Appendix — McNab v. United States

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_ > waprane Court, U8.

FILE®

03 622 ocr 24 2008

No.

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

DAVID HENSON MCNAB,

Petitioner,

V.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

_ Respondent.

On Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari

To The United States Court Of Appeals

For The Eleventh Circuit

APPENDIX TO PETITION

FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

WILLIAM W. WATTS, III MIGUEL A. ESTRADA

HUDSON & Watts, LLP Counsel of Record

P.O. Box 989 MARK A. PERRY

Mobile, AL 36601 WILLIAM M. JAY

(251) 432-7200 GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP

1050 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20036

(202) 955-8500

Counsel for Petitioner

ia

APPENDIX A: Opinion of the United States

Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit,

filed March 21, 2003, amended, May 29,

an SEER OF ON TN AACE Neen BAT AEE la

APPENDIX B: Order on Motion for Pretrial De-

termination of Foreign and State Law,

United States District Court for the Southem

District of Alabama, filed October 12, 2000........ 44a

APPENDIX C: Order on Motions Based on

Honduran Law Developments, United States

District Court for the Southern District of

Alabama, filed August 28, 2001 .......ccccccccceccceceeee 66a

APPENDIX D: Order of the United States Court

of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit Amend-

ing Panel Opinion and Denying Rehearing,

SOOO FEB 2, DE ses esssavs vce ssessivsvivesvnrvenvsnciaece: 77a

APPENDIX E: Judgment in a Criminal Case,

United States District Court for the Southern

District of Alabama, filed August 27, 2001 ......... 79a

APPENDIX F: Footnote 24 of Original Panel

Decision, Deleted on Rehearing, filed March

21, 2003, amended, May 29, 2003 ......ceccecccceceeceee 89a

APPENDIX G: Fifth Amendment to the United

SU CII aise ssescvsvisssvescvevevuvserssanavevesees 92a

APPENDIX H: 16 U.S.C. §§ 3372-3373 ...... ened 93a

APE BLE UBC. © 371 ccscescessccesssseovesveseeseees 10la

APPENDIX J: 18 U.S.C. § 545 (1994) .oocccecceceeees 102a

APPENDIX K: 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956-1957 (1994) ......104a

lla

APPENDIX L: Second Superseding Indictment,

United States District Court for the Southern

District of Alabama, filed Sept. 26, 2000...........

APPENDIX M: Excerpts of Transcript of For-

eign Law Hearing, United States District

Court for the Southern District of Alabama,

on September 27-29, 2000 .........:sscssesesresseseeees

APPENDIX N: Excerpts of Transcript of Tnal,

United States District Court for the Southern

District of Alabama, on October 23-27, 2000....

APPENDIX O: Government’s Trial Exhibit 26,

Anonymous Fax, dated February 3, 1999..........

APPENDIX P: Legal Opinion of Hector Ramon

Trochez, Attorney General of Honduras,

dated July 24, 2000 ........secsa:sssseeevenanstessvennesveces

APPENDIX Q: Declaration of Sergio Zavala

Leiva, Attorney General of Honduras, dated

May 13, 2002 .....0ss+.<s0s<sssencsusenesornennenenrnnennes

APPENDIX R: Opinion of the Honduran Court

of the First Instance of Administrative Law,

filed May 23, 2001 ........s0-ssssessensssesneeverssseneeenntes

APPENDIX S: Opinion of the Honduran Court

of Appeals of Administrative Matters, filed

October 15, ZOO1 ...cciisccsscscsnconninneenemnnaron

APPENDIX T: Special Report of Recommenda-

tions of the Honduran National Human

Rights Commissioner, dated November 8,

APPENDIX U: Report of the Honduran Minister

of Agriculture and Livestock, dated Novem-

Der 16, DUDE vsvciccecmmnnen Vaishnava

ilia

APPENDIX V: Certification of the Honduran

Minister of Agriculture and Livestock, dated

NN BR I op cremicpnvsosvansecnsessunvnnsssvnees

APPENDIX W: Diplomatic Note from Honduran

Embassy to United States Department of

State, dated January 23, ZO0Z..........00:0ce0sseerree

APPENDIX X: Acuerdo No. 0008-93, dated

I ania os dcchrasnelesenniuinieiuiennninchaniivwies

APPENDIX Y: The Fishing Law, Decree No.

Se ENE EB WI svssnssvccsisesensnsvavnecevsinsenes

APPENDIX Z: Resolution No. 030-95, dated

E.R ETE er es ED

APPENDIX AA: Decree No. 157-94, dated Janu-

NN aise hei hscahatebicaivaiestienwanvnoneriainvenind

APPENDIX BB: Decree No. 198-2001, dated

I aaa jasibediainnanieeeseunepasiiess

APPENDIX CC: Decree No. 245-2000, undated......

APPENDIX DD: Article 96 of the Constitution

ae SR a ee

APPENDIX EE: Article 205 of the Constitution

SA SE FUE eC OC

APPENDIX FF: Article 228 of the Constitution

i cnassabwabeoiel

APPENDIX GG: Articles 30-32 of the Honduran

Law of the Jurisdiction of Administrative

ERE ae Rae RE SO eon

la

APPENDIX A

[PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

FILED

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

MARCH 21, 2003

THOMAS K. KAHN

CLERK

No. 01-15148

D. C. Docket No. 00-00079-CR-1-RV

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

DAVID HENSON MCNAB,

ROBERT D. BLANDFORD, et al., Defendants-

Appellants.

No. 02-10810

D. C. Docket No. 00-00079-CR-CB

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

ABNER SCHOENWETTER,

}

————

2a

ROBERT D. BLANDFORD, Defendants-

Appellants.

No. 02-11264

D. C. Docket No. 00-00079-CR-1-RV

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

DAVID HENSON MCNAB,

ABNER SCHOENWETTER, et al., Defendants-

Appellants.

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Alabama

(March 21, 2003)

(As Amended May 29, 2003)

Before HULL, WILSON and FAY, Circuit J udges.

WILSON, Circuit Judge:

The Court hereby substitutes the following opinion in

place of the opinion which was issued on March 21 , 2003.

David Henson McNab, Abner Schoenwetter, Robert D.

Blandford, and Diane H. Huang (collectively the defendants)

appeal the convictions and sentences they received after a

jury found them guilty of conspiracy, smuggling, money

laundering, and Lacey Act violations in connection with the

importation, sale, and purchase of Caribbean spiny lobsters

from Honduras. The defendants’ main argument on appeal is

that the district court erred in determining that the Honduran

laws that served as the underlying basis of their convictions

were valid and enforceable. The defendants contend that the

DR cae AU RS REN cma mneMnaeecamad

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~~

3a

Honduran laws were invalid, and, therefore, there was no

violation of foreign law upon which to base their convic-

tions. '

The defendants’ challenge to the validity of the Honduran

laws requires us to undertake our own foreign law determina-

tion. Our task is complicated by conflicting representations

from Honduran officials regarding the validity of the Hondu-

ran laws. Throughout the investigation and trial, Honduran

officials offered support and assistance to the United States

government, and both the government and the district court

relied upon the Honduran officials’ verification of the Hon-

duran laws. Shortly after the defendants were convicted, the

Honduran government reversed its position; it currently re-

futes the validity of the laws it previously verified. There-

fore, we must decide whether our courts are bound by a for-

eign government’s new representations regarding the validity

of its laws when its new representations are issued only post-

conviction and directly contravene its original position upon

which the government and our courts relied and the jury

acted. This question is a matter of first impression in this

Circuit and apparently the other circuits as well. For the rea-

sons set forth below, we affirm the defendants’ convictions

and sentences.

The Lacey Act prohibits the importation of “fish or wild-

life taken, possessed, transported, or sold in violation of . . . any

foreign law.” 16 U.S.C. § 3372(a)(2)(A). If the lobsters were not

imported, transported, and sold in violation of Honduran law, there

could be no Lacey Act violations. Accordingly, if the lobsters

were brought into the United States legally and were not crimi-

nally-derived property, there could be no smuggling or money

laundering violations.

4a

BACKGROUND

On February 3, 1999, agents of the National Marine Fish-

eries Service (NMFS) received an anonymous facsimile,

which provided that McNab’s cargo transport vessel, the

M/V Caribbean Clipper, would arrive in Bayou la Batre,

Alabama on February 5, 1999, with a shipment of lobsters

containing “undersized (3&4 oz) lobster tails, [which was] a

violation of Honduran law.” The facsimile further provided

that Honduras prohibits the bulk exportation of lobsters and

requires that lobsters be packed in boxes for export.

In response to the anonymous tip, NMFS agents con-

sulted the Direccion General de Pesca y Acuicultura (DI-

GEPESCA) in Honduras’ regarding the legality of the lobster

shipment referenced in the facsimile. The NMFS agents

questioned whether the shipment violated the Lacey Act,

which makes it unlawful to import into the United States

“fish or wildlife [that has been] taken, possessed, transported,

or sold in violation of ... any foreign law.” 16 U.S.C.

§ 3372(a)(2)(A). In three separate letters responding to the

agents’ inquiry, the director general of the DIGEPESCA de-

scribed some of Honduras’s fishing laws and confirmed that

McNab’s shipment “ha[d] been illegally transported in viola-

tion of the Fishing Law, the Industrial and Hygienic Sanitary

Inspection Regulation for Fish Products and Resolution No.

030-95.” The director general provided authentic copies of

the applicable laws and stated that the DIGEPESCA was

ready to support all efforts by the government to prosecute

persons who violate the Lacey Act.

* The DIGEPESCA is the agency within Honduras’s Secre-

taria de Agricultura y Ganaderia (SAG) that is responsible for the

enforcement of the fishing laws and the execution of fishing pro-

grams.

OOOO eVOOOoOoOoOO| eee Se

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In early March of 1999 NMFS agents seized the lobster

shipment that was referenced in the anonymous facsimile

based upon the director general’s assurances that the lobsters

had been exported in violation of Honduran law. Over the

next few months, NMFS agents communicated with Hondu-

ran officials about the Honduran laws and the legality of the

seized lobster shipment. In June of 1999 NMFS special

agents and an attorney in the United States National Oceanic

and Atmospheric Administration Office of the General

Counsel met with various Honduran officials from the Secre-

taria de Agricultura y Ganaderia (SAG) in Tegucigalpa,

Honduras. The minister, the vice minister, the director of

legal services, the director of legal affairs, the secretary gen-

eral of the SAG, the director general of the DIGEPESCA,

and the legal advisor for the Servicio Nacional de Sanidad

Agropecuaria (SENASA)’ confirmed that the lobsters had

been exported illegally without first being inspected and

processed. Furthermore, the Honduran officials confirmed

that there was a 5.5-inch size limit for lobster tails and that

all catches had to be reported to Honduran authorities. The

Honduran officials provided certified copies of the laws in

question. In September of 1999 NMFS agents inspected the

lobster shipment that had been seized earlier in the year. The

inspection confirmed that the seized lobsters were packed in

bulk plastic bags without being processed and revealed that a

significant number had a tail length that was less than the 5.5

inches required by the Honduran size limit restriction. In ad-

dition, many of the lobsters were egg-bearing or had their

eggs removed. In March of 2000 two Honduran officials, a

legal advisor in the Despacho Ministerial and a SAG legal

* Like the DIGEPESCA, the SENASA is an agency within

the SAG. The SENASA is responsible for the enforcement of hy-

giene laws and regulations.

6a

advisor, traveled to Alabama to meet with government prose-

cutors and investigators. Both legal advisors provided wnt-

ten statements that cited Resolution 030-95 as a valid law

regulating the lobster fishing industry. They also described

the processing requirements mandated by Regulation 0008-

93.* They further explained that Honduras prohibits the har-

vesting of egg-bearing lobsters. Based upon the NMFS’s

investigation and the verification of the applicable foreign

laws by the Honduran officials charged with regulating the

lobster fishing industry, the government decided to prosecute

the defendants for their roles in the illegal importing scheme.

Subsequently, the grand jury returned a forty-seven-count

second superseding indictment in September of 2000.° To

determine the validity of the relevant Honduran laws, the dis-

trict court conducted a pretrial hearing on foreign law in Sep-

tember of 2000. Most of the defendants’ evidence at the

hearing pertained to the validity of Resolution 030-95, which

Processing lobster tails involves several steps: thawing,

sorting, and grading the lobsters by quality and size; placing the

tails in individual plastic sleeves; and packing thern in boxes.

* The legal advisors cited Resolution 003-80 as authority for

the prohibition against harvesting or destroying egg-bearing lob-

sters. Resolution 003-80 is substantially similar to Article 70(3) of

the Fishing Law, as both laws prohibit the harvesting or destruc-

tion of lobster eggs. At the foreign law hearing, the government

acknowledged that it could not verify the publication of Resolution

003-80 in La Gaceta and therefore relied upon Article 70(3) as a

Lacey Act predicate.

6

Although the investigation focused initially upon the

seized shipment referenced in the facsimile, the indictment charged

the defendants with violations based upon numerous shipments of

lobsters between 1996 and 1999.

7a

established a 5.5-inch size limit for lobsters.’ At the gov-

ermment’s request, the minister of the SAG sent Secretary

General Liliana Patricia Paz, the SAG’s highest-ranking legal

official, to testify at the foreign law hearing. Secretary Gen-

eral Paz testified as to the validity of various laws and con-

firmed that Resolution 030-95, Regulation 0008-93, and Ar-

ticle 70(3) of the Fishing Law*® were in effect and legally

binding during the time period covered by the indictment.

She also explained the means by which a Honduran citizen

may seek the invalidation of a resolution in Honduras,’ and

she testified that no such proceeding regarding Resolution

030-95 had been initiated at that time. Persuaded by the tes-

timony of Secretary General Paz, the district court found that

the government met its burden of establishing the validity of

the Honduran laws that served as the predicates for the Lacey

” Two law professors, both experts in Honduran law, testi-

fied for the defendants. The defendants also submitted a number

of legal opinions from members of the Honduran legal community,

including the attorney general of Honduras and the regional prose-

cutor of the Fiscalia Especial Para la Defensa de la Constitucion,

and a declaration from a practicing Honduran attorney.

* The Fishing Law is a comprehensive statute regulating the

Honduran fishing industry. See Decreto No. 154, May 19, 1959,

La Gaceta, June 9, 1959.

The Honduran judicial system includes a separate adminis-

trative law court system in which disputes relating to administra-

tive matters are adjudicated. Among the procedures available in

the administrative court system is an action by a Honduran citizen

who claims to be affected adversely by some administrative rule to

seek a declaration that the rule is invalid. Such an action is first

brought in the Honduran Court of the First Instance of Administra-

tive Law. Decisions from that court may be appealed to the Hon-

duran Court of Appeals for Administrative Law.

8a

Act charges. Shortly after the foreign law hearing, a jury

trial was conducted, and the defendants were found guilty on

multiple counts."

After the trial, the defendants filed a number of motions

seeking to have their convictions overturned.'’ In the mo-

tions, they attacked the validity of the foreign laws underly-

ing their convictions, citing recent developments in Hondu-

ran law. In preparation for a hearing on the motions, an offi-

cial from the United States Department of Justice and agents

from the NMFS and the Federal Bureau of Investigation

traveled to Honduras in early August of 2001 to discuss the

defendants’ challenges to the validity of the Honduran laws.

They received affidavits from three Honduran government

officials, including Secretary General Paz, confirming the

validity of the laws the defendants were challenging. They

also received an affidavit from the minister of the SAG, stat-

ing that those Honduran government officials were author-

ized to provide advice on the enforcement and validity of the

laws. After the hearing, the district court dismissed each of

the defendants’ posttrial motions. Thereafter, in August of

2001, the district court sentenced McNab, Blandford, and

10

McNab was found guilty of conspiracy, smuggling, and

money laundering. Blandford was found guilty of conspiracy,

smuggling, Lacey Act violations, and money laundering, as well as

two lesser included offenses under the Lacey Act. Schoenwetter

was found guilty as charged for conspiracy and smuggling, and

Huang was found guilty as charged for conspiracy, Lacey Act vio-

lations, and false labeling.

11

The final set of motions included a motion to dismiss be-

cause the indictment failed to charge a crime, a motion for a new

trial based upon newly discovered evidence, and a motion for rede-

termination of foreign law based upon developments in Honduran

law.

9a

Schoenwetter to ninety-seven months of imprisonment and

Huang to twenty-four months of imprisonment.

After sentencing, the defendants appealed their convic-

tions based, in part, upon their contention that the Honduran

laws used as the predicates for the Lacey Act convictions

were invalid or void during the time period covered by the

indictment.'’ In December of 2001 a government attorney

and NMFS agents traveled to Honduras to discuss the defen-

dants’ new documents with Honduran officials to prepare the

government’s brief on appeal. Once again, the Honduran

officials confirmed their prior statements regarding the valid-

ity of the Honduran laws.

After the initial notice of appeal, the defendants obtained

additional support for their claim that the district court misinter-

preted Honduran law. As a result, they filed a Motion for Judicial

Notice, as well as alternative motions regarding newly issued

Honduran legal opinions with this Court. We denied those mo-

tions without prejudice and held that the motions could be renewed

if the district court refused to certify its intention to grant a new

trial pursuant to United States v. Ellsworth, 814 F.2d 613 (11th

Cir. 1987) (per curiam).

Based upon our order, in January of 2002 McNab filed a Mo-

tion for Order Certifying Intention to Grant New Trial Upon Re-

mand with the district court, which was subsequently adopted by

Blandford, Schoenwetter, and Huang. After initially denying the

motion, the district court granted the defendants’ motion for recon-

sideration. Upon reconsideration, the district court affirmed its

earlier order that it would not certify its intention to grant a new

trial. The defendants appeal that order and argue that the district

court erred in denying the motion to certify its intention to grant a

new tral upon remand. In light of our holding regarding the valid-

ity of the Honduran laws, we need not address this issue.

10a

The defendants raise a number of issues in these consoli-

dated appeals. First, they argue that the scope of the Lacey

Act is limited to foreign statutes and that the Honduran reso-

lutions and regulations listed in the indictment were used im-

properly as predicates for their convictions. Second, they

contend that the district court’s interpretation of the Hondu-

ran resolutions and regulations was erroneous and that the

Honduran laws that served as predicates for the convictions

were invalid. Third, McNab argues that the district court

abused its discretion by excluding evidence at trial relating to

his “knowledge” of Honduran law. Fourth, the defendants

assert that the district court made several errors with respect

to the jury instructions. Fifth, they contend that the jury’s

verdicts were based upon insufficient evidence. Finally,

Schoenwetter and Blandford argue that the district court

erred in failing to postpone their sentencing and in determin-

ing the length of their sentences.

DISCUSSION

I. Scope of the Lacey Act

The first issue we address is whether the phrase “any for-

eign law” in the Lacey Act includes foreign regulations and

other legally binding provisions that have the force and effect

of law. The defendants argue that the phrase “any foreign

law” should be read to mean foreign statutes and not foreign

regulations or provisions that are legally binding. According

to their argument, Resolution 030-95 and Regulation 0008-

93 do not fall within the scope of the Lacey Act, because

they are not statutes.’ They rely upon what they consider a

' The parties do not dispute the following explanation of the

Honduran legal framework:

The Government of Honduras is a constitutional repub-

lic. Its legal system is generally under the continental or civil

[Footnote continued on next page]

lla

distinction by Congress between “any law or regulation of

any State” and “any foreign law.” 16 U.S.C.

§ 3372(a)(2)(A). The defendants argue that by failing to in-

clude foreign regulations explicitly, Congress intended that

only foreign statutes could serve as the basis for a foreign

law Lacey Act violation. .

In accordance with the plain meaning doctrine, “[w]e be-

gin our construction of ... [the Lacey Act] where courts

| should always begin the process of legislative interpretation,

and where they often should end it as well, which is with the

words of the statutory provision.” Harris v. Garner, 216

F.3d 970, 972 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc), cert. denied, 532

U.S. 1065 (2001); United States v. Gilbert, 198 F.3d 1293,

Pia Rer i nedene RU AOL

[Footnote continued from previous page]

law system .... [T]he Constitution is the supreme law of the

Republic.

en te ee Re tac ENE Lap tl a a

The adoption of statutes in Honduras (issued as “De-

i crees”) is the exclusive prerogative of the National Congress.

i At the same time, the Constitution ... vests in the Executive

; Branch the exclusive authority to issue “Regulations[.”]

Regulations (issued in the form of “Acuerdos”—in English,

“Accords” or “Decisions” or “Agreements”) are general rules

of conduct applicable to all who may be affected by them and

they have the force of law. The Constitution provides that

Regulations may be issued only by the President of the Re-

public with the co-signature of the Secretary of State. [sic]

(i.e. Chief Minister) of the pertinent ministry. Both statutes

and regulations become effective only when they are pub-

lished in La Gaceta, which is the Honduran equivalent of the

Federal Register.

Br. of Amicus Curiae of the Embassy of Honduras and the Asocia-

cion de Pescadores del Caribe in Supp. of Def.-Appellant David

Henson McNab at 8-9 (citations omitted).

| |

12a

1298 (11th Cir. 1999). It is well established that “Tw]hen the

words of a statute are unambiguous .. . [the] judicial inquiry

is complete.” CBS Inc. v. PrimeTime 24 Joint Venture, 245

F.3d 1217, 1222 (11th Cir. 2001) (first alteration in original)

(internal quotation marks omitted); see also Conn. Nat'l

Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54 (1992) (“[C]ourts

must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it

means and means in a statute what it says there.”). When,

however, “the language is ambiguous or leads to absurd re-

sults, .. . [we] may consult the legislative history and discern

the true intent of Congress.” United States v. Kattan-Kassin,

696 F.2d 893, 895 (11th Cir. 1983)."*

With this guidance in mind, we examine the language of

the Lacey Act. The Lacey Act provides that “[i]t is unlawful

for any person . . . to import, export, transport, sell, receive,

acquire, or purchase in interstate or foreign commerce ...

any fish or wildlife taken, possessed, transported, or sold in

violation of any law or regulation of any State or in violation

of any foreign law.” 16 U.S.C. § 3372(a)(2)(A). The Act

defines “law” as those “/aws . . . which regulate the taking,

possession, importation, exportation, transportation, or sale

of fish or wildlife or plants.” 16 U.S.C. § 3371(d) (emphasis

added).

14

We note that although a court may resort to extrinsic mate-

rials if the statutory language is ambiguous or if the interpretation

causes absurd results, only the latter is a true exception to the plain

meaning rule. CBS Inc., 245 F.3d at 1227 (“Stating that ambiguity

establishes an exception, instead of disestablishes the predicate for

the rule, confuses things.”).

OO ——————————— ee ES —_— —=—”-

— er

13a

Unfortunately, the statutory definition defines the word

“law” by using the word “laws.”'* While the definition is

helpful in determining what the “law” must regulate, it is si-

lent as to whether “law” is restricted to statutes or includes

regulations and other provisions that foreign governments

use to promulgate legally binding rules. Thus, we turn first

to the common usage or ordinary meaning of the word “law”

to determine its plain meaning. Cf Consol. Bank, N.A. v.

Jnited States Dep’t of the Treasury, 118 F.3d 1461, 1464

(11th Cir. 1997) (“In the absence of a statutory definition of a

term, we look to the common usage of words for their mean-

ing.”). “[T]o determine the common usage or ordinary

meaning of a term, courts often turn to dictionary definitions

for guidance.” See CBS Inc., 245 F.3d at 1223.

Merriam Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary provides sev-

eral definitions of law, including “a binding custom or prac-

tice of a community: a rule of conduct or action prescribed or

formally recognized as binding or enforced by a controlling

authority” and “the whole body of such customs, practices, or

rules.” Merriam Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 659 (Fre-

derick C. Mish et al. eds., 10th ed. 1996). Under these broad

definitions of the word “law,” the phrase “any foreign law”

PA oem iA CNR, Bove A

'S Section 3371(d) provides in full, “The terms ‘law,’

‘treaty,’ ‘regulation,’ and ‘Indian tribal law’ mean laws, treaties,

regulations or Indian tribal laws which regulate the taking, posses-

sion, importation, exportation, transportation, or sale of fish or

wildlife or plants.” 16 U.S.C. § 3371(d).

We read the word “law” to refer to laws “which regulate the

taking, possession, importation, exportation, transportation, or sale

of fish or wildlife or plants,” and the word “treaty” to refer to trea-

i ties “which regulate the taking, possession, importation, exporta-

tion, transportation, or sale of fish or wildlife or plants,” and so

forth.

l4a

incorporates the Honduran decrees and regulations at issue.

See United States v. 594,464 Pounds of Salmon, 871 F.2d

824, 826 (9th Cir. 1989).

On the other hand, there are more narrow definitions of

the word “law” that also are commonly used. Black’s Law

Dictionary provides several definitions of the word “law,”

including one that defines law simply as “[a] statute.”

Black’s Law Dictionary 889 (Bryan A. Gamer et al. eds., 7th

ed. 1999). This definition is plausible when the phrase “any

foreign law” is read in conjunction with the rest of

§ 3372(a)(2)(A). For example, the defendants assert that

“any foreign law” can refer only to foreign statutes, because

to read “any foreign law” to include regulations would render

the word “regulation” in the earlier phrase “any law or regu-

lation of any State” meaningless.'®

While the defendants advocate this interpretation of the

statute, it is not the only reasonable one. Another is that

Congress intended to punish violations of state laws and state

regulations and to punish violations of foreign laws, what-

ever form those foreign laws may take. The Ninth Circuit, in

explaining why it interpreted “any foreign law” to cover dif-

ferent forms of foreign laws, emphasized how the world’s

diverse legal systems defy easy definition or categorization.

It noted,

[B]jecause of the wide range the forms of law

may take given the world’s many diverse legal

and governmental systems, Congress would

be hard-pressed to set forth a definition that

16 “A basic premise of statutory construction is that a statute

is to be interpreted so that no words shall be discarded as being

meaningless, redundant, or mere surplusage.” United States v.

Canals-Jimenez, 943 F.2d 1284, 1287 (11th Cir. 1991).

ee OM ee |

i a pee eeaie

15a

would adequately encompass all of them... .

Thus, if Congress had sought to define “any

foreign law” with any kind of specificity

whatsoever, it might have effectively immu-

nized . . . [conduct] under the Act despite vio-

lation of conservation laws of a large portion

of the world’s regimes that possess systems of

law and government that defy easy definition

or categorization.

594,464 Pounds of Salmon, 871 F.2d at 827-28. In other

words, the argument is that Congress specifically chose to

limit domestic law to statutes and regulations, but specifi-

cally chose to use the language “any foreign law” to cover

the wide varieties of laws in foreign countries.

The net result is that there are several reasonable ways to

interpret the word “law” in the phrase “any foreign law.” As

a result of this ambiguity, we look beyond the language of

the statute to determine legislative intent. We thus now look

to the legislative history of the Lacey Act to ascertain Con-

gress’s intent. Fed. Reserve Bank of Atlanta v. Thomas, 220

F.3d 1235, 1239 (11th Cir. 2000). “In trying to learn Con-

gressional intent by examining the legislative history of a

statute, we look to the purpose the original enactment served,

the discussion of statutory meaning in committee reports, the

effect of amendments whether accepted or rejected and the

remarks in debate preceding passage.” Rogers y. Frito-Lay,

Inc., 611 F.2d 1074, 1080 (Sth Cir. 1980).'’ The Lacey Act

was introduced by Representative John F. Lacey of Iowa in

ich eee lta heared Se AERA eS RIS OLA ROE seh NA tlh DE I Re ST | aren

stihl titi ited

'7 In Bonner vy. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th

Cir. 1981) (en banc), we adopted as binding precedent all decisions

of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to the close of busi-

ness on September 30, 1981.

l6a

- 1900. H.R. Rep. No. 97-276, at 7 (1981) (discussing the en-

actment of the Lacey Act). Representative Lacey recognized

that individual states were unable to protect their wildlife,

because their laws did not reach into neighboring states. Jd.

Thus, he asserted that a federal law was necessary to outlaw

the interstate traffic in wildlife illegally taken from their state

of origin."® Jd. By 1981 Congress recognized the need to

strengthen the Lacey Act in response to “the massive illegal

trade in fish, wildlife and plants.” 127 Cong. Rec. 17,327

(1981) (remarks of Senator Lincoln Chafee). Congress thus

amended the Lacey Act in 1981 “to correct ... insufficien-

cies” in the Act and “to simplify administration and enforce-

ment.”!? §S. Rep. No. 97-123, at 2 (1981), reprinted in +981

U.S.C.C.A.N. 1748, 1749.

Although there are certain parts of the legislative history

of the Lacey Act that support the defendants’ position to

some extent, the legislative history reflects that “the [main]

thrust of Congress’s intention in amending the Act was to

expand its scope and enhance its deterrence effect.””

18

In 1935 the Lacey Act was amended to include foreign law

because of concern over the illegal marketing of wildlife from

other countries. H.R. Rep. No. 97-276, at 7.

'9 The Lacey Act Amendments of 1981 combined the Lacey

Act of 1900 and the Black Bass Act of 1926. 127 Cong. Rec.

26,537 (1981) (remarks of Representative John Breaux). The

Black Bass Act was similar to the Lacey Act in that it prohibited

the interstate transportation of fish taken in violation of state or

foreign law. See 127 Cong. Rec. 17,329 (remarks of Senator How-

ard Baker).

20 The defendants point to the fact that the pre-1981 Lacey

Act prohibited trade in wildlife taken in violation of “any law or

regulation of any State or foreign country,” but that now the Lacey

Act does not refer to foreign laws and regulations. “While the leg-

[Footnote continued on next page]

3

a

:

;

17a

594,464 Pounds of Salmon, 871 F.2d at 828. Indeed, Con-

gress clearly stated that the amendments were meant to

strengthen the existing wildlife protection laws and to “pro-

vide [the government] the tools needed to effectively control

the massive illegal trade in fish, wildlife and plants.” 127

Cong. Rec. 17,327 (remarks of Senator Chafee); see also 127

Cong. Rec. 26,537 (1981) (remarks of Representative John

Breaux). The Senate Report provided that the amendments

“would allow the Federal Government to provide more ade-

quate support for the full range of State, foreign and Federal

laws that protect wildlife.” S. Rep. No. 97-123, at 4. The

amendments were intended to “raise both the civil and crimi-

nal penalties of the current laws and target commercial viola-

tors and international traffickers.” 127 Cong. Rec. 17,328

(remarks of Senator Chafee). By strengthening the penalty

provisions of the Lacey Act, Congress intended “to give the

Federal Government stronger enforcement tools to stop the

large-scale importation and taking of fish ... which enjoy

protection under other foreign ... laws.” Jd. at 17,329 (re-

marks of Senator James Strom Thurmond).

Our examination of the legislative history of the Lacey

Act leads us to the conclusion that Congress by no means

intended to limit the application of the Act by its adoption of

the 1981 amendments. The defendants’ interpretation is un-

tenable, because it would restrict the application of the Lacey

Act unduly and would thwart Congress’s stated goal of

strengthening the Act by amending it in 1981. See id. at

17,328 (remarks of Senator Chafee). Their narrow interpre-

tation of the phrase “any foreign law” would prevent the

[Footnote continued from previous page]

islative history is not totally one-sided, the thrust of Congress’s

intention in amending the Act was to expand its scope and enhance

its deterrence effect.” 594,464 Pounds of Salmon, 871 F.2d at 828.

18a

wildlife conservation laws of many countries from serving as

the basis for Lacey Act violations and would limit the Act’s

utility. We therefore conclude that regulations and other

such legally binding provisions that foreign governments

may promulgate to protect wildlife are encompassed by the

phrase “any foreign law” in the Lacey Act.”! See United

States v. Lee, 937 F.2d 1388, 1391-92 (9th Cir. 1991) (hold-

ing that a Taiwanese fishing regulation constituted “foreign

law”); 594,464 Pounds of Salmon, 871 F.2d at 828 (holding

the same).

As we have determined that the phrase “any foreign law”

includes nonstatutory provisions such as Resolution 030-95

and Regulation 0008-93, we now turn to the defendants’ ar-

gument that their convictions were based upon the district

court’s erroneous interpretation of foreign law.

Il. Honduran Laws

The defendants contend that the Honduran laws that

served as predicates for their convictions were invalid. Spe-

cifically, they argue that (1) Resolution 030-95, which estab-

lished a 5.5-inch size limit for lobsters, never had the effect

of law, because it was promulgated improperly and has been

21 The defendants also argue that because the Lacey Act is

ambiguous as to the meaning of “any foreign law,” the rule of len-

ity requires that any doubt be resolved in their favor. Lenity, how-

ever, is “reserved ... for those situations in which a reasonable

doubt persists about a statute’s intended scope even after resort to

the language and structure, legislative history, and motivating poli-

cies of the statute.” Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 108

(1990) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also United States v.

Curry, 902 F.2d 912, 915 (11th Cir. 1990). As our examination of

the legislative history clarifies the purpose of and motivation be-

hind the Lacey Act, the defendants’ invocation of the rule of lenity

fails.

wa me,

Pee ee re <

19a

declared void by the Honduran courts; (2) Regulation 0008-

93, which established inspection and processing requirements

for the lobster fishing industry, was repealed in 1995, prior to

the time period covered by the indictment; and (3) Article

70(3), which prohibits the harvesting and destruction of lob-

ster eggs, was misinterpreted by the district court and was

repealed retroactively in 2001.

As the defendants were found guilty of conspiracy under

a general verdict, there is no way to know which Honduran

law the jury relied upon m determining their guilt. Thus, if

any of the three Honduran laws that the defendants challenge

were invalid during the time period covered by the indict-

ment, the defendants’ convictions must be reversed.” See

Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 376 (1988) (In criminal

cases, “the [Supreme] Court consistently has followed the

rule that the jury’s verdict must be set aside if it could be

supported on one ground but not on another, and the review-

ing court was uncertain which of the two grounds was relied

upon by the jury in reaching the verdict.”’).

We review a district court’s interpretation of foreign law

de novo. United States v. Gecas, 120 F.3d 1419, 1424 (11th

*? The government acknowledges that the rule stated above

generally is true, but argues that the defendants are estopped from

benefitting from that general rule because they “objected to a spe-

cial verdict form and requested general verdicts.” We disagree.

The record indicates that the only objection to the special verdict

forms was made by Blandford’s attorney, who initially stated that

he did not “like” the special interrogatories. Upon hearing the

government’s explanations for the special verdict forms, none of

the defendants made any further objections. Thus, the district

court declined to use the government’s special verdict forms sua

sponte, apparently because it considered them too complicated for

the jury members to use in their deliberations.

20a

Cir. 1997) (en banc). Our determination of foreign law is

complicated by the posttrial shift in the Honduran govern-

ment’s position regarding the validity of the laws at issue in

this case.” The Honduran government now maintains that

the laws were invalid at the time of the lobster shipments or

have been repealed retroactively. Thus, we must decide

whether we are bound by the Honduran government’s current

position regarding the validity of these laws, or whether we

are free to follow the Honduran government’s original posi-

tion.

As we begin our analysis, we must make clear that the

crux of this case is the validity of the Honduran laws during

the time period covered by the indictment. Much of the de-

fendants’ arguments focus upon the fact that none of the laws

are currently valid; however, their reliance upon the current

invalidity of the laws is misplaced. “Although Lacey Act

offenses are predicated upon violations of [foreign] law, the

statute nowhere states that a viable or prosecutable [foreign]

law violation is necessary to support federal charges. In-

stead, the Act simply requires that the fish or wildlife have

been obtained in violation of any [foreign] law... .” United

States v. Borden, 10 F.3d 1058, 1062 (4th Cir. 1993) (internal

quotation marks omitted). The reference to foreign law in

23 Despite the fact that Honduran officials supported the gov-

ernment throughout the investigation and trial of this case, the

Embassy of Honduras filed an amicus curiae brief in support of

McNab.

4 In Borden, two state statutes served as the predicates for

‘the Lacey Act violations. 10 F.3d at 1062. The defendant “con-

tend[ed] that his indictment [wa]s invalid because the one-year

statute of limitations for the predicate state offenses had expired by

the time the indictment was returned.” Jd. He argued that the state

statute of limitations governed Lacey Act violations, “because the

[Footnote continued on next page]

os

2la

the Lacey Act is there to define what constitutes illegal con-

duct. Thus, the subsequent invalidation of the underlying

foreign laws does not make the defendants any less culpable

for their actions. If the laws were valid in Honduras during

the time period covered by the indictment, the defendants

violated the Lacey Act by importing the lobsters in violation

of those laws. Whatever changes in the laws occurred after

the lobsters were imported into the United States illegally

have no effect on the defendants’ convictions.

In a Lacey Act prosecution, once the district court deter-

mines the validity of a foreign law during a given time pe-

riod, it is up to the government to prove that the defendants

knowingly violated those laws. United States v. Todd, 735

F.2d 146, 151 (Sth Cir. 1984). The initial foreign law deter-

mination, however, is a question of law for the court. See

Fed. R. Crim. P. 26.1. “The court, in determining foreign

law, may consider any relevant material or source, including

testimony, whether or not submitted by a party or admissible

under the Federal Rules of Evidence.” Jd. Among the most

logical sources for the court to look to in its determination of

foreign law are the foreign officials charged with enforcing

the laws of their country. The district court, in the course of

a Lacey Act prosecution, is entitled to rely upon such repre-

sentations by foreign officials as to the validity of their gov-

ermment’s laws. The court reasonably may assume that

[Footmote continued from previous page]

existence of a prosecutable violation of state law [wa]s necessary

to support a Lacey Act indictment.” Jd. The Fourth Circuit con-

cluded that even though the Lacey Act “incorporates the substan-

tive elements of state law,” “it is not designed to incorporate state

procedural law.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus,

although the state statute of limitations had run on the state of-

fense, the defendant’s indictment still was valid.

22a

statements from foreign officials are a reliable and accurate

source and may use such statements as a basis for its deter-

mination of the validity of foreign laws during a given time

period.”

When, however, a foreign government changes its origi-

nal position regarding the validity of its laws after a defen-

dant has been convicted, our courts are not required to revise

25 Although the amici suggest that the government used im-

proper procedures, such as seeking out midlevel employees who

were not authorized to render opinions on behalf of the Honduran

government in its effort to ascertain the applicable Honduran laws,

the record indicates quite the contrary. On February 9, 1999, an

NMFS agent sent a formal request to the deputy director of the

DIGEPESCA seeking information regarding the legality of the

lobster referenced in the anonymous facsimile. The director gen-

eral of the DIGEPESCA sent two letters to the NMFS in response

to the inquiry. In his first letter, dated February 12, 1999, the di-

rector general described some of the Honduran laws governing the

lobster industry, including Resolution 030-95. In a second letter,

dated February 25, 1999, the director general confirmed that the

lobsters “ha[d] been illegally transported in violation of the Fish-

ing Law, the Industrial and Hygienic Sanitary Inspection Regula-

tion for Fish Products and Resolution No. 030-95” and included

copies of the laws. The director general further stated the he sup-

ported all efforts “to legally prosecute natives or legalized Ameri-

cans that violate the articles of the Lacey Act.” The letter was cop-

ied to the minister and vice minister of the SAG. In addition, SAG

Minister Guillermo Alvarado Downing confirmed in an affidavit

that Secretary General Paz could “provide the necessary advice

about and explanation of the enforcement and validity of Honduran

laws, and especially the fisheries laws enforced by this Ministry.”

Thus, it is clear that the government conducted its investigation

properly through the Honduran officials who were responsible for

interpreting, enforcing, and applying the fishing laws of Honduras.

23a

their prior determinations of foreign law solely upon the ba-

sis of the foreign government’s new position. There must be

some finality with representations of foreign law by foreign

governments. Given the inevitable political changes that take

place in foreign governments, if courts were required to

maintain compliance with a foreign government’s position,

we would be caught up in the endless task of redetermining

foreign law.

In this case, the government solicited and received the as-

sistance of the SAG and the DIGEPESCA during the investi-

gation of the legality of the lobster shipments. From the ear-

liest stages of the investigation until after the defendants

were convicted, the statements from the SAG were consistent

with the government’s understanding of the laws. After the

defendants were convicted, however, certain events in Hon-

duras induced the Honduran government to refute its original

statements. The newly issued statements and opinions of

Honduran officials, however, do not persuade us that the dis-

trict court erred in its determination that the Honduran laws

at issue were valid and enforced during the time period cov-

ered by the indictment.

By our decision today, we do not mean to impinge upon

any foreign government’s sovereignty. Honduras has every

right to invalidate and repeal the laws at issue in this case.

The district courts and the government of the United States,

however, have the right to rely upon the Honduran govern-

ment’s original verifications of its laws. We must have con-

sistency and reliability from foreign governments with re-

spect to the validity of their laws. Otherwise, there never

could be any assurance when undertaking a Lacey Act prose-

cution for violations of foreign law that a conviction will not

be invalidated at some later date if the foreign government

changes its laws. Acceptance of the Honduran government’s

current interpretation of its laws as determinative of the va-

lidity of the laws would set the foundation for future Lacey

ecstatic

24a

Act defendants to seek post-conviction invalidation of the

underlying foreign laws. Although such is not the case here,

it is not difficult to imagine a Lacey Act defendant in the fu-

ture, who has the means and connections in a foreign coun-

try, lobbying and prevailing upon that country’s officials to

invalidate a particular law serving as the basis for his convic-

tion in the United States. Such a scenario would completely

undermine the purpose of the Lacey Act. There would cease

to be any reason to enforce the Lacey Act, at least with re- ©

spect to foreign law violations, if every change of position by

a foreign government as to the validity of its laws could in-

validate a conviction.

Thus, we conclude that the postconviction shift in the

Honduran government’s position regarding the validity of its

laws is not determinative as to whether the laws were valid at

the time the lobsters were imported into the United States.

We now examine each law in turn to determine whether each

was valid during the time period covered by the indictment.

Resolution 030-95

Resolution 030-95, the law establishing the 5.5-inch size

limit for lobsters, provides for sanctions for noncompliance

with its terms. See Resolucion No. 030-95, Dec. 5, 1995, La

Gaceta, Jan. 4, 1996. The defendants argue that Resolution

030-95 never was a binding law,”° because it was not issued

in accordance with Honduran constitutional procedure.

6 This argument is inconsistent with McNab’s prior ac-

knowledgment of the validity of the 5.5-inch size limit and his in-

structions to his lobster boat captains to abide by it. In a letter to

his fishing boat captains, dated October 28, 1999, McNab advised

that “[iJt is absolutely prohibited to capture lobsters under the size

allowed by the Law and/or eggbearing lobsters.... You will only

keep those tobsters measuring more than 5.5-inches.” A second

[Footnote continued on next page]

25a

The basis for the defendants’ argument that Resolution

030-95 never was a valid law is an opinion from the Hondu-

ran’ Court of the First Instance of Administrative Law.”’ In

May of 2001 the Honduran administrative law court found

that Resolution 030-95 had been promulgated through an in-

correct procedure and ordered that the resolution was “en-

tirely voided, but this is only for purposes of [its] annulment

and future inapplicability: This Resolution does not confer

any right to claims.” R. at 5:324 Ex. B (emphasis added).

Subsequently, the Honduran Court of Appeals for Adminis-

trative Law affirmed the lower court’s decision invalidating

Resolution 030-95. R. at 1 Supp.:415 Ex. C.

[Footnote continued from previous page]

letter was sent to the fishing boat captains by the general manager

of McNab’s company on July 31, 2000. The captains were “re-

minded to comply with the sizes and weights that the lobster

caught must fulfill, which is 5 % inches.”

Furthermore, throughout the investigation and after the trial,

Honduran officials repeatedly confirmed that Resolution 030-95

was a valid and binding law. The director general of the DIGEP-

ESCA confirmed the size limit requirement in three separate let-

ters. Resolution 030-95 was cited by several Honduran officials as _

a valid and binding law during two trips to Honduras by NMFS

agents, one before and one after the defendants’ trial. Secretary

General Paz testified as to the validity of Resolution 030-95 during

the pretrial foreign law hearing. Thus, it is evident that Resolution

030-95 was considered binding by those responsible for its en-

forcement.

*” After the trial in the district court had begun, McNab filed

a petition in the Honduran Court of the First Instance of Adminis-

trative Law, seeking to annul Resolution 030-95 on the grounds

that the resolution had not been signed by the Honduran president

before being issued and that it should have been issued as a decree

rather than as a resolution.

26a

There are conflicting opinions from Honduran officials as

to the effect of the court’s annulment of Resolution 030-95

on the defendants’ convictions.” While we certainly respect

28 The affidavit of the assistant attorney general of Honduras

indicates that the decision annulling Resolution 030-95 does not

apply retroactively and does not legalize the shipments of under-

sized lobsters retroactively. The ettorney general of Honduras,

however, offers an alternative explanation for the prospective lan-

guage in the court’s decision that favors the defendants. He con-

tends that Resolution 030-95 was annulled ab initio, that it never

was a valid law and, therefore, cannot serve as a basis for the de-

fendants’ convictions. Although the dissent accepts his explana-

tion that Resolution 030-95 never was binding and that the pro-

spective language merely protects the Honduran government from

civil liability, we believe that the attorney general is extracting

meaning from the Honduran court’s decision that is not supported

by the language of the opinion. In addition, although a report from

the Honduran national human rigits commissioner advised that

Secretary General Paz’s testimony be disqualified as legal error

and that Resolution 030-95 be declared void retroactively, a subse-

quent meeting between the commissioner and an NMFS agent re-

vealed that the commissioner was unaware of the factual back-

ground of the prosecution at the tine he rendered his report. Fur-

thermore, the commissioner said that he felt “pressured” by

McNab’s representatives to issue a quick decision.

McNab points to the statemeat of SAG Minister Downing to

support his assertion that aside from Article 96 of the Honduran

Constitution, the Honduran appdlate court’s decision mandates

retroactivity. Downing bases his opinion that the invalidation ap-

plies retroactively upon an inexplicable assertion that the Hondu-

ran appellate court’s opinion “expands” the Honduran Court of the

First Instance of Administrative Law’s opinion and somehow

mandates retroactivity. We, however, find nothing in the Hondu-

[Footnote continued on next page]

|

27a

the opinions of the Honduran officials, we base our determi-

nation that Resolution 030-95 was valid during the time pe-

riod covered by the indictment upon the Honduran court’s

opinion. The Honduran court clearly stated that Resolution

030-95 was annulled for prospective application only, and we

assume that the Honduran court meant what it said. Al-

though we recognize that Resolution 030-95 is now invalid,

we see nothing in the Honduran court’s opinion to indicate

that the nullification should be applied retroactively.” In

fact, the decision mandates prospective application.*° Thus,

[Footnote continued from previous page]

ran appellate court’s decision requiring retroactivity, because the

Honduran appellate court issued a summary affirmance.

°° We note that with the permission and approval of the min-

ister of the SAG, both Secretary General Paz and SAG Legal Ad-

visor Jose Bernardo Torres Umanzor confirmed that the Honduran

government continued to enforce Resolution 030-95 as a valid and

binding law while the appeal was pending before the Honduran

Court of Appeals for Administrative Law. They also explained

that any annulment of Resolution 030-95 would not be retroactive,

because the Honduran court’s judgment pertained to an administra-

tive matter, not a criminal matter.

°° We briefly address the defendants’ argument that the Hon-

duran Constitution requires that the invalidation of Resolution 030-

95 be applied retroactively in this case. Article 96 of the Honduran

Constitution provides, “The Law does not have retroactive effect,

except in penal matters when the new law favors the delinquent or

the person that is prosecuted.” Constitucién de la Republica de

Honduras art. 96. Article 96, however, has no application in this

case. The reason that we look to foreign law in Lacey Act prose-

cutions is to determine what constitutes illegal conduct. At the

time of the defendants’ conduct, harvesting lobsters under 5.5

inches was a violation of Resolution 030-95. The fact that Hondu-

ras now may not hold the defendants liable for past shipments that

[Foomote continued on next page]

28a

Resolution 030-95 is a valid predicate for the defendants’

convictions.”

[Footnote continued from previous page]

contained undersized lobsters does not change the fact that those

shipments violated then-valid Honduran laws and the Lacey Act.

The government’s evidence, both pretrial and posttrial, indi-

cates that because the Honduran court’s judgment about Resolu-

tion 030-95 involved an administrative matter and not a is a crimi-

na! matter it has no retroactive effect. Although McNab’s evi-

dence, submitted postconviction, may indicate a contrary view, it

is clear that a consensus has not been reached on this issue in Hon-

duras. Nevertheless, we still must determine the best reading of

the laws. See United States v. Mitchell, 985 F.2d 1275, 1281 (4th

Cir. 1993) (“Perhaps, as is the case with many of our own laws, a

consensus has not yet been reached in Pakistan. Yet we are

charged with determining the best reading of the laws.”).

In our judgment, the government’s evidence and a plain lan-

guage reading of Article 96 require us to find that Article 96 does

not apply in this case and that the invalidation of Resolution 030-

95 applies prospectively. Article 96 expressly provides that “[t]he

Law does not have retroactive effect.” This is consistent with the

Honduran court’s judgment that the invalidation of Resolution

030-95 be applied prospectively. The only exception under Article

96 is a “new law” in criminal matters.

McNab’s view requires a finding that “[t]he Law” in Article

96 applies to judicial declarations of the invalidity of an existing

law as opposed to the enactment or promulgation of a “new law.”

The language of Article 96 does not support this view. In the sec-

ond clause of the sentence, Article 96 specifically refers to a “new

law” that favors the accused. It does not refer to the absence of a

law or a declaration that a law is invalid.

31 The dissent concedes that reversal of the defendants’ con-

victions is not required if the invalidation applies prospectively.

[Footnote continued on next page]

29a

Regulation 0008-93

Regulation 0008-93 was issued pursuant to Decree 40

and required that lobsters be inspected and processed in

Honduras prior to exportation. See Acuerdo No. 0008-93,

Jan. 13, 1993, La Gaceta, Apr. 7, 1993. In January of 1995

the Congreso Nacional enacted Decree 157-94, which re-

pealed and replaced several existing statutes, including De-

cree 40. See Decreto No. 157-94, Nov. 15, 1994, La Gaceta,

Jan. 13, 1995. In December of 1999 the Secretaria de Recur-

sos Naturales y Ambiente issued Accord 1081-99, an admin-

istrative regulation that contained updated inspection and

processing requirements and expressly repealed Regulation

0008-93. See Acuerdo No. 1081-99, Sept. 23, 1999, La

Gaceta, Dec. 2, 1999.

On the basis of their posttrial research, the defendants ar-

gue that Regulation 0008-93 was repealed along with Decree

40 in 1995.*° They contend that the repeal of Decree 40 op-

[Footnote continued from previous page]

Further, the dissent concedes that “the language of the Honduran

Court could be construed to mean prospective application only.”

We conclude that the language of the Honduran court opinions

requires prospective application only and that nothing else in the

record mandates otherwise.

* The defendants also raise a second challenge with respect

to the propriety of Regulation 0008-93 as a Lacey Act predicate.

They argue that even if Regulation 0008-93 were not repealed until

1999 it falls outside the scope of the Lacey Act, because it is not a

law regulating the taking, possessing, transportation, or sale of

wildlife. We disagree. When Congress amended the Lacey Act in

1981, it expressly stated that the Act covers laws “relating or refer-

ring to fish or wildlife or plants.” S. Rep. No. 97-123, at 5; see

also United States v. Lewis, 240 F.3d 866, 869 (10th Cir. 2001)

(per curiam); Lee, 937 F.2d at 1392. Accordingly, our review of

[Footnote continued on next page]

30a

erated to repeal the regulations promulgated under it, includ-

ing Regulation 0008-93. The defendants argue that the auto-

matic repeal of regulations triggered by the repeal of the stat-

ute under which those regulations were promulgated is a

longstanding principle of Honduran law, and they rely upon a

recent interpretive decree by the Congreso Nacional for sup-

port. See Decreto No. 198-2001, Nov. 1, 2001. That decree

expressly provides that “the express total or partial repeal of

a law leaves without legal value or effect the general regula-

tions and the specific regulations totally ... that the Execu-

tive Branch through the respective Secretariat of State has

issued to implement the provisions of the repealed Law... .”

Id.

We are unconvinced by the defendants’ argument for two

reasons. First, we question why there is a need to issue an

interpretive decree if the concept of an automatic repeal of

regulations is such a longstanding principle of Honduran

law? Second, Regulation 0008-93 was repealed expressly

[Footnote continued from previous page]

the regulation confirms that it unquestionably relates to fish and is

within the scope of the Lacey Act.

33. The evidence in the record contradicts this assertion and

establishes that the Honduran government regarded the hygiene

regulation as valid between the time of the 1995 repeal of Decree

40 and the 1999 express repeal of Regulation 0008-93. The March

of 2000 statements by the Honduran legal advisors described the

processing requirements mandated by Regulation 0008-93 and

Decree 157-94, the very same decree that the defendants contend

repealed Regulation 0008-93 in 1995. At the pretrial foreign law

hearing, the SAG’s Secretary General Paz testified as to the valid-

ity of the processing and inspection requirements. Secretary Gen-

eral Paz stated that Regulation 0008-93 continued to be enforced in

Honduras, because it was only tacitly repealed in 1995. =

Shee PB och TRB A Rl OOS

3la

by the Secretaria de Recursos Naturales y Ambiente in 1999

when it issued new rules for lobster fishing. There would be

no need to repeal Regulation 0008-93 expressly in 1999 if it

was repealed automatically in 1995.

Furthermore, the Honduran Civil Code provides support

for the proposition that Regulation 0008-93 remained in ef-

fect until the express repeal in 1999.** According to the Civil

Code, a law may be repealed totally or partially by another

law. Codigo Civil art. 42. Such a repeal may be express or

tacit; it is express when the new law expressly provides that

it repeals the previous one, and it is tacit when the new law’s

provisions cannot be reconciled with the previous law.

Codigo Civil art. 43. Significantly, a “tacit repeal leaves in

effect in the previous law anything not in conflict with the

provisions of the new law, even though both versions may

cover the same matters.” Codigo Civil art. 44. The 1995 de-

cree did not repeal Regulation 0008-93 expressly, which

means that any repeal of the regulation was tacit. As Regula-

tion 0008-93 did not conflict with the 1995 decree, it re-

mained in effect until the 1999 regulation expressly repealed

it. Thus, the district court properly determined that Regula-

tion 0008-93 was valid during the time period covered by the

indictment.

34

Not only does the Honduran Civil Code support the dis-

trict court’s determination that Regulation 0008-93 was valid dur-

ing the time period covered by the indictment, the defendants’ in-

terpretation leads to an illogical result. An automatic repeal of

Regulation 0008-93 in 1995 would have created a four-year win-

dow during which there were no sanitary regulations for lobster

fishing. This would have been an odd result considering that the

1995 decree issued by the Congreso Nacional was intended to

strengthen the hygiene requirements.

32a

Article 70(3)

Article 70(3) of the Fishing Law prohibits the harvesting

<=—__ or destruction of lobster eggs. See Decreto No. 154, May 19,

1959, La Gaceta, June 17, 1959. The defendants argue that

Article 70(3) does not prohibit the destruction or collection

of lobster eggs for profit. They contend that the district

court’s interpretation that the law prohibited the harvesting of

the egg-bearing species themselves was erroneous.”

We fail to see how Article 70(3) can be read other than to

prohibit the destruction or harvesting of the eggs of lobsters

for profit. The destruction of eggs to sell the female lobsters

appears to be a clear violation of Article 70(3), which pro-

vides for punishment by fine or imprisonment to “(t]hose

who destroy or harvest the eggs, or the offspring of fish, che-

lonians or other aquatic species for profit.” Jd. The defen-

dants’ argument regarding the legality of capturing egg-

bearing lobsters is contrary to the piain language of Article

70(3).*°

35 Lobsters have swimming legs on their abdomens called

swimmerets, which female lobsters use to hold eggs. 7 The New

Encyclopedia Britannica 430 (15th ed. 1998). The swimmerets of

some of the lobsters in the seized shipment were clipped off and

the eggs were removed.

36 Not only is their interpretation contrary to the plain lan-

guage of Article 70(3), it directly conflicts with McNab’s own in-

structions to his boat captains that harvesting egg-bearing lobsters

was prohibited. The October 1999 letter from McNab to his fish-

ing boat captains provided that “i]t is absolutely prohibited to cut

the pleopods of the Lobsters to remove any eggs . . - All the lob-

sters with eggs will be returned to the sea without any exception.

For that purpose, you will have to instruct the fisherman who work

in the boats on how to identify them.” The letter from McNab’s

general manager to the captains in July of 2000 instructed that they

[Footnote continued on next page]

33a

The defendants also argue that Article 70(3) was repealed

retroactively in February of 2001 by the enactment of Decree

245-2000 by the Congreso Nacional. As stated above, our

duty with respect to each of the Honduran laws is to deter-

mine whether they were valid during the time period covered

by the indictment. Whether the 2001 amendment to Article

70(3) repealed the prohibition against harvesting egg-bearing

lobsters for profit is not our concern. Thus, we reject the de-

fendants’ argument that Article 96 of the Honduran Constitu-

tion requires that we apply the 2001 amendment retroactively

for the reasons stated with respect to Resolution 030-95. Ac-

cordingly, we conclude that Article 70(3) was a proper predi-

cate for the defendants’ convictions.

Thus, the defendants’ newfound support from the Hondu-

ran government does not change the fact that during the time

period covered by the indictment, the laws at issue were

valid. Although we certainly respect the Honduran govern-

ment’s position, the recent developments since the trial and

the newly rendered opinions from Honduran officials cannot

turn what were illegal lobster shipments into legal lobster

shipments retroactively.

Having determined that Resolution 030-95, Regulation

0008-93, and Article 70(3) were valid during the time period

covered by the indictment and thus were proper predicates

for the Lacey Act charges, we now briefly address the defen-

dants’ remaining issues on appeal. The defendants argue that

(1) the district court abused its discretion by excluding evi-

dence at trial relating to McNab’s “knowledge” of Honduran

[Footnote continued from previous page]

may “not capture lobsters that are in their reproductive phase or

gravid lobsters (with eggs). It is absolutely prohibited to remove

egg sacs from the lobster to remove its oe ....”

34a

law; (2) the district court made several errors with respect to

the jury instructions; (3) there was insufficient evidence to

support the jury’s verdicts; and (4) the district court erred in

failing to postpone Schoenwetter and Blandford’s sentencing

and in determining the length of their sentences. After thor-

oughly reviewing the record, we find that these issues are

without merit.

CONCLUSION

Thus, we conclude that the Honduran laws used as the

underlying predicates for the defendants’ convictions fall

within the scope of the Lacey Act and were valid and legally

binding during the time period covered by the indictment.

The remaining issues raised by the defendants were decided

properly by the district court or are without merit. We there-

fore AFFIRM the defendants’ convictions and sentences.

35a

FAY, Circuit J udge, dissenting:

The majority opinion is both thorough and scholarly in

dealing with this complicated matter. With some hesitation, I

most respectfully dissent from that portion of the majority

opinion upholding the validity of Honduran Resolution 030-

95. The theme of the majority opinion is that the government

of Honduras has “shifted” its position. The question for de-

termination is phrased as being complicated by the changed

or new position of the Honduran government. The majority

then decides this issue within the framework of whether or

not we are freeto follow the Honduran government’s original

position.

Try as I might, I simply cannot read this record that way.

There was never unanimity nor agreement concerning the

validity of Resolution 030-95. That question was hotly con-

tested. But, throughout the course of this litigation, the reso-

lution of that question was based upon the weight given by

the trial judge to the evidence presented by the U.S. govern-

ment during a pretrial hearing on foreign law. At that time,

the Honduran courts had not ruled. Now they have.

It should come as no surprise to anyone that some of the

“expert” witnesses were correct and some were wrong. Nor

should we be surprised that it was the courts of Honduras

which ultimately answered the question. That is the way it

works in Honduras and in the United States of America.

Simply stated, it is my position that we are bound by the rul-

ings of the Honduran courts declaring Resolution 030-95 null

and void. This being the case, the defendants convictions

must be reversed since one of the Honduran laws relied upon

by the jury in finding guilt has now been found to be a nul-

lity.

Most respectfully, I disagree with the majority’s conclu-

sion that the government of Honduras has changed its posi-

tion. Government officials testified on both sides of the issue

36a

before the district court. There was no one official voice for

the government of Honduras. But, there is now. The Hondu-

ran courts have ruled and the Honduran Embassy has filed an

amicus brief advising us of the Honduran government’s posi-

tion—Resolution 030-95 is null and void and was so during

the critical time charged in the second superceding indict-

ment. That is the only official government position I am

aware of in this record.

We all agree that the key component to any alleged Lacey

Act § 3372(a)(2)(A) violation is the commission of a predi-

cate State or Foreign offense concerning fish or wildlife. We

further agree that, for purposes of these appeals, three predi-

cate offenses are pertinent. Of those three, my concern goes

to Resolution 030-95 concerning the minimum legal size of

harvested lobster tails. As the majority correctly notes, the

district court properly conducted a foreign law hearing to de-

termine whether Resolution 030-95 was, in fact, a valid Hon-

duran law during the time period charged in the second su-

perseding indictment. Over the testimony of an expert in

Honduran law, a Honduran law professor and former Minis-

try of Justice, the then Attorney-General of the Republic of

Honduras, the Honduras Bar Association and others, the Dis-

trict Court, based upon the testimony of one lower-level

Honduran government official, Liliana Paz, Secretary Gen-

eral of the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock, concluded

that Resolution 030-95 was a valid law.

Following trial and conviction, defendant David Hensen

McNab (“McNab”) challenged the validity of Resolution

030-95 in the Court of First Instance of Administrative Law

in Honduras (“Honduran Court”). That challenge was op-

posed by an attorney representing the government of Hondu-

ras. At the conclusion of that proceeding, the Honduran

Court declared Resolution 030-95 to be null and void. Spe-

cifically, on May 23, 2001, the Honduran Court found:

37a

First: . .. [Resolution 030-95] [does] not con-

form to law by virtue of having violated the

legal code at the time [it] [was] issued. Sec-

ond: the challenged [Resolution]..., No.

030-95 of December 5, 1995, [is] entirely

voided, but this is only for purposes of [its]

annulment and future inapplicability: This

Resolution does not confer any right to

claims.

R. at 5:324 Ex. B. The Honduran Court premised its deci-

sion on the fact that Resolution 030-95 was not properly is-

sued by the President of the Republic of Honduras and au-

thorized by the proper Secretary or Under Secretary of State

as is required under Honduran law. Subsequently, the gov-

ernment of Honduras appealed the Honduran Court’s ruling

to the Court of Appeals of Administrative Matters (“Hondu-

ran Court of Appeals”) which on October 11, 2001, con-

firmed the correctness of the Honduran Court’s decision.

The rulings of the Honduran courts do raise a second

question as to whether or not the ruling applies retroactively.

As quoted above, the language of the Honduran Court could

be construed to mean prospective application only. That is

the position the majority takes in this case. Therefore, the

critical question before this court is whether or not Resolu-

tion 030-95 was valid at the time of the defendants’ conduct

as charged in the second superceding indictment. This ques-

tion is determined by whether the invalidation of Resolution

030-95 is to be applied retroactively or prospectively. If the

invalidation of Resolution 030-95 is to be applied retroac-

tively, it seems to me that reversal of the defendants’ convic-

tions is mandated. If invalidation is to be only applied pro-

spectively, reversal is not required.

We all agree that we review a district court’s interpreta-

tion of foreign law de novo. United States v. Gecas, 120

F.3d 1419, 1424 (11th Cir. 1997) (en banc). We also agree

38a

that under certain circumstances an underlying Lacey Act

predicate offense need not be independently prosecutable.

See United States v. Borden, 10 F.3d 1058 (4th Cir. 1993)

(affirming Lacey Act conviction where the enforcement of

underlying predicate state law was barred by applicable state

statute of limitations but not by federal statute of limitations).

However, Borden, or any similar case, is fundamentally dif-

ferent than this case where the predicate substantive criminal

law supporting the Lacey Act convictions cannot be en-

forced, not because of a procedural bar, but because the law

itself has been invalidated by the courts through nullification.

In other words, what was thought to be a crime turns out to

not be a crime under Honduran law. It bears noting that had

U.S. law been implicated, reversal of the convictions would

not be in question and the case would easily be resolved in

the defendants’ favor. In the United States, where a substan-

tive criminal law is subsequently declared to be invalid by

the courts, any convictions thereon would be reversed.

Further troubling is the fact that as a matter of Honduran

constitutional law, hese defendants could not be tried and

convicted for violation of Resolution 030-95 in Honduras. In

Honduras, as in the United States, any criminally enforceable

statute later declared to be invalid by the courts is retroac-

tively applied to any criminal defendant. Article 96 of the

Honduran Constitution specifically provides, “[t]he Law does

not have retroactive effect, except in penal matters when the

new law favors the delinquent [(i.e., criminally convicted)] or

the person that is prosecuted.” Constitucién de la Republica

de Honduras art. 96.

The majority makes note of Article 96 but simply asserts

its inapplicability by concluding that “[a]t the of time the de-

fendants’ conduct, harvesting lobsters under 5.5 inches was a

violation of Resolution 030-95.” As stated above, if the in-

validation of Resolution 030-95 is retroactively applied, as I

believe it must be, then at the time of the defendants’ con-

39a

duct, there would not have been a violation of Resolution

030-95. To this point, there are authorities in the record

which I find particularly relevant in deciding whether the

Honduran Court’s invalidation of Resolution 030-95 should

be retroactively applied.

We start with the official voice of Honduras in the United

States. The country of Honduras, through its Embassy in

Washington, D.C., has filed an amicus brief stating un-

equivocally that retroactive application is the law of Hondu-

ras. The current Attorney General of the Republic of Hondu-

ras, Sergio Zavala Leiva, the National Human Rights Com-

missioner of the Republic of Honduras, Leo Valladares

Lanza,’ the current Secretary of State of the Offices of Agri-

culture and Livestock, Guillermo Alvarado Downing and

Secretary Downing’s subordinate and star U.S. government

witness before the district court, Secretary General of the

Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock, Liliana Paz, all sup-

port the position that retroactive application is required. The

only witness presented suggesting that retroactive application

is not required is Juan Arnaldo Hernandez Espinoza, an As-

sistant Prosecutor General of the Public Ministry of the Re-

public of Honduras.” Thus, the overwhelming evidence be-

' Although his opinion was never altered, amended or

changed in any manner, the majority notes that a National Marine

and Fisheries Service agent who interviewed Commissioner Lanza

indicated that Commissioner Lanza revealed that he felt “‘pres-

sured’ by McNab’s representatives to issue a quick decision.”

> In his opinion, Assistant Attorney General Espinoza

(“Espinoza”) indicates that there is no retroactive application of the

invalidation of Resolution 030-95 because “the sanction to which

[the defendants’] conduct applies is based on a measure that origi-

nates in the Fishing Law and not in the activity of the Executive

Branch.” Appellee’s Addendum of Foreign Law Materials at tab

[Footnote continued on next page]

40a

fore this court is squarely on the side of the retroactive appli-

cation of the invalidation of Resolution 030-95. I can come

to no other conclusion.

As to the appropriate interpretation of the Honduran

Court’s use of the terms “annulment” and “future inapplica-

bility,” Attorney General Leiva provides the most reasoned

and reasonable explanation. Attorney General Leiva ex-

plains:

The reason that the laws of Honduras and, in

particular, the Court of Administrative Ap-

peals, with its specific language in its judg-

ment, only set forth its future inapplicability is

to guarantee the legal security of the State,

protecting it from damages and losses that

could have been caused by the enforcement of

an act that is null and void as a matter of law.

(Leiva Decl. § 8). J

[Footnote continued from previous page]

1. Upon closer examination, it becomes clear that Espinoza’s

opinion is premised on the assumption that the Fishing Law, not

Resolution 030-95, defines the minimum lobster harvest size.

Therefore, invalidation of Resolution 030-95, a resolution imple-

mented pursuant to the authority of the Fishing Law, is without

import and the question of retroactivity is rendered irrelevant.

This opinion is mistaken for two critical reasons. Firstly,

Espinoza’s opinion ignores the fact that, for purposes of U.S. law,

the predicate act the defendants were charged with violating is

Resolution 030-95, not the Fishing Law. Secondly, Espinoza’s

opinion ignores the fact that, with regard to minimum lobster har-

vest size, the Fishing Law is silent and directs such restrictions to

be fashioned pursuant to regulation. See Decreto No. 154, May

19, 1959, La Gaceta, June 9, 1959, art. 70.

4la

Apparently, in Honduras the government may be subject

to civil liability for the enforcement of a subsequently de-

clared invalid law Therefore, in the context of Honduran

law, the Honduran Court’s language makes sense and simply

seeks to limit the government’s liability and protect its treas-

ury. The precise language of the Honduran Court supports

this interpretation. Following the use of “annulment” and

“future inapplicability” is a colon followed by the following

illuminating language, “[t]his Resolution does not confer any

right to claims.” Thus, Attorney General Leiva’s explana-

tion, as compared to the other evidence before the court, is

most compelling. Furthermore, this court should not inter-

pret Honduran law in a vacuum. As stated above, in Hondu-

ras, Article 96 of the Honduran Constitution retroactively

applies the invalidation of Resolution 030-95 to any criminal

defendant. The Honduran Court certainly would have been

aware of the existence and effect of Article 96 when crafting

the language and scope of its opinion and this court should

seek to interpret the Honduran Court’s opinion in its proper

context.

The majority advances the important principle of finality

in support of its decision. As a general proposition, I agree

that finality is an important aspect of American jurispru-

dence. However, in the context of an invalidated substantive

criminal law which forms the basis of a criminal prosecution

or conviction, reliance on the concept of finality is mis-

placed. As stated above, under both U.S. and Honduran law,

retroactive application is warranted for a criminal defendant

charged or convicted of a subsequently declared invalid

criminal statute. Cf, Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333,

346, 94 S. Ct. 2298, 2305, 41 L. Ed. 2d 109, 119 (1974) (in

the context of a petition for relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 2255, concluding that if conviction and punishment are for

an act not made criminal by the law, “[t]here can be no room

for doubt that such a circumstance inherently results in a

42a

”

complete miscarriage of justice ....” (Internal quotations

omitted)).

For emphasis, I repeat again that the majority opinion

discusses extensively and is strongly critical of the changed

position or shift by the Honduran government. While that

terminology may give comfort to the majority, it is simp]

not accurate. While various government officials gave con-

flicting opinions regarding the validity of Resolution 030-95,

this was before the Honduran courts ruled. The Honduran

courts have now ruled and both agree, Resolution 030-95 was

null and void. The majority casts this in an unfavorable light

akin to something sinister. In my opinion, this is no different

than what occurs routinely in our country. Attorneys, and

even the Attorney General of a state or the United States, of-

ten express opinions about statutes only to find that after a

court challenge, they were wrong. That is all that happened

here. Some of the experts were right; some were wrong.

But, the Honduran courts have now spoken and there is sim-

ply no doubt that Resolution 030-95 is null and void as if it

never existed.

To suggest that the newly issued statements and opinions

of Honduran officials do not carry the weight of the earlier

statements is a strange position for members of the judiciary.

The so-called “shift in position” is the result of lawful litiga-

tion within the courts of a foreign nation. I think we would

be shocked should the tables be reversed and a foreign nation

simply ignored one of our court rulings because it caused

some frustration or inconvenience.

The evidence in this case supports the conclusion that the

defendants were guilty of knowingly violating the law at the

time they harvested, shipped and sold these “shorts.” The

prosecutors did their very best to establish the law of Hondu-

ras which is essential under the Lacey Act. It is easy to un-

derstand the frustration inherent in this present situation.

But, the Lacey Act, by its very terms, is dependent upon the

43a

laws of a foreign sovereign. In this situation, we do not con-

trol the outcome of challenges made to those underlying

laws. No one has suggested that McNab was not exercising

his lawful rights as a citizen of Honduras or that the courts of

Honduras were without authority to issue the decisions they

did.

Most reluctantly, I therefore dissent.

APPENDIX B

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF

AMERICA

v. CRIMINAL ACTION

NO. 1:00-00079-(1, 2, 3 & 4)-RV

DAVID HENSON [Filed October 12, 2000]

MCNAB, ROBERT D.

BLANDFORD, |

ABNER SCHOEN-

WETTER, DIANA H.

HUANG

ORDER

This matter is before the court on the following docu-

ments:

1. “Motion for Pretrial Determination of Foreign and State

Law Pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b) and 26.1 and

Memorandum in Support Thereof,” (doc. 46), together

with evidentiary materials, (in redwell), filed by the gov-

ernment;

2. “Motion to Dismiss Counts One through Twelve and

Counts Twenty-Eight Through Forty-Three of the In-

45a

dictment,” (doc. 53), filed by defendant David Henson

McNab:'

3. “Opposition To Defendant McNab’s Motion to Dismiss

Counts One Through Twelve and Counts Twenty-Eight

Through Forty-Three of the Indictment,” (doc. 87), filed

. by the government;

4. “Supplement/Amendment to ... Motion for Pretrial De-

termination of Foreign and State Law and Memorandum

in Support Thereof,” (doc. 100), filed by the government;

5. “Notice of Intent to Offer in Evidence Foreign Records,”

(doc. 105), filed by the government;

6. “Response to the Government’s Motion for Pretrial De-

termination of Foreign and State Law,” (doc. 110), filed

by defendant McNab;

7. “Renewed Motion for Evidentiary Hearing on Govern-

ment’s Motion for Determination of Foreign Law” (doc.

113), filed by defendant McNab;

8. “Opposition to Pretrial Determination of Foreign and

State Law,” (doc. 115), together with a supporting brief,

(doc. 116), filed by defendant Robert D. Blandford;

9. “Notice of Intent to Offer in Evidence Foreign Records,”

(doc. 117), filed by defendant McNab;

10. “Reply to Defendant [McNab’s] Response to Motion for

Pretrial Determination for Foreign and State Law,” (doc.

122), filed by the government;

' The motion to dismiss is premised on multiple grounds,

including the contention that “the transactions are not violative of

any valid law, treaty, or regulation in Honduras.” Mot. To Dism.,

q2.

46a

11. “Notice of Intent to Offer in Evidence Foreign Records,”

(doc. 125), filed by the government;

12. “Motion to Dismiss the Superseding Indictment,” (doc.

151), filed by defendant McNab;

13. “Brief in Support of ... Response to the Government’s

Motion for Pretrial Determination of Foreign and State

Law and In Support of .. . Motion to Dismiss the Super-

seding Indictment,” (doc. 178), filed by defendant

McNab;

14.“Summary Brief on Pretrial Determination of Foreign

and State Law,” (doc. 182), filed by the government;

15. “Summary of Significant Evidence Supporting its Posi-

tion Regarding the Determination of Foreign Law,” (doc.

185), filed by the government;

16. “Supplemental Opposition to Government’s Motion for

Determination of Foreign Law and In Support of Defen-

dant McNab’s Motion to Dismiss,” (doc. 186), filed by

defendant McNab:

17. “Notice of Filing of Expert Supplementary Affidavit,”

: (doc. 194), filed by defendant McNab;

18. “Supplemental Brief Regarding Foreign Law Issue,”

(doc. 199), filed by defendant McNab; and

19. All exhibits admitted during the September 27-29, 2000

hearing. |

INTRODUCTION

In this criminal proceeding, defendants are charged with,

inter alia, conspiring to violate and/or violating the Lacey

Act, 16 U.S.C. § 3371 et seg. Inter alia, the Lacey Act

makes it unlawful “to import, export, transport, sell, receive,

acquire, or purchase in interstate or foreign commerce any

fish .. . taken, posSessed, transported, or sold in violation of

any law or regulation of any State or in violation of any for-

47a

eign law.” 16 U.S.C. § 3372(2)(A). In this case, the gov-

ernment contends that defendants violated Honduran law in

various ways when they imported or conspired to import

spiny lobster tails and shrimp on multiple occasions over a

five-year period.” So that the court can adequately charge the

jury, the government requests the court to “determine” that

Honduran law:

(1) prohibits one to harvest, process, or

sell (including the sale/exportation of such

° The second superseding indictment also charges that some

of the defendants violated the Lacey Act by importing shrimp and

spiny lobsters in violation of Florida law, and the government has

requested the court to “determine” the relevant Florida law. As

stated on the record during the September 27-29 hearing, none of

the parties contest the validity or scope of the applicable Florida

law as set forth in the government's motion. There being no dis-

pute between the parties regarding the relevant Florida law, the

court concludes that Florida law prohibits:

l. the harvesting or possessing of any spiny lobster

(Panulirus argus) with a tail measurement less than 5 1/2

inches.

y the harvesting or possessing of egg-bearing spiny

lobster and/or the possessing of spiny lobster or spiny lob-

ster tails from which eggs, swimmerettes, or pleopods

have been removed or stripped. The practice of strip-

ping or otherwise molesting egg-bearing spiny lobster

in order to remove the eggs is also prohibited.

3. any person, firm, or corporation to deal in any

saltwater products, including lobster tails, without first

paying for and procuring a saltwater products dealer li-

cense. It is unlawful to sell, deliver, ship, or transport any

saltwater products without all invoices of such products

having thereon the wholesale dealer license number.

48a

lobster to a buyer outside Honduras for which

payment is, made directly or indirectly to a

Honduran citizen or company) any lobster the

tail of which measures less than five and one-

half (5 2) inches in length;

(2) prohibits one to harvest lobster com-

mercially between March 16 and July 31 of

years 1995, 1996 and 1998. In all other years,

the closed season runs from December 1

through April 30.

(3) prohibits one to harvest shrimp com-

mercially between February 1 and June 30 of

each year;

(4) prohibits one to harvest or destroy the

eggs of any aquatic species, including spiny

lobster, for profit; This includes a prohibition

against the tearing out or, in any other way

separating, the eggs from the female lobster,

for profit;

(5) prohibits one, commencing on the

sixth day after the beginning of the respective

lobster or shrimp closed season, to transport,

sell, store, or refrigerate lobster and/or shrimp

unless the lobster and shrimp were harvested

prior to the first day of the closed season;

(6) requires lobster and shrimp fishermen

to dock their vessels and unload their catch in

a Honduran port prior to exportation. This

duty may be fulfilled by the fishermen by ei-

ther docking the vessel that caught the lobster

or shrimp or transferring the catch to a li-

censed ship that in turn docks and unloads the

catch;

49a

(7) requires that businessmen and those

who use any kind of boat for fishing activities

or transportation of any fish species protected

by law, including lobsters, report in writing to

the governmental authorities the outcome of

their fishing trip. The captain of any fishing

boat has to report the departure and arrival of

the boat to governmental authorities, pointing

out places where the fishing was done, and the

species and amount caught.

(8) prohibits one to export lobster without

first processing/packing that lobster in Hondu-

ras which includes the packing of lobster into

boxes that have been paraffined and labeled

with (a) the business name of the firm that

makes the product, (b) the weight, (c) that it

was “inspected and approved of by the Hon-

duran Ministry of Natural Resources” and (d)

the number assigned to the processing com-

pany.

The government contends that these points of law are

mandated by certain Honduran statutes, regulations, and

resolutions. Except as noted below, defendants do not con-

test the government’s interpretation of the relevant Honduran

Statutes, regulations, and resolutions; rather, defendants’ pri-

mary contention is that the resolutions upon which the gov-

ernment relies do not satisfy the Honduran constitutional re-

quirements for resolutions and, therefore, are null and void.

The parties’ contentions and supporting evidence are dis-

cussed infra.’, *

* Defendants had asserted that they could not be indicted

under the Lacey Act when the underlying foreign law provides

[Footnote continued on next page]

50a

Over a 2 2-day period, the court conducted an eviden-

tiary hearing on the Honduran law issues. Additionally, the

court has reviewed the voluminous evidentiary material sub-

mitted by the parties before, during, and after the hearing.

After due consideration, the court makes the following de-

terminations of foreign law pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3505(b)’

and Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)° and 26.1.’

[Footnote continued from previous page]

only civil penalties or when the foreign government has not prose-

cuted them under the criminal penalties. Based on the reasons and

authorities cited by the government in its briefs, the court previ-

ously denied defendants’ motion to dismiss to the extent that it was

predicated on either of these two grounds.

* The government and defendant McNab have submitted a

tremendous amount of evidentiary material regarding Honduran

law. Given the time constraints on the court, the court cannot pos-

sibly address each item of evidence in this written order. Never-

theless, so the record is clear, the court notes that it has carefully

reviewed all of the materials submitted in English.

° ‘Title 18 U.S.C. § 3505 provides:

At the arraignment or as soon after the arraignment as

practicable, a party intending to offer in evidence under

this section a foreign record or regularly conducted activ-

ity shall provide written notice of that intention to each

other party. A motion opposing admission in evidence of

such record shall be made by the opposing party and de-

termined by the court before trial. Failure by a party to

file such a motion before trial shall constitute waiver of

objection to such record or duplicate, but the court for

cause shown may grant relief from the waiver.

° Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b) provides, inter alia:

[Footnote continued on next page]

Sla

DISCUSSION

Point of Law 1—Prohibition of harvesting lobster less than

5 1/2 inches in length

The government relies on Resolution No. 030-95 (De-

cember 5, 1995) to establish that Honduras law prohibits the

harvest and sale of lobster less than 5 1/2 inches in length.

That resolution provides in relevant part:

For the capture of lobster:

d) The minimum size for the capture of lobster

is 5.5 inches or 14.5 centimeters of abdominal

length.

Resolution No. 030-95, Third Provision

Point of Law 2—Closed season for harvesting of lobster

Point of Law 3—Closed season for harvesting of shnimp

The government relies on Decree No. 154, The Fishing

Law (May 19, 1959), Chapter V, Article 41, and Resolutions

[Footnote continued from previous page]

Any defense, objection, or request which is capable of de-

termination without the trial of the general issue may be

raised before trial by motion.

’ Fed. R. Crim. P. 26.1 provides:

A party who intends to raise an issue concerning the law of

a foreign country shall give reasonable written notice. The

court, in determining foreign law, may consider any

relevant material or source, including testimony,

whether or not submitted by a party or admissible un-

der the Federal Rules of Evidence. The court’s deter-

mination shall be treated as a ruling on a question of

law.

52a

No. 001-95 (January 14, 1995), No. 030-95 (December 5,

1995), and No. 031-97 (December 17, 1997), to establish that

Honduras law prohibits the harvest of lobster and shrimp dur-

ing closed seasons. The Fishing Law provides in relevant

part:

The closed season for fishing for shrimp and

lobster is fixed as the period between 1 De-

cember and 30 April of each year.

The Fishing Law, Chapter V, Article 41.

The three resolutions provide in relevant part:

FIRST: To establish closing season annually for the

capture of Shrimp [and] Lobster . . . in the At-

lantic Ocean, during the following periods:

a) Shrimp, from the lst of February to the

30th of June.

b) Lobster, from the 16th of March to the 31st

of July.

Resolution No. 001-95 (establishing the closed season for the

year 1995).

FIRST: To establish closing season annually for the

capture of all species of shrimp [and] lobster

...1n the Atlantic Ocean and in the coastal la-

goon system, during the following periods:

a) Shrimp, from the Ist of February to the

30th of June.

b) Lobster, from the 16th of March to the 31st

of July.

Resolution No. 030-95 (establishing the closed season for the

year 1996).

FIRST: To establish closing season for the capture of

shrimp [and] lobster .. . in the Caribbean Sea

and in the coastal lagoon system, during the

following time periods:

53a

a) Shrimp, from the lst of February to the

30th of June 1998.

b) Lobster, from the 16th of March to the 31st

of July 1988.

Resolution No. 031-97 (establishing the closed season for the

year 1998).

The government established that the resolutions were is-

sued by the Honduran Minister of the Department of Agricul-

ture and Livestock and were duly published in La Gaceta, the

official publication of the Republic of Honduras.

Defendants do not dispute the contents of the three reso-

lutions upon which the government relies to establish Points

of Law 1, 2, & 3; rather, they contend that the resolutions are

null and void. To support their contention, defendants rely

upon a number of legal opinions which the court has care-

fully reviewed.

Dr. Saul Litvinoff, a professor of law at Louisiana State

University, and Efrain Moncada Silva, a professor at the Na-

tional Autonomous University of Honduras and licensed

member of the Honduran bar, testified that the resolutions do

not meet the requirements of the Honduran Constitution in

order to have “a general binding, effect.” Aff. of Litvinoff,

p. 6. Specifically, Prof. Litvinoff testified that, under Arti-

cles 245 and 248 of the Honduran Constitution, to be valid

and binding, the documents must be 1) “issued in the form of

a regulation, 2) [] signed by the President and countersigned

by the departmental secretary, and 3) published in the official

form.” Jd. Prof. Salvia testified similarly.

The court has reviewed the cited portions of the Hondu-

ran Constitution and disagrees with the professors’ interpre-

tation thereof. Article 245 provides:

The President of the Republic has the

me general administration of the States. His

powers are: to issue accords and decrees and

54a

to issue regulations and resolutions in accor-

dance with law.

Article 248 provides:

The decrees, regulations, accords, orders,

and judgments of the President of the Repub-

lic must be authorized by the department sec-

retaries or their undersecretaries in proper

cases. If they fail to meet these require-

ments[,] they shall have no legal force.

As the court understands these two constitutional provi-

sions, the President of the Republic of Honduras is constitu-

tionally authorized to issue regulations and resolutions in ac-

cordance with law, and if he issues regulations, they must be

~authorized by the appropriate departmental secretary. How-

ever, these two provisions (which appear to be plain and

straightforward) do not state (or even suggest) that the presi-

dent is the only Honduran official legally authorized to issue

a resolution. Buttressing the court’s reading of these consti-

tutional provisions are two important facts. First, the gov-

ernment presented unrebutted testimony that other Honduran

departments (e.g., communications and banking) had issued

resolutions as a means of carrying out the laws governing

those industries. Second, the testimony of virtually every

witness asked was that everyone in the Honduran fishing in-

dustry, including defendant McNab and the government offi-

cials in the fishing industry, viewed the resolutions as legally

binding. Indeed, defendant McNab issued memoranda to his

boat captains reminding them of the lobster size limits.

Additionally, Liliana Paz, the General Secretary in the

Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock (the Honduran de-

partment responsible for the fishery management program),

testified that that Honduran Ministry most certainly views the

resolutions as legally binding. Secretary Paz is a graduate of

the National Autonomous University of Honduras and an at-

torney licensed in Honduras. She is the highest level attor-

SS

55a

ney within the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock, and her

job duties include providing legal advice to “the Minister in

matters having to do with legal affairs, institutional commu-

nication, [and] international cooperation.” Secretary Paz also

has experience clerking for one of the Honduran courts. The

court finds her to be well-qualified to speak to the issues re-

garding the validity and contents of the Fishing Law and the

related regulations and resolutions. Upon observing her de-

meanor, the court finds Secretary Paz to be a very credible

witness.

In contrast, the court found the testimony of Prof. Silva to

be less than credible, as he testified that he had not, as of the

date of his in-court testimony, decided whether he was going

to charge defendant McNab for his legal services (including

his time spent researching, drafting, and testifying).* Thus, it

appears that this expert witness for the defense intends to

charge a fee akin to a contingency fee. As for Professor Lit-

vinoff, the value of his testimony as to what is required under

Honduran law is diminished by the fact that he is not a li-

censed attorney in Honduras. Additionally, unlike Secretary

Paz, neither of these gentlemen regularly interpret the fisher-

ies laws, regulations, and resolutions.

The court~also notes that the Fishing Law itself specifi-

cally contemplates the implementation of resolutions such as

those at issue here in furtherance of the Law. The Fishing

Law of 1959, Chapter 11, Article 7, provides in relevant part:

[The Department of Hunting and Fishing]

shall be the only authority to resolve, clarify,

and decide all questions raised about the con-

ditions that must be satisfied by fisheries

8

Professor Silva was not asked who had paid his travel ex-

penses to America for the purpose of testifying in this matter.

56a

products, to permit them to be captured, trans- ‘

ported or sold for consumption in the markets

and for other industrial uses, and everything

related to importation, exportation and licens-

ing, to which end it shall announce such reso-

lutions an other measures as it believes neces-

sary for fisheries activities to be as effective as

possible.

The Fishing Law of 1959, Chapter II, Article 7.

Defendants correctly point out that elsewhere in the Fish-

ing Law, “[t]he Executive Branch, through the secretariat of

Natural Resources, is the superior authority on fisheries and

fisheries-related matters, and therefore, may establish and

announce ... [certain] measures [including those related to

closed seasons] through regulations.” The Fishing Law,

Chapter I, Article 5. After review, the court is unable to rec-

oncile Articles 5 & 7. Faced with this statutory dilemma, the

court finds the testimony of Secretary Paz to be cnitical—

namely, that the resolutions are valid, that the Honduran gov-

ernment views the resolutions to be valid, and that the Hon-

duran government has acted in accordance with the resolu-

tions.

One other item of evidence submitted by defendants mer-

its a remark. Defendants have submitted a one-sentence rul-

ing issued by the Honduras Supreme Court of Justice which

defendants characterize as a judicial statement by the high

court that resolutions are not law. One of defendant

McNab’s witnesses (Honduran attorney Maria Letizia De

Guillen) recently petitioned the Supreme Court challenging

the constitutionality of two of the resolutions at issue before

this court. In denying the petition, the high court stated in

toto:

Denied the admission of the petition of uncon-

stitutionality interposed by the way of action

_ by attorney MARIA LETIZIA DE GUILLEN,

ee

57a

because they recur against two administrative

resolutions that do not have the character of

law and according to article 184 of the Consti-

tution of the Republic: the recourse of uncon-

stitutionality only proceed against the Law by

reason of form or content.

After review, this court understands the ruling to be that

the Supreme Court of Justice only reviews the constitutional-

ity of a law (i.e., a statute or other form of legislation enacted

by the Honduran legislative branch—National Congress) and

that it does not determine the constitutionality of any “lesser”

documents (i.e., regulations and resolutions issued by the ex-

ecutive branch) notwithstanding that those “lesser” docu-

ments, have the binding force of law. According to defen-

dants, the fact that the Supreme Court declined to address the

constitutionality of the resolutions because they are no “law”

does not equate to a holding by the high court that he resolu-

tions have no binding legal effect. Defendants’ argument

goes too far and is simply unsupported. Honduran law

clearly encompasses many mechanisms which carry the force

of law notwithstanding that the mechanism is not denomi-

nated as “law” (and thereby subject to review by the Supreme

Court of Justice). y

Accordingly, the court concludes that the government has

met its burden of establishing that Points of Law 1, 2, & 3 (as

set forth on page five of this order) are valid and binding un-

der Honduran law.

Point of Law 4—Prohibition of harvesting egg-bearing lob-

ster or the removal of eggs from lobster

The government relies on Decree No. 154, The Fishing

Law (May 19, 1959), Chapter VII, Article 70(3), to establish

that Honduras law prohibits the harvest and sale of egg-

hearing lobster and the tearing out or separating in any other

way the eggs from the female lobster. That law provides in

relevant part:

- 58a

The following offense shall be punished

with [a fine of] THREE HUNDRED LEMPI-

RAS or THREE HUNDRED DAYS impris-

onment:

* ke &

3) Those who destroy or harvest the eggs,

or the offspring of fish, chelonians, or other

aquatic species for profit.

The Fishing Law, Chapter VII, Article 70(3).

Defendants do not contest the validity of the Fishing

Law; rather, they argue that Article 70(3) was written to pro-

tect the eggs and young of fish, turtles, and other aquatic spe-

cies which have been placed in situ. To this end, defendants

rely on Prof. Litvinoff’s supplemental affidavit in which he

opines that this statutory provision does not bar the severance

of the egg-bearing part of a female lobster or the harvesting

of egg-bearing lobsters. Moreover, the professor suggests

that the provision does not reach the harvesting of any lob-

sters, for “the Honduran system has always been specific in

its attempts to regulate lobster harvesting activities” and

“there is no mention of lobster in this provision.”

The court finds that defendants’ interpretation of Article

70(3) is strained and unnecessarily limiting. The statutory

provision is broadly written and clearly encompasses lob-

ster—which is undisputedly an “aquatic species.” Also, there

is nothing in the plain language of the provision which indi-

cates that it is limited to eggs in situ. Moreover, to read an in

situ requirement into the statutory provision would render

part of the provision an absurdity, for it is difficult to con-

ceive of a situation in which one would destroy eggs in situ

for profit.

Accordingly, the court concludes that the government has

met its burden of establishing that Point of Law 4 (as set

59a

forth on page five of this order) is valid and binding under

Honduran law.

Point of Law 5—Only lobster and shrimp harvested during

open season may be transported, sold, stored, or refrigerated

after 6th day of closed season

The government relies on Decree No. 154, The Fishing

Law (May 19, 1959), Chapter VII, Articles 28 and 54, to es-

tablish that Honduras law prohibits the transport, sale, stor-

age, or refrigeration of lobster and shrimp on or after the

sixth day of the closed season unless the lobster and shrimp

were harvested prior to the first day of the closed season.

The Fishing Law provides in relevant part:

The sale and transport of species which

are canned, salted, smoked, or prepared by in-

dustrial means and were caught prior to the

start of their respective closed seasons are also

authorized at all times.

The Fishing Law, Chapter IV, Article 28.

The transport and sale of species in closed

seasons ... is permitted until the fifth day af-

ter the respective closed season has begun for

the purpose of selling off existing quantities

which were captured prior to the start of said

closed season.

The Fishing Law, Chapter V, Article 54.

Defendants have not challenged this Point of Law or the

underlying law from which it is derived. Accordingly, the

court concludes that the government has met its burden of

establishing that Point of Law 5 (as set forth on page five of

this order) is valid and binding under Honduran law.

Point of Law 6—Fishermen must dock, in a Honduran port,

the vessel which caught lobster or shrimp and unload catch or

60a

transfer the catch to a licensed vessel that in turns docks and

unloads the catch in a Honduran port.

The government relies on Decree No. 154, The Fishing

Law (May 19, 1959), Chapter VII, Article 30, to establish

that Honduras law requires lobster and shrimp fishermen to

dock their vessels and unload their catch in a Honduran port

prior to exportation. Secretary Paz testified that, although

not specifically authorized by the Fishing Law, the Honduran

government deemed this requirement to be satisfied by either

the docking of the vessel that caught the lobster or shrimp or

the transferring of such catch to a licensed ship that in tum

docks and unloads the catch in a Honduran port.

The F ishing Law provides in relevant part:

Fishermen shall be required to dock their

vessels and unload their catch in Honduran

ports.

The Fishing Law, Chapter IV, Article 30.

Defendants have not challenged this Point of Law or the

underlying law from which it is derived. Accordingly, the

court concludes that the government has met its burden of

establishing that Point of Law 6 (as set forth on page five of

this order) is valid and binding under Honduran law.

Point of Law 7—Reporting requirements

The government relies on Decree No. 154, The Fishing

Law (May 19, 1959), Chapter VII, Articles 35 & 37, to estab-

lish that Honduras law requires businessmen and those who

use any kind of boat for fishing activities or transportation of

any fish species protected by law, including lobsters, must

report in writing to government authorities the outcome of

their fishing trip. The captain of any fishing boat must report

the departure and arrival of the boat to government authori-

ties, pointing out places where fishing was done and listing

the species and amount caught.

6la

The Fishing Law provides in relevant part:

Businessmen, shipowners, employers,

fishermen and sailors, as applicable to each

business, boat, ship, or transport of each class

dedicated to the fishing or transport of any of

the species protected by this Law, are required

to give to the respective officials an account or

report, in writing, of the results of the fishing

or fishing expedition, and to have the mer-

chandise examined to verify whether regula-

tory requirements have been met, and to ob-

tain the statistical data, and to allow their

books to be reviewed.

The Fishing Law, Chapter IV, Article 35.

All fishing boat captains shall report to

the appropriate office when they depart for

work and when they return, indicating fishing

places, species and quantities caught.

The Fishing Law, Chapter IV, Article 37.

Defendants have not challenged this Point of Law or the

underlying law from which it is derived. Accordingly, the

court concludes that the government has met its burden of

establishing that Point of Law 7 (as set forth on page six of

this order) is valid and binding under Honduran law.

Point of Law 8—Inspection, processing, and packing re-

quirements

The government relies on Agreement No. 0008-93 (Janu-

ary 13, 1993), Articles 3, 4, & 49, to establish that Honduras

law prohivits the exportation of lobster without first having it

officially inspected for health and sanitation and proc-

essed/packed at an approved establishment in Honduras,

which includes the packing of lobster into boxes that have

been paraffined and labeled with the business name of the

62a

firm that makes the product, the weight, that it was “In-

spected and Approved of by the Honduran Ministry of Natu-

ral Resources” and the number assigned to the processing

company. This “Agreement” is a regulation under Honduran

law, it was duly published in La Gaceta, and defendants do

not dispute its validity. As Secretary Paz testified, the

Agreement contains the inspection, industrial, health, and

hygiene regulations for the protection of fishery products.

Agreement No. 0008-93 provides in relevant part:

The ones subject to the Official Inspec-

tion are the fishing vessels, storing centers and

plants that capture, gather, industrialize and

- pack fishing products.

In agreement with the present Regulation

only the products previously inspected can be

offered for sale. ,

Products for export can only be the ones

processed in plants approved for that purpose.

Agreement No. 0008-93, Article 3.

Fish, crustaceans, molluscs, anurous rep-

tiles and mammals of comestible type, from

fresh or salt water, assigned for internal con-

sumption or export and by extension are also

included the subproducts obtained from the

same mentioned products.

Agreement No. 0008-93, Article 4.

For the icing and packing of the products it will be ob-

served:

h) The packing must be made in boxes with

the appropriate label, treated with paraffin

and the size must have been approved

63a

during the registration process. They

must have the following legend:

lst) The name or trade name of the busi-

ness that manufactured the product.

2nd) The weight.

3rd) The legend “Product of Honduras”

that can be also placed in another lan-

guage.

4th) A 3 (three) centimeter circle, “In-

spected and Approved by the Department

of Natural Resources of Honduras” and

the number assigned to the establishment

doing the processing.

5th) In addition, it can have printed the

different denominations of the size of the

product.

Agreement No. 0008-93, Article 49(h).

efendants do not object to the first part of this statement

, .e., that it is prohibited under Honduran law to export

without first having it officially inspected for health

itation and processed at an approved establishment in

tailed requirements of a processing plant under the Fishing

Law. Rather, the dispute between the parties turns on the

definition of “processing,” a term that is not specifically de-

fined in the Agreement.

Based on the evidence presented, the court concludes that

“processing” fish products for exportation includes inspec-

tion, grading, the preparation of the products for packaging,

and the packaging itself. Secretary Paz testified that process-

ing includes packaging. Mike Powers of Garden Restaurants

testified that partial processing can occur onboard the fishing

vessel, including the measuring and cutting off the lobster

tails, washing, deveining, and dipping the product into an

64a

approved preservative. However, the “process” is not com-

plete until the product is graded, the official inspector (or his

selected technician) inspects and approves the product, and it

is properly packaged for exportation.

Finally, defendants make much of the fact that Agree-

ment 0008-93, Article 5(t), permits the use of plastic as part

of the packing materials.’ However, Article 49 of Agreement

0008-93 plainly requires that the product ultimately be placed

in a paraffined box prior to exportation, with the box appro-

priately labeled with the requisite information. Additionally,

Secretary Paz testified that packing lobster in plastic bags—

without more—for exportation is not adequate under Hondu-

ran law.

Accordingly, the court concludes that the government has

met its burden of establishing that Point of Law 8 (as set

forth on page six of this order) is valid and binding under

Honduran law.

CONCLUSION

It is ORDERED that defendant McNab’s “Motion to

Dismiss Counts One through Twelve and Counts Twenty-

Eight Through Forty-Three of the Indictment,” (doc. 53),

and “Motion to Dismiss the Superseding Indictment,”

(doc. 151), are DENIED.

° — Agreement 0008-93, Article 5(t) provides:

Packing Materials: All the materials such as sheets of

aluminum, plastic, wax paper, cardboard boxes and others,

used to cover and protect the fishing products, and that

have been approved by the Department.

The fact that the Agreement permits the use of plastic as a packing

material is not surprising given the extensive regulations regarding

the use of ice.

65a

Nothing in this order should be construed as expressing,

an opinion or making a finding as to the innocence or guilt of

any of the defendants. It will be for the jury to decide

whether the government proves any of the defendants guilty

of any of the charges beyond a reasonable doubt. The fact

that the court has “determined” the applicable Honduran law

does not mean that the government has proven that any of the

defendants have violated Honduran law or that the lobster or

shrimp at issue in this case were taken, possessed, etc., in

violation of Honduran law.

The Clerk is DIRECTED to send a copy of this order

to counsel for all parties by facsimile.

DONE this 12th day of October, 2000.

/s/

RICHARD W. VOLLMER, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

66a

APPENDIX C

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF [Filed August 28, 2001]

AMERICA

v. CRIMINAL ACTION

NO. 1:00-00079-(1, 2, 3 & 4)-RV

DAVID HENSON MCNAB

ROBERT D. BLANDFORD

ABNER SCHOENWETTER-

DIANE H. HUANG

ORDER

This matter is before the court on the following docu-

ments:

1. “Alternative Motions Based on Honduran Law Develop-

ments,” (doc. 336), filed by defendant David Henson

McNab; '/”

' The “Alternative Motions”—which are premised on essen-

tially the same grounds—are a “Motion to Dismiss,” a “Motion for

New Trial Based on Newly Discovered Evidence,” and a Motion

for Redetermination of Foreign Law.”

2 Defendants Robert D. Blandford and Abner J. Schoen-

wetter adopted defendant McNab’s “Alternative Motions,” (docs.

346 & 342, respectively). Defendant Diane H. Huang filed her

own motion, also titled “Alternative Motions Based on Honduran

[Footnote continued on next page]

67a

2. “Notice of Filing Regarding Hygiene Regulation Re-

peal,” (doc. 325), filed by defendant McNab;

3. “Notice of Filing Regarding Annulment Action,” doc.

324), filed by defendant McNab;

4. “Notice of Filing Regarding Fishing Law Changes,” (doc.

326), filed by defendant McNab;

5. Supplemental Filing in Support of Alternative Motions,”

(doc. 341), filed by defendant McNab;

6. Second Supplemental Filing in Support of Alternative

Motions, (doc. 371), filed by defendant McNab;

7. “Second Response to Defendants’ Alternative Motions

Based on Issues of Honduran Law,” (doc. 387), filed by

the government;

and

8. Reply Declaration, (doc. 388), filed by defendant

McNab.*

[Footnote continued from previous page]

Law Developments,” (doc. 344), which is predicated on essentially

the same grounds and evidence as McNab’s alternative motions.

For simplicity’s sake, the court will refer only to the alternative

motions filed by defendant McNab, although the court’s ruling

applies to all four defendants.

> The government’s “Second Response” supercedes the gov-

ernment’s first response. (doc. 378).

* During the hearing held by the court on August 17, 2001,

the court granted defendant McNab’s “Motion for Leave to File

Reply Declaration,” (doc. 388), without objection by the govern-

ment.

68a

INTRODUCTION

Following a jury trial, defendants were convicted of, inter

alia, conspiring to violate the Lacey Act, 16 U.S.C. § 3371 et

seq. Stated generally, the Lacey Act makes it unlawful to

import into the United States fish or wildlife that has been

taken or acquired in violation of another country’s laws. In

this case, the government contended that defendants violated

Honduran law in various ways when they conspired to import

spiny lobster tails on multiple occasions over a five-year pe-

riod. Prior to trial, the court made a number of determina-

tions with respect to Honduran law pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §

3505(b)° and Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)° and 26.1.’

° Title 18 U.S.C. § 3505 provides:

At the arraignment or as soon after the arraignment

as practicable, a party intending to offer in evidence

under this section a foreign record or regularly conducted

activity shall provide written notice of that intention to

each other party. A motion opposing admission in evi-

dence of such record shall be made by the opposing party

and determined by the court before trial. Failure by a

party to file such a motion before trial shall constitute

waiver of objection to such record or duplicate, but the

court for cause shown may grant relief from the waiver.

° Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b) provides, inter alia:

Any defense, objection, or request which is capable

of determination without the trial of the general issue may

be raised before trial by motion.

’ Fed. R. Crim. P. 26.1 provides:

A party who intends to raise an issue concerning the

law of a foreign country shall give reasonable written no-

tice. The court, in determining foreign law, may consider

any relevant material or source, including testimony,

7a

#

=

a

i.

[Footnote continued on next page]

CapEOD EE ERIS HEE He i a ii a aca aa a ssiasane

os

Bo

69a

In his pending post-trial “alternative motions,” defendant

McNab has requested the court to revisit its Honduran law

determinations, at least as to three particular points. Because

the court’s jurisdiction was potentially impacted by the

newly-raised grounds, the court ordered the government to

file a response and, following that response, held a hearing

on August 17, 2001. After full consideration of the argu-

ments of counsel and the evidence submitted, the court con-

cludes that the alternative motions are due to be denied.

DISCUSSION

Point of Law 1—Lobster Size Limits—Annulment of

Resolution 030-95

In its original ruling on Honduran law, the court deter-

mined that Honduran Resolution 030-95, Third provision,

prohibits the harvesting of spiny lobsters which are less than

5 1/2 inches in length. Defendant McNab contends that

Resolution 030-95 has been annulled by a Honduran court

and that, pursuant to Article 96 of the Honduran Constitution,

the annulment operates retroactively in favor of a criminal

defendant such as himself. The annulment action was insti-

tuted by McNab following this court’s original ruling on

Honduran law.

The government does not contest defendant McNab’s as-

sertion that the Honduran “Court of the First Instant of Ad-

ministrative Law” declared Resolution 030-95 to be voided.

Rather, the government points out, correctly so, that the

Honduran administrative court declared the resolution to be

[Footnote continued from previous page]

whether or not submitted by a party or admissible under

the Federal rules of Evidence. The court’s determination

shall be treated as a ruling on a question of law.

70a

void “but ... only for purposes of [its] annulment and future

inapplicability. This Resolution does not confer any right to

claims.” Although the legal meaning of this limitation lan-

guage under Honduran law is not entirely clear to the under-

signed, the court concludes that the administrative court in-

tended to give its pronouncement prospective, rather than

retroactive, effect.®

Even if the administrative court’s voidance of Resolution

030-95 should be given retroactive effect, the express lan-

guage of the administrative court’s ruling provides that it will

not be a final judgment if an appeal is timely taken. It is un-

disputed that the Honduran government (which contested the

annulment action before the administrative court) timely ap-

pealed the ruling. Consequently, the administrative ruling is

not a final judgment, and it has no legal effect in Honduras.

Because the administrative decision is not Honduran law now

and because the evidence establishes that the Honduran gov-

ermment continues to enforce Resolution 030-95, the court

concludes that Resolution 030-95 continues to be valid under

Honduran law.

Point of Law 2—Processing/Packaging Rules—Repeal of

Agreement 0008-93

®* It would seem that a judge could not unilaterally declare

the effect of his/her ruling to be non-retroactive, for Article 96 of

the Honduran Constitution would appear to “trump” any such

declaration. This court need not decide that issue, however, be-

cause the government submitted evidence which the court under-

stands to mean that an Honduran administrative court lacks the

power to void a resolution with respect to criminal acts. See

affidavit of Jose Bernardo Torres Umanzor (“since the judgment

deals with an Administrative and not a Criminal matter, it has no

retroactive effect and only has effects for its future inapplicabil-

ity.”).

Tla

In its original ruling, the court concluded that Agreement

No. 0008-93 prohibits the exportation of lobster without first

having it officially inspected for health and sanitation and

processed/packed at an approved establishment in Honduras,

which includes the packing of lobster into boxes that have

been paraffined and labeled with (a) the business name of the

firm that makes the product, (b) the weight, (c) that it was

“Inspected and Approved of by the Honduran Ministry of

Natural Resources” and (d) the number assigned to the proc-

essing company.

It is undisputed that Agreement 0008-93 was issued pur-

suant to Decree No. 40 of May 16, 1973. It is also undis-

puted that Decree No. 40 was expressly repealed effective

January 13, 1995, by Decree No. 157-94. From this, defen-

dant McNab argues that the repeal of Decree No. 40 oper-

ated as a repeal of Agreement 0008-93. In support of this

position, defendant McNab offered the affidavit of Ramiro

Lozano, an Honduran attorney and law professor, who

opined that “regulations are automatically repealed when the

law under which they were issued is repealed.”

The Honduran Civil Code provides in relevant part: ~

Article 42—A law may be revoked totally or

partially by another law.

Article 43—The revocation « the law may be

express or tacit.

It is express when the new law expressly

revokes the law that antecedes it.

It is tacit when the new law contains rules

that may not be conciliated with the old law.

* Defendant McNab offered the affidavits of other Honduran

attorneys who offered similar, if not identical, opinions.

72a

Article 44—The express repeal may be total

or partial, as set forth by the repealing law.

The tacit repeal leaves in effect in the previous

law anything not in conflict with the provi-

sions of the new law, even though both ver-

sions may cover the same matter.

As the government points out, one of the objectives of the

new decree (No. 157-94) was “to strengthen the phyto-

zoosanitation, mainly in that which refers to the .. . control

of products that are of animal and plant origin.” Relying on

Article 44 of the Honduran Civil Code, the government con-

tends that “Agreement 0008-93 remained in effect following

the repeal of Decree No. 40, at the very least to the extent

that it did not impinge on the provisions of the new law.”

The court agrees. To conclude otherwise would mean that

the passage of a law intended to strengthen the existing law

would result in a weaker, if not impotent, new law during

that window of time until the appropriate ministry or agency

had sufficient time to draft, and the appropriate governmental

official(s) to sign and publish, new regulations. Such a result

is untenable. If the Honduran National Congress had simply

repealed Decree No. 40 without passing a new decree cover-

ing the same area of the law, then this court would readily

conclude that Agreement 0008-93 no longer carried the force

of law. That is not the case here, however. At all relevant

times a decree existed covering the area of phytozoosanita-

tion, and Agreement 0008-93 continued in effect when the

new decree became effective, at least to the extent that

Agreement 0008-93 was not inconsistent with the new de-

cree.

There are two additional facts which buttress the court’s

conclusion. First, the Honduran governmental officials re-

sponsible for the enforcement of Decree No. 40, Decree No.

157-94, and Agreement 0008-93 continued to enforce

Agreement 0008-93 after Decree No. 157-94 was enacted.

1 PREY LAO GORE Y He

73a

Second, when the Honduran government decided to create

new regulations for the enforcement of Decree No. 157-94, it

did so by the passage of Accord No. 1081-99 five years after

Decree No. 157-94 became effective. Decree No. 1081-99

specifically repealed Agreement 0008-93. If Agreement No.

0008-93 had been “automatically” repealed by the mere pas-

sage of Decree No. 157-94 in 1994 as defendant McNab

argues, then there would have been no reason for Honduras

to expressly repeal Agreement 0008-93 in 1999 as so pro-

vided in Accord No. 1081-99.

Accordingly, the court concludes that Agreement 0008-

93 remained in effect following the passage of Decree No.

157-94 and up to the passage of Accord No. 1081-99 and,

therefore, was in effect at all times relevant to the charged

conduct in the Second Superseding Indictment.

Point Three—Egg-Bearing Lobsters—Amendment of Ar-

ticle 70(3) of the Fishing Law

Defendant McNab correctly notes that Article 70 of the

Fishing Law was amended by the Honduras National Con-

gress in Decree No. 245-2000, which became effective on

February 5, 2001. Defendant McNab also correctly notes

that the amended Article 70 reenacted and restated some of

the prohibitions of the former Article 70. As this court de-

termined in its original ruling, the (now) former Article 70

prohibited the harvesting of egg-bearing lobsters. The

amended Article 70 does not contain a specific prohibition

against the harvesting of egg-bearing lobsters. The absence

of a specific prohibition regarding the harvesting of egg-

bearing lobster, combined with Article 96 of the Honduran

Constitution (which provides that a change in the law does

not have a retroactive effect except in criminal cases when

the change benefits the accused), constitute the basis for de-

fendant McNab’s assertion that all counts (and convictions)

predicated on a violation of the former Article 70 are due to

be dismissed.

74a

It is true that the Honduran National Congress reworked

Article 70. The amended legislation contains 10 specific

prohibitions and 1 catch-all provision. Namely, the follow-

ing conduct is sanctionable:

(a) Fishing with chemical or explosive elements;

(b) Fishing carried out by unlicenced persons or persons

with expired licenses;

(c) Fishing with prohibited gear;

(d) Catching for commercial purposes during the closed

season;

(e) Clearing mangrove swamps or destroying ecosystems

in general;

(f) Polluting with any substance the maritime or conti-

nental weters;

(g) Catching, destroying, or removing protected hydrobi-

ological species, especially manatees;

(h) Shipowners or captains of vessels that fail to report

their catch;

(i) Carrying out scientific research without a permit from

the National Fisheries Authority;

(j) Shipowners or captains of vessels that fail to comply

with the provisions related to the installation of the

Sea Turtle Excluding Devices (DETs) as set forth by

the National Fisheries Authority; and

(k) Any other activity not expressly mentioned in the

preceding items indicated with letters but which is

analogous.

In response, the government observes that the intent of

the Honduran National Congress in amending Article 70 was

to increase the monetary sanctions to reflect present currency

valuations, thereby putting some teeth into the law:

75a .

WHEREAS the current Fisheries Law .. . sets

forth sanctions of an administrative nature, the

amounts of which do not represent coercive

measures that reflect the gravity of the viola-

tions committed, so that it is necessary to re-

vise these sanctions according to the impor-

tance of the case and the -urrent value of the

national currency.

The government urges that those specific prohibitions con-

tained in the former Article 70 but not in the amended Article

70 (including the egg-bearing lobster prohibition at issue

here, as well as the prohibitions of catching lower weight

fish, crustaceans, and chelonians, and catching a quantity too

large to be transported in one’s own vessel) remain in effect

except to the extent that they are inconsistent with the new

prohibitions. Because there is nothing in the amended Arti-

cle 70 which is inconsistent with a prohibition against har-

vesting egg-bearing lobster, the government contends that the

harvesting of egg-bearing lobster prohibition remains in ef-

fect, if not on its own, then at least through the catch-all pro-

vision “(k)” of the amended Article 70.

Of the three changes in Honduran law which defendant

McNab advances in his alternative motions, it is this ground

which gives the court the most pause. It is troubling that the

Honduran National Congress would specifically “bring over”

certain prohibitions from the former Article 70 into the

amended Article 70, and choose not to specifically “bring

over” other prohibitions, only for this court to conclude that

the prohibitions not expressly brought over are still valid law

to the extent that they are not inconsistent with the amended

Article 70. Nevertheless, after full consideration, the court

concludes that that is exactly what this court must do in light

of Honduran Civil Code Articles 42, 43 & 44. This conclu-

sion is buttressed by the stated purpose of the amendment—

to increase the penalties—not to reduce the prohibited con-

76a

duct. This conclusion gains additional support from the affi-

davit of Liliana Paz, General Secretary in the Ministry of Ag-

riculture and Livestock, the department of the Honduran

government ultimately responsible for the enforcement of the

_ fisheries law, in which she states (albeit without much elabo-

ration) that “the destruction or harvest of eggs of aquatic spe-

cies remains prohibited under Honduran law, subject to

greater penalties.”

Accordingly, the court concludes that the harvesting and

destruction of egg-bearing lobsters continues to be prohibited

conduct under Honduran law.

CONCLUSION

After due consideration, it is

ORDERED that defendant McNab’s alternative mo-

tions are DENIED for the foregoing reasons.

The Clerk is DIRECTED to send a copy of this order

to counsel for all parties by facsimile.

DONE this 28th day of August, 2001.

/s/

RICHARD W. VOLLMER, JR

SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

77a

APPENDIX D

[PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

FILED

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

MAY 29, 2003

THOMAS K. KAHN

CLERK

No. 01-15148

D. C. Docket No. 00-00079-CR-1-RV

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

DAVID HENSON MCNAB,

ROBERT D. BLANDFORD, et al., Defendants-

Appellants.

No. 02-10810

D. C. Docket No. 00-00079-CR-CB

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

ABNER SCHOENWETTER,

78a

ROBERT D. BLANDFORD, Defendants-

Appellants.

No. 02-11264

D. C. Docket No. 00-00079-CR-1-RV

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee

versus

DAVID HENSON MCNAB,

ABNER SCHOENWETTER, et al., Defendants-Appellants

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Alabama

(May 29, 2003)

Before HULL, WILSON and FAY, Circuit Judges.

ORDERED:

The petitions for rehearing are granted in part by deleting

entirely footnote 24 from the Court’s opinion which was is-

sued on March 21, 2003. The Court will issue a substituted

opinion making that deletion. The Court otherwise denies

the petitions for rehearing of defendants’ McNabb, Schoen-

wetter, Huang, Blandford and Embassy of Honduras.

No member of this Court having requested a poll, we

deny the suggestion for rehearing en banc. See Fed. R. App.

P. 35(a); Eleventh Circuit Rule 35-5.

FAY, Circuit Judge, dissents.

79a

APPENDIX E

[Filed August 28, 2001]

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

UNITED STATES OF JUDGMENT IN A

AMERICA CRIMINAL CASE

(For Offenses Committed On

or After November 1, 1987)

V.

DAVID HENSON MCNAB CASE NUMBER: 1:00-CR-

00079-001

THE DEFENDANT: Donald Briskman, J. Patrick

Courtney, III and _ Patrick

Sims

Defendant’s Attorney

() pleaded guilty to count(s) _.

() pleaded nolo contendere to count(s) _ which was

accepted by the court.

(X) was found guilty on count(s) 1-12, 28-43 after a

plea of not guilty.

Date Count

Title & Nature of Offense Offense No.(s)

Section Concluded

18 U.S.C. Conspiracy 05/10/2000 l

§ 371

18 U.S.C. Importation con- 02/04/1999 2-12

§§ 545 & 2 trary to law

80a

18 U.S.C. Fraudulent transac- 12/11/1998 28-42

§§ 1957 &2 _ tions of funds de-

rived from unlawful

activity

18 U.S.C. Conspiracy to en- 05/10/2000 43

§§ 1957 & gage or attempt to

1956(h) engage in monetary

transactions

The defendant is sentenced as provided in pages 2

through 5 of this judgment. Pre-sentence is imposed pursu-

ant to the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984.

() The defendant has been found not guilty on

count(s) _.

() Count(s) ___ is/are dismissed on the motion of the

United States.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendant shall no-

tify the United States Attorney for this district within 30 days

of any change of name, residence, or mailing address until all

fines, restitution, costs and special assessments imposed by

this judgment are fully paid. If ordered to pay restitution, the

defendant shall notify the court and United States attorney of

any material change in the defendant’s economic circum-

stances.

Defendant’s Social Security 08/07/2001

No.: NONE Date of Imposition of

Judgment

Defendant’s Date of Birth:

01/17/1952

Defendant’s U.S.M. No.:

39028-018

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Defendant’s Residence /s/

Address: RICHARD W. VOLLMER,

Roatan (Bay Island) JR.

Honduras, Central America SENIOR UNITED STATES

DISTRICT JUDGE

Defendant’s Mailing 8-27-01

Address: Date

JUDGMENT ENTERED ON DOCKET

82a

IMPRISONMENT

The defendant is hereby committed to the custody of the

United States Bureau of Prisons to be imprisoned for a total

term of 97 months, said term consisting of 60 months as to

each of counts 1 through 12 and 97 months as to each of

counts 28 through 42 and 43, all such terms to run CON-

CURRENTLY:

() Special Conditions:

() The court makes the following recommendations

to the Bureau of Prisons:

() The defendant is remanded to the custody of the

United States Marshal.

() The defendant shall surrender to the United States

Marshal for this district:

() ats aam/p.m.on__..

() as notified by the United States Marshal

(X) The defendant shall surrender for service of sen-

tence at the institution designated by the Bureau of

Prisons:

() before2p.m.on__.

(X) as notified by the United States Marshal.

NOTE TO U.S. MARSHAL: Defendant

allowed to remain on bond pending ap-

peal to the 11th Circuit Court of Ap-

peals and may self-surrender to the in-

stitution after a decision is rendered on

appeal;

() as notified by the Probation or Pretrial

Services Office.

RETURN

I have executed this judgment as follows:

83a

Defendant delivered on

- at

tified copy of this judgment.

to

with a cer-

UNITED STATES MARSHAL ™

By

Deputy U.S. Marshal

LH OER OG CRE

84a

SUPERVISED RELEASE

Upon release from imprisonment, the defendant shall be on

supervised release for a term of 3 YEARS as to each of

counts 1-12, 28-42 & 43, all such terms to ran CONCUR-

RENTLY:

(X) Special Conditions:

1. Immediately after incarceration, the defendant is to be

delivered to a duly authorized Immigration official for possi-

ble DEPORTATION; If deported, the defendant is to remain

outside the United States pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d). If

not deported, within 72 hours of release from custody of the

Bureau of Prisons or Immigration authorities, the defendant

shall report in person to the probation office in the district to

which he is released and abide by their instructions;

For offenses committed on or after September 13, 1994: The

defendant shall refrain from any unlawful use of a controlled

substance. The defendant shall submit to one drug test

within 15 days of release from imprisonment and at least two

periodic drug tests thereafter, as directed by the probation

officer.

() The above drug testing condition is suspended

based on the court’s determination that the defen-

dant poses a low risk of future substance abuse.

(Check, if applicable)

(X) The defendant shall not possess a firearm, destruc-

tive device, or any other dangerous weapon

If this judgment imposes a fine or a restitution obligation, it

shall be a condition of supervised release that the defendant

pay any such fine or restitution that remains unpaid at the

commencement of the term of supervised release in accor-

dance with the Schedule of Payments set forth in the Crimi-

nal Monetary Penalties sheet of this judgment. The defen-

dant shall report to the probation office in the district to

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85a

which the defendant is released within 72 hours of release

from the custody of the Bureau of Prisons.

The defendant shall not commit another federal, state or local

crime.

The defendant shall not illegally possess a controlled sub-

stance.

The defendant shall comply with the standard conditions that

have been adopted by this court (Probation Form 7a).

The defendant shall also comply with the additional condi-

tions on the attached page (if applicable).

STANDARD CONDITIONS OF SUPERVISION

1) the defendant shall not leave the judicial district without

the permission of the court or probation officer, -

2) the defendant shall report to the probation officer and shall

submit a truthful and complete written report within the first

five days of each month;

3) the defendant shall answer truthfully all inquiries by the

probation officer and follow the instructions of the prob. offi-

cer;

4) the defendant shall support his or her dependents and meet

other family responsibilities;

5) the defendant shall work regularly at a lawful occupation

unless excused by the probation officer for schooling, train-

ing, or other acceptable reasons;

6) the defendant shall notify the probation officer at least ten

days prior to any change in residence or employment;

7) the defendant shall refrain from excessive use of alcohol

and shall not purchase, possess, use, distribute, or administer

any controlled substance or any paraphernalia related to any

controlled substances, except as prescribed by a physician;

86a

8) the cefendant shall not frequent places where controlled

substances are illegally sold, used, distributed, or adminis-

tered;

9) the defendant shall not associate with any persons engaged

in criminal activity, and shall not associate with any person

convicted of a felony unless granted permission to do so by

the probation officer; |

10) the defendant shall permit a probation officer to visit him

or her at any time at home or elsewhere and shall permit con-

fiscation of any contraband observed in plain view of the pro-

bation officer;

11) the defendant shall notify the probation officer within

seventy-two hours of being arrested or questioned by a law

enforcement office,

12) the defendant shall not enter into any agreement to act as

an informer or a special agent of a law enforcement agency

without the permission of the court;

13) as directed by the prob. officer, the defendant shall notify

third parties of risks that may be occasioned by the defen-

dant’s criminal record or personal history or characteristics,

and shall permit the probation officer to make such notifica-

tions and to confirm the defendant’s compliance with such

notification requirement.

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87a

CRIMINAL MONETARY PENALTIES

The defendant shall pay the following total criminal

monetary penalties in accordance with the schedule of pay-

ments set forth on Sheet 5, Part B.

Assessment’ Fine Restitution

Totals: $2,800.00 $100,000.00 .

* * * * *

88a

SCHEDULE OF PAYMENTS

se. fF 8 2 ©

The defendant will receive credit for all payments previously

made toward any criminal monetary penalties imposed.

() Joint and Several:

() The defendant shall pay the cost of prosecution.

() The defendant shall pay the following court

cost(s):

(X) the defendant shall forfeit the defendant’s interest

in the following property to the United States:

EIGHT HUNDRED THOUSAND AND NO/100

DOLLARS ($800,000.00)

Payments shall be applied in the following order:

(1) assessment; (2) restitution principal; (3) restitution inter-

est, (4) fine principal; (5) community restitution, (6) fine in-

terest (7) penalties, and (8) costs, including cost of prosecu-

tion and court costs.

Wess 9, - iid bi haan. hig ns} ee a PP RETITREY my a inp Lo Bier

89a

APPENDIX F

[Footnote 24 of original panel decision,

deleted on rehearing]

[PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

FILED

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

MARCH 21, 2003

THOMAS K. KAHN

‘ CLERK

No. 01-15148

D. C. Docket No. 00-00079-CR-1-RV

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

DAVID HENSON MCNAB,

ROBERT D. BLANDFORD, et al., Defendants-

Appellants.

No. 02-10810

D. C. Docket No. 00-00079-CR-CB

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

90a

versus

ABNER SCHOENWETTER,

ROBERT D. BLANDFORD, Defendants-

Appellants.

No. 02-11264

D. C. Docket No. 00-00079-CR-1-RV

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

DAVID HENSON MCNAB,

ROBERT D. BLANDFORD, et al., Defendants-

Appellants.

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Alabama

(March 21, 2003)

Before HULL, WILSON and FAY, Circuit Judges.

WILSON, Circuit Judge:

eS €&€ 8 @ @

Thus, we must decide whether we are bound by the Hon-

duran government’s current position regarding the validity of

these laws, or whether we are free to follow the Honduran

government’s original position.”

4 The Executive Branch of the United States government,

represented here by the Department of Justice, has taken the posi-

[Footnote continued on next page]

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[Footnote continued from previous page]

tion that the various Honduran laws in issue are valid and specifi-

cally that under Honduran law the Honduran court’s judgment re-

garding Resolution 030-95 applies only prospectively. The Execu-

tive Branch, in effect, has declined to accept the position of the

Honduran Embassy as determinative as to Honduran law.

There is no authority directing courts making foreign law de-

terminations to hold as determinative declarations made by foreign

embassies as to their laws. Instead, this Court considers the Hon-

duran Embassy’s position as evidence of what the Honduran law is

in conjunction with the other evidence in this case, which conflicts

with the Honduran Embassy’s position. Our Executive Branch’s

decision not to accept as determinative the position of a foreign

embassy on foreign law inevitably touches upon considerations of

foreign policy, which typically involve nonjusticiable “political

questions” committed to the other branches of government. See

Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211-12 (1962) (recognizing that

many questions touching foreign relations are political questions);

Oetjen v. Cent. Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918). Such is the

case here because a judicial decree that the Honduran Embassy’s

position is determinative would place this Court in conflict with

the Executive Branch with respect to the amount of deference due

a foreign government official’s position. See Baker, 369 U.S. at

217 (“Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a po-

litical question is found . . . the impossibility of a court’s undertak-

ing independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect

due coordinate branches of government .. . .”).

92a

APPENDIX G

The Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause provides:

No person shall * * * be deprived of life, lib-

erty, or property, without due process of law

* * *

U.S. Const. amend. V.

ot ue ae, 7 ‘

PD AURORA MY Sa ucitaies a TE ay Suxin ci, Oidebaalooe tee patos No 9p

Sy ONAL OMEN POE RE RTI SP eT! HOY Ps a Tee TN bey eS

93a

APPENDIX H

TITLE 16—CONSERVATION

CHAPTER 53—CONTROL OF ILLEGALLY TAKEN

FISH AND WILDLIFE

Ss & €&€ &

§ 3372. Prohibited acts

(a) Offenses other than marking offenses

It is unlawful for any person—

(1) to import, export, transport, sell, receive, acquire, or

purchase any fish or wildlife or plant taken, possessed, trans-

ported, or sold in violation of any law, treaty, or regulation of

the United States or in violation of any Indian tnbal law;

(2) to import, export, transport, sell, receive, acquire, or

purchase in interstate or foreign commerce—

(A) any fish or wildlife taken, possessed, transported,

or sold in violation of any law or regulation of any State or in

violation of any foreign law, or

(B) any plant taken, possessed, transported, or sold in

violation of any law or regulation of any State;

(3) within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction

of the United States (as defined in section 7 of title 18)—

(A) to possess any fish or wildlife taken, possessed,

transported, or sold in violation of any law or regulation of

any State or in violation of any foreign law or Indian tribal

law, or

94a

(B) to possess any plant taken, possessed, transported,

or sold in violation of any law or regulation of any State;'

(4) to attempt to commit any act described in paragraphs

(1) through (4).

(b) Marking offenses

It is unlawful for any person to import, export, or trans-

port in interstate commerce any container or package con-

taining any fish or wildlife unless the container or package

has previously been plainly marked, labeled, or tagged in ac-

cordance with the regulations issued pursuant to paragraph

(2) of section 3376(a) of this title.

(c) Sale and purchase of guiding and outfitting services and

invalid licenses and permits

(1) Sale

It is deemed to be a sale of fish or wildlife in viola-

tion of this chapter for a person for money or other consid-

eration to offer or provide—

(A) guiding, outfitting, or other services; or

(B) a hunting or fishing license or permit;

for the illegal taking, acquiring, receiving, transporting, or

possessing of fish or wildlife.

(2) Purchase

It is deemed to be a purchase of fish or wildlife in

violation of this chapter for a person to obtain for money or

other consideration—

1

So in original. Probably should be followed by “or”.

2

(3).

So in original. Probably should refer to pars. (1) through

95a

(A) guiding, outfitting, or other services; or

(B) a hunting or fishing license or permit;

for the illegal taking, acquiring, receiving, transporting, or

possessing of fish or wildlife.

(d) False labeling offenses

It is unlawful for any person to make or submit any false

record, account, or label for, or any false identification of,

any fish, wildlife, or plant which has been, or is intended to

be—

(1) imported, exported, transported, sold, purchased, or

received from any foreign country; or

(2) transported in interstate or foreign commerce.

96a

TITLE 16—CONSERVATION

CHAPTER 53—CONTROL OF ILLEGALLY TAKEN

FISH AND WILDLIFE

* *& &k KF

§ 3373. Penalties and sanctions

(a) Civil penalties

(1) Any person who engages in conduct prohibited by

any provision of this chapter (other than subsections (b) and

(d) of section 3372 of this title) and in the exercise of due

care should know that the fish or wildlife or plants were

taken, possessed, transported, or sold in violation of, or in a

manner unlawful under, any underlying law, treaty, or regu-

lation, and any person who knowingly violates section

3372(d) of this title, may be assessed a civil penalty by the

Secretary of not more than $10,000 for each such violation:

Provided, That when the violation involves fish or wildlife or

plants with a market value of less than $350, and involves

only the transportation, acquisition, or receipt of fish or wild-

life or plants taken or possessed in violation of any law,

treaty, or regulation of the United States, any Indian tribal

law, any foreign law, or any law or regulation of any State,

the penalty assessed shall not exceed the maximum provided

for violation of said law, treaty, or regulation, or $10,000,

whichever is less.

(2) Any person who violates section 3372(b) of this title

may be assessed a civil penalty by the Secretary of not more

than $250. 2

(3) For purposes of paragraphs (1) and (2), any reference

to a provision of this chapter or to a section of this chapter

97a

shall be treated as including any regulation issued to carry

out any such provision or section.

(4) No civil penalty may be assessed under this subsec-

tion unless the person accused of the violation is given notice

and opportunity for a hearing with respect to the violation.

Each violation shall be a separate offense and the offense

shall be deemed to have been committed not only in the dis-

trict where the violation first occurred, but also in any district

in which a person may have taken or been in possession of

the said fish or wildlife or plants.

(5) Any civil penalty assessed under this subsection may

be remitted or mitigated by the Secretary.

(6) In determining the amount of any penalty assessed

pursuant to paragraphs (1) and (2), the Secretary shall take

into account the nature, circumstances, extent, and gravity of

the prohibited act committed, and with respect to the violator,

the degree of culpability, ability to pay, and such other mat-

ters as justice may require.

(b) Hearings

Hearings held during proceedings for the assessment of

civil penalties shall be conducted in accordance with section

554 of title 5. The administrative law judge may issue sub-

penas for the attendance and testimony of witnesses and the

production of relevant papers, books, or documents, and may

administer oaths. Witnesses summoned shall be paid the

same fees and mileage that are paid to witnesses in the courts

of the United States. In case of contumacy or refusal to obey

a subpena issued pursuant to this paragraph and served upon

any person, the district court of the United States for any dis-

trict in which such person is found, resides, or transacts busi-

ness, upon application by the United States and after notice

to such person, shall have jurisdiction to issue an order re-

quiring such person to appear and give testimony before the

administrative law judge or to appear and produce documents

98a

before the administrative law judge, or both, and any failure

to obey such order of the court may be punished by such

court as a contempt thereof.

(c) Review of civil penalty

Any person against whom a civil penalty is assessed un-

der this section may obtain review thereof in the appropriate

District Court of the United States by filing a complaint in

such court within 30 days after the date of such order and by

simultaneously serving a copy of the complaint by certified

mail on the Secretary, the Attorney General, and the appro-

priate United States attorney. The Secretary shall promptly

file in such court a certified copy of the record upon which

such violation was found or such penalty imposed, as pro-

vided in section 2112 of title 28. If any person fails to pay an

assessment of a civil penalty after it has become a final and

unappealable order or after the appropriate court has entered

final judgment in favor of the Secretary, the Secretary may

request the Attorney General of the United States to institute

a civil action in an appropriate district court of the United

States to collect the penalty, and such court shall have juris-

diction to hear and decide any such action. In hearing such

action, the court shall have authority to review the violation

and the assessment of the civil penalty de novo.

(d) Criminal penalties

(1) Any person who—

(A) knowingly imports or exports any fish or wildlife

or plants in violation of any provision of this chapter (other

than subsections (b) and (d) of section 3372 of this title), or

(B) violates any provision of this chapter (other than

subsections (b) and (d) of section 3372 of this title) by know-

ingly engaging in cenduct that involves the sale or purchase

of, the offer of sale or purchase of, or the intent to sell or pur-

chase, fish or wildlife or plants with a market value in excess

of $350,

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99a

knowing that the fish or wildlife or plants were taken, pos-

sessed, transported, or sold in violation of, or in a manner

unlawful under, any underlying law, treaty or regulation,

shall be fined not more than $20,000, or imprisoned for not

more than five years, or both. Each violation shall be a sepa-

rate offense and the offense shall be deemed to have been

committed not only in the district where the violation first

occurred, but also in any district in which the defendant may

have taken or been in possession of the said fish or wildlife

or plants.

(2) Any person who knowingly engages in conduct pro-

hibited by any provision of this chapter (other than subsec-

tions (b) and (d) of section 3372 of this title) and in the exer-

cise of due care should know that the fish or wildlife or

plants were taken, possessed, transported, or sold in violation

of, or in a manner unlawful under, any underlying law, treaty

or regulation shall be fined not more than $10,000, or im-

prisoned for not more than one year, or both. Each violation

shall be a separate offense and the offense shall be deemed to

have been committed not only in the district where the viola-

tion first occurred, but also in any district in which th

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Appendix — McNab v. United States · 540 U.S. 1177 | Frix