Appendix — Whorton v. Collier (No. 05-589)

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by a state court if the decision of that court rests on a state

law ground that is independent of the federal question

and adequate to support the judgment.” Id. The Court

explained, "The doctrine applies to bar federal habeas

when a state court declined to address a prisoner's

federal claims because the prisoner had failed to meet a

state procedural requirement." Id. at 729-30.

[1] In order for a state procedural rule to preclude

federal review, the rule must be “firmly established and

regularly followed." Ford v. Georgia, 498 U.S. 411, 423-24,

111 S.Ct. 850, 112 L.Ed.2d 935 (1991). The Ninth Circuit

has elaborated that ‘a state rule must be clear,

consistently applied, and well-established at the time of

the petitioner's purported default." Calderon v. United

States District Court (Bean), 9 F3d 1126, 1129

(9th Cir.1996) (quoting Wells v. Maass, 28 F.3d 1005, 1010

(9th Cir.1994)). [FN5] If a state procedural rule is not

well-established before a petitioner supposedly breaks

the rule, then the rule cannot prevent federal review of

the petitioner's federal claims. Although the state is not

required “to articulate every permutation of every rule,

Bargas v. Burns, 179 F.3d 1207, 1213 (9th Cir.1999), a rule

held generally adequate can be deemed inadequate as

applied to particular unique circumstances, Lee v. Kemna,

534 US. 362, 376, 122 S.Ct. 877, 151 L.Ed.2d 820 (2002)

Once a petitioner has demonstrated the inadequacy of a

rule, the state bears the ultimate burden of proving the

rule bars federal review. Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F.3d 573,

585-86 (9th Cir.2003). [FN6]

ENS. The dissent argues that the petitioner must cite

cases in which a procedural bar is applied inconsistently.

Dissent at 6245. Inconsistency is only one aspect of the

principle that a state's procedural bar must be adequate.

This court has repeatedly said the state's rule must be

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clear, consistently applied, and well-established. Sev ¢.yv

Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1052 (9th Cir.2004);

Melendez v. Warden, 288 F.3d 1120, 1122 (9th Cir.2002)

lackson v. Calderon, 211 F.3d 1148, 1153 (9th Cir.2000). The

emphasis in the case before us is whether the rule was

well-established. We, obviously, do not require a habeas

petitioner to show inconsistency in application when the

problem with the rule is that the rule is not clear or well-

established and has never been applied to the unique

circumstances of his case

FN6. The Ninth Circuit explained the state's burden for

proving the adequacy of a state rule, saying

Once the state has adequately pled

the existence of an independent and

adequate state procedural ground as an

affirmative defense, the burden to place

that defense in issue shifts to the

petitioner. The petitioner may satisfy this

burden by asserting specific factual

allegations that demonstrate the

inadequacy of the state procedure,

including citation to authority

demonstrating inconsistent application ot

the rule. Once having done so, however,

the ultimate burden is the state's

Powell v. Lambert, 357 F.3d 871, 875 (9th Cir.2004) (quoting

Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F.3d 573, 586 (9th Cir.2003))

This standard for determining the adequacy of

state procedural bars is w ell-established in federal habeas

law. The dissent accuses the majority of creating ‘a

radical new rule of law which shifts the burden of proof

from the prisoner to the State." Dissent at 1289. The

dissent confuses a disagreement over the interpretation of

Nevada state law with a conflict over the federal habeas

standard. In this opinion we hold that Collier met his

burden by establishing that no state rule was adequately

established to bar his state habeas petition. Only then do

we shift the burden to the state, as the standard demands.

This is merely an application of the federal habeas

standard as it stands today. This holding makes no new

habeas law. State procedural rules must also be

independent to preclude federal review. As Collier

challenges only the adequacy of Nevada's procedural

rule, not its independence, we do not address the

independence prong.

The Nevada procedural rule at issue is a one-year time

limit for tiling a habeas corpus petition. The relevant law states:

Unless there is good cause shown

for delay, a petition that challenges the

validity of a judgment of sentence must be

filed within 1 vear after entry of the

judgment of conviction or, if an appeal

has been taken from the judgment, within

| year after the supreme court issues its

remittitur. For the purposes of his

subsection, good cause for delay exists if

the petitioner demonstrates to the

satisfaction of the court:

(a) That the delay is not the

fault of the petitioner; and

(b) That dismissal of the

petition as untimely will

unduly prejudice the

petitioner

Nev.Rev.Stat. 34.726(1). This court previously

found that the Nevada Supreme Court generally applies

this time limit consistently to habeas petitions. See, e.g

Loveland v. Hatcher, 231 F.3d 640, 643 (9th Cir.2000); Moran

v. McDaniel, 80 F.3d 1261, 1268-70 (9th Cir.1996). The

adequacy of this general time bar, however, is not at issue

here. The issues for review are specific to the application

of this rule in Collier's case. First, was it clear and well-

established in Nevada law that the original judgment, not

the amended judgment of conviction starts the one-year

time limit? Second, was it clear and well-established in

Nevada law that a motion to correct an illegal sentence

does not toll the one-year time limit?

B. Amended judgments

[2] The plain language of Nev.Rev Stat. 34.726(1)

does not distinguish between original judgments of

conviction and amended judgments of conviction. Until

recently, there was little in Nevada statutory or case law

to offer guidance on this issue. [FN7]| Then, on September

3, 2004, the Nevada Supreme Court published an opinion

holding that amended judgments of conviction do not

automatically re-start the time clock under Nev.Rev Stat

34.726(1). Sullivan v. Nevada, 96 P3d 761, 764 (Nev.2004)

Instead, an amended judgment of conviction may, if

proved, qualify as “good cause" under Nev.Rev.Stat

§ 34.726(1)(a), thus allowing for additional appeals. Id

The Nevada Supreme Court said

FN7. In 1888, the Nevada Supreme Court denied a

motion for a new trial in a civil case where the trial

court's clerk had entered the wrong name on the

judgment. Burbank v. Rivers, 20 Nev. 159, 18 P. 753 (1888).

The Nevada Supreme Court found the clerical error did

not extend the time for filing an appeal. Id. at 755. The

court said that to prevail on such a basis, the petitioner

must “affirmatively show, to the satisfaction of this court,

that he was deceived or misled by the entry as made.” /d.

Burbank is not instructive in the case before us. First, the

amendment to Collier's judgment was not a clerical error.

The trial court failed to include the basis for the

judgment: the statute under which Collier was sentenced.

Second, the Burbank case is not cited by the state courts as

grounds for the state courts’ opinions in this case. The

Burbank_rule (if such a rule exists) is not at issue here.

Finally, the Burbank case has not been cited by a Nevada

state court since 1921. See Bottini v. Mongolo, 45 Nev. 245,

197 P. 702, 704 (1921). Nowhere is it cited in the State's

briefing materials. The dissent's shaking the dust off a

century old rule, not used by the state courts in eighty

years, does not establish the rule as adequate under

federal habeas law. We do not reject the rule because it is

old, we reject it because it is not well-established.

We emphasize, however, that the entry of

an amended judgment may in and of

*1286 itself provide the good cause

required by that statute to present

appropriate post-conviction claims

relating to the amendment at issue. In

other words, if the claims presented in a

petition filed within one vear of the entry

of the amended judgment challenge the

proceedings leading to a_ substantive

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amendment of the judgment and could

not have been raised in prior proceedings,

there may be no delay attributable to the

“fault of the petitioner."

ld. As Sullivan was decided only recently, such a

rule cannot be held clearly and well-established at the

time Collier filed his motion to correct an illegal sentence

in 1997. Notably, the Nevada Supreme Court does not

cite a single statute, rule, or case standing for the

proposition that amended judgments of conviction do not

automatically re-start the one-year tme clock under

Nev.Rev Stat. 34.726(1). The two cases noted in the

discussion, Dickerson v. State, 114 Nev. 1084, 967 P.2d 1132

(1998) and Pellegrini v. State, 117 Nev. 860, 34 P.3d 519

(2001), are cited only to illustrate the legislature's general

intent in enacting Nev.Rev.Stat. 34.726(1). Sullivan, 96

P.3d at 764 nn. 7 & 10-11. There is scant evidence that

amended judgments of conviction did not re-start the

one-year clock at the time of Collier's default.

[3] The dissent would give substantial weight to

Morrell v. Edwards, 98 Nev. 91, 640 P.2d 1322 (1982). In

that case, the Nevada Supreme Court created a rule

governing when the time for an appeal in the civi/ context

may start anew after an amended judgment. The court

stated that whether ‘an appeal is properly taken from an

amended judgment rather than the judgment originally

entered depends upon whether the amendment

disturbed or revised legal rights and obligations which

the prior judgment had plainly and properly settled with

finality.” Id. at 1324. The Nevada Supreme Court has

never applied this standard in a criminal case. The

standard for criminal cases, as established in 2004, is

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whether the issues presented in the appeal relate to a

substantive change in the amended judgment. Sullivan, 96

P.3d at 764. Rules for civil appeals do not dictate

procedure for criminal habeas appeals. The Nevada

Supreme Court has specifically said, "this court has

consistently and repeatedly held that rules of civil

appellate procedure are not applicable to appeals from

statutory post-conviction habeas corpus proceedings."

Klein v. Warden, 118 Nev. 305, 43 P.3d 1029, 1033 (2002).

The rule establishing when amended judgments allow a

new period to file habeas appeals was decided by the

Nevada Supreme Court's holding in Sullivan in 2004.

L[FN8] Because this rule was not adequately established, if

at all, prior to 2004, it cannot bar federal habeas review in

Collier's case. [FN9]

FN8. The first footnote of the Nevada Supreme Court's

Opinion states that the court had previously disposed of

the case in an unpublished disposition on March 5, 2004.

The government then filed a motion seeking publication

of the decision. "Cause appearing, [the Court granted] the

State's motion to publish." Sullivan, 96 P.3d_ at 762 n. 1.

The cause for publication is not mentioned. Given the

lack of guidance on this issue in prior opinions, the need

for publication is consistent with the need to establish the

rule.

ENY. The dissent suggests that because Collier cannot

show cases illustrating an inconsistent application of such

> rule Collier's claim fails. Dissent at 1292. The dissent

completely ignores the well-established prong of the

standard for determining, adequacy. See supra at 1294-95.

Collier has shown this state procedural rule did not exist

prior to 2004 and the government has fatied its burden to

show it was adequately established

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C. Motions to correct an illegal sentence

[4] The second procedural rule at issue is whether

a motion to correct an illegal sentence tolls the one-year

clock under Nev.Rev.Stat. 34.726(1). The question is

whether a motion to correct an illegal sentence is an

appeal ... from the judgment" as stated in Nev.Rev Stat

34.726(1). Collier's motions to correct an illegal sentence

were properly filed under Nevada state law. The state

district court considered Collier's first motion and

amended his judgment of conviction. Both the Nevada

district court and the Nevada Supreme Court considered

his second motion and denied it on the merits. Collier

filed his federal habeas petition after the Nevada

Supreme Court's remittitur on his state habeas petition

When Collier filed his motion to correct an illegal

sentence, there was little in Nevada's state law to guide

the courts’ understanding of whether these motions are

an appeal from judgment, thus tolling the period for

filing a habeas petition under Nev.Rev.Stat. 34.726(1)

Then, after Collier filed his motion to correct an illegal

sentence, the Nevada Supreme Court gave form to these

words in Dickerson v. State, 967 P.2d at 1133-34. There-the

court held only timely direct appeals qualified as appeals

tolling the one-vear time limit. [FN10] Jd. The Court held

FNIO. Because the Dickerson case was decided after

Collier filed his motion to correct an illegal sentence, it is

not determinative in this case. Thus we need not explore

whether under Nevada state law motions to correct an

illegal sentence are direct appeals

We now construe [Nev Rev Stat.]

44.726(1) to mean that the one-vear period

for filing a post-conviction habeas corpus

petition begins to run from the issuance of

the remittitur from a timely direct appeal

to this court from the judgment of

conviction or from the entry of the

judgment of conviction if no direct appeal

is taken. A timely direct appeal is one in

which the notice of appeal is filed with the

district court within the time period

prescribed by statute.

ld. Dickerson was decided in 1998 and Collier filed

his motion to correct an illegal sentence in 1997. [FN11]

Collier cannot be held accountable for rules established

after his purported breach. See Ford v. Georgia, 498 U.S.

411, 424, 111 S.Ct. 850, 112 L.Ed.2d 935 (1991); Petrocelli v.

Angelone, 248 F.3d 877, 885 (9th Cir.2001).

FN11. The dissent relies heavily on Dickerson, 114 Nev.

1084, 967 P.2d 1132, and the NRAP 4(b). Dissent at 1298-

99. Neither is controlling here. Dickerson was decided

after Collier's purported breach. NRAP 4(b) established

tolling mechanisms for direct appeals, not habeas appeals.

It is inapplicable to the question of whether a motion to

correct an illegal sentence tolls the time period for filing a

habeas appeal. Furthermore, NRAP 4(b) does not govern

motions to correct an illegal sentence. Such motions, as

the Respondent and the dissent concede, need not be

tiled within thirty days of judgment as NRAP 4(b)

requires. Collier's motions to correct an illegal sentence

were timely and were addressed on the merits by the

Nevada courts

The government concedes it was in Dickerson

where the tolling provisions in Nev.Rev.Stat. 34.726(1)

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were narrowed to apply only to a “timely direct appeal."

Dickerson, 967 P.2d at 1133. Nonetheless, the government

argues such a rule “necessarily follows" from a prior

Nevada Supreme Court decision in Edwards v. State,

112 Nev. 704, 918 P.2d 321 (1996). In Edwards, the Nevada

Supreme Court explained that motions to correct an

illegal sentence are special because they attack a sentence

that is “either facially illegal or is the result of a mistaken

assumption regarding a criminal defendant's record, time

constraints and procedural defaults necessarily do not

apply." Id. at 324. The Nevada Supreme Court's

discussion of motions to correct an illegal sentence (and

like appeals) in Edwards emphasizes that these motions

are free from the various constraints and time limits

restricting access to other appeals. In particular these

motions are exempted from the limitations *1288 on

habeas’ petitions. Id; Nev.Rev.Stat. 34.724(2)(a).

Suggesting it "necessarily follows" from the discussion in

Edwards that motions to correct an illegal sentence (and

similar motions) limit an individual's ability to pursue

habeas relief completely mischaracterizes the Edwards

opinion. The Nevada Supreme Court's emphasis in

Edwards is on narrowly defining this type of appeal while

emphasizing broad access to it. Petitioners suffering

under the errors challenged by motions to correct an

illegal sentence are free of the procedural hurdles placed

on other types of appeals. It is disingenuous to suggest

Lidwards interpreted the phrase "an appeal has been taken

from the judgment" in Nev.Rev.Stat. 34.726(1) to exclude

motions to correct an illegal sentence. The Nevada

Supreme Court considered no such question. Twisting

the court's words to create such a meaning does not

establish a clear, consistently applied, and well-

established rule

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Today, because of the Dickerson decision, the

confusion present during Collier's appeal does not exist.

[FN12] Defendant-Appellants know they may pursue

habeas relief only within one year “from the issuance of

the remittitur from a timely direct appeal to this court

from the judgment of conviction or from the entry of the

judgment of conviction if no direct appeal is taken.’

Dickerson, 967 P.2d at 1133-34

FN12. The dissent suggests that every prisoner in Nevada

convicted prior to September 3, 2004 will be able to file a

meritless motion to correct an illegal sentence en route to

filing a state habeas petition. Dissent at 1289-90. This

assertion is unwarranted. In this case, the petitioner's

motion to correct an illegal sentence was granted and he

filed his second motion to correct an illegal sentence

within the one-year period for filing an appeal. His

motions were properly filed and considered on the merits

by the Nevada state courts. If a person were able to

replicate this unlikely pattern and they were convicted

prior to the Nevada Supreme Court's opinion in Dickerson

v. Nevada, 114 Nev. 1084, 967 P.2d 1132 (1998) (holding

motions to correct an illegal sentence are not an appeal

from a judgment) then they could and should be able to

file their habeas appeal. No state rule was established to

the contrary prior to the Dickerson opinion

Conclusion

The Nevada procedural rules applied by the

Nevada state courts to bar Colliers habeas petition are

not adequate to preclude federal review of his habeas

petition. The rules applving Nev Rev Stat. 4.726(1) were

not clear, consistently applied, and well-established at the

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time of Collier's purported defauit. When Collier filed his

motion to correct an illegal sentence in 1997 and

subsequent habeas petitions, it appeared under state law

a habeas petition could follow a remittitur from such an

appeal and amended judgment. The district court's

opinion is reversed and the appeal is remanded for

consideration on the merits.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

BEA, Circuit Judge, dissenting

| respectfully dissent because the majority's

opinion allows a petitioner for writ of habeas corpus to

mock the Nevada statutory deadline for filing a habeas

petition from a judgment of conviction, simply by filing

one or any number of motions to correct an illegal

sentence, no matter how moeretricious the motions

Henceforth, any prisoner convicted before the effective

date of Sullivan v. Nevada, 96 P3d 761 (Nev.2004)—

September 3, 2004 — will be able to file a baseless motion

to correct an illegal sentence as a prelude to filing a

Nevada state habeas petition on the ground that the

denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence creates

a one-year opportunity to file a habeas petition. | disagree

with the majority's analysis on three major points

First, it was well-established in Nevada law that a

motion to correct an illegal sentence did not either re-start

or toll [FN1] the one-year time limit in which to file a

habeas petition under Nevada Revised Statutes ("NRS") §

4.726(1). The majority opinion confuses appeals and

habeas petitions, both of which are used to attack the

merits of a judgment of conviction, with a motion to

correct an illegal sentence, which is used only when the

judgment contains a sentence that is invalid under the

statutory sentencing scheme, or when the district court

sentenced the defendant based on a misunderstanding of

the defendant's prior criminal record. Just as important,

there is no basis in the language of Nev. Rev. Stat.

§ 34.726(1) to conclude that a motion to correct an illegal

sentence either re-starts or tolls the time in which to file a

state habeas petition.

EN1. This is not to suggest that Collier's motions to

correct an illegal sentence were filed during the one-year

period when there was time to "toll," ic. stop the running

of the time to file a habeas petition. Indeed, the one year

had run both from the judgment (July 5, 1995) and the

amended judgment (March 26, 1997), when Collier filed

his habeas petition

on May 28, 1999.

Second, the majority opinion arrives at its

conclusion by placing the burden on the State to cite this

court to a prior case in’ which Collier's precise argument

was rejected by the Nevada Supreme Court to prove that

Nevada's one-year time limit to file a habeas petition

under NRS § 34.726(1) was well-established law. This is a

radical new rule of law which shifts the burden of proof

from the prisoner to the State, without the benefit of an

en bane or Supreme Court ruling that mandates such a

burden shift. Heretofore, where the State has pleaded a

procedural bar and the defendant challenges the

adequacy of a State's procedural bar, it is first the

petitioners burden to prove the procedural bar is

inadequate. Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F.3d 573, 586

(9th Cir.2003). Only if the petitioner proves the

procedural bar is inadequate does the burden then shift

A-24

to the State to prove the procedural bar is adequate. Here,

Collier failed in his initial burden of proof. The majority

opinion now relieves petitioners of that burden.

Further, the majority presumes that a statute is not

well-established law unless a court has ruled that the

statute means what it says. This ruling will lead to all

sorts of mischief. Habeas petitioners have a duty to

follow the plain language of a State's procedural rules,

even where no State court has yet rejected the precise

attempt made by the petitioner to circumvent those rules.

Bargas v. Burns, 179 F.3d 1207, 1211 (9th Cir.1999).

Third, even if the amended judgment of conviction did

start anew the time period in which Collier could file an

appeal, which I contend it could not, Collier's habeas

petition was filed more than one year after the date of

entry of the amended judgment of conviction. Hence,

Collier's habeas petition was still barred under

NRS § 34.726(1). The only way Collier's appeal from the

amended judgment of conviction could be timely is if his

second motion to correct an illegal sentence re-started the

time for him to appeal from the amended judgment. Of

course, a motion to correct an illegal sentence cannot

revive the time in which to appeal after that time has run

out; is also not one of the few motions which toll the time

in which to appeal a judgment of conviction in a criminal

case under Nevada Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(b).

I. Procedural History

The precise chronology of events is important in

this case. On May 17, 1995, Collier pleaded guilty to

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Count | of the Amended Information, which charged him

with violating NRS §§ 453.3385 and 453.3405 for

possession of a trafficking quantity of a controlled

substance. Collier and the State entered into a plea

bargain in which Collier agreed to a 45-year sentence. In

exchange, the district attorney dismissed the other ten

charges filed against Collier. [FN2]

FN2. Collier had been charged with eleven drug

trafficking offenses. After Collier's arrest, a substantial

amount of methamphetamine, ephedrine, and marijuana

was found in Collier's storage shed, along with

\%) weapons and narcotics paraphernalia. | add these

details lest a reader of the majority opinion come away

with the impression that Collier was an unfortunate

bystander who infelicitously fell captive to the wares of a

government plant.

At the time Collier entered his plea, the maximum

sentence under NRS § 453.3385 for a drug trafficking

offense was life in prison and a $100,000 fine. Nev. Rev.

Stat. § 453.3385(2) (1993). Five days before Collier was

sentenced, the Nevada legislature changed the law, and

the maximum sentence became fifteen years. Nev. Rev

Stat. § 453.3385(2)(1995). The new version of

NRS § 453.3385(2) specifically stated, however, that it did

not apply to any offense committed before its effective date

of July 1, 1995. Id. The Amended Information, to which

Collier pleaded guilty, stated that Collier committed a

violation of NRS § 453.3385 on March 12, 1994, over a year

before the effective date of the new statute. Therefore, the

amended statute did not apply to Collier's case

Collier was sentenced in accordance with the plea

agreement, and a final judgment of conviction was

entered against him on July 5, 1995. The judgment stated

that Collier was guilty of Count | of the Amended

Information and the court sentenced him to 45 years

imprisonment and assessed a $100,000 fine

Collier then had 30 days to file an appeal attacking

his judgment of conviction or to extend the 30-day period

by filing one or more specific motions which, under

NRAP 4(b), serve to toll the running of that 30-day

period:

In a criminal case, the notice of

appeal by a defendant shall be filed in the

district court within thirty (30) davs after

the entry of the judgment or order

appealed from.... If a timely motion in

arrest of judgment [FN3}] or for a new trial

on any ground other than newly

discovered evidence |[FN4] has been

made, an appeal from a iudgment of

conviction may be taken within thirty (303

days after entry of an order denying the

motion. A motion for a new trial based on

the ground of newly discovered evidence

will similarly extend the time for appeal

from a judgment of conviction if the

motion is made before or within thirty

(30) days after entry of the judgment

FN3. A motion in arrest of judgment must be filed within

7 davs after a determination of guilt or within such

further time as the court may fix during the 7-day period

Nev. Rev. Stat. § 176.525 (1995)

EN4. A motion for a new trial that is not based on newly

discovered evidence must be filed within 7 days after the

verdict or finding of guilt. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 176.515

(1995).

Nev. R. App. P. 4(b)(1)(1995).

Collier did not file a direct appeal within 30 days after the

entry of the judgment of conviction, nor did he file either

a motion in arrest of judgment or a motion for new trial.

Therefore, the right to appeal his judgment of conviction

expired on August 4, 1995.

Because Collier did not file a timely appeal, he

then had one year after the entry of his judgment of

conviction to file a habeas petition under Nevada law:

Unless there is good cause shown for

delay, a petition that chailenges the

validity of a judgment or sentence must

be filed within 1 year after entry of the

judgment of conviction or, if an appeal

has been taken from the judgment, within

1 year arter the Supreme Court issues its

remittitur. For the purposes of this

subsection, good cause for delay exists if

the petitioner demonstrates to the

satisfaction of the court:

(a) That the delay is not the fault of

the petitioner; and

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(b) That dismissal of the petition as

untimely will unduly prejudice the

petitioner

Nev. Rev. Stat. § 34.726(1) (1995). Collier failed to

file a habeas petition by July 5, 1996. His right to file a

habeas petition expired on that date, absent good cause

for the delay.

On March 21, 1997, over 8 months after his appeal

and habeas opportunities had expired because of the

passage of time, Collier filed a pro se motion to correct an

illegal sentence under NRS § 176.555. In his motion,

Collier set forth the language of Count I to which he had

pleaded guilty. He moved the court to amend the

judgment to include the statute numbers to which he

pleaded guilty, NRS §§ 453.3385 and 453.3405. [FN5] As a

second ground for his motion, Collier quoted the revised

version of NRS § 453.3385 and moved the court to limit

his sentence to 2 years, down from the 45 vears he agreed

to earlier. Coilier did not claim that he was ever confused

as to the statute under which he was convicted. The

statutes were spelled out in the Amended Information

and plea agreement, and Collier himself set them forth in

his motion to correct an illegal sentence

FN5. Why this punctiliousness? Perhaps Collier thought

that if he got the court to put in the statute number he

could argue the now revised statute would apply and he

was being held illegally. He was conveniently forgetting

that the revised statute, by its own terms, did not apply to

crimes committed betore its effective date of July 1, 1995

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Since Collier committed the offense on March 12, 1994,

regardless whether the statute number was listed in his

judgment, the revised statute does not apply to Collier's

case. But one must remember, Collier was acting pro se

On March 26, 1997, the Nevada state district court

issued an amended judgment of conviction, in effect

granting his motion that the judgment recite the statute

numbers under which he was convicted. The amended

judgment now specified that Collier had been found

guilty of NRS §§ 453.3385 and 453.3405. The court did

not, March 26, 1997. Collier did not file a habeas petition

before March 26, 1998.

FN6. This is precisely in keeping with the Nevada

Supreme Court's ruling in Burbank v. Rivers, 20 Nev. 159,

I8 P. 753, 755 (1888), discussed imfra. The date of the

judgment does not change when it is amended to correct

a clerical mistake, as was the case here.

On May 20, 1997, Collier tiled a second pro se

motion to correct an illegal sentence based on the same

grounds as his first motion to correct an illegal sentence.

[EN7Z]however, grant the second part of his motion; it

retused to reduce Collier's sentence by 43 vears. As the

majority correctly noted, "the amended judgment did not

change the sentence.” Maj. Op. at 6221. In fact, the

amended judgment of conviction even kept the original

date: "Dated this 5th day of July, 1995." [FN6] Collier

neither moved for reconsideration of his motion nor did

he appeal the district court's failure to rule on his motion

to limit his sentence to 2 vears, or any other aspect of the

amended judgment entered on

A

FN7. The majority claims Collier filed this second motion

“reviving” his claims asserted in his March 21, 1997

motion. Maj. Op. at 1282. To repeat is not to revive. His

earlier claim had been denied; it was final. The repetition

of his claim did not “relate back" or otherwise seek a

reconsideration of his earlier motion. It was just a second

attempt.

On May 28, 1997, the Nevada state district court

denied Collier's second motion to correct an illegal

sentence. The district court specifically denied Collier's

motion on the merits because, by its terms, the revised

version of NRS § 453.3385 did not apply to his case. This

time, Collier timely appealed the district court's order

denying his second motion to correct an illegal sentence

on June 10, 1997

On November 16, 1998, Collier filed a notice of

appeal from his original judgment of conviction, claiming

his appeal was untimely because his trial counsel did not

inform Collier he had a right to appeal. The Nevada

Supreme Court dismissed Collier's appeal as untimely

under NRAP 4(b) on February 3, 1999. [FN8]

FN8. The Nevada Supreme Court had no power to enlarge

the time for Collier to file his direct appeal. Nev. R. App. P.

26(b) (1995); Walker v. Scully, 99 Nev. 45, 657 P.2d 94 (1983).

Neither could the court have extended the time for Collier

to file either a motion in arrest of judgment or a motion for

new trial to toll the time to file an appeal. Nev. Rev. Stat. §

178.476 (1995); Culinary & Hotel Serv. Workers Union v.

Haugen, 76 Nev. 424, 357 P.2d 113 (1960) (court did not

have power to extend time to file motion for new trial,

even pursuant *o a stipulation between the parties, and

thus the notice of appeal was untimely).

A-31

On May 13, 1999, the Nevada Supreme Court

affirmed the district court's order denying Collier's

second motion to correct an illegal sentence. The

remittitur was issued on June 11, 1999.

On May 28, 1999, Collier filed a pro se petition for

writ of habeas corpus in the Nevada state district court,

seeking to have all charges against him dismissed. Collier

again claimed his trial counsel failed to inform him that

he had a right to file a _ direct appeal.

On August 20, 1999, the Nevada state district court

dismissed Collier's habeas petition as untimely under

NRS § 34.726(1). It also held that Collier failed to show

good cause for the untimeliness of the petition. On

September 1, 1999, Collier appealed from the state district

court's denial of his habeas petition to the Nevada

Supreme Court.

While Collier's appeal from the denial of his state

habeas petition was pending, he filed a habeas petition in

federal district court through counsel on June 30, 2000.

On August 28, 2001, the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed

the district court's denial of Collier's state habeas petition,

holding that his petition was untimely under

NRS § 24.726(1).

On March 28, 2003, the federal district court denied

Collier's federal habeas petition, holding that the

dismissal of Collier's state habeas petition under

NRS § 34.726(1) precluded federal habeas review because

NRS § 34.726(1) was an independent and adequate state

procedural bar [FN9] and Collier failed to show good

cause for the untimeliness of his state habeas petition.

This timely appeal followed.

A-32

ENY. For a state procedural bar to be an independent and

adequate ground sufficient to support a finding of

procedural default, the rule must be “clear, consistently

applied, and well-established at the time of petitioner's

purported default.” Wells v. Maass, 28 F.3d 1005, 1008

(9th Cir.1994). A state procedural rule is adequate if the

state courts follow it “in the vast majority of cases." Moran

v. McDaniel, 80 F.3d 1261, 1270 (9th Cir.1996) (citation

omitted)

Il. Standard of Review

We review de nove the district court's decision to

deny a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petition. Nunes v. Mueller,

350 F.3d 1045, 1051 (9th Cir.2003). We review findings of

fact made by the district court for clear error, and “may

atfirm the district court's decision on any ground

supported by the record, even if it differs from the district

court's rationale.” Id

Ill. Analysis

A. Under the Plain Language of NRS § 34.726(1) a

Motion to Correct an [legal Sentence Does Not Re-Start

or Toll the Time in Which to File a Habeas Petition

Regardless whether the original or amended

judgment of conviction is the relevant judgment, Collier's

state habeas petition, filed on May 28, 1999, was untimely

under NRS § 34.726(1) because it was filed more than one

vear after the original judgment was entered on July 5,

1995, and more than one year after the amended

judgment was entered on March 26, 1997, neither of

which did Collier timely appeal

The Nevada Supreme Court has stated that a

motion to correct an illegal sentence is to be used only

when the judgment contains a sentence that is invalid

under the statutory sentencing scheme, or is based on the

district court's misunderstanding of the defendant's

criminal record. Edwards v. State, 112 Nev. 704, 918 P.2d

321, 324-25 (1996).

Here, Collier properly filed a motion to correct an

illegal sentence given that his argument was that his

judgment of conviction failed to recite the statute

numbers under which he was convicted and his sentence

exceeded the statutory maximum. | agree that he was

able to file such motion at any time. Nev. Rev. Stat.

§ 176.555 (1995). But this is a very different proposition

from saying that a motion to correct an illegal sentence

also re-starts or tolls the time in which to file a habeas

petition, which must be filed within one year.

First, a motion to correct an illegal sentence and a

habeas petition are entirely different remedies with

different purposes. Collier's motion to correct an illegal

sentence did not raise the question whether he was justly

convicted. Collier had pleaded guilty. The motion raised

only the question whether Collier was correctly

sentenced for his crime.

On the other hand, a habeas petition is used to

¢*‘tack the validity of a judgment of conviction or sentence

based on alleged errors occurring at trial or sentencing.

Edwards, 918 P.2d at 324-25. A judgment of conviction

encompasses not only a sentence, but also a finding of

guilt. [here are important reasons why the Nevada

legislature has limited the time in which a judgment of

conviction can be attacked collaterally. Witnesses dic,

move away, or forget; evidence is lost. Witnesses and

evidence are irrelevant to a motion to correct a sentence,

particularly where the sentence is negotiated, and

imposed following a guilty plea. That is why timing is

important to a habeas petition, but irrelevant to a motion

to correct a sentence.

Second, under Nevada law a motion to correct an

illegal sentence does not re-start or toll the time in which

to file a habeas petition. Indeed, in Edwards, the Nevada

Supreme Court specifically disapproved of the very tactic

Collier is attempting to use here:

We have observed that defendants are

increasingly filing in_ district court

documents entitled "motion to correct

illegal sentence" or “motion to modify

sentence” to challenge the validity of their

convictions and sentences in violation of

the exclusive remedy provision detailed in

NRS 34.724(2)(b), in an attempt to

circumvent the procedural bars governing

post-conviction petitions for habeas relief

under NRS chapter 34. We have also

observed that the district courts are often

addressing the merits of issues regarding

the validity of convictions or sentences

when such issues are presented in motions

to modify or correct allegedly illegal

sentences without regard for the

procedural bars the legislature has

established. If a motion to correct an illegal

sentence or to modify a sentence raises

issues Outside of the verv narrow scope of

the inherent authority recognized in this

4-35

Opinion, the motion should be summarily

denied.

Id. at 325 n. 2. The majority incorrectly characterizes the

holding of Edwards. It is true that motions to correct an

illegal sentence can be filed at any time. But the filing of a

motion to correct an illegal sentence does not revive, nor

toll, the time in which to file a habeas petition

Further, in Sullivan v. Nevada, 96 P3d 761

(Nev.2004), the Nevada Supreme Court considered a case

that involved an amended judgment and held:

No specific language in NRS 34.726

expressly provides that the one-year time

period restarts if the judgment of

conviction is amended.

Moreover, construing NRS 34.726 to provide

such an extended time period would result

in an absurdity that the Legislature could

not have intended. [FN10] A judgment of

conviction may be amended at any tune to

correct a clericai error [under NRS § 176.565]

or to correct an illegal sentence [under NRS §

176,555]. Because the district court may

amend the judgment many vears, even

decades, after the entry of the original

judgment of conviction, restarting the one-

year period for all purposes every time an

amendment occurs would frustrate the

purpose and = spirit of NRS 44.726.

Specifically, it would undermine — the

doctrine of finality of jadgments by allowing

A-%6

petitioners to file post-conviction habeas

petitions in perpetuity

FN10. The court in Sullivan was referring to precisely the

‘absurdity" the majority embraces today and enacts tor

all Nevada convictions earlier than Sullivan, supra

ld. at 764 (footnotes eliminated)

(he majority holds that because no Nevada court

before Sullivan had ruled that the plain language of

NRS § 34.726(1) means what it says, a petitioner could

well believe that a motion to correct an illegal sentence

would re-start the time in which to file a habeas petition;

hence, according to the majority, the one-year time period

of NRS § 34.726(1) was not "well-established" until

Sullivan. While this argument might have some merit if

the language of NRS § 34.726(1) were ambiguous and

might allow one to interpret it in the manner Collier does,

the language of the statute is not ambiguous. See supra p

6221. In ruling that the very argument proposed by

Collier "would result in an absurdity that the Legislature

could not have intended,” the court in Sullivan was

interpreting what the legislature intended wien NRS §

4.726(1) was cnacted. | he meaning derived is not new; it

has always been there. Sev. ¢.g.. Bousley v. United States

523 US. 614, 633, 118 S.Ct. 1604, 140 L.Fd.2d 828 (1998)

("It is well established that 'when this Court construes a

statute, it is explaining its understanding of what the

statute has meant continuously since the date when it

became law.’ ") (quoting Rivers v. Roadway Lxpress, lnc. 511

LS, 298, 313, n. 12, 114S.Ct. 1510, 128 L.Ed.2d 274 (1994));

Schaeenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1204 (9th Cir.2000) Ct is

well-established that acts of Congress enjoy a strong

presumption of constitutionality and that newly-passed

statutes do not require judicial ratification in order to take

effect.)

B. Collier Has the Burden to Prove NRS § 34.726(1) Is

Not Adequate

[he majority holds that: “Once a petitioner has

demonstrated the inadequacy of a rule, the state bears the

ultimate burden of proving the rule bars federal review.’

Majority Op. at 6224-25. Although the majority properly

cites the standard, it mis applies the burden of proof

because Collier never has established the inadequacy of

NRS § 34.726(1). See Majority Op. at 6225, n. 6

For ease of reference, | reiterate the Ninth Circuit's

standard regarding the burden of proving the adequacy

ot a state rule

Once the state has adequately pled the

existence of an independent and adequate

state procedural ground as an affirmative

defense, the burden to place that defense

in issue shifts to the petitioner. The

petitioner may satisfy this burden by

asserting specific factual allegations that

demonstrate the inadequacy of the state

procedure, including citation to authority

demonstrating inconsistent application of

the rule. Once having done so, however,

the ultimate burden is the state's

Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F.3d 573, 586 (9th Cir.2003)

(emphasis added).

Thus, Step One is the state pleads a procedural bar.

The burden is then shifted to the petitioner. Step Two is

where the petitioner must demonstrate the inadequacy of

the state procedural bar, including "citation to authority

demonstrating inconsistent application of the rule."

The majority completely skips over Step Two, the

step requiring a petitioner who claims a state procedural

bar (here clearly stated in NRS § 34.726(1)) is not

adequate, to prove the inadequacy of the bar. Collier has

not alleged any specific factual allegations or cited us to

any cases, nor can we find any, where the Nevada

Supreme Court failed to apply NRS § 34.726(1), so that

one could conclude NRS § 34.726(1) was not "well-

established." Nor has he cited any cases where the

Nevada Supreme Court allowed a motion to correct an

illegal sentence to re-start either the time to file an appeal

or the time to file a habeas petition. Thus, the state carried

its burden under Step One by _ pleading

NRS § 34.726(1) as a procedural bar. Collier has failed to

carry his burden under Step Two.

Indeed, we have previously held _ that

NRS § 34.726(1) is an independent and adequate state

procedural rule barring federal habeas review. See

Loveland v. Hatcher, 231 F.3d 640, 643 (9th Cir.2000); Meran

v. McDaniel, 80 F.3d 1261, 1269 (9th Cir.1996). The

majority's conclusion is directly at odds with Loveland

and Moran. The majority concludes that because a case

presenting Collier's precise factual situation had not been

previously decided by the Nevada Supreme Court, the

law must not be well-established. But this cannot be the

A-W

rule. The precise factual situations involved in Loveland

and Moran had not been decided prior to those cases

either. Nevertheless, we held that NRS § 34.726(1) barred

federal review of those cases.

The only difference between Moran, Loveland and

this case is that Collier filed feo motions to correct an

iliegal sentence rather than the one motion filed in those

cases. This difference makes no more distinction than the

fact that Collier is not named Loveland or Moran

This court has already soundly rejected the

argument that for a procedural bar to be ‘“well-

established" a state court must have ruled that a

particular attempt to circumvent that procedural bar is

invalid. In Bargas vo. Burns, 179 F.3d 1207, 1211

(9th Cir.1999), the petitioner made a similar attempt to

circumvent Nevada's procedural bars. Bargas pleaded

guilty to sexual assault in Nevada state court. He then

filed a state habeas petition, claiming that he had

ineffective assistance of counsel and that his plea was not

knowing and voluntary. /d. at 1209-10. This petition was

denied, but the trial court failed to rule specifically on his

claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Bargas appealed

to the Nevada Supreme Court, but only on the ground

that his plea was not knowing and voluntary. He failed to

raise his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. The

Nevada Supreme Court affirmed the denial of his habeas

petition. fd, at 1210

Bargas then filed a habeas petition in federal court

Alleging inetiective assistance of counsel. The district

court dismissed his petition, holding that his claim of

ineffective assistance of counsel was unexhausted

because he failed to assert this claim before Nevada's

highest court. fd. at 1210

\-40)

Bargas then filed a second habeas petition in state

court, attempting to “revive,” as Collier did in his second

motion to correct an illegal sentence, his claim that he had

ineffective assistance of counsel and that his plea was not

knowing and voluntary. /d. The trial court held that

Bargas had procedurally defaulted on his ineffective

assistance of counsel claim by not appealing the failure to

rule on that issue in his first habeas petition. Id

Bargas then filed a second habeas petition in

federal court, again claiming he had ineffective assistance

of counsel and that his plea was not knowing and

voluntary. The district court denied the petition on the

claim that Bargas' plea was not knowing and voluntary,

but refused to reach the issue of ineffective assistance of

counsel because that claim was barred by an independent

and adequate state procedural bar—NRS § 34.726(1). /d.

On appeal, we affirmed the district court's ruling that it

had no jurisdiction to hear petitioner's federal habeas

petition on the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel

because Nevada's law that a habeas petitioner had to

raise all his claims in his first petition was “well

established," even though no Nevada case had yet held

that a second habeas petition did not "revive" such

claims

[Bargas] argues that there are not any

reported cases in Nevada specifically

holding that a petitioner procedurally

detaults a claim when he fails to appeal

from the denial of post-conviction relief,

and instead files a second petition for

habeas corpus. Although we agree with

that conclusion, Nevada law nevertheless

clearly requires a petitioner to raise all

A-41

claims in his first petition, unless he can

demonstrate cause and prejudice ...

ld, at 1211. The same is true here. Simply because no

Nevada court had previously stated that a second motion

to correct an illegal sentence does not re-start or toll the

time in which to file a habeas petition, anv more than a

first such motion, does not mean the law was not well-

established. NRS § 34.726(1) and NRAP 4(b) are both

quite clear about what alone will toll the time to file an

appeal and a habeas petition. All Collier had to do was

read the relevant statutes. Although Sullivan was not

decided at the time Collier was convicted, NRS § 34.726(1)

was well-established. NRS § 34.726(1) was passed in 1991,

well before Collier was convicted in 1995,

lhe plain language of NRS § 34.726(1) shows that

motions to correct an illegal sentence do not re-start or

toll the time in which to file a habeas petition. See supra

p. 6221. NRS § 34.726(1) states that on/y an appeal tolls the

time in which to file a habeas petition. The majority

opinion is reading possibilities into NRS § 34.726(1) that

the plain language of that statute precludes. There are no

cases where the Nevada Supreme Court allowed such a

second, identical and denied motion to correct an illegal

sentence to re-start or toll the time in which to file either

an appeal under NRAP 4(b)(1) or a habeas petition under

NRS § 34.726(1). Further, although the majority states that

Collier filed a second motion to correct an illegal

sentence reviving the challenge to his sentence

(Majority Op. at 1282), this second motion was not a

timely-filed motion to reconsider the denial of his first

raotion. Thus, it could not "revive" his first motion.

Accordingly, we are bound by Loveland and Moran

A-42

C. A Motion to Correct an Illegal Sentence Does Not

Re-Start or Toll the Time in Which to File an Appea!

Because the plain language of NRS § 34.726(1)

states that an appeal will toll the time in which to file a

habeas petition, we must examine whether Collier's

direct appeal from his judgment of conviction was a valid

appeal under Nevada law. It was not

Under either the original judgment of conviction,

entered on July 5, 1995, or the amended judgment of

conviction, entered on March 26, 1997, Collier's appeal

from his judgment of conviction, filed on November 16,

1998, was untimely and was therefore of no effect. Nev

R. App. P. 4(b). This rule was well-established at the time

of Collier's conviction even under the majority's holding

that there must be a case saving so. See Lozada v. State,

110 Nev. 349, 871 P.2d 944, 946 (1994)

Moreover, the amended judgment of conviction

did not re-start the time period for Collier to file a direct

appeal attacking his judgment of conviction under

NRAP 4. The Nevada Supreme Court addressed a similar

situation in Morrell v. Ldwards, 98 Nev. 91, 640 P.2d 1322

(1982). There, the Nevada Supreme Court dismissed a

civil appeal as untimely where the notice of appeal was

not filed within thirty days of the original judgment, but

was filed within thirty days of the amended judgment

The judgment had been amended to strike an award of

costs. The court held that: "The test for determining

whether an appeal is properly taken from an amended

judgment rather than the judgment originally entered

depends on whether the amendment disturbed or revised

legal rights and obligations which the prior judgment had

plainly and properly settled with finality.” 640 P.2d at

A-43

1324. Here, the amended judgment of conviction did not

revise the legal rights of the parties. The majority opinion

dismisses Edwards because it was a civil case, but there is

no reason the same principles would not apply to a

criminal case.

Further, the majority opinion dismisses a similar

holding in a criminal case Burbank v. Rivers, 20 Nev. 159,

18 P. 753, 755 (1888), as dusty old law. Majority Op. at

1285, n. 7. What the majority opinion refuses to

acknowledge is that Burbank is still good law. In Burbank,

the Nevada Supreme Court held that when a technical

change is made to a judgment of conviction, the time

within which an appeal may be taken from the judgment

of conviction is computed from the date of the entry of

the original judgment not the amended judgment, unless

the party filing the appeal can show that he was

“deceived” or “misled” vy the original judgment as

entered. Burbank v. Rivers, 20 Nev. 159, 18 P. 753, 755

(1888) (holding that a judgment that was amended to

state the defendant's correct name did not start the time

to file an appeal anew). Remember, the only change in

the amended judgment (March 26, 1997) was to add the

section number under which Collier was convicted. If

that is not merely “clerical” or “technical,” the words have

lost their meaning. Here, here is no argument Collier

was ever deceived or mised by the original judgment. By

dismissing Burbank as teo old, even though it has been

followed and cited, [FNVi] but never overruled, the

majority establishes the bizarre rule that a statute is only

well-established it a case has upheld the statute, but only

if that case is not tev old. Of course, the majority does not

tell us at what point a case becomes overruled by

operation of time

A+4

FNL. See Bottini v. Mongolo, 197 P. 702, 704, 45 Nev. 245,

245 (Nev.1921)

The only wav that Collier's appeal could be

considered timely is if his second motion to correct an

illegal sentence, which was filed on May 20, 1997, first

revived and then tolled the time in which to file an

appeal from his judgment of conviction. But that cannot

be the case--under NRAP 4(b), only timely motions in

arrest of judgment or for a new trial toll the time in which

to file an appeal. See supra p. 6236.

Further, the majority states that "there is no

established rule that motions to correct an illegal sentence

do not qualify as an appeal from judgment, thus tolling

the period for filing a habeas petition.” Majority Op. at

6223. This is incorrect for two reasons. First, as discussed

above, a motion to correct an_ illegal sentence

presupposes that guilt was proved or admitted. An

appeal from judgment posits innocence. Second, even if a

motion to correct an illegal sentence were to qualify as an

appeal, Collier failed to file his motion to correct an

illegal sentence within the 30-day time limit under

NRAP 4(b) and therefore, as an appeal, the motion was of

no effect. Lozada, 871 P.2d at 946. "In the case of an

untimely appeal, no ‘appeal had been taken from the

judgment’ within the meaning of NRS § 34.726(1) because

nothing has happened.” Dickerson v. State, 114 Nev. 1084,

967 P.2d 1132, 1134 (1998) (defendant who was convicted

of second degree murder filed an untimely appeal, and

then filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus within one

year of the issuance of the remittitur on his appeal, but

not within one vear of his judgment of conviction; the

Nevada trial court dismissed the habeas petition as

untimely under NRS § 34.726(1); the Nevada Supreme

Court affirmed, holding that under the language of

NRS § 34.726(1) only a timely appeal tolls the one-year

period in which to file a habeas petition).

The court in Dickerson held:

We now construe NRS 34.726(1) to mean

that the one-vear period for filing a post-

conviction habeas corpus petition begins

to run from the issuance of the remittitur

from a timely direct appeal to this court

from the judgment of conviction if no

direct appeal is taken. A timely direct

appeal is one in which the notice of

appeal is filed with the district court

within the time period prescribed by

statute. See, e.g., NRAP 4.... In the case of

an untimely appeal, no “appeal had been

taken from the judgment” within the

meaning of NRS 34.726(1) because

nothing has happened.

Moreover, to construe the statute any

other way would lead to absurd results...

If the appeal referred to in NRS 34.726(1)

meant any appeal, whether this court

obtained jurisdiction or not, petitioners

would be able to file successive notices of

appeal year after vear and thus

perpetually re-start the one-year

limitation period. Clearly, this is not what

the legislature envisioned. Indeed, this

court has already noted that the statutory

time periods are intended to prevent such

results. “Without such limitations on the

A-46

availability of post-conviction remedies,

prisoners could petition for relief in

perpetuity and thus abuse post-conviction

remedies.” Lozada v. State, 110 Nev. 349,

871 P.2d 944, 950 (1994)]

Dickerson, 967 P.2d at 1133-34

Although it is true that Dickerson was the first

Nevada case to hold that only a timely direct appeal tolls

the time in which to file a habeas petition under

NRS § 34.726(1), Dickerson was simply relying on the

plain language of NRS § 34.726(1) and NRAP 4(b), and

interpreting the intent of the legislature when it enacted

NRAP 4(b). By concluding that Nevada law was not well-

established prior to Collier's appeal, the majority opinion

overlooks the plain language of NRS § 34.726(1) and

NRAP 4(b)(1). It would be a supremely arrogant view of

judicial importance to say that only judges can make law

Law does not have to be in the form of a judge's decision

to be binding. Statutes and rules are also binding

Here, under the majoritys analysis, a Nevada

prisoner can completely defeat both NRS § 34.726(1) and

NRAP 4(b), and repeatedly re-start the time in which to

file a state habeas petition, simply by filing a motion to

correct an illegal sentence and then appealing the denial

of that motion--even if th» grounds alleged in the motion

to correct an illega’ sentence could have been brought up

ina timely direct uppeal from the judgment of conviction

or an appeal trom an identical earlier motion, as is the

case here

[here is no need tor such a rule. Under Nevada

law, petitioners who can show good cause tor the delay

can avoid the one-vear limitation under \NRS §& 4726/1)

\4/

Dickerson, 114 Nev. 1084, 967 P.2d 1132, 1134.

lo establish good cause to excuse a procedural default

under Nevada law, ‘a defendant must demonstrate that

some impediment external to the defense prevented him

from complying with the procedural rule that has been

violated.” Lozada, 871 P.2d at 946. Here, Collier has not

shown good cause because, under Nevada law, the

failure of counsel to advise a criminal defendant that he

has the right to file a direct appeal is not good cause for

failing to file a habeas petition within one vear after

judgment of conviction. Dickerson, 967 P.2d at 1134

(FN12]

FN12. Like Collier, Dickerson argued that his direct

appeal was late because his counsel failed to tell him he

had a right to appeal. 967 P.2d at 1133

Preor to and at the time of Collier's conviction in

1995, it was well-established law that ov/y the motions

specified in NRAP 4 would toll the time in which to file a

notice of appeal. See, ¢e.g., Chapman indus. v. United Ins

Cu., 110 Nev. 454, 874 P.2d 739, 741 (1994) (per curiam) (a

motion for reconsideration is not a telling motion under

NRAP 4(a) and therefore does not re-start or toll the time

in which to file a notice of appeal); Holiday Inn Downtown

Barnett, 103 Nev. 60, 732 P.2d 1376, 1379 (1987)

(per curiam) (a motion to vacate an order ~ffirming an

ddimuinistrative decision is not a tolling motion under

NRAP 4(a) and therefore does not re-start or toll the time

in which to tile a notice of appeal) This was all well

established law at the time of Collier's convict

IV. Conclusion

The majority opinion allows a_ petitioner to

resurrect an expired right to file a habeas petition

attacking a judgment of conviction simply by filing a

motion to correct an illegal sentence. This is contrary to

Nevada law and to this court's holdings in Loveland and

Moran.

Although the majority acknowledges that we have

no power to second guess state court interpretations of

state law, Estelle v. McGuire, 02 U.S. 62, 67-68, 112 S.Ct.

475, 116 L.Ed.2d 385 (1991), that is exactly what the

majority does. It second guesses NRS § 34.726(1) and

NRAP 4(b), not to mention our own burden of proof rule

stated in Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F3d 573, 586

(9th Cir.2003).

lf Collier's original July 5, 1995 judgment of

conviction is considered, Collier's November 16, 1998

notice of appeal was filed well after the thirty-day

deadline in NRAP 4(b), and his May 28, 1999 habeas

petition was filed well after the one-year deadline in

NRS § 34.726(1).

lf the March 26, 1997 amended judgment of

conviction is considered (which it should not be), Collier's

November 16, 1998 notice of appeal was filed after the

thirty-day deadline in NRAP 4(b), and his May 28, 1999

habeas petition was still filed after the one-year deadline

inn NRS § 34.726(1)

Phe one-year deadline in NRS § 34.726(1) was at all

times well-established law, and any way you look at this

AW

case, Collier missed that deadline. Accordingly, |

respectfully dissent.

APPENDIX B

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

STEVEN W. COLLIER,

Petitioner - Appellant,

No. 04-15017

D.C. No. CV-99-00641

vs ECR/ RAM

I as \ yas

BOB BAYER, ORDER

)

}

}

)

) District of Nevada,

)

)

)

Resp yndent Appellee )

)

Filed August 9, 2005

Before: B. FLETCHER, THOMAS, AND BEA, Circuit

judges

judges B. Fletcher and Thomas have voted to deny

the petition for panel rehearing. Judge Bea votes to grant the

petition for rehearing and petition for rehearing en ban

ludge Thomas votes to deny the petition for rehearing

en banc and Judge B. Fletcher so recommends

The full court has been advised of the petition for

rehearing en banc and no judge has requested a vote on

whether to rehear the matter cv haw. Fed. R App. P ta

The petition for panel rehearing and the petition for

rol rina « L ire dented

APPENDIX C

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEVADA

STEVEN WAYNE COLLIER, |)

) Case No. CV-N-99-641

Petitioner, ) ECR (RAM)

ORDER GRANTING

}

) CERTIFICATE OF

BOB BAYER, et al, ) APPEALABILITY

)

}

__Respondents. _

Filed December 30, 2003

Petitioner has filed a Notice of Appeal contesting

the dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 US.C. § 2254, and an Application for

Certificate of appealability (#45) Respondents have

opposed the application (#48). Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P

22(b), this Court must issue a Certificate of Appealability

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253 or state why a certificate shall

not msue. 28 USC. § 2253 (2) provides that a certificate of

appealability is appropriate only if the petitioner has made

a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional

right. The standard for the issuance of a certificate of

appealability calls for a “substantial showing of the denial

cf a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253 (c). The

Supreme Court has interpreted 28 U.S.C. § 2253 (c) as

follows:

Where a district court

has rejected the constitutional

claims on the merits, the

showing required to satisfy

§ 2253 (c) is straightforward:

The petitioner must

demonstrate that reasonable

jurists would find the district

court's assessment of the

constitutional claims

debatable or wrong. The

issue becomes somewhat

more complicated where, as

here, the district court

dismisses the petition based

on procedural grounds. We

hold as follows: When the

district court denies a habeas

petition on procedural

grounds without reaching the

prisoner's underlying

constitutional claim, a COA

should issue when the prison

shows, at least, that jurists of

reason would find it

debatable whether the

petition states a valid claim of

the denial of a constitutional

right and that jurists of reason

would find it debatable

whether the district court was

correct in its procedural

ruling

Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); see also James v.

Giles, 221 F.3d 1074, 1077-79 (9th Cir. 2000). The certificate

shall be granted.

The petition was dismissed because the claim

raised was procedurally barred and the court believed that

the petitioner failed to make an adequate showing of cause

and prejudice to overcome that bar. We are precluded

from considering the merits of procedurally barred claims

absent a showing of cause and prejudice. Coleman ov

Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991). Petitioner seeks a

certificate of appealability on three bases

That the procedural bar applied

by the Nevada Supreme Court

and relied upon by this court is

inadequate to foreclose federal

review.

NM

That Petitioner made an

adequate showing of cause

and prejudice to overcome the

procedural bar

3 That the propriety of applying

y

procedural bars to his

particular type of constitutional

claim is questionable among

jurists of reason

The single ground for relief before the court was

whether petitioners rights to effective assistance of

counsel under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment were

denied when his counsel failed to consult with him

regarding his right to an appeal and failed to file a notice

of appeal on his behalf

Petitioner has raised a valid showing of the denial

of a constitutional right. [he facts underlying his claim

paint a picture of potential prejudice to petitioner due to a

contlict of interest on the part of his defense counsel

Ihe second prong to our inquiry is whether jurists

of reason would find it debatable whether the district

court was correct in its procedural ruling. Slack, 529 US.

at 484. ‘The Nevada Supreme Court denied Petitioner's

appeal of the state district court's denial of his post-

conviction petition on the basis that it was filed more than

one year after his conviction became final. Petitioner

argues that Nevada law is unclear in its application of the

tolling provision to motions to correct illegal sentences.

He contends that the one-year period of time to file his

habeas petition was tolled pending the issuance of

remittitur of his appeal of denial of that motion.

We believe the circumstances are such that the

issue could be “debatable among jurists of reason,”

whether another court could resolve the issues differently,

or to cause us to decide that the showing was “adequate to

deserve encouragement to proceed further.”

Slack, 329 US. at 484, ciling, Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880,

893 (1983). The watershed Nevada case determining the

tolling of the one-year period for filing a state post-

conviction petition, Dickerson v. State, was not decided

until November 25, 1998. 114 Nev. 1084, 967 P.2d 1132

(1998). Petitioner's Motion to Correct [legal Sentence was

filed March 1997, Thus, until 1998, it was debatable in

Nevada exactly which remittitur must issue before the

one-year period of time to file a post-conviction petition

would begin to run. Thus, issue one and two of the

application should be allowed to proceed on appeal

The third issue proposed for this appeal raises an

obscure question of the appropriate avenue for addressing

the type of constitutional claim arising under the holding

of Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 120 S. Ct. 1029 (2000). Petitioner

brought his claim under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 and then, late in

the proceeding, sought leave to re-characterize his petition

one seeking a writ of auditea quercla, contending this was

defense or legal defect arising subsequent to the entry of

final judgment. Petitioner cites Doe v. INS, 120 F.3d 200,

203 (9 Cir. 1997) to support this contention. However,

Petitioner chose his avenue for relief and should be bound

by that choice. This issue does not meet the standard

imposed by 28 U.S.C. § 2253 (2) or Slack

A certificate of appealability will be granted as to basis

one and two of the application, but denied as to basis three

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Petitioner's

Application for Certification of Appealability (#45) is

granted in part and denied in part. Bases and one and

two of the application should be permitted to proceed on

appeal. Basis three should not.

December ECR

Dated this 30 day of january,-2004.

2003

Ls/__

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

APPENDIX D

AO 450 (REV__5/85) Judgment in a Civil Case ©

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

eee DISTRICT OF NEVADA

———

BOB BAYER, et al.,

STEVEN COLLIER, )

) JUDGMENT IN

Plaintiff, ) ACIVIL CASE

)

) CASE NUMBER

vs. ) CV-N-99-0641-

) ECR(RAM)

)

)

)

sj Detendants.

Filed March 28, 2003

Jury Verdict. This action came before the Court for a

trial by jury.

The issues have been tried and the jury has rendered its

verdict.

Decision by Court. This action came to trial or

hearing before the Court. The issues have been tried or

heard and a decision has been rendered.

X_Decision by Court. This action came to be considered

before the Court. The issues have been considered and a

decision has been rendered.

IT 1S ORDERED AND ADJUDGED

that petitioner's amended petition for writ of

habeas corpus (Docket #17) is denied. Claim one is

procedurally barred from federal review. The Clerk shall

enter judgment accordingly.

March 28, 2003.

Lance Wilson ___

Clerk

Ls/

___ Lisa Mann

Deputy Clerk

D-2

APPENDIX I

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEVADA

STEVEN COLLIER

) Case No. CV-N-99-641

Petitioner ECR (RAM)

Vs MEMORANDUM

} DECISION ORDER

BOB BAYER, et al

Respondents _)

Filed March 28, 2003

Petitioner, Steven Collier, filed an amended

petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 US.

§ 226 challenging his sentence and conviction (Docket

#14). Respondents, through their counsel the Attorney

C,eneral tor the State of Nevada, tiled a motion to dismiss

based upon exhaustion grounds. (Docket #21). The court

issued an order finding Ground One exhausted and

Ccround Two unexhausted. (Docket #28). Petitioner was

given the option of abandoning the unexhausted ground

and proceeding on the remaining fully exhausted ground,

or dismissing the petition. Petitioner chose to abandon the

unexhausted ground for relief. (Docket #29)

Respondents filed an answer to the remaining

ground for relief. (Docket #35). Petitioner sought leave of

court to file a traverse (Docket #36), which was granted

(Docket #37). Petitioner subsequently filed a notification

to the court that he would not be filing a traverse. (Docket

#38). Pending before the court at this time is Ground One

of the amended petition

[he court has reviewed the entire record in this

case, including all exhibits of the state proceedings, as well

as all of the pleadings, motions and other documents filed

in the record of this case. Following that review, the court

concludes that petitioner's claim is procedurally barred

from review

1. Procedural Background

On May 17, 1995, petitioner pled guilty to one

count of possession of a trafficking quantity of a controlled

substance. (Ex. 48/49). In the plea agreement, the parties

stipulated to a forty-five (45) year term of imprisonment.

(Ex. 50). The petitioner was sentenced to a forty-five (45)

vear term of imprisonment. (Ex. 50).

On May 20, 1997, Collier filed a motion to correct

illegal sentence. (Ex. 68). The State district court denied

the motion. (Ex. 70). Collier appealed the denial to the

Nevada Supreme Court (Ex. 71), and they issued an order

dismissing the appeal. (Ex. 78)

On November 16, 1998, petitioner filed a notice of

appeal concerning his conviction. (Ex. 74). The Nevada

Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, finding the notice of

appeal untimely, thereby divesting the court of

jurisdiction. (kx. 75)

On May 28, 1999, petitioner filed a post-conviction

petition for writ of habeas corpus. (Ex. 80). The State

district court denied the petition finding it was

proceaurally barred, and the petitioner unable to show

cause and prejudice to overcome the bar

(Ex. 8&7). Petitioner appealed the denial of his post

conviction petition to the Nevada Supreme Court

(Ex. 89). Prior to the Nevada Supreme Court deciding the

appeal, petitioner filed the instant petition for federal

habeas corpus. On January 11, 2001, the Nevada Supreme

Court issued an order affirming the State district court's

denial of the post-conviction petition. (Ex. 97)

2. Legal Discussion

The court has thoroughly reviewed the tacts ot thir

case and has considered carefully all of the legal points

and authorities presented by petitioner and respondents

Following that review, the court ts tully appraised of the

facts and circumstances regarding this matter, and tinds

that further briefing by the parties is neither warranted

nor required. Further, the court finds that the factual

record has been adequately developed in the state courts

relating to the issues presented in this petition. The court

finds that no further factual development via an

evidentiary hearing is required.

3. Procedural Default

The Federal courts will not review a question of

state law decided by a state court if the decision of the

State court rests on a state law ground that is independent

ot tederal question and adequate to support the

judgement. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729 (1991).

This rule applies whether the state law ground is

substantive or procedural and whether the default was

caused by a failure to raise a claim at trial, a failure to raise

a particular claim on appeal, or a failure to appeal at all

Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750.

it is well established that “[i}n order to constitute

adequate and independent grounds sufficient to support a

finding of procedural default, a state rule must be clear,

consistently applied, and well established at the time of

the petitioner's purported default.” Wells v. Maass, 28 F.

3d 1005, 1010 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing ord v. Georgia, 498 US.

411, 424-25 (1991); and County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140,

150-51 & nn. 8-10 (1979)).

Nevada law provides in pertinent part: “Unless

there is good cause shown for delay, a petition that

challenges the validity of a judgment must be filed within

1 year after entry of judgment of conviction or, if an

appeal has been taken from the judgment, within 1 year

after the supreme court issues its remitittur.” Nev. Rev.

Stat. § 34.726

In order to impose a procedural bar, the State court

must clearly state that it relied on the procedural violation

as its reason for rejecting the claims. See Siripongs v.

Calderon, 35 F.3d 1308 (9 Cir. 1994). Here, the Nevada

Supreme Court clearly stated in its order that the petition

was procedurally barred. (Ex. 97).

The Nevada Supreme Court has consistently

applied the state rule which prohibits review of the merits

of a claim presented in an untimely petition, unless the

petitioner demonstrates cause. Moran v. McDaniel, 80 F.3d

1261, 1269 (9 Cir. 1996). Thus, the state procedural

default rule at issue is adequate and independent.

Clearly, the petitioner's post-conviction petition for

writ of habeas corpus was filed more than one year after the

judgment and is untimely. Petitioner has violated the

state's procedural default rule. Therefore, Claim One of the

amended petition is barred from federal habeas review,

unless the petitioner can establish cause for the procedural

bar and prejudice by not hav® « he claim addressed on the

merits, or demonstrate a ‘undamental miscarriage of

justice. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 749-50 (1991).

E-7

Cause for a procedural default must ordinarily turn

on whether the prisoner can show that some objective

factor external to the defense impede counsel's efforts to

comply with the state’s procedural rule. Thus, cause may

be established by showing that “the factual or legal basis

for a claim was not reasonably available to counsel” or

that there was “some interference by officials that made

compliance impracticable.” Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478,

488 (quoting Prown v. Allen, 344 U. S. 443, 486 (1953)).

Examples of such external factors include the discovery of

new evidence, a change in the law, and interference by

state officials. Id.; see also Buffalo v. Sunn, 854 F.2d 1158,

1163 (9 Cir. 1988).

Assn, ing petitioner was able to show cause for his

procedural default, he also must show prejudice arising

trom the alleged constitutional errors. Petitioner must

show more than the mere possibility of prejudice crated by

the trial court's constitutional errors. Petitioner must

show actual and substantial disadvantage, which infected

the entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions.

United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982).

Petitioner argues that he can establish cause and

prejudice to excuse the procedural default. See Petitioner's

Legal Brief on Procedural Default, pp. 6-13. Petition

argues that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance

when he operated under a conflict of interest, and failed to

consult with him concerning his right to pursue a direct

appeai. Ineffective assistance of counsel may constitute

cause, if the representation amounts to an independent

Sixth Amendment violation. Bonin v. Vasquez, 999 F. 2:

425, 428 (9t Cir 1993).

[he United States Supreme Court has held that

“|clounsel has a constitutionally imposed duty to consult

with the defendant about an appeal when there is reason

to think either (1) that a rational defendant would want to

appeal (because there were non-frivolous grounds for

appeal), or (2) that his particular defendant reasonably

demonstrated to counsel that he was interested in

appealing.” Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 480 (2000).

“In making this determination, courts must take into

account all of the information counsel knew or should

have known.” Id. “Only by considering all relevant

factors in a given case can a court properly determine

whether a rational defendant would have desired an

appeal or that the particular defendant sufficiently

demonstrated to counsel an interest in an appeal.” Id.

If the court determines that counsel's performance

in failing td consult with the defendant about an appeal

“fell below an objective standard of reasonableness”, the

court must then apply the second prong of the Strickland!

test which requires the defendant to show prejudice from

counsel's deficient performance. Roe v. Flores-Ortexga,

528 U.S. at 480-82. In order to show prejudice, a defendant

| Strickland @. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)

E-10

“must demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability

that, but for counsel's deficient failure to consult with him

about an appeal, he would have timely appealed.” Roe v.

Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. at 484.

In considering whether petitioner's trial counsel

had a constitutionally imposed duty to consult with

petitioner concerning an appeal, the court must examine

all of the relevant faciors.

Petitioner alleges that he had seven appellate issues

he would have raised on direct appeal, had such as appeal

been taken. See Amended Petition, pp. 17-21. Despite

allegations to the contrary, non of petitioner's alleged

issues are potentially meritorious claims.

First, petitioner alleges that his right to conflict free

representation, due process, equal protection and a

reliable sentence were violated when he was represented

by the public defender’s office. The Sixth Amendment

guarantee of effective assistance of counsel includes the

right to counsel’s undivided loyalty. Wood v. Georgia,

450 U.S. 261, 271-72 (1981); United States v. Baker, 256 F.3d

855, 859-860 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing United States v. Mett, 65

F.3d 1531, 1534 (9th Cir. 1995)). To prevail on an

ineffective assistance of counsel claim based upon conflict

of interest, petitioner must show that “an actual conflict of

interest adversely affected his lawyer's performance.”

Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 350 (1980).

Petitioner has failed to demonstrate an actual

conflict of interest on the part of the public detender’s

office. Petitioner contends that the public defender’s office

represented the petitioner at the same time that thev

represented another person who was used as an informant

in petitioner's case. A review of the record reveals that the

informant was represented by the public defender’s office

in early 1994. (See Ex. 95). The informant entered into a

guilty plea, and judgment was entered in March 1994. (See

Ex. 95). On March 23, 1194, the informant was sentenced

to an indeterminate term-of probation not to exceed three

vears. (Seve Judgment, Ex. 95). The criminal information

was not filed against the petitioner until June 24, 1994.

Petitioner plead guilty on May 17, 1995. Thus, petitioner's

contention that the two were represented by the same

office at the same time is belied by the record.

Second, petitioner claims that his trial counsel was

ineffective for working under an actual conflict of interest.

Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel may not be

raised on direct appeal in Nevada. Pellegrini v. Nevada,

117 Nev. 860 (2001). Thus, even if counsel had filed a

direct appeal, petitioner would not have been able to raise

this issue on direct appeal.

Third, petitioner states that he would have argued

that the trial court's failure to grant him substitute counsel

and inquire into the alleged conflict between the petitioner

and the public defender’s office violated petitioner's

constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel.

In his amended petition, petitioner stated that he

had a conflict with the public defender’s office, because

they did not show up to represent him in another pending

case, and the public defender advised petitioner to waive

his preliminary hearing despite the fact that petitioner

provided the public defender with a letter from private

counsel requesting a motion to dismiss be made a the

preliminary hearing. Despite petitioner's contentions to

the contrary, his allegations do not amount to a conflict of

interest.

Fourth, petitioner argues tnat his arrest and

conviction violated his due process rights, because the

State violated the terms of its substantiai assistance

agreement. A_ review of the record indicates the

substantial assistance agreement did not provide the

petit:oner with permission to possess narcotics.

Possession of a narcotic was allowed only in a “controlled

transaction”. (See Ex. 11). Petitioner has failed to

E-14

demonstrate that this is a potentially meritorious claim.

Fifth, petitioner claims that the trial court erred in

accepting petitioner's guilty plea without an affirmative

showing that it was entered knowingly, intelligently and

voluntarily. Challenges to the validity of a guilty plea

may not be raised on direct appeal in Nevada, they must

first be raised in the context of a post-conviction petition

for writ of habeas corpus. See Mitchell v. State, 109 Nev.

137, 138 (1993).

Sixth, petitioner asserts that the State pursued two

separate actions arising out of the same arrest, thereby

violating the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth

Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.

Petitioner claims that the Nevada Department of

Taxation’s April 25, 1994, letters which imposed a tax debt

and fine in the amount ot just under two million dollars on

the petitioner is a punishment, and that the State's

subsequent criminal prosecution is a second punishment

for the same crime. The Nevada Department of Taxation

has assessed the petitioner with a drug tax which,

although it is a civil penaltv, could arguably constitute

punishment if the petitioner had paid the tax. Petitioner

makes no allegation that he paid the tax. A review of the

record -demonstrates no payment of the tax, nor a

judgment or other enforcement procedure by the

government. Since petitioner did not pay the drug tax,

and the government did not seek to enforce the drug tax,

petitioner has not been punished within the meaning of

the Double Jeopardy Clause. U.S. v. Sanchez-Escareno,

950 F.2d 193 (5" Cir. 1991). Therefore, this claim lacks merit.

Finally, petitioner claims that the statute under

which he was sentenced was subsequently amended to

provide a lesser penalty for those later convicted under the

same statute. Petitioner claims that the statute's provision

limiting its application to offenses occurring before its date

of implementation is unconstitutional. Petitioner fails to

F-16

articulate any legal basis for his assertions.

An examina, of other relevant factors reveals

that petitioner, through his trial counsel, negotiated a plea

bargain for the disposition of the criminal charges.

(Ex. 49). Pursuant to the plea bargain, petitioner plead

guilty to one count of possession of a trafficking quantity

of a controlled substance. (Ex. 48). Petitioner benefited

from the plea bargain in that he plead guilty to second

level trafficking, as opposed to the third level trafficking

with which he was originally charged. (Ex. 49, p.3).

Additionally, the State dismissed another pending third

level trafficking case and a simple possession charge

against the petitioner. (Ex. 49, p.3). Petitioner stipulated

to a forty-five (45) year sentence. (Ex. 49, p.3).

At sentencing, the trial judge gave petitioner the

opportunity to make a statement as to why sentence

should not be imposed. Petitioner declined to make a

statement. (Ex. 50, p.5). The trial judge noted that the

E-17

parties has stipulated to a forty-five (45) year sentence,

which was also the sentence recommended in the pre-

sentence report. (Ex. 50, p.5). The judge recounted the

physical evidence against the petitioner and stated that

“{t|his demonstrates beyond doubt the defendant is a drug

dealer and has been involved in narcotics transactions for

a substantial period of time.” (Ex. 50, pp. 5-6).

Following sentencing the State dismissed the

5 5

pending third level trafficking charge and simple

possession charge as agreed to in the plea agreement.

(Ex. 55). Petitioner received the benefits he negotiated for

in the plea bargain process.

A review of the record reveals that petitioner did

not file a notice of appeal, or any other document

indicating that he wished to appeal his conviction.

Petitioner makes no allegation that he ever made any

indication to his counsel that he wished to appeal.

A review of the totality of the circumstances shows

that petitioner has failed to demonstrate that counsel

should have known that petitioner would have wanted to

appeal. Therefore, petitioner has been unable to establish

an independent Sixth Amendment violation.

Petitioner also argues that he was unable to timely

file his post-conviction petition because of interference by

State government officials. Specifically, petitioner claims

that he tried, ultimately unsuccessfully, to obtain

documents for over one year. Whether or not petitioner

had difficulties in obtaining these documents is immaterial

to petitioner's ability to timely file his petition. The

documents petitioner was attempting to obtain are not

necessary to file the petition.

Petitioner's claims are insufficient to establish cause

to overcome the procedural bar.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that petitioner's

amended petition for writ of habeas corpus (Docket #17) is

DENIED. Claim one is procedurally barred from federal

review. The Clerk shall enter judgment accordingly.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that petitioner's

metion to accept a late pleading (Docket #39) is

GRANTED. Petitioner's motion to refashion the pending

28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition into a motion to issue writ of

Audita Querela (Docket #40) is DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that respondents’

motion to strike petitioner's legal brief on procedural

default and request to refashion pending 2254 petition as a

request to issue writ of Audita Querela (Docket #41) is

DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that petitioner's

request for an evidentiary hearing (Docket #40) is

DENIED.

Dated this 28 day of March, 2003.

/s/

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

APPENDIX F

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEVADA

STEVEN COLLIER, )

Petitioner, CV-N-99-641-ECR

vs. 7 ORDER

BOB BAYER, et al., |

Respondent. .

Filed August 28, 2001

Respondents filed a motion to dismiss (421) the

petition for writ of habeas corpus. [Petitioner filed an

opposition to the respondents’ motion to dismiss (#24). to

which respondents replied (#25). After the Nevada Supreme

Court dismissed petitioner's appeal of the denial of his state

habeas corpus petition on February 6, 2001, petitioner filed

and addendum to his opposition (#26), to which

respondents replied (#27). For the following reasons, the

court shall GRANT the motion to dismiss (#21).

I-1

In their motion to dismiss (#21) and other related

4

motions (#25, 27), respondents assert that both grounds in

the instant petition are unexhausted. Although petitioner,

in his opposition (#24) and addendum (#26), repeatedly

asserted that petitioner exhausted all grounds in state

court, this court finds that petitioner exhausted Ground |

in state court, yet failed to exhaust Ground II of the instant

petition

Both the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty

Act of 1996 and federal case law have specified the

requirements for exhausting state remedies before a

petitioner may file a petition for writ of habeas corpus in

the federal courts. Until a state prisoner has exhausted his

available state remedies for all claims raised, a federal

court will not grant the prisoner's petition for habeas

relict. Rose i mudy, 455 U.S. 509, 510 (1982) To exhaust a

claim, petitioner must have “fairly presented” that specific

claim to the Supreme Court of Nevada Picard

Conner, 404 US. 270,275-76 (1971); Sclrwartzmiller vo

Gardner, 752 F.2d 1341, 1344 (9th Cir. 1984). Furthermore,

a petitioner cannot merely allege exhaustion; the record

must show that the petitioner sought review in the highest

state court. Cartwriglit v. Cupp, 650 F.2d 1103, 1104 (9 Cir.

1981) (per curiam), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1023 (1982). The

petitioner also “must have either referenced specific

provisions of the federal constitution or statutes or cited to

federal case law” in order to exhaust federal claims in state

court. Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 670 (9% Cir. 2000).

A federal court cannot hear a mixed petition (one that

contains both exhausted and unexhausted claims for

habeas corpus relief). Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 521-22

(1982); Greenawalt v. Stewart, 105 F.3d 1268, 1273 (9° Cir

1997), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1102, (1997)

The instant petition contains two grounds tor

habeas relief. Ground | claims that petitioner's Sixth and

Fourteenth Amendments rights were violated when

petitioner's trial counsel failed to inform him that he had a

right to appeal his guilty plea, and when trial counsel

failed to file a notice of appeal. Ground II claims that

petitioner's Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were

violated when the trial court judge failed to inform

petitioner, after accepting his guilty plea, that he had a

right to appeal. In its review of the state court record, the

court finds that Ground I of the instant petition was

exhausted. Petitioner never specified which of his state

court pleadings contained the arguments in Ground II of

his federal petition. Nor did the court discover any thing

in the state court record te indicate that petitioner fairly

presented the claims in Ground II to the Nevada Supreme

Court. Thus, the court finds that Ground II of the instant

petition is unexhausted.

Therefore, the court shall grant respondents’

motion to dismiss petition as mixed. Since the court did

not examine the merits of the respondents’ procedural

default arguments in their motion to dismiss, the court

shall deny the procedural default arguments without

prejudice, subject to renewal by incorporation at a later time

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that respondents’

motion to dismiss (#21) is GRANTED. Petitioner shall

have thirty (30) days from the entry of this order on the

record within which to inform the court whether

petitioner wishes to formally and forever abandon the

claims for relief set out in Ground II and wishes to pursue

his petition with Ground I only. Alternatively, petitioner

shall have thirty (30) days from the entry of this order on

the record within which to inform the court that he wishes

to return to state court to completely exhaust his petition

The failure to timely inform the court of his decision will

result in the dismissal of the petition without prejudice as

a mixed petition.

Dated this 27 day of August, 2001

Ls/

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGI

APPENDIX G

IN THE SUPREME COURT

OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

STEVEN COLLIER, )

)

Appellant, ) No. 34762

)

vs )

)

WARDEN, NEVADA STATE )

PRISON, JOHN IGNACIO )

)

RSE SEs

Filed January 11, 2001

ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE

This is a proper person appeal from an order of the

district court dismissing appellant's post-conviction

petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

On July 5, 1995, the district court convicted

appellant, pursuant to a guilty plea, of one count of

possession of a trafficking quantity of a controlled

substance. The district court sentenced appellant to serve

a term of forty-five vears in the Nevada State Prison. On

March 26, 1997, the district court entered an amended

judgment of conviction to include the relevant statutory

provisions under which appellant was convicted. This

court dismissed appellant's untimely appeal from his

judgment of conviction and sentence for lack of

jurisdiction. Collier v. State, Docket No. 33382 (Order

Dismissing Appeal, February 3, 1999).

On March 21, 1997, appellant filed a proper person

motion to correct an illegal sentence in the district court.

On May 28, 1997, the district court denied appellant's

motion. This court dismissed appellant's appeal. Collier

v. State, Docket No. 30578 (Order Dismissing Appeal,

May 13, 1999).

On May 28, 1999, appellant filed a proper person

post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the

district court. The State opposed the petition. Appellant

tiled a reply. Pursuant to NRS 34.750 and 34.770, the

district court declined to appoint counsel to represent

G-

hN

appellant or to conduct an evidentiary hearing. On

August 10, 1999, the district court dismissed appellant's

petition. This appeal followed.

Appellant filed his petition approximately four

years after entry of the judgment of conviction and one

and one-half years after entry of the amended judgment of

conviction. Thus, appellant's petition was untimely filed

See NRS 34.726 (1). Appellant's petition was procedurally

barred absent a demonstration of cause for the delay and

prejudice. See id

In an attempt to demonstrate cause for the delay,

appellant argued that he was deprived of a direct appeal

because his trial counsel failed to inform him of his right

to appeal. Based upon our review of the record on appeal,

we conclude that the district court did not err in

determining that appellant failed to demonstrate sufficient

cause to overcome his delay See Harris v. Warden,

114 Nev. 956, 964 P.2d 785 (1998); Lozada v. State,

110 Nev. 349, 871 P.2d 944 (1994).

Having reviewed the record on appeal, and for the

reasons set forth above, we conclude that appellant is not

entitled to relief and that briefing and oral argument are

unwarranted. See Luckett v. Warden, 91 Nev. 681, 682,

541 P.2d 910, 911 (1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1077 (1976).

Accordingly, we affirm the order of the district court.

It is so ORDERED.-

_Ls/ =

Shearing

Ls/ AB PEaTCO BO

Agosti

cee sess a: vee

Leavitt

ce Hon. Brent T. Adams, District Judge

Attorney General

Washoe County District Attorney

Steven Collier

Washoe County Cler«

We have considered all proper person documents filed or

received in this matter, and we conclude that the relief requested iS

mnt warranted

APPENDIX H

IN THE SUPREME COURT

OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

STEVEN W. COLLIER, )

)

Appellant, ) No. 30578

)

VS. )

)

THE STATE OF NEVADA )

)

Respondent, dete ey

Filed May 13, 1999

ORDER DISMISSING APPEAL

This is a proper person appeal from an order of the

district court denying appellant's motion to correct an illegal

sentence. On July 5, 1995, appellant was convicted pursuant to

a guilty plea of one count of possession of a trafficking quantity

of a controlled substance of between 14 and 28 grams.’ See

NRS 453.3385(2). The district court sentenced appellant to

serve a term of forty -five vears in the Nevada State Prison.

On May 26, 1997, the district court entered an amended judgment

on conviction, which included the relevant statutory provisions

under which appellant was convicted

On March 21, 1997, appellant filed a motion to

correct an illegal sentence in the district court. On

May 28, 1997, the district court denied the motion, and this

appeal followed. In the motion, appellant contended that

his forty-five year sentence was illegal because the statute

under which he was convicted, NRS 453.3385(2), provides

for a minimum term of not less than two years and a

maximum term of not more than fifteen years

We conclude that appellant's contention lacks

merit. At the time of appellant's offense in March 1994,

NRS 453.3385(2) provided for a sentence of life or a

definite term of no less than ten years. Appellant's forty-

five year sentence was within the statutory limit. We

recognize that NRS 453.3385(2) was amended in 1995 to

reduce the penalty to a minimum term of two vears and a

maximum term of fifteen vears. 1995 Nev. Stat., ch. 443,

§ 296, at 1288. Hlowever, that amendment became

effective on July 1, 1995, and does not apply to offenses

H-2

committed before that date. 1995 Nev. Stat., ch. 443,

§§ 393-394, at 1340. Thus, the amendment does not apply

to appellant's sentence, as he committed the offense in

1994 Therefore, we conclude that the district court

properly denied appellant's motion

Having reviewed the record on appeal and for the

reasons set forth above, we conclude that appellant in not

entitled to relief and that briefing and oral argument are

unwarranted. See Luckett v. Warden, 91 Nev. 681, 682, 541

P.2d 910, 911 (1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1077 (1976)

Accordingly, we

ORDER this appeal dismissed. *

PME MER sia

Young

Shearing

Leavitt

We have considered all proper person documents filed of

received in this matter, and we conclude that the relief requested is

not warranted. We deny appellant s motion for voluntary dismissal

as mow

Hon. Brent T. Adams, District Judge

Attorney General

Washoe County District Attorney

Steven W. Collier

Washoe County Clerk

APPENDIX I

IN THE SUPREME COURT

OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

STEVEN WAYNE COLLIER,

Appellant, No. 33382

VS.

STATE OF NEVADA

Nm ee ee eee eet eee”

Respondent.

Filed February 3, 1999

ORDER DISMISSING APPEAL

This is a proper person appeal from a judgment of

conviction. Our review of this appeal indicates that the district

nm

court entered the judgment of conviction on July 5, 1995,

Appellant did not file the notice of appeal, however, until

November 16, 1998, well after the expiration of the thirty-day

appeal period prescribed by NRAP 4 (b). An untimely notice of

appeal fails to vest jurisdiction in this court. See Lozada v.

State, 110 Nev. 349, 871 P.2d 944 (1994). Accordingly, we

conclude that we lack jurisdiction to consider this appeal,

and we

ORDER this appeal dismissed

Ls/ ie

Young

Shearing

= SF SEE ES oe ar

Leavitt

cc Hon. Brent T. Adams, District Judge

Hon. Frankie Sue Del Papa, Attorney General

Hon. Richard A. Gammick, District Attorney

Steven Collier

Amy Harvey, Clerk

In the notice of appeal, appellant contends that his trial counsel

tailed to intorm him regarding his right to directly appeal his

conviction. We note that such a claim should be raised in the first

instance na post conviction petition tor a writ of habeas oOrpus

filed mm the district court. See Lozada v. State, 110 Nev. 349, 87]

2d 844 (1994) We express no opinion concerning whether

yppellant could satisty the procedural requirements detailed in

NRS chapter 44 or whether appellant would be entitled to reliet

pursuant to Lozada. See also Dickerson v. State, 114 Ne 967

P2d 1132 ICR (Adv. Op. No. 119, November 25, 1998): Harris \

Warden, 1f4 Nev YH4 P Od 7S9 (1998

APPENDIX J

No. CR94-1483

Dept. No. 6

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

OF THE STATE OF NEVADA, IN AND FOR THE

COUNTY OF WASHOE

STATE OF NEVADA,

Plaintiff, ) Reporter: R. Molezzo

VS. )

) AMENDED

STEVEN WAYNE COLLIER, ) JUDGMENT

Defendant )

)

Filed March 26, 1997

No sufficient cause being shown by Defendant as

to why judgment should not be pronounced against him,

the Court rendered judgment as follows:

Phat Steven Wayne Collier is guilty of the crime of

Possession of a Tratficking Quantity of a Controlled

Substance, a violation of NRS 453.3385 and NRS 453.3405,

a felony as charged in Count | of the Amended

Information, and that he be punished by imprisonment in

the Nevada State Prison for the term of forty-five (45)

years and payment of a fine in the amount of One

Hundred Thousand Doilars ($100, 000.00). The Defendant

is given credit for four hundred ten (410) days time served

commencing at the beginning of his term. The Defendant

is further ordered to reimburse the County of Washoe the

sum of Twenty-five Dollars ($25.00) for the statutory

administrative assessment fee and the Sixty Dollar ($60.00)

chemical analysis fee.

Dated this 5th day of July, 1995.

District Judge

APPENDIX K

No. CR94-1483

Dept. No. 6

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

OF THE STATE OF NEVADA, IN AND FOR THE

COUNTY OF WASHOE

STATE OF NEVADA,

Plaintiff,

Reporter: R. Molezzo

vs.

STEVEN WAYNE COLLIER,

Defendant.

JUDGMENT

)

)

)

)

)

ee

Filed July 5, 1995

No sufficient cause being shown by Defendant as

to why judgment should not be pronounced against him,

the Court rendered judgment as follows:

That Steven Wayne Collier is guilty of the crime of

Possession Of A Trafficking Quantity Of A Controlled

Substance as charged in Count I of the Amended

Information and that he be punished by imprisonment in

the Nevada State Prison for the term of forty-five (45)

years and payment of a fine in the amount of $100,000.00.

Ihe defendant is further ordered to pay the $60.00

chemical analysis fee and the $25.00 administrative

assessment fee. The defendant is given credit for 410 days

time served commencing at the beginning of his term.

Dated this 7#h day of July, 1995.

~3

B.A.

[s/ TERM ENY See

DISTRICT JUDGE

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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