Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Newdunn Associates, LLP v. United States Army Corps of Engineers

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Text

FILED

03 637 ocr 272093

No.

=_

35n the

Supreme Court of the United States

_

NEWDUNN ASSOCIATES, LLP; ORION ASSOCIATES;

NORTHWEST CONTRACTORS CORPORATION,

Petitioners,

V.

UNITED STATES ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS,

Respondent.

”

4

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United

States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

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4

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

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a

TIMOTHY S. BISHOP

DOUGLAS E. KAHLE

RUSSELL R. EGGERT Counsel of Record

Mayer, Brown, Rowe & Maw MARK R. BAUMGARTNER

190 South LaSalie Street Pender & Coward, P.C.

Chicago, IL 60603 222 Central Park Ave.

(312) 782-0600 Virginia Beach, VA 23462

(757) 490-3000

Counsel for Petitioners

QUESTION PRESENTED

The court of appeals, in Square conflict with the Fifth

Circuit’s decision in Rice v. Harken Exploration Co., 250

F.3d 264 (Sth Cir. 2001), and at odds with the principles laid

down by this Court in Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook

County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 531 U.S. 159

(2001), held that federal authority under Clean Water Act

Section 404 encompasses wetlands on petitioners’ property

that have only an ephemeral, intermittent, occasional, and

indirect manmade hydrological connection to navigable

waters located miles distant. The question presented, which is

of critical nationwide importance to determining the scope

of burdensome federal permitting schemes and the balance of

power between state and federal regulators, is:

Whether federal Clean Water Act jurisdiction over

“navigable waters” extends to wetlands that are not adjacent

or contiguous to open waters but from which rainwater

runoff may occasionally reach navigable waters located miles

away through a series of manmade, indirect, ephemeral, and

intermittent surface water connections.

ii

RULE 29.6 STATEMENT

None of the petitioners has a parent corporation or a non-

wholly owned subsidiary, and no publicly held corporation

owns 10% or more of any petitioners’ stock.

Additional plaintiffs in the district court and appellants in\

the court of appeals were the Virginia State Water Control

Board and Dennis H. Treacy, Director of the Virginia

Department of Environmental Quality.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

QUESTION PRESENTED.........ccccccsscsssssssssssseseeeeeeeecccccn. i

RULE 29.6 STATEMENT .......cccccccssssssssssssscssseseeeeeeeecccc. ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ..........cccccccssssssssesecseseoooecccecc Vv

PI MEI cn ssasenssinsvsonseoseevnsonocosoeseccs, 1

oe ps ig 1

STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED... eecccccseeees. 1

Meese ss sastsanonbissnacbcsonrnsovensnennsesseses,.... 1

A. The Statutory and Regulatory Scheme. .........0.000000.......... 4

B. The Corps’ Enforcement Action And The District

Court’s Findings Of Fact And Decision.................. 5

C. The Fourth Circuit’s Decision ......ccsssssscseeeeeeeeccccc. 7

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION........2.....00.0.. 7

A. The Fourth and Fifth Circuits Are In Direct

Conflict Concerning Whether Nonnavigable,

Intermittent, Ephemeral Waters Are “Navigable

Waters” Within The Meaning Of The Clean

I hana ete sceescsenrtoratniarecssscegceovtntarsonsoseseees...,... 7

B. The Fourth Circuit’s Decision Is At Odds With

The Principles This Court Set Forth In SWANCC......... 10

C. The Fourth Circuit’s Decision That Roadside

Ditches Are Tributaries Is Inconsistent With The

CWA, Because The CWA Defines A Ditch As A

“Point Source” And Not A ) , eee 13

D. The Fourth Circuit’s Erroneous Decision Flies In

The Face Of Corps Regulations and Policy................... 14

1. The Corps’ Regulations Limit Jurisdiction To

The Ordinary High Water Mark ........-ccccccc00--.-.. 15

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS - continued

2. The Corps’ Regulatory Guidance

Distinguishes Manmade Ditches From Natural

Ticats ca 15

3. Prior To SWANCC The Corps Treated The

Type Of Wetlands At Issue The Same As

IE IE vistnisnidiesesiasinsseveanioascstiaerrneiiacsneeisesn, 17

E. This Court’s Guidance Is Necessary Because

There Is No Consistent National Policy On CWA

GRR asrsiinirtciteinilcabal tial aal ia 19

F. The CWA Does Not Authorize The Corps To

Exercise General Land Use Regulation, Which

Congress Expressly Reserved For State And

Local Govermment..............0.s.cosssssesreseesscassesesesesesososoees 23

SAA ITT sitaihiisen.diciualcs medusa niuagniecnae 25

Vv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

CASES

Aiello v. Town of Brookhaven,

136 F. Supp. 2d 81 (E.D.N.Y. | a Ee 13

Bowen v. Georgetown University Hospital,

GEE D. TOG EGG) scevevensnesnvessvsssorareasesesssorsciessseese.... 14

Grayned v. City of Rockford,

WW I cisiihicenihrneccetatithad ce 7

Headwaters, Inc. v. Talent Irrigation Dist.,

243 F.3d 526 (9th Cir. 2001) oo... .cecccccecsscscessescsccceeeoeeces... 13

Hoffman Homes v. United States,

902 F.2d 567 (7th Cir. 1990) oo... .ceccccceccsssssecesceccoseeesecsn. 22

Ragsdale v. Wolverine World Wide Inc., -

FID IB. BE CIDE) scsscsensevscnssessicessvvrsnesesasoursmusonececic,.. 14

Rice v. Harken Exploration Co., '

250 F.3d 264 (Sth Cir. 2001) .o...eccccccccccceecoeeosecees... passim

Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v.

United States, 531 U.S. 159 (2001) ...eecccccccceccoeeseeses. passim

Southern Pines Assoc. v. United States,

912 F.2d 713 (4th Cir. 1990) oo... ccceccsccsscoseccessoeceseecessn. 22

United States v. Buday,

138 F. Supp. 2d 1282 (D. Mont. Pe cinkvbititoiiiuiee 10

United States v. Deaton,

332 F.3d 698 (4th Cir. 2003)... ..cccssecssccssscscssescoeceeeecesecsn. 9

United States v. Rapanos,

339 F.3d 447 (6th Cir. 2003) oo. ..cccccscecsscsssssescecsoecessece... 10

United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc.,

GPR TTB. TEE (RIGID sr csnnsessnsnerscnseinersinmesesadberiosssosoesccec.c, 11

vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES -— continued

Page(s)

FEDERAL STATUTES

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Is Te WI binttisnceesinnnnatinmsencnennnimiiiaaaiieds 1

a ee FE ciierivisatineementsiescsnaniaminaion 1, 4, 13

Fee RG Ie MEP innsishhnicndainanibadiniineadiaiieieaaaiassianele 14

ee es eB itisicisenstnsiieartnsigsnsnisescenileinlanciciieanainia passim

es SF Re iacinensnicteiigiccesaksasiisicsaiicinensicidagliciiakinana |

Fe a, hs er ciiiseviiicvicehteeenecssarienscenuenlldiaehaaicbiaesatani 1

Fe Rt iticsaiecienatiiiincinnaittinneeapiaiaiabiiiiaens 1,13

Pees 0 TINIE Pt cicssisea si niacchlescticinatensteinabbiebiilbnaignaiit 1, 3, 13

Fe es Sy HUET Pissvssisnstinidsaiahuntatinenniernibietiishndilbabaatiilda 1,3,4

ee are OF I deisveninsnwitsoancebcesieslacasiastamsiadeshinaiaeaenaanoraaaiaainde 7

REGULATIONS

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Fe ee ile I CREE icsniccahnivninsinisicsinitasalliiaiagiaa 17

Fe a OF EE Biexcshseeretesnniedaiemaanande 4

ee ee its sncsieensintiontsickiontescaecinncnabeiiciais sii 17

i Se EE Piet ssieinsaneinsensispninclnnintaiioasinenebsiehicleiietnacadaisliok 4

ae ly 6 TD eicisnrsssisessinliiaiidiasioveaaiiamniaminanaabiiaad 4

33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a), (b), (c), and (€) .ccccsssesssccssssscessessesssseess 1

a Pe ee a

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vii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - continued

Page(s)

I Bidets 1, 4, 15

ee ii cicciintoensondaeamennenanaaenens 17

33 C.F.R. § 330.5(a)(26) (1986) ......ccscsessssssessssssssssesssesessee 17

TB aise scichstls otncrienititncenaanen 19

at | RS 5 eae enn anaes et 19

ee iitoesnnicntvenalnniianiines 19

cn cncsdalatucniconaensaincnnaini 19

AO C.F.R. § 122.26(b)(8) ...cesccscccccccssscsessscssssusssecssscuscusensenes 14

ee aiibitiie sinciiissinescriictcrnnctnsniclacnaiiaaiat 23

8 Sh. , | a na 16, 17

Fi: at ea 16

51 Fed. Reg. 41206 (1986) .....c.ccccscssesssesssesseesseseee 3, 4, 15, 16

55 Fed. Reg. 47990 (1990) .....c.cccsscscssssesssessssssecsssssecnsenseenee 14

Oe Bik TI iinet 4, 15, 16

Ee ie I arin tiie setdensdiceieietesiaccsteiceationetetioi 8

OTHER AUTHORITIES .

fs FL, / | een 24

EPA & Corps, Guidance for Asserting Federal

Jurisdiction Over Isolated Wetlands in

Response to U.S. Supreme Court Decision in

SOPMEVO, Coane CFO. 1D, BOGS) nncccecsescscrcesssevesovesesccescnes 5,8

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Appeal Decision,

Evangelista, Detroit District,

File No. 00-010-030-0 (August 25, 2000)..................00. 21

viii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - continued

Page(s)

U.S. Corps of Engineers, Appeal Decision,

Daniel, New Orleans District,

File No. 20-010-0562 (June 20, 2001) ............cccccccseeeeees 20

U.S. Corps of Engineers, Appeal Decision,

E. Tetz & Sons, Inc. and Concrete Properties,

New York District, -

File No. 2000-00117 (June 24, 2003).............cccccee0 21, 22

U.S. Corps of Engineers, Appeal Decision,

Meehan, New York District,

File No. 2002-00023 (November 19, 2002)...............0006. 21

U.S. Corps of Engineers, Appeal Decision,

Memphis Stone and Gravel Company,

Vicksburg District,

File No. 200113910 (July 19, 2002)..............ccceccsseseeeeee 20

U.S. Corps of Engineers, Appeal Decision,

Molycorp, Inc., Los Angeles District,

File No. 2000-01678 (August 16, 2001)..............ccccceee 20

U.S. Corps of Engineers, Appeal Decision, NEC

Transit/Williams, L.L.C., Buffalo District,

File No. 2000-00325(2) (August 30, 2001)...............0000. 21

U.S. Corps of Engineers, Appeal Decision,

Soundview Properties, Inc.,

Jacksonville District,

File No. 199905468 (November 19, 2001)..............00000 20

U.S. Corps of Engineers, Appeal Decision,

Sunrise Office Park, Los Angeles District,

File No. 2001-00379 (September 7, 2001)................00000 20

V. Albrecht & B. Goode, Wetland Regulation in

the Real World (Feb. 1994)...............cccccscccssccscssesceees 22, 24

a ae EAL OF aS ET ETS SR Se eer

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|

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Petitioners Newdunn Associates LLP, Orion Associates,

and Northwest Contractors Corporation respectfully petition

for a writ of certiorari to review the judgment of the United

States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals (App., infra, 1a-19a)

is reported at 344 F.3d 407. The opinion of the district court

(App., infra, 20a-56aa) is reported at 195 F. Supp. 2d 751.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on

September 10, 2003. This Court’s jurisdiction is invoked

under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

The relevant provisions of the Clean Water Act, 33

U.S.C. §§ 1251(a), (b), (g), 1311(a), 1344(a), (0), (g),

1362(7), (12), (14) are set forth at App., infra, 57a-60a. The

relevant regulations, 33 C.F.R. §§ 328.3(a), (b), (c), (e), and

33 C.F.R. § 328.4(c) are set forth at App., infra, 60a-62a.

STATEMENT

The issue in this case is whether Congress, in enacting

Section 404(a) of the Clean Water Act (“CWA” or “Act”),

authorized the United States Army Corps of Engineers

(“Corps”) to assert jurisdiction over activities on property

containing wetlands adjacent to manmade ditches that are

only intermittently wet and that are located miles from

navigable waters. The Corps has asserted jurisdiction in this

and other cases based upon its interpretation that the

navigable waters of the United States encompass any wetland

from which rainwater may ultimately flow into navigable

waters, no matter how remote, indirect, or occasional that

runoff may be. In upholding such broad federal jurisdiction

2

(and reversing the district court), the Fourth Circuit seriously

misunderstood this Court’s teachings and created a Square

conflict with the Fifth Circuit as to the scope of a major

federal statute affecting the use of land across the Nation.

This Court recently set forth the principles governing the

Corps’ exercise of jurisdiction under Section 404 of the

Clean Water Act. Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook

County v. United States, 531 U.S. 159 (2001) (“SWANCC’”)

(Corps jurisdiction does not reach ponds, not adjacent to

navigable waters, that are used by migratory birds). This

Court found that “the plain text and import of § 404(a)” is

that it reaches only waters and wetlands that have a

“significant nexus” and are “inseparably bound up with”

waters of the United States, and that applying that standard

the Act does not reach “nonnavigable, isolated, intrastate

waters.” Jd. at 167, 169-170. This Court also found “no

persuasive evidence” that the Corps erred in 1974 when it

promulgated regulations interpreting the Statutory term

“navigable waters” as waters that are navigable in fact, have .

been navigable in the past, or could be made so in the future.

Id. at 167. And it could discern no purpose in 1977

amendments to the CWA “[bJeyond Congress’ desire to

regulate wetlands adjacent to ‘navigable waters.’” Jd. at 170-

171.

The Fifth Circuit, in Rice v. Harken Exploration Co., 250

F.3d 264 (Sth Cir. 2001), applied the principles set forth in

SWANCC. Reading SWANCC to authorize CWA jurisdiction

over waters that are “actually navigable” or “adjacent to an

open body of navigable water,” the Fifth Circuit held that “a

small seasonal creek” and “intermittent streams which only

infrequently contain running water” are not “sufficiently

linked” to navigable waters to themselves “qualify as

“navigable waters.’” Jd. at 270-272.

In stark contrast to SWANCC and Rice, the Fourth

Circuit’s ruling here allows the Corps to control

3

development, agriculture, and other land use activity in every

wetland from which any rainwater runoff may ultimately, on

occasion, reach navigable waters. The Fourth Circuit treats

ephemeral, intermittent waters distant from navigable waters

as within CWA jurisdiction; the Fifth Circuit does not.

The Fourth Circuit also held that manmade roadside

ditches and culverts were waters of the United States. App.,

infra, 17a. Yet, the Corps has long recognized a distinction

between manmade ditches and natural streams, and, prior to

this Court’s decision in SWANCC, did not generally consider

manmade drainage ditches to be waters of the United States.

See 51 Fed. Reg. 41206, 41217 (1986). Nonetheless, the

Fourth Circuit considered the distinction “irrelevant,” App.,

infra, 17a, deferring to the Corps’ new position.

The Fourth Circuit’s decision in this regard directly

conflicts with the plain language of the CWA, which defines

ditches, culverts and other manmade conveyances as “point

sources,” 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14), App., infra, 60a, not as

“waters of the United States.” 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7), App.,

infra, 59a. And the Corps only sometimes, on a case-by-case

basis, considers ditches and culverts to be jurisdictional

“tributaries” of navigable waters. Neither the Fourth Circuit

nor the Corps provide any guidance to landowners as to when

federal jurisdiction will be asserted over such ditches.

Under the Fourth Circuit’s decision, the CWA reaches to

the top of every mountain and the end of every street in the

country. The Corps is permitted to exercise this broad

jurisdiction without any showing of actual effect on

navigable waters or interstate commerce. Given the split

among circuits, the contrast between the Virtually limitless

jurisdiction accorded the Corps by the Fourth Circuit and the

direction given by this Court in SWANCC, and the practical

importance of the question presented to landowners and

regulators throughout the country, this Court should grant

certiorari. |

4

A. The Statutory and Regulatory Scheme.

When Congress enacted the CWA, it delegated authority

to the Corps to issue permits for the discharge of dredged and

fill material into “the navigable waters at specified disposal

sites.” 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a); 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a); App., infra,

58a. The CWA defines “navigable waters” as “the waters of

the United States, including the territorial seas.” 33 U.S.C.

§ 1362(7), App., infra, 59a. The statute does not define

“waters of the United States.”

The Corps asserted jurisdiction in this case pursuant to

regulations that define “waters of the United States” to

include “[aJll waters which are currently used, or were used

in the past, or may be susceptible to use in interstate or

foreign commerce, including all waters which are subject to

the ebb and flow of the tide” (33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(1), App.,

infra, 60a), tributaries of such waters (33 C.F.R.

§ 328.3(aX(5), App., infra, 61a), and wetlands adjacent to

such waters or their tributaries. 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(7),

App., infra, 61a.

The Corps’ regulations do not define the term “tributary,”

and do not define manmade drainage or irrigation ditches as

navigable waters of the United States. In some regulatory

interpretations, the Corps explains that a manmade ditch is

subject to the Corps’ jurisdiction only if it extends the

ordinary high-water mark of an existing water of the United

States. 65 Fed. Reg. 12818, 12824-25, App., infra, 38a n.13.'

' The Corps’ regulations specify that CWA jurisdiction in nontidal

waters extends only to the ordinary high-water mark, or if adjacent

wetlands are present, to the extent of those wetlands. 33 C.F.R.

§ 328.4(c\(1), (2), App., infra, 62a. In the preamble to its 1986

Regulations, the Corps states “[t]herefore, it should be concluded

that in the absence of wetlands the upstream limit of Corps

jurisdiction also stops when the ordinary high water mark is no

longer perceptible.” 51 Fed. Reg. at 41217 (1986), App., infra,

38a.

5

However, the Corps reserves, on a case-by-case basis, the

right to assert jurisdiction over ditches that can flow, even

intermittently, into other covered waters, but articulates no

meaningful guidance on the appropriate basis for such a

decision. App., infra, 47a; see EPA & Corps, Guidance for

Asserting Federal Jurisdiction Over Isolated Wetlands in

Response to U.S. Supreme Court Decision in SWANCC Case

(Jan. 10, 2003) (“Corps 2003 Guidance”).

B. The Corps’ Enforcement Action And The

District Court’s Findings Of Fact And Decision

During the summer of 2001, Newdunn Associates L.L.P.

(“Newdunn”), and its agents, Orion Associates (“Orion”) and

Northwest Contractors Corporation (“Northwest”), began

logging, filling and excavating on Newdunn’s property in

Newport News, Virginia. The Corps and the Virginia State

Water Control Board (“Board”), acting through the director

of the Virginia Department of Environmental Quality

(“DEQ”), Dennis H. Treacy, filed enforcement actions in.

federal and state court, respectively. Both agencies accused

Newdunn of conducting unauthorized activities in wetlands.”

? Virginia state law, at the time of Newdunn’s activities,

specifically permitted placement of fill into wetlands. App., infra,

23a. Therefore, Newdunn’s filling activities did not violate state

law. Once a wetland is filled, it is no longer saturated to the surface

with water and therefore no longer a wetland. The State alleged

that because the placement of fill eliminating the wetlands was

unauthorized by the Corps, Newdunn’s activities in the converted

uplands violated other state laws. Because the State’s allegations

hinged upon whether the fill was authorized, Newdunn removed

the State’s suit to the federal court, which consolidated the

enforcement actions for trial. The Fourth Circuit held that the

district court did not have jurisdiction to decide the asserted

violation of state law. App., infra, at 13a. Petitioners do not seek

review of that part of the Fourth Circuit’s decision.

6

The district court conducted a five-day bench trial, after

which it ruled that neither the Corps nor the Board had

jurisdiction over Newdunn’s property. The court found that

the wetlands on Newdunn’s Property “are not adjacent to

navigable waters or waters of the United States by any

reasonable definition of adjacency.” Jd. at 54a.

At trial, the “Corps’ claim of jurisdiction [was] based

solely upon the alleged surface water or hydrologic

connection of the Property to the navigable portion of Stony

Run.” App., infra, at 29a-30a. The district court carefully

traced how tenuous a hydrologic connection that was. “Rain

generated runoff’ only “occasionally exits the property

through a spur ditch”—“[t]here is no evidence,” the court

found, “of_the frequency or volume of th[at] surface water

runoff.” The spur ditch leads to a manmade drainage ditch

that runs east of and parallel to Interstate 64 (the “eastern I-

64 ditch”). That eastern ditch, the court found, “is ephemeral,

or dry most of the year,” and any water in it is

“intermitten[t].” Any water that continues through the

eastern I-64 ditch eventually reaches a culvert under I-64,

through which it travels to another manmade ditch parallel to

and on the western side of I-64. That western ditch, 1% miles

in length, “was constructed partially through dry land.”

Water “intermittently travels” through the western ditch into

the “not-navigable-in-fact” Western Arm of Stony Run, at a

point a mile away from where the Central Arm of Stony Run

becomes navigable. Jd. at 30a-32a & n.10 (all emphases

added).

The district court held that in these circumstances the

Corps had “not carried its burden of factually proving a

sufficient connection between the wetlands on the Property

and navigable waters or waters of the United States.” App.,

infra, 45a. And any claim that wetlands on Newdunn’s

property were within the Corps’ jurisdiction “far exceeded

the grant of authority by congress in the CWA.” Jd. at 46a.

7

The court rejected the Corps’ assertion that “a culvert or

storm drainage pipe” is a “tributary.” Jd. at 45a.

The district court observed that although the Corps’ 1986

regulations generally exclude non-tidal drainage ditches from

its definition of tributaries, the Corps reserves the power to

assert jurisdiction over such ditches on a case-by-case basis.

Id. at 47a. Because the Corps failed to articulate any limits to

its discretionary jurisdiction, the district court held, the

regulations are insufficient to meet the constitutional

guidelines set forth by this Court in Grayned v. City of

Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972). Ibid.

C. The Fourth Circuit’s Decision

The Fourth Circuit, although finding no error in the

district court’s findings of fact, reversed. It held that the

attenuated connection between wetlands on Newdunn’s

property and navigable portions of Stony Run was a

“sufficient nexus” for Corps jurisdiction. App., infra, at 19a.

The Corps may permissibly assert jurisdiction over wetlands

adjacent to nonnavigable tributaries of navigable waters, and

may permissibly label as tributaries intermittent and

ephemeral waters in manmade ditches and culverts and

drains located miles from navigable waters. Jd. at 17a.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

A. The Fourth and Fifth Circuits Are In Direct

Conflict Concerning Whether Nonnavigable,

Intermittent, Ephemeral Waters Are “Navigable

Waters” Within The Meaning Of The Clean

Water Act.

The Fifth Circuit in Rice v. Harken Exploration Co., 250

F.3d 264 (5th Cir. 2001), interpreting the Oil Pollution Act,

33 U.S.C. § 2701 (“OPA”), was the first court of appeals to

reconsider the jurisdictional scope of the term “navigable

waters” after the SWANCC decision. Jd. at 266. The court

noted that the OPA and CWA contained the same definition

8

of navigable waters, which should be interpreted the same

way. Id. at 267. The court reviewed its previously broad

interpretation of the language of the CWA and contrasted it

with this Court’s holding in SWANCC. Id. at 268-269.

Noting this Court’s warning in SWANCC that the word

“navigable” cannot be read out of the statute, the Fifth

Circuit held that “a body of water is subjected to regulation

under the CWA if the body of water is actually navigable or

is adjacent to an open body of navigable water.” Id. at 269.

Based on that standard, the Fifth Circuit held that federal

authority does not extend to waters or wetlands “that have

only an indirect, remote and attenuated connection with an

identifiable body of ‘navigable waters.” Jd. at 272. See id. at

270-272 (holding that “a small seasonal creek” and

“intermittent streams that only infrequently contain running

water” are not “sufficiently linked” to navigable waters to

“qualify as ‘navigable waters’ subject to federal

jurisdiction); see also Corps 2003 Guidance (observing that

“[s]ome courts have interpreted the reasoning in SWANCC to

potentially circumscribe CWA jurisdiction over tributaries”

and that Rice “is the leading case taking the narrowest view

of CWA jurisdiction after SWANCC’).

The district court found that the ditch nearest Newdunn’s

property was ephemeral. App., infra, 30a. The Fourth Circuit

did not overturn that conclusion. The Corps’ only definition

of “open water” specifically “does not include ephemeral

waters.” 67 Fed. Reg. 2020, 2094 (2002) (emphasis added).

Therefore, Newdunn’s wetlands are not adjacent to open

water.

This case thus presents the opportunity to decide the

important issue specifically reserved by this Court in

Riverside Bayview as to which the circuits are now squarely

in conflict: “the authority of the Corps to regulate discharges

of fill material into wetlands that are not adjacent to bodies of

open water.” 474 U.S. at 131 n.8. Wetlands that are not

9

adjacent to actually navigable waters do not have the

“significant nexus” that informed this Court’s “reading of the

CWA in Riverside Bayview Homes.” SWANCC, 531 U.S. at

167.

As the district court found and the Fourth Circuit did not

contradict, the wetlands on Newdunn’s property have only an

occasional, manmade, indirect, remote and attenuated

connection with a body of navigable water—the Central Arm

of Stony Run. If Newdunn’s property were located in the

Fifth Circuit the district court’s opinion would have been

affirmed. Instead, the Fourth Circuit adopted a starkly

contrasting view of federal authority.

Rather than restricting the Corps’ jurisdiction to waters

with a “significant nexus” to navigable waters or those that

are “inseparably bound up with the ‘waters’ of the United

States” (SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 167), the Fourth Circuit holds

an indirect, manmade, and occasional “nexus” sufficient.

App., infra, at 19a.

The Fourth Circuit extends the Corps’ jurisdiction to

“any branch of a tributary system that eventually flows into a

navigable body of water.” App., infra, at 16a. The Fourth

Circuit requires no minimum volume or frequency of water

flow to support jurisdiction, and remoteness of a wetland

from navigable water is no bar to the exercise of jurisdiction.

Anything that “eventually provides ‘additional matter’” to a

navigable water is a “tributary” and therefore subject to

CWA jurisdiction. United States v. Deaton, 332 F.3d 698,

710 (4th Cir. 2003).

Further expanding CWA jurisdiction, the Fourth Circuit

refused to find any distinction between natural tributaries and

manmade ditches and culverts. App., infra, at 17a. The court

of appeals held that the Corps’ jurisdiction includes “the

entire tributary system” including roadside ditches and

culverts. Jd. at 17a. In the Fourth Circuit, any drop of water

flowing from any property to traditional navigable water

10

through any gutter, pipe, culvert, or ditch regardless of

distance or amount of flow is ‘navigable water’ within the

meaning of the CWA. Any wetlands ‘adjacent’ to the gutter,

pipe, culvert or ditch would be subject to federal regulation.

The Sixth Circuit has similarly expanded CWA

jurisdiction in United States v. Rapanos, 339 F.3d 447 (6th

Cir. 2003). There, the court upheld CWA jurisdiction

wherever a “hydrologic connection” is proven between

wetlands and navigable waters. It held such a connection to

be present when a wetland connected through manmade

drains and creeks to navigable waters 11 to 20 miles distant.

See also United States v. Buday, 138 F. Supp. 2d 1282 (D.

Mont. 2001) (upholding federal jurisdiction over wetlands

adjacent to non-navigable “tributaries” 235 miles from the

navigable water to which they connected).

B. The Fourth Circuit’s Decision Is At Odds With

The Principles This Court Set Forth In SWANCC

Recently, this Court in SWANCC considered whether

Clean Water Act jurisdiction extends to isolated intrastate

ponds that may provide habitat for migratory birds. This

Court concluded that the text of the Act does not allow the

Corps to exercise such broad jurisdiction. In denying the

Corps’ jurisdiction over isolated ponds this Court set forth

principles to guide lower courts in determining the proper

scope of Section 404 jurisdiction.

Prior to SWANCC, some courts had interpreted the Clean

Water Act as granting jurisdiction to the full extent of the

Commerce Clause. This Court rejected that approach.

Instead, this Court held that the Corps’ jurisdiction under the

Act was based on Congress’ power to regulate navigation.

531 U.S. at 168 n3 (finding nothing to “signif[y] that

Congress intended to exert anything more than its commerce

power over navigation”).

11

This Court rejected the Corps’ position that the word

“navigable” in the statute has no “independent significance.”

531 U.S. at 172. This Court instead endorsed the Corps’ view

of the scope of the 1972 Act set forth in the Corps’ 1974

regulations—as reaching waters navigable in facts, navigable

in the past, or capable of being made navigable in the future.

Id. at 168. Thus, ““‘it is the water body’s capability of use by

the public for purposes of transportation or commerce which

is the determinative factor.’” Jbid. quoting 33 C.F.R.

§ 209.260(e)(1)(1974). Statutory amendments in 1977

supported extending the meaning of navigable waters to

include waters and “wetlands adjacent to ‘navigable waters’”

(id. at 170-171), leading this Court in United States v.

Riverside Rayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121 (1985), to hold

that Section 404(a) jurisdiction extended to “wetlands that

actually abutted on a navigable waterway.” SWANCC, 531

USS. at 167.

This Court held in SWANCC that “the plain text and

import of [CWA] § 404(a)” is that the Act reaches only

waters and wetlands that have a “significant nexus” to and

are “inseparably bound up with” navigable waters. 531 U.S.

at 167. Wetlands that “actually abutted on a navigable

waterway” and primary tributaries of navigable rivers satisfy

that standard (ibid.); but “nonnavigable, isolated, intrastate

waters” do not. Jd. at 170.

In refusing to interpret the CWA to give the Corps

jurisdiction over every pond in the country that might

provide habitat for migratory birds, this Court relied on the

principle that it takes a “clear statement” from Congress to

“alte[r] the federal-state framework by permitting federal

encroachment upon a traditional state power,” such as “the

States’ traditional and primary power over land and water

use.” SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 173-174. Avoiding such

encroachment through administrative overreaching is

especially important in the case of the Clean Water Act, this

Court observed, where Congress chose expressly to

12

‘recognize, preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities

and rights of States’” in those areas. Id. at 174.

The issue as to which, we have demonstrated, the courts

of appeals are divided is where, within the jurisdictional

scheme described in SWANCC, to fit wetlands that are not

adjacent to traditional navigable waters but are adjacent to

intermittent, ephemeral waters that occasionally run in

manmade ditches and culverts through which they may

eventually reach remote navigable waters. Like the Fifth

Circuit in Rice v. Harken, we believe that a fair reading of

SWANCC is that the CWA requires a more direct and

substantial connection between jurisdictional and traditional

navigable waters than the attenuated connection provided by

the possibility of intermittent flow of some quantity of water

through manmade ditches to remote navigable water.

Remote, intermittent water in manmade roadside ditches is

not in any meaningful sense, adjacent to, or a tributary of

navigable water. As Justice Stevens understood in dissent in

SWANCC, the effect of this Court’s ruling is that “such

‘isolated’ waters as ‘intermittent rivers, streams, tributaries,

and perched wetlands that are not contiguous or adjacent to

navigable waters’” are “completely excise[d] * * * from the

scope of the Act.” 531 U.S. at 189 & 190 n.14; see also id. at

187 n.13 (recognizing that wetlands, being only marginally

“waters” are “the most marginal category of ‘waters of the

United States’ potentially covered by the [CWA]”).

Were the Corps correct in its assertion of power over

water with any hydrological connection to navigable waters,

no matter how remote and attenuated, the vast accretion of

federal authority at the expense of traditional state powers

that the Court fended off in SWANCC will have occurred

anyway, and in a likely more potent form that leaves virtually

no water anywhere in the nation beyond the Corps’ reach.

The same “clear statement” rule of statutory interpretation

applied in SWANCC applies here. There is no more a clear

congressional statement in the CWA that federal power

13

reaches wetlands adjacent to normally dry ditches that could

on occasion indirectly carry runoff to remote navigable

waters than there was a clear congressional statement found

in SWANCC that federal power reaches isolated ponds used

by migratory birds.

The Fourth Circuit thus failed to apply the teaching of

SWANCC—in fact going through contortions to avoid the

lessons of that case. Other courts of appeals have similarly

sought to restrict the SWANCC decision to its facts, refusing

to follow the plain statutory meaning described by this Court.

E.g., United States v. Rapanos, supra; Headwaters, Inc. v.

Talent Irrigation Dist., 243 F.3d 526, 534 (9th Cir. 2001).

Further guidance from this Court is now essential.

C. The Fourth Circuit’s Decision That Roadside

Ditches Are Tributaries Is Inconsistent With The

CWA, Because The CWA Defines A Ditch As A

“Point Source” And Not A Tributary

Section 301(a) of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C.

§ 1311(a), prohibits the discharge of pollutants into navigable

waters. The term “discharge of a pollutant” means “any

addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point

source.” 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12)(A). The Clean Water Act

further defines the term “point source” as “any discernable,

confined and discrete conveyance, including but not limited

to any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well * * * from

which pollutants are or may be discharged.” 33 U.S.C.

§ 1362(14).

By definition, pipes, ditches and conduits are not

tributaries, but rather are point sources, which can, in some

circumstances, discharge pollutants into navigable waters. In

Aiello v. Town of Brookhaven, 136 F. Supp. 2d 81 (E.D.N.Y.

2001), for example, the court held that “culverts * * * qualify

as point sources.” Jd. at 118. Because the culverts at issue

there discharged pollutants into a pond and stream that were

navigable-in-fact, CWA jurisdiction existed. Jbid.

14

The Fourth Circuit’s definition of “tributary” includes

anything that “provides ‘additional matter’” that ultimately

reaches a navigable water. Deaton, 332 F.3d at 710. If all

pipes, ditches, channels, tunnels, conduits, wells, and discrete

fissures are “tributaries,” then a § 402 NPDES permit would

be required for all discharges into these “waters of the United

States.” Absurdly, every homeowner would need a § 402

permit for any discharges from his property into a curbside

gutter or house drain. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342.

The Environmental Protection Agency, which shares

CWA regulatory authority, however, defines the system of

“toads with drainage systems, * * * curbs, gutters, ditches

and man-made channels, or storm drains” as Municipal

Separate Storm Sewer Systems. 40 CFR. § 122.26(b)(8).

Separate storm sewers and other conveyances of urban runoff

“are point sources under the CWA.” 55 Fed. Reg. 47990,

47991 (1990).

The Corps’ litigation position that ditches and pipes are

tributaries, which is inconsistent with the plain language of

the CWA, and EPA regulations, leads to absurd results not

intended by Congress, and should be rejected. See Bowen v.

Georgetown University Hospital, 488 U.S. 204, 212 (1988);

Ragsdale v. Wolverine World Wide Inc., 535 U.S. 81, 86

(2002).

D. The Fourth Circuit’s Erroneous Decision Flies In

The Face Of Corps Regulations and Policy

Despite the Corps’ litigating position in this and other

cases since SWANCC, the agency’s regulations have long

recognized narrower limits on its jurisdiction. Concepts such

as headwaters, ordinary high water marks, and manmade

drainage or irrigation ditches have all served to mark the

outer limits of CWA jurisdiction. The Fourth Circuit’s

decision has vastly expanded federal jurisdiction by making

all of these concepts irrelevant to the reach of the statute.

15

I. The Corps’ Regulations Limit Jurisdiction To

The Ordinary High Water Mark

The Fourth Circuit concluded that the Corps’ jurisdiction

reaches “‘any branch of a tributary system that eventually

flows into a navigable body of water.”” App., infra, 16a,

quoting Deaton, 332 F.3d at 711 (emphasis added). Corps

regulations, however, limit Corps jurisdiction in non-tidal

waters to the ordinary high-water mark (“OHWM™”) and

make clear that CWA jurisdiction ends when the OHWM is

no longer discernable. 33 C.F.R. § 328.4; App. infra, 62a; see

also, e.g., 51 Fed. Reg. at 41217 (1986); App., infra, 38a; 65

Fed. Reg. 12818, 12823 (2000) (drainage ditch constructed in

a stream is a water of the United States “provided an OHWM

is still present”); Tr. of Oral Argument to Fourth Circuit at 5

(Corps’ counsel acknowledged this limitation on Corps’

authority).

Thus, in order for wetlands to be jurisdictional they must

be adjacent to the ordinary high water mark of a non-tidal

water of the United States. 33 C.F.R. § 328.4(c); App. infra,

62a. Here, the district court found that the eastern I-64 ditch

was ephemeral, meaning that at most times during the year it

was dry. App. infra, 30a. A ditch that does not ordinarily

have water will likely not have an ordinary high water mark,

and the district court made no finding that any OHWM

existed in any of the ditches and culverts in issue.

Nonetheless, the Fourth Circuit—without finding the

presence of an OHWM—upheld the Corps’ jurisdiction. In

doing so, it effectively removed, as a matter of law, the

jurisdictional limitation contained in 33 C.F.R. § 328.4(c).

2. The Corps’ Regulatory Guidance Distinguishes

Manmade Ditches From Natural Tributaries

Corps regulations have consistently treated manmade

ditches differently from natural tributaries. In 1975, man-

made canals which are navigable-in-fact were considered

waters of the United States, but “drainage and irrigation

16

ditches have been excluded.” 40 Fed. Reg. 31320, 31321

(1975). The 1977 regulations specifically stated that

“manmade nontidal drainage and irrigation ditches excavated

on dry land are not considered waters of the United States.”

42 Fed. Reg. 37122, 37144 (codified at 33 CFR.

323.2(a)(3)) (1977). The Corps explained that drainage and

irrigation ditches are only regulated by the CWA at the point

where they feed into navigable waters. 42 Fed. Reg. at

37127.

Even in 1986, when the Corps began regulating drainage

and irrigation ditches on a case-by-case basis, the Corps did

not define ditches as tributaries. 51 Fed. Reg. 41206, 41217.

Instead, the Corps recognized that non-tidal drainage ditches

were even further removed from navigable waters than ponds

used by migratory birds. Jbid.

In March 2000, the Corps stated that ditches constructed

in streams could'be waters of the United States if they

contained an OHWM, but still did not define ditches as

tributaries. 65 Fed. Reg. 12818, 12823 (2000). According to

current Corps guidance, ditches constructed in uplands are

still generally not waters of the United States. Jd. at 12824.

Nontidal drainage and irrigation ditches that are not

navigable-in-fact have s been excluded from the

general definition of the tnavigable” “waters of the United

States.” Given this regulatory history, it is remarkable that

the Fourth Circuit ignores the district court’s finding of fact

that the I-64 ditches were not waters of the United States.

The district court found that the Corps had failed to meet its

burden to prove that these ditches were tributaries. App.,

infra, at 47a. Overturning the district court’s judgment,

without challenging its factual conclusions, amounts to

holding that a// manmade ditches are waters of the United

States as a matter of law. There is no support for this

conclusion in either the statute or the regulations.

17

3. Prior To SWANCC The Corps Treated The Type

Of Wetlands At Issue The Same As “Isolated

Waters”

The Corps has long recognized that there is a point in

natural streams above which the flow is de minimis. This

point is called the “headwaters,” which the Corps defines as

“the point on a stream beyond which the flow of the water

body is normally less than five cubic feet per second.” 40

Fed. Reg. 31320, 31321 (1975); 33 C.F.R. § 330.2(d) (2003).

It is undisputed that the property in this case is above the

headwaters.

In the 1975 regulations, when the Corps expanded its

definition of waters of the United States, the Corps only

asserted jurisdiction in tributaries “up to their headwaters.”

40 Fed. Reg. at 31324 (1975). In 1977, the Corps’ position

was that permits would “ordinarily not be required” for

activities above the headwaters. 42 Fed. Reg. at 37129.

However, the Corps asserted that these headwaters were now

“waters of the United States” within its jurisdiction. Jbid. The

1977 regulations equated waters above the headwaters with

isolated waters such as the ponds in SWANCC. 33 CFR.

§ 323.2(ay(5) (1977); 42 Fed. Reg. 37144 n.2. As the

footnote makes clear, the Corps claimed authority over

isolated waters and waters above the headwaters under the

broad assertion of jurisdiction in 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3) over

waters “which could affect” interstate commerce—a provision

upon which this Court cast substantial doubt in SWANCC.

The Corps issued new regulations in 1986, purportedly to

“clarify the scope of the 404 program.” 51 Fed. Reg. at

41217. However, those regulations now required landowners

to get permits for activities above the headwaters. Still, the

permit regulations treated “isolated waters” and headwaters

the same. 51 Fed. Reg. at 41218: 33 C.F.R. § 330.5(a)(26)

(1986).

18

As the history of the Corps’ regulations make Clear, the

Corps has historically treated even natural streams above the

headwaters as “isolated.” Areas above the headwaters are

only occasionally connected to navigable waters through

surface water runoff. Ecologically, high elevation wetlands

are less functional than wetlands adjacent to navigable, open

water. App., infra, 31a. The Fourth Circuit’s decision

endorses the Corps’ exercise of jurisdiction over waters that

even the Corps recognizes as being as far removed from

navigable waters as the “isolated ponds” at issue in

SWANCC.

Although this Court has held there is “no persuasive

evidence” that the Corps erred in its 1974 regulations

interpreting “navigable waters” as waters that are navigable

in fact, have been navigable in the past, or could be made so

in the future (SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 167), and although 1977

amendments to the CWA did no more than indicate

“Congress” desire to [in addition] regulate wetlands adjacent

to [such] ‘navigable waters”” (id. at 170-171), the Corps has

time and again expanded its CWA jurisdiction to waters ever

more distantly and contingently connected to traditional

navigable waters. It is questionable whether many of those

regulatory expansions of jurisdiction, which find no

reasonable basis in the language of the CWA, survive

SWANCC. But what is clear is that even were the current

regulations permissible, they would not on any plausible

interpretation reach Newdunn’s wetlands, connected to

distant navigable waters only by remote, ephemeral,

intermittent flows of rainwater runoff through a series of

manmade ditches and culverts. This 30-year history of

progressive regulatory overreaching, compounded by the

Corps’ straining of its own regulations since SWANCC,

warrants corrective action by this Court now.

19

E. This Court’s Guidance Is Necessary Because

There Is No Consistent National Policy On CWA

Jurisdiction

Due to inconsistent administrative interpretations, and

resulting confusion over the extent of the Corps’ CWA

jurisdiction, Section 404 enforcement actions make up

approximately 75% of the Corps’ reported 5,500 annual

alleged violations of federal law under its regulatory

authority. U.S. Corps of Engineers, Regulatory Program

Overview, available at <http://www.usace.army.mil/inet/

functions/cw/cecwo/reg/oceover.htm>. Conversely, only

10% of the Corps’ enforcement actions involve Rivers and

Harbors Act violations, a statutory scheme where jurisdiction

is more apparent.

Absent this Court’s review of this case, landowners’

property rights will continue to be determined on an

arbitrary, ad hoc basis, with inconsistent results from

different Corps divisions and courts throughout the country.

Whether the Corps asserts jurisdiction over a particular piece

of property depends upon where in the country the property

is located. “Most of the authority for administering the

regulatory program has been delegated to the thirty-six

district engineers and eleven division engineers.” 33 C.F.R.

§ 320.1(b). The Corps may determine its jurisdiction

administratively as part of the Section 404 permit application

process, or in a separate Jurisdictional Determination. 33

C.F.R. § 331.2. The Corps has established an administrative

appeal process for jurisdictional determinations and permit

decisions, (33 C.F.R. § 331.1 et seg.), in which each Corps

division hears and decides the appeals from its subject

district, (33 C.F.R. § 331.7(a)), without regard to previous

decisions. 33 C.F.R. § 331.7(g). Administrative decisions

have no precedential value even within the same Corps’

district. Ibid. As a result, the scope of CWA jurisdiction

varies widely.

20

Some Corps divisions require that a ditch, or natural

watercourse, exhibit an ordinary high-water mark

(“OHWM7”)) in order to be considered “waters of the United

States.” For example, in the Mississippi Valley Division, a

ditch was not considered a water of the United States because

an “OHW mark was not evident.” U.S. Corps of Engineers,

Appeal Decision, Memphis Stone and Gravel Company,

Vicksburg District, File No. 200113910 (July 19, 2002). In

another case, the same division held that CWA jurisdiction

did not extend to a property because the Corps failed to

“clearly establish that the point of connection in the unnamed

natural drain to the Calcasieu River was below the plain of

the Calcasieu River OHWM.” U.S. Corps of Engineers,

Appeal Decision, Daniel, New Orleans District, File No. 20-

010-0562 (June 20, 2001).

' Similarly, the South Atlantic Division found CWA

jurisdiction did not exist where “the district did not document

the presence of an ordinary high-water mark.” U.S. Corps of

Engineers, Appeal Decision, Soundview Properties, Inc.,

Jacksonville District, File No. 199905468 (November 19,

2001).

On the other side of the country, the South Pacific

Division finds CWA jurisdiction even though drainage from

a property to navigable water did not exhibit an OHWM.

U.S. Corps of Engineers, Appeal Decision, Sunrise Office

Park, Los Angeles District, File No. 2001-00379 (September

7, 2001). And in another case, involving desert washes, (U.S.

Corps of Engineers, Appeal Decision, Molycorp, Inc., Los

Angeles District, File No. 2000-01678 (August 16, 2001))

the appeals officer concluded that the “policy position that a

tributary connection can exist in the absence of a continuous

ordinary high-water mark is reasonable.” Ibid. Accordingly,

the appeals officer upheld jurisdiction despite the fact that

there was no OHWM in the desert washes. Jbid.

21

In other Corps Divisions abrupt changes make predicting

CWA jurisdiction impossible. In 2000, the Great Lakes and

Ohio River Division held that a drainage ditch was not a

tributary, and therefore not a ‘water of the United States’, if it

merely conveyed “runoff from climatic factors” to navigable

waters. See U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Appeal Decision,

Evangelista, Detroit District, File No. 00-010-030-0 (August

25, 2000).

A year later, the same Corps Division adopted a

conflicting position on CWA jurisdiction. See U.S. Corps of

Engineers, Appeal Decision, NEC Transit/Williams, L.L.C.,

Buffalo District, File No. 2000-00325(2) (August 30, 2001).

In that case, the appeals officer determined that the subject

wetland had “no discernable outlet for water flow and no

evidence that water ever flows from the wetland.” Jbid. The

appeals officer found only that the wetland was in “close

proximity” to other wetlands, and contained “similar

vegetation and soils.” Jbid. These wetlands displayed “no

discernable channel or wetland soils in the area where water

overflowed.” Jbid. In fact, water overflows occurred so

“rarely or with such low velocity that it leaves no evidence of

flow through erosive forces.” Ibid. Nonetheless, CWA

jurisdiction was found to exist.

A North Atlantic Division appeals officer recently upheld

CWA jurisdiction where rainwater flowed down a grass

upland slope and a portion of a wetland into a culvert that ran

underneath a road and into an intermittent stream which was

a tributary of the Hudson River. See USS. Corps of

Engineers, Appeal Decision, E. Tetz & Sons, Inc. and

Concrete Properties, New York District, File No. 2000-

00117 (June 24, 2003).

The landowner argued that less than a year earlier, the

same appeals officer, in U.S. Corps of Engineers, Appeal

Decision, Meehan, New York District, File No. 2002-00023

(November 19, 2002), had rejected the Corps’ assertion of

22

CWA jurisdiction because the Corps had failed to prove the

existence of an OHWM in a manmade drainage ditch. The

appeals officer refused to explain or justify his sudden

change of position and merely pointed out that the Corps’

regulations “expressly prohibit citation of a prior appealed

decision in any other administrative appeal.” Tetz & Sons,

supra.

The Corps’ inconsistent, case-by-case approach to CWA

jurisdiction is particularly troublesome because judicial

review of the Corps’ jurisdiction is only available after the

landowner completes the application process or the Corps

brings an enforcement action. Southern Pines Assoc. v.

United States, 912 F.2d 713 (4th Cir. 1990) (holding that

CWA provides clear and convincing evidence that Congress

intended to bar pre-enforcement review); Hoffman Homes v.

United States, 902 F.2d 567 (7th Cir. 1990) (same).

The application process for a Section 404 permit is costly

and time consuming. The petitioner in SWANCC, for

example, amassed an administrative record of 46,000 pages

and battled with the Corps for over 13 years before this Court

held that the Corps had no jurisdiction over the property. See

Oral Argument Transcript at 16-17, SWANCC, supra. The

average process time for those that complete the application

process is 373 days. See V. Albrecht & B. Goode, Wetland

Regulation in the Real World (Feb. 1994). Unfortunately,

most landowners do not complete the application process.

Ibid (reporting that the majority of individual permit

applications are withdrawn). Each day countless landowners

must decide whether to embark upon a lengthy and costly

application process, give up their property rights, or risk an

enforcement action. Under current Corps practices, it is

impossible for a landowner to make a rational, informed

decision.

The vastly differing and contradictory positions reflected

in the administrative process demonstrate that the Corps has

23

no consistent national policy on CWA jurisdiction. Without

clear guidance from this Court, landowners’ property rights

will continue to be controlled by arbitrary administrative

decisions that vary from location to location and time to time.

F. The CWA Does Not Authorize The Corps To

Exercise General Land Use Regulation, Which

Congress Expressly Reserved For State And

Local Governments

Section 404(a) grants the Corps authority to issue permits

for the discharge of dredged or fill material at “specified

disposal sites.” 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a); App., infra at 58a.

Nothing in the plain text of Section 404 manifests Congress’

intent to delegate to the Corps the authority to regulate

general land use activities. To the contrary, Congress

expressly set forth its policy to “recognize, preserve and

protect the primary responsibilities and rights of States to * *

* plan development and use [ ] of land.” 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b),

App., infra, 57a.

Pursuant to the current regulations, the Corps claims the

authority to issue permits for the construction of homes,

shopping centers, airports, and roads. These are not “disposal

sites.” They are general development activities fully and

properly regulated by state and local governments.

Newdunn does not want to operate a disposal site; it

wants to develop its property. However, the Corps’ Section

404 permit process requires Newdunn to demonstrate to the

Satisfaction of the Corps that there are no practicable

alternative sites that Newdunn could develop. 40 C.F.R.

§ 230.10. How, when, and where a landowner should be

permitted to develop property is a land-use issue that

Congress left to state governments. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b),

App., infra, 57a.

If any artificial drain or ditch would extend the Corps’

jurisdiction, localities, as they seek to control rain-water

24

runoff, would constantly be expanding federal jurisdiction

over new lands. There is no evidence that Congress intended

to wrench this authority from local government and give it to

the Corps. To the contrary, “[t]he conferees were uniquely

aware of the process by which the dredge and fill permits are

presently handled and did not wish to create a burdensome

bureaucracy in light of the fact that a system to issue permits

already existed.” 118 Cong. Rec. 33699 (1972). The

legislative history shows that Congress intended for the

Corps to deal with the discharge of dredged materials into

navigable waters, much as it did under the Rivers and

Harbors Act.

In reality, the regulatory scheme that has arisen due to the

Corps’ claim of Section 404 jurisdiction is unparalleled in its

inconvenience and burden to the landowners. See V.

Albrecht & B. Goode, Wetland Regulation in the Real World

(Feb. 1994). If the Corps is allowed to extend CWA

jurisdiction to every roadside ditch in the country then every

local land use decision would be subject to federal review

and control. This would be directly contrary to Congress’

express goal to “recognize, preserve and protect the primary

responsibilities and rights of States to * * * plan development

and use [ ] of land.” 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b), App., infra, 57a.

25

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted.

TIMOTHY S. BISHOP DOUGLAS E. KAHLE

RUSSELL R. EGGERT Counsel of Record

Mayer, Brown, Rowe & Maw MARKR. BAUMGARTNER

190 South LaSalle Street Pender & Coward, P.C.

Chicago, IL 60603 222 Central Park Ave.

(312) 782-0600 Virginia Beach, VA 23462

(757) 490-3000

OCTOBER 2003

, Faster RED Te See a

la

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

Nos. 02-1480 & 02-1594

DENNIS H. TREACY, Director,

Department of Environmental Quality;

STATE WATER CONTROL BOARD,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

and

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

v.

NEWDUNN ASSOCIATES, LLP; ORION ASSOCIATES;

NORTHWEST CONTRACTORS,

Defendants-Appellees.

MARY MARGARET WHIPPLE, Virginia State Senator;

L. PRESTON BRYANT, Virginia State Delegate;

CHESAPEAKE BAY FOUNDATION, INCORPORATED,

Amici Supporting Appellants.

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF REALTORS; THE

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF HOME BUILDERS;

NFIB LEGAL FOUNDATION; NATIONAL

ASSOCIATION OF INDUSTRIAL AND OFFICE

PROPERTIES; NATIONAL MULTI HOUSING

COUNCIL; NATIONAL APARTMENT ASSOCIATION;

REAL ESTATE ROUNDTABLE; BUILDING INDUSTRY

LEGAL DEFENSE FOUNDATION; FOUNDATION FOR

ENVIRONMENTAL AND ECONOMIC PROGRESS;

INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL OF SHOPPING CENTERS,

Amici Supporting Appellees.

2a

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

and

DENNIS H. TREACY, Director,

Department of Environmental Quality;

STATE WATER CONTROL BOARD,

Plaintiff,

v.

NEWDUNN ASSOCIATES, LLP; ORION ASSOCIATES;

NORTHWEST CONTRACTORS,

Defendants-Appellees.

MARY MARGARET WHIPPLE, Virginia State Senator;

L. PRESTON BRYANT, Virginia State Delegate;

CHESAPEAKE BAY F OUNDATION, INCORPORATED,

Amici Supporting Appellants.

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF REALTORS; THE

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF HOME BUILDERS;

NFIB LEGAL FOUNDATION; NATIONAL

ASSOCIATION OF INDUSTRIAL AND OFFICE

PROPERTIES; NATIONAL MULTI HOUSING

COUNCIL; NATIONAL APARTMENT ASSOCIATION;

REAL ESTATE ROUNDTABLE; BUILDING INDUSTRY

LEGAL DEFENSE F OUNDATION; FOUNDATION FOR

ENVIRONMENTAL AND ECONOMIC PROGRESS;

INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL OF SHOPPING CENTERS,

Amici Supporting Appellees.

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Norfolk.

Henry C. Morgan, Jr., District Judge.

(CA-01-508-2, CA-01-86-4, CA-01 -508)

3a

February 25, 2003, Argued

September 10, 2003, Decided

JUDGES: Before GREGORY and SHEDD, Circuit Judges,

and C. Arlen BEAM, Senior Circuit Judge of the United

States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, sitting by

designation. Judge Gregory wrote the opinion, in which

Judge Shedd and Senior Judge Beam joined.

Reversed and Remanded.

OPINION BY: Gregory

OPINION: GREGORY, Circuit Judge:

During the summer of 2001, without obtaining a permit

from the Army Corps of Engineers (the “Corps’”) or the

Virginia State Water Control Board (the “Board”), Newdunn

Associates, Orion Associates, and Northwest Contractors

(collectively “Newdunn”) began ditching and draining

wetlands on a forty-three-acre property near Newport News,

Virginia (the “Newdunn Property”). Pursuant to its authority

under the Clean Water Act (“CWA” or the “Act”), the Corps

brought a civil enforcement action in federal district court.

The Board initiated its own enforcement action in state court,

premised on the Virginia Nontidal Wetlands Resources Act

of 2000 (the “Virginia Act”). Newdunn removed the state

action to federal court, and the two cases were consolidated.

After a five-day bench trial, the district court ruled for

Newdunn in both cases, finding that the Corps lacked

jurisdiction over wetlands on the Newdunn Property under

the Clean Water Act, and that the jurisdictional reach of

Virginia law was merely coextensive with federal law. For

the reasons stated below, we reverse.

4a

I.

In 1978, Newdunn Associates purchased forty-three acres

of land located in Newport News, Virginia. It is undisputed

that approximately thirty-eight acres of the Newdunn

Property (the “Newdunn Wetlands”) were “wetlands,” as that

term is defined by the Corps in its CWA regulations. 33

C.F.R. § 328.3(b) (2002) (defining “wetlands” as “those

areas that are inundated or saturated by surface or ground

water at a frequency and duration sufficient to support, and

that under normal circumstances do support, a prevalence of

vegetation typically adapted for life in saturated soil

conditions”). Historically, before the construction of

Interstate 64 (“I-64”), the wetlands on the Newdunn Property

had a natural hydrologic connection to Stony Run, which is a

navigable waterway-in-fact. Presently, the Newdunn

Wetlands remain connected to the navigable waters of Stony

Run by the intermittent flow of surface water through

approximately 2.4 miles of natural streams and manmade

ditches (paralleling and crossing under I-64). Silt-laden

waters from the Newdunn Wetlands merge with clear water

flowing south of the manmade ditch on the west side of I-64.

In May of 2001, following the Supreme Court’s ruling in

Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County (‘SWANCC”) y.

United States, 531 U.S. 159, 167, 121 S. Ct. 675 (2001),

which struck down the Corps’ attempted exercise of

jurisdiction under its Migratory Bird Rule, Newdunn

informed the Corps that it believed the Corps lacked

jurisdiction over the Newdunn Property, and began filling the

Newdunn Wetlands without a permit. Newdunn argued that

there were no “jurisdictional” wetlands on the property, even

though the property contained “scientific” wetlands. The

Corps disagreed with Newdunn’s interpretation of SWANCC,

and on July 6, 2001, attempted to assert jurisdiction over

wetlands on the Newdunn Property by commencing an

Sa

enforcement action in federal district court, alleging

violations of sections 301 and 404 of the Clean Water Act.

Based on the same activities, and pursuant to Virginia

state law, the Board issued an Emergency Special Order

(“ESO”), mandating that Newdunn cease stumping and

grading on its property. Va. Code. Ann. § 62.1-44.15(8b).

Newdunn ignored the ESO, and as a result, on August 7,

2001, the Board filed a civil enforcement action in state

court, alleging violations of Va. Code Ann. § § 62.1-44.5,

62.1-44.14, 62.1-44.15, 62.1-44.15:5, 62.1-44.23, and 62.1-

44.32 (2001). Newdunn removed the Board’s action to

federal court. The Board, claiming that the district court was

without jurisdiction to consider its case, filed a motion to

remand. The court denied the Board’s motion, and the Corps’

and the Commonwealth’s cases were consolidated for a five-

day bench trial in March of 2002.

As to the federal suit, the district court held that the

Corps’ wetlands regulations were invalid because they

exceeded Congress’ grant of authority to the Corps under the

Clean Water Act. On the state suit, the court ruled that the

Commonwealth “has been unable to show that the Virginia

Legislature has, at this time, granted regulatory authority

independently of the Corps’ jurisdiction.” Accordingly, the

district court determined that the Commonwealth lacked

jurisdiction over the Newdunn Wetlands, since its authority

was presumably coextensive with the Corps’. This

consolidated appeal followed.

II.

We review de novo both the district court’s statutory

interpretation of the Clean Water Act, Hughes River

Watershed Conservancy v. Glickman, 81 F.3d 437, 448 (4th

Cir. 1996), and the district court’s conclusion that it had

subject matter jurisdiction over the Commonwealth’s

enforcement action, Jn re Celotex Corp., 124 F.3d 619, 625

(4th Cir. 1997). We review any factual findings of the district

6a

court for clear error. Virginia Vermiculite, Ltd. v. Historic

Green Springs, Inc., 307 F.3d 277, 284 (4th Cir. 2002).

II.

A.

Before reaching the merits of either case, we must first

determine whether we have jurisdiction over the Board’s

enforcement action premised on Virginia law. In cases where

state law creates the cause of action, federal question

jurisdiction is “unavailable unless it appears that some

substantial, disputed question of federal law is a necessary

element of one of the well-pleaded state claims.” Franchise

Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 13,

103 S. Ct. 2841 (1983) (emphasis added). For a federal issue

to be both a necessary and disputed element, “the vindication

of a right under state law [must] necessarily turn[ ] on some

construction of federal law.” Jd. at 9 (emphasis added).

In the present case, the district court noted that both the

Virginia state statute and the Corps’ federal regulations

define “wetlands” as “those areas that are inundated or

saturated by surface or groundwater at a frequency and

duration sufficient to support, and tiat under normal

circumstances do support, a prevalence of vegetation

typically adapted for life in saturated soil conditions.” 33

C.F.R. § 328.3(b); Va. Code Ann. § 62.1-44.3. Based on this

shared scientific definition,' the district court concluded “that

' It is, of course, unexceptional that Virginia would elect to take

advantage of the Corps’ vast technical resources in elucidating the

scientific meaning of “wetlands,” while at the same time making its own,

unrelated decision on when and where to exercise jurisdiction over those

wetlands. As Henry R. Butler and Jonathan R. Macey have observed:

One real source of economies of scale associate’ with

centralization of environmental regulation could be in

centralized research on technical, scientific issues that recur

throughout a number of different states . . . . These economies

(Continued on following page)

Ta

the state statute is coextensive with the CWA.” In making

this finding, however, the district court confused the

definition of “scientific wetlands” and “jurisdictional

wetlands.”

Newdunn concedes, and the district court recognized, that

at least thirty-eight acres of the Newdunn Property contained

“wetlands” as that term is used in both 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(b)

and Va. Code Ann. § 62.1-44.3. Thus, from a scientific

perspective, there is no disputed federal question as to

whether the Newdunn Property contains wetlands.? Because

the resolution of this case in no way turns upon any

interpretation of 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(b), there can be no federal

question jurisdiction based on Virginia’s decision to adopt

the Corps’ technical definition of wetlands. See Franchise

Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 9. Stated differently, the issue is not

can be realized by the federal government even when most

policy-making and implementation functions are handled by

the states.

Henry R. Butler & Jonathan R. Macey, Using Federalism to

Improve Environmental Policy 26 (1996).

? In fact, even if this case did involve a dispute over the scientific

definition of wetlands, it is doubtful that the conflict would raise a

question of federal law. Importantly, the General Assembly did not

reference or cite to federal law in its definition of wetlands. Rather, it

merely parroted the language from the federal regulation in Va. Code

Ann. § 62.1-44.3. The fact that a state law might mimic the wording of a

federal law, of course, does not transform interpretation of the state

statute into a federal question.

Many states, for example, have “little NEPAs” on their books,

which are based on language found in federal law. See Bradley C.

Karkkainen, “Toward a Smarter NEPA: Monitoring and Managing

Government’s Environmental Performance,” 102 Colum. L. Rev. 903,

905 (2002) (noting that the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C.

§ 4321, et seq., “has inspired dozens of ‘little NEPAs’ at the state and

local levels”). Notwithstanding the presence of mirrored language, courts

applying those statutes are interpreting state, not federal, law.

8a

whether the Newdunn Property contains wetlands, but

whether those wetlands are within the jurisdiction of the

State Water Control Board. The answer to this question is

resolved solely by looking to the Virginia Wetlands

Resources Act of 2000, codified at Va. Code Ann. §§ 62.1-

44.3, 44.5, 44.15, 44.15:5, 44.29 (2001).

The Virginia Act was crafted after this circuit announced

its decision in United States v. Wilson, 133 F.3d 251 (4th Cir.

1997), and after the D.C. Circuit invalidated the Corps’

Tulloch rule, which had allowed the Corps to regulate

incidental fallback as a pollutant added to a wetland, see

Nat'l Mining Assoc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 145 F.3d

1399, 1404 (D.C. Cir. 1998). Following Wilson and National

Mining, and the subsequent loss of federal control over

Virginia’s wetlands, nearly 10,000 acres of nontidal wetlands

were drained or were set to be drained in a period of less than

six months. See Tyler Whitley, “Nontidal Wetlands Rules

Bill , Expected, ” Richmond Times-Dispatch, Dec. 1, 1999, at

B42 Although Virginia was losing wetlands at a dramatic

pace, the State Water Control Board was largely without

authority to act. Interpreting then-existing state law, former

Attorney General Mark Earley opined, “(T]he Board [did]

not have authority to regulate wetlands beyond that

contemplated by the § 401 certification process” found in the

CWA. 1999 Op. Va. Att’y Gen. 179.

Subsequent to this 1999 opinion, environmentalists

petitioned the Virginia General Assembly to fill the

regulatory vacuum. Delegate L. Preston Bryant, Jr.,

responded to this call, and co-patroned a bill to provide the

State with a comprehensive, nontidal wetlands permitting

3 As Wilson and National Mining make clear, the district court

erred when it wrongly assumed that, prior to the Supreme Court’s ruling

in SWANCC, 531 U.S. 159, 148 L. Ed. 2d 576, 121 S. Ct. 675 (2001), the

Corps enjoyed “seemingly unlimited jurisdiction.”

9a

program. In a letter to then-Governor James S. Gilmore, III,

Delegate Bryant explained the need for his proposal as

follows:

For many years, the federal wetlands permitting

program has fluctuated in its ability to protect

Virginia’s nontidal wetlands. This fluctuation

has_ resulted not only from _ changing

administrations and policies within the federal

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, but more

recently from changing federal case law... .A

comprehensive state program would remove the

uncertainty created by changing federal policies

and case law decisions.

Letter from L. Preston Bryant, Jr., Delegate, to James S.

Gilmore, III, Governor (Dec. 3, 1999) (quoted in Br. of

Amici Curiae Sen. Whipple, et al. at 19). Delegate Bryant’s

bill was ultimately passed into law, becoming the Virginia

Act at issue in this case. See S. 648, 2000 Gen. Assem., Reg.

Sess. (Va. 2000); H.D. 1170, 2000 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess.

(Va. 2000) (amending Va. Code Ann. §§ 62.1-44.3, 44.5,

44.15, 44.15:5, 44.29). Newdunn posits that the Virginia Act

was crafted narrowly to close only the Tulloch loophole, and

not to broaden the Board’s jurisdiction within the

Commonwealth. The plain text of the Virginia Act, however,

belies this contention. Virginia law defines “state waters”

broadly to include “all water, on the surface and under the

ground, wholly or partially within or bordering the

Commonwealth or within its jurisdiction, including

wetlands.” Va. Code Ann. § 62.1-44.3 (emphasis added). The

words “including wetlands” were added to the statute by the

Virginia Act, without any jurisdictional limitation. S. 648,

2000 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2000); H.D. 1170, 2000

Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2000). In “state waters,”

Virginia law prohibits excavating, draining, filling, dumping,

10a

or any other activity that may significantly alter or degrade a

wetland without a permit issued by the Board. See Va. Code

Ann. § 62.1-44.5. Nothing in the Virginia Act refers to the

CWA’s definition of “navigable waters” or the “waters of the

United States.” A plain reading of the Virginia Act, therefore,

makes it inconceivable that the term “wetlands” as it is used

in the state legislation could necessarily turn on the

resolution of a question of federal law.*

Alternatively, Newdunn maintains that the Board’s

jurisdiction depends on a resolution of federal law because

‘In fact, if there were any doubt as to the meaning of the text, the

legislative history of the Virginia Act makes it abundantly clear that the

legislation was crafted, not to incorporate the CWA’s jurisdictional

limits, but rather to remedy perceived shortcomings with the

jurisdictional reach of federal law.

During the 2000 General Assembly session, legislators rejected a

proposal that would have limited the Board’s jurisdiction to those

wetlands “that are subject to federal jurisdiction under the federal Clean

Water Act.” See Legislative History of S. 695, Gen Assem. Reg. Sess.

(Va. 2000), available at http://leg 1 .state.va.us/001/bil.htm; Legislative

History of H.D. 1246, 2000 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2000),

available at http://leg1.state.va.us/001/bil.htm.

Instead, lawmakers adopted an initiative that defined “wetlands”

without any federal jurisdictional limitation and that was crafted not only

to close the Tulloch loophole, but also “to protect and enhance the

Commonwealth’s wetland resources” by charging the Board with

designing regulatory programs “to achieve no net loss of existing wetland

acreage and functions.” See Legislative History of S. 648, Gen Assem.

Reg. Sess. (Va. 2000), available at http://leg1 .state.va.us/001/bil.htm;

Legislative History of H.D. 1170, 2000 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Va.

2000), available at http://leg1.state.va.us/001/bil.htm.

As one commenter has observed, “Under Virginia’s new wetlands

regulations, impacts that may have been permissible to isolated wetlands

under federal regulations will be limited in Virginia. This is because

Virginia includes wetlands as part of its definition of ‘state waters,” Lisa

Spickler Goodwin, Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Environmental Law,

37 U. Rich. L. Rev. 117, 143 (2002).

lla

Va. Code Ann. § 62.1-44.15:5 provides: “Issuance of a

Virginia Water Protection Permit shall constitute the

certification required under § 401 of the Clean Water Act.”

Based on this statute, Newdunn posits that the Board’s

jurisdiction must be coextensive with the Corps’. Newdunn’s

theory, however, is premised on a _ fundamental

misunderstanding of the relationship between the federal and

state permitting procedures.

Section 401(a)(1) of the CWA requires an applicant for a

federal permit to “provide the licensing or permitting agency

a certification from the State in which the discharge

originates or will originate . . . .” The Commonwealth, by

enacting § 62.1-44.15:5, has taken advantage of this federal

provision, so that when federal and state laws overlap,

applicants may use their state permits to satisfy the

certification requirements under section 401 of the CWA. Of

course, simply because a state permit carries the added ©

benefit of satisfying a potentially applicable federal

requirement does not mean that the state’s jurisdictional

reach turns on an interpretation of the CWA. Undoubtedly,

situations will arise where a permittee needs a state permit,

but no federal permit. In those situations, the state permitting

process would apply without reference to the CWA.

As the Supreme Court of Virginia recognized, “The

CWA and federal regulations allow a state program to

operate a discharge elimination system program in place of

the federal program, provided that the state program is

authorized under state law and has standards that are at least

as stringent as the federal ones.” State Water Control Bd. v.

Smithfield Foods, $42 $.E.2d 766, 768 (Va. 2001) (emphasis

added). That is, for a state’s permitting procedure to satisfy

the federal requirements of 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a), the state

law must be “at least” as exacting as the Clean Water Act,

but of course, it may be more demanding.

12a

Even when state and federal requirements do overlap, as

was the case in Smithfield Foods, the issue of whether the

Board has authority to regulate the subject wetlands remains

a question of Virginia law. Accordingly, the Board’s

jurisdiction cannot “necessarily depend” on any

interpretation of federal law, even if it happens that federal

and state laws are coextensive on the particular facts of a

certain case. See Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 13.

The Virginia Supreme Court’s finding in Smithfield

Foods that “the interests and rights of both the [federal and

State] entities were vested in a single permit” does not alter

this analysis. See Smithfield Foods, 542 S.E.2d at 770. In

Smithfield Foods, because this court had already “affirmed

the finding of the district court that Smithfield was liable,”

and because the United States Supreme Court denied

certiorari, the federal determination was a final judgment for

the purposes of res judicata. Id. at 768. In the present case,

while the Corps and the Board may ultimately require

Newdunn to obtain the same discharge permit, no final

judgment in either case has been rendered.

Depending upon how the Corps and Newdunn resolve the

federal case on remand, the Board’s interest may or may not

be satisfied. Accordingly, the Board should be permitted to

pursue its rights in a Virginia court. Of course, if either the

state or federal actions were to result in a final judgment

requiring the issuance of a permit satisfying both federal and

state laws, then Newdunn might elect to file a motion to have

the unresolved action dismissed on the grounds of res

judicata. See Smithfield Foods, 542 S.E.2d at 771.

In sum, in light of the Virginia Act’s clear statutory

language, it is apparent that “Virginia now regulates

activities in wetlands beyond its federal mandate.” Goodwin,

Annual Survey of Virginia Law, 37 U. Rich. L. Rev. at 141. It

would be perverse, therefore, for this court to conclude that

the jurisdictional limits of the Virginia Act depend upon the

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13a

CWA. Any determination as to the extent of the Board’s

jurisdictional reach is purely a question of state law that does

not require the resolution of any federal question. Because

we lack jurisdiction over the Board’s action, we reverse the

district court’s ruling on the Board’s motion to remand, and

we remand the state enforcement action to the Virginia court

from which it was improperly removed.

B.

We now turn to the only case for which federal subject

matter jurisdiction exists -- the Corps’ civil enforcement

action premised on the CWA.

The Federal Water Pollution Control Amendments of

1972, known collectively as the Clean Water Act, were

crafted “to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and

biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.” 33 U.S.C. §

1251(a) (2002). To achieve this ambitious goal, Congress

mandated that “the discharge of any pollutant by any person

shall be unlawful” except as in compliance with the Act’s

permitting procedures. Jd. § 1311. The permitting scheme at

issue in this case is articulated in section 404(a), which gives

the Corps the authority “to issue permits . . . for the discharge

of dredged or fill material into the navigable waters at

specified disposal sites.” Id. § 1344(a). The CWA defines

“navigable waters” to include “the waters of the United

States, including the territorial seas,” id. § 1362(7), and the

Corps’ regulatory jurisdiction is limited by this definition.

In 1985, the Supreme Court ruled that the Corps

possessed the authority to exercise jurisdiction over wetlands

that were adjacent to other waters, even though the wetlands

themselves were not navigable waters-in-fact. United States

v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 139, 106 S.

Ct. 455 (1985). The Court deferred to the Corps’ technical

expertise on the matter, noting the considerable difficulty,

both for the Corps and for federal courts, in defining the

14a

| jurisdictional limits of the Act. Jd at 132. The Court

explained:

In determining the limits of power to regulate

discharges under the Act, the Corps must

necessarily choose some point at which water

ends and land begins. Our common experience -

tells us that this is often no easy task: the

transition from water to solid ground is not

necessarily or even typically an abrupt one.

Rather, between open waters and dry land may

lie shallows, marshes, mudflats, swamps, bogs --

in short, a huge array of areas that are not wholly

aquatic but nevertheless fall far short of being

dry land. Where on this continuum to find the

limit of “waters” is far from obvious.

Id. The Corps had determined that wetlands adjacent to other

waters should be included in the definition of “waters of the

United States,” because “wetlands adjacent to lakes, rivers,

streams, and other bodies of water may function as integral

parts of the aquatic environment even when the moisture

creating the wetlands does not find its source in the adjacent

bodies of water.” Jd. at 134-35. The Supreme Court upheld

the Corps’ exercise of jurisdiction, concluding, “We cannot

say that the Corps’ conclusion that adjacent wetlands are

inseparably bound up with the ‘waters’ of the United States --

based as it is on the Corps’ and the EPA’s technical expertise

-- is unreasonable.” Jd. at 134.

The Supreme Court has recently reaffirmed Riverside

Bayview Homes, commenting: “It was the significant nexus

between the wetlands and ‘navigable waters’ that informed

our reading of the CWA in Riverside Bayview Homes.”

SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 167; see also United States v. Krilich,

303 F.3d 784, 791 (7th Cir. 2002) (observing that the

SWANCC Court “reaffirm[ed] its prior holding [in Riverside

.

15a

Bayview Homes] that Section 404 encompassed non-

navigable wetlands adjacent to navigable waters,” but

“explicitly declined to further determine the exact meaning of

‘navigable waters’”). In SWANCC, the Court struck down the

Corps’ so-called “Migratory Bird Rule,” which defined

“waters of the United States” to include intrastate waters,

“[w]hich are or would be used as habitat by birds protected

by Migratory Bird Treaties; or . . . [w]hich are or would be

used as habitat by other migratory birds which cross state

lines... .” SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 164 (quoting 51 Fed. Reg.

41217). Quoting Riverside Bayview Homes, the Court held

that “Congress’ concern for the protection of water quality

and aquatic ecosystems indicated its intent to regulate

wetlands ‘inseparably bound up with the “waters” of the

United States.” Jd. at 167 (emphasis added). Thus, the

Corps’ attempted exercise of jurisdiction over isolated ponds

that had no hydrologic connection whatsoever to navigable

waters could not stand.°

Along similar lines, this court has previously held that the

phrase “waters of the United States” cannot be used by the

Corps to assert jurisdiction over intrastate, nonnavigable

waters, solely on the ground that those waters could possibly

affect interstate commerce. United States v. Wilson, 133 F.3d

* As is evident from the above discussion, Newdunn’s insistence

that SWANCC limited the Corps’ jurisdiction solely to those wetlands

adjacent to navigable waters-in-fact is plainly incorrect. Unlike the

administrative regulation at issue in Riverside Bayview Homes, the

“Migratory Bird Rule” before the Court in SWANCC was not developed

to clarify the scientifically nebulous point “at which water ends and land

begins.” Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. at 134. Instead, the Corps’

supposed justification for the rule was purely legal — that Congress

drafted the CWA with the intention of defining “waters of the United

States” as broadly as possible under the Commerce Clause. The Court

rejected the Corps’ interpretation of the CWA, recognizing that the

Corps’ Commerce Clause argument would read the phrase “navigable

waters” completely out of the statute. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 172.

l6a

251, 253-54 (4th Cir. 1997). We explained, “To include

intrastate waters that have nothing to do with navigable or

interstate waters, expands the statutory phrase ‘waters of the

United States’ beyond its definitional limit.” Jd. at 257-58

(emphasis added). Accordingly, we struck down 33 C.F.R. §

328.3(a)(3), because it attempted to give the Corps

jurisdiction over any waters, “the use, degradation or

destruction of which could affect interstate or foreign

commerce ... .” Jd. at 257 (quoting 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)

(1993)). As we held in Wilson, and as the Supreme Court

affirmed in SWANCC, the Corps’ jurisdiction does not extend

to the limits of the Commerce Clause. Rather, the critical,

limiting term is ‘navigable waters,’ as that term is defined in

33 U.S.C. § 1362(7).

In the present case, the Corps asserts jurisdiction over

navigable waters (33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(1)), tributaries of

navigable waters (§ 328.3(a)(5)), and “[w]etlands adjacent to

waters (other than waters that are themselves wetlands). . .”

(§ 328.3(a)(7)). The Corps defines “adjacent” to mean,

“bordering, contiguous, or neighboring. Wetlands separated

from other waters of the United States by man-made dikes or

barriers, natural river berms, beach dunes and the like are

‘adjacent wetlands.’” 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(c). This circuit has

recently concluded that, pursuant to these regulations, the

Corps intends to assert jurisdiction over “any branch of a

tributary system that eventually flows into a navigable body

of water.” United States v. Deaton, 332 F.3d 698, 711 (4th

Cir. 2003). In Deaton, the Corps claimed authority to

regulate wetlands bordering a “roadside ditch” that took “a

winding, thirty-two mile path to the Chesapeake Bay.” Jd. at

702. Along the way to the Bay, water flowed from the

Deaton’s wetlands to the roadside ditch, and then into a

_ “culvert” on the other side of the road. Jd. Water from the

culvert drained into a second ditch, which flowed into

Beaverdam Creek. Beaverdam Creek was “a direct tributary

of the Wicomico River, which [was] navigable.” Jd. The

17a

distance from the Deaton’s wetlands to a navigable-in-fact

river was approximately eight miles. The Deaton court

upheld the Corps’ exercise of jurisdiction over all of these

waters, finding that “the Corps’s regulatory interpretation of

the term ‘waters of the United States’ as encompassing

nonnavigable tributaries of navigable waters does not invoke

the outer limits of Congress’s power or alter the federal-state

framework.” Jd. at 708. In dismissing a Commerce Clause

challenge to the Corps’ regulations, the Deaton court

summarized Congress’ well-articulated purpose for crafting

the CWA and concluded, “The Corps has pursued this goal

by regulating nonnavigable tributaries and their adjacent

wetlands. This use of delegated authority is well within

Congress’s traditional power over navigable waters.” Jd. at

707. In sum, the Corps’ unremarkable interpretation of the

term “waters of the United States” as including wetlands

adjacent to tributaries of navigable waters is permissible

under the CWA because pollutants added to any of these

tributaries will inevitably find their way to the very waters

that Congress has sought to protect.

To the extent that Newdunn challenges the Corps’

decision to label the manmade, I-64 ditch a “tributary,” that

argument has also been foreclosed by Deaton. The Deaton

court recognized that the Corps has defined the word

“tributary” to include “the entire tributary system,” including

roadside ditches. Jd. at 710. As explained above, Deaton

deferred to the Corps’ definition of “tributary” because

“discharges into nonnavigable tributaries and adjacent

wetlands have a substantial effect on water quality in

navigable waters.” Jd. at 712. That the I-64 ditch at issue in

the present case is a manmade rather than a natural

watercourse is an irrelevant distinction. As the Corps has

explained:

The discharge of a pollutant into a waterway

generally has the same effect downstream

18a

whether the waterway is natural or manmade.

Indeed, given the extensive human modification

of watercourses and hydrologic systems

throughout the country, it would be difficult to

identify a principled basis in this case for

distinguishing between natural watercourses and

watercourses that are wholly or partly manmade

or modified.

(Br. for the United States at 48-49.) This observation is

particularly meaningful in the present case, where the United

States has extensively documented the connection between

the Newdunn Property’s wetlands and the navigable waters,

both before and after the construction of I-64. Because of this

long-standing connection, it would be illogical to conclude

that, prior to the existence of I-64, the Newdunn Wetlands

would have been within the ambit of the Corps’ regulations,

but that now, with the construction of the highway, the

wetlands are no longer jurisdictional.

As stated before, the CWA’s primary objective is “to

restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological

integrity of the Nation’s waters.” 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2002).

If this court were to conclude that the I-64 ditch is not a

“tributary” solely because it is manmade, the CWA’s chief

goal would be subverted. Whether manmade or natural, the

tributary flows into traditional, navigable waters.

Accordingly, the Corps may permissibly define that tributary

as part of the “waters of the United States.” See 33 U.S.C. §

1362(7).

Turning our attention to the specific wetlands at issue in

this case, it is undisputed that water flows intermittently from

wetlands on the Newdunn Property through a series of

natural and manmade waterways, crossing under I-64,

draining into the west arm of Stony Run, and eventually

finding its way 2.4 miles later to traditional navigable waters.

19a

As the district court found, Stony Run is “navigable-in-fact”

because the “lower reaches of Stony Run are subject to the

ebb and flow of the tide.” The court further found that “Stony

Run flows into the Warwick River, which intersects with the

James River, which intersects with the Hampton Roads

Harbor, which intersects with the Chesapeake Bay.” These

factual findings are supported in part by photographic

evidence of silt-laden water flowing from the subject

property into Stony Run. Because there exists a sufficient

nexus between the Newdunn Wetlands and navigable waters-

in-fact, the Corps’ jurisdiction in this case is amply supported

by the Act and the Corps’ regulations under the Act.

IV.

For the reasons stated above, the ruling of the district

court is reversed. We remand the Board’s state enforcement

action directly to the Virginia state court from which it was

improperly removed. We remand the Corps’ enforcement

action to the district court for further proceedings not

inconsistent with this opinion.

REVERSED AND REMANDED

20a

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA

NORFOLK DIVISION

Civil Action No. 2:01cv508

United States of America,

Plaintiff,

V.

Newdunn Associates LLP, Orion Associates,

and Northwest Contractors Corporation

Defendants.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA

NEWPORT NEWS DIVISION

Civil Action No. 4:01cv86

Dennis H. Treacy, Director

Commonwealth of Virginia

Department of Environmental Quality

And State Water Control Board,

Plaintiffs,

V.

Newdunn Associates LLP, Orion Associates,

and Northwest Contractors Corporation

Defendants.

April 3, 2002, Decided

April 3, 2002, Opinion Filed

OPINION BY: HENRY COKE MORGAN, JR., UNITED

STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

2la

OPINION:

OPINION AND ORDER

The parties come before the Court in these consolidated

cases for a non-jury trial, seeking to resolve issues

surrounding the Defendant’s activities on the forty three (43)

acre parcel of land located at the intersection of Industrial

Park Drive and Jefferson Avenue in Newport News, Virginia

(the “Property’ or the ‘“Newdunn Property”). At the

conclusion of the trial on March 8, 2002, the Court ruled

from the bench that the United States Army Corps of

Engineers (the “Corps’’) did not have jurisdiction to regulate

the Property. The Court also ruled that Plaintiff Dennis

Treacy (“Treacy”), Director of the Virginia Department of

Environmental Quality (“VDEQ”), acting on behalf of the

State Water Control Board (the “Board’’), possessed no

jurisdiction over the Property independent of the Corps’

claim of jurisdiction. This order further explains the

reasoning of the Court’s decision.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

Newdunn Associates, LLP (‘“Newdunn” or the

“Defendants”) is the owner of the Property at issue in this

case. On May 21, 2001, the Corps issued a second

jurisdictional determination that the Newdunn Property

contained wetlands which are waters of the United States and

any filling would require a “404 permit,” pursuant to Section

404 of the Clean Water Act (“CWA”), 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a).

From approximately June 12, 2001 through July 12, 2001,

Newdunn and/or persons acting on their behalf, conducted,

contracted for, supervised and/or otherwise controlled the

discharge of dredged or fill material onto the Newdunn

Property without a permit under CWA section 404. On June

14, 2001 and June 16, 2001, the Corps issued a cease and

desist order to the Defendants. On June 25, 2001, the Board

issued Newdunn an Emergency Special Order (“ESO”)

22a

directing Newdunn Associates to cease all excavation on the

Property. Believing that the Corps lacked jurisdiction over

the Property and that their activities did not violate state law,

the Defendants elected not to comply with these orders.

On July 6, 2001, the United States filed a Complaint in

United States v. Newdunn Associates, et. al., Civil Action

No. 2:01cv508, seeking inter alia an injunction barring the

Defendants from discharging dredged or fill material into the

Property without a permit. On July 13, 2001, the Court

granted the motion by the United States for a Temporary

Restraining Order (“TRO”) enjoining the Defendants from

conducting any filling or related activity on the Property for a

period of ten (10) days. On July 23, 2001, after conducting an

evidentiary hearing and viewing the Property, the Court

granted a Preliminary Injunction (“PI”) with significant

modifications to the July 13, 2001 TRO. With certain

conditions regarding, amongst other things, the maintenance

of a buffer strip of wetlands on the perimeter of the Property

and the construction of a ditching system to minimize surface

water runoff, the Court lifted the prohibition on the

Defendant’s activities. The Court indicated at that time that

the paramount issue in this case was whether the Corps had

jurisdiction to regulate the Property.

From late July, 2001 through approximately September

30, 2001, Defendants and/or persons acting on their behalf

conducted, contracted for, supervised and/or otherwise

controlled the use of mechanized land-clearing and earth

moving equipment to discharge dredged or fill material into a

portion of the wetlands on the Newdunn Property.

On July 30, 2001, the Court filed a written Order

explaining the July 23, 2001 Preliminary Injunction. The

Corps, unsuccessful in its attempt in this Court to enjoin

Newdunn’s filling activities, then conferred with the state

regulatory body, the VDEQ. The day after the Court entered

the Preliminary Injunction, Treacy notified Newdunn that it

23a

could not excavate ditches on the Property® and followed this

notice with a civil action in the Circuit Court of the City of

Newport News, Virginia, seeking to enjoin the excavation

ordered by this Court.’ Prior to VDEQ’s filing this state court

claim, Newdunn filed Newdunn Associates, L.L.P. v. Dennis

H. Treacy and Bert W. Parolari, Jr., Civil Action No.

_2:01cv575, in which Newdunn sought to enjoin Treacy and

Parolari, as state officials, from proceeding with plans to seek

injunctive relief in state court regarding Newdunn’s ditching

activities on the Property. On August 8, 2001, Newdunn also

filed a petition to remove the state action to this Court, which

had been designated Dennis H. Treacy and State Water

Control Board v. Newdunn Associates, L.L.P., Civil Action

No. 4:01cv86.

In an Order entered in Civil Action No: 2:01cv575 on

August 9, 2001, this Court issued a TRO enjoining Treacy

and Parolari from instituting any proceeding in state court

against Newdunn relating to activities authorized by the PI

° In July, 2001, the statute upon which the VDEQ relied, Va. Code

§ 62.1-44.5 and 62.1-44.15:5, did not prohibit the filling of wetlands. As

conceded by the VDEQ, as of July, 2001, this statute only barred the

excavation of wetlands. The portion of the statute prohibiting excavation

became effective July 1, 2000 in accord with normal scheduling of

effective dates by the Virginia legislature. However, the statute

specifically contains a delayed effective date for the prohibition of filling

wetlands until October 1, 2001, thereby intentionally creating a window

of opportunity for owners, such as Newdunn, to fill property alleged to be

wetlands.

7 The City of Newport News had also previously and conditionally

approved excavation on the Property as part of a drainage plan. When it

was brought to the Court’s attention that a more extensive ditching plan

had been ordered by the City of Newport News, by modification of its

Preliminary Injunction in Civil Action No. 2:01cv508, on August 22,

2001, the Court permitted the more extensively and presumably more

scientifically sound system of ditching approved by the City of Newport

News to be substituted for the Court’s ditching plan.

24a

and ordered them to appear and show cause why such state

court proceeding would not be controlled by Civil Action

No. 2:01cv508, which was pending in this Court. In a tele-

conference hearing held on August 10, 2001, this Court

rejected the state’s request to dissolve or modify this TRO.

On August 8, 2001, Treacy and Parolari moved to

dismiss Newdunn vy. Treacy, et. al., Civil Action No.

2:01cv575. On August 17, 2001, the United States filed a

Motion to Enforce the Preliminary Injunction in United

States v. Newdunn, et. al., Civil Action No. 2:01cv508. On

August 20, 2001, Newdunn moved in Civil Action No.

2:01cv575 to convert the August 9, 2001 TRO into a PI. The

Court heard evidence and arguments on these interrelated

motions on August 20, 2001.* In an Order filed August 22,

2001, the Court extended the TRO for an additional 10 days,

ordered Newdunn to obtain a bond with sufficient surety or

obtain an appropriate letter of undertaking from a bank in the

principal sum of one-hundred and fifty thousand dollars to

cover the potential cost of reversing its excavation activities

and ordered a hearing upon Newdunn’s request for a

Preliminary Injunction be held on August 30, 2001. Further,

the Court dismissed Parolari as a party to the suit.

On August 23, 2001, Treacy moved to remand Civil

Action No. 4:01cv86 to the Newport News Circuit Court.

The Court heard arguments on this motion as well as

Newdunn’s motion to convert the August 9, 2001 TRO to a

Preliminary Injunction on August 30, 2001. In an Order filed

8 At the August 20, 2001 hearing, counsel for VDEQ issued a

thinly veiled threat that, should the Court lift the TRO, it would proceed

with other legal actions against Newdunn, including possible criminal

actions. When pressed further by the Court, VDEQ counsel, an Assistant

Attorney General, refused to either confirm or deny that criminal action

was contemplated. Given the complexities of these civil actions, the

Court found that the threat of criminal proceedings placed Newdunn in an

untenable position.

25a

August 31, 2001 in Civil Action No:201cv575, the Court

found preliminarily that (1) Treacy relied on the Corps’

assertion of jurisdiction over the Property via the CWA in his

attempt to assert jurisdiction to enjoin the excavation of

ditches and, (2) Treacy’s proffered evidence was insufficient

to establish that Newdunn’s filling and subsequent

excavation activities authorized in the Court’s July 30, 2001

Preliminary Injunction was in violation of state statute, Va.

Code §§ 62.1-44.5 and 62.1-44.15:5, and (3) as of October

1, 2001, Treacy had independent jurisdiction over further

filling activity provided that Treacy also had independent

jurisdiction over the Property. Further, the Court converted

the TRO into a Preliminary Injunction with modifications,

and thereby enjoined Treacy from instituting any proceeding

in state court against Newdunn related to activities authorized

by the Corps’ Preliminary Injunction issued by the Court on

July 30, 2001 and modified on August 22, 2001 in Civil

Action 2:01cv508. The Court set an expiration date for the

Treacy Preliminary Injunction of October 1, 2001.

In an Order filed September 5, 2001 in Civil Action No.

4:01cv86, the Court again found that Treacy relied on the

Corps’ assertion of jurisdiction over the Property via the

CWA in his attempt to assert jurisdiction to enjoin the

excavation of ditches. In that Order the Court denied

Treacy’s Motion to Remand.

On October 4, 2001, the Board affirmed the Emergency

Special Order (“ESO”) and held that Newdunn was in

violation of Va. Code § 62.1-44 et seq. The Board issued a

Final Special Order (“FSO”) on October 11, 2001 ordering

Newdunn to cease its activities on the Property. Both the

ESO and FSO listed as the first Finding of Fact that the

Corps had jurisdiction over the Property under the CWA.

On October 26, 2001, Treacy moved for Voluntary

Dismissal Without Prejudice of Civil Action No. 4:01cv86.

On October 29, 2001, Newdunn moved to Consolidate Civil

26a

Action No. 2:01cv 508 and Civil Action No. 4:01cv86. On

November 7, 2001, Newdunn moved for a Preliminary

Injunction to prevent VDEQ from taking any further state

administrative actions involving Newdunn’s activities on the

Property before October 1, 2001. On November 7, 2001,

Treacy moved for partial summary judgment against

Newdunn on the issue of liability based upon the outcome of

the state administrative hearings. The Court held a hearing on

these matters on December 11, 2001. In an Order filed

December 21, 2001, the Court adhered to its finding that

Treacy’s exercise of jurisdiction was dependent upon the

Corps’ alleged jurisdiction under the CWA. Further, the

Court (1) denied Treacy’s Motion to Voluntarily Dismiss

without Prejudice Civil Action No. 4:01cv86, (2)granted

Newdunn’s Motion to Consolidate Civil Action No. 2:0lcv

508 and Civil Action No. 4:01cv86, (3) declined to consider

Treacy’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment because

Treacy failed to file a statement of undisputed facts as

required by Local Rule 56(B), and (4) denied Newdunn’s

Motion for Preliminary Injunction. Further, the Court ordered

all parties to arrange a Settlement Conference with a

Magistrate Judge of this Court. The Court ordered that each

party be represented at said settlement conference by

someone with authority to settle the case or that such a

person be readily available via telephone during the

conference.’

On February 1, 2002, the Corps filed a Motion for Partial

Summary Judgment. On February 8, 2001, the Board issued

a Supplemental Final Special Order (“SFSO”) finding that

Newdunn’s activities on the Property prior to October 1,

2001 were in violation of state law. On February 13, 2002,

Treacy filed a Motion for Summary Judgment based on this

® The Settlement Conference was held on January 24, 2002. The

parties were unable to settle the matters before the Court.

—— ne REE RE eer eon

27a

SFSO. The Corps’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment

and Treacy’s Motion for Summary Judgment were not

considered by the Court, as they did not mature within a

reasonable time before the date of trial.

The bench trial in this case began on March 4, 2002. The

Corps argued that a “surface water’ or “hydrological”

connection exists between the wetlands on the Property and

other Waters of the United States, as defined in Corps’

regulations, and therefore the Corps had jurisdiction over the

Property. Treacy argued that Newdunn violated Va. Code §§

62.1-44.15:5 and 62.1-44.5 and that Treacy possessed

jurisdiction over the Property independent of the Corps.

Newdunn contended that the Corps’ regulations exceeded the

authority granted under the CWA and, in the alternative, that

the Corps did not properly exercise jurisdiction under their

own regulations. Newdunn also argued that Treacy possessed

no jurisdiction independently of the Corps and, in the

alternative, Newdunn did not violate the state statute. The

Court ruled from the bench on March 8, 2002. The court

indicated it was ruling for the Defendants, but that it would

not enter judgment until a written opinion and order was

filed.

II. Findings of Fact

1. In September and October of 1997, the Williamsburg

Environmental Group, Inc. (“WEG”), an environmental

consulting firm, performed a wetland delineation on the

Newdunn Property at the request of Newdunn Associates.

WEG determined that most of the Property constituted

wetlands.

2. In September of 1999, another environmental

consultant, Doug Davis of Davis Environmental Consultants,

acting on behalf of Newdunn Associates, requested a

jurisdictional determination and confirmation of wetlands

delineation from the Corps. On December 16, 1999, the

Corps provided Newdunn with a formal jurisdictional

28a

determination that the Property contained wetlands which it

believed were subject to CWA jurisdiction. The Corps also

confirmed the wetland delineation submitted by Davis at this

time. A determination that a property contains wetlands is

defined as a delineation in Corps regulations. A

determination by the Corps that it has jurisdiction over

wetlands previously delineated is a separate decision.

3. On May 21, 2001, before Newdunn began the filling

activities, the Corps issued a second jurisdictional

determination that the Property contained wetlands which are

waters of the United States. Although the Supreme Court’s

decision in Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. United

States Army Corps of Engineers, 531 U.S. 159, 121 S. Ct.

675 (2001) (SWANCC) was decided between the Corps’

December 16, 1999 determination of jurisdiction and its May

21, 2001 determination, it looked at the same factors in both

determinations.

4. Before Newdunn and its contractors commenced work

on the Property in early June 2001, the Property contained

approximately thirty-eight (38) acres of non-tidal forested

wetlands.

5. From approximately June 12, 2001 through July 12,

2001, the Defendants and/or persons acting on their behalf,

conducted, contracted for, supervised and/or otherwise

controlled the discharge of dredged or fill material onto the

Property. From about July 23, 2001 through approximately

September 20, 2001, the Defendants and/or persons acting on

their behalf, conducted, contracted for, supervised and/or

otherwise controlled the discharge of dredged or fill material

onto the Property. From early June, 2001 through September,

2001, the Defendants or persons acting on their behalf

conducted, contracted for, supervised, directed and/or

otherwise controlled the mechanized stumping, grading

and/or grubbing of the Property. From late July, 2001

through September, 2001, the Defendants or persons acting

29a

on their behalf conducted, contracted for, supervised,

directed and/or otherwise controlled the mechanized

excavation of ditches on the Property as indicated in the

proposal dated May 11, 2001 which was executed by and

between Orion and Newdunn and _ the “Drainage

Improvements for Newdunn Associates, L.L.P.” and

submitted by Newdunn to the City of Newport News,

Virginia. Newdunn conducted al! of these activities without a

permit under CWA § 404 or an individual or General

Virginia Water Protection Permit under Va. Code §§ 62.1-

44.15:5(D) and 62.1-44.5(A)(2).

6. Rain generated surface water runoff occasionally exits

the Property through a spur ditch by the Property. There is no

evidence of the frequency or volume of the surface water

runoff. At prior hearings, the Corps had claimed a

hydrological connection between the Property and Jones

Run, as well as a hydrological connection between the

Property and a branch of Stony Run located to the east of

highway I-64. However, these alternate hydrological

connections were not proven at any pretrial hearings and no

evidence of either alternate connection was presented at trial.

Further, at prior hearings, the Corps had claimed that surface

water runoff contributed to flooding in a low lying residential

area to the east of the Property. Obviously, maintaining the

Status quo, as urged by the Corps, would not alleviate this

problem and it was not mentioned at the trial. Although

reference was also made in pretrial hearings to damage to

plant and animal iife which occupied the wetlands on the

Property, no evidence on this issue was presented at trial by

the Corps. There was a mention in the State Board’s

February 8, 2002 Supplemental Special Final Order

(“SFSO”) of potential damage to plant and animal life, but

neither the Corps nor Treacy asserted this as a basis for

jurisdiction. Thus, the Corps’ claim of jurisdiction is based

solely upon the alleged surface water or hydrological

connection of the Property to the navigable portion of Stony

30a

Run and Treacy must base his claim of jurisdiction upon the

enabling statute passed by the Virginia Legislature.

7. In order for the surface water which exits the Property

to reach the navigable portion of Stony Run, it must traverse

the following path:

A. Enter the spur ditch leading from the

Property through the adjacent VDOT wetlands

approximately forty (40) feet to a manmade,

drainage ditch lying adjacent and parallel to the

east side of 1-64 (“eastern I-64 ditch”). The

eastern I-64 ditch is ephemeral, or dry most of

the year.

B. The surface water that continues through the

eastern 1-64 ditch intermittently travels

approximately four hundred (400) feet in this

ditch to a culvert, which runs under I-64.

C. The surface water that continues through the

culvert under I-64 intermittently travels

approximately one hundred (100) feet through

this culvert to another manmade, drainage ditch,

which lies on the western side of I-64 (“western

1-64 ditch”).

D. The surface water that continues through the

western [1-64 ditch intermittently travels

approximately one and one third miles down the

western I-64 ditch before intersecting the

Western Arm of Stony Run.

E. The Western Arm of Stony Run, including the

point where surface water from the western I-64

ditch intermittently enters the Western Arm of

Stony Run, is not navigable-in-fact.

3la

F. The Western Arm of Stony Run intersects

with the Central Arm of Stony Run

approximately one thousand (1,000) feet from

the point where surface water from the western

I-64 ditch may intermittently enter the Western

Arm of Stony Run.

G. Old Courthouse Road passes over Stony Run

approximately one mile downstream from the

point where surface water from the western I-64

ditch may intermittently enter the Western Arm

of Stony Run.

H. Stony Run is only _navigable-in-fact

downstream of the Old Courthouse Road

overpass. The lower reaches of Stony Run are

subject to the ebb and flow of the tide. The upper

limits of tidal influence reach the Old

Courthouse Road overpass.

I. Stony Run flows into the Warwick River,

which intersects with the James River, which

intersects with the Hampton Roads Harbor,

which intersects with the Chesapeake Bay.

8. The evidence shows that the wetlands contained on the

Property were non-tidal high elevation hydric soil flats,

which are qualitatively different and less functional than

wetlands that lay closer to navigable, open water.

9. The Property averaged approximately forty six (46)

feet above sea level in its natural state before any filling,

ditching, grading or stumping activities began. It rested on

one of the highest elevations in this generally low lying area.

Thus, the wetlands on the Property did not serve to filter

pollutants from I-64 or the surrounding area from entering

32a

the Chesapeake Bay. Rather, when surface water did exit the

Property, it actually traveled to the drainage ditches of I-64.

10. The Corps and Treacy have presented no evidence of

any pollution, other than silt from “clean fill,” exiting from

the Property. There is no evidence that the silt exiting the

Property as a result of Newdunn’s activities on the Property

actually reaches any natural watercourse or causes harm to

the Chesapeake Bay or any of its “natural” tributaries. '°

11. The Corps first promulgated regulations for the CWA

on April 3, 1974 (“1974” or “old” regulations).

Subsequently, it put forth revisions in 1975, 1977, and 1986

(“1986” regulations).

'° In fact, the Corps’ position may assist pollutants from I-64

entering the Chesapeake Bay. The Corps claims that it has jurisdiction

over the Property because of a “surface water connection” from a ditch on

the Property, to a drainage ditch on the eastern side of 1-64, through a

culvert under I-64, to a drainage ditch on the western side of I-64, to

Stony Run, and, eventually, into the Chesapeake Bay. Under this

scenario, the Corps only claims jurisdiction because of the existence of an

alleged hydrological connection from I-64 to the Chesapeake Bay. Thus,

in its quest to regulate the surface water and accompanying silt from the

Property, the Corps has promoted and failed to alter the path of pollutants

from I-64 to the Chesapeake Bay. Pollutants emanating from I-64 should

potentially cause more damage to the Chesapeake Bay than the silt from

the Property. Yet, in order to protect the Chesapeake Bay from these

pollutants emanating from 1-64, the Corps would have to alter the

hydrological connection from I-64 away from a path that leads to the

Chesapeake Bay. However, if it were to make such an alteration, the

Corps would no longer have a “surface water” or “hydrological”

connection from I-64 to the Chesapeake Bay. Without such a connection

from I-64 to the Chesapeake Bay, the Corps would have to concede that it

did not have jurisdiction over the Property and similar property which are

allegedly connected to the Chesapeake Bay via the ditches or culverts of

1-64. Thus by attempting to maintain the status quo with regard to the

Property both the Corps and Treacy are risking damage to the Bay. It was

for this reason that the Court vigorously and repeatedly urged the parties

to negotiate a settlement.

33a

12. The authority granted to the Corps by Congress has

not been expanded since the Corps promulgated the 1974

regulations.

13. Both the 1974 and 1986 regulations share the

definition for navigable waters: “The term ‘navigable waters

of the United States’ and ‘navigable waters,’ as used herein

mean those waters of the United States which are subject to

the ebb and flow of the tide and/or are presently, or have

been in the past, or may be in the future susceptible for use

for purposes of interstate or foreign commerce.” 33 C.F.R.

209.120(d)(1) (1974), 33 C.F.R. 321.2(a) (1986). Both sets of

regulations include the same conditions that must be met to

be considered a “navigable water.”"!

14. The 1986 regulations distinguish the applicability of

the term “navigable waters” from the term “waters of the

United States.” The 1986 regulations state,

“The terms ‘navigable waters of the United

States’ and ‘waters of the United States’ are used

frequently throughout these regulations, and it is

important from the outset that the reader

understand the difference between the two.

‘Navigable waters of the United States’ are

defined in 33 C.F.R. Part 329. These are waters

that are navigable in the traditional sense where

permits are required for certain work or

_ Specifically, the following conditions must be met:

“(1) Past, present, or potential presence of interstate or foreign

commerce;

(2) Physical capabilities for use by commerce as in paragraph (a) of

this section; and

(3) Defined geographic limits of the waterbody.”

33 C.F.R. 209.260(b) (1974), 33 C.F.R. 329.5 (1986).

34a

structures pursuant to Section 9 and 10 of the

Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899. ‘Waters of the

United States’ are defined in 33 C.F.R. Part 328.

These waters include more than navigable waters

of the United States and are the waters where

permits are required for the discharge of dredged

or fill material pursuant to Section 404 of the

Clean Water Act.” 33 C.F.R. § 320.1(d) (1986).

The 1974 regulations make no such distinction.

15. The 1986 regulations state that the definition for

“waters of the United States” applies to the authority of the

Corps under the CWA. 33 C.F.R. § 328.1 (1986). It also

clearly states that the definition for “navigable waters” “does

not apply to authorities under the Clean Water Act. . .” 33

C.F.R. § 329.1 (1986). Again, there is no such distinction in

the 1974 regulations.

16. The 1986 regulations define the term “waters of the

United States,”'* which it states applies to the CWA

'? The 1986 regulations use the following definition for “waters of

the United States”:

(1) All waters which are currently used, or were used in the past, or

may be susceptible to use in interstate or foreign commerce, including all

waters which are subject to the ebb and flow of the tide;

(2) All interstate waters including interstate wetlands;

(3) All other waters such as intrastate lakes, rivers, streams

(including intermittent streams), mudflats, sandflats, wetlands, sloughs,

prairie potholes, wet meadows, playa lakes, or natural ponds, the use,

degradation or destruction of which could affect interstate or foreign

commerce including any such waters;

(i.) Which are or could be used by interstate or foreign

travelers for recreational or other purposes; or

(ii.) From which fish or shellfish are or could be taken and

sold in interstate or foreign commerce; or

(Continued on following page)

35a

jurisdictional limits, 33 C.F.R. § 328.1 (1986), in much

broader terms than the definition for “navigable waters.”

17. The 1974 regulations state under “General Policies”

that, “[t]he term ‘navigable waters of the United States’ is

used to define the scope and extent of the regulatory powers

of the Federal government.” 33 C.F.R. § 209.260(b)(1974).

The 1986 regulations do not contain this statement.

18. In several places throughout the regulations, the 1986

regulations have substituted the term “waters of the United

States,” where the old regulations had used “navigable

waters.” These changes took place in otherwise identical

sections of the new and old regulations. See e.g. 33 C.F.R.

209.120(b)(7) (1974) and 33 C.F.R. § 209.120(b)(7) (1986);

33 C.F.R. § 209.120(c) (1974) and 33 CFR. § 209.120(c)

(1986); 33 C.F.R. § 209.120(d)(3) (1974) and 33 C.F.R. §

323.2(c) (1986); 33 C.F.R. § 209.120(e)(2) (1974) and 33

C.F.R. § 323.3(a) (1986).

19. The 1975 regulations, in its definition of “Navigable

waters,” includes “All tributaries of navigable waters of the

United States up to their headwaters and landward to their

ordinary high water mark.” 33 C.F.R. 209.120(d)(2)(i)(e)

(iii.) Which are used or could be used for industrial purpose by

industries in interstate commerce;

(4) All impoundments of waters otherwise defined as waters of the

United States under the definition;

(5) Tributaries of waters identified in paragraphs (a)(1)-(4) of this

section;

(6) The territorial seas;

(7) Wetlands adjacent to waters (other than waters that are

themselves wetlands) identified in paragraphs (1)-(6) of this section.” 33

C.F.R. 328.3 (1986).

36a

(1975).° The 1975 regulations further define “Primary

'’ The Corps has argued in this case that the spur ditch, the I-64

drainage ditches, and the culvert all qualify as “tributaries” to “waters of

the United States,” making these alleged tributaries also waters of the

United States. However, the Corps has also expanded the definition of the

term “tributary” since the 1974 regulations:

The 1974 regulations stated, “The term ‘navigable waters of the

United States’ and ‘navigable waters,’ as used herein mean those waters

of the United States which are subject to the ebb and flow of the tide,

and/or are presently or have been in the past, or may be in the future

susceptible for use for purposes of interstate or foreign commerce.” 33

C.F.R. § 209.120(d)(1) (1974).

The 1975 regulations stated, “(2) ‘ ‘Navigable waters.’(i) the term

‘navigable waters,’ as used herein for purposes of Section 404 of the

Federal Water Pollution Control Act, is administratively defined to mean

waters of the United States . . . and shall include the following waters:

(c) All tributaries of navigable waters of the United States up to

their headwaters and landward to their ordinary high water mark.

(i) Those other waters which the District Engineer determines

necessitate regulation for the protection of water quality as expressed in

the guidelines (40 CFR 230). For example, in the case of intermittent

rivers, streams, tributaries, and perched wetlands that are not continuous

or adjacent to navigable waters identified in paragraphs (a)-(h), a decision

on jurisdiction shall be made by the District Engineer.”

. (ii) The following additional terms are defined as follows:

(e) ‘Primary tributaries’ means the main stems of tributaries

directly connecting to navigable waters of the United States up to their

headwaters and does not include any additional tributaries extending off

of the main stems of these tributaries.”

33 C.F.R. § § 209.120(d)(2)(i)(e) & (i) and (d)(2)(iiKe) (1975).

The 1975 preamble stated, “With respect to the inland areas of the

country, Corps jurisdiction under Section 404 of the FWPCA would

extend to all rivers, lakes, and streams that are navigable waters of the

United States, to all tributaries (primary, secondary, tertiary, etc.) of

navigable waters of the United States, and to all interstate waters. . —

Drainage and irrigation ditches have been excluded . . In view of

(Continued on following page)

37a

manpower and budgetary constraints it is necessary that this program be

phased in over a two year period. . . . Thus, under Phase I, this regulation

would become immediately operative in all coastal waters and contiguous

or adjacent wetlands as well as inland rivers, lakes and streams that are

navigable waters of the United States . . . and their contiguous or adjacent

wetlands. In Phase II, which would begin on July 1, 1976, we would...

also begin to regulate discharges of dredged or fill material in primary

tributaries (the main stems of tributaries directly connecting to navigable

waters of the United States), their contiguous or adjacent wetlands, and

all lakes. Finally, in Phase III, all discharges of dredged or fill material in

navigable waters would be regulated after July 1, 1977.” 40 Fed. Reg.

31,320-321 (1975).

The 1977 regulations stated, “(a) The term ‘waters of the United

States’ means:

(3) Tributaries to navigable waters of the United States, including

adjacent wetlands (manmade nontidal drainage and irrigation ditches

excavated on dry land are not considered waters of the United States

under this definition).

(4) Interstate waters and their tributaries, including adjacent

wetlands;” 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(a)(3) and (4).

The 1982 regulations stated, “(a) The term ‘waters of the United

Sates’ means []:

(1) All waters which are currently used, or were used in the past, or

may be susceptible to use in interstate or foreign commerce, including all

waters which are subject to the ebb and flow of the tide;

(2) All interstate waters including interstate wetlands;

(3) All other waters such as intrastate lakes, rivers, streams

(including intermittent streams), mudflats, sandflats, wetlands, sloughs,

prairie potholes, wet meadows, playa lakes, or natural ponds, the use,

degradation or destruction of which could affect interstate or foreign

commerce including any such waters;

(i.) Which are or could be used by interstate or foreign

travelers for recreational or other purposes; or

(ii.) From which fish or shellfish are or could be taken and

sold in interstate or foreign commerce; or

(Continued on following page)

38a

tributaries” as “the main stems of tributaries directly

connecting to navigable waters of the United States up to

their headwaters and does not include any additional

tributaries extending off of the main stems of these

tributaries.” 33 C.F.R. § 209.120(d)(2)(ii(e). The 1986

regulations do not have a definition of Primary tributaries,

nor does it exclude “additional tributaries extending off of

the main stems of these tributaries.”

(iii.) Which are used or could be used for industrial purpose by

industries in interstate commerce;

(4) All impoundments of waters otherwise defined as waters of the

United States under the definition;

(5) Tributaries of waters identified in paragraphs (a)(1)-(4) of this

section.

33 C.F.R. 323.2(a)(5) (1982).

The 1986 preamble stated, “For clarification, it should be noted that

we generally do not consider the following waters to be ‘Waters of the

United States.’ However, the Corps reserves the right on a case-by-case

basis to determine that a particular waterbody within these categories of

waters is a water of the United States. EPA also has the right to determine

on a case-by-case basis if any of these waters are ‘waters of the United

States.’

(a) Non-tidal drainage and irrigation ditches excavated on dry land

. . . [I]n the absence of wetlands the upstream limit of the Corps

jurisdiction also stops when the ordinary high water mark is no longer

perceptible.” 51 Fed. Reg. 41,217 (1986).

The 1990 preamble states, “The statement that non-tidal drainage

ditches are waters of the United States if they extend the OHWM of an

existing waters of the United States is consistent with the final rule

published in the November 13, 1986 Federal Register and applies to

ditches constructed in waters or that connect waters. Nothing in the NWP

notice was intended to change the November 13, 1986 Federal Register

notice which states that drainage ditches constructed entirely in upland

areas generally are not considered to be waters of the United States.” 65

Fed. Reg. 12,824-825 (2000).

39a

20. The 1975 preamble to the regulations states, “With

respect to the inland areas of the country, Corps jurisdiction

under Section 404 of the FWPCA would extend to all rivers,

lakes, and streams that are navigable waters of the United

States, to all tributaries (primary, secondary, tertiary, etc.) of

navigable waters of the United States, and to all interstate

waters.” 40 Fed. Reg. 31,320-21 (1975).

21. The 1977 regulations stated that “Waters of the

United States” means: “Tributaries to navigable waters of the

United States, including adjacent wetlands (manmade

nontidal drainage and irrigation ditches excavated on dry

land are not considered waters of the United States under this

definition). . . .[and] Interstate waters and their tributaries,

including adjacent wetlands.” 33 C.F.R. 323.2(a)(3) and (4)

(1977).

22. The 1982 regulations further expanded the definition

of “Waters of the United States”.'* See 33 C.F.R. 323.2(a)(5)

(1982).

'* The 1982 regulations use the following definition for “waters of

the United States”:

(1) All waters which are currently used, or were used in the past, or

may be susceptible to use in interstate or foreign commerce, including all

waters which are subject to the ebb and flow of the tide;

(2) All interstate waters including interstate wetlands;

(3) All other waters such as intrastate lakes, rivers, streams

(including intermittent streams), mudflats, sandflats, wetlands, sloughs,

prairie potholes, wet meadows, playa lakes, or natural ponds, the use,

degradation or destruction of which could affect interstate or foreign

commerce including any such waters;

(i.) Which are or could be used by interstate or foreign

travelers for recreational or other purposes; or

(ii.) From which fish or shellfish are or could be taken and

sold in interstate or foreign commerce; or

(Continued on following page)

40a

23. The 1986 regulations include the following passage in

the preamble: “For clarification, it should be noted that we

generally do not consider the following waters to be ‘Waters

of the United States.” However, the Corps reserves the right

on a case-by-case basis to determine that a particular

waterbody within these categories of waters is a water of the

United States. . .

(a) Non-tidal drainage and irrigation ditches excavated on

dry land.” 51 Fed. Reg. 41,217 (1986).

24. As noted in the Court’s Order of December 21, 2001,

the VDEQ continually relied on the Corps’ claim of

jurisdiction in its attempts to regulate the Property. In a letter

dated July 31, 2001 to Newdunn’s counsel, VDEQ counsel

wrote that VDEQ “will continue to view the wetlands on [the

Property] as wetlands subject to [state regulations] until

Newdunn demonstrates that the property no longer contains

wetlands, either with a final determination from the Corps or

court that the activities that removed or covered the

previously existing wetland parameters were either

authorized by the Corps or not subject to its jurisdiction or

the jurisdiction of the Board.” (emphasis added).

25. In the Emergency Special Order issued by the VDEQ

on June 25, 2001, which ordered Newdunn not to excavate,

the first Finding of Fact is that the Corps had determined that

the Property is comprised of “jurisdictional wetlands subject

to regulation under the CWA.”

(iii.) Which are used or could be used for industrial purpose by

industries in interstate commerce;

(4) All impoundments of waters otherwise defined as waters of the

United States under the definition;

(5) Tributaries of waters identified in paragraphs (a)(1)-(4) of this

section.

33 C.F.R. 323.2(a)(5) (1982).

4la

26. Even after the Court issued its August 31, 2001

Order, the VDEQ repeated this finding. After the October 4,

2001 hearing, the Board stated in a “Final Special Order” as

its first Finding of Fact that “On December 16, 1999, the

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (ACOE) notified Newdunn

Associates that it had determined that the majority of the

Facility is comprised of jurisdictional wetlands subject to

regulation under the Clean Water Act.”

27. Not until the Board entered a Supplemental Special

Final Order (“SFSO”) on February 8, 2002, only weeks

before trial, did the Board omit reference to its dependence

upon Corps jurisdiction under the CWA.

III. Conclusions of Law

1. The paramount issue in this case is whether the Corps

has jurisdiction under the CWA and _ its regulations

interpreting the Act over the wetlands on the Property under

the holding in United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes,

Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 106 S. Ct. 455 (1985) (Riverside), in light

of SWANCC.

2. The CWA was passed in 1972 in reaction to incidences

involving heavily polluted waters, such as the burning of the

Cuyahoga River cited in SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 175 (Stevens,

J. dissenting). The overarching goal of the Act was “ending

water pollution by 1985.” Jd. Following Riverside, courts

generally allowed the act’s jurisdiction to expand through

Corps regulations and interpretation thereof until J anuary of

last year when the decision in SWANCC was announced.

SWANCC recognized there is a limit to the Corps’ unilateral

expansion of the jurisdiction that the CWA conferred upon it.

3. The Supreme Court in SWANCC stated that “The term

‘navigable’ has at least the import of showing us what

Congress had in mind as its authority for enacting the CWA:

its traditional jurisdiction over waters that were or had been

navigable in fact or which could reasonably be made so.” Jd.

42a

at 172. Justice Stevens cogently, if disapprovingly, described

the effect of SWANCC when he wrote in his dissent, “{T]he

Court draws a new jurisdictional line, one that invalidates the

1986 migratory bird regulation as well as the Corps assertion

of jurisdiction over all waters except for actually navigable

waters, their tributaries and wetlands adjacent to each.” Jd. at

176.

4. Justice Stevens also observed that SWANCC had the

effect of excluding, amongst other waters, tributaries and

wetlands that are not contiguous or adjacent to navigable

waters from the scope of the Corps’ jurisdiction. Jd. at 188,

fn. 14. Justice Stevens discussed three “phases” of waters.

“Phase 1” waters, which are navigable waters and their

contiguous wetlands, and “phase 2” waters, which are the

“primary tributaries”!* of navigable waters and their adjacent

wetlands, were still subject to the Corps regulation after

SWANCC according to Justice Stevens. However, “phase 3”

waters, which are “all other waters covered by the statute,

and can include such isolated waters as intermittent rivers,

streams, tributaries, and perched wetlands that are not

contiguous or adjacent to navigable waters,” Jd. at 188

(internal quotations omitted), were excised from the scope of

the CWA by the SWANCC decision. Jd. at fn. 14.

5. SWANCC also called the 1986 regulations into

question. The Supreme Court expressly refused to give

deference to the Corps’ regulations. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at

'S The Corps’ 1975 regulations define “Primary tributaries” as “the

main stems of tributaries directly connecting to navigable waters of the

United States up to their headwaters and does not include any additional

tributaries extending off of the main stems of these tributaries.” 33 C.F.R.

209.120(d)\(2){ii(e).

43a

170, 174.'° According to the Supreme Court, “The Corps’

original interpretation of the CWA, promulgated two years

after its enactment, is inconsistent with its new regulations.”

Id. at 168 (emphasis in original). In those original

regulations, the 1974 regulations, the Supreme Court pointed

out that the Corps “emphasized that ‘[i]t is the water body’s

capability of use by the public for purposes of transportation

or commerce which is the determinative factor [in deciding

jurisdiction].’ 33 C.F.R. § 209.260(e)(1).” Jd. The Supreme

Court noted that there was nothing in the legislative history

to signify that “Congress intended to exert anything more

than its commerce power over navigation.” SWANCC, 531

U.S. at 168 n.3.

6. Even before SWANCC was decided, the Fourth Circuit

held that the Corps exceeded its authority under the CWA. In

United States v. Wilson, 133 F.3d 251 (4th Cir. 1997), the

Fourth Circuit held that the Corps exceeded its congressional

authorization under the CWA when it promulgated 33 C.F.R.

§ 328.3(a)(3),'’ defining “waters of the United States” to

'© “We thus read the statute as written to avoid the significant

constitutional and federalism questions raised by respondents’

interpretation, and therefore reject the request for administrative

deference.” SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 174.

'7 33 C. F.R. § 328.3(a)(3) defines “waters of the United States” to

include:

“All other waters such as intrastate lakes, rivers, streams (including

intermittent streams), mudflats, sandflats, wetlands, sloughs, prairie

potholes, wet meadows, playa lakes, or natural ponds, the use,

degradation or destruction of which could affect interstate or foreign

commerce including any such waters;

(i.) Which are or could be used by interstate or foreign

travelers for recreational or other purposes; or

(ii.) From which fish or shellfish are or could be taken and

sold in interstate or foreign commerce; or

(Continued on following page)

t4a

include intrastate waters which need not have anything to do

with navigable or interstate waters. Therefore, the Fourth

Circuit held that 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3) is invalid. The

Fourth Circuit stated, “Absent a clear indication to the

contrary, we should not lightly presume that . . . Congress

authorized the [Corps] to assert its jurisdiction in such a

sweeping and constitutionally troubling manner. Even as a

matter of statutory construction, one would expect that the

phrase ‘waters of the United States’ when used to define the

phrase ‘navigable waters’ refers to waters which, if not

navigable in fact, are at least interstate or closely related to

navigable or interstate waters.” Wilson, 133 F.3d at 257.

7. “Where an administrative interpretation of a statute

invokes the outer limits of Congress’ power, we expect a

clear indication that Congress intended that result.”

SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 172. This requirement stems in part

from the assumption that Congress does not casually

authorize administrative agencies to interpret a statute to

push the limit of congressional authority. Jd. Additionally,

the Corps has re-interpreted its authority under the CWA

several times since its passage, further pushing the limit of

congressional authority with each new set of regulations.

Therefore, at least as to its 1986 and later adopted

regulations, the Corps is not entitled to administrative

deference under Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources

Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).'®

(iii.) Which are used or could be used for industrial purpose by

industries in interstate commerce.” (Emphasis in Wilson, 133 F.3d at

257).

'® The “phases” discussed by Justice Stevens in his SWANCC

dissent, 531 U.S. at 188, fn. 14, are identical to the “phases” outlined in

the preambie to the 1975 regulations. 40 Fed. Reg. 31,320-21 (1975). The

fact that Justice Stevens also uses pre-1986 regulations in interpreting the

scope of the CWA further supports the contention that only pre-1986

regulations are entitled to administrative deference under Chevron.

45a

8. The Corps has not carried its burden of factually

proving a sufficient connection between the wetlands on the

Property and navigable waters or waters of the United States.

Surface water leaving the Property must pass through miles -

- via (1) a spur ditch; (2) the eastern, manmade I-64 drainage

ditch; (3) a culvert under I-64; (4) the western, manmade I-64

drainage ditch (portions of which were indisputably

constructed through “dry lands”); and (5) non-navigable parts

of Stoney Run -- before finding navigable waters. The Corps

argued that each segment of this path qualified as “waters of

the United States” under the 1986 regulations. The Corps

relied at trial exclusively on this “surface water connection”

or “hydrological connection” for jurisdiction, although

neither of those terms are included in even the 1986

regulations. Further, were the Court to allow this “surface

water connection” to suffice for jurisdiction, any property

connected by a drainage pipe or culvert to navigable waters

would fall under the Corps’ jurisdiction, for the Corps argues

that a culvert or storm drainage pipe connection from

wetlands to a tributary to navigable waters is a sufficient

surface water or hydrological connection. In fact, it argues

that a culvert or storm drainage pipe meets its newest

definition of a tributary. The arbitrariness of this position is

illustrated by the Corps’ evidence regarding the wetlands east

of Jefferson Avenue, which were historically a portion of the

wetlands on the Property but whose hydrological or surface

water connection was severed by the construction of

Jefferson Avenue. The Corps evidence opines that Jefferson

Avenue severs this connection and thereby eliminates the

easterly wetlands from Corps jurisdiction since there is no

culvert connecting them to the Property. Such a rule leads to

situations where wetlands which otherwise would be under

Corps jurisdiction are rendered non-jurisdictional by the

construction of a road or other manmade obstruction.

Conversely, should a storm drain be installed under Jefferson

Avenue the easterly wetlands would be hydrologically

46a

reconnected to the Property and allegedly become

jurisdictional. Thus, wetlands could alternately become

jurisdictional or non-jurisdictional in tandem with adjacent

road and storm drainage construction.

9. Even if the Corps had proven factually that under the

1986 regulations the wetlands on the Property would be

considered jurisdictional, these rules which it seeks to apply

have far exceeded the grant of authority by Congress in the

CWA. The multiple changes the Corps has made to its CWA

regulations have substantially increased the reach of its

regulatory powers. For example, the 1974 regulations used

the term “navigable waters of the United States” to define

“the scope and extent of the regulatory powers” of the Corps.

33 C.F.R. § 209.260(b) (1974). The Corps used a limited

definition for “navigable waters of the United States,” which

restricted their jurisdiction to waters which “are subject to the

ebb and flow of the tide and/or are presently, or have been in

the past, or may be in the future susceptible for use for

purposes of interstate or foreign commerce.” 33 C.F.R. §

209.120(d)(1) (1974). However, by 1986, the Corps had

distinguished the terms “navigable waters” and “waters of the

United States,” 33 C.F.R. § 320(d) (1986), given the term

“waters of the United States” a far more expansive definition

than “navigable waters,” 33 C.F.R. § 328.1 (1986), and

determined that the more expansive “waters of the United

States” would now define the scope of their jurisdiction

under the CWA. /d. In adopting these changes, it usurped

Congress’ authority to determine the Corps’ jurisdiction.

Additionally, the Corps replaced the limited term “navigable

waters” with the expansively defined term “waters of the

United States” in several other places throughout the

regulations, further expanding its own jurisdiction. See e.g.

33 CFR. 209.120(b)7) (1974) and 33 CFR. §

209.120(b)(7) (1986); 33 C.F.R. § 209.120(c) (1974) and 33

CF.R. § 209.120(c) (1986); 33 C.F.R. § 209.120(d)(3)

47a

(1974) and 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(c) (1986); 33 CFR. §

209.120(e)(2) (1974) and 33 C.F.R. § 323.3(a) (1986).

10. Although the 1986 regulations state that the Corps

generally excludes non-tidal drainage and irrigation ditches

excavated on dry land from its definition of tributaries over

which it asserts jurisdiction, it reserves the power to claim

jurisdiction over such ditches on a “case-by-case basis.” 51

Fed. Reg. 41,217 (1986). In other words, the 1986

regulations have expanded the Corps’ power to the point

where it may give itself jurisdiction even over the waters that

the regulations define as generally not qualifying under the

expansively-defined term “water of the United States.” The

Corps does not indicate in the regulations how it will go

about making such a “case-by-case” determination. Thus,

there are no definable limits to the Corps’ definition of

tributaries over which it possesses jurisdiction. See Grayned

v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108, 92 S. Ct. 2294 (1972)

(stating that due process requires insufficiently clear

regulations be held void for vagueness); See also Bullfrog

Films, Inc. v. Wick, 847 F.2d 502, 514 (9th Cir. 1988)

(holding that United States Information Agency (“USIA”)

regulations were unconstitutionally vague because “The

regulations enable USIA officials to act in an arbitrary and

discriminatory manner in granting or denying permits and

still be completely within the scope of their regulations . . .

This kind of unfettered discretion is patently offensive to the

notion of due process.”’) (internal quotations omitted).

11. The legislative power is vested in Congress. It cannot

be abdicated or transferred to others. Separation of Powers

between the three branches of government requires that the

enactment of a statute be a legislative function which cannot

be transferred to an administrative body. Since promulgating

the 1974 regulations, Congress has not passed a statute

granting the Corps any additional authority under the CWA.

However, by dramatically expanding its own authority

48a

through amendments to its own regulations, the Corps has in

effect amended the CWA, thereby usurping the power of

Congress. While expanding its authority through new

regulations may be more expedient than convincing Congress

to do so through properly enacted legislation, it is not

permissible for the Corps to take a shortcut by continually

redefining regulatory terminology and therefore its own

jurisdiction.

Albeit speaking in dissent, the language chosen by

Circuit Judge Widener in United States v. Baker, 45 F.3d

837, 850 (4th Cir. 1995) is instructive. Judge Widener stated:

“The Virginia Court, in addressing the

delegation of legislative power, has addressed

the importance of not approving shortcuts on

account of administrative convenience, and we

should heed that admonition. In Thompson v.

Smith, 155 Va. 367, 154 S.E. 579, 584 (1940),

the Court stated:

It is a fundamental principle of our system of

government that the rights of man are to be

determined by the law itself, and not by the let or

leave of administrative officers or bureaus. This

principal ought not to be surrendered for

convenience or in effect nullified for the sake of

expediency.”

12. The Court FINDS that when Congress passed the

CWA, it did not intend for the Corps to greatly expand what

qualifies as jurisdictional waters of the United States. In

addition, the Court FINDS that when Congress passed the

CWA, it was not Congress’s intent to vest the discretion in

the Corps to decide on a case-by-case basis which ditches

constructed partially through dry lands and which culverts

should be defined as tributaries to waters of the United

49a

States.'? However, under 51 Fed. Reg. 41,217 (1986), this is

precisely the scope of authority the Corps has granted itself.

13. The Corps, in exerting jurisdiction over the wetlands

on the Property, has exceeded the authority granted to it by

Congress. The Supreme Court in SWANCC made it clear that

the 1974 regulations, promulgated two years after the CWA’s

enactment, are more consistent with the intent of Congress.

SWANCC. 531 U.S. at 168. These regulations focused on

“navigable waters” and the “water body’s capability of use

by the public for purposes of transportation or commerce.”

33 C.F.R. §§ 209.120(d)(1), 209.260(e)(1) (1974). The

Supreme Court noted that Congress intended to only exert its

“commerce power over navigation.” SWANCC, 531 U.S. at

fn 3. In the case at bar, only by multiple drainage ditches, a

culvert under a highway, and miles of non-navigable waters,

are the wetlands on the Property even remotely connected to

navigable waters or a water body capable of use by the public

for purposes of transportation or commerce. Further, the

wetlands on the Property bear no relation to the commerce

power over navigation. Therefore, the Court FINDS that the

wetlands on the Property fall outside the scope of the CWA.

14. The Court agrees with the sweep of SWANCC as

explained in the dissent written by Justice Stevens and joined

by three other Justices. Although not essential to the holding,

9 Tt is noicworihy that in closing argument counsel for the Corps

relied on the “case by case” language from the 1986 definition of

tributaries. The argument was generally that although the evidence clearly

proved that the ditch abutting the westerly side of I-64 was constructed

partially through dry land, the Corps had jurisdiction over this link to the

Property because it had determined that jurisdiction was appropriate “in

this case.” The preamble to the 1990 definition of tributaries specifies that

such ditches are jurisdictional unless they are “. . . constructed entirely in

upland areas . . .” 65 Fed. Reg. 12,824-825 (2000). It appears that even

the Corps own attorneys have difficulty in keeping pace with these ever-

changing regulations.

50a

Justice Stevens opined that SWANCC excluded wetlands and

tributaries that are not contiguous or adjacent to navigable

waters from the scope of the Corps’ jurisdiction. SWANCC,

531 U.S. at 188, fn. 14. The wetlands on the Property are not

adjacent to navigable waters by any reasonable definition of

adjacency. Further, the Corps argues that the spur ditch, the

two I-64 drainage ditches and the culvert under I-64 qualify

as tributaries. However, even if the Court were to accept the

1986 regulations and find that the ditches and culvert can be

so defined, none of these alleged tributaries are contiguous or

adjacent to navigable waters or waters of the United States.

Thus, the Court FINDS that SWANCC alone eliminates any

claim of jurisdiction by the Corps in this case under any

permissible interpretation of the facts as presented by the

Corps.

15. As in the Fourth Circuit’s holding in Wilson, the

- Army Corps of Engineers exceeded its congressional

authorization under the CWA. In this case, the Corps did not

have congressional authorization to regulate the wetlands on

the Property. Accordingly, the Court FINDS that the Corps

did not have jurisdiction to regulate the wetlands on the

Newdunn Property and Newdunn was not required to obtain

a permit under the CWA prior to conducting the activities

delineated in the Corps’ Complaint.

16. In determining whether the Court has jurisdiction to

decide if Treacy and the Board possessed jurisdiction over

the Property, the Court FINDS that the nature and timing of

Treacy’s filing of Treacy v. Newdunn, Civil Action No.

4:01cv86, establishes that this filing was in reaction to this

Court’s issuance of a Preliminary Injunction in United States

v. Newdunn, Civil Action No. 2:01cv508. Further, since, in

determining this issue, the Court must decide whether the

Board’s jurisdiction is dependant on that of the Corps, the

paramount issue in the two cases are identical and judicial

economy encourages consolidation.

Sla

17. The holding in SWANCC affirms that the State has

broader authority to regulate wetlands within its borders than

does the Corps under the CWA. However, in this case,

Treacy has been unable to show that the Virginia Legislature

has, at this time, granted regulatory authority independently

of the Corps’ jurisdiction.

18. The enabling legislation relied on by Treacy, Va.

Code 62.1-44.5 and 62.1-44.15:5 (the “state statute”), was

adopted prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in SWANCC,

when many federal courts had interpreted the reach of the

Corps’ jurisdiction more broadly than that permitted under

SWANCC’s holding. Therefore, it was logical at the time the

Virginia legislature passed this statute to base its jurisdiction

upon the Corps’ seemingly unlimited jurisdiction.

19. The state statute defines wetlands as land so

delineated by the Corps and over which the Corps has

jurisdiction. The statute reads in part, “Any delineation

accepted by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers as sufficient

in its exercise of jurisdiction pursuant to § 404 of the Clean

Water Act shall be determinative of the geographic area of

that delineated wetland.” Va. Code § 62.1-44.15:5(D).

20. Va. Code § 62.1-44.15:5(A) states, “Issuance of a

Virginia Water Protection Permit shall constitute the

certification required under § 401 of the Clean Water Act.”

21. Va. Code § 62.1-44.15:5(B) states, “The Board shall,

after providing an opportunity for public comment, issue a

Virginia Water Protection Permit if it has determined that the

proposed activity is consistent with the provisions of the

Clean Water Act...”

22. The term “wetlands” is defined identically by state

Statute as by the Corps’ regulations. 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(b)

and Va. Code § 62.1-44.3 defines “Wetlands” as “those

areas that are inundated or saturated by surface or

groundwater at a frequency and duration sufficient to

52a

support, and that under normal circumstances do support, a

prevalence of vegetation typically adapted for life in

saturated soil conditions. Wetlands generally include

swamps, marshes, bogs and similar areas.”

23. The language in the state statute defining wetlands as

land so delineated by the Corps and over which the Corps has

jurisdiction under the CWA, Va. Code § 62.1-44.15:5(D),

and establishing the permitting process as coexistent with the

permit required under the CWA, Va. Code §§ 62.1-

44.15:5(A) and (B), makes it clear that the state statute is

coextensive with the CWA.

24. The fact that the term “wetlands” is defined

identically by the state statute as by the Corps regulations, 33

C.F.R. § 328.2(b) and Va. Code § 62.1-44.3, supports this

interpretation of the state statute.

25. The language used by the VDEQ and the Board

proves that they have been consistently relying on the

jurisdiction of the Corps in asserting state jurisdiction. In a

letter dated July 31, 2001 to Newdunn’s counsel by VDEQ

counsel, the VDEQ explicitly based its jurisdiction on the

Corps’ jurisdiction. In both the Emergency Special Order

issued on June 25, 2001 and Final Special Order issued on

October 4, 2001, the VDEQ used the Corps’ claim of

jurisdiction over the Property as its first Finding of Fact, on

which it based its own jurisdiction. Surprisingly, the October

4, 2001 Final Special Order used this language even after the

Court discussed the VDEQ’s apparent dependence on Corps’

jurisdiction in its August 31, 2001 Order. There was no

reason for the VDEQ to repeatedly use this language unless

Treacy was relying on it in asserting jurisdiction.

26. The fact that weeks before trial, on February 8, 2002

the Board issued a Supplemental Final Special Order that for

the first time omitted this language is unpersuasive. By that

time, the Court had cited this language in several Orders and

at several hearings for the proposition that Treacy’s actions

53a

were dependent upon the Corps’ jurisdiction, in spite of the

arguments of Treacy’s counsel to the contrary. This omission

at such a late date demonstrates that the language was

important to the Board’s prior decisions, and appears to be an

effort to circumvent the prior findings of the Court on this

issue.

27. Therefore, the actions of and language used by the

VDEQ and the Board support the Court’s interpretation of

the statute as granting the state jurisdiction coextensive with

Corps jurisdiction under the Clean Water Act.

28. Accordingly, the Court FINDS that Treacy and the

Board exercised the State’s jurisdiction over the Property

based on the Corps’ claim that the Property contains

jurisdictional wetlands under the CWA.

29. Having found that the Corps has no jurisdiction, it

follows that the Court FINDS that Treacy, acting on behalf

of the Board, has no jurisdiction.

30. Having found Treacy and the Board lack jurisdiction,

the Court DECLINES Newdunn’s request to decide whether

its activities constituted a violation of the state’s regulatory

Statute. The Court also DECLINES to consider the

constitutionality under state law of the state regulatory

scheme, an issue which Newdunn raised for the first time at

trial. Both of these issues are better left to the appropriate

State court or agency.

31. Since neither the Corps, nor Treacy and the Board,

have jurisdiction over the wetlands on the Newdunn

Property, the Court ENTERS JUDGMENT for the

DEFENDANTS.

IV. Summary

Congress passed the CWA in 1972. The Corps adopted

regulations interpreting that act in 1974. Although since 1972

Congress has not granted the Corps additional jurisdiction,

54a

the Corps has made multiple changes to its original

regulations expanding its jurisdiction. The 1986 regulations

adopted by the Corps substantially expanded the definition of

jurisdictional waters and, in doing so, granted itself

dramatically more authority. In making these changes, it

usurped Congress’ authority to determine the Corps’

jurisdiction. Accordingly, the Court FINDS that the Corps

did not have authority under the CWA to adopt the 1986

regulations or any regulations adopted thereafter since the

1986 regulations are not entitled to administrative deference

under Chevron, 467 U.S. 837.

The Court FINDS that the Corps did not have jurisdiction

over the Property under the regulations existing prior to

1986. Further, the majority opinion in SWANCC makes it

clear that the Supreme Court excised the Property from the

scope of the CWA, even under the 1986 regulations, as the

wetlands on the Property are not adjacent to navigable waters

or waters of the United States by any reasonable definition of

adjacency.

Accordingly, the Court FINDS that even under the 1986

regulations as interpreted by SWANCC, the Corps still has

not proven a sufficient connection between the property and

navigable waters or waters of the United States to establish

jurisdiction over the Property.

Therefore, the Court FINDS that the Corps lacks

jurisdiction under the CWA to regulate the Property.

It may well be that the Corps’ amendments to its

regulations are meritorious in attempting to protect the

environment, although in this instance, the Corps’

interpretation of its jurisdiction is more likely to harm than

help the Chesapeake Bay. However, the fact that the Corps

has a meritorious scientific basis for expanding its

jurisdiction in an effort to protect the environment does not

authorize it to usurp the function of the legislative branch for

55a

the sake of expediency. It is incumbent upon the Courts to

prevent the Corps from shortcutting the legislative process.

The enabling legislation relied on by Treacy was adopted

prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in SWANCC, when

many Federal Courts had interpreted the reach of the Corps’

jurisdiction more broadly than that permitted under

SWANCC’s holding. The language of the state statute makes

it clear that the statute granting the state jurisdiction is

coextensive with the CWA. The actions of and language used

by the VDEQ and the Board further supports this

interpretation of the state statute. The Court FINDS that

Treacy and the Board sought to exercise the State’s

jurisdiction over the Property based on the Corps’ claim that

the Property contains jurisdictional wetlands under the CWA.

In determining the question of the Court’s jurisdiction to

decide this issue, the Court FINDS that the nature and timing

of Treacy’s filing of Treacy v. Newdunn, Civil Action No.

4:01cv86, establishes that this filing was in reaction to this

Court’s issuance of a Preliminary Injunction in United States

v. Newdunn, Civil Action No. 2:01cv508. Further, since the

Board’s jurisdiction is dependant on that of the Corps, the

paramount issue in the two cases is identical and judicial

economy encourages consolidation. Having found that the

Corps has no jurisdiction, it follows that the Court FINDS

that Treacy, acting on behalf of the Board, has no

jurisdiction. Having found Treacy and the Board lack

jurisdiction, the Court DECLINES Newdunn’s request to

rule upon the issue of whether its activities constituted a

violation of the state’s regulatory statute. This issue is better

left to the appropriate state agency or court. The state court is

also the more appropriate forum to decide the

constitutionality under state law of the state regulatory

scheme, an issue which Newdun

This text is long and has been trimmed here. Open the source document for the complete record.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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