Appendix — McNab v. United States
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_ > waprane Court, U8.
FILE®
03 622 ocr 24 2008
No.
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
DAVID HENSON MCNAB,
Petitioner,
V.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
_ Respondent.
On Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari
To The United States Court Of Appeals
For The Eleventh Circuit
APPENDIX TO PETITION
FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
WILLIAM W. WATTS, III MIGUEL A. ESTRADA
HUDSON & Watts, LLP Counsel of Record
P.O. Box 989 MARK A. PERRY
Mobile, AL 36601 WILLIAM M. JAY
(251) 432-7200 GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP
1050 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 955-8500
Counsel for Petitioner
ia
APPENDIX A: Opinion of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit,
filed March 21, 2003, amended, May 29,
an SEER OF ON TN AACE Neen BAT AEE la
APPENDIX B: Order on Motion for Pretrial De-
termination of Foreign and State Law,
United States District Court for the Southem
District of Alabama, filed October 12, 2000........ 44a
APPENDIX C: Order on Motions Based on
Honduran Law Developments, United States
District Court for the Southern District of
Alabama, filed August 28, 2001 .......ccccccccceccceceeee 66a
APPENDIX D: Order of the United States Court
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit Amend-
ing Panel Opinion and Denying Rehearing,
SOOO FEB 2, DE ses esssavs vce ssessivsvivesvnrvenvsnciaece: 77a
APPENDIX E: Judgment in a Criminal Case,
United States District Court for the Southern
District of Alabama, filed August 27, 2001 ......... 79a
APPENDIX F: Footnote 24 of Original Panel
Decision, Deleted on Rehearing, filed March
21, 2003, amended, May 29, 2003 ......ceccecccceceeceee 89a
APPENDIX G: Fifth Amendment to the United
SU CII aise ssescvsvisssvescvevevuvserssanavevesees 92a
APPENDIX H: 16 U.S.C. §§ 3372-3373 ...... ened 93a
APE BLE UBC. © 371 ccscescessccesssseovesveseeseees 10la
APPENDIX J: 18 U.S.C. § 545 (1994) .oocccecceceeees 102a
APPENDIX K: 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956-1957 (1994) ......104a
lla
APPENDIX L: Second Superseding Indictment,
United States District Court for the Southern
District of Alabama, filed Sept. 26, 2000...........
APPENDIX M: Excerpts of Transcript of For-
eign Law Hearing, United States District
Court for the Southern District of Alabama,
on September 27-29, 2000 .........:sscssesesresseseeees
APPENDIX N: Excerpts of Transcript of Tnal,
United States District Court for the Southern
District of Alabama, on October 23-27, 2000....
APPENDIX O: Government’s Trial Exhibit 26,
Anonymous Fax, dated February 3, 1999..........
APPENDIX P: Legal Opinion of Hector Ramon
Trochez, Attorney General of Honduras,
dated July 24, 2000 ........secsa:sssseeevenanstessvennesveces
APPENDIX Q: Declaration of Sergio Zavala
Leiva, Attorney General of Honduras, dated
May 13, 2002 .....0ss+.<s0s<sssencsusenesornennenenrnnennes
APPENDIX R: Opinion of the Honduran Court
of the First Instance of Administrative Law,
filed May 23, 2001 ........s0-ssssessensssesneeverssseneeenntes
APPENDIX S: Opinion of the Honduran Court
of Appeals of Administrative Matters, filed
October 15, ZOO1 ...cciisccsscscsnconninneenemnnaron
APPENDIX T: Special Report of Recommenda-
tions of the Honduran National Human
Rights Commissioner, dated November 8,
APPENDIX U: Report of the Honduran Minister
of Agriculture and Livestock, dated Novem-
Der 16, DUDE vsvciccecmmnnen Vaishnava
ilia
APPENDIX V: Certification of the Honduran
Minister of Agriculture and Livestock, dated
NN BR I op cremicpnvsosvansecnsessunvnnsssvnees
APPENDIX W: Diplomatic Note from Honduran
Embassy to United States Department of
State, dated January 23, ZO0Z..........00:0ce0sseerree
APPENDIX X: Acuerdo No. 0008-93, dated
I ania os dcchrasnelesenniuinieiuiennninchaniivwies
APPENDIX Y: The Fishing Law, Decree No.
Se ENE EB WI svssnssvccsisesensnsvavnecevsinsenes
APPENDIX Z: Resolution No. 030-95, dated
E.R ETE er es ED
APPENDIX AA: Decree No. 157-94, dated Janu-
NN aise hei hscahatebicaivaiestienwanvnoneriainvenind
APPENDIX BB: Decree No. 198-2001, dated
I aaa jasibediainnanieeeseunepasiiess
APPENDIX CC: Decree No. 245-2000, undated......
APPENDIX DD: Article 96 of the Constitution
ae SR a ee
APPENDIX EE: Article 205 of the Constitution
SA SE FUE eC OC
APPENDIX FF: Article 228 of the Constitution
i cnassabwabeoiel
APPENDIX GG: Articles 30-32 of the Honduran
Law of the Jurisdiction of Administrative
ERE ae Rae RE SO eon
la
APPENDIX A
[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
MARCH 21, 2003
THOMAS K. KAHN
CLERK
No. 01-15148
D. C. Docket No. 00-00079-CR-1-RV
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
DAVID HENSON MCNAB,
ROBERT D. BLANDFORD, et al., Defendants-
Appellants.
No. 02-10810
D. C. Docket No. 00-00079-CR-CB
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
ABNER SCHOENWETTER,
}
————
2a
ROBERT D. BLANDFORD, Defendants-
Appellants.
No. 02-11264
D. C. Docket No. 00-00079-CR-1-RV
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
DAVID HENSON MCNAB,
ABNER SCHOENWETTER, et al., Defendants-
Appellants.
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Alabama
(March 21, 2003)
(As Amended May 29, 2003)
Before HULL, WILSON and FAY, Circuit J udges.
WILSON, Circuit Judge:
The Court hereby substitutes the following opinion in
place of the opinion which was issued on March 21 , 2003.
David Henson McNab, Abner Schoenwetter, Robert D.
Blandford, and Diane H. Huang (collectively the defendants)
appeal the convictions and sentences they received after a
jury found them guilty of conspiracy, smuggling, money
laundering, and Lacey Act violations in connection with the
importation, sale, and purchase of Caribbean spiny lobsters
from Honduras. The defendants’ main argument on appeal is
that the district court erred in determining that the Honduran
laws that served as the underlying basis of their convictions
were valid and enforceable. The defendants contend that the
DR cae AU RS REN cma mneMnaeecamad
ee ee en
~~
3a
Honduran laws were invalid, and, therefore, there was no
violation of foreign law upon which to base their convic-
tions. '
The defendants’ challenge to the validity of the Honduran
laws requires us to undertake our own foreign law determina-
tion. Our task is complicated by conflicting representations
from Honduran officials regarding the validity of the Hondu-
ran laws. Throughout the investigation and trial, Honduran
officials offered support and assistance to the United States
government, and both the government and the district court
relied upon the Honduran officials’ verification of the Hon-
duran laws. Shortly after the defendants were convicted, the
Honduran government reversed its position; it currently re-
futes the validity of the laws it previously verified. There-
fore, we must decide whether our courts are bound by a for-
eign government’s new representations regarding the validity
of its laws when its new representations are issued only post-
conviction and directly contravene its original position upon
which the government and our courts relied and the jury
acted. This question is a matter of first impression in this
Circuit and apparently the other circuits as well. For the rea-
sons set forth below, we affirm the defendants’ convictions
and sentences.
The Lacey Act prohibits the importation of “fish or wild-
life taken, possessed, transported, or sold in violation of . . . any
foreign law.” 16 U.S.C. § 3372(a)(2)(A). If the lobsters were not
imported, transported, and sold in violation of Honduran law, there
could be no Lacey Act violations. Accordingly, if the lobsters
were brought into the United States legally and were not crimi-
nally-derived property, there could be no smuggling or money
laundering violations.
4a
BACKGROUND
On February 3, 1999, agents of the National Marine Fish-
eries Service (NMFS) received an anonymous facsimile,
which provided that McNab’s cargo transport vessel, the
M/V Caribbean Clipper, would arrive in Bayou la Batre,
Alabama on February 5, 1999, with a shipment of lobsters
containing “undersized (3&4 oz) lobster tails, [which was] a
violation of Honduran law.” The facsimile further provided
that Honduras prohibits the bulk exportation of lobsters and
requires that lobsters be packed in boxes for export.
In response to the anonymous tip, NMFS agents con-
sulted the Direccion General de Pesca y Acuicultura (DI-
GEPESCA) in Honduras’ regarding the legality of the lobster
shipment referenced in the facsimile. The NMFS agents
questioned whether the shipment violated the Lacey Act,
which makes it unlawful to import into the United States
“fish or wildlife [that has been] taken, possessed, transported,
or sold in violation of ... any foreign law.” 16 U.S.C.
§ 3372(a)(2)(A). In three separate letters responding to the
agents’ inquiry, the director general of the DIGEPESCA de-
scribed some of Honduras’s fishing laws and confirmed that
McNab’s shipment “ha[d] been illegally transported in viola-
tion of the Fishing Law, the Industrial and Hygienic Sanitary
Inspection Regulation for Fish Products and Resolution No.
030-95.” The director general provided authentic copies of
the applicable laws and stated that the DIGEPESCA was
ready to support all efforts by the government to prosecute
persons who violate the Lacey Act.
* The DIGEPESCA is the agency within Honduras’s Secre-
taria de Agricultura y Ganaderia (SAG) that is responsible for the
enforcement of the fishing laws and the execution of fishing pro-
grams.
OOOO eVOOOoOoOoOO| eee Se
Sa
In early March of 1999 NMFS agents seized the lobster
shipment that was referenced in the anonymous facsimile
based upon the director general’s assurances that the lobsters
had been exported in violation of Honduran law. Over the
next few months, NMFS agents communicated with Hondu-
ran officials about the Honduran laws and the legality of the
seized lobster shipment. In June of 1999 NMFS special
agents and an attorney in the United States National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration Office of the General
Counsel met with various Honduran officials from the Secre-
taria de Agricultura y Ganaderia (SAG) in Tegucigalpa,
Honduras. The minister, the vice minister, the director of
legal services, the director of legal affairs, the secretary gen-
eral of the SAG, the director general of the DIGEPESCA,
and the legal advisor for the Servicio Nacional de Sanidad
Agropecuaria (SENASA)’ confirmed that the lobsters had
been exported illegally without first being inspected and
processed. Furthermore, the Honduran officials confirmed
that there was a 5.5-inch size limit for lobster tails and that
all catches had to be reported to Honduran authorities. The
Honduran officials provided certified copies of the laws in
question. In September of 1999 NMFS agents inspected the
lobster shipment that had been seized earlier in the year. The
inspection confirmed that the seized lobsters were packed in
bulk plastic bags without being processed and revealed that a
significant number had a tail length that was less than the 5.5
inches required by the Honduran size limit restriction. In ad-
dition, many of the lobsters were egg-bearing or had their
eggs removed. In March of 2000 two Honduran officials, a
legal advisor in the Despacho Ministerial and a SAG legal
* Like the DIGEPESCA, the SENASA is an agency within
the SAG. The SENASA is responsible for the enforcement of hy-
giene laws and regulations.
6a
advisor, traveled to Alabama to meet with government prose-
cutors and investigators. Both legal advisors provided wnt-
ten statements that cited Resolution 030-95 as a valid law
regulating the lobster fishing industry. They also described
the processing requirements mandated by Regulation 0008-
93.* They further explained that Honduras prohibits the har-
vesting of egg-bearing lobsters. Based upon the NMFS’s
investigation and the verification of the applicable foreign
laws by the Honduran officials charged with regulating the
lobster fishing industry, the government decided to prosecute
the defendants for their roles in the illegal importing scheme.
Subsequently, the grand jury returned a forty-seven-count
second superseding indictment in September of 2000.° To
determine the validity of the relevant Honduran laws, the dis-
trict court conducted a pretrial hearing on foreign law in Sep-
tember of 2000. Most of the defendants’ evidence at the
hearing pertained to the validity of Resolution 030-95, which
Processing lobster tails involves several steps: thawing,
sorting, and grading the lobsters by quality and size; placing the
tails in individual plastic sleeves; and packing thern in boxes.
* The legal advisors cited Resolution 003-80 as authority for
the prohibition against harvesting or destroying egg-bearing lob-
sters. Resolution 003-80 is substantially similar to Article 70(3) of
the Fishing Law, as both laws prohibit the harvesting or destruc-
tion of lobster eggs. At the foreign law hearing, the government
acknowledged that it could not verify the publication of Resolution
003-80 in La Gaceta and therefore relied upon Article 70(3) as a
Lacey Act predicate.
6
Although the investigation focused initially upon the
seized shipment referenced in the facsimile, the indictment charged
the defendants with violations based upon numerous shipments of
lobsters between 1996 and 1999.
7a
established a 5.5-inch size limit for lobsters.’ At the gov-
ermment’s request, the minister of the SAG sent Secretary
General Liliana Patricia Paz, the SAG’s highest-ranking legal
official, to testify at the foreign law hearing. Secretary Gen-
eral Paz testified as to the validity of various laws and con-
firmed that Resolution 030-95, Regulation 0008-93, and Ar-
ticle 70(3) of the Fishing Law*® were in effect and legally
binding during the time period covered by the indictment.
She also explained the means by which a Honduran citizen
may seek the invalidation of a resolution in Honduras,’ and
she testified that no such proceeding regarding Resolution
030-95 had been initiated at that time. Persuaded by the tes-
timony of Secretary General Paz, the district court found that
the government met its burden of establishing the validity of
the Honduran laws that served as the predicates for the Lacey
” Two law professors, both experts in Honduran law, testi-
fied for the defendants. The defendants also submitted a number
of legal opinions from members of the Honduran legal community,
including the attorney general of Honduras and the regional prose-
cutor of the Fiscalia Especial Para la Defensa de la Constitucion,
and a declaration from a practicing Honduran attorney.
* The Fishing Law is a comprehensive statute regulating the
Honduran fishing industry. See Decreto No. 154, May 19, 1959,
La Gaceta, June 9, 1959.
The Honduran judicial system includes a separate adminis-
trative law court system in which disputes relating to administra-
tive matters are adjudicated. Among the procedures available in
the administrative court system is an action by a Honduran citizen
who claims to be affected adversely by some administrative rule to
seek a declaration that the rule is invalid. Such an action is first
brought in the Honduran Court of the First Instance of Administra-
tive Law. Decisions from that court may be appealed to the Hon-
duran Court of Appeals for Administrative Law.
8a
Act charges. Shortly after the foreign law hearing, a jury
trial was conducted, and the defendants were found guilty on
multiple counts."
After the trial, the defendants filed a number of motions
seeking to have their convictions overturned.'’ In the mo-
tions, they attacked the validity of the foreign laws underly-
ing their convictions, citing recent developments in Hondu-
ran law. In preparation for a hearing on the motions, an offi-
cial from the United States Department of Justice and agents
from the NMFS and the Federal Bureau of Investigation
traveled to Honduras in early August of 2001 to discuss the
defendants’ challenges to the validity of the Honduran laws.
They received affidavits from three Honduran government
officials, including Secretary General Paz, confirming the
validity of the laws the defendants were challenging. They
also received an affidavit from the minister of the SAG, stat-
ing that those Honduran government officials were author-
ized to provide advice on the enforcement and validity of the
laws. After the hearing, the district court dismissed each of
the defendants’ posttrial motions. Thereafter, in August of
2001, the district court sentenced McNab, Blandford, and
10
McNab was found guilty of conspiracy, smuggling, and
money laundering. Blandford was found guilty of conspiracy,
smuggling, Lacey Act violations, and money laundering, as well as
two lesser included offenses under the Lacey Act. Schoenwetter
was found guilty as charged for conspiracy and smuggling, and
Huang was found guilty as charged for conspiracy, Lacey Act vio-
lations, and false labeling.
11
The final set of motions included a motion to dismiss be-
cause the indictment failed to charge a crime, a motion for a new
trial based upon newly discovered evidence, and a motion for rede-
termination of foreign law based upon developments in Honduran
law.
9a
Schoenwetter to ninety-seven months of imprisonment and
Huang to twenty-four months of imprisonment.
After sentencing, the defendants appealed their convic-
tions based, in part, upon their contention that the Honduran
laws used as the predicates for the Lacey Act convictions
were invalid or void during the time period covered by the
indictment.'’ In December of 2001 a government attorney
and NMFS agents traveled to Honduras to discuss the defen-
dants’ new documents with Honduran officials to prepare the
government’s brief on appeal. Once again, the Honduran
officials confirmed their prior statements regarding the valid-
ity of the Honduran laws.
After the initial notice of appeal, the defendants obtained
additional support for their claim that the district court misinter-
preted Honduran law. As a result, they filed a Motion for Judicial
Notice, as well as alternative motions regarding newly issued
Honduran legal opinions with this Court. We denied those mo-
tions without prejudice and held that the motions could be renewed
if the district court refused to certify its intention to grant a new
trial pursuant to United States v. Ellsworth, 814 F.2d 613 (11th
Cir. 1987) (per curiam).
Based upon our order, in January of 2002 McNab filed a Mo-
tion for Order Certifying Intention to Grant New Trial Upon Re-
mand with the district court, which was subsequently adopted by
Blandford, Schoenwetter, and Huang. After initially denying the
motion, the district court granted the defendants’ motion for recon-
sideration. Upon reconsideration, the district court affirmed its
earlier order that it would not certify its intention to grant a new
trial. The defendants appeal that order and argue that the district
court erred in denying the motion to certify its intention to grant a
new tral upon remand. In light of our holding regarding the valid-
ity of the Honduran laws, we need not address this issue.
10a
The defendants raise a number of issues in these consoli-
dated appeals. First, they argue that the scope of the Lacey
Act is limited to foreign statutes and that the Honduran reso-
lutions and regulations listed in the indictment were used im-
properly as predicates for their convictions. Second, they
contend that the district court’s interpretation of the Hondu-
ran resolutions and regulations was erroneous and that the
Honduran laws that served as predicates for the convictions
were invalid. Third, McNab argues that the district court
abused its discretion by excluding evidence at trial relating to
his “knowledge” of Honduran law. Fourth, the defendants
assert that the district court made several errors with respect
to the jury instructions. Fifth, they contend that the jury’s
verdicts were based upon insufficient evidence. Finally,
Schoenwetter and Blandford argue that the district court
erred in failing to postpone their sentencing and in determin-
ing the length of their sentences.
DISCUSSION
I. Scope of the Lacey Act
The first issue we address is whether the phrase “any for-
eign law” in the Lacey Act includes foreign regulations and
other legally binding provisions that have the force and effect
of law. The defendants argue that the phrase “any foreign
law” should be read to mean foreign statutes and not foreign
regulations or provisions that are legally binding. According
to their argument, Resolution 030-95 and Regulation 0008-
93 do not fall within the scope of the Lacey Act, because
they are not statutes.’ They rely upon what they consider a
' The parties do not dispute the following explanation of the
Honduran legal framework:
The Government of Honduras is a constitutional repub-
lic. Its legal system is generally under the continental or civil
[Footnote continued on next page]
lla
distinction by Congress between “any law or regulation of
any State” and “any foreign law.” 16 U.S.C.
§ 3372(a)(2)(A). The defendants argue that by failing to in-
clude foreign regulations explicitly, Congress intended that
only foreign statutes could serve as the basis for a foreign
law Lacey Act violation. .
In accordance with the plain meaning doctrine, “[w]e be-
gin our construction of ... [the Lacey Act] where courts
| should always begin the process of legislative interpretation,
and where they often should end it as well, which is with the
words of the statutory provision.” Harris v. Garner, 216
F.3d 970, 972 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc), cert. denied, 532
U.S. 1065 (2001); United States v. Gilbert, 198 F.3d 1293,
Pia Rer i nedene RU AOL
[Footnote continued from previous page]
law system .... [T]he Constitution is the supreme law of the
Republic.
en te ee Re tac ENE Lap tl a a
The adoption of statutes in Honduras (issued as “De-
i crees”) is the exclusive prerogative of the National Congress.
i At the same time, the Constitution ... vests in the Executive
; Branch the exclusive authority to issue “Regulations[.”]
Regulations (issued in the form of “Acuerdos”—in English,
“Accords” or “Decisions” or “Agreements”) are general rules
of conduct applicable to all who may be affected by them and
they have the force of law. The Constitution provides that
Regulations may be issued only by the President of the Re-
public with the co-signature of the Secretary of State. [sic]
(i.e. Chief Minister) of the pertinent ministry. Both statutes
and regulations become effective only when they are pub-
lished in La Gaceta, which is the Honduran equivalent of the
Federal Register.
Br. of Amicus Curiae of the Embassy of Honduras and the Asocia-
cion de Pescadores del Caribe in Supp. of Def.-Appellant David
Henson McNab at 8-9 (citations omitted).
| |
12a
1298 (11th Cir. 1999). It is well established that “Tw]hen the
words of a statute are unambiguous .. . [the] judicial inquiry
is complete.” CBS Inc. v. PrimeTime 24 Joint Venture, 245
F.3d 1217, 1222 (11th Cir. 2001) (first alteration in original)
(internal quotation marks omitted); see also Conn. Nat'l
Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54 (1992) (“[C]ourts
must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it
means and means in a statute what it says there.”). When,
however, “the language is ambiguous or leads to absurd re-
sults, .. . [we] may consult the legislative history and discern
the true intent of Congress.” United States v. Kattan-Kassin,
696 F.2d 893, 895 (11th Cir. 1983)."*
With this guidance in mind, we examine the language of
the Lacey Act. The Lacey Act provides that “[i]t is unlawful
for any person . . . to import, export, transport, sell, receive,
acquire, or purchase in interstate or foreign commerce ...
any fish or wildlife taken, possessed, transported, or sold in
violation of any law or regulation of any State or in violation
of any foreign law.” 16 U.S.C. § 3372(a)(2)(A). The Act
defines “law” as those “/aws . . . which regulate the taking,
possession, importation, exportation, transportation, or sale
of fish or wildlife or plants.” 16 U.S.C. § 3371(d) (emphasis
added).
14
We note that although a court may resort to extrinsic mate-
rials if the statutory language is ambiguous or if the interpretation
causes absurd results, only the latter is a true exception to the plain
meaning rule. CBS Inc., 245 F.3d at 1227 (“Stating that ambiguity
establishes an exception, instead of disestablishes the predicate for
the rule, confuses things.”).
OO ——————————— ee ES —_— —=—”-
— er
13a
Unfortunately, the statutory definition defines the word
“law” by using the word “laws.”'* While the definition is
helpful in determining what the “law” must regulate, it is si-
lent as to whether “law” is restricted to statutes or includes
regulations and other provisions that foreign governments
use to promulgate legally binding rules. Thus, we turn first
to the common usage or ordinary meaning of the word “law”
to determine its plain meaning. Cf Consol. Bank, N.A. v.
Jnited States Dep’t of the Treasury, 118 F.3d 1461, 1464
(11th Cir. 1997) (“In the absence of a statutory definition of a
term, we look to the common usage of words for their mean-
ing.”). “[T]o determine the common usage or ordinary
meaning of a term, courts often turn to dictionary definitions
for guidance.” See CBS Inc., 245 F.3d at 1223.
Merriam Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary provides sev-
eral definitions of law, including “a binding custom or prac-
tice of a community: a rule of conduct or action prescribed or
formally recognized as binding or enforced by a controlling
authority” and “the whole body of such customs, practices, or
rules.” Merriam Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 659 (Fre-
derick C. Mish et al. eds., 10th ed. 1996). Under these broad
definitions of the word “law,” the phrase “any foreign law”
PA oem iA CNR, Bove A
'S Section 3371(d) provides in full, “The terms ‘law,’
‘treaty,’ ‘regulation,’ and ‘Indian tribal law’ mean laws, treaties,
regulations or Indian tribal laws which regulate the taking, posses-
sion, importation, exportation, transportation, or sale of fish or
wildlife or plants.” 16 U.S.C. § 3371(d).
We read the word “law” to refer to laws “which regulate the
taking, possession, importation, exportation, transportation, or sale
of fish or wildlife or plants,” and the word “treaty” to refer to trea-
i ties “which regulate the taking, possession, importation, exporta-
tion, transportation, or sale of fish or wildlife or plants,” and so
forth.
l4a
incorporates the Honduran decrees and regulations at issue.
See United States v. 594,464 Pounds of Salmon, 871 F.2d
824, 826 (9th Cir. 1989).
On the other hand, there are more narrow definitions of
the word “law” that also are commonly used. Black’s Law
Dictionary provides several definitions of the word “law,”
including one that defines law simply as “[a] statute.”
Black’s Law Dictionary 889 (Bryan A. Gamer et al. eds., 7th
ed. 1999). This definition is plausible when the phrase “any
foreign law” is read in conjunction with the rest of
§ 3372(a)(2)(A). For example, the defendants assert that
“any foreign law” can refer only to foreign statutes, because
to read “any foreign law” to include regulations would render
the word “regulation” in the earlier phrase “any law or regu-
lation of any State” meaningless.'®
While the defendants advocate this interpretation of the
statute, it is not the only reasonable one. Another is that
Congress intended to punish violations of state laws and state
regulations and to punish violations of foreign laws, what-
ever form those foreign laws may take. The Ninth Circuit, in
explaining why it interpreted “any foreign law” to cover dif-
ferent forms of foreign laws, emphasized how the world’s
diverse legal systems defy easy definition or categorization.
It noted,
[B]jecause of the wide range the forms of law
may take given the world’s many diverse legal
and governmental systems, Congress would
be hard-pressed to set forth a definition that
16 “A basic premise of statutory construction is that a statute
is to be interpreted so that no words shall be discarded as being
meaningless, redundant, or mere surplusage.” United States v.
Canals-Jimenez, 943 F.2d 1284, 1287 (11th Cir. 1991).
ee OM ee |
i a pee eeaie
15a
would adequately encompass all of them... .
Thus, if Congress had sought to define “any
foreign law” with any kind of specificity
whatsoever, it might have effectively immu-
nized . . . [conduct] under the Act despite vio-
lation of conservation laws of a large portion
of the world’s regimes that possess systems of
law and government that defy easy definition
or categorization.
594,464 Pounds of Salmon, 871 F.2d at 827-28. In other
words, the argument is that Congress specifically chose to
limit domestic law to statutes and regulations, but specifi-
cally chose to use the language “any foreign law” to cover
the wide varieties of laws in foreign countries.
The net result is that there are several reasonable ways to
interpret the word “law” in the phrase “any foreign law.” As
a result of this ambiguity, we look beyond the language of
the statute to determine legislative intent. We thus now look
to the legislative history of the Lacey Act to ascertain Con-
gress’s intent. Fed. Reserve Bank of Atlanta v. Thomas, 220
F.3d 1235, 1239 (11th Cir. 2000). “In trying to learn Con-
gressional intent by examining the legislative history of a
statute, we look to the purpose the original enactment served,
the discussion of statutory meaning in committee reports, the
effect of amendments whether accepted or rejected and the
remarks in debate preceding passage.” Rogers y. Frito-Lay,
Inc., 611 F.2d 1074, 1080 (Sth Cir. 1980).'’ The Lacey Act
was introduced by Representative John F. Lacey of Iowa in
ich eee lta heared Se AERA eS RIS OLA ROE seh NA tlh DE I Re ST | aren
stihl titi ited
'7 In Bonner vy. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th
Cir. 1981) (en banc), we adopted as binding precedent all decisions
of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to the close of busi-
ness on September 30, 1981.
l6a
- 1900. H.R. Rep. No. 97-276, at 7 (1981) (discussing the en-
actment of the Lacey Act). Representative Lacey recognized
that individual states were unable to protect their wildlife,
because their laws did not reach into neighboring states. Jd.
Thus, he asserted that a federal law was necessary to outlaw
the interstate traffic in wildlife illegally taken from their state
of origin."® Jd. By 1981 Congress recognized the need to
strengthen the Lacey Act in response to “the massive illegal
trade in fish, wildlife and plants.” 127 Cong. Rec. 17,327
(1981) (remarks of Senator Lincoln Chafee). Congress thus
amended the Lacey Act in 1981 “to correct ... insufficien-
cies” in the Act and “to simplify administration and enforce-
ment.”!? §S. Rep. No. 97-123, at 2 (1981), reprinted in +981
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1748, 1749.
Although there are certain parts of the legislative history
of the Lacey Act that support the defendants’ position to
some extent, the legislative history reflects that “the [main]
thrust of Congress’s intention in amending the Act was to
expand its scope and enhance its deterrence effect.””
18
In 1935 the Lacey Act was amended to include foreign law
because of concern over the illegal marketing of wildlife from
other countries. H.R. Rep. No. 97-276, at 7.
'9 The Lacey Act Amendments of 1981 combined the Lacey
Act of 1900 and the Black Bass Act of 1926. 127 Cong. Rec.
26,537 (1981) (remarks of Representative John Breaux). The
Black Bass Act was similar to the Lacey Act in that it prohibited
the interstate transportation of fish taken in violation of state or
foreign law. See 127 Cong. Rec. 17,329 (remarks of Senator How-
ard Baker).
20 The defendants point to the fact that the pre-1981 Lacey
Act prohibited trade in wildlife taken in violation of “any law or
regulation of any State or foreign country,” but that now the Lacey
Act does not refer to foreign laws and regulations. “While the leg-
[Footnote continued on next page]
3
a
:
;
17a
594,464 Pounds of Salmon, 871 F.2d at 828. Indeed, Con-
gress clearly stated that the amendments were meant to
strengthen the existing wildlife protection laws and to “pro-
vide [the government] the tools needed to effectively control
the massive illegal trade in fish, wildlife and plants.” 127
Cong. Rec. 17,327 (remarks of Senator Chafee); see also 127
Cong. Rec. 26,537 (1981) (remarks of Representative John
Breaux). The Senate Report provided that the amendments
“would allow the Federal Government to provide more ade-
quate support for the full range of State, foreign and Federal
laws that protect wildlife.” S. Rep. No. 97-123, at 4. The
amendments were intended to “raise both the civil and crimi-
nal penalties of the current laws and target commercial viola-
tors and international traffickers.” 127 Cong. Rec. 17,328
(remarks of Senator Chafee). By strengthening the penalty
provisions of the Lacey Act, Congress intended “to give the
Federal Government stronger enforcement tools to stop the
large-scale importation and taking of fish ... which enjoy
protection under other foreign ... laws.” Jd. at 17,329 (re-
marks of Senator James Strom Thurmond).
Our examination of the legislative history of the Lacey
Act leads us to the conclusion that Congress by no means
intended to limit the application of the Act by its adoption of
the 1981 amendments. The defendants’ interpretation is un-
tenable, because it would restrict the application of the Lacey
Act unduly and would thwart Congress’s stated goal of
strengthening the Act by amending it in 1981. See id. at
17,328 (remarks of Senator Chafee). Their narrow interpre-
tation of the phrase “any foreign law” would prevent the
[Footnote continued from previous page]
islative history is not totally one-sided, the thrust of Congress’s
intention in amending the Act was to expand its scope and enhance
its deterrence effect.” 594,464 Pounds of Salmon, 871 F.2d at 828.
18a
wildlife conservation laws of many countries from serving as
the basis for Lacey Act violations and would limit the Act’s
utility. We therefore conclude that regulations and other
such legally binding provisions that foreign governments
may promulgate to protect wildlife are encompassed by the
phrase “any foreign law” in the Lacey Act.”! See United
States v. Lee, 937 F.2d 1388, 1391-92 (9th Cir. 1991) (hold-
ing that a Taiwanese fishing regulation constituted “foreign
law”); 594,464 Pounds of Salmon, 871 F.2d at 828 (holding
the same).
As we have determined that the phrase “any foreign law”
includes nonstatutory provisions such as Resolution 030-95
and Regulation 0008-93, we now turn to the defendants’ ar-
gument that their convictions were based upon the district
court’s erroneous interpretation of foreign law.
Il. Honduran Laws
The defendants contend that the Honduran laws that
served as predicates for their convictions were invalid. Spe-
cifically, they argue that (1) Resolution 030-95, which estab-
lished a 5.5-inch size limit for lobsters, never had the effect
of law, because it was promulgated improperly and has been
21 The defendants also argue that because the Lacey Act is
ambiguous as to the meaning of “any foreign law,” the rule of len-
ity requires that any doubt be resolved in their favor. Lenity, how-
ever, is “reserved ... for those situations in which a reasonable
doubt persists about a statute’s intended scope even after resort to
the language and structure, legislative history, and motivating poli-
cies of the statute.” Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 108
(1990) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also United States v.
Curry, 902 F.2d 912, 915 (11th Cir. 1990). As our examination of
the legislative history clarifies the purpose of and motivation be-
hind the Lacey Act, the defendants’ invocation of the rule of lenity
fails.
wa me,
Pee ee re <
19a
declared void by the Honduran courts; (2) Regulation 0008-
93, which established inspection and processing requirements
for the lobster fishing industry, was repealed in 1995, prior to
the time period covered by the indictment; and (3) Article
70(3), which prohibits the harvesting and destruction of lob-
ster eggs, was misinterpreted by the district court and was
repealed retroactively in 2001.
As the defendants were found guilty of conspiracy under
a general verdict, there is no way to know which Honduran
law the jury relied upon m determining their guilt. Thus, if
any of the three Honduran laws that the defendants challenge
were invalid during the time period covered by the indict-
ment, the defendants’ convictions must be reversed.” See
Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 376 (1988) (In criminal
cases, “the [Supreme] Court consistently has followed the
rule that the jury’s verdict must be set aside if it could be
supported on one ground but not on another, and the review-
ing court was uncertain which of the two grounds was relied
upon by the jury in reaching the verdict.”’).
We review a district court’s interpretation of foreign law
de novo. United States v. Gecas, 120 F.3d 1419, 1424 (11th
*? The government acknowledges that the rule stated above
generally is true, but argues that the defendants are estopped from
benefitting from that general rule because they “objected to a spe-
cial verdict form and requested general verdicts.” We disagree.
The record indicates that the only objection to the special verdict
forms was made by Blandford’s attorney, who initially stated that
he did not “like” the special interrogatories. Upon hearing the
government’s explanations for the special verdict forms, none of
the defendants made any further objections. Thus, the district
court declined to use the government’s special verdict forms sua
sponte, apparently because it considered them too complicated for
the jury members to use in their deliberations.
20a
Cir. 1997) (en banc). Our determination of foreign law is
complicated by the posttrial shift in the Honduran govern-
ment’s position regarding the validity of the laws at issue in
this case.” The Honduran government now maintains that
the laws were invalid at the time of the lobster shipments or
have been repealed retroactively. Thus, we must decide
whether we are bound by the Honduran government’s current
position regarding the validity of these laws, or whether we
are free to follow the Honduran government’s original posi-
tion.
As we begin our analysis, we must make clear that the
crux of this case is the validity of the Honduran laws during
the time period covered by the indictment. Much of the de-
fendants’ arguments focus upon the fact that none of the laws
are currently valid; however, their reliance upon the current
invalidity of the laws is misplaced. “Although Lacey Act
offenses are predicated upon violations of [foreign] law, the
statute nowhere states that a viable or prosecutable [foreign]
law violation is necessary to support federal charges. In-
stead, the Act simply requires that the fish or wildlife have
been obtained in violation of any [foreign] law... .” United
States v. Borden, 10 F.3d 1058, 1062 (4th Cir. 1993) (internal
quotation marks omitted). The reference to foreign law in
23 Despite the fact that Honduran officials supported the gov-
ernment throughout the investigation and trial of this case, the
Embassy of Honduras filed an amicus curiae brief in support of
McNab.
4 In Borden, two state statutes served as the predicates for
‘the Lacey Act violations. 10 F.3d at 1062. The defendant “con-
tend[ed] that his indictment [wa]s invalid because the one-year
statute of limitations for the predicate state offenses had expired by
the time the indictment was returned.” Jd. He argued that the state
statute of limitations governed Lacey Act violations, “because the
[Footnote continued on next page]
os
2la
the Lacey Act is there to define what constitutes illegal con-
duct. Thus, the subsequent invalidation of the underlying
foreign laws does not make the defendants any less culpable
for their actions. If the laws were valid in Honduras during
the time period covered by the indictment, the defendants
violated the Lacey Act by importing the lobsters in violation
of those laws. Whatever changes in the laws occurred after
the lobsters were imported into the United States illegally
have no effect on the defendants’ convictions.
In a Lacey Act prosecution, once the district court deter-
mines the validity of a foreign law during a given time pe-
riod, it is up to the government to prove that the defendants
knowingly violated those laws. United States v. Todd, 735
F.2d 146, 151 (Sth Cir. 1984). The initial foreign law deter-
mination, however, is a question of law for the court. See
Fed. R. Crim. P. 26.1. “The court, in determining foreign
law, may consider any relevant material or source, including
testimony, whether or not submitted by a party or admissible
under the Federal Rules of Evidence.” Jd. Among the most
logical sources for the court to look to in its determination of
foreign law are the foreign officials charged with enforcing
the laws of their country. The district court, in the course of
a Lacey Act prosecution, is entitled to rely upon such repre-
sentations by foreign officials as to the validity of their gov-
ermment’s laws. The court reasonably may assume that
[Footmote continued from previous page]
existence of a prosecutable violation of state law [wa]s necessary
to support a Lacey Act indictment.” Jd. The Fourth Circuit con-
cluded that even though the Lacey Act “incorporates the substan-
tive elements of state law,” “it is not designed to incorporate state
procedural law.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus,
although the state statute of limitations had run on the state of-
fense, the defendant’s indictment still was valid.
22a
statements from foreign officials are a reliable and accurate
source and may use such statements as a basis for its deter-
mination of the validity of foreign laws during a given time
period.”
When, however, a foreign government changes its origi-
nal position regarding the validity of its laws after a defen-
dant has been convicted, our courts are not required to revise
25 Although the amici suggest that the government used im-
proper procedures, such as seeking out midlevel employees who
were not authorized to render opinions on behalf of the Honduran
government in its effort to ascertain the applicable Honduran laws,
the record indicates quite the contrary. On February 9, 1999, an
NMFS agent sent a formal request to the deputy director of the
DIGEPESCA seeking information regarding the legality of the
lobster referenced in the anonymous facsimile. The director gen-
eral of the DIGEPESCA sent two letters to the NMFS in response
to the inquiry. In his first letter, dated February 12, 1999, the di-
rector general described some of the Honduran laws governing the
lobster industry, including Resolution 030-95. In a second letter,
dated February 25, 1999, the director general confirmed that the
lobsters “ha[d] been illegally transported in violation of the Fish-
ing Law, the Industrial and Hygienic Sanitary Inspection Regula-
tion for Fish Products and Resolution No. 030-95” and included
copies of the laws. The director general further stated the he sup-
ported all efforts “to legally prosecute natives or legalized Ameri-
cans that violate the articles of the Lacey Act.” The letter was cop-
ied to the minister and vice minister of the SAG. In addition, SAG
Minister Guillermo Alvarado Downing confirmed in an affidavit
that Secretary General Paz could “provide the necessary advice
about and explanation of the enforcement and validity of Honduran
laws, and especially the fisheries laws enforced by this Ministry.”
Thus, it is clear that the government conducted its investigation
properly through the Honduran officials who were responsible for
interpreting, enforcing, and applying the fishing laws of Honduras.
23a
their prior determinations of foreign law solely upon the ba-
sis of the foreign government’s new position. There must be
some finality with representations of foreign law by foreign
governments. Given the inevitable political changes that take
place in foreign governments, if courts were required to
maintain compliance with a foreign government’s position,
we would be caught up in the endless task of redetermining
foreign law.
In this case, the government solicited and received the as-
sistance of the SAG and the DIGEPESCA during the investi-
gation of the legality of the lobster shipments. From the ear-
liest stages of the investigation until after the defendants
were convicted, the statements from the SAG were consistent
with the government’s understanding of the laws. After the
defendants were convicted, however, certain events in Hon-
duras induced the Honduran government to refute its original
statements. The newly issued statements and opinions of
Honduran officials, however, do not persuade us that the dis-
trict court erred in its determination that the Honduran laws
at issue were valid and enforced during the time period cov-
ered by the indictment.
By our decision today, we do not mean to impinge upon
any foreign government’s sovereignty. Honduras has every
right to invalidate and repeal the laws at issue in this case.
The district courts and the government of the United States,
however, have the right to rely upon the Honduran govern-
ment’s original verifications of its laws. We must have con-
sistency and reliability from foreign governments with re-
spect to the validity of their laws. Otherwise, there never
could be any assurance when undertaking a Lacey Act prose-
cution for violations of foreign law that a conviction will not
be invalidated at some later date if the foreign government
changes its laws. Acceptance of the Honduran government’s
current interpretation of its laws as determinative of the va-
lidity of the laws would set the foundation for future Lacey
ecstatic
24a
Act defendants to seek post-conviction invalidation of the
underlying foreign laws. Although such is not the case here,
it is not difficult to imagine a Lacey Act defendant in the fu-
ture, who has the means and connections in a foreign coun-
try, lobbying and prevailing upon that country’s officials to
invalidate a particular law serving as the basis for his convic-
tion in the United States. Such a scenario would completely
undermine the purpose of the Lacey Act. There would cease
to be any reason to enforce the Lacey Act, at least with re- ©
spect to foreign law violations, if every change of position by
a foreign government as to the validity of its laws could in-
validate a conviction.
Thus, we conclude that the postconviction shift in the
Honduran government’s position regarding the validity of its
laws is not determinative as to whether the laws were valid at
the time the lobsters were imported into the United States.
We now examine each law in turn to determine whether each
was valid during the time period covered by the indictment.
Resolution 030-95
Resolution 030-95, the law establishing the 5.5-inch size
limit for lobsters, provides for sanctions for noncompliance
with its terms. See Resolucion No. 030-95, Dec. 5, 1995, La
Gaceta, Jan. 4, 1996. The defendants argue that Resolution
030-95 never was a binding law,”° because it was not issued
in accordance with Honduran constitutional procedure.
6 This argument is inconsistent with McNab’s prior ac-
knowledgment of the validity of the 5.5-inch size limit and his in-
structions to his lobster boat captains to abide by it. In a letter to
his fishing boat captains, dated October 28, 1999, McNab advised
that “[iJt is absolutely prohibited to capture lobsters under the size
allowed by the Law and/or eggbearing lobsters.... You will only
keep those tobsters measuring more than 5.5-inches.” A second
[Footnote continued on next page]
25a
The basis for the defendants’ argument that Resolution
030-95 never was a valid law is an opinion from the Hondu-
ran’ Court of the First Instance of Administrative Law.”’ In
May of 2001 the Honduran administrative law court found
that Resolution 030-95 had been promulgated through an in-
correct procedure and ordered that the resolution was “en-
tirely voided, but this is only for purposes of [its] annulment
and future inapplicability: This Resolution does not confer
any right to claims.” R. at 5:324 Ex. B (emphasis added).
Subsequently, the Honduran Court of Appeals for Adminis-
trative Law affirmed the lower court’s decision invalidating
Resolution 030-95. R. at 1 Supp.:415 Ex. C.
[Footnote continued from previous page]
letter was sent to the fishing boat captains by the general manager
of McNab’s company on July 31, 2000. The captains were “re-
minded to comply with the sizes and weights that the lobster
caught must fulfill, which is 5 % inches.”
Furthermore, throughout the investigation and after the trial,
Honduran officials repeatedly confirmed that Resolution 030-95
was a valid and binding law. The director general of the DIGEP-
ESCA confirmed the size limit requirement in three separate let-
ters. Resolution 030-95 was cited by several Honduran officials as _
a valid and binding law during two trips to Honduras by NMFS
agents, one before and one after the defendants’ trial. Secretary
General Paz testified as to the validity of Resolution 030-95 during
the pretrial foreign law hearing. Thus, it is evident that Resolution
030-95 was considered binding by those responsible for its en-
forcement.
*” After the trial in the district court had begun, McNab filed
a petition in the Honduran Court of the First Instance of Adminis-
trative Law, seeking to annul Resolution 030-95 on the grounds
that the resolution had not been signed by the Honduran president
before being issued and that it should have been issued as a decree
rather than as a resolution.
26a
There are conflicting opinions from Honduran officials as
to the effect of the court’s annulment of Resolution 030-95
on the defendants’ convictions.” While we certainly respect
28 The affidavit of the assistant attorney general of Honduras
indicates that the decision annulling Resolution 030-95 does not
apply retroactively and does not legalize the shipments of under-
sized lobsters retroactively. The ettorney general of Honduras,
however, offers an alternative explanation for the prospective lan-
guage in the court’s decision that favors the defendants. He con-
tends that Resolution 030-95 was annulled ab initio, that it never
was a valid law and, therefore, cannot serve as a basis for the de-
fendants’ convictions. Although the dissent accepts his explana-
tion that Resolution 030-95 never was binding and that the pro-
spective language merely protects the Honduran government from
civil liability, we believe that the attorney general is extracting
meaning from the Honduran court’s decision that is not supported
by the language of the opinion. In addition, although a report from
the Honduran national human rigits commissioner advised that
Secretary General Paz’s testimony be disqualified as legal error
and that Resolution 030-95 be declared void retroactively, a subse-
quent meeting between the commissioner and an NMFS agent re-
vealed that the commissioner was unaware of the factual back-
ground of the prosecution at the tine he rendered his report. Fur-
thermore, the commissioner said that he felt “pressured” by
McNab’s representatives to issue a quick decision.
McNab points to the statemeat of SAG Minister Downing to
support his assertion that aside from Article 96 of the Honduran
Constitution, the Honduran appdlate court’s decision mandates
retroactivity. Downing bases his opinion that the invalidation ap-
plies retroactively upon an inexplicable assertion that the Hondu-
ran appellate court’s opinion “expands” the Honduran Court of the
First Instance of Administrative Law’s opinion and somehow
mandates retroactivity. We, however, find nothing in the Hondu-
[Footnote continued on next page]
|
27a
the opinions of the Honduran officials, we base our determi-
nation that Resolution 030-95 was valid during the time pe-
riod covered by the indictment upon the Honduran court’s
opinion. The Honduran court clearly stated that Resolution
030-95 was annulled for prospective application only, and we
assume that the Honduran court meant what it said. Al-
though we recognize that Resolution 030-95 is now invalid,
we see nothing in the Honduran court’s opinion to indicate
that the nullification should be applied retroactively.” In
fact, the decision mandates prospective application.*° Thus,
[Footnote continued from previous page]
ran appellate court’s decision requiring retroactivity, because the
Honduran appellate court issued a summary affirmance.
°° We note that with the permission and approval of the min-
ister of the SAG, both Secretary General Paz and SAG Legal Ad-
visor Jose Bernardo Torres Umanzor confirmed that the Honduran
government continued to enforce Resolution 030-95 as a valid and
binding law while the appeal was pending before the Honduran
Court of Appeals for Administrative Law. They also explained
that any annulment of Resolution 030-95 would not be retroactive,
because the Honduran court’s judgment pertained to an administra-
tive matter, not a criminal matter.
°° We briefly address the defendants’ argument that the Hon-
duran Constitution requires that the invalidation of Resolution 030-
95 be applied retroactively in this case. Article 96 of the Honduran
Constitution provides, “The Law does not have retroactive effect,
except in penal matters when the new law favors the delinquent or
the person that is prosecuted.” Constitucién de la Republica de
Honduras art. 96. Article 96, however, has no application in this
case. The reason that we look to foreign law in Lacey Act prose-
cutions is to determine what constitutes illegal conduct. At the
time of the defendants’ conduct, harvesting lobsters under 5.5
inches was a violation of Resolution 030-95. The fact that Hondu-
ras now may not hold the defendants liable for past shipments that
[Foomote continued on next page]
28a
Resolution 030-95 is a valid predicate for the defendants’
convictions.”
[Footnote continued from previous page]
contained undersized lobsters does not change the fact that those
shipments violated then-valid Honduran laws and the Lacey Act.
The government’s evidence, both pretrial and posttrial, indi-
cates that because the Honduran court’s judgment about Resolu-
tion 030-95 involved an administrative matter and not a is a crimi-
na! matter it has no retroactive effect. Although McNab’s evi-
dence, submitted postconviction, may indicate a contrary view, it
is clear that a consensus has not been reached on this issue in Hon-
duras. Nevertheless, we still must determine the best reading of
the laws. See United States v. Mitchell, 985 F.2d 1275, 1281 (4th
Cir. 1993) (“Perhaps, as is the case with many of our own laws, a
consensus has not yet been reached in Pakistan. Yet we are
charged with determining the best reading of the laws.”).
In our judgment, the government’s evidence and a plain lan-
guage reading of Article 96 require us to find that Article 96 does
not apply in this case and that the invalidation of Resolution 030-
95 applies prospectively. Article 96 expressly provides that “[t]he
Law does not have retroactive effect.” This is consistent with the
Honduran court’s judgment that the invalidation of Resolution
030-95 be applied prospectively. The only exception under Article
96 is a “new law” in criminal matters.
McNab’s view requires a finding that “[t]he Law” in Article
96 applies to judicial declarations of the invalidity of an existing
law as opposed to the enactment or promulgation of a “new law.”
The language of Article 96 does not support this view. In the sec-
ond clause of the sentence, Article 96 specifically refers to a “new
law” that favors the accused. It does not refer to the absence of a
law or a declaration that a law is invalid.
31 The dissent concedes that reversal of the defendants’ con-
victions is not required if the invalidation applies prospectively.
[Footnote continued on next page]
29a
Regulation 0008-93
Regulation 0008-93 was issued pursuant to Decree 40
and required that lobsters be inspected and processed in
Honduras prior to exportation. See Acuerdo No. 0008-93,
Jan. 13, 1993, La Gaceta, Apr. 7, 1993. In January of 1995
the Congreso Nacional enacted Decree 157-94, which re-
pealed and replaced several existing statutes, including De-
cree 40. See Decreto No. 157-94, Nov. 15, 1994, La Gaceta,
Jan. 13, 1995. In December of 1999 the Secretaria de Recur-
sos Naturales y Ambiente issued Accord 1081-99, an admin-
istrative regulation that contained updated inspection and
processing requirements and expressly repealed Regulation
0008-93. See Acuerdo No. 1081-99, Sept. 23, 1999, La
Gaceta, Dec. 2, 1999.
On the basis of their posttrial research, the defendants ar-
gue that Regulation 0008-93 was repealed along with Decree
40 in 1995.*° They contend that the repeal of Decree 40 op-
[Footnote continued from previous page]
Further, the dissent concedes that “the language of the Honduran
Court could be construed to mean prospective application only.”
We conclude that the language of the Honduran court opinions
requires prospective application only and that nothing else in the
record mandates otherwise.
* The defendants also raise a second challenge with respect
to the propriety of Regulation 0008-93 as a Lacey Act predicate.
They argue that even if Regulation 0008-93 were not repealed until
1999 it falls outside the scope of the Lacey Act, because it is not a
law regulating the taking, possessing, transportation, or sale of
wildlife. We disagree. When Congress amended the Lacey Act in
1981, it expressly stated that the Act covers laws “relating or refer-
ring to fish or wildlife or plants.” S. Rep. No. 97-123, at 5; see
also United States v. Lewis, 240 F.3d 866, 869 (10th Cir. 2001)
(per curiam); Lee, 937 F.2d at 1392. Accordingly, our review of
[Footnote continued on next page]
30a
erated to repeal the regulations promulgated under it, includ-
ing Regulation 0008-93. The defendants argue that the auto-
matic repeal of regulations triggered by the repeal of the stat-
ute under which those regulations were promulgated is a
longstanding principle of Honduran law, and they rely upon a
recent interpretive decree by the Congreso Nacional for sup-
port. See Decreto No. 198-2001, Nov. 1, 2001. That decree
expressly provides that “the express total or partial repeal of
a law leaves without legal value or effect the general regula-
tions and the specific regulations totally ... that the Execu-
tive Branch through the respective Secretariat of State has
issued to implement the provisions of the repealed Law... .”
Id.
We are unconvinced by the defendants’ argument for two
reasons. First, we question why there is a need to issue an
interpretive decree if the concept of an automatic repeal of
regulations is such a longstanding principle of Honduran
law? Second, Regulation 0008-93 was repealed expressly
[Footnote continued from previous page]
the regulation confirms that it unquestionably relates to fish and is
within the scope of the Lacey Act.
33. The evidence in the record contradicts this assertion and
establishes that the Honduran government regarded the hygiene
regulation as valid between the time of the 1995 repeal of Decree
40 and the 1999 express repeal of Regulation 0008-93. The March
of 2000 statements by the Honduran legal advisors described the
processing requirements mandated by Regulation 0008-93 and
Decree 157-94, the very same decree that the defendants contend
repealed Regulation 0008-93 in 1995. At the pretrial foreign law
hearing, the SAG’s Secretary General Paz testified as to the valid-
ity of the processing and inspection requirements. Secretary Gen-
eral Paz stated that Regulation 0008-93 continued to be enforced in
Honduras, because it was only tacitly repealed in 1995. =
Shee PB och TRB A Rl OOS
3la
by the Secretaria de Recursos Naturales y Ambiente in 1999
when it issued new rules for lobster fishing. There would be
no need to repeal Regulation 0008-93 expressly in 1999 if it
was repealed automatically in 1995.
Furthermore, the Honduran Civil Code provides support
for the proposition that Regulation 0008-93 remained in ef-
fect until the express repeal in 1999.** According to the Civil
Code, a law may be repealed totally or partially by another
law. Codigo Civil art. 42. Such a repeal may be express or
tacit; it is express when the new law expressly provides that
it repeals the previous one, and it is tacit when the new law’s
provisions cannot be reconciled with the previous law.
Codigo Civil art. 43. Significantly, a “tacit repeal leaves in
effect in the previous law anything not in conflict with the
provisions of the new law, even though both versions may
cover the same matters.” Codigo Civil art. 44. The 1995 de-
cree did not repeal Regulation 0008-93 expressly, which
means that any repeal of the regulation was tacit. As Regula-
tion 0008-93 did not conflict with the 1995 decree, it re-
mained in effect until the 1999 regulation expressly repealed
it. Thus, the district court properly determined that Regula-
tion 0008-93 was valid during the time period covered by the
indictment.
34
Not only does the Honduran Civil Code support the dis-
trict court’s determination that Regulation 0008-93 was valid dur-
ing the time period covered by the indictment, the defendants’ in-
terpretation leads to an illogical result. An automatic repeal of
Regulation 0008-93 in 1995 would have created a four-year win-
dow during which there were no sanitary regulations for lobster
fishing. This would have been an odd result considering that the
1995 decree issued by the Congreso Nacional was intended to
strengthen the hygiene requirements.
32a
Article 70(3)
Article 70(3) of the Fishing Law prohibits the harvesting
<=—__ or destruction of lobster eggs. See Decreto No. 154, May 19,
1959, La Gaceta, June 17, 1959. The defendants argue that
Article 70(3) does not prohibit the destruction or collection
of lobster eggs for profit. They contend that the district
court’s interpretation that the law prohibited the harvesting of
the egg-bearing species themselves was erroneous.”
We fail to see how Article 70(3) can be read other than to
prohibit the destruction or harvesting of the eggs of lobsters
for profit. The destruction of eggs to sell the female lobsters
appears to be a clear violation of Article 70(3), which pro-
vides for punishment by fine or imprisonment to “(t]hose
who destroy or harvest the eggs, or the offspring of fish, che-
lonians or other aquatic species for profit.” Jd. The defen-
dants’ argument regarding the legality of capturing egg-
bearing lobsters is contrary to the piain language of Article
70(3).*°
35 Lobsters have swimming legs on their abdomens called
swimmerets, which female lobsters use to hold eggs. 7 The New
Encyclopedia Britannica 430 (15th ed. 1998). The swimmerets of
some of the lobsters in the seized shipment were clipped off and
the eggs were removed.
36 Not only is their interpretation contrary to the plain lan-
guage of Article 70(3), it directly conflicts with McNab’s own in-
structions to his boat captains that harvesting egg-bearing lobsters
was prohibited. The October 1999 letter from McNab to his fish-
ing boat captains provided that “i]t is absolutely prohibited to cut
the pleopods of the Lobsters to remove any eggs . . - All the lob-
sters with eggs will be returned to the sea without any exception.
For that purpose, you will have to instruct the fisherman who work
in the boats on how to identify them.” The letter from McNab’s
general manager to the captains in July of 2000 instructed that they
[Footnote continued on next page]
33a
The defendants also argue that Article 70(3) was repealed
retroactively in February of 2001 by the enactment of Decree
245-2000 by the Congreso Nacional. As stated above, our
duty with respect to each of the Honduran laws is to deter-
mine whether they were valid during the time period covered
by the indictment. Whether the 2001 amendment to Article
70(3) repealed the prohibition against harvesting egg-bearing
lobsters for profit is not our concern. Thus, we reject the de-
fendants’ argument that Article 96 of the Honduran Constitu-
tion requires that we apply the 2001 amendment retroactively
for the reasons stated with respect to Resolution 030-95. Ac-
cordingly, we conclude that Article 70(3) was a proper predi-
cate for the defendants’ convictions.
Thus, the defendants’ newfound support from the Hondu-
ran government does not change the fact that during the time
period covered by the indictment, the laws at issue were
valid. Although we certainly respect the Honduran govern-
ment’s position, the recent developments since the trial and
the newly rendered opinions from Honduran officials cannot
turn what were illegal lobster shipments into legal lobster
shipments retroactively.
Having determined that Resolution 030-95, Regulation
0008-93, and Article 70(3) were valid during the time period
covered by the indictment and thus were proper predicates
for the Lacey Act charges, we now briefly address the defen-
dants’ remaining issues on appeal. The defendants argue that
(1) the district court abused its discretion by excluding evi-
dence at trial relating to McNab’s “knowledge” of Honduran
[Footnote continued from previous page]
may “not capture lobsters that are in their reproductive phase or
gravid lobsters (with eggs). It is absolutely prohibited to remove
egg sacs from the lobster to remove its oe ....”
34a
law; (2) the district court made several errors with respect to
the jury instructions; (3) there was insufficient evidence to
support the jury’s verdicts; and (4) the district court erred in
failing to postpone Schoenwetter and Blandford’s sentencing
and in determining the length of their sentences. After thor-
oughly reviewing the record, we find that these issues are
without merit.
CONCLUSION
Thus, we conclude that the Honduran laws used as the
underlying predicates for the defendants’ convictions fall
within the scope of the Lacey Act and were valid and legally
binding during the time period covered by the indictment.
The remaining issues raised by the defendants were decided
properly by the district court or are without merit. We there-
fore AFFIRM the defendants’ convictions and sentences.
35a
FAY, Circuit J udge, dissenting:
The majority opinion is both thorough and scholarly in
dealing with this complicated matter. With some hesitation, I
most respectfully dissent from that portion of the majority
opinion upholding the validity of Honduran Resolution 030-
95. The theme of the majority opinion is that the government
of Honduras has “shifted” its position. The question for de-
termination is phrased as being complicated by the changed
or new position of the Honduran government. The majority
then decides this issue within the framework of whether or
not we are freeto follow the Honduran government’s original
position.
Try as I might, I simply cannot read this record that way.
There was never unanimity nor agreement concerning the
validity of Resolution 030-95. That question was hotly con-
tested. But, throughout the course of this litigation, the reso-
lution of that question was based upon the weight given by
the trial judge to the evidence presented by the U.S. govern-
ment during a pretrial hearing on foreign law. At that time,
the Honduran courts had not ruled. Now they have.
It should come as no surprise to anyone that some of the
“expert” witnesses were correct and some were wrong. Nor
should we be surprised that it was the courts of Honduras
which ultimately answered the question. That is the way it
works in Honduras and in the United States of America.
Simply stated, it is my position that we are bound by the rul-
ings of the Honduran courts declaring Resolution 030-95 null
and void. This being the case, the defendants convictions
must be reversed since one of the Honduran laws relied upon
by the jury in finding guilt has now been found to be a nul-
lity.
Most respectfully, I disagree with the majority’s conclu-
sion that the government of Honduras has changed its posi-
tion. Government officials testified on both sides of the issue
36a
before the district court. There was no one official voice for
the government of Honduras. But, there is now. The Hondu-
ran courts have ruled and the Honduran Embassy has filed an
amicus brief advising us of the Honduran government’s posi-
tion—Resolution 030-95 is null and void and was so during
the critical time charged in the second superceding indict-
ment. That is the only official government position I am
aware of in this record.
We all agree that the key component to any alleged Lacey
Act § 3372(a)(2)(A) violation is the commission of a predi-
cate State or Foreign offense concerning fish or wildlife. We
further agree that, for purposes of these appeals, three predi-
cate offenses are pertinent. Of those three, my concern goes
to Resolution 030-95 concerning the minimum legal size of
harvested lobster tails. As the majority correctly notes, the
district court properly conducted a foreign law hearing to de-
termine whether Resolution 030-95 was, in fact, a valid Hon-
duran law during the time period charged in the second su-
perseding indictment. Over the testimony of an expert in
Honduran law, a Honduran law professor and former Minis-
try of Justice, the then Attorney-General of the Republic of
Honduras, the Honduras Bar Association and others, the Dis-
trict Court, based upon the testimony of one lower-level
Honduran government official, Liliana Paz, Secretary Gen-
eral of the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock, concluded
that Resolution 030-95 was a valid law.
Following trial and conviction, defendant David Hensen
McNab (“McNab”) challenged the validity of Resolution
030-95 in the Court of First Instance of Administrative Law
in Honduras (“Honduran Court”). That challenge was op-
posed by an attorney representing the government of Hondu-
ras. At the conclusion of that proceeding, the Honduran
Court declared Resolution 030-95 to be null and void. Spe-
cifically, on May 23, 2001, the Honduran Court found:
37a
First: . .. [Resolution 030-95] [does] not con-
form to law by virtue of having violated the
legal code at the time [it] [was] issued. Sec-
ond: the challenged [Resolution]..., No.
030-95 of December 5, 1995, [is] entirely
voided, but this is only for purposes of [its]
annulment and future inapplicability: This
Resolution does not confer any right to
claims.
R. at 5:324 Ex. B. The Honduran Court premised its deci-
sion on the fact that Resolution 030-95 was not properly is-
sued by the President of the Republic of Honduras and au-
thorized by the proper Secretary or Under Secretary of State
as is required under Honduran law. Subsequently, the gov-
ernment of Honduras appealed the Honduran Court’s ruling
to the Court of Appeals of Administrative Matters (“Hondu-
ran Court of Appeals”) which on October 11, 2001, con-
firmed the correctness of the Honduran Court’s decision.
The rulings of the Honduran courts do raise a second
question as to whether or not the ruling applies retroactively.
As quoted above, the language of the Honduran Court could
be construed to mean prospective application only. That is
the position the majority takes in this case. Therefore, the
critical question before this court is whether or not Resolu-
tion 030-95 was valid at the time of the defendants’ conduct
as charged in the second superceding indictment. This ques-
tion is determined by whether the invalidation of Resolution
030-95 is to be applied retroactively or prospectively. If the
invalidation of Resolution 030-95 is to be applied retroac-
tively, it seems to me that reversal of the defendants’ convic-
tions is mandated. If invalidation is to be only applied pro-
spectively, reversal is not required.
We all agree that we review a district court’s interpreta-
tion of foreign law de novo. United States v. Gecas, 120
F.3d 1419, 1424 (11th Cir. 1997) (en banc). We also agree
38a
that under certain circumstances an underlying Lacey Act
predicate offense need not be independently prosecutable.
See United States v. Borden, 10 F.3d 1058 (4th Cir. 1993)
(affirming Lacey Act conviction where the enforcement of
underlying predicate state law was barred by applicable state
statute of limitations but not by federal statute of limitations).
However, Borden, or any similar case, is fundamentally dif-
ferent than this case where the predicate substantive criminal
law supporting the Lacey Act convictions cannot be en-
forced, not because of a procedural bar, but because the law
itself has been invalidated by the courts through nullification.
In other words, what was thought to be a crime turns out to
not be a crime under Honduran law. It bears noting that had
U.S. law been implicated, reversal of the convictions would
not be in question and the case would easily be resolved in
the defendants’ favor. In the United States, where a substan-
tive criminal law is subsequently declared to be invalid by
the courts, any convictions thereon would be reversed.
Further troubling is the fact that as a matter of Honduran
constitutional law, hese defendants could not be tried and
convicted for violation of Resolution 030-95 in Honduras. In
Honduras, as in the United States, any criminally enforceable
statute later declared to be invalid by the courts is retroac-
tively applied to any criminal defendant. Article 96 of the
Honduran Constitution specifically provides, “[t]he Law does
not have retroactive effect, except in penal matters when the
new law favors the delinquent [(i.e., criminally convicted)] or
the person that is prosecuted.” Constitucién de la Republica
de Honduras art. 96.
The majority makes note of Article 96 but simply asserts
its inapplicability by concluding that “[a]t the of time the de-
fendants’ conduct, harvesting lobsters under 5.5 inches was a
violation of Resolution 030-95.” As stated above, if the in-
validation of Resolution 030-95 is retroactively applied, as I
believe it must be, then at the time of the defendants’ con-
39a
duct, there would not have been a violation of Resolution
030-95. To this point, there are authorities in the record
which I find particularly relevant in deciding whether the
Honduran Court’s invalidation of Resolution 030-95 should
be retroactively applied.
We start with the official voice of Honduras in the United
States. The country of Honduras, through its Embassy in
Washington, D.C., has filed an amicus brief stating un-
equivocally that retroactive application is the law of Hondu-
ras. The current Attorney General of the Republic of Hondu-
ras, Sergio Zavala Leiva, the National Human Rights Com-
missioner of the Republic of Honduras, Leo Valladares
Lanza,’ the current Secretary of State of the Offices of Agri-
culture and Livestock, Guillermo Alvarado Downing and
Secretary Downing’s subordinate and star U.S. government
witness before the district court, Secretary General of the
Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock, Liliana Paz, all sup-
port the position that retroactive application is required. The
only witness presented suggesting that retroactive application
is not required is Juan Arnaldo Hernandez Espinoza, an As-
sistant Prosecutor General of the Public Ministry of the Re-
public of Honduras.” Thus, the overwhelming evidence be-
' Although his opinion was never altered, amended or
changed in any manner, the majority notes that a National Marine
and Fisheries Service agent who interviewed Commissioner Lanza
indicated that Commissioner Lanza revealed that he felt “‘pres-
sured’ by McNab’s representatives to issue a quick decision.”
> In his opinion, Assistant Attorney General Espinoza
(“Espinoza”) indicates that there is no retroactive application of the
invalidation of Resolution 030-95 because “the sanction to which
[the defendants’] conduct applies is based on a measure that origi-
nates in the Fishing Law and not in the activity of the Executive
Branch.” Appellee’s Addendum of Foreign Law Materials at tab
[Footnote continued on next page]
40a
fore this court is squarely on the side of the retroactive appli-
cation of the invalidation of Resolution 030-95. I can come
to no other conclusion.
As to the appropriate interpretation of the Honduran
Court’s use of the terms “annulment” and “future inapplica-
bility,” Attorney General Leiva provides the most reasoned
and reasonable explanation. Attorney General Leiva ex-
plains:
The reason that the laws of Honduras and, in
particular, the Court of Administrative Ap-
peals, with its specific language in its judg-
ment, only set forth its future inapplicability is
to guarantee the legal security of the State,
protecting it from damages and losses that
could have been caused by the enforcement of
an act that is null and void as a matter of law.
(Leiva Decl. § 8). J
[Footnote continued from previous page]
1. Upon closer examination, it becomes clear that Espinoza’s
opinion is premised on the assumption that the Fishing Law, not
Resolution 030-95, defines the minimum lobster harvest size.
Therefore, invalidation of Resolution 030-95, a resolution imple-
mented pursuant to the authority of the Fishing Law, is without
import and the question of retroactivity is rendered irrelevant.
This opinion is mistaken for two critical reasons. Firstly,
Espinoza’s opinion ignores the fact that, for purposes of U.S. law,
the predicate act the defendants were charged with violating is
Resolution 030-95, not the Fishing Law. Secondly, Espinoza’s
opinion ignores the fact that, with regard to minimum lobster har-
vest size, the Fishing Law is silent and directs such restrictions to
be fashioned pursuant to regulation. See Decreto No. 154, May
19, 1959, La Gaceta, June 9, 1959, art. 70.
4la
Apparently, in Honduras the government may be subject
to civil liability for the enforcement of a subsequently de-
clared invalid law Therefore, in the context of Honduran
law, the Honduran Court’s language makes sense and simply
seeks to limit the government’s liability and protect its treas-
ury. The precise language of the Honduran Court supports
this interpretation. Following the use of “annulment” and
“future inapplicability” is a colon followed by the following
illuminating language, “[t]his Resolution does not confer any
right to claims.” Thus, Attorney General Leiva’s explana-
tion, as compared to the other evidence before the court, is
most compelling. Furthermore, this court should not inter-
pret Honduran law in a vacuum. As stated above, in Hondu-
ras, Article 96 of the Honduran Constitution retroactively
applies the invalidation of Resolution 030-95 to any criminal
defendant. The Honduran Court certainly would have been
aware of the existence and effect of Article 96 when crafting
the language and scope of its opinion and this court should
seek to interpret the Honduran Court’s opinion in its proper
context.
The majority advances the important principle of finality
in support of its decision. As a general proposition, I agree
that finality is an important aspect of American jurispru-
dence. However, in the context of an invalidated substantive
criminal law which forms the basis of a criminal prosecution
or conviction, reliance on the concept of finality is mis-
placed. As stated above, under both U.S. and Honduran law,
retroactive application is warranted for a criminal defendant
charged or convicted of a subsequently declared invalid
criminal statute. Cf, Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333,
346, 94 S. Ct. 2298, 2305, 41 L. Ed. 2d 109, 119 (1974) (in
the context of a petition for relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255, concluding that if conviction and punishment are for
an act not made criminal by the law, “[t]here can be no room
for doubt that such a circumstance inherently results in a
42a
”
complete miscarriage of justice ....” (Internal quotations
omitted)).
For emphasis, I repeat again that the majority opinion
discusses extensively and is strongly critical of the changed
position or shift by the Honduran government. While that
terminology may give comfort to the majority, it is simp]
not accurate. While various government officials gave con-
flicting opinions regarding the validity of Resolution 030-95,
this was before the Honduran courts ruled. The Honduran
courts have now ruled and both agree, Resolution 030-95 was
null and void. The majority casts this in an unfavorable light
akin to something sinister. In my opinion, this is no different
than what occurs routinely in our country. Attorneys, and
even the Attorney General of a state or the United States, of-
ten express opinions about statutes only to find that after a
court challenge, they were wrong. That is all that happened
here. Some of the experts were right; some were wrong.
But, the Honduran courts have now spoken and there is sim-
ply no doubt that Resolution 030-95 is null and void as if it
never existed.
To suggest that the newly issued statements and opinions
of Honduran officials do not carry the weight of the earlier
statements is a strange position for members of the judiciary.
The so-called “shift in position” is the result of lawful litiga-
tion within the courts of a foreign nation. I think we would
be shocked should the tables be reversed and a foreign nation
simply ignored one of our court rulings because it caused
some frustration or inconvenience.
The evidence in this case supports the conclusion that the
defendants were guilty of knowingly violating the law at the
time they harvested, shipped and sold these “shorts.” The
prosecutors did their very best to establish the law of Hondu-
ras which is essential under the Lacey Act. It is easy to un-
derstand the frustration inherent in this present situation.
But, the Lacey Act, by its very terms, is dependent upon the
43a
laws of a foreign sovereign. In this situation, we do not con-
trol the outcome of challenges made to those underlying
laws. No one has suggested that McNab was not exercising
his lawful rights as a citizen of Honduras or that the courts of
Honduras were without authority to issue the decisions they
did.
Most reluctantly, I therefore dissent.
APPENDIX B
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA
v. CRIMINAL ACTION
NO. 1:00-00079-(1, 2, 3 & 4)-RV
DAVID HENSON [Filed October 12, 2000]
MCNAB, ROBERT D.
BLANDFORD, |
ABNER SCHOEN-
WETTER, DIANA H.
HUANG
ORDER
This matter is before the court on the following docu-
ments:
1. “Motion for Pretrial Determination of Foreign and State
Law Pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b) and 26.1 and
Memorandum in Support Thereof,” (doc. 46), together
with evidentiary materials, (in redwell), filed by the gov-
ernment;
2. “Motion to Dismiss Counts One through Twelve and
Counts Twenty-Eight Through Forty-Three of the In-
45a
dictment,” (doc. 53), filed by defendant David Henson
McNab:'
3. “Opposition To Defendant McNab’s Motion to Dismiss
Counts One Through Twelve and Counts Twenty-Eight
Through Forty-Three of the Indictment,” (doc. 87), filed
. by the government;
4. “Supplement/Amendment to ... Motion for Pretrial De-
termination of Foreign and State Law and Memorandum
in Support Thereof,” (doc. 100), filed by the government;
5. “Notice of Intent to Offer in Evidence Foreign Records,”
(doc. 105), filed by the government;
6. “Response to the Government’s Motion for Pretrial De-
termination of Foreign and State Law,” (doc. 110), filed
by defendant McNab;
7. “Renewed Motion for Evidentiary Hearing on Govern-
ment’s Motion for Determination of Foreign Law” (doc.
113), filed by defendant McNab;
8. “Opposition to Pretrial Determination of Foreign and
State Law,” (doc. 115), together with a supporting brief,
(doc. 116), filed by defendant Robert D. Blandford;
9. “Notice of Intent to Offer in Evidence Foreign Records,”
(doc. 117), filed by defendant McNab;
10. “Reply to Defendant [McNab’s] Response to Motion for
Pretrial Determination for Foreign and State Law,” (doc.
122), filed by the government;
' The motion to dismiss is premised on multiple grounds,
including the contention that “the transactions are not violative of
any valid law, treaty, or regulation in Honduras.” Mot. To Dism.,
q2.
46a
11. “Notice of Intent to Offer in Evidence Foreign Records,”
(doc. 125), filed by the government;
12. “Motion to Dismiss the Superseding Indictment,” (doc.
151), filed by defendant McNab;
13. “Brief in Support of ... Response to the Government’s
Motion for Pretrial Determination of Foreign and State
Law and In Support of .. . Motion to Dismiss the Super-
seding Indictment,” (doc. 178), filed by defendant
McNab;
14.“Summary Brief on Pretrial Determination of Foreign
and State Law,” (doc. 182), filed by the government;
15. “Summary of Significant Evidence Supporting its Posi-
tion Regarding the Determination of Foreign Law,” (doc.
185), filed by the government;
16. “Supplemental Opposition to Government’s Motion for
Determination of Foreign Law and In Support of Defen-
dant McNab’s Motion to Dismiss,” (doc. 186), filed by
defendant McNab:
17. “Notice of Filing of Expert Supplementary Affidavit,”
: (doc. 194), filed by defendant McNab;
18. “Supplemental Brief Regarding Foreign Law Issue,”
(doc. 199), filed by defendant McNab; and
19. All exhibits admitted during the September 27-29, 2000
hearing. |
INTRODUCTION
In this criminal proceeding, defendants are charged with,
inter alia, conspiring to violate and/or violating the Lacey
Act, 16 U.S.C. § 3371 et seg. Inter alia, the Lacey Act
makes it unlawful “to import, export, transport, sell, receive,
acquire, or purchase in interstate or foreign commerce any
fish .. . taken, posSessed, transported, or sold in violation of
any law or regulation of any State or in violation of any for-
47a
eign law.” 16 U.S.C. § 3372(2)(A). In this case, the gov-
ernment contends that defendants violated Honduran law in
various ways when they imported or conspired to import
spiny lobster tails and shrimp on multiple occasions over a
five-year period.” So that the court can adequately charge the
jury, the government requests the court to “determine” that
Honduran law:
(1) prohibits one to harvest, process, or
sell (including the sale/exportation of such
° The second superseding indictment also charges that some
of the defendants violated the Lacey Act by importing shrimp and
spiny lobsters in violation of Florida law, and the government has
requested the court to “determine” the relevant Florida law. As
stated on the record during the September 27-29 hearing, none of
the parties contest the validity or scope of the applicable Florida
law as set forth in the government's motion. There being no dis-
pute between the parties regarding the relevant Florida law, the
court concludes that Florida law prohibits:
l. the harvesting or possessing of any spiny lobster
(Panulirus argus) with a tail measurement less than 5 1/2
inches.
y the harvesting or possessing of egg-bearing spiny
lobster and/or the possessing of spiny lobster or spiny lob-
ster tails from which eggs, swimmerettes, or pleopods
have been removed or stripped. The practice of strip-
ping or otherwise molesting egg-bearing spiny lobster
in order to remove the eggs is also prohibited.
3. any person, firm, or corporation to deal in any
saltwater products, including lobster tails, without first
paying for and procuring a saltwater products dealer li-
cense. It is unlawful to sell, deliver, ship, or transport any
saltwater products without all invoices of such products
having thereon the wholesale dealer license number.
48a
lobster to a buyer outside Honduras for which
payment is, made directly or indirectly to a
Honduran citizen or company) any lobster the
tail of which measures less than five and one-
half (5 2) inches in length;
(2) prohibits one to harvest lobster com-
mercially between March 16 and July 31 of
years 1995, 1996 and 1998. In all other years,
the closed season runs from December 1
through April 30.
(3) prohibits one to harvest shrimp com-
mercially between February 1 and June 30 of
each year;
(4) prohibits one to harvest or destroy the
eggs of any aquatic species, including spiny
lobster, for profit; This includes a prohibition
against the tearing out or, in any other way
separating, the eggs from the female lobster,
for profit;
(5) prohibits one, commencing on the
sixth day after the beginning of the respective
lobster or shrimp closed season, to transport,
sell, store, or refrigerate lobster and/or shrimp
unless the lobster and shrimp were harvested
prior to the first day of the closed season;
(6) requires lobster and shrimp fishermen
to dock their vessels and unload their catch in
a Honduran port prior to exportation. This
duty may be fulfilled by the fishermen by ei-
ther docking the vessel that caught the lobster
or shrimp or transferring the catch to a li-
censed ship that in turn docks and unloads the
catch;
49a
(7) requires that businessmen and those
who use any kind of boat for fishing activities
or transportation of any fish species protected
by law, including lobsters, report in writing to
the governmental authorities the outcome of
their fishing trip. The captain of any fishing
boat has to report the departure and arrival of
the boat to governmental authorities, pointing
out places where the fishing was done, and the
species and amount caught.
(8) prohibits one to export lobster without
first processing/packing that lobster in Hondu-
ras which includes the packing of lobster into
boxes that have been paraffined and labeled
with (a) the business name of the firm that
makes the product, (b) the weight, (c) that it
was “inspected and approved of by the Hon-
duran Ministry of Natural Resources” and (d)
the number assigned to the processing com-
pany.
The government contends that these points of law are
mandated by certain Honduran statutes, regulations, and
resolutions. Except as noted below, defendants do not con-
test the government’s interpretation of the relevant Honduran
Statutes, regulations, and resolutions; rather, defendants’ pri-
mary contention is that the resolutions upon which the gov-
ernment relies do not satisfy the Honduran constitutional re-
quirements for resolutions and, therefore, are null and void.
The parties’ contentions and supporting evidence are dis-
cussed infra.’, *
* Defendants had asserted that they could not be indicted
under the Lacey Act when the underlying foreign law provides
[Footnote continued on next page]
50a
Over a 2 2-day period, the court conducted an eviden-
tiary hearing on the Honduran law issues. Additionally, the
court has reviewed the voluminous evidentiary material sub-
mitted by the parties before, during, and after the hearing.
After due consideration, the court makes the following de-
terminations of foreign law pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3505(b)’
and Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)° and 26.1.’
[Footnote continued from previous page]
only civil penalties or when the foreign government has not prose-
cuted them under the criminal penalties. Based on the reasons and
authorities cited by the government in its briefs, the court previ-
ously denied defendants’ motion to dismiss to the extent that it was
predicated on either of these two grounds.
* The government and defendant McNab have submitted a
tremendous amount of evidentiary material regarding Honduran
law. Given the time constraints on the court, the court cannot pos-
sibly address each item of evidence in this written order. Never-
theless, so the record is clear, the court notes that it has carefully
reviewed all of the materials submitted in English.
° ‘Title 18 U.S.C. § 3505 provides:
At the arraignment or as soon after the arraignment as
practicable, a party intending to offer in evidence under
this section a foreign record or regularly conducted activ-
ity shall provide written notice of that intention to each
other party. A motion opposing admission in evidence of
such record shall be made by the opposing party and de-
termined by the court before trial. Failure by a party to
file such a motion before trial shall constitute waiver of
objection to such record or duplicate, but the court for
cause shown may grant relief from the waiver.
° Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b) provides, inter alia:
[Footnote continued on next page]
Sla
DISCUSSION
Point of Law 1—Prohibition of harvesting lobster less than
5 1/2 inches in length
The government relies on Resolution No. 030-95 (De-
cember 5, 1995) to establish that Honduras law prohibits the
harvest and sale of lobster less than 5 1/2 inches in length.
That resolution provides in relevant part:
For the capture of lobster:
d) The minimum size for the capture of lobster
is 5.5 inches or 14.5 centimeters of abdominal
length.
Resolution No. 030-95, Third Provision
Point of Law 2—Closed season for harvesting of lobster
Point of Law 3—Closed season for harvesting of shnimp
The government relies on Decree No. 154, The Fishing
Law (May 19, 1959), Chapter V, Article 41, and Resolutions
[Footnote continued from previous page]
Any defense, objection, or request which is capable of de-
termination without the trial of the general issue may be
raised before trial by motion.
’ Fed. R. Crim. P. 26.1 provides:
A party who intends to raise an issue concerning the law of
a foreign country shall give reasonable written notice. The
court, in determining foreign law, may consider any
relevant material or source, including testimony,
whether or not submitted by a party or admissible un-
der the Federal Rules of Evidence. The court’s deter-
mination shall be treated as a ruling on a question of
law.
52a
No. 001-95 (January 14, 1995), No. 030-95 (December 5,
1995), and No. 031-97 (December 17, 1997), to establish that
Honduras law prohibits the harvest of lobster and shrimp dur-
ing closed seasons. The Fishing Law provides in relevant
part:
The closed season for fishing for shrimp and
lobster is fixed as the period between 1 De-
cember and 30 April of each year.
The Fishing Law, Chapter V, Article 41.
The three resolutions provide in relevant part:
FIRST: To establish closing season annually for the
capture of Shrimp [and] Lobster . . . in the At-
lantic Ocean, during the following periods:
a) Shrimp, from the lst of February to the
30th of June.
b) Lobster, from the 16th of March to the 31st
of July.
Resolution No. 001-95 (establishing the closed season for the
year 1995).
FIRST: To establish closing season annually for the
capture of all species of shrimp [and] lobster
...1n the Atlantic Ocean and in the coastal la-
goon system, during the following periods:
a) Shrimp, from the Ist of February to the
30th of June.
b) Lobster, from the 16th of March to the 31st
of July.
Resolution No. 030-95 (establishing the closed season for the
year 1996).
FIRST: To establish closing season for the capture of
shrimp [and] lobster .. . in the Caribbean Sea
and in the coastal lagoon system, during the
following time periods:
53a
a) Shrimp, from the lst of February to the
30th of June 1998.
b) Lobster, from the 16th of March to the 31st
of July 1988.
Resolution No. 031-97 (establishing the closed season for the
year 1998).
The government established that the resolutions were is-
sued by the Honduran Minister of the Department of Agricul-
ture and Livestock and were duly published in La Gaceta, the
official publication of the Republic of Honduras.
Defendants do not dispute the contents of the three reso-
lutions upon which the government relies to establish Points
of Law 1, 2, & 3; rather, they contend that the resolutions are
null and void. To support their contention, defendants rely
upon a number of legal opinions which the court has care-
fully reviewed.
Dr. Saul Litvinoff, a professor of law at Louisiana State
University, and Efrain Moncada Silva, a professor at the Na-
tional Autonomous University of Honduras and licensed
member of the Honduran bar, testified that the resolutions do
not meet the requirements of the Honduran Constitution in
order to have “a general binding, effect.” Aff. of Litvinoff,
p. 6. Specifically, Prof. Litvinoff testified that, under Arti-
cles 245 and 248 of the Honduran Constitution, to be valid
and binding, the documents must be 1) “issued in the form of
a regulation, 2) [] signed by the President and countersigned
by the departmental secretary, and 3) published in the official
form.” Jd. Prof. Salvia testified similarly.
The court has reviewed the cited portions of the Hondu-
ran Constitution and disagrees with the professors’ interpre-
tation thereof. Article 245 provides:
The President of the Republic has the
me general administration of the States. His
powers are: to issue accords and decrees and
54a
to issue regulations and resolutions in accor-
dance with law.
Article 248 provides:
The decrees, regulations, accords, orders,
and judgments of the President of the Repub-
lic must be authorized by the department sec-
retaries or their undersecretaries in proper
cases. If they fail to meet these require-
ments[,] they shall have no legal force.
As the court understands these two constitutional provi-
sions, the President of the Republic of Honduras is constitu-
tionally authorized to issue regulations and resolutions in ac-
cordance with law, and if he issues regulations, they must be
~authorized by the appropriate departmental secretary. How-
ever, these two provisions (which appear to be plain and
straightforward) do not state (or even suggest) that the presi-
dent is the only Honduran official legally authorized to issue
a resolution. Buttressing the court’s reading of these consti-
tutional provisions are two important facts. First, the gov-
ernment presented unrebutted testimony that other Honduran
departments (e.g., communications and banking) had issued
resolutions as a means of carrying out the laws governing
those industries. Second, the testimony of virtually every
witness asked was that everyone in the Honduran fishing in-
dustry, including defendant McNab and the government offi-
cials in the fishing industry, viewed the resolutions as legally
binding. Indeed, defendant McNab issued memoranda to his
boat captains reminding them of the lobster size limits.
Additionally, Liliana Paz, the General Secretary in the
Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock (the Honduran de-
partment responsible for the fishery management program),
testified that that Honduran Ministry most certainly views the
resolutions as legally binding. Secretary Paz is a graduate of
the National Autonomous University of Honduras and an at-
torney licensed in Honduras. She is the highest level attor-
SS
55a
ney within the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock, and her
job duties include providing legal advice to “the Minister in
matters having to do with legal affairs, institutional commu-
nication, [and] international cooperation.” Secretary Paz also
has experience clerking for one of the Honduran courts. The
court finds her to be well-qualified to speak to the issues re-
garding the validity and contents of the Fishing Law and the
related regulations and resolutions. Upon observing her de-
meanor, the court finds Secretary Paz to be a very credible
witness.
In contrast, the court found the testimony of Prof. Silva to
be less than credible, as he testified that he had not, as of the
date of his in-court testimony, decided whether he was going
to charge defendant McNab for his legal services (including
his time spent researching, drafting, and testifying).* Thus, it
appears that this expert witness for the defense intends to
charge a fee akin to a contingency fee. As for Professor Lit-
vinoff, the value of his testimony as to what is required under
Honduran law is diminished by the fact that he is not a li-
censed attorney in Honduras. Additionally, unlike Secretary
Paz, neither of these gentlemen regularly interpret the fisher-
ies laws, regulations, and resolutions.
The court~also notes that the Fishing Law itself specifi-
cally contemplates the implementation of resolutions such as
those at issue here in furtherance of the Law. The Fishing
Law of 1959, Chapter 11, Article 7, provides in relevant part:
[The Department of Hunting and Fishing]
shall be the only authority to resolve, clarify,
and decide all questions raised about the con-
ditions that must be satisfied by fisheries
8
Professor Silva was not asked who had paid his travel ex-
penses to America for the purpose of testifying in this matter.
56a
products, to permit them to be captured, trans- ‘
ported or sold for consumption in the markets
and for other industrial uses, and everything
related to importation, exportation and licens-
ing, to which end it shall announce such reso-
lutions an other measures as it believes neces-
sary for fisheries activities to be as effective as
possible.
The Fishing Law of 1959, Chapter II, Article 7.
Defendants correctly point out that elsewhere in the Fish-
ing Law, “[t]he Executive Branch, through the secretariat of
Natural Resources, is the superior authority on fisheries and
fisheries-related matters, and therefore, may establish and
announce ... [certain] measures [including those related to
closed seasons] through regulations.” The Fishing Law,
Chapter I, Article 5. After review, the court is unable to rec-
oncile Articles 5 & 7. Faced with this statutory dilemma, the
court finds the testimony of Secretary Paz to be cnitical—
namely, that the resolutions are valid, that the Honduran gov-
ernment views the resolutions to be valid, and that the Hon-
duran government has acted in accordance with the resolu-
tions.
One other item of evidence submitted by defendants mer-
its a remark. Defendants have submitted a one-sentence rul-
ing issued by the Honduras Supreme Court of Justice which
defendants characterize as a judicial statement by the high
court that resolutions are not law. One of defendant
McNab’s witnesses (Honduran attorney Maria Letizia De
Guillen) recently petitioned the Supreme Court challenging
the constitutionality of two of the resolutions at issue before
this court. In denying the petition, the high court stated in
toto:
Denied the admission of the petition of uncon-
stitutionality interposed by the way of action
_ by attorney MARIA LETIZIA DE GUILLEN,
ee
57a
because they recur against two administrative
resolutions that do not have the character of
law and according to article 184 of the Consti-
tution of the Republic: the recourse of uncon-
stitutionality only proceed against the Law by
reason of form or content.
After review, this court understands the ruling to be that
the Supreme Court of Justice only reviews the constitutional-
ity of a law (i.e., a statute or other form of legislation enacted
by the Honduran legislative branch—National Congress) and
that it does not determine the constitutionality of any “lesser”
documents (i.e., regulations and resolutions issued by the ex-
ecutive branch) notwithstanding that those “lesser” docu-
ments, have the binding force of law. According to defen-
dants, the fact that the Supreme Court declined to address the
constitutionality of the resolutions because they are no “law”
does not equate to a holding by the high court that he resolu-
tions have no binding legal effect. Defendants’ argument
goes too far and is simply unsupported. Honduran law
clearly encompasses many mechanisms which carry the force
of law notwithstanding that the mechanism is not denomi-
nated as “law” (and thereby subject to review by the Supreme
Court of Justice). y
Accordingly, the court concludes that the government has
met its burden of establishing that Points of Law 1, 2, & 3 (as
set forth on page five of this order) are valid and binding un-
der Honduran law.
Point of Law 4—Prohibition of harvesting egg-bearing lob-
ster or the removal of eggs from lobster
The government relies on Decree No. 154, The Fishing
Law (May 19, 1959), Chapter VII, Article 70(3), to establish
that Honduras law prohibits the harvest and sale of egg-
hearing lobster and the tearing out or separating in any other
way the eggs from the female lobster. That law provides in
relevant part:
- 58a
The following offense shall be punished
with [a fine of] THREE HUNDRED LEMPI-
RAS or THREE HUNDRED DAYS impris-
onment:
* ke &
3) Those who destroy or harvest the eggs,
or the offspring of fish, chelonians, or other
aquatic species for profit.
The Fishing Law, Chapter VII, Article 70(3).
Defendants do not contest the validity of the Fishing
Law; rather, they argue that Article 70(3) was written to pro-
tect the eggs and young of fish, turtles, and other aquatic spe-
cies which have been placed in situ. To this end, defendants
rely on Prof. Litvinoff’s supplemental affidavit in which he
opines that this statutory provision does not bar the severance
of the egg-bearing part of a female lobster or the harvesting
of egg-bearing lobsters. Moreover, the professor suggests
that the provision does not reach the harvesting of any lob-
sters, for “the Honduran system has always been specific in
its attempts to regulate lobster harvesting activities” and
“there is no mention of lobster in this provision.”
The court finds that defendants’ interpretation of Article
70(3) is strained and unnecessarily limiting. The statutory
provision is broadly written and clearly encompasses lob-
ster—which is undisputedly an “aquatic species.” Also, there
is nothing in the plain language of the provision which indi-
cates that it is limited to eggs in situ. Moreover, to read an in
situ requirement into the statutory provision would render
part of the provision an absurdity, for it is difficult to con-
ceive of a situation in which one would destroy eggs in situ
for profit.
Accordingly, the court concludes that the government has
met its burden of establishing that Point of Law 4 (as set
59a
forth on page five of this order) is valid and binding under
Honduran law.
Point of Law 5—Only lobster and shrimp harvested during
open season may be transported, sold, stored, or refrigerated
after 6th day of closed season
The government relies on Decree No. 154, The Fishing
Law (May 19, 1959), Chapter VII, Articles 28 and 54, to es-
tablish that Honduras law prohibits the transport, sale, stor-
age, or refrigeration of lobster and shrimp on or after the
sixth day of the closed season unless the lobster and shrimp
were harvested prior to the first day of the closed season.
The Fishing Law provides in relevant part:
The sale and transport of species which
are canned, salted, smoked, or prepared by in-
dustrial means and were caught prior to the
start of their respective closed seasons are also
authorized at all times.
The Fishing Law, Chapter IV, Article 28.
The transport and sale of species in closed
seasons ... is permitted until the fifth day af-
ter the respective closed season has begun for
the purpose of selling off existing quantities
which were captured prior to the start of said
closed season.
The Fishing Law, Chapter V, Article 54.
Defendants have not challenged this Point of Law or the
underlying law from which it is derived. Accordingly, the
court concludes that the government has met its burden of
establishing that Point of Law 5 (as set forth on page five of
this order) is valid and binding under Honduran law.
Point of Law 6—Fishermen must dock, in a Honduran port,
the vessel which caught lobster or shrimp and unload catch or
60a
transfer the catch to a licensed vessel that in turns docks and
unloads the catch in a Honduran port.
The government relies on Decree No. 154, The Fishing
Law (May 19, 1959), Chapter VII, Article 30, to establish
that Honduras law requires lobster and shrimp fishermen to
dock their vessels and unload their catch in a Honduran port
prior to exportation. Secretary Paz testified that, although
not specifically authorized by the Fishing Law, the Honduran
government deemed this requirement to be satisfied by either
the docking of the vessel that caught the lobster or shrimp or
the transferring of such catch to a licensed ship that in tum
docks and unloads the catch in a Honduran port.
The F ishing Law provides in relevant part:
Fishermen shall be required to dock their
vessels and unload their catch in Honduran
ports.
The Fishing Law, Chapter IV, Article 30.
Defendants have not challenged this Point of Law or the
underlying law from which it is derived. Accordingly, the
court concludes that the government has met its burden of
establishing that Point of Law 6 (as set forth on page five of
this order) is valid and binding under Honduran law.
Point of Law 7—Reporting requirements
The government relies on Decree No. 154, The Fishing
Law (May 19, 1959), Chapter VII, Articles 35 & 37, to estab-
lish that Honduras law requires businessmen and those who
use any kind of boat for fishing activities or transportation of
any fish species protected by law, including lobsters, must
report in writing to government authorities the outcome of
their fishing trip. The captain of any fishing boat must report
the departure and arrival of the boat to government authori-
ties, pointing out places where fishing was done and listing
the species and amount caught.
6la
The Fishing Law provides in relevant part:
Businessmen, shipowners, employers,
fishermen and sailors, as applicable to each
business, boat, ship, or transport of each class
dedicated to the fishing or transport of any of
the species protected by this Law, are required
to give to the respective officials an account or
report, in writing, of the results of the fishing
or fishing expedition, and to have the mer-
chandise examined to verify whether regula-
tory requirements have been met, and to ob-
tain the statistical data, and to allow their
books to be reviewed.
The Fishing Law, Chapter IV, Article 35.
All fishing boat captains shall report to
the appropriate office when they depart for
work and when they return, indicating fishing
places, species and quantities caught.
The Fishing Law, Chapter IV, Article 37.
Defendants have not challenged this Point of Law or the
underlying law from which it is derived. Accordingly, the
court concludes that the government has met its burden of
establishing that Point of Law 7 (as set forth on page six of
this order) is valid and binding under Honduran law.
Point of Law 8—Inspection, processing, and packing re-
quirements
The government relies on Agreement No. 0008-93 (Janu-
ary 13, 1993), Articles 3, 4, & 49, to establish that Honduras
law prohivits the exportation of lobster without first having it
officially inspected for health and sanitation and proc-
essed/packed at an approved establishment in Honduras,
which includes the packing of lobster into boxes that have
been paraffined and labeled with the business name of the
62a
firm that makes the product, the weight, that it was “In-
spected and Approved of by the Honduran Ministry of Natu-
ral Resources” and the number assigned to the processing
company. This “Agreement” is a regulation under Honduran
law, it was duly published in La Gaceta, and defendants do
not dispute its validity. As Secretary Paz testified, the
Agreement contains the inspection, industrial, health, and
hygiene regulations for the protection of fishery products.
Agreement No. 0008-93 provides in relevant part:
The ones subject to the Official Inspec-
tion are the fishing vessels, storing centers and
plants that capture, gather, industrialize and
- pack fishing products.
In agreement with the present Regulation
only the products previously inspected can be
offered for sale. ,
Products for export can only be the ones
processed in plants approved for that purpose.
Agreement No. 0008-93, Article 3.
Fish, crustaceans, molluscs, anurous rep-
tiles and mammals of comestible type, from
fresh or salt water, assigned for internal con-
sumption or export and by extension are also
included the subproducts obtained from the
same mentioned products.
Agreement No. 0008-93, Article 4.
For the icing and packing of the products it will be ob-
served:
h) The packing must be made in boxes with
the appropriate label, treated with paraffin
and the size must have been approved
63a
during the registration process. They
must have the following legend:
lst) The name or trade name of the busi-
ness that manufactured the product.
2nd) The weight.
3rd) The legend “Product of Honduras”
that can be also placed in another lan-
guage.
4th) A 3 (three) centimeter circle, “In-
spected and Approved by the Department
of Natural Resources of Honduras” and
the number assigned to the establishment
doing the processing.
5th) In addition, it can have printed the
different denominations of the size of the
product.
Agreement No. 0008-93, Article 49(h).
efendants do not object to the first part of this statement
, .e., that it is prohibited under Honduran law to export
without first having it officially inspected for health
itation and processed at an approved establishment in
tailed requirements of a processing plant under the Fishing
Law. Rather, the dispute between the parties turns on the
definition of “processing,” a term that is not specifically de-
fined in the Agreement.
Based on the evidence presented, the court concludes that
“processing” fish products for exportation includes inspec-
tion, grading, the preparation of the products for packaging,
and the packaging itself. Secretary Paz testified that process-
ing includes packaging. Mike Powers of Garden Restaurants
testified that partial processing can occur onboard the fishing
vessel, including the measuring and cutting off the lobster
tails, washing, deveining, and dipping the product into an
64a
approved preservative. However, the “process” is not com-
plete until the product is graded, the official inspector (or his
selected technician) inspects and approves the product, and it
is properly packaged for exportation.
Finally, defendants make much of the fact that Agree-
ment 0008-93, Article 5(t), permits the use of plastic as part
of the packing materials.’ However, Article 49 of Agreement
0008-93 plainly requires that the product ultimately be placed
in a paraffined box prior to exportation, with the box appro-
priately labeled with the requisite information. Additionally,
Secretary Paz testified that packing lobster in plastic bags—
without more—for exportation is not adequate under Hondu-
ran law.
Accordingly, the court concludes that the government has
met its burden of establishing that Point of Law 8 (as set
forth on page six of this order) is valid and binding under
Honduran law.
CONCLUSION
It is ORDERED that defendant McNab’s “Motion to
Dismiss Counts One through Twelve and Counts Twenty-
Eight Through Forty-Three of the Indictment,” (doc. 53),
and “Motion to Dismiss the Superseding Indictment,”
(doc. 151), are DENIED.
° — Agreement 0008-93, Article 5(t) provides:
Packing Materials: All the materials such as sheets of
aluminum, plastic, wax paper, cardboard boxes and others,
used to cover and protect the fishing products, and that
have been approved by the Department.
The fact that the Agreement permits the use of plastic as a packing
material is not surprising given the extensive regulations regarding
the use of ice.
65a
Nothing in this order should be construed as expressing,
an opinion or making a finding as to the innocence or guilt of
any of the defendants. It will be for the jury to decide
whether the government proves any of the defendants guilty
of any of the charges beyond a reasonable doubt. The fact
that the court has “determined” the applicable Honduran law
does not mean that the government has proven that any of the
defendants have violated Honduran law or that the lobster or
shrimp at issue in this case were taken, possessed, etc., in
violation of Honduran law.
The Clerk is DIRECTED to send a copy of this order
to counsel for all parties by facsimile.
DONE this 12th day of October, 2000.
/s/
RICHARD W. VOLLMER, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
66a
APPENDIX C
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF [Filed August 28, 2001]
AMERICA
v. CRIMINAL ACTION
NO. 1:00-00079-(1, 2, 3 & 4)-RV
DAVID HENSON MCNAB
ROBERT D. BLANDFORD
ABNER SCHOENWETTER-
DIANE H. HUANG
ORDER
This matter is before the court on the following docu-
ments:
1. “Alternative Motions Based on Honduran Law Develop-
ments,” (doc. 336), filed by defendant David Henson
McNab; '/”
' The “Alternative Motions”—which are premised on essen-
tially the same grounds—are a “Motion to Dismiss,” a “Motion for
New Trial Based on Newly Discovered Evidence,” and a Motion
for Redetermination of Foreign Law.”
2 Defendants Robert D. Blandford and Abner J. Schoen-
wetter adopted defendant McNab’s “Alternative Motions,” (docs.
346 & 342, respectively). Defendant Diane H. Huang filed her
own motion, also titled “Alternative Motions Based on Honduran
[Footnote continued on next page]
67a
2. “Notice of Filing Regarding Hygiene Regulation Re-
peal,” (doc. 325), filed by defendant McNab;
3. “Notice of Filing Regarding Annulment Action,” doc.
324), filed by defendant McNab;
4. “Notice of Filing Regarding Fishing Law Changes,” (doc.
326), filed by defendant McNab;
5. Supplemental Filing in Support of Alternative Motions,”
(doc. 341), filed by defendant McNab;
6. Second Supplemental Filing in Support of Alternative
Motions, (doc. 371), filed by defendant McNab;
7. “Second Response to Defendants’ Alternative Motions
Based on Issues of Honduran Law,” (doc. 387), filed by
the government;
and
8. Reply Declaration, (doc. 388), filed by defendant
McNab.*
[Footnote continued from previous page]
Law Developments,” (doc. 344), which is predicated on essentially
the same grounds and evidence as McNab’s alternative motions.
For simplicity’s sake, the court will refer only to the alternative
motions filed by defendant McNab, although the court’s ruling
applies to all four defendants.
> The government’s “Second Response” supercedes the gov-
ernment’s first response. (doc. 378).
* During the hearing held by the court on August 17, 2001,
the court granted defendant McNab’s “Motion for Leave to File
Reply Declaration,” (doc. 388), without objection by the govern-
ment.
68a
INTRODUCTION
Following a jury trial, defendants were convicted of, inter
alia, conspiring to violate the Lacey Act, 16 U.S.C. § 3371 et
seq. Stated generally, the Lacey Act makes it unlawful to
import into the United States fish or wildlife that has been
taken or acquired in violation of another country’s laws. In
this case, the government contended that defendants violated
Honduran law in various ways when they conspired to import
spiny lobster tails on multiple occasions over a five-year pe-
riod. Prior to trial, the court made a number of determina-
tions with respect to Honduran law pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §
3505(b)° and Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)° and 26.1.’
° Title 18 U.S.C. § 3505 provides:
At the arraignment or as soon after the arraignment
as practicable, a party intending to offer in evidence
under this section a foreign record or regularly conducted
activity shall provide written notice of that intention to
each other party. A motion opposing admission in evi-
dence of such record shall be made by the opposing party
and determined by the court before trial. Failure by a
party to file such a motion before trial shall constitute
waiver of objection to such record or duplicate, but the
court for cause shown may grant relief from the waiver.
° Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b) provides, inter alia:
Any defense, objection, or request which is capable
of determination without the trial of the general issue may
be raised before trial by motion.
’ Fed. R. Crim. P. 26.1 provides:
A party who intends to raise an issue concerning the
law of a foreign country shall give reasonable written no-
tice. The court, in determining foreign law, may consider
any relevant material or source, including testimony,
7a
#
=
a
i.
[Footnote continued on next page]
CapEOD EE ERIS HEE He i a ii a aca aa a ssiasane
os
Bo
69a
In his pending post-trial “alternative motions,” defendant
McNab has requested the court to revisit its Honduran law
determinations, at least as to three particular points. Because
the court’s jurisdiction was potentially impacted by the
newly-raised grounds, the court ordered the government to
file a response and, following that response, held a hearing
on August 17, 2001. After full consideration of the argu-
ments of counsel and the evidence submitted, the court con-
cludes that the alternative motions are due to be denied.
DISCUSSION
Point of Law 1—Lobster Size Limits—Annulment of
Resolution 030-95
In its original ruling on Honduran law, the court deter-
mined that Honduran Resolution 030-95, Third provision,
prohibits the harvesting of spiny lobsters which are less than
5 1/2 inches in length. Defendant McNab contends that
Resolution 030-95 has been annulled by a Honduran court
and that, pursuant to Article 96 of the Honduran Constitution,
the annulment operates retroactively in favor of a criminal
defendant such as himself. The annulment action was insti-
tuted by McNab following this court’s original ruling on
Honduran law.
The government does not contest defendant McNab’s as-
sertion that the Honduran “Court of the First Instant of Ad-
ministrative Law” declared Resolution 030-95 to be voided.
Rather, the government points out, correctly so, that the
Honduran administrative court declared the resolution to be
[Footnote continued from previous page]
whether or not submitted by a party or admissible under
the Federal rules of Evidence. The court’s determination
shall be treated as a ruling on a question of law.
70a
void “but ... only for purposes of [its] annulment and future
inapplicability. This Resolution does not confer any right to
claims.” Although the legal meaning of this limitation lan-
guage under Honduran law is not entirely clear to the under-
signed, the court concludes that the administrative court in-
tended to give its pronouncement prospective, rather than
retroactive, effect.®
Even if the administrative court’s voidance of Resolution
030-95 should be given retroactive effect, the express lan-
guage of the administrative court’s ruling provides that it will
not be a final judgment if an appeal is timely taken. It is un-
disputed that the Honduran government (which contested the
annulment action before the administrative court) timely ap-
pealed the ruling. Consequently, the administrative ruling is
not a final judgment, and it has no legal effect in Honduras.
Because the administrative decision is not Honduran law now
and because the evidence establishes that the Honduran gov-
ermment continues to enforce Resolution 030-95, the court
concludes that Resolution 030-95 continues to be valid under
Honduran law.
Point of Law 2—Processing/Packaging Rules—Repeal of
Agreement 0008-93
®* It would seem that a judge could not unilaterally declare
the effect of his/her ruling to be non-retroactive, for Article 96 of
the Honduran Constitution would appear to “trump” any such
declaration. This court need not decide that issue, however, be-
cause the government submitted evidence which the court under-
stands to mean that an Honduran administrative court lacks the
power to void a resolution with respect to criminal acts. See
affidavit of Jose Bernardo Torres Umanzor (“since the judgment
deals with an Administrative and not a Criminal matter, it has no
retroactive effect and only has effects for its future inapplicabil-
ity.”).
Tla
In its original ruling, the court concluded that Agreement
No. 0008-93 prohibits the exportation of lobster without first
having it officially inspected for health and sanitation and
processed/packed at an approved establishment in Honduras,
which includes the packing of lobster into boxes that have
been paraffined and labeled with (a) the business name of the
firm that makes the product, (b) the weight, (c) that it was
“Inspected and Approved of by the Honduran Ministry of
Natural Resources” and (d) the number assigned to the proc-
essing company.
It is undisputed that Agreement 0008-93 was issued pur-
suant to Decree No. 40 of May 16, 1973. It is also undis-
puted that Decree No. 40 was expressly repealed effective
January 13, 1995, by Decree No. 157-94. From this, defen-
dant McNab argues that the repeal of Decree No. 40 oper-
ated as a repeal of Agreement 0008-93. In support of this
position, defendant McNab offered the affidavit of Ramiro
Lozano, an Honduran attorney and law professor, who
opined that “regulations are automatically repealed when the
law under which they were issued is repealed.”
The Honduran Civil Code provides in relevant part: ~
Article 42—A law may be revoked totally or
partially by another law.
Article 43—The revocation « the law may be
express or tacit.
It is express when the new law expressly
revokes the law that antecedes it.
It is tacit when the new law contains rules
that may not be conciliated with the old law.
* Defendant McNab offered the affidavits of other Honduran
attorneys who offered similar, if not identical, opinions.
72a
Article 44—The express repeal may be total
or partial, as set forth by the repealing law.
The tacit repeal leaves in effect in the previous
law anything not in conflict with the provi-
sions of the new law, even though both ver-
sions may cover the same matter.
As the government points out, one of the objectives of the
new decree (No. 157-94) was “to strengthen the phyto-
zoosanitation, mainly in that which refers to the .. . control
of products that are of animal and plant origin.” Relying on
Article 44 of the Honduran Civil Code, the government con-
tends that “Agreement 0008-93 remained in effect following
the repeal of Decree No. 40, at the very least to the extent
that it did not impinge on the provisions of the new law.”
The court agrees. To conclude otherwise would mean that
the passage of a law intended to strengthen the existing law
would result in a weaker, if not impotent, new law during
that window of time until the appropriate ministry or agency
had sufficient time to draft, and the appropriate governmental
official(s) to sign and publish, new regulations. Such a result
is untenable. If the Honduran National Congress had simply
repealed Decree No. 40 without passing a new decree cover-
ing the same area of the law, then this court would readily
conclude that Agreement 0008-93 no longer carried the force
of law. That is not the case here, however. At all relevant
times a decree existed covering the area of phytozoosanita-
tion, and Agreement 0008-93 continued in effect when the
new decree became effective, at least to the extent that
Agreement 0008-93 was not inconsistent with the new de-
cree.
There are two additional facts which buttress the court’s
conclusion. First, the Honduran governmental officials re-
sponsible for the enforcement of Decree No. 40, Decree No.
157-94, and Agreement 0008-93 continued to enforce
Agreement 0008-93 after Decree No. 157-94 was enacted.
1 PREY LAO GORE Y He
73a
Second, when the Honduran government decided to create
new regulations for the enforcement of Decree No. 157-94, it
did so by the passage of Accord No. 1081-99 five years after
Decree No. 157-94 became effective. Decree No. 1081-99
specifically repealed Agreement 0008-93. If Agreement No.
0008-93 had been “automatically” repealed by the mere pas-
sage of Decree No. 157-94 in 1994 as defendant McNab
argues, then there would have been no reason for Honduras
to expressly repeal Agreement 0008-93 in 1999 as so pro-
vided in Accord No. 1081-99.
Accordingly, the court concludes that Agreement 0008-
93 remained in effect following the passage of Decree No.
157-94 and up to the passage of Accord No. 1081-99 and,
therefore, was in effect at all times relevant to the charged
conduct in the Second Superseding Indictment.
Point Three—Egg-Bearing Lobsters—Amendment of Ar-
ticle 70(3) of the Fishing Law
Defendant McNab correctly notes that Article 70 of the
Fishing Law was amended by the Honduras National Con-
gress in Decree No. 245-2000, which became effective on
February 5, 2001. Defendant McNab also correctly notes
that the amended Article 70 reenacted and restated some of
the prohibitions of the former Article 70. As this court de-
termined in its original ruling, the (now) former Article 70
prohibited the harvesting of egg-bearing lobsters. The
amended Article 70 does not contain a specific prohibition
against the harvesting of egg-bearing lobsters. The absence
of a specific prohibition regarding the harvesting of egg-
bearing lobster, combined with Article 96 of the Honduran
Constitution (which provides that a change in the law does
not have a retroactive effect except in criminal cases when
the change benefits the accused), constitute the basis for de-
fendant McNab’s assertion that all counts (and convictions)
predicated on a violation of the former Article 70 are due to
be dismissed.
74a
It is true that the Honduran National Congress reworked
Article 70. The amended legislation contains 10 specific
prohibitions and 1 catch-all provision. Namely, the follow-
ing conduct is sanctionable:
(a) Fishing with chemical or explosive elements;
(b) Fishing carried out by unlicenced persons or persons
with expired licenses;
(c) Fishing with prohibited gear;
(d) Catching for commercial purposes during the closed
season;
(e) Clearing mangrove swamps or destroying ecosystems
in general;
(f) Polluting with any substance the maritime or conti-
nental weters;
(g) Catching, destroying, or removing protected hydrobi-
ological species, especially manatees;
(h) Shipowners or captains of vessels that fail to report
their catch;
(i) Carrying out scientific research without a permit from
the National Fisheries Authority;
(j) Shipowners or captains of vessels that fail to comply
with the provisions related to the installation of the
Sea Turtle Excluding Devices (DETs) as set forth by
the National Fisheries Authority; and
(k) Any other activity not expressly mentioned in the
preceding items indicated with letters but which is
analogous.
In response, the government observes that the intent of
the Honduran National Congress in amending Article 70 was
to increase the monetary sanctions to reflect present currency
valuations, thereby putting some teeth into the law:
75a .
WHEREAS the current Fisheries Law .. . sets
forth sanctions of an administrative nature, the
amounts of which do not represent coercive
measures that reflect the gravity of the viola-
tions committed, so that it is necessary to re-
vise these sanctions according to the impor-
tance of the case and the -urrent value of the
national currency.
The government urges that those specific prohibitions con-
tained in the former Article 70 but not in the amended Article
70 (including the egg-bearing lobster prohibition at issue
here, as well as the prohibitions of catching lower weight
fish, crustaceans, and chelonians, and catching a quantity too
large to be transported in one’s own vessel) remain in effect
except to the extent that they are inconsistent with the new
prohibitions. Because there is nothing in the amended Arti-
cle 70 which is inconsistent with a prohibition against har-
vesting egg-bearing lobster, the government contends that the
harvesting of egg-bearing lobster prohibition remains in ef-
fect, if not on its own, then at least through the catch-all pro-
vision “(k)” of the amended Article 70.
Of the three changes in Honduran law which defendant
McNab advances in his alternative motions, it is this ground
which gives the court the most pause. It is troubling that the
Honduran National Congress would specifically “bring over”
certain prohibitions from the former Article 70 into the
amended Article 70, and choose not to specifically “bring
over” other prohibitions, only for this court to conclude that
the prohibitions not expressly brought over are still valid law
to the extent that they are not inconsistent with the amended
Article 70. Nevertheless, after full consideration, the court
concludes that that is exactly what this court must do in light
of Honduran Civil Code Articles 42, 43 & 44. This conclu-
sion is buttressed by the stated purpose of the amendment—
to increase the penalties—not to reduce the prohibited con-
76a
duct. This conclusion gains additional support from the affi-
davit of Liliana Paz, General Secretary in the Ministry of Ag-
riculture and Livestock, the department of the Honduran
government ultimately responsible for the enforcement of the
_ fisheries law, in which she states (albeit without much elabo-
ration) that “the destruction or harvest of eggs of aquatic spe-
cies remains prohibited under Honduran law, subject to
greater penalties.”
Accordingly, the court concludes that the harvesting and
destruction of egg-bearing lobsters continues to be prohibited
conduct under Honduran law.
CONCLUSION
After due consideration, it is
ORDERED that defendant McNab’s alternative mo-
tions are DENIED for the foregoing reasons.
The Clerk is DIRECTED to send a copy of this order
to counsel for all parties by facsimile.
DONE this 28th day of August, 2001.
/s/
RICHARD W. VOLLMER, JR
SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
77a
APPENDIX D
[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
MAY 29, 2003
THOMAS K. KAHN
CLERK
No. 01-15148
D. C. Docket No. 00-00079-CR-1-RV
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
DAVID HENSON MCNAB,
ROBERT D. BLANDFORD, et al., Defendants-
Appellants.
No. 02-10810
D. C. Docket No. 00-00079-CR-CB
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
ABNER SCHOENWETTER,
78a
ROBERT D. BLANDFORD, Defendants-
Appellants.
No. 02-11264
D. C. Docket No. 00-00079-CR-1-RV
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee
versus
DAVID HENSON MCNAB,
ABNER SCHOENWETTER, et al., Defendants-Appellants
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Alabama
(May 29, 2003)
Before HULL, WILSON and FAY, Circuit Judges.
ORDERED:
The petitions for rehearing are granted in part by deleting
entirely footnote 24 from the Court’s opinion which was is-
sued on March 21, 2003. The Court will issue a substituted
opinion making that deletion. The Court otherwise denies
the petitions for rehearing of defendants’ McNabb, Schoen-
wetter, Huang, Blandford and Embassy of Honduras.
No member of this Court having requested a poll, we
deny the suggestion for rehearing en banc. See Fed. R. App.
P. 35(a); Eleventh Circuit Rule 35-5.
FAY, Circuit Judge, dissents.
79a
APPENDIX E
[Filed August 28, 2001]
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
UNITED STATES OF JUDGMENT IN A
AMERICA CRIMINAL CASE
(For Offenses Committed On
or After November 1, 1987)
V.
DAVID HENSON MCNAB CASE NUMBER: 1:00-CR-
00079-001
THE DEFENDANT: Donald Briskman, J. Patrick
Courtney, III and _ Patrick
Sims
Defendant’s Attorney
() pleaded guilty to count(s) _.
() pleaded nolo contendere to count(s) _ which was
accepted by the court.
(X) was found guilty on count(s) 1-12, 28-43 after a
plea of not guilty.
Date Count
Title & Nature of Offense Offense No.(s)
Section Concluded
18 U.S.C. Conspiracy 05/10/2000 l
§ 371
18 U.S.C. Importation con- 02/04/1999 2-12
§§ 545 & 2 trary to law
80a
18 U.S.C. Fraudulent transac- 12/11/1998 28-42
§§ 1957 &2 _ tions of funds de-
rived from unlawful
activity
18 U.S.C. Conspiracy to en- 05/10/2000 43
§§ 1957 & gage or attempt to
1956(h) engage in monetary
transactions
The defendant is sentenced as provided in pages 2
through 5 of this judgment. Pre-sentence is imposed pursu-
ant to the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984.
() The defendant has been found not guilty on
count(s) _.
() Count(s) ___ is/are dismissed on the motion of the
United States.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendant shall no-
tify the United States Attorney for this district within 30 days
of any change of name, residence, or mailing address until all
fines, restitution, costs and special assessments imposed by
this judgment are fully paid. If ordered to pay restitution, the
defendant shall notify the court and United States attorney of
any material change in the defendant’s economic circum-
stances.
Defendant’s Social Security 08/07/2001
No.: NONE Date of Imposition of
Judgment
Defendant’s Date of Birth:
01/17/1952
Defendant’s U.S.M. No.:
39028-018
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Defendant’s Residence /s/
Address: RICHARD W. VOLLMER,
Roatan (Bay Island) JR.
Honduras, Central America SENIOR UNITED STATES
DISTRICT JUDGE
Defendant’s Mailing 8-27-01
Address: Date
JUDGMENT ENTERED ON DOCKET
82a
IMPRISONMENT
The defendant is hereby committed to the custody of the
United States Bureau of Prisons to be imprisoned for a total
term of 97 months, said term consisting of 60 months as to
each of counts 1 through 12 and 97 months as to each of
counts 28 through 42 and 43, all such terms to run CON-
CURRENTLY:
() Special Conditions:
() The court makes the following recommendations
to the Bureau of Prisons:
() The defendant is remanded to the custody of the
United States Marshal.
() The defendant shall surrender to the United States
Marshal for this district:
() ats aam/p.m.on__..
() as notified by the United States Marshal
(X) The defendant shall surrender for service of sen-
tence at the institution designated by the Bureau of
Prisons:
() before2p.m.on__.
(X) as notified by the United States Marshal.
NOTE TO U.S. MARSHAL: Defendant
allowed to remain on bond pending ap-
peal to the 11th Circuit Court of Ap-
peals and may self-surrender to the in-
stitution after a decision is rendered on
appeal;
() as notified by the Probation or Pretrial
Services Office.
RETURN
I have executed this judgment as follows:
83a
Defendant delivered on
- at
tified copy of this judgment.
to
with a cer-
UNITED STATES MARSHAL ™
By
Deputy U.S. Marshal
LH OER OG CRE
84a
SUPERVISED RELEASE
Upon release from imprisonment, the defendant shall be on
supervised release for a term of 3 YEARS as to each of
counts 1-12, 28-42 & 43, all such terms to ran CONCUR-
RENTLY:
(X) Special Conditions:
1. Immediately after incarceration, the defendant is to be
delivered to a duly authorized Immigration official for possi-
ble DEPORTATION; If deported, the defendant is to remain
outside the United States pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d). If
not deported, within 72 hours of release from custody of the
Bureau of Prisons or Immigration authorities, the defendant
shall report in person to the probation office in the district to
which he is released and abide by their instructions;
For offenses committed on or after September 13, 1994: The
defendant shall refrain from any unlawful use of a controlled
substance. The defendant shall submit to one drug test
within 15 days of release from imprisonment and at least two
periodic drug tests thereafter, as directed by the probation
officer.
() The above drug testing condition is suspended
based on the court’s determination that the defen-
dant poses a low risk of future substance abuse.
(Check, if applicable)
(X) The defendant shall not possess a firearm, destruc-
tive device, or any other dangerous weapon
If this judgment imposes a fine or a restitution obligation, it
shall be a condition of supervised release that the defendant
pay any such fine or restitution that remains unpaid at the
commencement of the term of supervised release in accor-
dance with the Schedule of Payments set forth in the Crimi-
nal Monetary Penalties sheet of this judgment. The defen-
dant shall report to the probation office in the district to
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85a
which the defendant is released within 72 hours of release
from the custody of the Bureau of Prisons.
The defendant shall not commit another federal, state or local
crime.
The defendant shall not illegally possess a controlled sub-
stance.
The defendant shall comply with the standard conditions that
have been adopted by this court (Probation Form 7a).
The defendant shall also comply with the additional condi-
tions on the attached page (if applicable).
STANDARD CONDITIONS OF SUPERVISION
1) the defendant shall not leave the judicial district without
the permission of the court or probation officer, -
2) the defendant shall report to the probation officer and shall
submit a truthful and complete written report within the first
five days of each month;
3) the defendant shall answer truthfully all inquiries by the
probation officer and follow the instructions of the prob. offi-
cer;
4) the defendant shall support his or her dependents and meet
other family responsibilities;
5) the defendant shall work regularly at a lawful occupation
unless excused by the probation officer for schooling, train-
ing, or other acceptable reasons;
6) the defendant shall notify the probation officer at least ten
days prior to any change in residence or employment;
7) the defendant shall refrain from excessive use of alcohol
and shall not purchase, possess, use, distribute, or administer
any controlled substance or any paraphernalia related to any
controlled substances, except as prescribed by a physician;
86a
8) the cefendant shall not frequent places where controlled
substances are illegally sold, used, distributed, or adminis-
tered;
9) the defendant shall not associate with any persons engaged
in criminal activity, and shall not associate with any person
convicted of a felony unless granted permission to do so by
the probation officer; |
10) the defendant shall permit a probation officer to visit him
or her at any time at home or elsewhere and shall permit con-
fiscation of any contraband observed in plain view of the pro-
bation officer;
11) the defendant shall notify the probation officer within
seventy-two hours of being arrested or questioned by a law
enforcement office,
12) the defendant shall not enter into any agreement to act as
an informer or a special agent of a law enforcement agency
without the permission of the court;
13) as directed by the prob. officer, the defendant shall notify
third parties of risks that may be occasioned by the defen-
dant’s criminal record or personal history or characteristics,
and shall permit the probation officer to make such notifica-
tions and to confirm the defendant’s compliance with such
notification requirement.
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te
‘
87a
CRIMINAL MONETARY PENALTIES
The defendant shall pay the following total criminal
monetary penalties in accordance with the schedule of pay-
ments set forth on Sheet 5, Part B.
Assessment’ Fine Restitution
Totals: $2,800.00 $100,000.00 .
* * * * *
88a
SCHEDULE OF PAYMENTS
se. fF 8 2 ©
The defendant will receive credit for all payments previously
made toward any criminal monetary penalties imposed.
() Joint and Several:
() The defendant shall pay the cost of prosecution.
() The defendant shall pay the following court
cost(s):
(X) the defendant shall forfeit the defendant’s interest
in the following property to the United States:
EIGHT HUNDRED THOUSAND AND NO/100
DOLLARS ($800,000.00)
Payments shall be applied in the following order:
(1) assessment; (2) restitution principal; (3) restitution inter-
est, (4) fine principal; (5) community restitution, (6) fine in-
terest (7) penalties, and (8) costs, including cost of prosecu-
tion and court costs.
Wess 9, - iid bi haan. hig ns} ee a PP RETITREY my a inp Lo Bier
89a
APPENDIX F
[Footnote 24 of original panel decision,
deleted on rehearing]
[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
MARCH 21, 2003
THOMAS K. KAHN
‘ CLERK
No. 01-15148
D. C. Docket No. 00-00079-CR-1-RV
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
DAVID HENSON MCNAB,
ROBERT D. BLANDFORD, et al., Defendants-
Appellants.
No. 02-10810
D. C. Docket No. 00-00079-CR-CB
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,
90a
versus
ABNER SCHOENWETTER,
ROBERT D. BLANDFORD, Defendants-
Appellants.
No. 02-11264
D. C. Docket No. 00-00079-CR-1-RV
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
DAVID HENSON MCNAB,
ROBERT D. BLANDFORD, et al., Defendants-
Appellants.
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Alabama
(March 21, 2003)
Before HULL, WILSON and FAY, Circuit Judges.
WILSON, Circuit Judge:
eS €&€ 8 @ @
Thus, we must decide whether we are bound by the Hon-
duran government’s current position regarding the validity of
these laws, or whether we are free to follow the Honduran
government’s original position.”
4 The Executive Branch of the United States government,
represented here by the Department of Justice, has taken the posi-
[Footnote continued on next page]
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[Footnote continued from previous page]
tion that the various Honduran laws in issue are valid and specifi-
cally that under Honduran law the Honduran court’s judgment re-
garding Resolution 030-95 applies only prospectively. The Execu-
tive Branch, in effect, has declined to accept the position of the
Honduran Embassy as determinative as to Honduran law.
There is no authority directing courts making foreign law de-
terminations to hold as determinative declarations made by foreign
embassies as to their laws. Instead, this Court considers the Hon-
duran Embassy’s position as evidence of what the Honduran law is
in conjunction with the other evidence in this case, which conflicts
with the Honduran Embassy’s position. Our Executive Branch’s
decision not to accept as determinative the position of a foreign
embassy on foreign law inevitably touches upon considerations of
foreign policy, which typically involve nonjusticiable “political
questions” committed to the other branches of government. See
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211-12 (1962) (recognizing that
many questions touching foreign relations are political questions);
Oetjen v. Cent. Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918). Such is the
case here because a judicial decree that the Honduran Embassy’s
position is determinative would place this Court in conflict with
the Executive Branch with respect to the amount of deference due
a foreign government official’s position. See Baker, 369 U.S. at
217 (“Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a po-
litical question is found . . . the impossibility of a court’s undertak-
ing independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect
due coordinate branches of government .. . .”).
92a
APPENDIX G
The Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause provides:
No person shall * * * be deprived of life, lib-
erty, or property, without due process of law
* * *
U.S. Const. amend. V.
ot ue ae, 7 ‘
PD AURORA MY Sa ucitaies a TE ay Suxin ci, Oidebaalooe tee patos No 9p
Sy ONAL OMEN POE RE RTI SP eT! HOY Ps a Tee TN bey eS
93a
APPENDIX H
TITLE 16—CONSERVATION
CHAPTER 53—CONTROL OF ILLEGALLY TAKEN
FISH AND WILDLIFE
Ss & €&€ &
§ 3372. Prohibited acts
(a) Offenses other than marking offenses
It is unlawful for any person—
(1) to import, export, transport, sell, receive, acquire, or
purchase any fish or wildlife or plant taken, possessed, trans-
ported, or sold in violation of any law, treaty, or regulation of
the United States or in violation of any Indian tnbal law;
(2) to import, export, transport, sell, receive, acquire, or
purchase in interstate or foreign commerce—
(A) any fish or wildlife taken, possessed, transported,
or sold in violation of any law or regulation of any State or in
violation of any foreign law, or
(B) any plant taken, possessed, transported, or sold in
violation of any law or regulation of any State;
(3) within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction
of the United States (as defined in section 7 of title 18)—
(A) to possess any fish or wildlife taken, possessed,
transported, or sold in violation of any law or regulation of
any State or in violation of any foreign law or Indian tribal
law, or
94a
(B) to possess any plant taken, possessed, transported,
or sold in violation of any law or regulation of any State;'
(4) to attempt to commit any act described in paragraphs
(1) through (4).
(b) Marking offenses
It is unlawful for any person to import, export, or trans-
port in interstate commerce any container or package con-
taining any fish or wildlife unless the container or package
has previously been plainly marked, labeled, or tagged in ac-
cordance with the regulations issued pursuant to paragraph
(2) of section 3376(a) of this title.
(c) Sale and purchase of guiding and outfitting services and
invalid licenses and permits
(1) Sale
It is deemed to be a sale of fish or wildlife in viola-
tion of this chapter for a person for money or other consid-
eration to offer or provide—
(A) guiding, outfitting, or other services; or
(B) a hunting or fishing license or permit;
for the illegal taking, acquiring, receiving, transporting, or
possessing of fish or wildlife.
(2) Purchase
It is deemed to be a purchase of fish or wildlife in
violation of this chapter for a person to obtain for money or
other consideration—
1
So in original. Probably should be followed by “or”.
2
(3).
So in original. Probably should refer to pars. (1) through
95a
(A) guiding, outfitting, or other services; or
(B) a hunting or fishing license or permit;
for the illegal taking, acquiring, receiving, transporting, or
possessing of fish or wildlife.
(d) False labeling offenses
It is unlawful for any person to make or submit any false
record, account, or label for, or any false identification of,
any fish, wildlife, or plant which has been, or is intended to
be—
(1) imported, exported, transported, sold, purchased, or
received from any foreign country; or
(2) transported in interstate or foreign commerce.
96a
TITLE 16—CONSERVATION
CHAPTER 53—CONTROL OF ILLEGALLY TAKEN
FISH AND WILDLIFE
* *& &k KF
§ 3373. Penalties and sanctions
(a) Civil penalties
(1) Any person who engages in conduct prohibited by
any provision of this chapter (other than subsections (b) and
(d) of section 3372 of this title) and in the exercise of due
care should know that the fish or wildlife or plants were
taken, possessed, transported, or sold in violation of, or in a
manner unlawful under, any underlying law, treaty, or regu-
lation, and any person who knowingly violates section
3372(d) of this title, may be assessed a civil penalty by the
Secretary of not more than $10,000 for each such violation:
Provided, That when the violation involves fish or wildlife or
plants with a market value of less than $350, and involves
only the transportation, acquisition, or receipt of fish or wild-
life or plants taken or possessed in violation of any law,
treaty, or regulation of the United States, any Indian tribal
law, any foreign law, or any law or regulation of any State,
the penalty assessed shall not exceed the maximum provided
for violation of said law, treaty, or regulation, or $10,000,
whichever is less.
(2) Any person who violates section 3372(b) of this title
may be assessed a civil penalty by the Secretary of not more
than $250. 2
(3) For purposes of paragraphs (1) and (2), any reference
to a provision of this chapter or to a section of this chapter
97a
shall be treated as including any regulation issued to carry
out any such provision or section.
(4) No civil penalty may be assessed under this subsec-
tion unless the person accused of the violation is given notice
and opportunity for a hearing with respect to the violation.
Each violation shall be a separate offense and the offense
shall be deemed to have been committed not only in the dis-
trict where the violation first occurred, but also in any district
in which a person may have taken or been in possession of
the said fish or wildlife or plants.
(5) Any civil penalty assessed under this subsection may
be remitted or mitigated by the Secretary.
(6) In determining the amount of any penalty assessed
pursuant to paragraphs (1) and (2), the Secretary shall take
into account the nature, circumstances, extent, and gravity of
the prohibited act committed, and with respect to the violator,
the degree of culpability, ability to pay, and such other mat-
ters as justice may require.
(b) Hearings
Hearings held during proceedings for the assessment of
civil penalties shall be conducted in accordance with section
554 of title 5. The administrative law judge may issue sub-
penas for the attendance and testimony of witnesses and the
production of relevant papers, books, or documents, and may
administer oaths. Witnesses summoned shall be paid the
same fees and mileage that are paid to witnesses in the courts
of the United States. In case of contumacy or refusal to obey
a subpena issued pursuant to this paragraph and served upon
any person, the district court of the United States for any dis-
trict in which such person is found, resides, or transacts busi-
ness, upon application by the United States and after notice
to such person, shall have jurisdiction to issue an order re-
quiring such person to appear and give testimony before the
administrative law judge or to appear and produce documents
98a
before the administrative law judge, or both, and any failure
to obey such order of the court may be punished by such
court as a contempt thereof.
(c) Review of civil penalty
Any person against whom a civil penalty is assessed un-
der this section may obtain review thereof in the appropriate
District Court of the United States by filing a complaint in
such court within 30 days after the date of such order and by
simultaneously serving a copy of the complaint by certified
mail on the Secretary, the Attorney General, and the appro-
priate United States attorney. The Secretary shall promptly
file in such court a certified copy of the record upon which
such violation was found or such penalty imposed, as pro-
vided in section 2112 of title 28. If any person fails to pay an
assessment of a civil penalty after it has become a final and
unappealable order or after the appropriate court has entered
final judgment in favor of the Secretary, the Secretary may
request the Attorney General of the United States to institute
a civil action in an appropriate district court of the United
States to collect the penalty, and such court shall have juris-
diction to hear and decide any such action. In hearing such
action, the court shall have authority to review the violation
and the assessment of the civil penalty de novo.
(d) Criminal penalties
(1) Any person who—
(A) knowingly imports or exports any fish or wildlife
or plants in violation of any provision of this chapter (other
than subsections (b) and (d) of section 3372 of this title), or
(B) violates any provision of this chapter (other than
subsections (b) and (d) of section 3372 of this title) by know-
ingly engaging in cenduct that involves the sale or purchase
of, the offer of sale or purchase of, or the intent to sell or pur-
chase, fish or wildlife or plants with a market value in excess
of $350,
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knowing that the fish or wildlife or plants were taken, pos-
sessed, transported, or sold in violation of, or in a manner
unlawful under, any underlying law, treaty or regulation,
shall be fined not more than $20,000, or imprisoned for not
more than five years, or both. Each violation shall be a sepa-
rate offense and the offense shall be deemed to have been
committed not only in the district where the violation first
occurred, but also in any district in which the defendant may
have taken or been in possession of the said fish or wildlife
or plants.
(2) Any person who knowingly engages in conduct pro-
hibited by any provision of this chapter (other than subsec-
tions (b) and (d) of section 3372 of this title) and in the exer-
cise of due care should know that the fish or wildlife or
plants were taken, possessed, transported, or sold in violation
of, or in a manner unlawful under, any underlying law, treaty
or regulation shall be fined not more than $10,000, or im-
prisoned for not more than one year, or both. Each violation
shall be a separate offense and the offense shall be deemed to
have been committed not only in the district where the viola-
tion first occurred, but also in any district in which th
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