Prologue — Lee v. State Compensation Insurance Fund

Supreme Court, U.8.

DO eres

05-423 OCT 3- 2009

e OFFICE OF THE CLERK

oO.

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

RUSSELL L, LEE,

Petitioner,

STATE COMPENSATION INSURANCE FUND,

Respondent.

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

RUSSELL L. LEE

4100 Massachusetts Ave., N.W.

#1319

Washington, D.C. 20016

(202) 364-1187

Petitioner Pro Se.

October 3, 2005...

Westingion,0.C + THIEL PRESS + (202) 328-3286

(1)

QUESTION PRESENTED

Did the District of Columbia Superior Court violate

the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution

and its implementing federai statute by failing to treat

Plaintiff’s prior California award as res judicata?

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

The parties to the proceeding are as stated on the cover

of this Petition For Writ Of Certiorari.

— - —

i LT Ee El

eg aS

]

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

f

!

Petitioner Russell L. Lee asks the Court to issue a

writ of certiorari to review the judgment of the District

of Columbia Court of Appeals, affirming the judgment of

the Superior Court.

OPINIONS BELOW

The order of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the

judgment of the trial court issued on June 8, 2005, and

is reproduced herein as Appendix A (p. la). The order

denying rehearing issued on July 6, 2005, and is repro-

duced herein as Appendix B (p. 8a). The order of the

Superior Court issued on March 31, 2004, and is repro-

duced herein as Appendix C (p. 10a). The orders are

unpublished. 3

JURISDICTION

The District of Columbia Court of Appeals entered its

opinion on June 8, 2005. Petitioner’s petition for

rehearing was denied July 6, 2005. The Court has juris-

diction pursuant to 28 U.S.C, Section 1254(1).

RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISION

This case entails the interpretation and application of

Full Faith and Credit, Title 28 U.S.C. Section 1738.

(App. D, p. 12a).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This petition seeks review of a decision of the Court

of Appeals for the District of Columbia upholding a

2

decision of the Honorable Michael L. Rankin, Associate

Judge of the Superior Court, who dismissed Plaintiff's

complaint filed to enforce a workers’ compensation

award. A copy of award is attached hereto as Appen-

dix E (p. 5a).

Petitioner believes that the decision of the Court of

Appeals is inconsistent with numerous controlling deci-

sions of this Court.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Petitioner’s right to enforce his award in the District

of Columbia Superior Court is guaranteed by the Due

Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the.

Constitution of the United States.

ARGUMENT

The complaint alleges that jurisdiction is founded on

28 U.S.C. 1738. The trial court granted Defendant’s

motion and dismissed the complaint on grounds that

“Plaintiff failed to show that the D.C. Superior Court

has personal jurisdiction, and that, in any event, he

failed to state a cognizable claim.” Super.Ct.Civ.R.

12(b)(2) and (b)(6).

In affirming, the Court of Appeals relied on deter

national Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, as con-

trolling authority. The issue in International Shoe —

Must a foreign corporation pay certain taxes in the forum

state? — turned on local law and no foreigi: judgment was

involved. Local law has no application ir. a diversity suit

predicated on a foreign judgment.

The statute merely provides the standard to be used

in evaluating any judicial acts introduced into pro-

ceedings over which the court already has jurisdic-

tion. In this case plaintiff has founded jurisdiction

on diversity of citizenship, and Congress, by the

exercise of its express and implied powers, has fed- |

eralized all relevant legal questions — a diversity

case in which there are no issues of forum state law.

Hazen Research, Inc. v. Omega Minerals, Inc., 497 F.2d

151, 156 (5th Cir. 1974). The court would have realized

that full faith and credit confers personal jurisdiction on

the courts, had it looked to the res judicata law of Cali-

fornia. Migra v. Warren City School Dist. Bd. of Ed., 465

U.S. 75. Under California law,

“ *Res judicata’ describes the preclusive effect of

a final judgment on the merits. Res judicata or

claim preclusion prevents relitigation of the same

cause of action in a second suit between the same

parties or parties in privity with them. Collateral

estoppel, or issue preclusion, ‘precludes relitigation

of issues argued and decided in prior proceedings.’

{Citation.] Under the doctrine of res judicata, if

a plaintiff prevails in an action, the cause is merged

into the judgment and may not be asserted in a sub-

sequent lawsuit... .”. (Mycogen Corp. v. Monsanto

Co. (2002).

Richard B. Levine, Inc. v. Higashi, GO32995 (Cal.App.

2005). Because Respondent did not litigate failure-to-

state-a-claim in the original suit, it cannot do so here,

A fundamental precept of common-law adjudica-

tion, embodied in the related doctrines of collat-

eral estoppel and res judicata, is that a “‘right, ques-

tion or fact distinctly put in issue and directly

determined by a court of competent jurisdic-

tion . . . cannot be disputed in a subsequent suit

between the same parties or their privies... .”’

4

Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153 (1979).

“To preclude parties from contesting matters that they

have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate procects

their adversaries from the expense and vexation attend-

ing multiple lawsuits, conserves judicial resources, and

fosters reliance on judicial action by minimizing the

possibility of inconsistent decisions.” /d.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

I.

THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS VIO-

LATES PETITIONER’S RIGHT TO THE APPLICATION

OF PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS HEREIN.

“There can be no dispute that the Supremacy Clause

invalidates all state laws that conflict or interfere with

an Act of Congress.” Rose v. Arkansas State Police,

‘ 479 U.S. 1, 3 (1986). The effectual decision of the

Court of Appeals, that local law dominates federal law,

clashes with the federal interest in uniform dispute reso-

lution,

Il.

THE PROVISION IN THE CONSTITUTION MAKING IT

THE DUTY OF COURTS IN ONE STATE TO GIVE FULL

FAITH AND CREDIT TO THE DECREES AND LEGIS-

LATIVE ACTS OF OTHER STATES IS MANDATORY.

THE SUPERIOR COURT HAD A MINISTERIAL ACT TO

PERFORM — bh OBEDIENCE TO THE FULL FAITH AND

CREDIT COMMAND.

Respondent at no point below addressed in the leas

an integral part of the full faith and credit domain, res

judicata.

5

“The principles of res judicata apply to questions of

jurisdiction as well as to other issues.” American Surety

Co. v. Baldwin, 287 U.S. 156, 166. Plaintiff is entitled as

a matter of right to have his California decree given effect

in the District of Columbia.

CONCLUSION

The petition for writ of certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

RUSSELL L. LEE

4100 Massachusetts Ave., N.W.

#1319

Washington, D.C. 20016

(202) 364-1187

Petitioner Pro Se.

October 3, 2005

la

APPENDIX A

[ Filed June 8, 2005]

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS

No, 04-CV-778

RUSSELL LEE, APPELLANT,

v. CA-414-04

STATE COMPENSATION INSURANCE

FUND, APPELLEE.

Appeal from the Superior Court of the

District of Columbia

Civil Division

(Hon. Michael L. Rankin, Trial Judge)

(Submitted June 7, 2005 — Decided June 8, 2005)

Before SCHWELB, FARRELL and REID, Associate

' Judges.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND JUDGMENT

PER CURIAM: On January 20, 2004, the appellant,

Russell Lee, filed a complaint in the Superior Court

against the appellee, State Compensation Insurance Fund

(“Fund”’), and “adjusting agent for the California Depart-

2a

ment of Corrections,” alleging that the Fund had failed

to comply with a judgment entered in October 1990 in

California. By order dated March 31, 2004, the trial

court dismissed Mr, Lee's complaint for want of personal

jurisdiction and for failing to state a claim. We affirm.

FACTUAL SUMMARY

The record before the court reflects that on January

20, 2004, Mr. Lee filed a complaint in the Superior

Court against the State Compensation Insurance Fund

(“Fund”).! Mr. Lee alleged that the Fund had failed

to comply with a judgment, entered by a California state

court, awarding him disability benefits for an injury “to

his heart and psyche” that he suffered “during the per-

iod [from] October 17, 1979 to May 2, 1985,” while an

employee of the California Department of Corrections.

On February 11, 2004, the Fund filed a motion to dis

miss Mr. Lee’s complaint, asserting that the Superior

Court lacked personal jurisdiction over the Fund, a

non-resident entity, to adjudicate Mr. Lee’s claim. The

Fund also asserted that Mr. Lee’s complaint should be

dismissed for insufficient service of process and because

he had failed to state a claim for which relief could be

granted.

By order dated March 31, 2004, the trial court dis-

missed Mr. Lee’s compiaint with prejudice. The trial

court concluded that Mr. Lee “failed to show that the

D.C. Superior Court has personal jurisdiction,” and that,

a

I The State Compensation Insurance Fund maintains that it

is an ‘insurer of last resort’ which was “‘created by the California

legislature to . . . [insure] California employers who are required

to secure workers’ compensation insurance in the event their

employees suffer industrial accidents or injuries.”

3a

_in any event, he had “failed to state a cognizable claim.”

On April 7, 2004, Mr. Lee filed a motion for reconsid-

eration which the trial court denied on May 20, 2004. '

On June 21, 2004, Mr. Lee filed a timely notice of

appeal.

’

ANALYSIS

Relying on the doctrine of res judicata, Mr. Lee asserts

that the Fund was prevented from asserting a personal

jurisdiction defense because it had failed to raise the

defense in the California proceedings when the case was

first litigated. Mr. Lee also asserts that “[the Fund]

should have raised its failure-to-state-a-claim issue in

California, not in the District.”2 We affirm.

“As an initial matter, we note that [Mr. Lee], as the

plaintiff, has the burden of establishing that the trial

court had personal jurisdiction over [the Fund], the...

defendant in the litigation.” Holder v. Haarmann &

Retmer Corp., 779 A.2d 264, 269 (D.C. 2001) (citing

Parsons v. Mains, 580 A.2d 1329, 1330 (D.C. 1990)).

“A court may assert personal jurisdiction over a non-

resident defendant where service of process is authorized

by statute and where the service of process so authorized

2in the conclusion of his opening brief, Mr. Lee states that:

“Orders disregarding full faith and credit cannot invalidate the

judgment.” To the extent that he relies on the Full Faith and

Credit clause of Article IV, §1 of the Constitution of the United

States, that reliance is misplaced. Generally, that clause applies

to “ ‘fa} final judgment. . . rendered by a court with adjudicatory

authority over the subject matter and persons governed by the

judgment.’ " Franchise Tax Bd. v. Hyatt, 538 U.S. 488, 494

(U.S. 2003) (citation omitted). Here, there is no indication in the

record that any California workers’ compensation award appli-

cable to Mr, Lee has been properly certified. See 28 U.S.C. § 1739.

4a

is consistent with due process.” Mouzavires v. Baxter,

434 A.2d 988, 990 (D.C. 1981) (citing Jnternational

Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945)). Pursuant

to the District’s long-arm statute, see D.C. Code § 13-423

(2001), a court in the District of Columbia may only

exercise jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant in

seven enumerated situations.? While the District’s long-

arm statute “is coextensive in reach with the personal

jurisdiction allowed by the due process clause of the

United States Constitution,” see Shoppers Food Ware-

house v. Moreno, 746 A.2d 320, 329 (D.C. 2000) (en

banc), Mr. Lee “must allege some specific facts evidenc-

ing purposeful activity by the defendant in the District

5D.C, Code § 13-423 provides, in relevant part:

(a) A District of Columbia court may exercise personal jur-

isdiction over a person, who acts directly or by an agent, as

to a claim for relief arising from the person’s —

(1) transacting any business in the District of Columbia;

(2) contracting to supply services in the District of Columbia;

(3) causing tortious injury in the District of Columbia by an

act or omission in the District of Columbia;

(4) causing tortious injury in the District of Columbia by an

act or omission outside the District of Columbia if he regu-

. larly does or solicits business, engages in any other persistent

course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods

used or consumed, or services rendered, in the District of

Columbia;

(5) having an interest in, using, or possessing rea) property in

the District of Columbia;

(6) contracting to insure or act as surety for or on any per-

son, property, or risk, contract, obligation, or agreement

located, executed, or to be performed within the District of

Columbia at the time of contracting, unless the parties other-

wise provide in writing; or

(7) [there is a] marital or parent and child relationship in the

District of Columbia... .

5a

including the District of Columbia. This contention +

untenable, and would “offend traditional notions of fair

play and substantial justice.” International Shoe Co.,

326 U.S. at 316.

We agree with the trial court that it lacked personal

jurisdiction to adjudicate Mr. Lee’s claim, The Fund, an

insurer of last resort, was created by the California legis-

lature to protect California employers against accidents

and injuries to their employees. As Mr. Lee acknowl-

edges, the Fund is principally organized and located in

California, and does not maintain an office in the Dis-

trict of Columbia. Nor does it transact business or have

any enumerated contacts with the District of Columbia.

The single contact that the Fund has with the District —

specifically, it mails disability payments to Mr. Lee’s

home — is a result of Mr. Lee’s unilateral decision to

move into the District of Columbia. However,. “[a]

plaintiff's unilateral activity in relation to a defendant

cannot alone sustain personal jurisdiction under the

‘minimum contacts’ theory.” Shopper. Food Ware-

house, 746 A.2d at 325 (citing Hanson v. Denckla, 357

U.S. 235 (1958)). Based on this record, there is nothing

to suggest that the Fund has “purposefully avail[ed]

itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the

[District] .’”’ /d.

In sum, Mr, Lee has failed to allege specific facts, or

any facts at all for that matter, which would demon-

strate that the Fund has maintained sonie ‘minimum

contacts” with the District of Columbia. See Shoppers

Food Warehouse, supra. Without such a showing, the

trial court could not, consistent with fundamental prin-

ciples of due process, exercise jurisdiction over the Fund.

~ See International Shoe Co., supra. Finally, even if we

were to look beyond the substance of Mr. Lee’s com-