Opposition Brief — Orzechchowskii v. York International International Corp. (No. 05-1651)
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No. 05-1651 FILED
OFFICE OF Thee
In The GER
Supreme Court of the Gnited States
S
JAY E. ORZECHOWSKI
Petitioner,
V.
YORK INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION,
Respondent.
S
On Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari
To The United States Court Of Appeals
For The Sixth Circuit
a
RESPONDENT YORK INTERNATIONAL
CORPORATION’S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION
TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
°
CHRISTINA HENAGEN PEER
(Counsel of Record)
Wo. MICHAEL HANNA
SQUIRE, SANDERS & DEMPSEY LLP
4900 Key Tower
127 Public Square
Cleveland, Ohio 44114
Phone: (216) 479-8500
Fax: (216) 479-8780
~———— -—-- —--—
cain
COCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING CU (800) 225-4964
OR CALL COLLECT (402) 342-2831
QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether the Sixth Circuit heightened the evidentiary
requirements to survive summary judgment on disability
discrimination claims under § 4112.02 of the Ohio Revised
Code by (1) requiring a plaintiff alleging a substantial
limitation of the major life activity of working to present
evidence that he is precluded from a broad range or class
of jobs or (2) by requiring a plaintiff alleging a disability
due to a “record of impairment” to present evidence of a
substantial limitation of a major life activity.
il
RULE 29.6 CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 29.6, Respondent
YORK International Corporation states that it is a wholly
owned subsidiary of Johnson Controls International which
is publicly traded on the New York Stock Exchange as JCI.
ill
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Cane N GI FIIs os dacicrnns cdedentanieecenennientasevininwbetenes i
Rule 29.6 Corporate Disclosure Statement ............... ii
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IE Or I ic veccids caesar cosecsancecsmnnctinupeicenastiviacen vi
SF iti ica abensthinjtsietecrtntmdiistaiannigiets 1
Statutory Provisions Involved...................:cccseseeeeeeees 1
SOD hiss i iiiviscisticnsecctesnanttatcieiabetintes aes 1
I NG inibcdewineé+cdenvtdviniesdvchimunliasbtcorend 2
Reasons for Denying the Petition...........................44. 6
I. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT ALLEGED BY PETI-
TIONER DOES NOT EXIST ........................4. 6
A. This Court Has Defined The Term “Sub-
stantially Limits” In Relation To The
Major Life Activity Of Working As Being
Precluded From A Class Of Jobs Or
Broad Range Of Jobs In Various Classes. 7
B. The First, Third And Sixth Circuits Uni-
formly Apply This Cowrt’s Definition Of
“Substantially Limits” .................cccccsecceees 8
C. The Cases Cited By Petitioner Do Not
Evidence A Circuit Split... ................eeee 9
i. The First Circuit Cases Cited By Pe-
titioner Are Inapposite And Do Not
Evidence A Circuit Split...................... 9
ii. The Third Circuit Case Cited By Peti-
tioner Does Not Evidence A Circuit
iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS - Continued
Page
D. Courts In Other Circuits Do Not Allow
Plaintiffs Who Merely Establish A Physi-
cal Impairment To Proceed To Trial ......... 12
E. The First, Third And Sixth Circuits Util-
ize The Same Test When Reviewing “Re-
cord Of Impairment” Claims.................... 13
Il. PETITIONER FAILED TO PRESENT EVI-
DENCE SUFFICIENT TO OVERCOME RE-
SPONDENT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
a oN i ak a 16
EOLA LDS LN ORAM PD ILL AN ABS OE 17
APPENDIX:
Appendix A Farkas v. Carpenter Technology Corp.,
Civil Action No. 05-CV-2741, 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 9170 (E.D. Pa. March 6, 2006) (unpub-
NEED nib ith ui th oc scierisiycotnbabistinliakcydinidoccegupbbaeumeetetealanseaies App. 1
Appendix B Olds v. U.PS., Inc., 127 Fed. Appx.
779 (6th Cir. 2005) (unpublished) ................0...0... App. 16
Appendix C Sebest v. Campbell City Sch. Dist. Bd.
Of Educ., 94 Fed. Appx. 320 (6th Cir. 2004) (un-
S| ESRI Sarma A Sao R Peper NOREEN Ti EAE App. 26
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
FEDERAL CASES
Alberson’s Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555 (1999)......... 13
Clemente v. Executive Airlines, Inc., 213 F.3d 25
Cie Fae iain iusttiness icenabnacolneovbaconaes canto alctneiiadhdaks 15
Farkas v. Carpenter Technology Corp., Civil Action
No. 05-CV-2741, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9170
CER Fc UI WO, MED cin stevens cuted ocadacassencecavananelon 15
LeBron-Torres v. Whitehall Labs., 251 F.3d 236 (1st
Se FD uicistises sascidwadscsdcbniieny iecedbuahtnctinbesnttnaiiaaaeuniansaetoinues 9
Lowry v. Cabletron Systems, Inc., 973 F. Supp. 77
CER Pe UE Bika au casnincccepneplanbudcanads snlakcesbiveamainaies 9, 10, 16
McKay v. Toyota Motor Mfg., Inc., 110 F.3d 369 (6th
SIE LOOT seciuntnsonisacheiassubNeaspsoidachevtbaudovsuwuncanciia 9, 10, 11, 12
Murphy v. UPS, 527 U.S. 516 (1999)... ereeneeseneeees 8
Olds v. UPS, Inc., 127 Fed. Appx. 779 (6th Cir.
MMOD kcsvhavensvedscaviéna vests tticceinteeepipeicuspinimecnbvexgdacanredent oie: 15
Quint v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 172 F.3d 1 (1st Cir.
ET sp isticiscinigtnntecdied bein ds sindiniind tidplebbomiccenazionibiies 9, 10, 16
Sebest v. Campbell City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 94
Ped. Apna: 320 (6th Cir, 2006) .........ccccsnsseserresesrereesssesss 15
Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (2999)........... 7
Tice v. Centre Area Trans. Auth.. 247 F.3d 506 (3d
NS SDs ccsalavsiadcccokatasaioscinasstocasdadacsipsiauadnaaerconans 8, 14
Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky. Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S.
PI IE chisadceidisicdsietesdaconainindccesacvindiae tatters deallckinhdas 12
Whitfield v. Pathmark Stores, Inc., 39 F. Supp. 434
ER BIE Be Ricthnaskdnseoabsccciscdchswoibeotsantneds 10, 11, 12, 13, 16
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ~— Continued
Page
STATUTES AND REGULATIONS
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RULES
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RESPONDENT’S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION
¢
JURISDICTION
Petitioner invokes this Court’s jurisdiction pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1254. This case was decided by the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals based on diversity jurisdiction
and does not raise a federal question. Rather, the Sixth
Circuit’s application of federal law principles to a state
statute is at issue.
¢
STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED
In addition to § 4112.02 of the Ohio Revised Code,
cited by Petitioner, 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2), and 29 C.F.R.
§ 1630.2 are germane to this matter.
¢
INTRODUCTION
Because this case involves the consistent and correct
application of well-settled law, it is a textbook example of a
matter that does not warrant this Court’s review.
Throughout this litigation, Petitioner has repeatedly failed
to present evidence that he is disabled within the meaning
of § 4112.02 of the Ohio Revised Code. Now, in a last-dit#h
attempt to salvage his case, he asserts the Sixth Circuit
utilized an inappropriate evidentiary standard in review-
ing the district court’s decision to grant Respondent’s
motion for summary judgment. However, in requiring that
he demonstrate a substantial limitation of the major life
activity of working by presenting evidence that he was
2
precluded from a broad range or class of jobs, the Sixth
Circuit and the district court adhered to well-settled and
consistently applied principles established by this Court.
Petitioner’s argument that this requirement created a
circuit split is without merit. First, while the Sixth Circuit
applied Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) princi-
ples, this case was not brought under the ADA. Rather,
Petitioner’s claim was brought and decided under Ohio
law. Second, the Sixth Circuit’s application of ADA princi-
ples and Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(“EEOC”) regulations which require a showing of preclu-
sion from a broad range or class of jobs to Petitioner’s
state law claims did not create a split between the First
and Third Circuits and the Sixth Circuit. Rather, a review
of applicable case law demonstrates the First, Third and
Sixth Circuits uniformly apply these principles and
regulations. Likewise, contrary to Petitioner’s claims, the
First, Third and Sixth Circuits all require evidence of a
substantial limitation of a major life activity to demon-
strate a disability due to a “record of impairment.”
For these reasons, this Court should deny the Peti-
tion.
+
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Respondent employed Petitioner at its Valley View,
Ohio facility as a warehouseman. Pet. App. 16a. His duties
included preparing UPS and Airborne packages, coordinat-
ing inbound freight, pulling orders from trucks, customer
pickups, imputing orders, answering customer questions
and minor maintenance. Jd. On August 25, 1999, Peti-
tioner injured his back while at work. Jd. Despite his
3
injury, he continued to work his regular duties and hours
until approximately October 8, 1999, when his doctor
diagnosed a herniated disk and indicated he could not
work. Jd. Petitioner returned to work on approximately
October 25, 1999 and worked through October 27, 1999.
Id. Petitioner was placed on leave and did not return to
work after this time.’ Id.
Respondent’s leave policy allows an employee to take
up to twelve consecutive months of leave. Pet. App. 17a. If
an employee’s leave extends beyond the twelve months
allowed by the policy, the employee’s employment is
terminated. Jd. On October 18, 2000, Petitioner was
advised that, because he would be absent from work for
twelve consecutive months as of October 28, 2000, he
would be receiving a termination letter. Jd. In accordance
with its leave policy, Respondent terminated Petitioner’s
employment effective October 31, 2000.* Pet. App. 18a.
On July 8, 2002, almost two years after his termina-
tion, Petitioner contacted Respondent seeking part-time
work through the Part-Time Work Incentive Program
administered by Aetna, Respondent’s third-party insurance
’ On October 28, 1999, Respondent placed Petitioner on leave
under the Family and Medical Leave Act. Pet. App. 16a. Petitioner
initially received eight weeks of salary continuation and later short-
term disability benefits. Jd. In February 2000, Petitioner had back
surgery. Jd. Petitioner began receiving long-term disability benefits on
May 1, 2000. /d.
* Petitioner alleges he attempted to return to work in August 2000
by inquiring about part-time employment. Pet. App. 17a. Petitioner was
informed that no part-time positions were available. Jd. However, even
had a position been available, because he had not been released by his
doctor to return to work, Petitioner could not have been hired. Pet. App.
30a.
4
carrier. Pet. App. 18a. Under this program, an individual
who is medically released to work may work part-time
with any employer and continue to receive long-term
disability benefits. Jd.
Respondent informed Petitioner that, although he
could work part-time for any employer, part-time employ-
ment with Respondent was possible under certain circum-
stances. Pet. App. 18a. To be considered for a part-time
position with Respondent, Petitioner was advised he must
be medically released to return to work and a part-time
position had to be available. Jd. Petitioner was medically
released to work on July 11, 2002. Pet. App. 30a. However,
because no part-time positions were available, Respondent
did not re-hire Petitioner.’ Pet. App. 18a. Since October
2002, Petitioner has worked as a projectionist at a movie
theater. Pet. App. 28a.
On October 25, 2002, Petitioner filed a Complaint in
the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas which
asserted claims for breach of contract, promissory estop-
pel, violation of good faith and fair dealing, intentional
and negligent infliction of emotional distress, discharge in
violation of public policy and handicap discrimination in
violation of Ohio Revised Code § 4112.02.‘ Respondent
removed the case to the United States District Court for
* The lack of part-time positions was not surprising as no part-time
positions were available during Petitioner’s ten-year employment with
Respondent. Pet. App. 23a.
* As the docket in this matter is “capable of accurate and ready
determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably
be questioned,” this Court may take judicial notice of it. Fep. R. Evin.
201(b\2). In the interest of brevity, Respondent will not continue to
recite the text of the rule each time it cites to the docket of this case but
instead will merely cite to the judicial notice rule.
5
the Northern District of Ohio based on diversity of citizen-
ship.’ The district court granted Respondent’s motion to
dismiss Petitioner’s claims of promissory estoppel, inten-
tional and negligent infliction of emotional distress and
violation of good faith and fair dealing.® Petitioner’s claims
for breach of contract, discharge in violation of public
policy and disability discrimination survived dismissal.
Petitioner claimed to be disabled within the meaning
of Ohio Revised Code § 4112.02 due to a substantial
limitation of the major life activity of working.’ Pet. App.
26a. Petitioner asserted his back condition limited his
ability to do repetitive work because he needed to “sit
down for a little while” and “stand up for a little while”
and needed to keep moving. Jd. Dr. James Faremouth
opined Petitioner could not perform a job involving repeti-
tive bending from the waist to the floor or a job that
involved heavy lifting of more than twenty pounds on a
regular or occasional basis. Pet. App. 27a.
After the completion of discovery, Respondent filed a
motion for summary judgment on the remaining claims.’
On December 3, 2004, the Magistrate Judge entered a
Report and Recommendation recommending that Respon-
dent’s motion for summary judgment be granted. Pet. App.
D. The Magistrate Judge found Petitioner’s evidence, as
cited above, to be insufficient to raise a genuine issue of
material fact regarding whether he was disabled due to a
* Feb. R. Evin. 201(b\2).
* Feb. R. Evin. 201(b)(2).
” As Petitioner's other causes of action are not at issue here, the
~ ~~ basis of these claims will not be discussed.
* Fen. R. Evin. 201(bX2).
6
substantial limitation of the major life activity of working.
Pet. App. 28a. The district court adopted the Magistrate
Judge’s Report and Recommendation in its entirety on
February 3, 2005. Pet. App. B; Pet. App. C. Petitioner
timely appealed the decision to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.’ After briefing and oral
argument, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the decision of the
district court. Pet. App. A. This Petition followed.
i’
vv
REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION
I. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT ALLEGED BY PETI-
TIONER DOES NOT EXIST.
This Court should reject the Petition because the
“split” alleged by Petitioner does not exist. Contrary to
Petitioner’s arguments, the Sixth Circuit does not require
an individual alleging a substantial limitation of the major
life activity of working to produce more evidence to survive
summary judgment than is required in the First and Third
Circuits. Rather, consistent with other circuits, the Sixth
Circuit merely requires such a plaintiff to present evidence
that would allow a reasonable jury to find that he cannot
perform a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various
classes. Similarly, in line with the First and Third Cir-
cuits, the Sixth Circuit requires an individual claiming a
disability due to a “record of impairment” to demonstrate
both a “record” of the impairment and that the impair-
ment “substantially limits a major life activity.” Thus,
Petitioner’s assertion that a circuit split exists is errone-
ous.
* Feo. R. Ww. 201(b)\ 2).
Further, Petitioner did not allege discrimination based
on a “record of impairment” with the district court, nor did
he argue on appeal that the district court somehow erred
in not addressing this issue. Pet. App. A; Pet. App. D.
Rather, as the Sixth Circuit noted, Petitioner did not cite
any legal error on the part of the district court. Pet. App.
8a. Therefore, Petitioner should not be given the opportu-
nity to seek review based on an alleged “circuit split”
regarding an issue that he never raised.
A. This Court Has Defined The Term “Sub-
stantially Limits” In Relation To The Ma-
jor Life Activity Of Working As Being
Precluded From A Class Of Jobs Or Broad
Range Of Jobs In Various Classes.
The fundamental premise of Petitioner’s argument in
support of certiorari is flawed. In fact, this Court has
defined the term “substantially limits” as it applies to the
major life activity of working. In Sutton v. United Airlines,
Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 491 (1999), when addressing the major
life activity of working, this Court stated that the statu-
tory phrase “‘substantially limits’ requires, at a minimum,
that plaintiffs allege they are unable to work in a broad
class of jobs.” This Court then explained:
To be substantially limited in the major life activ-
ity of working, then, one must be precluded from
more than one type of job, a specialized job, or a
particular job of choice. If jobs utilizing an indi-
vidual’s skills (but perhaps not his or her unique
talents) are available, one is not precluded from
a substantial class of jobs. Similarly, if a host of
8
different types of jobs are available, one is not
precluded from a broad range of jobs.
Id. at 492.
This definition comports with the regulations promul-
gated by the EEOC. In its regulations, the EEOC defines
“substantially limits” in the context of the major life
activity of working as “significantly restricted in the
ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of
jobs in various classes compared to the average person
having comparable training, skills or abilities.” 29 C.F.R.
§ 1630.2(jX3)G). The EEOC further notes that the “inabil-
ity to perform a single, particular job does not constitute a
substantial limitation in the major life activity of work-
ing.” Id. See also Murphy v. UPS, 527 U.S. 516 (1999)
(assuming, without deciding, the validity of the EEOC
regulation). Thus, this Court has provided ample guidance
regarding the definition of “substantially limits” as it
applies to the major life activity of working.
B. The First, Third And Sixth Circuits Uni-
formly Apply This Court’s Definition Of
“Substantially Limits.”
Not only has this Court clearly defined “substantially
limits,” the First, Third and Sixth Circuits all consistently
adhere to this definition, requiring an ADA plaintiff alleg-
ing a substantial limitation of the major life activity of
working to present evidence that he or she is precluded
from a class or broad range of jobs in various classes to
survive summary judgment. See Tice v. Centre Area Trans.
Auth., 247 F.3d 506 (3d Cir. 2001) (holding a plaintiff's
inability to drive a bus did not preclude him from a broad
class of jobs as necessary to demonstrate a substantial
9
limitation of the major life activity of working because
evidence demonstrated the plaintiff’s ability to engage in
other employment); Lebron-Torres v. Whitehall Labs., 251
F.3d 236 (1st Cir. 2001) (finding a plaintiff with a back
injury did not demonstrate a substantial limitation on the
major life activity of working because she continued to
work full-time at her manufacturing job after her injury
and later almost full-time as a hairstylist); McKay v.
Toyota Motor Mfg., Inc., 110 F.3d 369 (6th Cir. 1997)
(holding the plaintiff did not produce sufficient evidence to
survive summary judgment because evidence only demon-
strated her inability to perform a narrow range of jobs
requiring repetitive motion, not a broad class of jobs).
Thus, Petitioner’s alleged circuit split regarding the
“substantially limits” definition is nonexistent.
C. The Cases Cited By Petitioner Do Not
Evidence A Circuit Split.
Although Petitioner alleges the absence of a definition
of “substantial limitation” with respect to the major life
activity of working has created a circuit split, he does not
set forth any cases supporting this proposition.
i. The First Circuit Cases Cited By Peti-
tioner Are Inapposite And Do Not Evi-
dence A Circuit Split.
The cases relied on by Petitioner to evidence a split of
authority between the First and Sixth Circuits are inappo-
site. First, neither Quint v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 172 F.3d
1 (1st Cir. 1999) nor Lowry v. Cabletron Systems, Inc., 973
F.Supp. 77 (D. N.H. 1997), address the First Circuit
standard for demonstrating a “record of impairment”
10
under the ADA. Second, neither Quint nor Lowry address
the evidence necessary to survive summary judgment in
the First Circuit as neither case was decided on summary
judgment. Rather, in Quint, the defendant appealed the
district court’s finding that it had discriminated against
the plaintiff in violation of the ADA. Quint, 172 F.3d at 5.
In Lowry, the district court denied the defendant’s motion
to dismiss the plaintiff’s ADA claim pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Lowry, 973 F. Supp. at 84.
Thus, neither Quint nor Lowry support Petitioner’s con-
tention that a circuit split exists between the First and
Sixth Circuits regarding “record of impairment” or the
evidentiary standard required for an ADA plaintiff to
survive summary judgment.”
ii. The Third Circuit Case Cited By Peti-
tioner Does Not Evidence A Circuit
Split.
In support of the contention that a circuit split exists
between the Third and Sixth Circuits, Petitioner relies
solely on Whitfield v. Pathmark Stores, Inc., 39 F. Supp.
434 (D. Del. 1999). In Whitfield, the plaintiff argued she
was disabled under the ADA because she had “an impair-
ment that ‘substantially limit[ed) one or more of [her]
major life activities’ or, in the alternative, because she
‘(had] a record of such impairment.’” Jd. at 436. The court
first addressed whether the impairment substantially
*° Interestingly, both Quint and Lowry utilize the court’s holding in
McKay v. Toyota Motor Mfg., U.S.A., Inc., 110 F.3d 369 (6th Cir. 1997) -
the Sixth Circuit case Petitioner claims is at the heart of the “circuit
split.” Quint, 172 F.3d at 12-13; Lowry, 973 F. Supp. at 81.
11
limited one or more of the plaintiff’s major life activities."
Id. Regarding the major life activity of working, the court
applied the EEOC definition of “substantial limitation”
and found that evidence from the plaintiff’s vocational
expert that her job options were “greatly diminished,” was
sufficient to survive summary judgment. Jd. at 440-43,
citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3).
The court next considered whether the plaintiff had
presented sufficient evidence of a “record of impairment”
to survive summary judgment. Id. at 444. In concluding
that sufficient evidence existed, the court relied on two
factors: (1) evidence the defendant knew the plaintiff’s
medical restrictions were permanent when it began its
allegedly discriminatory treatment and (2) the court’s
previous finding that the restrictions caused by the plain-
tiff’s physical impairment could substantially limit a
major life activity. Id. at 444-45. Thus, the court also
allowed the “record of impairment” claim to proceed to
trial. Id.
Although Petitioner asserts that comparing Whitfield
to McKay v. Toyota Motor Mfg. U.S.A., Inc., 110 F.3d 369
(6th Cir. 1997) evidences a circuit split, the basis for this
assertion is unclear. In McKay, like Whitfield, there was
no dispute regarding the existence of a physical impair-
ment. Jd. at 371. Rather, the district court in McKay
granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment as
it concluded that the plaintiff’s carpal tunnel syndrome
did not substantially limit the major life activity of work-
ing. Id. The district court noted that “a diagnosis of carpal
“ It was uncontested that the plaintiff’s back injury constituted a
“physical impairment.” Jd. at 436,
12
tunnel syndrome, by itself, [is] insufficient to raise a
genuine issue of material fact concerning whether plaintiff
was disabled within the contemplation of the ADA.” Id.
Unlike Whitfield, the McKay plaintiff did not set forth
sufficient evidence of a “substantial limitation of the major
life activity of working” to raise an issue of material fact.
Id. The Sixth Circuit, utilizing the same EEOC regula-
tions as the Whitfield Court, affirmed this decision. Id. at
371-73. Because the McKay plaintiff did not allege dis-
crimination based on a “record of impairment”, the court
did not address the issue. Thus, comparing Whitfield to
McKay does not evidence a circuit split.
D. Courts In Other Circuits Do Not Allow
Plaintiffs Who Merely Establish A Physi-
cal Impairment To Proceed To Trial.
Petitioner erroneously asserts that, in “the First and
Third Circuit Court of Appeals, plaintiffs who are able to
establish physical impairments are able to proceed to trial
in the district courts.”” Pet. at 5. This statement runs
contrary to this Court’s well-settled precedent. In Toyota
Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 198 (2002),
this Court found:
It is insufficient for individuals attempting to
prove disability status under this test to merely
submit evidence of a medical diagnosis of an
impairment. Instead, the ADA requires those
‘claiming the Act’s protection ... to prove a dis-
ability by ofering evidence that the extent of the
” As previously noted, Petitioner has waived any “record of
impairment” argument by failing to raise this issue with the district
court or Sixth Circuit.
13
limitation [caused] by their impairment’ in terms
of their own experience.
Id. at 198, quoting Alberson’s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S.
555, 567 (1999). Petitioner also asserts that, in the First
and Third Circuits, ADA claims will survive summary
judgment if the plaintiff produces evidence that he or she
has a “record of disability.” Pet. at 4-5. However, none of
the cases cited by Petitioner support this propzsition.
Rather, as discussed below, a review of case law shows
courts in the First and Third Circuits do not allow cases to
proceed to trial simply because an individual has pre-
sented records documenting a “physical impairment.”
E. The First, Third And Sixth Circuits Utilize
* The Same Test When Reviewing “Record
Of Impairment” Claims.
Petitioner’s assertion of a circuit split regarding the
evidence “required to survive summary judgment on a
“record of impairment” claim is based on a misreading of
Whitfield. Petitioner seems to assert that a “record of
impairment,” standing alone, is evidence that will allow an
ADA plaintiff to survive summary judgment. This asser-
tion is contrary to the ADA which defines “disability” as:
(A) a physical or mental impairment that sub-
stantially limits one or more of tte major life
activities of such individual;
(B) a record of such an impairment [an im-
pairment that substantially limits one or
more of the major life activities]; or
(C) being regarded as having suck an impair-
ment.
14
42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (emphasis added). Under the plain
language of the statute, it is insufficient to demonstrate a
“record of impairment”; rather, the individual must also
demonstrate that the impairment in the record substan-
tially limits a major life activity.
The EEOC further amplifies this point in its regula-
tions which state that an individual has a “record of
impairment” when he or she “has a history of, or has been
misclassified as having, a mental or physical impairment
that substantially limits one or more major life
activities.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k) (emphasis added). As
these regulations make clear, the recorded impairment
must be one that substantially limits a major life activity.
Contrary to Petitioner’s assertion, the First, Third
and Sixth Circuits all apply the statute and regulations in
this manner. In Tice v. Centre Area Transp. Auth., 247 F.3d
506 (3rd Cir. 2001), the court examined a claim based on
the “record of disability” prong of the ADA and stated:
In the alternative, Tice submits that he has a
“record of disability” based on his back injuries.
This contention fails for the same reason that we
hold Tice is not currently disabled. A plaintiff
attempting to prove the existence of a “re-
cord” of disability must still demonstrate
that the recorded impairment is a “disabil-
ity” within the meaning of the ADA. Tice has
only presented evidence that his impairment lim-
ited his ability to drive a bus — once again, be-
cause an impairment that limits only bus
driving is not a “disability,” Tice has not
demonstrated the existence of a record of
disability.
15
Id. at 513 (emphasis added). See also Farkas v. Carpenter
Technology Corp., Civil Action No. 05-CV-2741, 2006 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 9170 (E.D. Pa. March 6, 2006) (unpublished)
(holding the plaintiff’s record of having suffered a stroke
insufficient to establish a “record of impairment” as there
was no evidence his ability to work was substantially
limited).
Similarly, in Clemente v. Executive Airlines, Inc., 213
F.3d 25, 33 (1st Cir. 2000), the court held the plaintiff
failed to establish a “record of impairment” because there
was no evidence of an impairment that substantially
limited a major life activity. Likewise, in Sebest v. Camp-
bell City Sch. Dist. Bd. Of Educ., 94 Fed. Appx. 320, 327
(6th Cir. 2004) (unpublished), the court held the plaintiff
did not establish a “record of impairment.” As in this case,
the Sebest plaintiff proceeded under a misinterpretation of
the requirements to demonstrate a “record of impairment.”
The court noted:
While Sebest has presented evidence to show
that he has suffered from leukemia in the past,
he has not presented evidence demonstrating
that he has a record of an impairment that sub-
stantially limits a major life activity. Sebest ap-
pears to assume that by having leukemia, he
necessarily has a record of a disability. This un-
derstanding, however, is in conflict with the lan-
guage of the ADA.
Id. See also Olds v. UPS, Inc., 127 Fed. Appx. 779 (6th Cir.
2005) (unpublished) (holding plaintiff did not establish a
record of impairment because there was no evidence of a
substantial limitation of the major iife activity of working).
Thus, there is no evidence to support Petitioner’s conten-
tion that a circuit split exists with respect to this issue.
16
Il, PETITIONER FAILED TO PRESENT EVIDENCE
SUFFICIENT TO OVERCOME RESPONDENT'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
Petitioner’s claims failed because he did not present
evidence of a substantial limitation of the major life
activity of working — not because of an illusory circuit split
or error on the part of the Sixth Circuit. As previously
noted, to survive summary judgment, an ADA plaintiff
must present evidence demonstrating a _ substantial
limitation of a major life activity. When the major life
activity is working, a plaintiff must demonstrate that he
was precluded from occupying a class or broad range of
jobs in various classes as compared to the average person
with similar skills, training and abilities. 29 C.FR.
§ 1630.2(j)(3)(i). Unless such a showing is made, summary
judgment is appropriate. FED. R. Civ. Pro. 56(c).
Here, Petitioner alleged a substantial limitation of the
major life activity of working based entirely on: (1) Dr.
Faremouth’s diagnosis of chronic lumbar radiculopathy —
post surgical therapy lumbar spine which limited his
ability to bend repeatedly from the waist or regularly lift
more than twenty pounds; and (2) his own testimony that
due to his back injury, he needs to “sit down for a little
while” and “stand up for a little while” and needs to keep
moving. Pet. App. 26a-27a. Unlike the situation in Whit-
field, Quint and Lowry, Petitioner did not present any
evidence in the form of expert testimony or otherwise that
he was precluded from a class of jobs or broad range of jobs
in various classes. Indeed, Petitioner has been employed
since shortly after being medically released to return to
work. Pet. App. 28a. Thus, the district court did not err in
granting Respondent’s motion for summary judgment. In
upholding the district court, the Sixth Circuit noted that
17
Petitioner did not “cite any legal error in the district
court’s determination, nor [did] he allege that there [were]
disputed issues of fact.” Pet. App. 8a. Thus, the outcome of
this Petition will not alter the disposition of this case.
+
CONCLUSION
For all of the foregoing reasons, the Petition for a Writ
of Certiorari should be denied.
Respectfully submitted,
CHRISTINA HENAGEN PEER
(Counsel of Record)
WM. MICHAEL HANNA
SQUIRE, SANDERS & DEMPSEY LLP
4900 Key Tower
127 Public Square
Cleveland, Ohio 44114
Phone: (216) 479-8500
Fax: (216) 479-8780
July 28, 2006
App. 1
APPENDIX A
DAVID FARKAS v. CARPENTER
TECHNOLOGY CORP.
CIVIL ACTION, NO. 05-CV-2741
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9170;
17 Am. Disabilities Cas. (BNA) 1831
March 8, 2006, Decided
March 8, 2006, Filed; March 9, 2006, Entered
COUNSEL: For DAVID FARKAS, Plaintiff: DONALD P.
RUSSO, DONALD P. RUSSO, ESQUIRE, BETHLEHEM,
PA.
For CARPENTER TECHNOLOGY CORPORATION,
Defendant: JOSEPH P. HOFMANN, STEVENS & LEE,
LANCASTER, PA.
JUDGES: R. Barclay Surrick, Judge.
OPINION BY: R. Barclay Surrick
OPINION:
MEMORANDUM & ORDER
SURRICK, J.
March 8, 2006.
Presently before the Court is Defendant’s Motion For
Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 7). For the following rea-
sons, Defendant’s Motion will be granted.
)
\|
App. 2
I. BACKGROUND
A. Facts
Plaintiff David Farkas worked as a metallurgist for
Defendant Carpenter Technology Corporation (“Carpen-
ter”) since 1982. On May 28, 2001, Plaintiff suffered a
stroke, which caused him to be hospitalized for approxi-
mately one week. Plaintiff then applied for and was
granted leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act
(“FMLA”). He returned to work on July 5, 2001. At first,
Plaintiff’s physician restricted Plaintiff’s work schedule
to three days per week, to be spent in the office only and
not in the steel mill. On August 22, 2001, his physician
increased his work schedule to four days per week. Plain-
tiff was permitted to work with these restrictions. On
October 12, 2001, Plaintiff’s physician lifted all restric-
tions on Plaintiff’s work schedule. From October 12, 2001
until his termination on November 17, 2003, Plaintiff was
able to perform his job at Carpenter without restriction.
In his 2002 and 2003 annual performance reviews,
Plaintiff received criticisms related to his job performance.
(Farkas Dep. at Exs. 11-12.) Some of these criticisms were
similar to criticisms that Plaintiff had received in his
1998, 1999, and 2000 performance reviews — reviews that
Plaintiff had received before he suffered the stroke. These
criticisms included concerns about his leadership skills,
accountability, time management, and prioritizing. (Far-
kas Dep. at Exs. 8-10.) In October 2003, Plaintiff’s imme-
diate supervisor, John McGraw (hereinafter “McGraw’”),
had a meeting with Plaintiff regarding McGraw’s concerns
about Plaintiff’s failure to complete ongoing projects in a
timely fashion. (McGraw Dep. at 70-77; Farkas Dep. at
100-02; id. at Ex. 14.) At this meeting, Plaintiff indicated
to McGraw that he did not want to stay in his current
App. 3
position with Carpenter and that he wanted to be trans-
ferred to a less stressful job. (McGraw Dep. at 70-76;
Farkas Dep. at 100-02.) Shortly after this meeting,
McGraw discovered that Plaintiff had committed a signifi-
cant error with regard to a product that Carpenter was
manufacturing for Mercury Marine, one of Carpenter’s
major customers. (McGraw Dep. at 82-86.) This error
caused the Defendant great concern related to keeping the
client. It also cost Defendant approximately $18,000 to
remedy the error. (Jd . at 83-85; McElwee Dep. at 60-62.)
Citing Plaintiff’s declining job performance, failure to
improve on noted deficiencies, and the aforementioned
error with Mercury Marine, Carpenter terminated Plain-
tiff’s employment on November 17, 2003. (Farkas Dep. at
Ex. 15.)
B. Procedural History
On July 26, 2004, Plaintiff filed an administrative
claim of discrimination with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) and with the Pennsyl-
vania Human Relations
Commission (“PHRC”).’ On February 9, 2005, the
EEOC sent Plaintiff a Dismissal and Notice of Right to
' Plaintiff’s complaint filed with the EEOC stated as follows:
I began my employment with Carpenter Technology
Corporation as a Associate Metallurgist, on 7/01/82, and
have progressed to the level as a Senior Metallurgist. My
annual reviews were mostly very favorable and I enjoyed
my work. On May 28, 2001, I had suffered with a major
medical condition which caused me to be out of work for a
few days. I had a full recovery and returned back to work
after approximately three months and I told John McGraw,
Supervisor, that I was not limited in performing any aspects
(Continued on following page)
Sue letter advising that it was closing his file and advising
App. 4
Plaintiff of his right to sue. (Compl., Doc. No. 1 at Ex. B.)
In May 2005, Plaintiff filed suit in the Court of Com-
mon Pleas of Lehigh County, alleging that Defendant
violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42
U.S.C. § 12101 et seg., and the Pennsylvania Human
Relations Act (“PHRA”), 43 P.S. § 951 et seg. (Doc. No. 1
qf 16-18.) On June 7, 2005, Defendant filed a Notice of
Removal in this Court. (U/d.) Defendant has filed the
instant Motion requesting summary judgment on both of
Plaintiff’s claims.
IT.
LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). A genuine issue of material fact exists
of my job. I gradually worked more and more hours upon my
return to work until I was able to resume full time employ
ment around December 2001. I noticed that my annual per-
formance were lower after my illness, yet nothing was ever
noted which caused me to have concerns about my employ-
ment, yet on November 17, 2003, John McGraw terminated
me due to “performance concerns.” No warnings (written or
verbal) were ever given to me regarding poor performance
prior to my termination. | strongly believe that the company
perceived my condition as a financial risk and this was the
real reason for my termination.
I believe that I have been discriminated against be-
cause of my medical condition in violation of the Americans
with Disabilities Act (ADA).
(Farkas Dep. at Ex. 16.)
App. 5
only when “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury
could return a verdict for the non-moving party.” Anderson
v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S. Ct. 2505,
91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986). The party moving for summary
judgment bears the initial burden of demonstrating that
there are no facts supporting the nonmoving party’s legal
position. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-24, 106
S. Ct. 2548, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986). Once the moving
party carries this initial burden, the nonmoving party
must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genu-
ine issue for trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); see also Matsushita
Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587,
106 S. Ct. 1348, 89 L. Ed. 2d 538 (1986) (explaining that
the nonmoving party “must do more than simply show
that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material
facts”). “The nonmoving party .. . ‘cannot rely merely upon
bare assertions, conclusory allegations or suspicion’ to
support its claim.” Townes v. City of Philadelphia, Civ. A.
No. 00-CV-138, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6056, at *4 (E.D.
Pa. May 11, 2001) (quoting Fireman’s Ins. Co. v. DeFresne,
676 F.2d 965, 969 (3d Cir. 1982)). Rather, the party oppos-
ing summary judgment must go beyond the pleadings and
present evidence through affidavits, depositions, or a‘/mis-
sions on file to show that there is a genuine issue for trial.
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. When deciding a motion for
summary judgment, the court must view facts and infer-
ences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255; Siegel Transfer, Inc. v. Carrier
Express, Inc., 54 F.3d 1125, 1127 (3d Cir. 1995). However,
we will not resolve factual disputes or make credibility
determinations. Siegel Transfer, Inc., 54 F.3d at 1127.
App. 6
Ill. LEGAL ANALYSIS
Title I of the ADA prohibits discrimination by certain
private employers against individuals with disabilities.
Specifically, it provides that no covered employer “shall
discriminate against a qualified individual with a disabil-
ity because of the disability of such individual in regard to
job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or
discharge of employees, employee compensation, job
training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of
employment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). In order to make out a
prima facie case under the ADA, a plaintiff must demon-
strate: “(1) he is a disabled person within the meaning of
the ADA; (Z) he is otherwise qualified to perform the
essential functions of the-job,with or without reasonable
accommodations by the employer; and (3) he has suffered
an otherwise adverse employment decision as a result of
discrimination.” Gaul v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 134 F.3d 576,
580 (3d Cir. 1998). Under the Act, a “disability” is defined
as: “(A}~a-physical or mental impairment that substan-
tially limits one or more of the major life activities of such
individual; (B) a record of such impairment; or (C) being
regarded as having such impairment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102.
Defendant contends that Plaintiff has failed to establish a
prima facie case because Plaintiff has not established that
he has a disability under any of the ADA’s definitions.
A. Impairment That Substantially Limits a
Major Life Activity
“It is insufficient for individuals attempting to prove
disability status under this test to merely submit evidence
of a medical diagnosis of an impairment.” Toyota Motor
Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 198, 122 S. Ct.
681, 151 L. Ed. 2d 615 (2002). The ADA requires that a
App. 7
plaintiff must also offer evidence that the extent of the
limitation caused by their impairment is substantial. /d.
Plaintiff argues that his disability is his 2001 stroke, and
that the stroke substantially limited his ability to work, a
major life activity. (Pl.’s Mem. in Opp., Doc. No. 11 at 32.)
The Code of Federal Regulations specifically provides
that to be disabled because of a substantial limitation on
the major life activity of working, a plaintiff must be:
significantly restricted in the ability to perform
either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in
various classes as compared to the average per-
son having comparable training, skills and abili-
ties. The inability to perform a single, particular
job does not constitute a substantial limitation in
the major life activity of working.
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2())(3)G). When Plaintiff requested FMLA
leave immediately after his stroke, Defendant granted his
request. (Farkas Dep. at 33.) In addition, Plaintiff admit-
ted in his deposition that on October 12, 2001, when he
returned to a full five-day work schedule, he was able to
perform all the functions of his metallurgist position. (/d.)
Indeed, according to Plaintiff’s Complaint, he made a “full
recovery” upon his return to work. (Doc. No. 1 { 9.) The
only evidence of any kind that Plaintiff offers to demon-
strate that his stroke substantially limited his ability to
perform “either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs” are
the negative performance evaluations submitted by
Plaintiff’s supervisor after Plaintiff’s stroke. (Doc. No. 11
at 32.) According to Plaintiff, these negative reviews
clearly demonstrate “that Farkas’ ability to work was
impacted by his stroke.” (/d.)
App. 8
As an initial matter, we note that Plaintiff’s own
testimony undermines this argument, since he has dis-
puted the accuracy of these very reviews. (Farkas Dep. at
70-99.) More importantly, these performance evaluations
do not indicate that Plaintiff was limited in his ability to
perform a class of jobs, let alone substantially limited. In
the 2002 and 2003 evaluations, Plaintiff’s supervisor
indicated that he did not believe that Plaintiff had demon-
strated enough leadership qualities, that he had time
management problems, that he did not take responsibility
for work, and that he was indecisive. (Farkas Dep. Exs. 11,
12.) There is no evidence that Plaintiff was unable to
perform his job. This conclusion is underscored by Plain-
tiff’s testimony that he was, in fact, able to carry out the
essential functions of his position. In his deposition,
Plaintiff admitted that only after he was terminated did
he believe that his stroke had affected his ability to per-
form his job. (Farkas Dep. at 124-25, 127-28, 132-33.) After
a thorough review of the record, we are satisfied that
Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that his stroke substan-
tially limited his ability to work. Plaintiff went back to
work shortly after his stroke and performed his job with-
out limitation. See Hill v. Steven Motors, Inc., 97 Fed.
App’x 267, 276 (10th Cir. 2004) (plaintiff did not suffer
substantial limitations on her ability to work after her
stroke, despite having to undergo a “relearning process”
and occasionally losing her balance); Mitchell v. Girl
Scouts of the U.S.A., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20570, No. 98-
CV-3730, 2003 WL 22705121, at *6-7 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 17,
2003) (plaintiff’s contentions that after her stroke she was
unable to do a “substantial amount of walking,” clean, or
ride a bike did not meet criteria for disability under the
ADA). Moreover, the deficiencies noted in his reviews
existed both before and after his stroke. Accordingly,
App. 9
Plaintiff has failed to establish that he suffers from a
disability as that term is used in the ADA.
B. Record of Disability
Plaintiff has also failed to demonstrate that he has a
record of having a disability. “Has « record of such im-
pairment means has a history of, or has been misclassified
as having, a mental or physical-impairment that substan-
tially limits one or more major life activities.” 29 C.F.R.
§ 1630.2(k). Plaintiff contends that “Defendant had com-
piled a substantial record” of Plaintiff’s disability, and
that this record was well-known by Defendant. (Doc. No.
11 at 34.) It is undisputed that Defendant was aware that
Plaintiff had a stroke. However, this alone is not sufficient
to satisfy the requirements of the ADA. “A plaintiff at-
tempting to prove the existence of a ‘record’ of disability
still must demonstrate that the recorded impairment is a
‘disability’ within the meaning of the ADA.” Tice v. Centre
Area Transp. Auth., 247 F.3d 506, 513 (3d Cir. 2001). As
discussed above, Plaintiff has not demonstrated that his
stroke is a disability under the ADA because he has offered
ne proof that his ability to work was substantially limited.
See, e.g., Sorensen v. Univ. of Utah Hosp., 194 F.3d 1084,
1087 (10th Cir. 1999) (plaintiff did not meet standard for
“record of disability” where plaintiff’s hospitalization
affected her for only a brief period and did not impact her
ability to perform her job, because she did not suffer an
impairment that substantially limits a major life aci:vity).
Similarly, Plaintiff has offered no evidence that
Defendant “misclassified” him as having an impairment
that substantially limited his ability to work. Although
Defendant was aware that Plaintiff had been hospitalized
App. 10
for a stroke and subsequently granted his request for
FMLA leave, there is no indication in the record that
Plaintiff’s supervisors believed him to be incapable of
working. Plaintiff’s own doctor lifted all restrictions on his
work schedule in October 2001. After that, Plaintiff him-
self indicated that he had made a full recovery. He also
testified that after October 2001, he did not need, nor did
he request, a reasonable accommodation on account of his
stroke. (Farkas Dep. at 33, 133.) Plaintiff’s argument that
Defendant misclassified him as disabled has no basis in
fact.
Plaintiff attempts to use McGraw’s statements in an
October 27, 2003 memo to establish a “record” of disability.
In that memo, McGraw refers to a discussion he had had
with Plaintiff in which Plaintiff indicated that he wanted a
less stressful position at Defendant. McGraw notes that
“based on Dave’s state of mind and the cited affect [sic] on
his health together with his lack of performance in this
position over the past several years, we should consider
removing Dave from this position as soon as possible.”
(Farkas Dep. at Ex. 14.) Plaintiff’s reliance on this state-
ment is at best misguided and at worst, intentionally
misleading. The health effects referenced in the memo are
the stress-related issues that Plaintiff discussed with
McGraw.’ (Farkas Dep. at 111-12.) Plaintiff admits that he
did not think these issues were related to his stroke, and
that he did not tell McGraw that they were related to his
? Although Plaintiff does not make this argument, we also note
that these stress-related health issues — “irregular heartbeat and
chronic hemorrhoids” (Farkas Dep. at 111-12) — do not independently
satisfy the ADA’s definition of a disability, because there is no evidence
that they substantially limited his ability to work. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 12102; 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(jX3){i).
App. 11
Pr
stroke. (Farkas Dep. at 111-14.) Without any evidence that
Defendant had classified him as having a disability that
substantially limited his work, Plaintiff has failed to
satisfy the “record of such impairment” test.
C. “Regarded As” Disability
In order to prove that a defendant regarded a plaintiff
as disabled, the plaintiff must prove that: “(1) a covered
entity mistakenly believes that a person has a physical
impairment that substantially limits one or more major
life activities, or (2) a covered entity mistakenly believes
that an actual, nonlimiting impairment substantially
limits one or more major life activities.” Sutton v. United
Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 489, 119 S. Ct. 2139, 144
L. Ed. 2d 450 (1999). Defendant contends that there is no
evidence indicating that Defendant believed he had an
impairment that substantially limited his life activities.
While Plaintiff argues that Defendant was aware that he
had been hospitalized for a stroke, the Third Circuit has
observed that “the mere fact that an employer is aware of
an employee’s impairment is insufficient to demonstrate
either that the employer regarded the employee as dis-
_ abled or that that perception caused the adverse employ-
ment action.” Kelly v. Drexel Univ., 94 F.3d 102, 109 (3d
Cir. 1996). Plaintiff also claims that “Defendant considered
Farkas as being unable to perform a wide range of jobs.”
(Doc. No. 11 at 35.) However, Plaintiff offers no support for
this contention. To the extent that Plaintiff is suggesting
that the fact that. Defendant terminated Plaintiff’s em-
ployment is evidence that Defendant considered Farkas
unable to perform a'wide range of jobs, this argument is
circular in its reasoning and therefore unhelpful. See
Zalepa v. Cornerstone Tech., LLC, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
App. 12
34246, No. CV 03-1850, 2005 WL 3234314, at *7 (M.D. Pa.
Nov. 30, 2005) (“The notion that defendant must have fired
plaintiff because it regarded him as disabled and that it
plainly regarded him as disabled because it fired him is
attractive but circular — it lacks a causal antecedent.”)
(internal citations omitted).
Plaintiff relies on the Third Circuit’s opinion in Taylor
v. Pathmark Stores, 177 F.3d 180 (3d Cir. 1999), for the
proposition that “in general, an employer’s perception that
an employee cannot perform a wide range of jobs suffices
to make out a ‘regarded as’ claim.” Jd. at 188. However, in
Taylor there was actual written evidence that the em-
ployer did not believe the plaintiff could perform any job
for the employer even with accommodation, and as a result
of this perception the employer terminated the plaintiff.
Id. at 188. There is no such evidence in this case, nor does
Plaintiff provide any evidence that his termination was
due to such a misperception. The other cases cited by
Plaintiff are distinguishable as well, in that those cases
involve fact patterns in which the employer drastically
restricted plaintiff’s employment as a result of the em-
ployer’s belief that plaintiff was unable to perform a range
of jobs. See, e.g., Williams v. Phila. Hous. Auth. Police
Dep't, 380 F.3d 751 (3d Cir. 2004); Best v. Shell Oil Co., 107
F.3d 544 (7th Cir. 1997); Dacasin v. Bay Area Rapid
Transit Dist., 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18626, No. C 97-0455,
1998 WL 827697 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 23, 1998). As previously
discussed, the only restrictions that Defendant placed on
Plaintiff’s work as a result of his stroke were those re-
quested by Plaintiff or Plaintiff’s physician. After Plain-
tiff’s physician indicated that Plaintiff could work full-
time, there is no indication that Defendant regarded
App. 13
Plaintiff as une .* to perform a wide range of jobs.’ More-
over, Plaintiff himself insisted that he had made a full
recovery after his stroke. Under the circumstances, there
is no support for Plaintiff’s argument under the “regarded
as” test for disability.
D. Nondiscriminatory Reasons
Even if one were to somehow conclude that Plaintiff
has established a prime facie case of discrimination, one
could not reasonably conclude that Defendant’s proffered
nondiscriminatory reasons for their actions were pretext
for discrimination. Plaintiff’s reviews over the years, even
before his stroke, showed deficiencies in his performance.
Although Defendant was satisfied with Plaintiff’s job
performance and generally considered him a good em-
ployee, the deficiencies were never really remedied by
Plaintiff. Then, in 2003, Plaintiff made_an error which
could have cost Defendant a client and did cost Defendant
$18,000 to remedy. This coupled with Plaintiff’s lack of
progress in his job performance and Plaintiff’s expressed
dissatisfaction with his job provide a nondiscriminatory
explanation for Plaintiff’s termination.‘ Plaintiff has
* Plaintiff’s allegation that Defendant took away his responsibili-
ties for fuel injection customers because of his stroke does not meet the
standard under the “regarded as” test. (See Doc. No. 14 at 3; Farkas
Dep. at 38-40.) The fact that Defendant removed Plaintiff from that one
particular job does not establish that Defendant regarded Plaintiff’s
stroke as substantially limiting his ability to work at a broad class of
jobs. Indeed, Plaintiff’s compensation and benefits were not affected by
the transfer of these responsibilities, and Plaintiff still had a “full plate”
of duties without the fuel injection job. (Farkas Dep. at 38-40.)
* It is worth noting that in 2001 and 2002, Defendant went through
a downsizing in which forty percent of its salaried employees were
terminated. This included at least three people who were under
(Continued on following page)
App. 14
failed to offer evidence of “weaknesses, implausibilities,
inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions” to rebut
Defendant’s nondiscriminatory reasons. Fuentes v. Perskie,
32 F.3d 759, 765 (3d Cir. 1994). The fact that Defendant’s
reasons may have been wrong, or mistaken, or demon-
strated a complete lack of loyalty to an employee of over
twenty years service does not render the employer’s
reasons pretextual. See id. (“To discredit the employer’s |
proffered reason, however, the plaintiff cannot simply
show that the employer’s decision was wrong or mistaken,
since the factual dispute at issue is whether discrimina-
tory animus motivated the employer, not whether the
employer is wise, shrewd, prudent, or competent.”).
E. PHRA Claim
We similarly conclude that Plaintiff has not provided
sufficient evidence of a disability under the PHRA. The
PHRA definition of disability is nearly identical to that of
the ADA: “(1) a physical or mental impairment which
substantially limits one or more of such person’s major life
activities; (2) a record of having such an impairment; or (3)
being regarded as having such an impairment....” 43 Pa.
Cons. Stat. § 954(p.1). “The PHRA is basically the same as
the ADA in relevant respects and ‘Pennsylvania courts...
generally interpret the PHRA in accord with its federal
counterparts.’” Rinehimer v. Cemcolift, Inc., 292 F.3d 375,
382 (3d Cir. 2002) (citing Kelly, 94 F.3d at 105). Therefore,
we will grant Defendant’s Motion with respect to Plain-
tiff’s PHRA claim also.
McGraw’s supervision. Plaintiff's responsibilities increased as a result
of the downsizing.
App. 15
IV. CONCLUSION
Plaintiff has not met his burden to establish a prima
facie case under the ADA or the PHRA. He has failed to
provide evidence demonstrating that he has a disability as
defined by these statutes. He has also failed to establish
that Defendant’s reasons for terminating him were pretex-
tual. Accordingly, we will grant Defendant’s Motion for
Summary Judgment.
An appropriate Order follows.
ORDER
AND NOW, this 8th day of March, 2006, upon consid-
eration of Defendant’s Motion For Summary Judgment, it
is ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion is GRANTED, and
judgement is entered in favor of Defendant Carpenter
Technology Corp. and against Plaintiff David Farkas.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
BY THE COURT: .
S/ R. Barclay Surrick, Judge
App. 16
APPENDIX B
MARX OLDS, Plaintiff-Appellant v. UNITED
PARCEL SERVICE, INC., Defendant-Appellee
No. 03-1920
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
127 Fed. Appx. 779; 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 5501
April 1, 2005, Filed
COUNSEL: For MARK OLDS, Plaintiff-Appellant: Mary
Katherine Norton, Detroit, MI; Steven A. Hicks, Knaggs,
Harter, Brake & Schneider, Lansing, MI
For UNITED PARCEL SERVICE, INC., Defendant-Appellee:
Kathleen McCree Lewis, Dykema Gossett, Detroit, MI;
Stephen S. Muhich, Kelley E. Stonnels, Dykema Gossett,
Grand Rapids, MI
JUDGES: BEFORE: NORRIS, BATCHELDER AND
ROGERS, Circuit Judges.
OPINION:
PER CURIAM. Plaintiff Mark Olds appeals from the
district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of
defendant United Parcel Service, Inc. (“UPS”), in this
disability discrimination action under the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (“ADA”).'
' The district court also granted summary judgment is favor of
UPS on Olds’ claims for retaliation in violation of the ADA and the
Michigan Workers Disability Compensation Act. On appeal, Olds does
not challenge the decision to grant UPS summary judgment on those
claims.
App. 17
I.
The district court set forth the facts of the case in an
opinion granting summary judgment to UPS:
Plaintiff Mark Olds worked as a package de-
livery driver for Defendant United Parcel Service,
Inc. (“UPS”) at its St. Joseph, Michigan facility
from September 1982 until January 8, 1998.
Plaintiff is 52 years old, married, and has three
children. He has a high school education and an
associate’s degree in business. Prior to beginning
employment with Defendant, Plaintiff worked at
various manual labor jobs including welding,
machining auto parts, construction, and carpen-
try. All parties agree Plaintiff had an excellent
employment record while with UPS.
In 1997, Plaintiff was diagnosed with mono-
clonal gammopathy of undetermined signifi-
cance, a condition involving an abnormal protein
that leads to cancer 20 percent of the time “his
diagnosis had no impact on Plaintiff’s ability to
work. After sustaining a compression fracture in
his neck while on the job in January 1998, De-
fendant was diagnosed with multiple myeloma, a
cancer affecting bone marrow. Plaintiff went on
short-term disability after sustaining this injury.
After undergoing chemotherapy, Plaintiff sought
to return to work in May 1998 pursuant to his
doctor’s approval. Plaintiff was initially under a
25 pound lifting restriction and precluded from
doing any kind of repetitive bending or twisting.
This was later increased to a 40 pound restric-
tion in January 1999, and the lifting restriction
was made permanent in September 1999. Plain-
tiff was also instructed not to perform certain re-
petitive activities that might put sudden, excessive
App. 18
force on his bones. Plaintiff underwent a bone
marrow transplant in September 2002. He was
cleared to work in January 2003, still under a 40
pound lifting restriction.
Plaintiff first inquired about accommodation
for his weight restriction in February 1999 and
formally sought accommodation in September
1999. Plaintiff sought permission to use a two-
wheel dolly to deliver packages over 40 pounds in
weight. In October 1999, Plaintiff submitted a
written request for Defendant to make this ac-
commodation available to him.’ Defendant de-
nied Plaintiff’s request for accommodation on
the basis that it did not find him entitled to one
under the Americans with Disabilities Act of
1990 (“ADA”). Defendant also informed Plaintiff
he was not qualified to return to work because of
his lifting restriction. Plaintiff filed a grievance
with respect to Defendant’s refusal to let him re-
turn to work under a 40 pound lifting restriction.
The grievance was appealed to a state panel
which upheld UPS’s decision as not being in vio-
lation of the collective bargaining contract. The
panel did not address whether Defendant should
provide Plaintiff with any accommodation or
whether other positions were available.
After being denied the opportunity to return
to his old job as a package delivery driver, Plain-
tiff bid on a number of openings at the St. Joseph
facility, including delivery driver positions, a cus-
tomer clerk opening, a porter position, and an air
shuttle driver job. His application for each was
denied on the ground that he was unable to per-
form the essential job function of being able to
lift over 40 pounds regardless of his seniority.
App. 19
Plaintiff is currently collecting Social Secu-
rity Disability benefits, for which he applied in
January 1998, pursuant to his diagnosis. Imme-
diately after sustaining his injury, Piaintiff also
filed a worker’s compensation claim that Defen-
dant initially denied. Subsequently, in May 1999,
upon review by a Magistrate Judge, Plaintiff was
awarded worker’s compensation benefits for a
closed period from January to October 1998, the
time during which Plaintiff’s compression frac-
ture was healing. In June 2000, Plaintiff filed a
charge of discrimination with the Michigai De-
partment of Civil Rights, which, as far as the
Court can determine from the record, recom-
mended referral of the case to conciliation.
* Defendant instructs its drivers to use a
two-wheel dolly when delivering packages over
70 pounds and places no restriction on a driver’s
decision to use a dolly for lesser weight packages.
Defendant also recommends use of a dolly when
delivering multiple packages and/or envelopes to
one location regardless of their individual or cu-
mulative weight. The Court also notes, drivers
are allotted a certain amount of time in which to
complete their routes based on time studies peri-
odically conducted by Defendant. Use of a dolly
generaily increases the allotted delivery time by
approximately 15 seconds. Such an allotment is
granted to account for the time needed to deliver
packages over 70 pounds with a dolly.
Opinion, June 17, 2003 at 1-3 (footnote in original).
The district court granted summary judgment to
defendant because it found that plaintiff was not disabled
as defined by the ADA. The court held that Olds did not
suffer from an impairment that substantially limited a-
App. 20
major life activity because “a lifting restriction alone does
not constitute a disability.” Opinion, June 17, 2003, at 5.
The court also concluded that Olds was not substantially
limited in a major life activity because he did not demon-
strate a significant restriction on his ability to obtain
employment in a broad range of jobs. In the same vein, the
court determined that Olds did not suffer from a record of
impairment that substantially limited a major life activity:
“At no time, based on the record before the Court, has
Plaintiff’s physical impairment substantially limited one
or more of his major life activities.” Opinion, June 17,
2003, at 11. Finally, the district court held that Olds did
not suffer from being regarded as having an impairment
that substantially limited a major life activity. It deter-
mined that UPS did not permit Olds to return to work
because of his lifting restriction, and that Olds did not
raise a question of fact with respect to whether UPS
entertained a misperception about him.
II. riggs
This court reviews a grant of summary judgment de
novo. Motorists Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hammond, 355 F.3d 593,
596 (6th Cir. 2004). Summary judgment must be granted
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) if there are no genuine
issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. All evidence and inferences
must be construed in the light most favorable to the non-
moving party. Shah v. Deaconess Hosp., 355 F.3d 496, 498
(6th Cir. 2004).
To state a claim under the ADA, a plaintiff must
demonstrate:
App. 21
(1) that she is a disabled person within the
meaning of the Act, (2) that she is qualified to
perform the essential functions of her job with or
without reasonable accommodation, and (3) that
she suffered an adverse employment decision be-
cause of her disability.
McKay v. Toyota Motor Mfg., U.S.A., Inc., 116 F.3d 369,
371 (6th Cir. 1997). The parties do not dispute that Olds
suffered an adverse employment action, but do contest the
other two elements of the test.
“Disability” under the ADA means:
(A) a physical or mental impairment that sub-
stantially limits one or more of the major life ac- -
tivities of such individual; (B) a record of such an
impairment; or (C) being regarded as having
such an impairment.
42 U.S.C. § 12102(2). A plaintiff who claims that he is
disabled because a condition substantially limits his
ability to engage in the “major life activity” of working
must show that he is “significantly restricted in [his]
ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of
jobs in various classes as compared to the average person
with comparable training, skills and abilities.” McKay, 110
F.3d at 371. (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i)). Olds
accordingly can survive summary judgment if he can
demonstrate that he was subject to any one of these three
conditions and that he was restricted in his ability to work
in a “class of jobs” or a “broad range of jobs in various
classes.” Id. However, the “inability to perform a single,
particular job does not constitute a substantial limitation in
the major life activity of working.” 29 C.F-R. § 1630.2(j3)(i).
App. 22
We agree with the district court that Olds is not so
physically impaired that he is disabled as defined by the
ADA. Olds argues that he has a physical impairment,
cancer, which creates a weight restriction that substan-
tially limits a major life activity: his ability to work.
However, as the district court correctly concluded, the
general rule in this circuit is that a weight restriction
alone is not considered a disability under the ADA. Opin-
ion, June 17, 2003, at 5-7 (citing Gayer v. Cont? Airlines,
21 Fed.Appx. 347 (6th Cir. 2001) (unpublished)); see also
McKay, 110 F.3d at 373 (holding that plaintiff’s inability
to lift more than ten pounds would not significantly
restrict her ability to perform a broad range of jobs in
various classes). Olds’ lifting restriction prevents him from
working as a delivery driver and from performing other
jobs at UPS specifically, but there is no evidence in the
record that it prevents him from engaging in a broad class
of jobs.
Similarly, Olds has not raised a genuine issue of
material fact that he has a “record of impairment.” “A
record of an impairment means an individual has ‘a
history of, or has been misclassified as having, a mental or
physical impairment that substantially limits one or more
major life activities.”” MX Group, Inc. v. City of Covington,
293 F.3d 326, 339 (6th Cir. 2002); (citing 28 C.FR.
§ 35.104(3)). The district court determined that Olds’
physical impairments limited his ability to meet his job
requirements, but did not limit one or more major life
activities. We agree with the district court for the same
reasons that led us to conclude that Olds was not disabled
as defined by the ADA.
That said, we depart from the decision in one respect:
we hold that Olds has raised a genuine issue of material
App. 23
fact about whether UPS regarded him as having an
impairment. To succeed in demonstrating that he is
“regarded as having ... an impairment,” a plaintiff must
show the following:
(1) a covered entity mistakeniy believes that a
person has a physical impzirment that substan-
tially limits one or more major life activities,
or (2) a covered entity mistakenly believes that
an actual, nonlimiting impairment substantially
limits one or more major life activities. In both
cases, it is necessary that a covered entity enter-
tain misperceptions about the individual — it
must believe either that one has a substantially
limiting impairment that one does not have or
that one has a substantially limiting impairment
when, in fact, the impairment is not so limiting.
Ross v. Campbell Soup Co., 237 F.3d 701, 706 (6th Cir.
2001) (citing Sutton v. United Air Lines, 527 U.S. 471, 489,
144 L. Ed. 2d 450, 119 S. Ct. 2139 (1999)). The district
court concluded that there was no evidence to indicate
that UPS discriminated against Olds based upon a mis-
perception; rather, it concluded that UPS refused him
employment based upon an accurate understanding of his
limitations — that he could not lift 40 pounds.
However, a former UPS employee testified that a UPS
corporate lawyer said that Olds should not be reinstated
because he had cancer. Furthermore, the former employee
testified that UPS did not want to accommodate Olds
because it did not want to rel.” him: “we didn’t want to
come right out and say that because of Mark’s condition,
his cancerous condition, that he couldn’t do the job.” The
same employee also indicated that UPS changed the lifting
requirements of certain positions to avoid accommodating
App. 24
Olds. A reasonable jury could infer that UPS believed that
Olds’ condition was significantly more disabling than it
actually was, and for that reason UPS did not want to
reinstate him. Olds has accordingly raised a genuine issue
of material fact as to whether UPS regarded him as
having an impairment.
Because the district court determined that Olds was
not disabled as defined by the ADA, it did not reach the
question of whether he was qualified to perform the
essential functions of his job. UPS argues that Olds cannot
perform the task of lifting up to 70 pounds without assis-
tance, a task defined by UPS as essential. Olds suggests
that the weight-lifting requirements are arbitrary because
they were changed without regard to job duties to make
the lifting requirements “uniform” for all jobs at the St.
Joseph facility. He also contends that other package
delivery drivers with back problems had been given
permission to use dolly carts and request customer assis-
tance for limited periods of time. Accordingly, on remand,
the district court will need to determine what the “essen-
tial functions” of UPS jobs are and whether Olds reasona-
bly can perform them with an accommodation.
UPS argues that Olds is precluded from demonstrat-
ing that he is qualified because an administrative law
judge found him entitled to Social Security Disability
benefits. We disagree. Under the Supreme Court’s decision
in Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795, 807,
143 L. Ed. 2d 966, 119 S. Ct. 1597 (1999), Olds is required
to give a “sufficient explanation” as to how he can perform
the essential functions of the job, given the Social Security
Administration’s determination of total disability. How-
ever, because the Social Security Administration assesses
only what a claimant can do, while the relevant inquiry
App. 25
under the ADA asks what the claimant can do with or
without accommodation, the only explanation that a
plaintiff need provide is that he can perform the work in
question with accommodation. As stated by the Supreme
Court:
To defeat summary judgment, that explanation
must be sufficient to warrant a reasonable juror’s
concluding that, assuming the truth of, or the
plaintiff’s good-faith belief in, the earlier state-
ment [to the Social Security Administration], the
plaintiff could nonetheless “perform the essential
functions” of her job, with or without “reasonable
accommodation.”
Id. Because Olds has suggested two accommodations,
namely, either a transfer to another position, or permis-
sion to use the dolly cart and to request customer assis-
tance with packages over 40 pounds, it appears that he
can provide a satisfactory “explanation.”
iil.
The judgment of the district court is reversed and
the case is remanded to the district court for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
App. 26
APPENDIX C
JOSEPH M. SEBEST, Plaintiff-Appellee v.
CAMPBELL CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT BOARD
OF EDUCATION; MICHAEL TSIKOURIS,
Defendants-Appellants.
No. 02-4012
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
94 Fed. Appx. 320; 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 7173
April 8, 2004, Filed
COUNSEL: For JOSPEH M. SEBEST, Plaintiff-Appellant:
Eric E. Norton, The Norton Law Firm, Cleveland, OH.
For CAMPBELL CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT BOARD —
OF EDUCATION, MICHAEL TSIKOURIS, Defendants-
Appellees: James E. Roberts, Roth, Blair, Roberts, Stras-
feld & Lodge, John C. Pfau, Pfau, Pfau & Marando,
Youngstown, OH.
JUDGES: Before: BATCHELDER, GIBBONS, and COOK,
Circuit Judges.
OPINION BY: JULIA SMITH GIBBONS
OPINION:
JULIA SMITH GIBBONS, Circuit Judge. Joseph
Sebest became treasurer of the Campbell City school
district for a probationary term starting in March 1999.
Sebest’s employment with the school district elapsed on
January 11, 2000, when his contract expired, and the
Campbell City School District Board of Education (the
“Board”) offered him a new employment contract that
provided for an annual salary approximately $4,000 less
than the salary earned by Sebest under his first contract.
Sebest rejected the second contract and filed suit in the
App. 27
United States District Court for the Northern District of
Ohio against the school board and one of its members,
Michael Tsikouris, for violations of federal and state
disability discrimination law. Sebest and the defendants
filed cross-motions for summary judgment, and the district
court granted summary judgment to the defendants.
On appeal, Sebest challenges the district court’s
factual assumption that Tsikouris’s views on Sebest’s
health did not influence other members of the school-
board. Accordingly, Sebest argues that the district court
erred in granting summary judgment to the defendants on
his disability discrimination claims. Sebest also asserts
that the district court erred in deciding that he had not
brought suit against Tsikouris in his individual capacity.
For the reasons set forth below. we affirm the grant of
summary judgment to the Board and Tsikouris.
I.
In the early 1980s, Sebest was diagnosed with chronic
myelogenous leukemia.’ As treatment for his leukemia, he
received a bone marrow transplant in 1984. Because of the
transplant, Sebest acquired graft-versus-host disease, a
condition that affects the lungs. Around 1999, Sebest
experienced breathing-related difficulties, such as short-
ness of breath when he exerted himself, sinus drainage,
and sputum production. His treating physician, Dr. Clay
Braden Marsh, categorized Sebest’s condition in 1999 as
severe obstructive pulmonary lung disease and probably a
' In a 2002 deposition, Sebest stated that he no longer suffers from
leukemia.
App. 28
combination of bronchiectasis and bronchiolitis obliterans.’
Dr. Marsh testified that during this period Sebest gener-
ally could perform daily functions — such as getting up in
the morning, brushing his teeth, and driving to work — but
that his breathing problems became aggravated by stress
or strenuous activity. According to Dr. Marsh’s testimony,
Sebest’s abnormal pulmonary function may prevent him
from being able to walk up a flight of stairs “on his bad
days.”
On March 25, 1999, the Board convened a special
meeting to hire a probationary treasurer for the district.
At the meeting, board member Bernard Petro remarked
that Sebest had suffered from leukemia in the past. Board
member Tsikouris asked the other board members if
Sebest, who was in attendance for parts of the meeting,
looked frail and whether he should be hired since he might
not be well. Tsikouris also discussed Sebest’s $300 health
insurance deductible. In addition, Tsikouris expressed
concern that a recurrence of Sebest’s illness could be costly
to the school district. The other board members declined to
discuss these issues, and several members even told
Tsikouris that his comments were inappropriate.
Sebest was hired by the Board at an annual salary of
$48,000, with three members voting in favor of his hiring
and Tsikouris and another board member voting against
it. Sebest then entered into a contract with the school
board, which stated:
? According to Dr. Marsh, bronchiectasis is abnormal dilation of the
lower airways, which can predispose individuals to develop infections in
the lung. Bronchiolitis obliterans occurs when there has been a small
obliteration in the lungs and can be caused by graft-versus-host
disease.
App. 29
This contract of employment entered into this
25th day of March 1999 by and between the
Board of Education of the Campbell City School
District, Mahoning County, Ohio, and Joseph M.
Sebest hereafter designated as Treasurer.
The said Board of Education, pursuant to motion-
duly adopted and in accordance with the provi-
sions of Revised Code [§] 3313.22 hereby employs
the said Joseph M. Sebest as Treasurer for a one
(1) year probationary term beginning on April 6,
1999 through the Organizational Meeting in
January of 2000.
The said Board of Education in consideration of
the services rendered by the Treasurer, hereby
agrees to pay the said Treasurer an annual sal-
ary of $48,000.00 as adopted by the Board on
March 25, 1999. If a renewal contract is adopted,
said annual salary will be negotiated for each
year of the contract and may be increased by ac-
tion of the Board of Education at any time as per
Ohio Revised Code [§] 3313.24. That the Treas-
urer per diem be based on 260 work days and di-
vided into his total annual salary.
The said Treasurer agrees to enter into this con-
tract of employment for the above designated
term, and to diligently and faithfully perform his
duties as Treasurer in accordance with the law
for the above designated term or until such time
as his contract may be terminated as prescribed
by law.
Sebest served as school district treasurer for the period
specified in his contract.
App. 30
On January 11, 2000, the school board held its organ-
izational meeting — the point at which Sebest’s employ-
ment under his contract elapsed - and adopted a
resolution offering Sebest a two-year probationary con-
tract with compensation and benefits to be determined at
a later time. On January 25, the Board adopted another
resolution, which set the salary for treasurer at $44,000
and increased the contribution made on Sebest’s behalf to
the School Employees Retirement System from two per-
cent to five percent of his salary.’ The resolution also
stated that a formal written contract would be prepared at
a later date and presented to Sebest, who would then have
two weeks to decide whether or not to accept it. On Janu-
ary 31, 2000, the Board presented Sebest with the pro-
posed written contract, which Sebest eventually rejected.
Sebest pursued an ultimately unsuccessful adminis-
trative appeal of his dismissal in the Ohio Court of Com-
mon Pleas. Sebest then filed suit against the Board and
Tsikouris in district court for disability discrimination
under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”)
and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. Sebest also alleged
additional federal and state law claims."
* The Board members suggested the following annual salary
figures for Sebest’s second contract: $38,000 (Board member Rohan);
$42,000 (Board member Tsikouris); $41,000 (Board member Rusnak);
$48,000 (Board member Cougras); and $48,000 (Board member
Gerlick). The Board eventually decided to offer Sebest a salary of
$44,000 by averaging the salary figures provided by each of the five
board members.
* Sebest’s complaint alleged the following claims: violations of Ohio
Rev. Code § 4112; breach of contract; violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983;
wrongful discharge in violation of public policy (disability discrimina-
tion); wrongful discharge in violation of public policy (Ohio Rev. Code
§ 3313.22); promissory estoppel; intentional infliction of emotional
(Continued on following page)
App. 31
Sebest and defendants filed cross-motions for sum-
mary judgment. The district court denied Sebest’s motion
and granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment
with respect to Sebest’s claims under the ADA, the Reha-
bilitation Act, and wrongful discharge in violation of public
policy (disability discrimination).° The district court held
that “examining all of the evidence in the light most
favorable to Sebest, there is nothing on this record to show
that the Board discriminated against Sebest on the basis
of a real or perceived disability.” Sebest appeals the
district court’s decision.
II.
This court reviews a district court’s order granting
summary judgment de novo. Laderach v. U-Haul, 207 F.3d
825, 827 (6th Cir. 2000). Summary judgment is appropri-
ate “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogato-
ries, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as
a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). “A dispute over a
material fact cannot be ‘genuine’ unless a reasonable jury
could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Cockrel v.
Shelby County Sch. Dist, 270 F.3d 1036, 1048 (6th Cir.
2001). In performing this review, we must draw inferences
distress; and a claim for punitive damages. The district court granted
Sebest’s motion to dismiss the claims for violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
-wrongful discharge in violation of public policy (Ohio Rev. Code
§ 3313.22), and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
* The district court also dismissed Sebest’s remaining state law
claims because these claims “substantially predominate[] over the
claim or claims over which the district court has original jurisdiction.”
See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(2).
App. 32
from the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-
moving party. Andersons, Inc. v. Consol, Inc., 348 F.3d 496,
501 (6th Cir. 2003). “Accordingly, summary judgment must
be entered ‘against a party who fails to make a showing
sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential
to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the
burden of proof at trial.’” Laderach, 207 F.3d at 828
(quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 91 L.
Ed. 2d 265, 106 S. Ct. 2548 (1986)).
Sebest asserts that there is direct and indirect evi-
dence that the Board discriminated against him because
he is disabled. We affirm the district court’s conclusion
that the record does not support this claim. Specifically,
Sebest has failed to present evidence that the Board — the
decision-maker in this case — made decisions with respect
to Sebest’s employment based on his disability. Even
assuming arguendo that the school board did make such
decisions, we are unpersuaded that Sebest meets the
definition of disability provided in the ADA.
A.
In considering Sebest’s discrimination claims, we
must first review his challenge to the district court’s
factual assumption that Tsikouris’s discussions about
Sebest’s health did not influence the decision of other
board members to offer Sebest a second employment
contract at a lower salary. On this point, the district court
stated, “it is clear that the decision-maker/employer, that
is, the Board, was not influenced by Tsikouris.” We review
de novo a district court’s factual assumptions made at the
summary judgment stage. Brennan v. Township of North-
ville, 78 F.3d 1152, 1156 (6th Cir. 1996).
App. 33
We see no_ reason to disturb the district court’s deter-
mination that Tsikouris’s personal views of Sebest did not
direct the decision-making of the five-member Board.
Sebest has presented evidence that Tsikouris made state-
ments at the March 25, 1999, school board meeting about
Sebest having leukemia. While members serving on the
Board at that time testified that Tsikouris asked questions
about Sebest’s health and his health insurance deductible,
Sebest has not presented any evidence that Tsikouris’s
remarks were shared — or were even considered — by other
members of the Board. This conclusion is bolstered by the
fact that, after Tsikouris raised the issue of Sebest’s
health, three board members told Tsikouris that his
remarks were inappropriate. Furthermore, at the same
meeting that Tsikouris discussed Sebest’s health, the
Board proceeded to hire Sebest under the first contract.
The following year, the Board voted to offer him a second
employment contract. In sum, while the record may
provide information about Tsikouris’s personal views, it
does not indicate that a majority of the Board — the only
entity able to make decisions about Sebest’s employment —
supported his opinion.
B.
Even if we construed Tsikouris’s comments about
Sebest to reflect the opinion of at least a majority of the
Board, Sebest has not met his burden of showing that he is
disabled under the ADA. To recover on an ADA claim, an
individual must establish that he or she was a qualified
individual with a disability at the time of the discrimina-
tory act. Kocsis v. Multi-Care Mgmt., Inc., 97 F.3d 876, 884
(6th Cir. 1996). In the ADA, the term “disability” is defined
as, with respect to an individual: “[1] a physical or mental
App. 34
impairment that substantially limits one or more of the
major life activities of such individual; [2] a record of such
an impairment; [3] <. being regarded as having such an
impairment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2). Sebest claims that he
is disabled under all three definitions.
Sebest first argues that his breathing is substantially
limited. Breathing is indeed a “major life activity” for
purposes of the ADA, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i), because it is an
activity “of central importance to daily life.” See Toyota
Motor Mfg. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 197, 151 L. Ed. 2d
615, 122 S. Ct. 681 (2002) (providing definition of “major
life activity”). The term “substantially limits” in the
definition of disability means
unable to perform a major life activity that the
average person in the general population can
perform; or significantly restricted as to the con-
dition, manner or duration under which an in-
activity as compared to the condition, manner, or
duration under which the average person in the
general population can perform that same major
life activity.
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1) (emphasis added). In considering
whether an individual is substantially limited in a major
life activity, the following factors are relevant:
{1} The nature and severity of the impairment;
(2) The duration or expected duration of the
impairment; and
[3] The permanent or long term impact, or the
expected permanent or long term impact of or re-
sulting from the impairment.
29 C.FR. § 1630.2(j)\(2).
App. 35
In support of his claim that he is disabled, Sebest
points to his affidavit testimony that his physical impair-
ments include shortness of breath and significant diffi-
culty with breathing and that his condition becomes
aggravated when he is under stress. Sebest also cites the
testimony of Dr. Clay Marsh, who stated that Sebest’s
condition affects his breathing when Sebest is under stress
or has engaged in strenuous activity. Dr. Marsh did not
indicate that Sebest’s breathing is affected in the absence
of these factors. In fact, Dr. Marsh testified that at the
time Sebest was hired and served as school district treas-
urer, Sebest was able to perform normal daily functions —
activities such as showering, eating, and driving to work —
and was able to complete his job as treasurer. Only during
what Dr. Marsh described as Sebest’s “bad days” would
Sebest encounter difficulty in breathing. The record does
not indicate how often Sebest had a “bad day” or the
duration of such a period.
This testimony fails to demonstrate that Sebest’s
condition substantially limits his breathing. Clearly
Sebest’s impairment does not render him unable to
breathe. Therefore, for Sebest to demonstrate that his
impairment substantially limits his breathing, he must
present evidence such that a reasonable jury could find
that his impairment significantly restricted the condition
or manner of his breathing, as compared to the average
person in the population.* Looking to the nature and
severity of Sebest’s impairment, as explained by Sebest’s
statements and the testimony of Dr. Marsh, we conclude
* We note that Sebest has only presented arguments that he is
disabled because his impairment interferes with breathing and not
because his impairment interferes with any other major life activity.
App. 36
that Sebest has not presented such evidence. Both Sebest
and his treating physician testified that his breathing
becomes affected under stress or strenuous conditions. The
record lacks any evidence indicating that, when Sebest is
not under stress or is not performing a strenuous activity,
his breathing is significantly restricted. Therefore, Sebest
does not meet the first definition of disability in the ADA.
See Robinson v. Global Marine Drilling Co., 101 F.3d 35,
37 (5th Cir. 1996) (noting that “several instances of short-
ness of breath when climbing stairs do not rise to the level
of substantially limiting the major life activity of breath-
ing”); Minnix v. City of Chillicothe, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS
2099, No. 98-4285, 2000 WL 191828, at *2 (6th Cir. Feb.
10, 2000) (holding that plaintiff failed to present a genuine
question of material fact that impairment substantially
limited breathing when there was no medical evidence
that plaintiff’s breathing problems were “severe, long
term, or permanent”); Ventura v. City of Independence,
1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 4102, No. 95-3582, 1997 WL 94688,
at *2 (6th Cir. Mar. 4, 1997) (finding that plaintiff with
asthma, which caused him difficulty breathing but did not
prevent him from engaging in activities such as walking or
playing baseball, was not substantially limited in breath-
ing).’
Sebest also argues that he is disabled because he
previously suffered from leukemia and leukemia-related
* In his brief, Sebest cites U-Haul Co. v. Kunkle, an unpublished
decision, for the proposition that a plaintiff who experienced breathing
problems that occasionally required him to go “out to [his] truck to get
oxygen” in order to breathe was disabled under the ADA. 165 F.3d 29,
1998 WL 681253, at *3 (6th Cir. 1998) (alteration in original). Unlike
the plaintiff in Kunkle, Sebest has not presented evidence that he has
ever needed an oxygen tank in order to breathe.
App. 37
health problems, thereby indicating that he has a record of
a disability. While Sebest has presented evidence to show
that he has suffered from leukemia in the past, he has not
presented evidence demonstrating that he has a record of
an impairment that substantially limits a major life
activity. Sebest appears to assume that by having leuke-
mia, he necessarily has a record of a disability. This
understanding, however, is in conflict with the language of
the ADA. An individual is disabled if he or she has a record
of a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits
a major life activity 42 U.S.C. §12102(2); 29 C.FR.
§ 1630.2(g\(2) (incorporating 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g)(1)); see
also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k) (stating that a person is disabled
by having a record of an impairment when that person
“has a history of, or has been misclassified as having, a
mental or physical impairment that substantially limits
one or more major life activities”).
Sebest has not provided evidence that the leukemia
from which he suffered in the 1980s substantially limited
a major life activity. Declaring leukemia a disability per se
would contravene this court’s “statutory obligation to
determine the existence of disabilities on a case-by-case
basis.” Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 566,
144 L. Ed. 2d 518, 119 S. Ct. 2162 (1999). As the Supreme
Court has explained, “the [ADA] expresses that mandate
clearly by defining ‘disability’ ‘with respect to an individ-
ual,’ 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2), and in terms of the impact of an
impairment on ‘such individual,’ § 12102(2)(A).” Id.; see
also Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 483,
144 L. Ed. 2d 450, 119 S. Ct. 2139 (1999) (noting that
“whether a person has a disability under the ADA is
an individualized inquiry”); Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S.
624, 641-42, 141 L. Ed. 2d 540, 118 S. Ct. 2196 (1998)
App. 38
(declining to consider whether HIV is a per se disability
under the ADA); 29 C.F.R. Pt. 1630, App. § 1630.2(j) (“The
determination of whether an individual has a disability is
not necessarily based on the name or diagnosis of the
impairment the person has, but rather on the effect of that
impairment on the life of the individual.”). Since Sebest
has failed to present evidence that he has a record of an
impairment that substantially limits a major life activity,
he is not disabled under the second definition of disability
provided in the ADA.
Finally, Sebest argues that he was “regarded as”
having a disability by his employer because of the con-
cerns about Sebest’s health expressed by Tsikouris at the
March 25, 1999, board meeting. The Supreme Court has
stated that there are two ways in which an individual can
be regarded as disabled: “(1) a covered entity mistakenly
believes that a person has a physical impairment that
substantially limits one or more major life activities, or (2)
a covered entity mistakenly believes that an actual,
nonlimiting impairment substantially limits one or more
major life activities.” Sutton, 527 U.S. at 489.
As we previously discussed, decisions about Sebest’s
employment were made by the five member school board.
Besides Tsikouris’s comments, Sebest has offered no
evidence that the school board made decisions regarding
Sebest’s employment with any consideration of his health
condition. Therefore, as Sebest has failed to present
evidence that a reasonable jury could find him to be
disabled under the definitions of disability provided in the
App. 39
ADA, we affirm the grant of summary judgment to the
defendants."
Because we affirm the grant of summary judgment to
the Board and Tsikouris, we do not need to consider
whether Sebest sued Tsikouris in his individual or official
capacity.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of
the district court granting summary judgment to the
defendants.
* Sebest asserts that he is also protected under Ohio disability
discrimination law, Ohio Rev. Code § 4112.02. Our decision on Sebest’s
ADA claim is also dispositive of his state law disability claim. Lockard
v. Gen. Motors‘ -p., 52 Fed. Appx. 782, 785 n.2 (6th Cir. 2002) (“This
court’s ruling wi. respect to [plaintiff’s} ADA claim also disposes of her
claim of disability discrimination under Ohio law.”); see also City of
Columbus Civil Serv. Comm'n v. McGlone, 82 Ohio St. 3d 569, 1998
Ohio 410, 697 N.E.2d 204, 206-07 (Ohio 1998) (“The federal Americans
with Disabilities Act .. . is similar to the Ohio handicap discrimination
law. ... We can look to regulations and cases interpreting the federal
Act for guidance in our interpretation of Ohio law.”).
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.