’s work schedule. From October 12, 2001

until his termination on November 17, 2003, Plaintiff was

able to perform his job at Carpenter without restriction.

In his 2002 and 2003 annual performance reviews,

Plaintiff received criticisms related to his job performance.

(Farkas Dep. at Exs. 11-12.) Some of these criticisms were

similar to criticisms that Plaintiff had received in his

1998, 1999, and 2000 performance reviews — reviews that

Plaintiff had received before he suffered the stroke. These

criticisms included concerns about his leadership skills,

accountability, time management, and prioritizing. (Far-

kas Dep. at Exs. 8-10.) In October 2003, Plaintiff’s imme-

diate supervisor, John McGraw (hereinafter “McGraw’”),

had a meeting with Plaintiff regarding McGraw’s concerns

about Plaintiff’s failure to complete ongoing projects in a

timely fashion. (McGraw Dep. at 70-77; Farkas Dep. at

100-02; id. at Ex. 14.) At this meeting, Plaintiff indicated

to McGraw that he did not want to stay in his current

App. 3

position with Carpenter and that he wanted to be trans-

ferred to a less stressful job. (McGraw Dep. at 70-76;

Farkas Dep. at 100-02.) Shortly after this meeting,

McGraw discovered that Plaintiff had committed a signifi-

cant error with regard to a product that Carpenter was

manufacturing for Mercury Marine, one of Carpenter’s

major customers. (McGraw Dep. at 82-86.) This error

caused the Defendant great concern related to keeping the

client. It also cost Defendant approximately $18,000 to

remedy the error. (Jd . at 83-85; McElwee Dep. at 60-62.)

Citing Plaintiff’s declining job performance, failure to

improve on noted deficiencies, and the aforementioned

error with Mercury Marine, Carpenter terminated Plain-

tiff’s employment on November 17, 2003. (Farkas Dep. at

Ex. 15.)

B. Procedural History

On July 26, 2004, Plaintiff filed an administrative

claim of discrimination with the Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) and with the Pennsyl-

vania Human Relations

Commission (“PHRC”).’ On February 9, 2005, the

EEOC sent Plaintiff a Dismissal and Notice of Right to

' Plaintiff’s complaint filed with the EEOC stated as follows:

I began my employment with Carpenter Technology

Corporation as a Associate Metallurgist, on 7/01/82, and

have progressed to the level as a Senior Metallurgist. My

annual reviews were mostly very favorable and I enjoyed

my work. On May 28, 2001, I had suffered with a major

medical condition which caused me to be out of work for a

few days. I had a full recovery and returned back to work

after approximately three months and I told John McGraw,

Supervisor, that I was not limited in performing any aspects

(Continued on following page)

Sue letter advising that it was closing his file and advising

App. 4

Plaintiff of his right to sue. (Compl., Doc. No. 1 at Ex. B.)

In May 2005, Plaintiff filed suit in the Court of Com-

mon Pleas of Lehigh County, alleging that Defendant

violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42

U.S.C. § 12101 et seg., and the Pennsylvania Human

Relations Act (“PHRA”), 43 P.S. § 951 et seg. (Doc. No. 1

qf 16-18.) On June 7, 2005, Defendant filed a Notice of

Removal in this Court. (U/d.) Defendant has filed the

instant Motion requesting summary judgment on both of

Plaintiff’s claims.

IT.

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on

file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is

no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the

moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). A genuine issue of material fact exists

of my job. I gradually worked more and more hours upon my

return to work until I was able to resume full time employ

ment around December 2001. I noticed that my annual per-

formance were lower after my illness, yet nothing was ever

noted which caused me to have concerns about my employ-

ment, yet on November 17, 2003, John McGraw terminated

me due to “performance concerns.” No warnings (written or

verbal) were ever given to me regarding poor performance

prior to my termination. | strongly believe that the company

perceived my condition as a financial risk and this was the

real reason for my termination.

I believe that I have been discriminated against be-

cause of my medical condition in violation of the Americans

with Disabilities Act (ADA).

(Farkas Dep. at Ex. 16.)

App. 5

only when “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury

could return a verdict for the non-moving party.” Anderson

v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S. Ct. 2505,

91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986). The party moving for summary

judgment bears the initial burden of demonstrating that

there are no facts supporting the nonmoving party’s legal

position. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-24, 106

S. Ct. 2548, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986). Once the moving

party carries this initial burden, the nonmoving party

must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genu-

ine issue for trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); see also Matsushita

Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587,

106 S. Ct. 1348, 89 L. Ed. 2d 538 (1986) (explaining that

the nonmoving party “must do more than simply show

that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material

facts”). “The nonmoving party .. . ‘cannot rely merely upon

bare assertions, conclusory allegations or suspicion’ to

support its claim.” Townes v. City of Philadelphia, Civ. A.

No. 00-CV-138, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6056, at *4 (E.D.

Pa. May 11, 2001) (quoting Fireman’s Ins. Co. v. DeFresne,

676 F.2d 965, 969 (3d Cir. 1982)). Rather, the party oppos-

ing summary judgment must go beyond the pleadings and

present evidence through affidavits, depositions, or a‘/mis-

sions on file to show that there is a genuine issue for trial.

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. When deciding a motion for

summary judgment, the court must view facts and infer-

ences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255; Siegel Transfer, Inc. v. Carrier

Express, Inc., 54 F.3d 1125, 1127 (3d Cir. 1995). However,

we will not resolve factual disputes or make credibility

determinations. Siegel Transfer, Inc., 54 F.3d at 1127.

App. 6

Ill. LEGAL ANALYSIS

Title I of the ADA prohibits discrimination by certain

private employers against individuals with disabilities.

Specifically, it provides that no covered employer “shall

discriminate against a qualified individual with a disabil-

ity because of the disability of such individual in regard to

job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or

discharge of employees, employee compensation, job

training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of

employment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). In order to make out a

prima facie case under the ADA, a plaintiff must demon-

strate: “(1) he is a disabled person within the meaning of

the ADA; (Z) he is otherwise qualified to perform the

essential functions of the-job,with or without reasonable

accommodations by the employer; and (3) he has suffered

an otherwise adverse employment decision as a result of

discrimination.” Gaul v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 134 F.3d 576,

580 (3d Cir. 1998). Under the Act, a “disability” is defined

as: “(A}~a-physical or mental impairment that substan-

tially limits one or more of the major life activities of such

individual; (B) a record of such impairment; or (C) being

regarded as having such impairment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102.

Defendant contends that Plaintiff has failed to establish a

prima facie case because Plaintiff has not established that

he has a disability under any of the ADA’s definitions.

A. Impairment That Substantially Limits a

Major Life Activity

“It is insufficient for individuals attempting to prove

disability status under this test to merely submit evidence

of a medical diagnosis of an impairment.” Toyota Motor

Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 198, 122 S. Ct.

681, 151 L. Ed. 2d 615 (2002). The ADA requires that a

App. 7

plaintiff must also offer evidence that the extent of the

limitation caused by their impairment is substantial. /d.

Plaintiff argues that his disability is his 2001 stroke, and

that the stroke substantially limited his ability to work, a

major life activity. (Pl.’s Mem. in Opp., Doc. No. 11 at 32.)

The Code of Federal Regulations specifically provides

that to be disabled because of a substantial limitation on

the major life activity of working, a plaintiff must be:

significantly restricted in the ability to perform

either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in

various classes as compared to the average per-

son having comparable training, skills and abili-

ties. The inability to perform a single, particular

job does not constitute a substantial limitation in

the major life activity of working.

29 C.F.R. § 1630.2())(3)G). When Plaintiff requested FMLA

leave immediately after his stroke, Defendant granted his

request. (Farkas Dep. at 33.) In addition, Plaintiff admit-

ted in his deposition that on October 12, 2001, when he

returned to a full five-day work schedule, he was able to

perform all the functions of his metallurgist position. (/d.)

Indeed, according to Plaintiff’s Complaint, he made a “full

recovery” upon his return to work. (Doc. No. 1 { 9.) The

only evidence of any kind that Plaintiff offers to demon-

strate that his stroke substantially limited his ability to

perform “either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs” are

the negative performance evaluations submitted by

Plaintiff’s supervisor after Plaintiff’s stroke. (Doc. No. 11

at 32.) According to Plaintiff, these negative reviews

clearly demonstrate “that Farkas’ ability to work was

impacted by his stroke.” (/d.)

App. 8

As an initial matter, we note that Plaintiff’s own

testimony undermines this argument, since he has dis-

puted the accuracy of these very reviews. (Farkas Dep. at

70-99.) More importantly, these performance evaluations

do not indicate that Plaintiff was limited in his ability to

perform a class of jobs, let alone substantially limited. In

the 2002 and 2003 evaluations, Plaintiff’s supervisor

indicated that he did not believe that Plaintiff had demon-

strated enough leadership qualities, that he had time

management problems, that he did not take responsibility

for work, and that he was indecisive. (Farkas Dep. Exs. 11,

12.) There is no evidence that Plaintiff was unable to

perform his job. This conclusion is underscored by Plain-

tiff’s testimony that he was, in fact, able to carry out the

essential functions of his position. In his deposition,

Plaintiff admitted that only after he was terminated did

he believe that his stroke had affected his ability to per-

form his job. (Farkas Dep. at 124-25, 127-28, 132-33.) After

a thorough review of the record, we are satisfied that

Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that his stroke substan-

tially limited his ability to work. Plaintiff went back to

work shortly after his stroke and performed his job with-

out limitation. See Hill v. Steven Motors, Inc., 97 Fed.

App’x 267, 276 (10th Cir. 2004) (plaintiff did not suffer

substantial limitations on her ability to work after her

stroke, despite having to undergo a “relearning process”

and occasionally losing her balance); Mitchell v. Girl

Scouts of the U.S.A., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20570, No. 98-

CV-3730, 2003 WL 22705121, at *6-7 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 17,

2003) (plaintiff’s contentions that after her stroke she was

unable to do a “substantial amount of walking,” clean, or

ride a bike did not meet criteria for disability under the

ADA). Moreover, the deficiencies noted in his reviews

existed both before and after his stroke. Accordingly,

App. 9

Plaintiff has failed to establish that he suffers from a

disability as that term is used in the ADA.

B. Record of Disability

Plaintiff has also failed to demonstrate that he has a

record of having a disability. “Has « record of such im-

pairment means has a history of, or has been misclassified

as having, a mental or physical-impairment that substan-

tially limits one or more major life activities.” 29 C.F.R.

§ 1630.2(k). Plaintiff contends that “Defendant had com-

piled a substantial record” of Plaintiff’s disability, and

that this record was well-known by Defendant. (Doc. No.

11 at 34.) It is undisputed that Defendant was aware that

Plaintiff had a stroke. However, this alone is not sufficient

to satisfy the requirements of the ADA. “A plaintiff at-

tempting to prove the existence of a ‘record’ of disability

still must demonstrate that the recorded impairment is a

‘disability’ within the meaning of the ADA.” Tice v. Centre

Area Transp. Auth., 247 F.3d 506, 513 (3d Cir. 2001). As

discussed above, Plaintiff has not demonstrated that his

stroke is a disability under the ADA because he has offered

ne proof that his ability to work was substantially limited.

See, e.g., Sorensen v. Univ. of Utah Hosp., 194 F.3d 1084,

1087 (10th Cir. 1999) (plaintiff did not meet standard for

“record of disability” where plaintiff’s hospitalization

affected her for only a brief period and did not impact her

ability to perform her job, because she did not suffer an

impairment that substantially limits a major life aci:vity).

Similarly, Plaintiff has offered no evidence that

Defendant “misclassified” him as having an impairment

that substantially limited his ability to work. Although

Defendant was aware that Plaintiff had been hospitalized

App. 10

for a stroke and subsequently granted his request for

FMLA leave, there is no indication in the record that

Plaintiff’s supervisors believed him to be incapable of

working. Plaintiff’s own doctor lifted all restrictions on his

work schedule in October 2001. After that, Plaintiff him-

self indicated that he had made a full recovery. He also

testified that after October 2001, he did not need, nor did

he request, a reasonable accommodation on account of his

stroke. (Farkas Dep. at 33, 133.) Plaintiff’s argument that

Defendant misclassified him as disabled has no basis in

fact.

Plaintiff attempts to use McGraw’s statements in an

October 27, 2003 memo to establish a “record” of disability.

In that memo, McGraw refers to a discussion he had had

with Plaintiff in which Plaintiff indicated that he wanted a

less stressful position at Defendant. McGraw notes that

“based on Dave’s state of mind and the cited affect [sic] on

his health together with his lack of performance in this

position over the past several years, we should consider

removing Dave from this position as soon as possible.”

(Farkas Dep. at Ex. 14.) Plaintiff’s reliance on this state-

ment is at best misguided and at worst, intentionally

misleading. The health effects referenced in the memo are

the stress-related issues that Plaintiff discussed with

McGraw.’ (Farkas Dep. at 111-12.) Plaintiff admits that he

did not think these issues were related to his stroke, and

that he did not tell McGraw that they were related to his

? Although Plaintiff does not make this argument, we also note

that these stress-related health issues — “irregular heartbeat and

chronic hemorrhoids” (Farkas Dep. at 111-12) — do not independently

satisfy the ADA’s definition of a disability, because there is no evidence

that they substantially limited his ability to work. See 42 U.S.C.

§ 12102; 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(jX3){i).

App. 11

Pr

stroke. (Farkas Dep. at 111-14.) Without any evidence that

Defendant had classified him as having a disability that

substantially limited his work, Plaintiff has failed to

satisfy the “record of such impairment” test.

C. “Regarded As” Disability

In order to prove that a defendant regarded a plaintiff

as disabled, the plaintiff must prove that: “(1) a covered

entity mistakenly believes that a person has a physical

impairment that substantially limits one or more major

life activities, or (2) a covered entity mistakenly believes

that an actual, nonlimiting impairment substantially

limits one or more major life activities.” Sutton v. United

Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 489, 119 S. Ct. 2139, 144

L. Ed. 2d 450 (1999). Defendant contends that there is no

evidence indicating that Defendant believed he had an

impairment that substantially limited his life activities.

While Plaintiff argues that Defendant was aware that he

had been hospitalized for a stroke, the Third Circuit has

observed that “the mere fact that an employer is aware of

an employee’s impairment is insufficient to demonstrate

either that the employer regarded the employee as dis-

_ abled or that that perception caused the adverse employ-

ment action.” Kelly v. Drexel Univ., 94 F.3d 102, 109 (3d

Cir. 1996). Plaintiff also claims that “Defendant considered

Farkas as being unable to perform a wide range of jobs.”

(Doc. No. 11 at 35.) However, Plaintiff offers no support for

this contention. To the extent that Plaintiff is suggesting

that the fact that. Defendant terminated Plaintiff’s em-

ployment is evidence that Defendant considered Farkas

unable to perform a'wide range of jobs, this argument is

circular in its reasoning and therefore unhelpful. See

Zalepa v. Cornerstone Tech., LLC, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

App. 12

34246, No. CV 03-1850, 2005 WL 3234314, at *7 (M.D. Pa.

Nov. 30, 2005) (“The notion that defendant must have fired

plaintiff because it regarded him as disabled and that it

plainly regarded him as disabled because it fired him is

attractive but circular — it lacks a causal antecedent.”)

(internal citations omitted).

Plaintiff relies on the Third Circuit’s opinion in Taylor

v. Pathmark Stores, 177 F.3d 180 (3d Cir. 1999), for the

proposition that “in general, an employer’s perception that

an employee cannot perform a wide range of jobs suffices

to make out a ‘regarded as’ claim.” Jd. at 188. However, in

Taylor there was actual written evidence that the em-

ployer did not believe the plaintiff could perform any job

for the employer even with accommodation, and as a result

of this perception the employer terminated the plaintiff.

Id. at 188. There is no such evidence in this case, nor does

Plaintiff provide any evidence that his termination was

due to such a misperception. The other cases cited by

Plaintiff are distinguishable as well, in that those cases

involve fact patterns in which the employer drastically

restricted plaintiff’s employment as a result of the em-

ployer’s belief that plaintiff was unable to perform a range

of jobs. See, e.g., Williams v. Phila. Hous. Auth. Police

Dep't, 380 F.3d 751 (3d Cir. 2004); Best v. Shell Oil Co., 107

F.3d 544 (7th Cir. 1997); Dacasin v. Bay Area Rapid

Transit Dist., 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18626, No. C 97-0455,

1998 WL 827697 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 23, 1998). As previously

discussed, the only restrictions that Defendant placed on

Plaintiff’s work as a result of his stroke were those re-

quested by Plaintiff or Plaintiff’s physician. After Plain-

tiff’s physician indicated that Plaintiff could work full-

time, there is no indication that Defendant regarded

App. 13

Plaintiff as une .* to perform a wide range of jobs.’ More-

over, Plaintiff himself insisted that he had made a full

recovery after his stroke. Under the circumstances, there

is no support for Plaintiff’s argument under the “regarded

as” test for disability.

D. Nondiscriminatory Reasons

Even if one were to somehow conclude that Plaintiff

has established a prime facie case of discrimination, one

could not reasonably conclude that Defendant’s proffered

nondiscriminatory reasons for their actions were pretext

for discrimination. Plaintiff’s reviews over the years, even

before his stroke, showed deficiencies in his performance.

Although Defendant was satisfied with Plaintiff’s job

performance and generally considered him a good em-

ployee, the deficiencies were never really remedied by

Plaintiff. Then, in 2003, Plaintiff made_an error which

could have cost Defendant a client and did cost Defendant

$18,000 to remedy. This coupled with Plaintiff’s lack of

progress in his job performance and Plaintiff’s expressed

dissatisfaction with his job provide a nondiscriminatory

explanation for Plaintiff’s termination.‘ Plaintiff has

* Plaintiff’s allegation that Defendant took away his responsibili-

ties for fuel injection customers because of his stroke does not meet the

standard under the “regarded as” test. (See Doc. No. 14 at 3; Farkas

Dep. at 38-40.) The fact that Defendant removed Plaintiff from that one

particular job does not establish that Defendant regarded Plaintiff’s

stroke as substantially limiting his ability to work at a broad class of

jobs. Indeed, Plaintiff’s compensation and benefits were not affected by

the transfer of these responsibilities, and Plaintiff still had a “full plate”

of duties without the fuel injection job. (Farkas Dep. at 38-40.)

* It is worth noting that in 2001 and 2002, Defendant went through

a downsizing in which forty percent of its salaried employees were

terminated. This included at least three people who were under

(Continued on following page)

App. 14

failed to offer evidence of “weaknesses, implausibilities,

inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions” to rebut

Defendant’s nondiscriminatory reasons. Fuentes v. Perskie,

32 F.3d 759, 765 (3d Cir. 1994). The fact that Defendant’s

reasons may have been wrong, or mistaken, or demon-

strated a complete lack of loyalty to an employee of over

twenty years service does not render the employer’s

reasons pretextual. See id. (“To discredit the employer’s |

proffered reason, however, the plaintiff cannot simply

show that the employer’s decision was wrong or mistaken,

since the factual dispute at issue is whether discrimina-

tory animus motivated the employer, not whether the

employer is wise, shrewd, prudent, or competent.”).

E. PHRA Claim

We similarly conclude that Plaintiff has not provided

sufficient evidence of a disability under the PHRA. The

PHRA definition of disability is nearly identical to that of

the ADA: “(1) a physical or mental impairment which

substantially limits one or more of such person’s major life

activities; (2) a record of having such an impairment; or (3)

being regarded as having such an impairment....” 43 Pa.

Cons. Stat. § 954(p.1). “The PHRA is basically the same as

the ADA in relevant respects and ‘Pennsylvania courts...

generally interpret the PHRA in accord with its federal

counterparts.’” Rinehimer v. Cemcolift, Inc., 292 F.3d 375,

382 (3d Cir. 2002) (citing Kelly, 94 F.3d at 105). Therefore,

we will grant Defendant’s Motion with respect to Plain-

tiff’s PHRA claim also.

McGraw’s supervision. Plaintiff's responsibilities increased as a result

of the downsizing.

App. 15

IV. CONCLUSION

Plaintiff has not met his burden to establish a prima

facie case under the ADA or the PHRA. He has failed to

provide evidence demonstrating that he has a disability as

defined by these statutes. He has also failed to establish

that Defendant’s reasons for terminating him were pretex-

tual. Accordingly, we will grant Defendant’s Motion for

Summary Judgment.

An appropriate Order follows.

ORDER

AND NOW, this 8th day of March, 2006, upon consid-

eration of Defendant’s Motion For Summary Judgment, it

is ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion is GRANTED, and

judgement is entered in favor of Defendant Carpenter

Technology Corp. and against Plaintiff David Farkas.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

BY THE COURT: .

S/ R. Barclay Surrick, Judge

App. 16

APPENDIX B

MARX OLDS, Plaintiff-Appellant v. UNITED

PARCEL SERVICE, INC., Defendant-Appellee

No. 03-1920

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

127 Fed. Appx. 779; 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 5501

April 1, 2005, Filed

COUNSEL: For MARK OLDS, Plaintiff-Appellant: Mary

Katherine Norton, Detroit, MI; Steven A. Hicks, Knaggs,

Harter, Brake & Schneider, Lansing, MI

For UNITED PARCEL SERVICE, INC., Defendant-Appellee:

Kathleen McCree Lewis, Dykema Gossett, Detroit, MI;

Stephen S. Muhich, Kelley E. Stonnels, Dykema Gossett,

Grand Rapids, MI

JUDGES: BEFORE: NORRIS, BATCHELDER AND

ROGERS, Circuit Judges.

OPINION:

PER CURIAM. Plaintiff Mark Olds appeals from the

district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of

defendant United Parcel Service, Inc. (“UPS”), in this

disability discrimination action under the Americans with

Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (“ADA”).'

' The district court also granted summary judgment is favor of

UPS on Olds’ claims for retaliation in violation of the ADA and the

Michigan Workers Disability Compensation Act. On appeal, Olds does

not challenge the decision to grant UPS summary judgment on those

claims.

App. 17

I.

The district court set forth the facts of the case in an

opinion granting summary judgment to UPS:

Plaintiff Mark Olds worked as a package de-

livery driver for Defendant United Parcel Service,

Inc. (“UPS”) at its St. Joseph, Michigan facility

from September 1982 until January 8, 1998.

Plaintiff is 52 years old, married, and has three

children. He has a high school education and an

associate’s degree in business. Prior to beginning

employment with Defendant, Plaintiff worked at

various manual labor jobs including welding,

machining auto parts, construction, and carpen-

try. All parties agree Plaintiff had an excellent

employment record while with UPS.

In 1997, Plaintiff was diagnosed with mono-

clonal gammopathy of undetermined signifi-

cance, a condition involving an abnormal protein

that leads to cancer 20 percent of the time “his

diagnosis had no impact on Plaintiff’s ability to

work. After sustaining a compression fracture in

his neck while on the job in January 1998, De-

fendant was diagnosed with multiple myeloma, a

cancer affecting bone marrow. Plaintiff went on

short-term disability after sustaining this injury.

After undergoing chemotherapy, Plaintiff sought

to return to work in May 1998 pursuant to his

doctor’s approval. Plaintiff was initially under a

25 pound lifting restriction and precluded from

doing any kind of repetitive bending or twisting.

This was later increased to a 40 pound restric-

tion in January 1999, and the lifting restriction

was made permanent in September 1999. Plain-

tiff was also instructed not to perform certain re-

petitive activities that might put sudden, excessive

App. 18

force on his bones. Plaintiff underwent a bone

marrow transplant in September 2002. He was

cleared to work in January 2003, still under a 40

pound lifting restriction.

Plaintiff first inquired about accommodation

for his weight restriction in February 1999 and

formally sought accommodation in September

1999. Plaintiff sought permission to use a two-

wheel dolly to deliver packages over 40 pounds in

weight. In October 1999, Plaintiff submitted a

written request for Defendant to make this ac-

commodation available to him.’ Defendant de-

nied Plaintiff’s request for accommodation on

the basis that it did not find him entitled to one

under the Americans with Disabilities Act of

1990 (“ADA”). Defendant also informed Plaintiff

he was not qualified to return to work because of

his lifting restriction. Plaintiff filed a grievance

with respect to Defendant’s refusal to let him re-

turn to work under a 40 pound lifting restriction.

The grievance was appealed to a state panel

which upheld UPS’s decision as not being in vio-

lation of the collective bargaining contract. The

panel did not address whether Defendant should

provide Plaintiff with any accommodation or

whether other positions were available.

After being denied the opportunity to return

to his old job as a package delivery driver, Plain-

tiff bid on a number of openings at the St. Joseph

facility, including delivery driver positions, a cus-

tomer clerk opening, a porter position, and an air

shuttle driver job. His application for each was

denied on the ground that he was unable to per-

form the essential job function of being able to

lift over 40 pounds regardless of his seniority.

App. 19

Plaintiff is currently collecting Social Secu-

rity Disability benefits, for which he applied in

January 1998, pursuant to his diagnosis. Imme-

diately after sustaining his injury, Piaintiff also

filed a worker’s compensation claim that Defen-

dant initially denied. Subsequently, in May 1999,

upon review by a Magistrate Judge, Plaintiff was

awarded worker’s compensation benefits for a

closed period from January to October 1998, the

time during which Plaintiff’s compression frac-

ture was healing. In June 2000, Plaintiff filed a

charge of discrimination with the Michigai De-

partment of Civil Rights, which, as far as the

Court can determine from the record, recom-

mended referral of the case to conciliation.

* Defendant instructs its drivers to use a

two-wheel dolly when delivering packages over

70 pounds and places no restriction on a driver’s

decision to use a dolly for lesser weight packages.

Defendant also recommends use of a dolly when

delivering multiple packages and/or envelopes to

one location regardless of their individual or cu-

mulative weight. The Court also notes, drivers

are allotted a certain amount of time in which to

complete their routes based on time studies peri-

odically conducted by Defendant. Use of a dolly

generaily increases the allotted delivery time by

approximately 15 seconds. Such an allotment is

granted to account for the time needed to deliver

packages over 70 pounds with a dolly.

Opinion, June 17, 2003 at 1-3 (footnote in original).

The district court granted summary judgment to

defendant because it found that plaintiff was not disabled

as defined by the ADA. The court held that Olds did not

suffer from an impairment that substantially limited a-

App. 20

major life activity because “a lifting restriction alone does

not constitute a disability.” Opinion, June 17, 2003, at 5.

The court also concluded that Olds was not substantially

limited in a major life activity because he did not demon-

strate a significant restriction on his ability to obtain

employment in a broad range of jobs. In the same vein, the

court determined that Olds did not suffer from a record of

impairment that substantially limited a major life activity:

“At no time, based on the record before the Court, has

Plaintiff’s physical impairment substantially limited one

or more of his major life activities.” Opinion, June 17,

2003, at 11. Finally, the district court held that Olds did

not suffer from being regarded as having an impairment

that substantially limited a major life activity. It deter-

mined that UPS did not permit Olds to return to work

because of his lifting restriction, and that Olds did not

raise a question of fact with respect to whether UPS

entertained a misperception about him.

II. riggs

This court reviews a grant of summary judgment de

novo. Motorists Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hammond, 355 F.3d 593,

596 (6th Cir. 2004). Summary judgment must be granted

pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) if there are no genuine

issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law. All evidence and inferences

must be construed in the light most favorable to the non-

moving party. Shah v. Deaconess Hosp., 355 F.3d 496, 498

(6th Cir. 2004).

To state a claim under the ADA, a plaintiff must

demonstrate:

App. 21

(1) that she is a disabled person within the

meaning of the Act, (2) that she is qualified to

perform the essential functions of her job with or

without reasonable accommodation, and (3) that

she suffered an adverse employment decision be-

cause of her disability.

McKay v. Toyota Motor Mfg., U.S.A., Inc., 116 F.3d 369,

371 (6th Cir. 1997). The parties do not dispute that Olds

suffered an adverse employment action, but do contest the

other two elements of the test.

“Disability” under the ADA means:

(A) a physical or mental impairment that sub-

stantially limits one or more of the major life ac- -

tivities of such individual; (B) a record of such an

impairment; or (C) being regarded as having

such an impairment.

42 U.S.C. § 12102(2). A plaintiff who claims that he is

disabled because a condition substantially limits his

ability to engage in the “major life activity” of working

must show that he is “significantly restricted in [his]

ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of

jobs in various classes as compared to the average person

with comparable training, skills and abilities.” McKay, 110

F.3d at 371. (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i)). Olds

accordingly can survive summary judgment if he can

demonstrate that he was subject to any one of these three

conditions and that he was restricted in his ability to work

in a “class of jobs” or a “broad range of jobs in various

classes.” Id. However, the “inability to perform a single,

particular job does not constitute a substantial limitation in

the major life activity of working.” 29 C.F-R. § 1630.2(j3)(i).

App. 22

We agree with the district court that Olds is not so

physically impaired that he is disabled as defined by the

ADA. Olds argues that he has a physical impairment,

cancer, which creates a weight restriction that substan-

tially limits a major life activity: his ability to work.

However, as the district court correctly concluded, the

general rule in this circuit is that a weight restriction

alone is not considered a disability under the ADA. Opin-

ion, June 17, 2003, at 5-7 (citing Gayer v. Cont? Airlines,

21 Fed.Appx. 347 (6th Cir. 2001) (unpublished)); see also

McKay, 110 F.3d at 373 (holding that plaintiff’s inability

to lift more than ten pounds would not significantly

restrict her ability to perform a broad range of jobs in

various classes). Olds’ lifting restriction prevents him from

working as a delivery driver and from performing other

jobs at UPS specifically, but there is no evidence in the

record that it prevents him from engaging in a broad class

of jobs.

Similarly, Olds has not raised a genuine issue of

material fact that he has a “record of impairment.” “A

record of an impairment means an individual has ‘a

history of, or has been misclassified as having, a mental or

physical impairment that substantially limits one or more

major life activities.”” MX Group, Inc. v. City of Covington,

293 F.3d 326, 339 (6th Cir. 2002); (citing 28 C.FR.

§ 35.104(3)). The district court determined that Olds’

physical impairments limited his ability to meet his job

requirements, but did not limit one or more major life

activities. We agree with the district court for the same

reasons that led us to conclude that Olds was not disabled

as defined by the ADA.

That said, we depart from the decision in one respect:

we hold that Olds has raised a genuine issue of material

App. 23

fact about whether UPS regarded him as having an

impairment. To succeed in demonstrating that he is

“regarded as having ... an impairment,” a plaintiff must

show the following:

(1) a covered entity mistakeniy believes that a

person has a physical impzirment that substan-

tially limits one or more major life activities,

or (2) a covered entity mistakenly believes that

an actual, nonlimiting impairment substantially

limits one or more major life activities. In both

cases, it is necessary that a covered entity enter-

tain misperceptions about the individual — it

must believe either that one has a substantially

limiting impairment that one does not have or

that one has a substantially limiting impairment

when, in fact, the impairment is not so limiting.

Ross v. Campbell Soup Co., 237 F.3d 701, 706 (6th Cir.

2001) (citing Sutton v. United Air Lines, 527 U.S. 471, 489,

144 L. Ed. 2d 450, 119 S. Ct. 2139 (1999)). The district

court concluded that there was no evidence to indicate

that UPS discriminated against Olds based upon a mis-

perception; rather, it concluded that UPS refused him

employment based upon an accurate understanding of his

limitations — that he could not lift 40 pounds.

However, a former UPS employee testified that a UPS

corporate lawyer said that Olds should not be reinstated

because he had cancer. Furthermore, the former employee

testified that UPS did not want to accommodate Olds

because it did not want to rel.” him: “we didn’t want to

come right out and say that because of Mark’s condition,

his cancerous condition, that he couldn’t do the job.” The

same employee also indicated that UPS changed the lifting

requirements of certain positions to avoid accommodating

App. 24

Olds. A reasonable jury could infer that UPS believed that

Olds’ condition was significantly more disabling than it

actually was, and for that reason UPS did not want to

reinstate him. Olds has accordingly raised a genuine issue

of material fact as to whether UPS regarded him as

having an impairment.

Because the district court determined that Olds was

not disabled as defined by the ADA, it did not reach the

question of whether he was qualified to perform the

essential functions of his job. UPS argues that Olds cannot

perform the task of lifting up to 70 pounds without assis-

tance, a task defined by UPS as essential. Olds suggests

that the weight-lifting requirements are arbitrary because

they were changed without regard to job duties to make

the lifting requirements “uniform” for all jobs at the St.

Joseph facility. He also contends that other package

delivery drivers with back problems had been given

permission to use dolly carts and request customer assis-

tance for limited periods of time. Accordingly, on remand,

the district court will need to determine what the “essen-

tial functions” of UPS jobs are and whether Olds reasona-

bly can perform them with an accommodation.

UPS argues that Olds is precluded from demonstrat-

ing that he is qualified because an administrative law

judge found him entitled to Social Security Disability

benefits. We disagree. Under the Supreme Court’s decision

in Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795, 807,

143 L. Ed. 2d 966, 119 S. Ct. 1597 (1999), Olds is required

to give a “sufficient explanation” as to how he can perform

the essential functions of the job, given the Social Security

Administration’s determination of total disability. How-

ever, because the Social Security Administration assesses

only what a claimant can do, while the relevant inquiry

App. 25

under the ADA asks what the claimant can do with or

without accommodation, the only explanation that a

plaintiff need provide is that he can perform the work in

question with accommodation. As stated by the Supreme

Court:

To defeat summary judgment, that explanation

must be sufficient to warrant a reasonable juror’s

concluding that, assuming the truth of, or the

plaintiff’s good-faith belief in, the earlier state-

ment [to the Social Security Administration], the

plaintiff could nonetheless “perform the essential

functions” of her job, with or without “reasonable

accommodation.”

Id. Because Olds has suggested two accommodations,

namely, either a transfer to another position, or permis-

sion to use the dolly cart and to request customer assis-

tance with packages over 40 pounds, it appears that he

can provide a satisfactory “explanation.”

iil.

The judgment of the district court is reversed and

the case is remanded to the district court for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

App. 26

APPENDIX C

JOSEPH M. SEBEST, Plaintiff-Appellee v.

CAMPBELL CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT BOARD

OF EDUCATION; MICHAEL TSIKOURIS,

Defendants-Appellants.

No. 02-4012

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

94 Fed. Appx. 320; 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 7173

April 8, 2004, Filed

COUNSEL: For JOSPEH M. SEBEST, Plaintiff-Appellant:

Eric E. Norton, The Norton Law Firm, Cleveland, OH.

For CAMPBELL CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT BOARD —

OF EDUCATION, MICHAEL TSIKOURIS, Defendants-

Appellees: James E. Roberts, Roth, Blair, Roberts, Stras-

feld & Lodge, John C. Pfau, Pfau, Pfau & Marando,

Youngstown, OH.

JUDGES: Before: BATCHELDER, GIBBONS, and COOK,

Circuit Judges.

OPINION BY: JULIA SMITH GIBBONS

OPINION:

JULIA SMITH GIBBONS, Circuit Judge. Joseph

Sebest became treasurer of the Campbell City school

district for a probationary term starting in March 1999.

Sebest’s employment with the school district elapsed on

January 11, 2000, when his contract expired, and the

Campbell City School District Board of Education (the

“Board”) offered him a new employment contract that

provided for an annual salary approximately $4,000 less

than the salary earned by Sebest under his first contract.

Sebest rejected the second contract and filed suit in the

App. 27

United States District Court for the Northern District of

Ohio against the school board and one of its members,

Michael Tsikouris, for violations of federal and state

disability discrimination law. Sebest and the defendants

filed cross-motions for summary judgment, and the district

court granted summary judgment to the defendants.

On appeal, Sebest challenges the district court’s

factual assumption that Tsikouris’s views on Sebest’s

health did not influence other members of the school-

board. Accordingly, Sebest argues that the district court

erred in granting summary judgment to the defendants on

his disability discrimination claims. Sebest also asserts

that the district court erred in deciding that he had not

brought suit against Tsikouris in his individual capacity.

For the reasons set forth below. we affirm the grant of

summary judgment to the Board and Tsikouris.

I.

In the early 1980s, Sebest was diagnosed with chronic

myelogenous leukemia.’ As treatment for his leukemia, he

received a bone marrow transplant in 1984. Because of the

transplant, Sebest acquired graft-versus-host disease, a

condition that affects the lungs. Around 1999, Sebest

experienced breathing-related difficulties, such as short-

ness of breath when he exerted himself, sinus drainage,

and sputum production. His treating physician, Dr. Clay

Braden Marsh, categorized Sebest’s condition in 1999 as

severe obstructive pulmonary lung disease and probably a

' In a 2002 deposition, Sebest stated that he no longer suffers from

leukemia.

App. 28

combination of bronchiectasis and bronchiolitis obliterans.’

Dr. Marsh testified that during this period Sebest gener-

ally could perform daily functions — such as getting up in

the morning, brushing his teeth, and driving to work — but

that his breathing problems became aggravated by stress

or strenuous activity. According to Dr. Marsh’s testimony,

Sebest’s abnormal pulmonary function may prevent him

from being able to walk up a flight of stairs “on his bad

days.”

On March 25, 1999, the Board convened a special

meeting to hire a probationary treasurer for the district.

At the meeting, board member Bernard Petro remarked

that Sebest had suffered from leukemia in the past. Board

member Tsikouris asked the other board members if

Sebest, who was in attendance for parts of the meeting,

looked frail and whether he should be hired since he might

not be well. Tsikouris also discussed Sebest’s $300 health

insurance deductible. In addition, Tsikouris expressed

concern that a recurrence of Sebest’s illness could be costly

to the school district. The other board members declined to

discuss these issues, and several members even told

Tsikouris that his comments were inappropriate.

Sebest was hired by the Board at an annual salary of

$48,000, with three members voting in favor of his hiring

and Tsikouris and another board member voting against

it. Sebest then entered into a contract with the school

board, which stated:

? According to Dr. Marsh, bronchiectasis is abnormal dilation of the

lower airways, which can predispose individuals to develop infections in

the lung. Bronchiolitis obliterans occurs when there has been a small

obliteration in the lungs and can be caused by graft-versus-host

disease.

App. 29

This contract of employment entered into this

25th day of March 1999 by and between the

Board of Education of the Campbell City School

District, Mahoning County, Ohio, and Joseph M.

Sebest hereafter designated as Treasurer.

The said Board of Education, pursuant to motion-

duly adopted and in accordance with the provi-

sions of Revised Code [§] 3313.22 hereby employs

the said Joseph M. Sebest as Treasurer for a one

(1) year probationary term beginning on April 6,

1999 through the Organizational Meeting in

January of 2000.

The said Board of Education in consideration of

the services rendered by the Treasurer, hereby

agrees to pay the said Treasurer an annual sal-

ary of $48,000.00 as adopted by the Board on

March 25, 1999. If a renewal contract is adopted,

said annual salary will be negotiated for each

year of the contract and may be increased by ac-

tion of the Board of Education at any time as per

Ohio Revised Code [§] 3313.24. That the Treas-

urer per diem be based on 260 work days and di-

vided into his total annual salary.

The said Treasurer agrees to enter into this con-

tract of employment for the above designated

term, and to diligently and faithfully perform his

duties as Treasurer in accordance with the law

for the above designated term or until such time

as his contract may be terminated as prescribed

by law.

Sebest served as school district treasurer for the period

specified in his contract.

App. 30

On January 11, 2000, the school board held its organ-

izational meeting — the point at which Sebest’s employ-

ment under his contract elapsed - and adopted a

resolution offering Sebest a two-year probationary con-

tract with compensation and benefits to be determined at

a later time. On January 25, the Board adopted another

resolution, which set the salary for treasurer at $44,000

and increased the contribution made on Sebest’s behalf to

the School Employees Retirement System from two per-

cent to five percent of his salary.’ The resolution also

stated that a formal written contract would be prepared at

a later date and presented to Sebest, who would then have

two weeks to decide whether or not to accept it. On Janu-

ary 31, 2000, the Board presented Sebest with the pro-

posed written contract, which Sebest eventually rejected.

Sebest pursued an ultimately unsuccessful adminis-

trative appeal of his dismissal in the Ohio Court of Com-

mon Pleas. Sebest then filed suit against the Board and

Tsikouris in district court for disability discrimination

under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”)

and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. Sebest also alleged

additional federal and state law claims."

* The Board members suggested the following annual salary

figures for Sebest’s second contract: $38,000 (Board member Rohan);

$42,000 (Board member Tsikouris); $41,000 (Board member Rusnak);

$48,000 (Board member Cougras); and $48,000 (Board member

Gerlick). The Board eventually decided to offer Sebest a salary of

$44,000 by averaging the salary figures provided by each of the five

board members.

* Sebest’s complaint alleged the following claims: violations of Ohio

Rev. Code § 4112; breach of contract; violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983;

wrongful discharge in violation of public policy (disability discrimina-

tion); wrongful discharge in violation of public policy (Ohio Rev. Code

§ 3313.22); promissory estoppel; intentional infliction of emotional

(Continued on following page)

App. 31

Sebest and defendants filed cross-motions for sum-

mary judgment. The district court denied Sebest’s motion

and granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment

with respect to Sebest’s claims under the ADA, the Reha-

bilitation Act, and wrongful discharge in violation of public

policy (disability discrimination).° The district court held

that “examining all of the evidence in the light most

favorable to Sebest, there is nothing on this record to show

that the Board discriminated against Sebest on the basis

of a real or perceived disability.” Sebest appeals the

district court’s decision.

II.

This court reviews a district court’s order granting

summary judgment de novo. Laderach v. U-Haul, 207 F.3d

825, 827 (6th Cir. 2000). Summary judgment is appropri-

ate “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogato-

ries, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if

any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material

fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as

a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). “A dispute over a

material fact cannot be ‘genuine’ unless a reasonable jury

could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Cockrel v.

Shelby County Sch. Dist, 270 F.3d 1036, 1048 (6th Cir.

2001). In performing this review, we must draw inferences

distress; and a claim for punitive damages. The district court granted

Sebest’s motion to dismiss the claims for violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983,

-wrongful discharge in violation of public policy (Ohio Rev. Code

§ 3313.22), and intentional infliction of emotional distress.

* The district court also dismissed Sebest’s remaining state law

claims because these claims “substantially predominate[] over the

claim or claims over which the district court has original jurisdiction.”

See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(2).

App. 32

from the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-

moving party. Andersons, Inc. v. Consol, Inc., 348 F.3d 496,

501 (6th Cir. 2003). “Accordingly, summary judgment must

be entered ‘against a party who fails to make a showing

sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential

to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the

burden of proof at trial.’” Laderach, 207 F.3d at 828

(quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 91 L.

Ed. 2d 265, 106 S. Ct. 2548 (1986)).

Sebest asserts that there is direct and indirect evi-

dence that the Board discriminated against him because

he is disabled. We affirm the district court’s conclusion

that the record does not support this claim. Specifically,

Sebest has failed to present evidence that the Board — the

decision-maker in this case — made decisions with respect

to Sebest’s employment based on his disability. Even

assuming arguendo that the school board did make such

decisions, we are unpersuaded that Sebest meets the

definition of disability provided in the ADA.

A.

In considering Sebest’s discrimination claims, we

must first review his challenge to the district court’s

factual assumption that Tsikouris’s discussions about

Sebest’s health did not influence the decision of other

board members to offer Sebest a second employment

contract at a lower salary. On this point, the district court

stated, “it is clear that the decision-maker/employer, that

is, the Board, was not influenced by Tsikouris.” We review

de novo a district court’s factual assumptions made at the

summary judgment stage. Brennan v. Township of North-

ville, 78 F.3d 1152, 1156 (6th Cir. 1996).

App. 33

We see no_ reason to disturb the district court’s deter-

mination that Tsikouris’s personal views of Sebest did not

direct the decision-making of the five-member Board.

Sebest has presented evidence that Tsikouris made state-

ments at the March 25, 1999, school board meeting about

Sebest having leukemia. While members serving on the

Board at that time testified that Tsikouris asked questions

about Sebest’s health and his health insurance deductible,

Sebest has not presented any evidence that Tsikouris’s

remarks were shared — or were even considered — by other

members of the Board. This conclusion is bolstered by the

fact that, after Tsikouris raised the issue of Sebest’s

health, three board members told Tsikouris that his

remarks were inappropriate. Furthermore, at the same

meeting that Tsikouris discussed Sebest’s health, the

Board proceeded to hire Sebest under the first contract.

The following year, the Board voted to offer him a second

employment contract. In sum, while the record may

provide information about Tsikouris’s personal views, it

does not indicate that a majority of the Board — the only

entity able to make decisions about Sebest’s employment —

supported his opinion.

B.

Even if we construed Tsikouris’s comments about

Sebest to reflect the opinion of at least a majority of the

Board, Sebest has not met his burden of showing that he is

disabled under the ADA. To recover on an ADA claim, an

individual must establish that he or she was a qualified

individual with a disability at the time of the discrimina-

tory act. Kocsis v. Multi-Care Mgmt., Inc., 97 F.3d 876, 884

(6th Cir. 1996). In the ADA, the term “disability” is defined

as, with respect to an individual: “[1] a physical or mental

App. 34

impairment that substantially limits one or more of the

major life activities of such individual; [2] a record of such

an impairment; [3] <. being regarded as having such an

impairment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2). Sebest claims that he

is disabled under all three definitions.

Sebest first argues that his breathing is substantially

limited. Breathing is indeed a “major life activity” for

purposes of the ADA, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i), because it is an

activity “of central importance to daily life.” See Toyota

Motor Mfg. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 197, 151 L. Ed. 2d

615, 122 S. Ct. 681 (2002) (providing definition of “major

life activity”). The term “substantially limits” in the

definition of disability means

unable to perform a major life activity that the

average person in the general population can

perform; or significantly restricted as to the con-

dition, manner or duration under which an in-

activity as compared to the condition, manner, or

duration under which the average person in the

general population can perform that same major

life activity.

29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1) (emphasis added). In considering

whether an individual is substantially limited in a major

life activity, the following factors are relevant:

{1} The nature and severity of the impairment;

(2) The duration or expected duration of the

impairment; and

[3] The permanent or long term impact, or the

expected permanent or long term impact of or re-

sulting from the impairment.

29 C.FR. § 1630.2(j)\(2).

App. 35

In support of his claim that he is disabled, Sebest

points to his affidavit testimony that his physical impair-

ments include shortness of breath and significant diffi-

culty with breathing and that his condition becomes

aggravated when he is under stress. Sebest also cites the

testimony of Dr. Clay Marsh, who stated that Sebest’s

condition affects his breathing when Sebest is under stress

or has engaged in strenuous activity. Dr. Marsh did not

indicate that Sebest’s breathing is affected in the absence

of these factors. In fact, Dr. Marsh testified that at the

time Sebest was hired and served as school district treas-

urer, Sebest was able to perform normal daily functions —

activities such as showering, eating, and driving to work —

and was able to complete his job as treasurer. Only during

what Dr. Marsh described as Sebest’s “bad days” would

Sebest encounter difficulty in breathing. The record does

not indicate how often Sebest had a “bad day” or the

duration of such a period.

This testimony fails to demonstrate that Sebest’s

condition substantially limits his breathing. Clearly

Sebest’s impairment does not render him unable to

breathe. Therefore, for Sebest to demonstrate that his

impairment substantially limits his breathing, he must

present evidence such that a reasonable jury could find

that his impairment significantly restricted the condition

or manner of his breathing, as compared to the average

person in the population.* Looking to the nature and

severity of Sebest’s impairment, as explained by Sebest’s

statements and the testimony of Dr. Marsh, we conclude

* We note that Sebest has only presented arguments that he is

disabled because his impairment interferes with breathing and not

because his impairment interferes with any other major life activity.

App. 36

that Sebest has not presented such evidence. Both Sebest

and his treating physician testified that his breathing

becomes affected under stress or strenuous conditions. The

record lacks any evidence indicating that, when Sebest is

not under stress or is not performing a strenuous activity,

his breathing is significantly restricted. Therefore, Sebest

does not meet the first definition of disability in the ADA.

See Robinson v. Global Marine Drilling Co., 101 F.3d 35,

37 (5th Cir. 1996) (noting that “several instances of short-

ness of breath when climbing stairs do not rise to the level

of substantially limiting the major life activity of breath-

ing”); Minnix v. City of Chillicothe, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS

2099, No. 98-4285, 2000 WL 191828, at *2 (6th Cir. Feb.

10, 2000) (holding that plaintiff failed to present a genuine

question of material fact that impairment substantially

limited breathing when there was no medical evidence

that plaintiff’s breathing problems were “severe, long

term, or permanent”); Ventura v. City of Independence,

1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 4102, No. 95-3582, 1997 WL 94688,

at *2 (6th Cir. Mar. 4, 1997) (finding that plaintiff with

asthma, which caused him difficulty breathing but did not

prevent him from engaging in activities such as walking or

playing baseball, was not substantially limited in breath-

ing).’

Sebest also argues that he is disabled because he

previously suffered from leukemia and leukemia-related

* In his brief, Sebest cites U-Haul Co. v. Kunkle, an unpublished

decision, for the proposition that a plaintiff who experienced breathing

problems that occasionally required him to go “out to [his] truck to get

oxygen” in order to breathe was disabled under the ADA. 165 F.3d 29,

1998 WL 681253, at *3 (6th Cir. 1998) (alteration in original). Unlike

the plaintiff in Kunkle, Sebest has not presented evidence that he has

ever needed an oxygen tank in order to breathe.

App. 37

health problems, thereby indicating that he has a record of

a disability. While Sebest has presented evidence to show

that he has suffered from leukemia in the past, he has not

presented evidence demonstrating that he has a record of

an impairment that substantially limits a major life

activity. Sebest appears to assume that by having leuke-

mia, he necessarily has a record of a disability. This

understanding, however, is in conflict with the language of

the ADA. An individual is disabled if he or she has a record

of a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits

a major life activity 42 U.S.C. §12102(2); 29 C.FR.

§ 1630.2(g\(2) (incorporating 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g)(1)); see

also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k) (stating that a person is disabled

by having a record of an impairment when that person

“has a history of, or has been misclassified as having, a

mental or physical impairment that substantially limits

one or more major life activities”).

Sebest has not provided evidence that the leukemia

from which he suffered in the 1980s substantially limited

a major life activity. Declaring leukemia a disability per se

would contravene this court’s “statutory obligation to

determine the existence of disabilities on a case-by-case

basis.” Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 566,

144 L. Ed. 2d 518, 119 S. Ct. 2162 (1999). As the Supreme

Court has explained, “the [ADA] expresses that mandate

clearly by defining ‘disability’ ‘with respect to an individ-

ual,’ 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2), and in terms of the impact of an

impairment on ‘such individual,’ § 12102(2)(A).” Id.; see

also Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 483,

144 L. Ed. 2d 450, 119 S. Ct. 2139 (1999) (noting that

“whether a person has a disability under the ADA is

an individualized inquiry”); Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S.

624, 641-42, 141 L. Ed. 2d 540, 118 S. Ct. 2196 (1998)

App. 38

(declining to consider whether HIV is a per se disability

under the ADA); 29 C.F.R. Pt. 1630, App. § 1630.2(j) (“The

determination of whether an individual has a disability is

not necessarily based on the name or diagnosis of the

impairment the person has, but rather on the effect of that

impairment on the life of the individual.”). Since Sebest

has failed to present evidence that he has a record of an

impairment that substantially limits a major life activity,

he is not disabled under the second definition of disability

provided in the ADA.

Finally, Sebest argues that he was “regarded as”

having a disability by his employer because of the con-

cerns about Sebest’s health expressed by Tsikouris at the

March 25, 1999, board meeting. The Supreme Court has

stated that there are two ways in which an individual can

be regarded as disabled: “(1) a covered entity mistakenly

believes that a person has a physical impairment that

substantially limits one or more major life activities, or (2)

a covered entity mistakenly believes that an actual,

nonlimiting impairment substantially limits one or more

major life activities.” Sutton, 527 U.S. at 489.

As we previously discussed, decisions about Sebest’s

employment were made by the five member school board.

Besides Tsikouris’s comments, Sebest has offered no

evidence that the school board made decisions regarding

Sebest’s employment with any consideration of his health

condition. Therefore, as Sebest has failed to present

evidence that a reasonable jury could find him to be

disabled under the definitions of disability provided in the

App. 39

ADA, we affirm the grant of summary judgment to the

defendants."

Because we affirm the grant of summary judgment to

the Board and Tsikouris, we do not need to consider

whether Sebest sued Tsikouris in his individual or official

capacity.

III.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of

the district court granting summary judgment to the

defendants.

* Sebest asserts that he is also protected under Ohio disability

discrimination law, Ohio Rev. Code § 4112.02. Our decision on Sebest’s

ADA claim is also dispositive of his state law disability claim. Lockard

v. Gen. Motors‘ -p., 52 Fed. Appx. 782, 785 n.2 (6th Cir. 2002) (“This

court’s ruling wi. respect to [plaintiff’s} ADA claim also disposes of her

claim of disability discrimination under Ohio law.”); see also City of

Columbus Civil Serv. Comm'n v. McGlone, 82 Ohio St. 3d 569, 1998

Ohio 410, 697 N.E.2d 204, 206-07 (Ohio 1998) (“The federal Americans

with Disabilities Act .. . is similar to the Ohio handicap discrimination

law. ... We can look to regulations and cases interpreting the federal

Act for guidance in our interpretation of Ohio law.”).

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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