Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Fischer v. United States

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Text

7

confinement, the FMR is obviously punitive. /d. at 424.

“This regulation imposes a forfeiture upon a servicemember

in the absence of any due process or adjudication of guilt.”

Id.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

The decision of the lower court is in direct conflict with

this Court’s decision in Bell v. United States, 366 U.S. 393

(1961). The lower court has applied common-law rules

governing contracts to military pay. And it has sanctioned

the forfeiture of military pay without Due Process_and in

violation of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. The

decision also raises substantial questions about the nature

military jurisdiction. Are servicemembers who are not

entitled to pay or performing military duties still subject to

trial by court-martial? This case presents a rare opportunity to

address both the status-based nature of military pay and the

Due Process protections afforded servicemembers with

respect to it.

The Court of Appeals’ Decision that Military Pay

is Conditioned Upon the Performance of Useful

Military Duties and can be Forfeited Before a

Service Member has been Convicted by a Court-

Martial Conflicts with this Court’s Decision in Bell

v. United States, 366 U.S. 393 (1961).

Bell v. United States, 366 U.S. 393 (1961), involved three

servicemembers who, after their capture by Chinese forces

during the Korean War, became monitors for their captors at

8

their prison camp, wore Chinese military uniforms, and made

propaganda broadcasts on behalf of the Chinese government.

Bell v. United States, 149 Ct. C) 248 (Ct. Cl.-1960). Private

First Class Bell called President Harry Truman a war-monger

and offered to run a tank over his body. /d. at 252. After

they had refused repatriation, they were discharged from the

Army on January 23, 1954. Id.

They then brought suit for pay until their discharge. The

United States argued that they were not entitled to pay

because they had breached their enlistment contract by not

performing military duties. Bell, 366 U.S. at 401. This Court

rejected the government’s argument, upholding the weli-

settled principle that a service member’s pay is “dependent

upon statutory nght.” /d. “If a soldier's conduct falls below

a specified level he is subject to discipline, and his

punishment may include forfeiture of future but not of

accrued pay.” /d.

In reaching its decision, this Court relied upon numerous

court decisions and upon the opinions of the Attomeys

General and Judge Advocates General. Jd. These opinions

uniformly held that servicemembers are entitled to receive the

pay provided by statute, “unless he has forfeited it in

accordance with the provisions of law, whether he has

actually performed military service or not.” 13 Op. Atty.

Gen. 103, 104 (1869).

But in 1951, the Comptroller General responded to an

opinion of the Judge Advocate General of the Army that held

that the forfeiture of pay under the circumstances of this case

constituted illegal pretrial punishment. 30 Comp. Gen. 449

(1951). The Comptroller opined that servicemembers in

Petitioner's situation were no longer in a “full duty” status

and were not entitled to pay unless they were acquitted of

their suspected offenses at court-martial. /d.

9

The opinion of the Comptroller General was codified in

the FMR. Recently, citing the FMR, the Court of Federal

Claims and the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit have

declined to follow their previous decisions cited by this Court

in Bell, and have held that servicemembers who do not

perform useful and productive duties are not entitled to pay

and allowances. Simoy v. United States, 64 Fed. Appx. 745,

746 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Anderson v. United States, 70 Fed.

Appx. 572, 575 (Fed. Cir. 2003). The Federal Circuit has

determined this to be a “settled rule of law.” Simoy, 70 Fed.

Appx. at 575. The Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces

has adopted the holdings of these courts and applied their

decisions to Petitioner's case. “Where Petitioner was not

entitled to payment, nothing could have been forfeited.”

Fischer, 61 M.J. at 420.

The Comptroller General’s opinion, issued ten years

before Bell, should not have survived that decision. But it

has and the Courts of Appeal for the Armed Forces and for

the Federal Circuit have adopted the reasoning from that

opinion that was expressly rejected by this Court in Bell.

This Court should grant the petition because the lower court

has decided a federai question in a way that conflicts with

Bell v. United States.

Il.

The Decision of the Court of Appeals is Erroneous

The Court of Appeals erroneously applied this Court’s

decisions in Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979) and

Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963) in

reaching its decision that the forfeiture of pay by active duty

servicemembers does not constitute illegal pretrial

10

punishment.

Applying the test set out in Bell v. Wolfish, the Court of

Appeals held that the forfeiture of Petitioner’s pay was

“reasonably related to the legitimate Government objective of

not paying people who are not performing duties.” Fischer,

61 M.J. at 420.

“This logic breaks down, however, because a

servicemember whce is later acquitted has performed the same

duties while in pretrial confinement and receives

compensation.” Fischer, 61 M.J. at 424 (Erdmann J.,

dissenting). And the servicemember who is in pretrial

confinement and has not reached his EAS, and who is

performing the same “duties” as the post-EAS

servicemember in the next cell, receives full pay and

allowances. In fact, the only servicemembers who forfeit pay

are those who are later convicted at court-martial. All other

servicemembers are entitled to pay regardless of their EAS.

“This is punishment.” Fischer, 61 M.J. at 424 (Erdmann J.,

dissenting).

Even if the performance of useful duties is not a pretext

for the intentional imposition of illegal pretrial punishment,

an application of this Court’s decision in Kennedy indicates

that the FMR operates as punishment.

The Court of Appeals erroneously applied the seven

factors set out by this Court in Kennedy. Kennedy, 372 U.S.

at 168.

The FMR imposed an affirmative disability on Petitioner.

While he was in confinement, his wife and seven-month-old

son, no longer entitled to government quarters or Petitioner’s

housing allowances, were given what was essentially a one-

day eviction notice by the government.

The Court of Appeals concedes that this “could be

11

viewed as a disability” but concluded that those in

Petitioner’s position “are not entitled to be paid.” Fischer, 61

M.J. at 420. But active duty servicemembers are entitled to

pay. 37 U.S.C. § 204(a)(1); Bell, 366 U.S. at 401. And it is

well settled that, with regard to military compensation, the

President may not diminish what Congress has given. United

States v. Symonds, 120 U.S. 46 (1887); United States v.

Williamson, 90 U.S. 411 (1874). To the extent that the FMR

conflicts with 37 U.S.C. § 204(a)(1) and terminates the pay

that Congress has authorized, it is a nullity. Petitioner was

entitled to pay and the forfeiture of that pay constitutes an

affirmative disability.

2. Historically Regarded as Punishment.

Forfeiture of pay has long been regarded as punishment

and continues to be “the most frequent of all the military

punishments.” WILLIAM WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND

PRECEDENTS 427-28 (2d ed. 1920). In Robertson v. Baldwin,

this Court, while discussing the history of maritime law,

noted that forfeitures, as a means of punishment, have existed

since “the maritime law of the ancient Rhodians, which is

supposed to antedate the birth of Christ by about 900 years.”

Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275 (1897).

In this country, forfeitures were established punishment

by 1668 where the Colonial General Court of Massachusetts

held that any mariner who departed his ship, “shall forfeit all

his wages.” Robertson, 165 U.S. at 287. The punitive

nature and usage of forfeitures by masters and commanders

in this country was perhaps best descnbed by the District.

Court for Pennsylvania in 1806:

The framers of maritime laws, knowing that

seaman are, by the nature of their

employment, subject to peculiar failings and

12

vices, the offspring of unpolished manners and

hardy, rude, and fearless habits, have

calculated their codes for reformation, where

practicable, and for punishment, where this

cannot be effected. Heavy forfeitures,

pecuniary mulcts, and corporal inflictions

(many now obsolete and disused) are to be

found in those laws, frequent and severe.

Watson v. The Rose, 1806 U.S. Dist. Lexis | (D.P.A. 1806).

Forfeitures have always been considered and employed as

punishment for mariners.

The Court of Appeals attempted to avoid the history of

forfeitures as a means of punishment by simply insisting

Petitioner's loss of pay and allowances was not forfeiture.

“Where Petitioner was not entitled to payment, nothing could

have been forfeited.” Fischer, 61 M.J. at 420. But active

duty servicemembers are entitled to pay unti! discharge or

until they have been sentenced at court-martial. 37 U.S.C. §

204(a)(1); Bell, 366 U.S. at 401. Forfeiture is defined as the

“{ljoss of some right or property as a penalty for some illegal

act.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 650 (6th Ed. 1990). The

loss of Petitioner's pay can only be characterized as

forfeiture. This has always been considered punishment for

sailors.

3. Scienter.

The Court of Appeals correctly notes that consciousness

of guilt is not a factor in determining whether to forfeit the

pay of servicemembers in Petitioner’s situation.

4. Retnbution and Deterrence.

The FMR does promote the “traditional aims of

punishment-retribution and deterrence.”” Kennedy, 372 U.S.

at 168-69. In fact, it is difficult to imagine a better form of

13

retribution and deterrence than that provided for by the FMR.

Not only was Petitioner held involuntarily held past his EAS,

he was confined without pay while the government took

ninety-seven days to bring him to court-martial for his guilty

plea. While he was in confinement, his family was evicted

from government quarters and denied Petitioner’s housing

allowance or any means to subsist.

The Court of Appeals held that the FMR is not aimed at

those accused of criminal misconduct but only “applies if a

neutral event occurs—-the person’s EAS date.” Fischer, 61

M.J. at 421. But the FMR does not stop the pay of all

servicemembers whose EAS passes. Only those who are

ultimately convicted at a court-martial are not paid under the

regulation. All other post-EAS servicemembers are paid.

5. Application to Criminal Behavior.

The FMR terminates that pay of servicemembers who are

accused of a crime, past their EAS, in pretrial confinement,

and who are ultimately convicted at a court-martial.

6. Alternative Purpose.

The Court of Appeals held that the FMR’s purpose is not

paying those who are not “providing productive service....”

Fischer, 61 M.J. at 421. But the pay of servicemembers is

status based and not determined by the performance of useful

duties. Bell, 366 U.S. at 401. There can be no non-punitive

purpose for denying pay and allowances to servicemembers

who will later be convicted by a court-martial.

7. Excessiveness.

The Court of Appeals held that the termination of pay and

allowances was not excessive. The Court compared

Petitioner to civilian employees. “In civilian life, pretrial

confinees may lose their jobs and are often not compensated

for the time spent in pretrial confinement.” Fischer, 61 M.J.

at 421. Petitioner is not a civilian. The termination of his

14

pay and allowances was excessive.

The application of this Court’s decisions in Bell v.

Wolfish and Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez indicates the

FMR punishes servicemembers before they have been

convicted by a duly constituted court-martial. The Court of

Appeals’ misapprehension of controlling precedent calls for

an exercise of this Court’s power of supervision. This Court

should grant the petition.

III.

This Issue is Important as the Court of Appeals

has Sanctioned the Creation of a Class of

Servicemembers who are not Paid as

Servicemembers and who do not Perform Military

Duties but Remain Subject to Court-Martial

Jurisdiction.

With more than one million servicemembers currently on

active duty, the issue of whether the pay of these

servicemembers continues to be status based, and under what

conditions they may lose their entitlement to pay, presents an

important federal question. But the Court of Appeals’

apparent rejection of the status-based nature of military pay

also has tremendous implications for the status-based nature

of court-martial junsdiction.

The Constitution conditions the exercise of court-martial

junsdiction on one factor: the military status of the accused.

Solario v. United States, 483 U.S. 435, 439 (1987). The test

for this jurisdiction is whether a person can be regarded as

falling within the term “land and naval forces.”’ Kinsella v.

United States, 361 U.S. 234, 241 (1960). In his opinion

reserving judgment in Kinsella v. Krueger, 351 U.S. 470

(1956), overruled by Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. | (1957),

15

Justice Frankfurter stated that “the Constitution ‘clearly

distinguishes the military from the civil class as separate

communities’ and ‘recognizes no third class which is part

civil and part military—military for a particular purpose or in

a particular situation, and civil for all other purposes and in

all other situations...," Winthrop, Military Law and

Precedents (2d ed. 1896), 145.” Kinsella, 351 U.S. at 481-

482.

The Court of Appeals’ decision has established a third

class of citizens who are military for purposes of court-

martial jurisdiction but civilian in all other respects. Article

2, Uniform Code of Military Justice, confers court-martial

jurisdiction over those receiving pay or allowances and

performing military duties. 10 U.S.C. § 802(c) (2000). By

virtue of his pretrial confinement, Petitioner was no longer

wearing-military uniforms. Further, Petitioner had reached

his EAS and thus his contractual obligation of service had

ended.

At least as far back as Jn re Walker, 2 Am. "»nist 281

(Mass. 1830), servicemembers who committec cnmes shortly

- before their EAS could be retained on active duty past their

EAS for tnal by court-martial. But, until the decision of the

Court of Appeals, no court has ever held that military

jurisdiction continues Over citizens who wear no uniforms,

receive no pay or allowances, perform no military duties, and

have no enlistment contract. This perhaps explains the Court

of Appeals’ companson of Petitioner to similarly situated

federal civilian employees. Fischer,61 M.J. at 419. ' We

note that federal civilian employees may be suspended

without pay upon indictment, regardless of whether there is

pretrial confinement.” Jd.

The Court of Appeals decision has blurted the line

between servicemembers anid civilians. In fact, it is difficult

16

to establish any connection between Petitioner and the

military after his EAS without the status-based determination

that he was oui active duty. But military jurisdiction, like

military pay, is status based. Fischer, 61 M.J. at 423

(Erdmann, J. dissenting).

In holding that military pay is governed by contract

principles of useful performance, rathe1 ‘han the status based

nature of active duty, the Court of Appeals has created a new

class of servicemembers who are not subject to pay or

allowances but remain subject to court martial jurisdiction.

The legality of the Court of Appeals’ creation of this hybrid

class of servicemembers is an important question of federal

law that has not, but should be, decided by this Court. This

Court should grant the petition.

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certioran should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

BRIAN L. MIZER

Lieutenant, JAGC, USNR

Counsel of Record

JASON S. GROVER

Lieutenant Commander, JAGC, USN

Navy-Marine Corps Appellate

Review Activity

716 Sicard St. S.E., Suite 1000

Washington, D.C. 20374- 5047

202/685-7396

la

APPENDIX A

U.S. v. David E. FISCHER

No. 04-0756/MC.

UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE ARMED

FORCES

2005 CAAF LEXIS 1211

October 17, 2005, Decided

NOTICE: [*1] DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED

OPINION

PRIOR HISTORY: CCA 200200303. United States v.

Fischer, 2005 CAAF LEXIS 963 (C.A.A.F., Sept. 2, 2005)

OPINION:

Appellant's petition for reconsideration of the Court's

decision issued on September 2, 2005, denied.

2a

APPENDIX B

UNITED STATES, Appellee v.

David E. FISCHER, Lance

Corporal, U.S. Marine Corps,

Appellant

No. 04-0756

UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE ARMED

FORCES

61 M.J. 415; 2005 CAAF

LEXIS 963

May 3, 2005, Argued

September 2, 2005, Decided

SUBSEQUENT HISTORY: Reconsideration denied by

United States v. Fischer, 2005 CAAF LEXIS 1211 (C.A.A.F.,

Oct. 17, 2005)

PRIOR HISTORY: Crim. App. No. 200200303. Military

Judges: T.A. Daly and M. H. Sitler. United States v. Fischer,

60 M.J. 650, 2004 CCA LEXIS 143 (N-M.C.C.A., 2004)

COUNSEL: For Appellant: Lieutenant Bran L. Mizer,

JAGC, USNR (argued).

For Appellee: Captain Glen R. Hines, USMC (argued);

Colonel William K. Lietzau, USMC (on brief).

3a

JUDGES: EFFRON, J., delivered the opinion of the Court,

in which CRAWFORD and BAKER, JJ., joined.

ERDMANN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which

GIEP. XE, C.J., joined.

OPINIONBY: EFFRON

OPINION:

[*415] Judge EFFRON delivered the opinion of the

Court.

At a general court-martial composed of a military judge

sitting alone, Appellant was convicted, pursuant to his pleas,

of two specifications of indecent acts with a child under the

age of sixteen, in violation of Article 134, Uniform Code of

Military Justice (UCMJ), /0 U.S.C. § 934 (2000). He was

sentenced to a bad-conduct discharge, confinement for

twelve months, and reduction to pay grade E-1. Pursuant to a

pretrial agreement, the [*416] convening authority

suspended all confinement in excess of 270 days. The United

States Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals, sitting

en banc, affirmed the findings and sentence. United States v.

Fischer, 60 M.J. 650 [**2} (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 2004).

On Appellant's petition, we granted review of the

following issue:

WHETHER APPELLANT WAS SUBJECTED

TO ILLEGAL PRETRIAL PUNISHMENT

AND DENIED DUE PROCESS OF LAW

WHEN HIS PAY WAS STOPPED WHILE HE

WAS IN PRETRIAL CONFINEMENT AFTER

THE END OF HIS OBLIGATED SERVICE.

4a

For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the decision of the

Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals.

I. BACKGROUND

A. PRETRIAL AND TRIAL PROCEEDINGS

Under Appellant's enlistment contract, his period of

obligated service ended on June 29, 2001. Eight weeks

earlier, on May 4, Appellant was placed in pretrial

confinement for various sexual offenses with minor females.

In recommending pretrial confinement, Appellant's

commander explained that he considered Appellant a flight

risk because of his upcoming end of obligated service (EAS)

date, June 29.

Appellant was still in pretrial confinement on June 29.

Under applicable military pay regulations, discussed infra,

the Government terminated his entitlement to military pay

and allowances. On July 11, defense counsel notified the

Depot Consolidated Administrative Center that Appellant's

pay had been stopped. Initially, defense [**3] counsel was

informed that Appellant's pay would be reinstated. Later, the

Government advised defense counsel that Department of

Defense (DoD) regulations prohibited reinstatement of

Appellant's pay because he had reached his EAS date and

was in pretrial confinement.

Appellant was convicted and sentenced on August 9,

2001. Appellant was paid for the period of pretrial

confinement before his EAS, but he was not paid for the

forty-one days of pretrial confinement that he served after his

EAS. On appeal, Appellant argues that the termination of his

pay amounted to illegal pretrial punishment in violation of

Article 13, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 813 (2000).

B. PAY REGULATIONS

Sa

By statute, servicemembers who are on active duty are

entitled to the basic pay of the pay grade to which they are

assigned. 37 U.S.C. § 204(a)(1), see Bell v. United States,

366 U.S. 393, 401, 6 L. Ed. 2d 365, 81 S. Ct. 1230 (1961) (a

soldier's entitlement to pay is statutory, not contractual). The

Department of Defense Financial Management Regulations

(DoD FMR) provide implementing rules concerning the

obligation to pay servicemembers. See Paalan v. United

States, 51 Fed. Cl. 738, 745 (2002). [**4] In the course of

determining that Appellant's pay could not be reinstated, the

Depot Consolidated Administrative Center relied upon DoD

FMR, vol. 7A, ch. 1, subpara. 010302.G.4 (2005), ni which

provides: "If a member is confined awaiting court-martial

trial when the enlistment expires, pay and allowances end on

the date the enlistment expires. If the member is acquitted

when tried, pay and allowances accrue until discharge."

nl The Depot Consolidated Administrative Center

cited DoD FMR, vol. 7A, ch. 3, subpara. 030207.D.

This provision is identical to DoD subpara.

010302.G.4, the only difference being that subpara.

030207 appears in Chapter 3, which is entitled "Special

Pays -- Officers Only" as opposed to Chapter 1, which

is entitled "Basic Pay." Though subpara. 030207 was

cited by the Depot Consolidated Administrative

Center, Appellant's brief refers to subpara. 010302, and

the Government's brief refers to subpara. 030207. For

consistency, our discussion will cite to subpara.

010302, but the analysis would be no different for

subpara. 030207.

[**5]

The regulation is consistent with decisions of the

Comptroller General of the United States, n2 the United

States Court of Federal [*417] Claims, and the United

States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Well before

6a

the enactment of the UCMJ, the Comptroller General

determined that a soldier who reached EAS while in pretrial

confinement, and who was later convicted, was not entitled

to be paid subsequent to the EAS while in pretrial

confinement. E.g., Comptroller General McCarl to Maj. E.

C. Morton, United States Army, 11 Comp. Gen. 342 (1932).

In a 1937 decision, the Comptroller General stated:

An enlisted man of the Navy held for trial or for

sentence by court martial after expiration of

enlistment is being held to await the completion

of criminal proceedings against him under

authority of the Articles for the Government of

the Navy. He is no more entitled to pay when so

held after expiration of his enlistment than is a

civilian who is being held for trial on a criminal

offense by the civil authorities, and the fact that

the issuance of his discharge is delayed pending

the conclusion of the proceedings gives him no

right to pay beyond the period for which [**6]

he contracted to serve. The period of retention

for criminal proceedings is no part of the

enlistment contract and the obligation of the

Government . . . is to pay him for the period for

which he contracted to serve, not to pay him for

any period he may be held on criminal charges

after expiration of enlistment, any more than it

would be obligated to pay him after his

enlistment had expired if he were convicted and

sentenced to im™isonment.

Acting Comptroller General Elliot to the Secretary of the

Navy, 17 Comp. Gen. 103 (1937), 1937 U.S. Comp. Gen.

LEXIS 271, at *6-*7 (1937).

Ta

n2 The Comptroller General is the head of the

Government Accountability Office (GAO), formerly

known as the General Accounting Office. See GAO

Human Capital Reform Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-

271, 118 Stat. 811 (2004). The GAO is an independent,

nonpartisan agency in the legislative branch that

reports to Congress on the activities of executive

branch agencies. Frederick M. Kaiser, General

Accounting Office and Comptroller General: A Brief

Overview, in Major Studies and Issue Briefs of the

Congressional Research Service (2000); Frederick C.

Mosher, The GAO: The Quest for Accountability in

American Government 2-3 (1979). A primary duty of

the Comptroller General involves issuance of opinions

on behalf of the legislative branch interpreting

legislation and determining the legality of financial

transactions. See Mosher, supra at 205-06.

[**7]

In 1951, shortly before the UCMJ took effect, the

Comptroller General ruled that the pre- UCMJ prohibition

against pretrial punishment n3 did not require payment of

pretrial confinees held beyond their EAS date:

a>—_—

The said provisions do not require any change in

the rule that the pay and allowances of an

enlisted person whose term of enlistment expires

while he is in confinement, awaiting trial by

court martial, terminate on the date of the

expiration of his term of enlistment unless he is

acquitted, in which event pay and allowances

accrue until he is discharged.

8a

Assistant Comptroller General Yates to the Secretary of the

Army, 30 Comp. Gen. 449 (1951), 1951 U.S. Comp. Gen.

LEXIS 86, at *6 (1951) [hereinafter Yates].

n3 "Nor shall any defendant awaiting trial be made

subject to punishment or penalties other than

confinement prior to sentence on charges against him."

Article of War 16, Manual for Courts-Martial, U.S.

Army (MCM) (1949 ed.), App. 1. “Nor shall any

accused who is confined while awaiting trial be made

subject to punishments or penalties cther than

confinement for any offense with which he stands

charged prior to execution of an approved sentence on

charges against him... and they will not forfeit pay or

allowances during the period of confinement except

pursuant to sentences ordered executed." MCM (1949

ed.), P 19a.

[**8]

In suits brought by pretrial confinees who reached their

EAS while in pretrial confinement against the Government

for pay and allowances for the time in pretrial confinement

past their EAS, tne United States Court of Federal Claims

and its predecessor court have followed the reasoning of the

Comptroller General's decisions, holding that "when an

enlisted person is in confinement awaiting tnal at the time his

term of enlistment expires, his pay and allowances terminate

on the date his enlistment expires unless he is subsequently

acquitted." Moses v. United States, 137 Ct. Cl. 374, 380

(1957); see also Singleton v. United States, 54 Fed. Cl. 689,

692 (2002). But cf. Rhoades v. United States, 668 F.2d 1213,

229 Ct. Cl. 282 (1982); Dickenson v. United [*418] States,

163 Ct. Cl. 512 (1963) (distinguishing the facts and holding

that the Comptroller General's rule did not apply under the

circumstances of the cases).

9a

According to the United States Court of Appeals for the

Federal Circuit, the authority for the military to hold an

enlistee in service after EAS without pay pending court-

martial unless there is an acquittal constitutes a "settled [**9]

rule of law." Simoy v. United States, 64 Fed. Appx. 745, 746

(Fed. Cir. 2003); see also Anderson v. United States, 70 Fed.

Appx. 572, 575 (Fed. Cir. 2003), Dock v. United States, 46

F.3d 1083 (Fed. Cir. 1995).

C. ARTICLE 13

Appellant contends that DoD FMR 010302.G.4, which

was the basis for terminating his pay after he reached his

EAS while in pretrial confinement, violated the Article 13,

UCM, right to be free from illegal pretrial punishment.

Article 13 provides: "No person, while being held for trial,

may be subjected to punishment or penalty other than arrest

or confinement upon the charges pending against him." We

have interpreted Article 13 to prohibit two types of activities:

(1) the intentional imposition of punishment on an accused

prior to trial, i.e., illegal pretrial punishment; and (2) pretrial

confinement conditions that are more ngorous than necessary

to ensure the accused's presence at trial, i.e., illegal pretrial

confinement. See United States v. Inong, 58 M.J. 460, 463

(C.A.A.F. 2003); United States v. McCarthy, 47 M.J. 162,

165 (C.A.A.F. 1997).

Appellant focuses his argument on the illegal pretrial

punishment [**10] prong of Article 13. A violation of this

prong “entails a purpose or intent to punish an accused before

guilt or innocence has been adjudicated." McCarthy, 47 M.J.

at 165. We apply this standard by examining the intent of

detention officials or by examining whether the purposes

served by the restriction or condition are "reasonably related

to a Jegitimate governmental objective." United States v.

King, 61 M.J. 225, 227 (C.A.A.F. 2005) (citing Bell v.

10a

Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 539, 60 L. Ed. 2d 447, 99 S. Ct. 1861

(1979); McCarthy, 47 M.J. at 165).

The question of whether Appellant is entitled to credit for

an Article 13 violation is reviewed de novo. United States v.

Mosby, 56 M.J. 309, 310 (C.A.A.F. 2002). It is a mixed

question of law and fact, and the military judge's findings of

fact will not be overturned unless they are clearly erroneous.

Id. Appellant bears the burden of proof to establish a

violation of Article 13. Id.

II. DISCUSSION

Appellant does not dispute the lower court's finding that

neither Appellant's jailors nor his chain of command intended

to punish Appellant by stopping his pay. Instead, Appellant

asks {**11] this Court to find that the termination of

Appellant's pay, in accordance with DoD FMR 010302.G.4,

amounted to illegal pretrial punishment because it operated

as punishment imposed before trial.

A. REGULATORY PURPOSE

Appellant contends that the implicit purpose of DoD

FMR 010302.G.4 is to punish. Appellant interprets DoD

FMR 010302.G.4 as denying pay only to those who are

guilty, citing the provision that those who are held in pretrial

confinement past their EAS and later acquitted are

reimbursed for the time held without pay. The Department of

Defense regulations, however, are not so narrow.

A servicemember's pay is not terminated just because the

servicemember is placed in pretrial confinement. DoD FMR

010302.F.1 states that pay and allowances accrue to members

in military confinement unless: (a) confined by military

authorities on behalf of civil authorities; (b) pay and

allowances are forfeited by court-martial sentence; or (c) the

term of enlistment expires. A servicemember who is confined

lla

before trial is entitled to “receive pay until the end of his |

enlistment contract, regardless of the ultimate disposition of

the case." Paalan, 51 Fed. Cl. at 745. If a pretrial [**12]

confinee does not reach EAS until after the adjudication of

the case, the pretrial confinee is entitled to pay and

allowances for the time held in pretrial [*419] confinement,

regardless of whether the individual was found guilty or not

guilty.

Moreover, every servicemember's entitlement to pay is

terminated at EAS. See Simoy v. United States, 64 Fed. Appx.

745, 747 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (a service member's entitlement to

pay ceases when his enlistment expires"); Matter of: Courts-

martial Sentences-Records Lost Before Appellate Review-

Appellate Leave Benefits, 1996 U.S. Comp. Gen. LEXIS 442,

at *4-*5 (1996) ("It is a well settled rule that no credit for pay

and allowances accrues to a court-martialed enlisted member

during periods after the expiration of his term of enlistment .

...'). Although Appellant characterizes the regulations as

"terminating a serviceman's pay and allowances at the end of

his enlistment if the serviceman is in pre-trial confinement,"

there is no distinction between a servicemember in pretrial _

confinement and one in any other status. All servicemembers

lose their entitlement to pay and allowances upon expiration

of their enlistment contract.

A servicemember [**13] may be paid after an enlistment

expires in two situations. First, a servicemember who

remains in the service and performs productive work may be

paid. See United States v. Shattuck, 1989 CMR LEXIS 187, at

*5 (A.F.C.M.R. 1989); DoD FMR 010302.G.1. Standard

confinement duties, however, are not considered active-duty

work that would entitle a pretrial confinee held past EAS to

payment. See DoD FMR 010302.G.1; Combs v. United

States, SO Fed. Cl. 592, 594 n.2 (2001); Shattuck, 1989 CMR

LEXIS 187, at *5. The second situation is the focus of

12a

Appellant's concern. If a servicemember held in pretrial

confinement past EAS is later acquitted, the servicemember

is retroactively paid for the time spent in pretrial confinement

past the EAS date. See DoD FMR 010302.G.4. Appellant

assumes that because one group of pretrial confinees (the

group that is later acquitted) is reimbursed, then the other

group (the group that is later convicted) is being punished.

This argument takes too limited a view of the regulations.

Acquittal provides a rational, objective basis for

reimbursement. The Government's policy of retroactively

paying persons held [**14] past their EAS when a charge

has not been sustained at trial does not signify an intent to

punish the other group. In civilian criminal cases, for

example, the Government may be liable for reasonable

attomey's fees and litigation expenses to a prevailing

defendant if the Government position was "vexatious,

frivolous, or in bad faith." Hyde Amendment, Pub. L. No.

105-119, tit. VI, § 617, 111 Stat. 2440, 2519 (codified in

statutory notes at 78 U.S.C. § 3006A (2000)). Although more

limited than the reimbursement provision of DoD FMR

010302.G.4, the Hyde Amendment reflects a policy to

compensate specific individuals because of a flaw in their

prosecution. It is not a policy designed to punish those who

are not compensated. Likewise, we should not assume that

the compensatory provisions of the military pay regulations

reflect an implicit intent to punish an individual in

Appellant's situation.

We note Appellant does not allege that he was held in

pretrial confinement without due process. Appellant was

placed in pretrial confinement in accordance with Rule for

Courts-Martial 305, which contains specific standards and

detailed requirements for notice and an opportunity [**15]

to respond. Following the determination that he should be

13a

held in pretrial confinement, Appellant's pay was terminated

in accordance with a neutral criterion, his EAS.

Appellant does not claim before this Court that the

termination of his pay violated the Thirteenth Amendment's

prohibition against involuntary servitude or that there is a

constitutional right to be paid while in pretrial confinement.

In that regard, we note that federal civilian employees may

be suspended without pay upon an indictment, regardless of

whether there is pretrial confinement. See 5 U.S.C. §

7513(b) (2000). As the Federal Circuit explained:

An indictment . . . will, as a general rule, provide

reasonable cause for an agency to believe that

the employee has committed such a crime, and,

when the nature of the crime alleged relates to

the employee's ability to perform his or her

duties, an agency may summarily suspend the

employee, without pay, pending the outcome of

the criminal proceedings.

[*420] Richardson v. United States Customs Serv., 47 F.3d

415, 419 (Fed. Cir. 1995). By contrast, the pay of military

personnel is not terminated upon the filing or [**16] referral

or charges, nor is it terminated upon pretrial confinement.

The fact that pay is terminated only when pretrial

confinement is combined with a neutral criterion, the

expiration of the term of service, underscores the non-

punitive nature of the policy. When the Government selects

one among many available objective cniteria for terminating

pay, the fact that other criteria could have been used does not

demonstrate that the selected point fails to serve a legitimate

Government objective. Like the indictment date, the EAS

date is a rationai, objective point for termination of pay, and

it is reasonably related to the legitimate Government

14a

objective of not paying people who are not performing

duties.

B. REGULATORY EFFECT

Appellant next argues that even if the regulation is not

implicitly punitive, the policy is punitive in effect under the ©

factors set out by the Supreme Court in Kennedy v. Mendoza-

Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168, 9 L. Ed. 2d 644, 83 S. Ct. 554

(1963). In Mendoza-Martinez, the Court set forth the

following seven factors for use in determining whether an

Act of Congress is punitive or regulatory in nature: (1)

whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or

restraint; [**17] (2) whether it has historically been

regarded as punishment; (3) whether it comes into play only

on a finding of scienter; (4) whether its operation promotes

retribution and deterrence -- the traditional aims of

punishment; (5) whether the behavior to which it applies is

already a crime; (6) whether an alternative purpose to which

it may rationally be connected is assignable for it; and (7)

whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative

purpose assigned. 372 U.S. at 168-69; see Fischer, 60 M.J. at

656-58 (Villemez, J., dissenting).

Our Court has not previously applied the Mendoza-

Martinez factors in the context of conducting a review under

Article 13, Assuming, without deciding, that the Mendoza-

Martinez factors are applicable to Article 13, these factors do

not support a finding that DoD FMR 010302.G.4 is punitive.

1. Affirmative Disability or Restraint

We first take into account whether DoD FMR

010302.G.4 imposes an affirmative disability or restraint. See

Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 168. DoD FMR 010302.G.4

provides for the termination of pay for an individual in

Appellant's situation. Although termination {**18] of pay at

1Sa

EAS could be viewed as a disability, it is difficult to

characterize this as an affirmative disability because

Appellant, and those in his position, are not entitled to be

paid. See Yates; Shattuck, 1989 CMR LEXIS 187, at *4-*5.

2. Historic Perspective

The next factor considers the historical perspective on the

consequence of the regulation. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S.

at 168. Appellant points out that "forfeiture of pay has long

been regarded as punishment." In the present case, there has

been no forfeiture of pay. Where Appellant was not entitled

to payment, nothing could have been forfeited.

Also, while we do not give great weight to negative

legislative history, we note that Congress has amended

provisions of the UCMJ addressing military pay on several

occasions, but has not disturbed the settled interpretation of

the relationship between Article 13 and termination of

military pay upon EAS. See, e.g., Military Justice Act of

1983, Pub. L. No. 98-209, 97 Stat. 1393 (1983) (amending

Article 57, UCMJ, /0 U.S.C. § 857); National Defense

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-

106, tit. XI, 110 Stat. 461-67 (1996) [**19] (amending

Article 57, establishing Article 58b, /0 U.S.C. § 858b),

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998,

Pub. L. No. 105-85, § 581-82, 1073(a)(9)-(11), 111 Stat.

1759, 1900 (1997) (amending Article 58b).

3. Scienter

As previously discussed, the pay of all servicemembers is

terminated when they reach EAS. Consciousness of guilt is

nota [*421) factor in determining whether to implement the

regulation, so the regulation has no role in a finding of

scienter.

l6a

4. Retribution and Deterrence

The fourth factor considers whether DoD FMR

010302.G.4 promotes the traditional aims of punishment --

retribution and deterrence. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at

168. Appellant argues that "it is difficult to imagine a better

form of retribution and deterrence." The policy, however, is

not aimed at all who are accused of a crime and held in

pretrial confinement, but only applies if a neutral event

occurs -- the person's EAS date.

5. Application to Criminal Behavior

The fifth factor requires an evaluation as to whether the

policy is invoked as a result of behavior that is already a.

crime. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 168. [**20]

Appellant argues that this factor is met because the relevant

FMR provisions would not have been triggered if there was

no probable cause to believe Appellant violated the UCMJ.

However, the behavior to which DoD FMR 010302.G

applies is reaching the end of an enlistment contract, which is

notacrime. —

As noted above, a servicemember does not lose

entitlement to pay by virtue of being in pretrial confinement.

The deciding factor is whethei the servicemember has

reached EAS, not whether there is probable cause to believe

the individual violated the UCMJ. See DoD FMR

010302.G.4.

6. Alternative Purpose

The sixth factor considers whether there is a non-punitive

purpose to the regulation. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at

168-69. Here, Appellant reiterates his argument that the

stated purpose of the FMR is pretext, specifically noting that

17a

DoD FMR 010302.G.4 returns pay and aliowances to

servicemembers in Appellant's position who are subsequently

acquitted.

However, there is an alternative, non-punitive purpose of

DoD FMR 010302.G.4. The alternative purpose is that a

servicemember held in pretrial confinement who has passed

EAS and who is not providing productive (**21] service is

not entitled to pay and allowances. As discussed above, EAS

is a neutral, non-punitive point in time which is reasonably

related to the legitimate governmental interest in terminating

the pay of persons who are not performing productive

service.

7. Excessiveness

The final factor considers whether the regulation is

excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned to it.

Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 169. Appellant argues that

the FMR inflicts an excessive toll. We disagree. In civilian

life, pretrial confinees may lose their jobs and are often not

compensated for the time spent in pretrial confinement. The

military's policy to reimburse pretrial confinees who were

mistakenly held is more generous than the Hyde

Amendment, discussed above, that applies in civilian

criminal cases. Although Appellant may undergo personal

financial loss because of the policy reflected in the

regulations, the termination of pay upon the expiration of the

enlistment contract does not signify that the policy is

EXCESSIVE.

III]. CONCLUSION

As Appellant conceded, the brig authorities in this case

had no intent to punish Appellant. The regulation is not

implicitly [**22] punitive or punitive in effect. There is a

legitimate, non-punitive reason behind the regulation. The

18a

application of the policy was reasonable, given that

Appellant reached his EAS and did not perform productive

services. Under an Article 13 claim, we look to whether there

was intent to punish or a punitive effect. If Appellant takes

issue with the propriety of the underlying decisions as a

matter of fiscal law, he must pursue that issue before the

United States Court of Federal Claims.

As a final matter, Appellant also maintains that his Fifth

Amendment rights were violated because he was punished by

virtue of the application of DoD FMR 010302.G.4 without

due process of law. In view of our conclusion that the

regulation has a legitimate non-punitive [*422] purpose,

there is no punishment at issue in this case. Moreover, as

explained above, there was no forfeiture in this case because

Appellant had no entitlement to pay and allowances.

IV. DECISION

The decision of the United States Navy-Marine Corps

Court of Criminal Appeals is affirmed.

DISSENTBY: ERODMANN

DISSENT:

ERDMANN, Judge, with whom GIERKE, Chief Judge,

joins (dissenting):

The majority opinion finds that terminating the pay of a

servicemember [**23] in pretrial confinement, whose term

of service has been involuntarily extended by the

Government, does not constitute illegal pretrial punishment

under Article 13, Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCM5J),

10 U.S.C. § 813 (2000). I would hold that the regulation

requiring the termination of pay under those circumstances is

i9a

punitive in effect and its application constitutes illegal

pretrial punishment.

Fischer was placed in pretrial confinement on May 4,

2001. His enlistment expired on June 29, 2001. Rather than

discharging him from military service at the end of his

enlistment and thereby losing jurisdiction over him, the

Marine Corps understandably extended his active duty status

pending court-martial. nl Fischer remained in confinement

and his pay and allowances were terminated. When Fischer

asked for his pay to be reinstated, the Government responded

that it was prohibited from paying him under Department of

Defense (DoD) regulations.

nl Rule for Courts-Martial 202(c)(1) provides that

a servicemember whose enlistment has expired may be

"held on active duty.” Marine Corps Manual for Legal

Administration § 1005 (31 Aug 99), details this

involuntary extension of active duty and requires that

proper administrative action be taken to effectuate the

extension. While the record in this case contains

references to the fact that Fischer's active duty was

extended, it contains no references to the

administrative action effectuating the extension.

{**24}

One of the basic guarantees under the Due Process

Clause is that a pretrial detainee cannot be punished until

there is a finding of guilt. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 533,

60 L. Ed. 2d 447, 99 S. Ct. 1861 (1979). Article 13 of the

UCM, which prohibits pretrial punishment, has its roots in

this constitutional guarantee. Servicemembers who are

accused of crimes can be placed in pretrial confinement to

ensure that they will appear at trial and to prevent further

misconduct. Rule for Courts-Martial (R.C.M.) 305(h)(2)(B).

When placed in pretrial confinement, Article 13 protects

20a

them from conditions that constitute punishment, penalty or

excess. In this case we are called on to determine whether

terminating the pay and allowances of a servicemember, who

is in pretrial confinement and whose enlistment has been

involuntarily extended, constitutes punishment under Article

13.

The DoD regulation in question, the Department of

Defense Financial Management Regulation (DoD FMR), vol.

TA, ch. 1, 010302.G.4 (May 2005), n2 provides:

4. Confined Awaiting Trial by Court-Martial. If a member is

confined awaiting cor\rt-martial trial when the enlistment

expires, pay and allowances end on the date the [**25]

enlistment expires. If the member is acquitted when tried,

pay and allowances accrue until discharge.

n2 The May 2005 version of subpara. 010302.G.4

is identical to provisions that were in effect during

Fischer's pretrial confinement. See Department of

Defense Financial Management Regulation, vol. 7A,

ch. 3, 030207.D (Feb. 2000).

The majority focuses on the fiscal implications of the

regulation and relies, in part, on opinions of the Comptroller

General and Court of Claims. While these opinions are

iriteresting both from a fiscal and a historical perspective,

they do not provide any binding authority for this court as

they do not interpret Article 13 or the cases from this court or

the U.S. Supreme Court dealing with illegal pretrial

punishment. Nor do those opinions consider the "status"

based nature of court-martial jurisdiction under the UCMJ. It

is the primacy duty of this court to provide such

interpretat ons.

2la

I have no quarrel with the majonty's finding that a

servicemember's entitlement to [*423] pay is [**26]

terminated when his or her enlistment expires. That,

however, is simply not the situation in this case. One of the

mandatory factors underlying court-martial jurisdiction is

that the person to be tried must be subject to the UCMJ. In

other words, the person must be in a "status" in which he or

she is a “person{] . . . subject to" the UCMJ. See Article 2(a),

UCM], 10 U.S.C. § 802(a) (2000). Article 3(a), UCMJ, 10

U.S.C. § 803(a) (2000), makes it clear that personal

jurisdiction is "status based" under the UCMJ: ". . . a person

who is in a Status in which the person is subject to this

chapter . . ." Emphasis added. Holding Fischer beyond his

term of service continued his status as a "servicemember on

active duty” through disposition of the charges against him.

R.C.M. 202(c)(1).

As I read the majority opinion, once a servicemember's

term of enlistment is involuntarily extended, the obligation to

provide pay and allowances is extended as well except in the

event that the servicemember is in pretrial confinement. The

result of this view is that the Government can, solely for its

OWN purposes, imprison a presumptively innocent [**27]

individual, unilaterally continue military status with all its

obligations and duties and at the same time take away one of

the basic rights associated with active duty military status --

the right to pay. n3 I cannot join the majority's view that

these circumstances do not constitute a violation of Article

13.

n3 37 U.S.C. § 204(a)(1) (2000) provides that

members of a uniformed service on active duty are

entitled to pay.

As the majority notes, this court has not previously

applied the criteria of Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372

22a

U.S. 144, 168, 9 L. Ed. 2d 644, 83 S. Ct. 554 (1963), in order

to determine whether conditions of pretrial confinement

violate Article 13. Were | to apply those factors, I would

disagree with the conclusion reached by the majority that the

regulation at issue is not punitive in effect. However, I do not

believe that such an analysis is necessary. In my view, this

court's Article 13 jurisprudence provides a proper framework

for determining whether Fischer was subject to unlawful

[**28] pretrial punishment.

Article 13 prohibits two types of activity: (1) the

intentional imposition of punishment on an accused prior to

trial; and (2) pretrial confinement conditions that are more

rigorous than necessary to ensure the accused's presence at

trial. United States v. Inong, 58 M.J. 460, 463 (C_A.A.F.

2003); United States v. McCarthy, 47 M.J. 162, 165

(C.A.A.F. 1997). The first prong prohibits a purpose or intent

to punish, determined by examining the intent of detention

officials or by examining the purposes served by the

restriction or condition, and whether such purposes are

"reasonably related to a legitimate governmental objective. . .

." Bell, 441 U.S. at 539, McCarthy, 47 M.J. at 165. The

second prevents unduly rigorous circumstances during

pretrial detention. Conditions that are sufficiently egregious

may give rise to a permissive inferen~e that an accused is

being punished, or the conditions may be so excessive as to

constitute punishment. Id.; United States v. James, 28 M.J.

214, 216 (C.M.A. 1989). A determination of whether Fischer

is entitled to relief for unlawful pretrial [**29] punishment

involves independent, de novo review. United States v.

Smith, 53 M.J. 168, 170 (C.A.A.F. 2000), McCarthy, 47 M.J.

at 165; see Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 113, 133 L.

Ed. 2d 383, 116 S. Ct. 457 (1995).

Fischer's active duty military status was extended in

virtually every respect save one -- he was no longer paid. The

23a

sole reason that his pay was stopped, as opposed to other

servicemembers extended on active duty, was that he was in

pretrial confinement. Fischer was in pretrial confinement

because both his Commanding Officer and the Initial Review

Officer found that he constituted a flight msk and a threat to

commit serious misconduct. I find no reasonable relation to a

legitimate government objective served by terminating an

active duty servicemember's pay and allowances because he

or she is in pretrial confinement. Since Fischer's pay would

not have been terminated except for the pretrial [*424]

confinement, its effect on Fischer is obviously punitive.

The regulation's objective, as characterized by the

majority, is that servicemembers held in pretrial confinement

are not considered to be performing “active duty work" and

therefore should not be entitled [**30] to pay. This logic

breaks down; however, because a servicemember who is later ~

acquitted has performed the same duties while in pretrial

confinement and receives compensation. Servicemembers in

pretrial confinement are not automatically excused from

performing useful duties. Military appellate case law is

replete with cases discussing various duties performed by

pretrial confinees. See, e.g., United States v. Nelson, 18

C.M.A. 177, 178-79, 39 C.M.R. 177, 178-79 (1969), United

States v. Palmiter, 20 M.J. 90, 94 (C.M.A. 1985); United

States v. Dvonch, 44 M.J. 531, 533 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App.

1996). Similarly, an active duty servicemember in pretrial

confinement who has not been involuntarily extended

performs those same duties and receives his or her pay and

allowances.

Forfeiting pay traditionally has been regarded as a form

of punishment in the military services. See generally United

States v. Stebbins,61M.J. , (11-18) 61 M.J. 366, 2005

CAAF LEXIS 923 (C.A.A.F. 2005). This regulation imposes

a forfeiture upon a servicemember in the absence of any due

24a

process or adjudication of guilt. The effect of this action as

punishment is illustrated [**31] by how the forfeiture is

linked to the results of trial. If a servicemember in Fischer's

situation is acquitted, he or she is paid retroactively. n4 But if

that person is convicted, there is no pay adjustment. While

the initial termination of pay was based solely on Fischer's

pretrial confinement status, the ultimate termination of his

pay in this situation is based solely on a finding of guilt. This

is punishment.

n4 The majority's conclusion that this payment is

akin to compensation for the accused when the charge

has not been sustained at trial creates a dangerous

precedent. An acquittal in a criminal action does not

mean that the Government was wrong in bringing the

charges, nor should an acquittal entitle an accused to

compensation. It merely means that the court-mar*.al

did not find the accused guilty beyond a reasonable

doubt.

The nexus between the permanent termination of pay and

a finding of guilt raises an additional concern which I believe

further highlights the unlawful nature of this deprivation.

[**32] Congress has delegated to the President the authority

to establish maximum punishments. Article 56, UCMJ, /0

U.S.C. § 856 (2000). Under the Rules for Courts-Martial, the

President has directed that the only authorized punishment

involving a loss of pay is a forfeiture of pay to be accrued.

See R.C.M. 1003(b)(2) and discussion. Additionally,

execution of any punishment to forfeit pay is effective and

executed only after trial. See Article 57, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. §

- 857 (2000). Tying the deprivation of Fischer's pay to his

conviction creates a punishment beyond that authorized by

the UCMJ and the Manual for Courts-Martial, United States

(2002 ed.).

25a

There is no legitimate governmental objective in DoD

FMR 010302.G.4 that outweighs its clear punitive effect, and

the regulation therefore constitutes illegal pretrial punishment

in violation of Article 13. 1 would hold that the regulation is

unenforceable and Fischer is entitled to his full pay and

allowances for the period in question. I therefore dissent.

26a

APPENDIX C

UNITED STATES v. David E.

FISCHER, Lance Corporal (E-3),

U.S. Marine Corps

NMCCA 200200303

UNITED STATES NAVY-

MARINE CORPS COURT OF

CRIMINAL APPEALS

60 M.J. 650; 2004 CCA LEXIS

143

June 30, 2004, Decided

SUBSEQUENT HISTORY: Motion granted by United

States v. Fischer, 60 M.J. 368, 2004 CAAF LEXIS 1072

(C.A.A.F., 2004)

Review granted by United States v. Fischer, 61 M.J. 13, 2005

CAAF LEXIS 155 (C.A.A.F., 2005)

Affirmed by United States v. Fischer, 2005 CAAF LEXIS 963

(C.A.A.F., Sept. 2, 2005)

PRIOR HISTORY: [**1] Sentence adjudged 9 August

2001. Military Judge: M.H. Sitler. Review pursuant to

Article 66(c), UCMJ, of General Court-Martial convened by

Commanding General, Marine Corps Recruit Depot, Eastern

Recruiting Region, Parris Island, SC.

DISPOSITION: The court concluded that the findings and

sentence were correct in law and fact, and that no error

27a

materially prejudicial to the substantial rights of the appellant

was committed.

CORE TERMS: pretrial, confinement, regulation, military,

enlistment, court-martial, servicemember, entitlement,

questioned, active duty, prong, allowances, sentence,

presumption of innocence, military service, duty, forfeiture,

expiration, soldier, legitimate governmental, detainee, grade,

punitive, convenience, stoppage, rigorous, arrest, senior,

punish, appropriate relief

COUNSEL: CDR GEORGE REILLY, JAGC, USN,

Appellate Defense Counsel.

Capt GLEN HINES, USMC, Appellate Government

Counsel.

JUDGES: BEFORE THE COURT EN BANC. RITTER,

Senior Judge, delivered the opinion of the Court in which

DORMAN, Chief Judge, CARVER, Senior Judge, PRICE,

Senior Judge, SUSZAN, Judge, and REDCLIFF, Judge,

concur. VILLEMEZ, Judge, filed a dissenting opinion, with

HARRIS, Judge, joining.

OPINIONBY: RITTER

OPINION: [*650] RITTER, Senior Judge:

A military judge, sitting as a general court-martial,

convicted the appellant, pursuant to his pleas, of two

specifications of indecent acts with a child under the age of

16, in violation of Article 134, Uniform Code of Military

Justice, 1/0 U.S.C. § 934. The appellant was sentenced to a

bad-conduct discharge, confinement for 12 months, and

reduction to pay grade E-1.

28a

We have carefully considered the record of trial, the

appellant's single assignment of error, and the Government's

response. We conclude [**2] that the findings and sentence

are correct in law and fact, and that no error materially

prejudicial to the substantial rights of the appellant was

committed. Arts. 59(a) and 66(c), UCMJ.

[*651] The appellant's pay was terminated pursuant to

Department of Defense regulations upon the expiration of his

enlistment while he was in pretrial confinement. See

Department of Defense Financial Management Regulation

(DODFMR), Volume 7A, PP 010302FIc, G3 and G4. nl At

trial, he asserted that he had a statutory right to military pay

while in pretrial confinement, even after the expiration of his

term of enlistment. See 37 U.S.C. § 204(a)(1). On appeal,

the appellant contends that the military judge erred by

applying this regulation, rather than the statute, in denying

his motion for appropriate relief. .

nl Formerly PP 030206A3, 030207C, and

030207D.

Jurisdiction Regarding Entitlement to Pay

As a preliminary matter, the Government contends that

this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over [**3]

military pay issues. We agree generally with that proposition,

but find that we have jurisdiction to decide the underlying

issue before us.

The jurisdiction of this court is narrowly proscribed by

Congress. See Arts. 62, 66, 69, and 73, UCMJ, see also

Clinton v. Goldsmith, 526 U.S. 529, 535, 143 L. Ed. 2d 720,

119 S. Ct. 1538 (1999)(construing similar language in Article

67(c), UCM, defining the jurisdiction of our superior court).

At issue in this case is our authority under Article 66(c),

UCMS, which provides in part:

29a

In any case reviewed by it, the Court of Criminal

Appeals may act only with respect to the

findings and sentence as approved by the

convening authority. It may affirm only such

findings of guilty and the sentence or such part

or amount of the sentence, as it finds correct in

law and fact and determines, on the basis of the

entire record, should be approved.

Were the appellant making a specific request of this court

to determine his entitlement to back pay under the

administrative regulations, we would be without jurisdiction

to act. Cf. United States v. Webb, 53 M.J. 702, 703 (Army

Ct.Crim.App. 2000)(holding that a Court of Criminal

Appeals does not [**4] have jurisdiction to adjudicate a

claim for retired pay). However, the appellant's motion at

trial claimed the stoppage of his pay constituted unlawful

pretrial punishment. n2 Record at 70, Appellate Exhibit

XX VII. On appeal, he claims that the military judge erred in

denying his motion. Appellant's Bnef of 9 Jun 2003 at 3. An

evaluation of whether the stoppage of the appellant's pay

violated Article 13, UCMJ, is properly within this court's

subject matter jurisdiction. See generally United States v.

Anderson, 49 M.J. 575 (N.M.Ct.Crim.App.

1998 (invalidating brig's procedure of placing all pretrial

detainees facing more than five years confinement in

maximum custody as a violation of Article 13, UCM5J).

n2 In addition, the appellant asserted his period of

unpaid pretrial confinement violated the / 3th

Amendment to the United State: Constitution's

prohibition against involuntary servitude. The military

judge correctly held that 13th Amendment did not

apply to military service. See United States v. Allen,

31 M.J. 572, 635 (N.M.C.M.R. 1990), United States v.

30a

Shy, 10 M.J. 582 (A.C.M.R. 1980). The appellant has

not advanced that argument on appeal.

[**5]

Illegal Pretrial Punishment

Whether a pretrial detainee suffered unlawful punishment

is a mixed question of law and fact that qualifies for

independent review. See United States v. Pryor, 57 M.J. 821,

825 (N.M.Ct.Crim.App. 2003), rev. denied 59 M.J. 32

(C.A.A.F. 2003). The burden of proof is on the appellant to

show a violation of Article 13, UCMJ. See United States v.

Mosby, 56 M.J. 309, 310 (C.A.A.F. 2002). Article 13

prohibits two things: (1) the intentional imposition of

punishment on an accused before his or her guilt is

established at trial, i.e., illegal pretrial punishment, and (2)

arrest or pretrial confinement conditions that are more

rigorous than necessary to ensure the accused's presence at

trial, i.e., illegal pretrial confinement. See United States v.

Inong, 58 M.J. 460, 463 (C.A.A.F. 2003).

The "punishment prong" of Article /3 focuses on intent,

while the "rigorous circumstances" prong focuses on the

conditions of pretrial restraint. See Pryor, 57 M.J. ai 825

(citing United States v. McCarthy, 47 M.J. 162, 165 [*652}]

(C.A.A.F. 1997)). As a detainee's pay status is [**6] nota

condition of the restraint, nor relevant to ensuring presence at

trial, the appellant's claim only implicates the punishment

prong of Article 13. To determine if the stoppage of the

appellant's pay violated the punishment prong of Article 13,

we must determine whether this pretrial action was intended

to be punishment and whether it furthered a legitimate

governmental objective. See Anderson, 49 M.J. at 576, see

generally Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 538-39, 60 L. Ed. 2d

447, 99 §. Ct. 1861 (1979).

3la

1. There was no intent to punish the appellant.

We find that the military judge's findings of fact on this

issue are fully supported by the record, and adopt those

findings here. Record at 89; Appellate Exh?dit XXXVI. The

record is clear, from the appellant's own evidence submitted

in support of the motion, that there was no punitive intent:

behind the stoppage of his pay. To the contrary, when the

trial defense counsel first inquired of brig staff about the

status of the appellant's pay, the staff indicated that the

appellant should have been receiving pay, and that it would

be restarted. Only after researching the applicable regulations

did the staff inform the trial defense [**7] counsel that the

appellant could not be paid. We agree with the military judge

that the local authorities were merely carrying out the

regulation, and not attempting to punish the appellant.

2. The regulation does not operate as punishment.

We then turn to the question of whether the DODFMR

provisions at issue further a legitimate governmental interest.

Three subparagraphs of P 010302 of the DODFMR operate

to deny pay to service members in the appellant's situation:

010302. Unauthorized Absence and Other Lost

Time

F. Military Confinement

1. General. Pay and allowances

accrue to a member in military

confinement except when:

32a

c. The term of enlistment

expires. See subparagraph 010302.G

below.

G. Term of Enlistment Expires

3. Enlistment Expires Before Trial. An enlisted

member retained in the Military Service for the

purpose of trial by court-martial is not entitled to

pay for any period after expiration of the

enlistment unless acquitted or the charges are

dismissed, or the member is retained in or

restored to a full-duty status.

4. Confined Awaiting Trial by Court-Martial. If

[**8] a member is confined awaiting court-

martial trial when the enlistment expires, pay

and allowances end on the date the enlistment

expires. If the member is acquitted when tried,

pay and allowances accrue until discharge.

By statute, service members on active duty are entitled to

the basic pay at the pay grade to which they are assigned. See

37 U.S.C. § 204(a})(1). As the appellant correctly points out,

nothing in the statute expressly prohibits a service member

who has been extended involuntarily to secure court-martial

jurisdiction from receiving basic pay. See Paalan v. United

States, 51 Fed. Cl. 738, 744-745 (2002). However,

regulations may supplant the military's liability to pay active-

duty service members in certain situations, such as pretrial

confinement. /d. (citing Dock v. United States, 46 F.3d

1083, 1091-92 (Fed. Cir. 1995)). Whether the statute

“trumps” the regulation, or the regulation is an authorized

implementation of statutory authority, is a question outside

33a

the proper purview of this court. The appellant may seek

relief on this basis, if he chooses, from the Board for

Correction of Naval Records under [**9] /0 U.S.C. § 1552,

and, if he deems necessary, from the United States Court of

Federal Claims under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491, ora

United States District Court under the Little Tucker Act, 28

U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2). See Keys v. Cole, 31 M.J. 228, 234

(C.M.A. 1990); United States v. Webb, 53 M.J. at 704.

For our purposes, it is sufficient to evaluate the purpose

of the applicable DODFMR [*653] provisions, which is

evident from the text and the overall goal of P 010302. The

military, like any other executive branch agency, has a duty

to spend its financial resources wisely. This regulation denies

payment to those service members who do not continue to

serve in a full duty status and provide productive service in

furtherance of the military mission, whether it is because they

have commenced an unauthorized absence, incapacitated

themselves as a result of certain diseases, or are being held in

pretrial confinement past the end of their active obligated

service pending trial by court-martial. We find this to be a

legitimate governmental interest, not punitive in nature, and

[**10] that the military judge properly denied the appellant's

motion for appropriate relief under Article 13, UCMJ. The

appellant's assignment of error is without merit.

Conclusion

We therefore affirm the findings and sentence, as

approved by the convening authonty.

CHIEF JUDGE DORMAN, Senior Judge CARVER,

Senior Judge PRICE, Judge SUSZAN, and Judge

REDCLIFF concur.

DISSENTBY: Villemez

34a

DISSENT: VILLEMEZ, Judge (dissenting):

Numerius, the governor of Narbonensis, was on

trial before the Emperor [Julian], and contrary to

the usage in criminal cases, the trial was public.

Numerius contented himself with denying his

guilt, and there was not sufficient proof against

him. His adversary, Delphidius, "a passionate

man," seeing that the failure of the accusation

was inevitable, could not restrain himself, and

exclaimed, "Oh, illustrious Caesar! If it is

sufficient to deny, what hereafter will become of

the guilty?” to which Julian replied, “If it

suffices to accuse, what will become of the

innocent?" Rerum Gestarum, L.X VIII, c.1.

Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 455, 39 L. Ed. 481, 15

S. Ct. 394 (1895).

This case and its proper judicial resolution revolve

around three seemingly simple, fundamental [**11] concepts

and principles: the jurisdiction of this court to consider the

appellant's plea of error, the appellant's military status, and--

most basic of all to our criminal justice system in this

country, both in and out of the military services--the almost-

sacred principle of the presumption of innocence. I

respectfully disagree with the way the majority of this court

has chosen to apply these concepts to the facts and

circumstances of this case. I believe that the appellant is

entitled to appropriate relief, because the termination of his

statutonily-based military pay, merely because he was in

pretrial confinement beyond his original "term of

enlistment” upon the expiration of his tour of active service

(EAS), violates Article 13, UCMJ, which prohibits the

35a

pretrial "punishment or penalty other than arrest or

confinement... ." (Emphasis added).

Jurisdiction

Under the duties and responsibilities given us by Article

66(c), UCMJ, this court may only "affirm such findings of

guilty and the sentence or such part or amount of the

sentence, as it finds correct in law and fact and determines,

on the basis of the entire record, should be approved.” In

Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 142, 97 L. Ed. 1508, 73 S. Ct.

1045 (1953), [**12] the Supreme Court states: "The military

courts, like the state courts, have the same responsibilities as

do the federal courts to protect a person from the violation of

his constitutional nghts." While in United States v. Tardif,

57 M.J. 219, 223 (C.A.A.F. 2002), our senior court

concludes: "Our Court has consistently recognized the broad

power of the Courts of Criminal Appeals to protect an

accused. We have consistently recognized that the charter of

Courts of Criminal Appeals on sentence review is to 'do

justice.” (Internal citations omitted). Thus, as the Supreme

Court observes in Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114, 120,

90 L. Ed. 567, 66 S. Ct. 423 (1946): "Judicial review may

indeed be required by the Constitution.” (Citation omitted).

In Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 143, 52 L. Ed. 714, 28

S. Ct. 441 (1908)(quoting Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 6

Wheat, 264, 404, 5 L. Ed. 257{1821), the Supreme Court

reasons:

"It is most true that this court will not take

jurisdiction if it should not; but it is equally true

that it must take jurisdiction if it should. The

judiciary cannot, as the [*654] legislature may,

avoid a measure because it approaches the

confines of the Constitution. We cannot pass

[**13]} it by because it is doubtful. With

36a

whatever doubts, with whatever difficulties, a

case may be attended, we must decide it, if it be

brought before us. We have no more right to

decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is

given, than to usurp that which is not given. The

one or the other would be treason to the

Constitution. Questions may occur which we

would gladly avoid, but we cannot avoid them.

All we can do is to exercise our best judgment,

and conscientiously perform our duty."

See also Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 483-84, 14 L.

Ed. 2d 22, 85 S. Ct. 1116 (1965).

The majority opinion in this case correctly establishes the

jurisdiction of this court to review and rule on the trial

judge's denial of the appellant's court-martial motion

claiming the stoppage of his pay constituted unlawful

punishment applied pretrial, in violation of Article 13,

UCM J. I disagree, however, with the general conclusion

reached in the majority opinion that it is beyond this court's

proper purview to determine whether the statute establishing

a servicemember’s pay “trumps” the Department of Defense

Financial Management Regulation (DODFMR) at Volume

7a, P 030207, or if that DODRMR provision cutting [**14]

off the pay of a post-EAS pretrial confinee is an authorized

implementation of statutory authority. I do not believe that

answering that statutory-construction question is necessary

per se in this case, because the clear effect of the questioned

DODFMR provision is the creation, pretrial, of an illegal or,

at the very least, an improper punishment condition. If in

different circumstances the resolution of that question

becomes necessary in determining whether an appellant had

been subjected to an action with adverse constitutional-nghts

implications, this court does have the authority to make that

37a

determination, simply in the context of remedying the

adverse impact on an appellant. nl Such is not the case

herein, however, as the questioned DODFMR provision

implodes under the excessive weight of its own internal

illogicalness.

nl In regards to the issue or potential issue of "the

interplay between pay mandating (or limiting) statutes

and pay administrating regulations,” the appellant

notes and develops the point that when Congress grew

concemed about some military members continuing to

receive active duty pay and allowances while serving

extended periods of post-trial confinement, statutory

action and not mere regulatory action was taken to

effect a change. Appellant's Brief of 9 Jun 2003 at 8-

le.

[**15]

Military Status

There is no issue with a servicemember being retained

beyond his or her EAS for the purpose of facing a court-

martial for an offense or offenses alleged to have occurred

before the expiration of his or her active-duty enlistment

period. n2 To borrow a phrase, when done correctly it is an

“altogether fitting and proper" procedure by which to ensure

the integrity of the military justice system. What "legally"

happens when this is done is that the suspected or accused

servicemember is involuntarily extended on active duty,

never actually being permitted to separate or leave active-

duty, despite the passing of his EAS or contractual end-of-

enlistment date. This is a permissible action, because

enlistment in the military--while a contract--is much more in

context and effect than a normal commercial contract. It

creates a status that is not affected by a breach of that

contract.

38a

n2 For guidance on extending a servicemember

beyond his or her EAS, see MILPERSMAN, art. 1160-

050. See also Department of Defense (DOD) Directive

5154.29: DOD Pay and Allowances Policy and

Procedures; and DOD Financial Management

Regulation, DOD 7000.14-R, Volume 7A, Military

Pay Policy and Procedures - Active Duty and Reserve

Pay.

[** 16]

The Supreme Court long ago established the principle

that entry into military service effects a definite and

discernible change of status, when it concluded:

Enlistment is a contract; but it is one of those

contracts which changes the status; and, where,

that is changed, no breach of the contract

destroys the new status or relieves from the

obligations which its existence imposes.

By enlistment the citizen becomes a soldier.

His relations to the State and the public are

changed. He acquires anew [*655] status, with

correlative rights and duties; and although he

may violate his contract obligations, his status as

a soldier is unchanged.

In re Grimley, 137 U.S. 147, 151-52, 34 L. Ed. 636, 11 S. Ct.

54 (1890). Just as clearly established is the principle that the

military status of a servicemember does not terminate by the

mere appearance of a specific date on the calendar, and it

certainly does not end automatically at a servicemember's

EAS.

39a

Thus, the individual, despite the passing of his or her

original "contractual" discharge date, remains on active duty

and subject to in personam jurisdiction, until properly

separated. Providing guidance on this issue, our senior

[**17] court in United States v. Melanson, 53 M.J. 1, 2

(C.A.A.F. 2000), held that military jurisdiction terminates

only upon the delivery of a valid discharge certificate, a final

accounting of pay, and completion of the clearing process

required under the appropriate service regulations to separate

one from the military service. n3 The Court of Appeals for

the Armed Forces, then the Court of Military Appeals, in

United States v. Poole, 30 M.J. 149, 151 (C.M.A. 1990)

stated:

Despite any prior intimation to the contrary, .. .

we now hold that jurisdiction to court-martial a

servicemember exists despite delay -- even

unreasonable delay -- by the Government in

discharging that person at the end of an

enlistment and that no "constructive discharge"

results when a servicemember is retained on

duty beyond the end of an enlistment.

(Internal citation omitted). See also United States v.

Williams, 53 M.J. 316, 317 (C.A.A.F. 2000); United States v.

King, 42 M.J. 79, 80 (C.A.A.F. 1995), United States v.

Batchelder, 41 M.J. 337 (C.A.A.F. 1994); United States v.

King, 27 M.J. 327, 329 (C.M.A. 1989); [**18] United States

v. Howard, 20 M.J. 353 (C.M.A. 1985); United States v.

Wheeley, 6 M.J. 220(C.M.A. 1979).

n3 A DD 214 is an individual's discharge

certification, and the most common type of proof of

military service. It has been issued to veterans

discharged from all branches of the military service

since 1950. In addition to personal information, such

40a

as one's name, social security number, and date of

birth, it includes all relevant service dates, such as

entry and separation dates. Among other things, it also

lists net active service time, branch of service, type of

discharge received, and any time lost due, for instance,

to periods of unauthorized absence. See

http://www. valaro.com/gy/coe/id49_m.him.

In the case of Dickenson v. Davis, 245 F.2d 317, 319

(10th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 918, 2 L. Ed. 2d 278,

78 S. Ct. 349 (1958), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth

Circuit states: "Service in the military, whether by enlistment

or otherwise, creates a status [**19] which is not and cannot

be severed by breach of contract unfortified by a proper

authoritative action." Thus, the question is whether in this

case, the "breach of contract” has been fortified, or not, "by a

proper authoritative action." /d. :

Entitlement to Pay

In his Brief, the appellant does an excellent job in

establishing and explaining the statutory basis for a

servicemember's entitlement to pay. All of which basically

boils down to the fact that a servicemember is entitled to a

base pay calculated on his or her pay grade and time in

service. With certain well-established exceptions--such as the

withholding of forfeitures properly awarded at a disciplinary

proceeding--the individual continues to be so entitled to his

or her pay until properly discharged, as noted above, and that

is based solely on his or her status as an active-duty

servicemember, not on the type or quality of his or her actual

performance of duty.

In Bell v. United States, 366 U.S. 393, 401-02, 6 L. Ed.

2d 365, 81 S. Ct. 1230 (1961), the Supreme Court states:

4la

A soldier's entitlement to pay is dependent upon

statutory right. In the Armed Force, as

everywhere else, there are good men and rascals,

courageous {**20] men and cowards, honest

men and cheats. If a soldier's conduct falls below

a specified level he is subject to discipline, and

his punishment may include the forfeiture of

future but not of accrued pay. But a soldier who

has not received such a punishment from a duly

constituted court-martial is entitled to the

statutory pay and allowances of his grade [*656]

and status, however ignoble a soldier he may be.

(Footnotes omitted). In Bell, the Supreme Court quotes

affirmatively from an almost-100-year-old opinion of the

Attorney General:

"In the naval, as in the military service, the nght

to compensation does not depend upon, nor is it

controlled by, ‘general principles of law’; [sic] it

rests upon, and is governed by, certain statutory

provisions or regulations made in pursuance

thereof, which specially apply to such service.

These fix the pay to which officers and men

belonging to the Navy are entitled; and the rule

to be deduced therefrom is that both officers and

men become entitled to the pay thus fixed so

long as they remain in the Navy, whether they

actually perform service or not, unless their right

thereto is forfeited or lost in some one of the

modes prescribed [**21] in the provisions or

regulations adverted to." 15 Op. Atty. Gen. 175,

176. -

42a

Bell v. United States, 366 U.S. at 403-04. The "modes

prescribed in the provisions or regulations" referred to above

as proper and legitimate methods to take away a

servicemember's entitled pay seem to be such things as the

withholding of pay forfeited by a court-martial sentence, or

pay for days during which the individual was absent without

proper authority from his or her unit. n4 That the post-EAS-

pay regulation might be included in that group will be

addressed below.

n4 See generally Bell v. United States, 366 U.S.

393, 6 L. Ed. 2d 365, 81 S. Ct. 1230 (1961), Cowden

v. United States, 600 F.2d 1354, 220 Ct. Cl. 490

(1979); Dickenson y. United States, 163 Ct. Cl. 512

(1963); and Walsh v. United States, 43 Ct. Cl. 225

(1908).

Post-EAS-Entitlement to Pay

In Dickenson v. United States, 163 Ct. Cl. 512, 519

(1963), the Court of Claims found that: "In the absence

[**22] of the issuance of a discharge to the plaintiff by the

Amy, his status as a soldier was not affected in any way by

the expiration of the term of his enlistment... ." That court

went on to conclude that the servicemember's entitlement to

the statutory pay and allowances of his grade and status

"continues even though he is placed in arrest or confinement

for trial on court-martial charges." Id. at 520-2] (emphasis

added). The pivotal point for the court--the lynchpin of its

decision--was the fact that the plaintiff was held in the

military service beyond his EAS for the convenience of the

Government, which, thus, entitled him to his pay, despite the

expiration of his contracted enlistment. Id. at 514.

In this case, almost by definition, the appellant also was

extended on active duty for the convenience of the

Government; for I do not believe anyone would argue it was

43a

for the appellant's convenience. Likewise, there is no debate

that the appellant, when extended on active duty to face

disciplinary action, continued to be entitled to his statutory-

based pay, as determined by his pay grade and number of

years of service in the Marine Corps. [**23] The only real

issue is whether the passing of the appellant's now-

eviscerated EAS date served to legitimately end his total pay

entitlement, solely due to his residence in pretrial

confinement. The majority concludes with a "Yes," while I

reason "NO" to be the correct answer.

Prohibited Pretrial Punishment

Article 13, UCMJ:

No person, while being held for trial, may be

subjected to punishment or penalty other than

arrest or confinement upon the charges pending

against him, nor shall the arrest or confinement

imposed upon him be any more rigorous than the

circumstances required to insure his presence,

but he may be subjected to minor punishment

during that period for infractions of discipline.

The confiscation of the appellant's entire pay entitlement,

due se!ety to his post-EAS pretrial confinement, violates the

provisions of Article 13, UCMJ, both as an improper

punishment and as an improper penalty, which is defined as a

"punishment imposed on a wrongdoer, especially in the form

of imprisonment or fine." n5

n5 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1153 (7th ed.

1999).

[**24]

{[*657] The majority opinion focuses on its conclusion

that only one of the two prongs of the illegal pretrial

44a

punishment prohibition of Article ]3--the "punishment"

prong--applies in this case. Before addressing that prong, I

wonder why it cannot additionally be argued that the second

prong, as it relates to pretrial confinement conditions that are

more rigorous than necessary to ensure an accused's presence

at trial, is applicable to this case as well? Certainly taking

away all of a pretrial confinee's pay is a condition more

rigorous than necessary to ensure his or her presence at trial.

Is not locking up the individual sufficient to ensure presence

at trial, for money would only aid in his possible absence

from trial if he were free to move about as desired?

Addressing the perhaps more cogent aspect of the issue,

the majority opinion looks at the “punishment prong" of the

Article 13 prohibition too literally and technically. Perhaps,

as Albert Einstein said: "This is too difficult for a

mathematician. It takes a philosopher." n6 As the Court of

Claims reasons in Cowden v. United States, 220 Ct. Cl. 490,

499, 600 F.2d 1354, 1359 (1979): “Retention without pay is a

kind [**25] of punishment. Such was not the intent of

Congress in enacting the military pay statutes or the Uniform

Code of Military Justice."

n6 Profess >r Einstein was referring to the

preparation of his income tax return. See Albert

Einstein, Fort Liberty: Using the First Amendment to

Protect the Second (visited 22 Jun 2004) <

http://www.fortliberty.org/quotes/quotes-taxes.shtmI>.

The majority opinion in this case centers on the vanilla

intent of the brig personnel and local authorities in merely

carrying out the mandate of the relevant regulation in cutting

off the appellant's pay at his EAS, solely due to his being

held in pretrial confinement. The string, however, must

further be pulled. The just-following-orders explanation is

but a deflection, not a "defense," in this case, as the

45a

Government is the Government. If the trail leads back to an

unconstitutional effect resulting from the implementation of

the questioned regulation, such must surely override the

purest of intentions.

The majority opinion narrows the consideration to the

“punishment prong" of Article 13, UCMJ, and, to support

{**26] its conclusion that there was no requisite intent to

punish the appellant, affirmatively cites both Bell v. Wolfish,

44] U.S. 520, 60 L. Ed. 2d 447, 99 S. Ct. 1861 (1979) and

United States v. Anderson, 49 M.J. 575 (N.M.Ct.Crim.App.

1998), concluding both that in the appellant's case there was

no specific intent by local authorities to punish the appellant

and that the questioned regulation serves to further a

legitimate governmental interest. Concerning the first aspect,

the majority opinion holds that the local authorities were

merely carrying out the regulation, with no personal intent to

"punish" the appellant. Regarding the latter factor, the

majority opinion finds that, as a pretrial confinee past his

EAS, the appellant was not serving in the "full-duty status"

required by the regulation for one past his or her original

EAS to be continued to be entitled to his or her statutorily-

based pay.

As mentioned, the majority opinion herein looks to this

court's prior opinion in Anderson for guidance in considering

the issue of pretrial punishment. I would urge a closer

reading of Anderson, especially footnote 2 at page 577,

where this court, in considering the "intent" factor, [**27]

states: "Although we don't suggest that this was the intention

of the policy, we are also concerned about the policy's

coercive effect on pretrial confinees. It places considerable

pressure on them... ."

46a

Additionally, as also mentioned above, the majority

opinion cites Bell v. Wolfish. In that case, the Supreme Court

concludes:

Thus, if a particular condition or restriction of

pretrial detention is reasonably related to a

legitimate governmental objective, it does not,

without more, amount to "punishment."

Conversely, if a restriction or condition is not

reasonably related to a legitimate goal - if it is

arbitrary or purposeless - a court permissibly

may infer that the purpose of the governmental

action is punishment that may not

constitutionally be inflicted upon detainees qua

detainees. n7

[*658] Bell, 441 U.S. at 539, (internal citation and footnote

omitted). See also United States v. McCarthy, 47 M.J. 162,

165 (C.A.A.F. 1997) and United States v. James, 28 M.J. 214

(C.M.A. 1989).

n7 "Qua: in the capacity of ... ." BLACK'S LAW

DICTIONARY 1252 (7th ed. 1999).

(**28]

In providing this guidance, in Bell, 441 U.S. at 537, the

Supreme Court was borrowing from its prior decision in

Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69, 9 L.

Ed. 2d 644, 83 S. Ct. 554 (1963), where the Court had

previously reasoned:

The punitive nature of the sanction here is

evident under the tests traditionally applied to

determine whether an Act of Congress is penal

or regulatory in character, even though in other

cases this problem has been extremely difficult

47a

and elusive of solution. Whether the sanction

involves an affirmative disability or restraint,

whether it has historically been regarded as a

punishment, whether it comes into play only on

a finding of scienter, whether its operation will

promote the traditional aims of punishment -

retribution and deterrence, whether the behavior

to which it applies ‘s already a crime, whether an

alternative purpose to which it may rationally be

connected is assignable for it, and whether it

appears excessive in relation to the alternative

purpose assigned are all relevant to the inquiry,

and may often point in differing directions.

Absent conclusive evidence of congressional

intent as to the penal nature of a statute, [**29]

these factors must be considered in relation to

the statute on its face. Here, although we are

convinced that application of these criteria to the

face of the statutes supports the conclusion that

they are punitive, a detailed examination along

such lines is unnecessary, because the objective

manifestations of congressional purpose indicate

conclusively that the provisions in question can

only be interpreted as punitive.

(Internal citations and footnotes omitted).

When we consider the facts of this case alongside these

criteria, we may only conclude that the effect of the no-post-

EAS-pay-for-pretrial-detainees regulation is clearly pretrial

punishment and a violation of basic due process. First, the

forfeiture of one's entire pay and allowances is and “has

traditionally been regarded as a punishment." Second, it is

automatic at the arrival of the pretrial detainee’s original

EAS, a date already neutered by the individual having been

48a

involuntarily extended on active duty for the convenience of

the Government, so that he or she might be processed for

disciplinary action. Thus, it is automatic, taking effect prior

to any guilt-determinative judicial action, and not coming

{**30] “into play only on a finding of scienter." Third, the

deprivation of income due to an artificial status being placed

on a pretrial detainee does not "promote the traditional aims

of punishment - retribution and deterrence." Fourth, the

“behavior to which it applies"--merely being in pretrial

confinement after one’s now-meaningless EAS--is not

“already a crime.” Fifth, there is no "alternative purpose to

which it may rationally be connected... ." Kennedy, 372

U.S. at 168-69. And, if | may be so very presumptuous as to

offer a sixth factor: It just does not appear to be

"fundamentally fair."

Presumption of Innocence

In tracing the history of the principle of the "presumption

of innocence," in Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453-

56, 39 L. Ed. 481, 15 S. Ct. 394 (1895), the Supreme Court

offers, as the starting point for its lengthy historical review of

the principle: "Greenleaf traces this presumption to

Deuteronomy, and quotes Mascardus De Probationibus to

show that it was substantially embodied in the laws of Sparta

and Athens." Jd. at 454. In focusing on this country's

application of the concept, the Court states: "The principle

that there [**31] is a presumption of innocence in favor of

the accused is the undoubted law, axiomatic and elementary,

and its enforcement lies at the foundation of the

administration of our criminal law." Id. at 453.

Thus, the "presumption of innocence" is such an accepted

and basic principle in our judicial system in this country that

little needs to be said about it as it applies to this case, except

to offer a clarification of the Supreme Court's pronouncement

49a

concerning the concept in Bell, which has been affirmatively

cited by both the majority opinion in (*659] this case and in

this dissent above. In Bell, the Court, after reviewing the

questioned physica} conditions involved in a particular,

challenged pretrial confinement circumstance, which had

been attacked, in part, as a violation of the presumption of

innocence, concludes that the principle "has no application to

a determination of a pretrial detainee during confinement

before his trial has even begun." Bell, 44] U.S. at 533.

The nature of the due-process violation is decidedly

different in this case, to the point that, I believe, the

presumption of innocence does have an "application" to this

case [**32] and the adverse affects on the appellant of the

questioned, pay-depriving regulation. In Bell, physical

conditions of the questioned pretrial confinement were being

challenged. As noted above, the Court held that the issue is

whether the challenged condition of pretrial confinement

was, in fact, punishment--and, thus, improper--or whether it

is "reasonably related to a legitimate governmental objective

....' Id. at 539. In this case, we are not considering a

physical condition of the appellant's pretrial confinement,

such as the sleeping arrangements of detainees, which was

the genesis of the challenge in Bell, along with other

conditions of confinement and management practices. In this |

case, we are examining the validity of the adverse impact of a

condition separate from, but superimposed on the appellant's

pretrial confinement, to the extent that it becomes improper

"punishment" in violation of Article 13, UCMJ, in that it is

not “reasonably related to a legitimate governmental

objective.” Id.

Legitimate Governmental Objective

To completely cut off one’s statutory pay entitlement, due

solely to being in pretrial confinement, after the individual's

50a

[**33] now-rendered-meaningless original EAS, serves no

legitimate governmental objective. To say that the individual

is no longer in the "full-duty” status required by the

questioned regulation to entitle one to his or her statutory pay

and allowances, because a now-meaningless date passes, is

artificial and appears to be without sound logic. As discussed

above, the pretrial detainee's original EAS is meaningless,

because the Government, for its convenience, involuntarily

extended him or her on active duty--thus rendering his EAS

date a nullity--for the purpose of facing disciplinary

proceedings. No one debates the continued entitlement of the

individual to his or her statutory pay after being so extended

on active duty. No one even questions the individual's

continued pay entitlement after being placed in pretrial

confinement. However, all supposedly changes when the

individual's now-meaningless EAS pops up on the calendar.

I believe this to be a problem, because: (a) there is no

meaningful change in the individual's status at his or her

original EAS, and (b) he or she is being hit with improper

disparate--and perhaps harsh--treatment for no valid reason.

The individual, [**34] extended on active duty past his or

her original, now-meaningless EAS date, is in the location

and "fully" performing the "duty" assigned to him or her,

which are exactly the same as the day before, when he or she

was still entitled to pay. Additionally, the now-pay-deprived

individual is in the same place doing the same duties as the

still-being-paid pre-EAS pretrial detainee in the next cell.

And the logic and justification for this disparate treatment is

what? And the real difference between the two? Perhaps it

lies in one being “smarter” then the other, in that he or she

had the "foresight" to commit his or her alleged offense

earlier in his or her enlistment?

Improper Adverse Consequences

Sla

Before ending this consideration with a list of adverse

consequences that render this questioned regulation a

violation of the appellant's due-process rights, the

counterpoint is made that a civilian does not get paid by the

state for being in pretrial confinement. While that is a true

statement as far as it goes, it does not apply to the facts of

this case. For a servicemember the Government is his or her

employer. If a salaried civilian employee is placed in pretrial

confinement, he [**35] or she is entitled to a bail hearing

and normally would continue to receive his or her salary,

until actually fired for an inability to come to work. For a

servicemember in the appellant's circumstances, the "firing"

and end of employment--and logical end of one's [*660] pay

entitlement--comes only with the awarding of a punitive

discharge at the conclusion of the court-martial proceedings.

The following adverse consequences of the questioned

pay-depriving regulation render it an improper pretrial

punishment in violation of Article 13, UCMJ, and a violation

of the appellant's right to the due process of law:

-- The questioned regulation is arbitrary and

capricious, in that it aetificially and

automatically impases a total forfeiture of

statutorily-based pay and allowances, without

any meaningful change in status; and as such, it

is not reasonably-related to a legitimate

governmental objective; forfeitures may only be

imposed as part of a legitimately awarded

sentence;

-- It violates the basic principle of the

presumption of innocence, and is not "saved" by

the provision that returns all of the pretrial

money so withheld upon an acquittal at court-

martial; as likely hardship [**36] created by this

52a

artificially-imposed forfeiture of all pay and

allowances may not be capable of repair, such

as: adverse consequences and hardships for the

appellant's family, the repossession of the

appellant's property for inability to meet

payment schedules; inability to hire, if desired,

civilian counsel for court-martial representation;

ng

-- The potential to place improper pressure

on the appellant to plead guilty and accept a

pretrial agreement, in order to sooner extricate

himself from a no-pay situation; and

-- By removing the potential punishment of

forfeitures at the appellant's court-martial,

increasing the likelihood that more confinement

might be awarded to “compensate” for the

inability to award forfeitures.

n8 While representation by a civilian defense

counsel is not a guaranteed right, it is an important

personal option that does much to protect the integrity

of the military justice system in the eyes of the general

public.

For all these reasons and those discussed above, the

questioned [**37] regulation must implode from the excess

weight of its own illogicalness. While its intent might be

admirable--saving the Government money--its effect is to

impose an impermissible form of pretrial punishment or

penalty on the appellant, in violation of Article 13, UCMJ.

Thus, the appellant is entitled to appropriate relief, since the

impressing of seaman fell out of favor in this country some

time ago.

53a

Judge HARRIS concurs.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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