Opposition Brief — Munari v. City of El Paso de Robles

7

The City demurred to the causes of action alleging

violation of State and Federal procedural due process,

substantive due process, equal protection, and inverse

condemnation and the cause of action for damages under

42 U.S.C. § 1983. The trial court (1) sustained the City’s

demurrer to the procedural due process, substantive due

process and inverse condemnation claims without leave to

amend, (2) sustained the City’s demurrer to the equal

protection claims with leave to amend and (3) sustained

the City’s demurrer to the section 1983 claim (thirteenth

cause of action) with leave to amend with respect to the

federal equal protection theory and without leave with

respect to the other theories. (Pet. for Cert., App. D at 25a-

33a.)

On May 31, 2002, Petitioner filed a Second Amended

Petition and Complaint (“Second Amended Petition” or

“SAP”). Petitioner alleged only six causes of action against

the City. Specifically, the SAP re-alleged Petitioner’s

claims of (1) violation of CEQA, (2) violation of the Gov-

ernment Code sections regarding adoption of a general

plan amendment, (3) request for declaratory relief claim,

(4) violations of state and federa] equal protection claims,

and (5) damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

On October 21, 2002, the City moved for summary

adjudication with respect to each cause of action against

the City. The trial court granted the City’s motion in full

on April 17, 2003. On October 6, 2003, the trial court

entered judgment against Petitioner and in favor of the

City with respect to all the causes of action alleged against

the City in both the FAP and the SAP. (Pet. for Cert., App.

D at 20a-24a.)

8

Prior to the entry of judgment, Petitioner filed a

Notice of Appeal (June 16, 2003) and an Amended Notice

of Appeal (September 2, 2003). On October 15, 2003, after

the entry of judgment, Petitioner filed a Second Amended

Notice of Appeal. On March 23, 2005, the Court of Appeal

issued an unpublished opinion affirming the trial court

judgment in full. (Pet. for Cert., App. C.)

On April 8, 2005, Petitioner submitted a petition for

rehearing to the Court of Appeal. On April 18, 2005, the

Court of Appeal issued an Order Modifying Opinion and

Denying Rehearing [No Change in Judgment]. (Pet. for

Cert., App. B.)

Petitioner thereafter petitioned for review with the

California Supreme Court. The California Supreme Court

denied Petitioner’s Petition for Review on June 8, 2005.

Petitioner now seeks review in this Court of the denial of

his constitutional claims based upon an alleged conflict

amongst state and the circuit courts of appeal as to the

Williamson County ripeness test.

S

REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION

A. The Petition Does Not Address Petitioner’s First

Question.

Petitioner first asks whether state and local govern-

ments may impose an “exaction” like the kit fox mitigation

agreement as a pre-condition to holding a hearing on his

development application. Perhaps because the facts do not

support his allegations, Petitioner never addresses this

substantive questa The City nevertheless addresses the

merits of his question out of an abundance of caution.

9

Petitioner’s first question fails to establish the neces-

sity of this Court’s review for two key reasons. First,

’ Petitioner ignores the fundamental rule that the City may

“take” or regulate property for public use — the only

question is whether such a taking requires the payment of

just compensation. See Williamson County Reg'l Planning

Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 194 (1985) (“The

Fifth Amendment does not proscribe the taking of prop-

erty; it proscribes taking without just compensation.”). The

obvious answer to Petitioner’s question is thus “yes,” the

City may impose such a condition.

Second, regardless of whether the mitigation agree-

ment under different circumstances might constitute a

taking or exaction, there has been no such taking here.

The mitigation agreement was expressly contingent upon

the approval of Petiticner’s development application for

Chandler Ranch. That development application was

denied, and Petitioner did not challenge the City’s denial

of the application. He never paid any money for kit fox

mitigation either before or after the June 19, 2001 City

Council hearing. As the Court of Appeal noted, “the [miti-

gation] agreement was dependent on the City’s approval of

his master plan application. Whatever merit the argument

may have had, it became moot when the City denied his

application.” (Pet. for Cert., App. B at 3a.) The mitigation

agreement could not constitute an exaction and Petitioner

has suffered no damages because Petitioner was never

required to pay any money pursuant to that agreement.

10

B. Neither The Decision Below Nor The Record

Raises The Questions Presented In The Petition.

Petitioner’s remaining issues rest on the mistaken

presumption that the Court of Appeal disposed of all of his

constitutional claims based upon application of the first

and second prong ripeness requirements in Williamson

County. Petitioner asserts that review is necessary to

resolve alleged inconsistencies between the state and

federal courts as to the application of Williamson County

to his constitutional claims. The state Court of Appeal,

however, did not decide these questions in this proceeding.

Moreover, the facts of record will not support a determina-

tion of these questions by the Court.

1. The State Ceurt Of Appeal Denied Peti-

tioner’s Equal Protection Claims On The

Merits; Thus Williamson County’s Ripeness

Test And Any Alleged Court Split As To Its

Application Are Irrelevant To This Case.

Petitioner’s assertion that determination of whether

the equal protection claims should be subject to the Wil-

liamson County ripeness tests generally applied to takings

claims is irrelevant to the instant proceeding. The Court of

Appeal did not dismiss Petitioner’s equal protection claims

on ripeness grounds. Rather, the Court of Appeal deter-

mined that whatever merit Petitioner’s equal protection

claim may have had with respect to the kit fox mitigation

agreement, it became moot when the City denied his

application because the agreement was expressly depend-

ent on the City’s approval of his master plan application.

(Pet. for Cert., App. B at 3a.).

ll

As to Petitioner’s assertion that he was treated

differently from other similarly-situated property owners

when the City adopted a specific plan requirement for the

Chandler Ranch, the Court of Appeal denied this claim on

the merits. The Court of Appeal recognized that there were

other properties within the City other than the Chandler

Ranch that were also subject to a specific plan require-

ment. (Pet. for Cert., App. C at 18a.) Further:

All other properties within the city that [Peti-

tioner) claims are similar to the Chandler Ranch

are significantly smaller. Two of the properties

that [Petitioner] claims are similar are a 400-

acre golf course and a 40-acre park. A golf course

and a park are substantially different than [Peti-

tioner’s} proposed residential subdivision. The

undisputed facts show that any difference in

treatment between the Chandler Ranch and

other parcels within the city has a rational basis.

(Pet. for Cert., App. C at 18a.)

It is clear from the above holding that Petitioner’s

petition lacks the essential factual predicate of his ques-

tion presented — i.e., a dismissal of his equal protection

claims on ripeness grounds. Resolution of any alleged

conflict regarding the application of Williamson County’s

ripeness tests to equal protection claims will not provide

any redress here. In essence, Petitioner seeks to have this

Court render an impermissible advisory opinion.

12

2. Deciding The Question Presented Would Not

Provide Any Relief For Petitioner With Re-

spect To His Temporary Takings Claim.

a. There Is No Conflict As To The Applica-

tion Of Williamson County's Ripeness

Tests To Temporary Takings Claims.

“It was settled well before Williamson County that ‘a

claim that the application of government regulations

effects a taking of a property interest is not ripe until the

government entity charged with implementing the regula-

tions has reached a final decision regarding the applica-

tion of the regulations to the property at issue.’” San

Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City and County of San Francisco, 545

US. __, 125 S.Ct. 2491 (2005) (quoting Williamson

County, 473 U.S. at 186). None of the cases Petitioner cites

questioned the application of this final decision prong of

the ripeness inquiry to temporary takings claims. Indeed,

this Court’s own recent decision in Tahoe-Sierra Pres.

Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302,

339-40 (2002) seems to have decided this issue, recogniz-

ing that the ripeness inquiry is applicable to all takings

claims. In Tahoe-Sierra, this Court reiterated the “strict

ripeness requirement” imposed on landowners asserting a

regulatory takings claim. Requiring planners to compen-

sate for alleged temporary takings before making a final

decision would “create a perverse system of incentives”

wherein “landowners must wait for takings claim to ripen

so that planners can make well-reasoned decisions while,

at the same time, holding that those planners must

compensate landowners for the delay.” Id. at 340. Stated

another way, the ripeness inquiry is applicable to all

takings claims; to hold otherwise would create absurd

results. There is no conflict as to the application of the

13

Williamson County ripeness inquiry to temporary takings

claims.

-b. The State Court Of Appeal Denied Peti-

tioner’s Temporary Takings Claim On The

Merits, And Thus Williamson County’s

Ripeness Test And Any Alleged Court

Split As To Its Application Are Irrelevant

To This Case.

Alternatively, the Court of Appeal denied Petitioner’s

takings claims on the merits, holding that any delay in

certifying the EIR was an ordinary delay in the planning

process which did not preclude all beneficial use of his

property. (Pet. for Cert., App. C at 10a) (quoting First

English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los

Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 321 (1987), “We limit our holding to

the facts presented, and of course do not deal with the

quite different questions that would arise in the case of

normal delays in obtaining building permits, changes in

zoning ordinances, variances, and the like which are not

before us.”).

3. There Is No Conflict Amongst The Courts

Concerning The Application Of Williamson

County’s Ripeness Tests To Due Process

Claims Where, As Here, Such Claims Are An-

cillary To A Takings Claim.

Petitioner again misrepresents the Court of Appeal’s

opinion as to his procedural and substantive due process

claims. The Court of Appeal did not dismiss Petitioner’s

due process claims solely on the basis of the Williamson

County ripeness requirements. The Court of Appeal

recognized that Petitioner’s due process claims were

14

simply a reiteration of his takings claim. As such, Peti-

tioner was required to satisfy the Williamson County

ripeness requirements. (Pet. for Cert., App. C at 12a.)

(citing Armendariz v. Penman, 75 F.3d 1311, 1324-26 (9th

Cir. 1996)). Although “certain wrongs affect more than a

single right and, accordingly, can implicate more than one

of the Constitution’s commands,” this Court has instructed

that plaintiffs may not “double up” constitutional claims in

this way. Armendariz, 75 F.3d at 1320. Where a claim can

be analyzed under “an explicit textual source” of rights in

the Constitution, a court may not also assess the claim

under another “more generalized” source. Graham uv.

Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394-95 (1989).

a. Petitioner’s Due Process Claims Simply

Reiterate His Takings Claim, And Thus

Are Subject To Traditional Ripeness Re-

quirements.

Here, because the Fifth Amendment takings clause

supplies an explicit textual source of constitutional protec-

tion when the government is alleged to have deprived a

plaintiff of the economically beneficial use of his property,

the takings clause and not the due process clause governs

the constitutionality of the City’s actions. Petitioner

should not be permitted to avoid the ripeness require-

ments simply by recasting his claims as a due process

violation. (Pet. for Cert., App. C at 12a.)

This Court in Williamson County determined that

whether cast as a takings or a question of due process, a

claim is premature if the essential argument, as here, is

that a regulation “goes too far” as an invalid exercise of

the police power. 473 U.S. at 199. Such an inquiry requires

the court to resolve the same difficult issue of how to

15

define “too far.” Jd. Resolution of this question depends, as

to a takings claim, in significant part upon an analysis of

the effect of the government’s actions and regulations on

the value of the plaintiff’s property and investment-

backed investment expectations. Jd. at 199-200. “That

effect cannot be measured until a final decision is made as

to how the regulations will be applied to [Petitioner’s]

property.” Id. at 200.

No such final determination was made as to Peti-

tioner’s claims. The City denied Petitioner’s Master Plan

Application following a public hearing, but he never

appealed this decision. The City never made any decision

on his second application because his option expired before

any decision could be made. The adoption of a general plan

amendment requiring that a specific plan be submitted

with development applications for the Chandler Ranch is

irrelevant. The City has never made a final determination

of the extent of permitted development. As in Williamson

County, Petitioner’s claims are premature, whether

analyzed as a deprivation of due process under the Four-

teenth Amendment, or as a taking under the Fifth

Amendment’s just compensation clause (made applicable

to state and local governments through the Fourteenth

Amendment).

The Court of Appeal’s analysis comports with this

Court’s decisions applying the final decision ripeness test

to due process claims where, as here, they are based upon

the same set of facts and circumstances giving rise to the

petitioner’s takings claims. Contrary to Petitioner’s

assertions, the cases he cites do not conflict with this

interpretation. These decisions reveal that the final

determination rule is regularly applied to due process

claims challenging the process by which officials reach

16

land use decisions as this Court instructed in Williamson

County. .See, e.g., Taylor Inv., Ltd. v. Upper Darby Town-

ship, 983 F.2d 1285, 1293-94 (3d Cir. 1993); Herrington v.

County of Sonoma, 857 F.2d 567, 569 n.1 (9th Cir. 1988);

Greenbriar, Ltd. v. City of Alabaster, 881 F.2d 1570, 1573-

74 (11th Cir. 1989).* The only time the courts have refused

to apply this strict ripeness test is where the due process

claim is not ancillary to the takings claim. See Warren v.

City of Athens, 411 F.3d 697, 708 (6th Cir. 2005). Only in

this narrow situation, not relevant here, have the courts

found Williamson County inapplicable. Accordingly, there

is no conflict for this Court to resolve because it is well-

settled that due process claims ancillary to a takings claim

may not be used to avoid a ripeness inquiry.

b. Resolution Of The Question Presented

Is Not Necessary Because Petitioner’s

Due Process Claims Fail Regardless Of

Whether Or Not They Are Ripe Under

Williamson County.

The Court of Appeal went on to address the merits of

Petitioner’s substantive due process claims related to the

* Petitioner contends that in Greenbriar Ltd. v. City of Alabaster,

881 F.2d 1570 (11th Cir. 1989), the Eleventh Circuit, in dicta, “stated

that it is ‘not at all clear’ that first prong ripeness should apply to a

substantive due process claim premised upon arbitrary governmental

action.” Petition, 17-18. The Eleventh Circuit made no such statement.

The Eleventh Circuit noted that it was “not at all clear” that this

Court's re-application requirement for finality in MacDonald, Sommer

& Frates v. County of Yolo, 477 U.S. 340 (1986) was also required to

satisfy the fina] determination standard for substantive due process

claims, or that it applied in precisely the same manner. Greenbriar,

Ltd., 881 F.2d at 1576 n.11. The Greenbriar court never questioned the

applicability of the final determination test under Williamson County to

due process claims.

17

City’s renewal of a specific plan requirement. The Court of

Appeal recognized the uniqueness of the Chandler Ranch

— 673 acres of the most extensive oak woodland in the City,

surrounded by steep hillsides that present a significant

challenge to vehicular access and development. (Pet. for

Cert., App. C at 17a.) As the Court of Appeal concluded,

“On its face, this is the type of parcel for which a specific

plan can be beneficial. The City has a legitimate public

interest in requiring a specific plan to preserve the parcel’s

natural resources and prevent piecemeal development.”

(Id.) (citing Kawaoka v. City of Arroyo Grande, 17 F.3d

1227, 1234 (9th Cir. 1994)).

Similarly, Petitioner’s procedural due process claims

are without merit as Petitioner has not shown a liberty or

property interest protected by the Constitution. Petitioner

could not establish that he was deprived of a property

interest, because the City retained substantial discretion

in considering the Master Plan Application and General

Plan Amendment requiring the specific plan. It is well-

settled that general plan amendments and rezonings are

legislative acts, over which the City has full discretion.

See, e.g., Yost v. Thomas 36 Cal. 3d 561, 570 (1984);

Mitchell v. County of Orange 165 Cal. App. 3d 1185, 1191-

92 (1985).

In other words, Petitioner’s due process claims rest on

the bald assertion that he was denied all beneficial use of

his property because the City delayed acting on his Master

Plan Application before rejecting it. Such an assertion,

however, is not supported by the facts or law. The City

processed Petitioner’s Master Plan Application in just two

years from the date he claims it was “deemed complete.”

Given the substantial development proposed on a very

18

unique piece of property that required significant envi-

ronmental review, such a delay did not amount to an

unconstitutional deprivation of due process or a taking

without just compensation. Petitioner had no entitlement

to expedited processing of his application simply because

his option was about to expire. Petitioner assumed the risk

that his option might expire before the normal entitlement

process ran its course, particularly when unique property

was involved and the proposed development deviated

significantly from existing approved uses. See Mola Dev.

Corp. v. City of Seal Beach, 57 Cal. App. 4th 405, 416-17

(1997). As this Court recently explained in holding that a

32-month planning moratorium did not constitute a per se

taking:

The interest in facilitating informed decision-

making by regulatory agencies counsels against

adopting a per se rule that would impose such

severe costs on their deliberations. Otherwise,

the financial constraints of compensating prop-

erty owners during a moratorium may force offi-

cials to rush through the planning process or to

abandon the practice altogether.

Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, 535 U.S. at 339. This would, in

turn, foster “inefficient and ill-conceived growth.” Jd.

Accordingly, even if there are conflicting decisions

over the application of the final determination rule to due

process claims stemming from land use decisions, resolu-

tion of such a conflict would not provide any relief to

Petitioner because his due process claims fail regardless of

whether or not they are ripe under Williamson County.

19

C. The Court Of Appeal’s Decision Did Not Deny

Petitioner Any Adequate State Law Remedies

For His Constitutional Rights.

Petitioner’s final question asks whether mandamus is

a sufficient remedy to preclude recovery of damages under

section 1983. Petitioner asserts that the Court of Appeal’s

denial of his claims for failure to pursue mandamus to

compel the City to hold a hearing on the EIR and his

Master Plan Application deprived him of a remedy under

section 1983. Petitioner’s question presented again grossly

mischaracterizes the Court of Appeal’s holding.

1. The Court Of Appeal Dismissed Petitioner’s

Claim On The Merits, And Thus Review Of

State Law Mandamus Procedures Is Not

Necessary.

The Court of Appeal did not deny Petitioner a remedy

under section 1983. Petitioner ignores the fact that the

Court of Appeal denied his takings claim regarding the

alleged delay in certifying the EIR on the merits. The

Court of Appeal recognized that any delay in certifying the

EIR was one of the “normal delays” common in the plan-

ning process and did not deprive him of all economically

beneficial use of his property. Delaying certification of the

EIR “simply delayed consideration of one proposed eco-

nomically beneficial use.” (Pet. for Cert., App. C at 10a.)

Petitioner still had the option of proposing a development

plan in compliance with the then-existing zoning and

general plan requirements for the Chandler Ranch. (/d.)

(distinguishing First English, supra, 482 U.S. 304 (1987)).

Only after determining this issue on the merits did the

court go on to hold that Petitioner’s takings claim was also

subject to dismissal for failure to pursue a remedy in

20

mandate. (/d.) Again, Petitioner seeks to have this Court

render an improper advisory opinion.

2. Alternatively, The Court Of Appeal’s Decision

Does Not Raise The Question Petitioner Now

Presents To This Court Because Exhaustion Of

Mandamus Procedures Merely Aids The Courts

In Determining Whether A Taking Has Gone

“Too Far,” And Dees Not Hamper Petitioner’s

Right To Seek Compensation Under Section

1983 If A Taking Has Indeed Occurred.

Even assuming arguendo that the Court of Appeal

had not reached the merits of the claim, the Court of

Appeal’s decision on ripeness grounds does not raise the

question Petitioner now presents to this Court. Although

unclear, Petitioner seems to contend that the Court of

Appeal imposed “unreasonable procedural impediments”

to Petitioner’s section 1983 claims by misapplying the

second prong of the Williamson County ripeness test in

holding that Petitioner should have exhausted the avail-

able remedy in mandate to compel the City to review the

EIR. Again, Petitioner has missed the point.

A petition for writ of mandamus is not a state proce-

dure for seeking compensation (i.e., a procedure that must

be exhausted urder the second prong of Williamson

County). Rather, it is a procedure that must be utilized to

reach a “final decision.” Before the second prong of the

Williamson County ripeness test is even considered, a

petitioner must be able to show that there has been a

“final decision” as to the extent to which the beneficial use

of any property rights have been impaired by government

21

action. Petitioner has no remedies to pursue under section

1983 or through a state inverse condemnation claim for

“just compensation,” until there has been a “final decision”

from which a reviewing court can first determine whether

there was indeed a “taking.” Williamson County, 473 U.S.

at 191.

Here, the Court of Appeal correctly determined that

Petitioner failed to satisfy even this first “final decision”

prong by not first pursuing a remedy in mandamus. Under

Williamson County and the California Supreme Court's

decision in Hensler v. City of Glendale, 8 Cal. 4th 1 (1994),

a final administrative decision is “one which {has afforded]

similar authority the opportunity to amend the agency

decision and/or grant a variance.” Hensler, 8 Cal. 4th at

10-11. This means that Petitioner must first attempt to set

aside a city’s decision through a mandamus action before

pursuing damages for a taking or any ancillary due

process claims. See Mola Dev. Corp., 57 Cal. App. 4th at

410. “Mandamus proceedings allow courts to flesh out the

issues and factual components of the dispute. including

issues of procedural fairness. Review by mandamus is

necessary because a court ‘cannot determine whether a

regulation has gone “too far” unless it knows how far the

regulation goes.’” Jd. at 411.

Petitioner challenged the City’s alleged delay in

processing the E.% long after the City had certified the

EIR. He cannot avoid the final determination requirement

by simply waiting until his claim becomes moot. Jd. at 418;

County of San Luis Obispo v. Superior Court, 90 Cal. App.

4th 288, 295 (2001).

3. Irrespective Of Williamson County’s Second

Prong Ripeness Requirement, Petitioner

Has Failed To Satisfy Even The First Prong

“Final Decision” Requirement.

In addition, Petitioner failed to seek a final decision

on a development propos-" »t Chandler Ranch. Where, as

here, the petitioner is nu. challenging the then-existing

zoning or development requirements but merely has

submitted one application seeking approvals for a more

intensive development, this Court has generally held that

the takings claim is not ripe. For example, in MacDonald,

Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo, 477 U.S. 340 (1986),

the county board of supervisors affirmed the county

planning commission's rejection of a landowners’ subdivi-

sion plan. Under the landowner’s proposal, the property

was to be subdivided into 159 single-family and multi-

family residential lots. Although the property was zoned

for residential use, the planning commission and board of

supervisors rejected the plan because it failed to ade-

quately account for public street access, sewer services,

water supplies, and police protection. The landowner did

not submit any other development plans and simply filed

suit claiming his property rights had been “taken” without

just compensation. This Court, however, determined that

this single rejection did not constitute a taking. Jd. at 352-

53. In so holding, the Court pointed out that Petitioner

had not attempted to obtain approval of a development in

accordance with the applicable zoning regulations, and

thus there had not yet been a “final determination” be-

cause no meaningful application had been made. /d. at

353. The possibility still existed that “some development

[would] be permitted.” Jd. at 352.

As in MacDonald, the City only rejected one develop-

ment application from Petitioner. Petitioner’s Master Plaa

23

Application would have required a general plan amend-

ment and called for nearly five times the number of

residential units permitted under the then-existing zoning

regulations. “Rejection of exceedingly grandiose develop-

ment plans does not logically imply that less ambitious

plans will receive similar unfavorable reviews.” Jd. at 353,

n.9; see also Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438

U.S. 104 (1978) (declining to find that application of state

landmark preservation law effected a taking where com-

mittee had only disapproved of 50-story building and

property owners had not sought approval for another

plan); San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. San Diego, 450 U.S.

621 (1981) (dismissing appeal because it did not appear

that city’s rezoning and adoption of an open space plan

had deprived utility of all beneficial use of its property).

The City’s subsequent requirement that a Chandler

Ranch specific plan be prepared did not ripen Petitioner’s

takings claims because the requirement did not prohibit

development or operate as a moratorium. See Selby Realty

Co. v. City of San Buenaventura 10 Cal. 3d 110, 118-19

(1973) (adoption of general plan amendment may not

constitute a taking because it does not represent a final

agency decision on the application of the city’s land use

regulations to the property at issue). The specific plan

requirement does not change the already existing allow-

able uses, nor does it authorize any new, not yet approved

development. No development was approved. No entitle-

ments for development were granted. No land use or

zoning designation was changed. All the City did was

require the adoption of a specific plan before any develop-

ment could occur. Petitioner let his option expire without

submitting a specific plan, and therefore never received

24

a final determination of what development would be

permitted.

+

CONCLUSION

Petitioner has vastly overstated the significance of

Williamson County to the specific facts and decision in this

case because the questions presented by Petitioner are

more theoretical than factual. Petitioner has suffered no

constitutional injuries. Petitioner made one development

application to the City, which required several legislative

acts, including a general plan amendment and rezoning.

The City exercised its legitimate discretion in denying that

application. The City then exercised its authority to

require that a specific plan be prepared for Chandler

Ranch. Petitioner submitted no new application and his

option expired. No exactions were imposed on Petitioner,

and no constitutional rights were violated. The Court of

Appeal applied well-settled law to the specific facts of the

present case. Its decision is unpublished. This case pre-

sents no unique facts and no new law. Therefore, this

Court’s review is unnecessary.

For all the foregoing reasons, the petition of certiorari

should be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

Ir1s P. YANG*

MCDONOUGH HOLLAND & ALLEN PC

555 Capitol Mall, 9th Floor

Sacramento, CA 95814-4692

*Counsel for Respondents

City of El Paso de Robles,

City Council of City of El Paso

de Robles, and Robert Lata