Amicus Curiae Brief — Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. Suzuki Motor Corp.

No. 03-281 SEP ? 3

IN THE

Supreme Court of the Gnited States

CONSUMERS UNION OF UNITED STATES, INC.,

Petitioner,

V.

SUZUKI MOTOR CORP.,

Respondent.

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

BRIEF FOR THE CONSUMER FEDERATION OF

AMERICA AS AMICUS CURIAE

IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER

JOHN TOWNSEND RICH*

ADAM M. CHUD

SHEA & GARDNER

1800 Massachusetts Ave., N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20036

(202) 828-2000

Counsel for Amicus Curiae

September 22, 2003 *Counsel of Record

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIEG...........ccssscossscessesssessssssosseresnsesees ll

INTEREST OF THE AMICUS CURIAE ..eecccccccscsescssssseseeseseees l

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY .........cccccccesssscsssscesescees 2

IE iieicisiaiebes ssniidbisetiibaniniaiepilianspmictapiditamdeasiannes: 4

I. A Summary Judgment Standard That Permits

District Courts To Dispose of Cases Where a

Jury Verdict in Favor of the Plaintiff Would Not

Survive the Court’s Independent Review of the

Evidence Is Important to Organizations That

Comment on Consumer Products. ........ccceccccssesesececes 4.

II. The Ninth Circuit’s Reliance on Petitioner’s

Financial Situation Is Dangerous to Consumer

Organizations and to the Public Interest in

Candid Product Evaluations. .0.........c.ccccccccccsosesssseseee. 7

III. The Ninth Circuit’s Reliance on the Existence

of an Inconsistent Government Report Is

Dangerous to Consumer Organizations and to

the Public Interest in Candid Product

NN theiasterscnichticice ret catiacse ua 9

SA eisiictia andi anteaters Ns 10

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES:

Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States,

Frec., SOG UL. SBS CI eaiscrcvestcsencncivcrmunnnnmnnsanncsanine 2-3

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986) c.ccecsessesseesee 6

Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton,

Bi UE. CSF (TR ction aenemmenten 8

New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254

(TIDE) .n~xsiniscisicinadalapeemtepleauaabheaiaeaidiaaabmiie aaa aT

OTHER AUTHORITIES:

Brobeck, Stephen, Fund-Raising, in Encyclopedia of

the Consumer Movement 283 (Stephen Brobeck

00h, FPF EP iceasnsiestviseniteniceaitisidaiiaeiaetinaditakgidaeaame tinal iiaicek datas 5

Clark, Charles E., & Charles U. Samenow, The

Summary Judgment, 38 Yale L.J. 423 (1929)............ 6-7

Gilles, Susan M., Taking First Amendment

Procedure Seriously: An Analysis of Process, in

Libel Litigation, 58 Ohio St. L.J. 1753 (1997-—

SPEED vccecsuossevesicdiinteheianiasuanianeaiaataniiedncm an dmentaiiiaaia 6—7

Gillmor, Donald M., Power, Publicity, and the

Pilrame OF Lilet Le (IFIED ocesesscscessvasivsrnevcvesasviepravoneences 6

Herrmann, Robert O., & Robert N; Mayer, U.S.

Consumer Movement: History and Dynamics, in

Encyclopedia of the Consumer Movement 584

(Stopheems BrobOck C6. TIFT) csisccsescccosssssssnssevsecovnenevsnsese 5

11 Moore, James Wm., et al., Moore’s Federal

PRCT F SOE Ce kvicicinsicntemscocnsianntacntsianenavinenvented 6

Schwarzer, William W., et al., The Analysis and

Decision of Summary Judgment Motions, 139

F REA SG CIS) nxiiviccisconanmmaeasaaannet 6

—————————

ili

Wissler, Roselle L., et al., Resolving Libel Disputes

Out of Court: The Libel Dispute Resolution

Program, in Reforming Libel Law 286 (John

Soloski & Randall P. Bezanson eds., 1992)...........ce 6

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

No. 03-281

CONSUMERS UNION OF UNITED STATES, INC -

Petitioner,

v.

SUZUKI MOTOR CorpP.,

Respondent.

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

BRIEF FOR THE CONSUMER FEDERATION OF

AMERICA AS AMICUS CURIAE

IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER

INTEREST OF THE AMICUS CURIAE'

This brief is filed on behalf of the Consumer Federation of

America (“CFA”), a nonprofit umbrella organization of 300

local, state, and national consumer groups from all 50 states

and the District of Columbia. A full list of CFA’s members is

included in the Appendix hereto. CFA’s constituent member

organizations count more than 50 million individuals in their

collective membership.

' No counsel for any party authored this brief either in whole or in part,

and no persons other than the amicus curiae and their counsel made any

monetary contribution to its preparation or submission. The parties’

written consents to the filing of this brief have been filed with the Clerk of

the Court.

On behalf of its members, CFA gathers, analyzes, and

disseminates information about a range of consumer issues to

the public, Congress, and federal agencies. CFA seeks to

provide a voice for the concerns of consumers, particularly

those of limited means. Many of CFA’s members evaluate

consumer products and publish reports detailing the results of

their studies; those reports are often critical of the products

reviewed.

The ability of CFA and its members to provide important

information to the public about products and services in the

marketplace would be jeopardized if they were forced to

absorb the costs of defending at trial against meritless product

disparagement and libel suits. Therefore CFA and its

members have a keen interest in the standard to be applied on

review of motions for summary judgment in such actions.

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

This action concerns the proper standard for reviewing an

order of summary judgment in favor of a media defendant in a

product disparagement or libel case. The factual background

and procedural history of this case are set forth in detail in the

Petition and in the decision of the Ninth Circuit, 330 F.3d

1110, 1127 (9th Cir. 2003), Pet. App. la, and amicus

incorporates and adopts those statements by reference.

A summary judgment standard in product disparagement

and libel cases that facilitates the dismissal of meritless

actions before trial is vital to the functioning and survival of

organizations that comment on consumer products. This

Court has not previously had the occasion to clarify this

standard, and it should do so now.

In Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc.,

466 U.S. 485 (1984), the Court held that, after the trial in a

defamation action concerning a public figure, courts must

make an “independent review” of the “whole record” to

determine whether “clear and convincing evidence” of “actual

—L es LS”

malice” exists per New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254

(1964). Bose did not address the central question at issue

here: whether courts must conduct such independent review

of the evidence when deciding a media defendant’s motion

for summary judgment.

Independent review of the evidence before trial—which the

Ninth Circuit held is not permitted—is critical to the ability of

organizations that comment on consumer products to perform

their important watchdog function. The Ninth Circuit’s view

that the Bose rule applies only to “the review of a judgment

rendered after trial” (330 F.3d at 1133 n.10, Pet. App. 16a

n.10) condemns consumer organizations to defending all but

the most frivolous product disparagement and libel actions

through trial, rather than obtaining dismissal of unfounded

actions in advance of trial. Forcing consumer organizations

to face a trial before the court may independently review the

entire record (even after a full summary judgment record has

been established) is a pointless and expensive exercise that

will only encourage such litigation against product reviewers.

As Judge Kozinski noted in his dissent from the Ninth

Circuit’s denial of rehearing en banc, “[i]f Suzuki can get to

trial on evidence this flimsy, no consumer group in the

country will be safe from assault by hordes of handsomely

paid lawyers deploying scorched-earth litigation tactics.” 330

F.3d at 1121, Pet. App. 69a.

In Part I we explain the damage that the Ninth Circuit’s

ruling will do to the many organizations that comment on

consumer products. In particular, we explain the importance

of the summary judgment standard to consumer-organization

defendants in product disparagement actions, for which the

expense of even a single trial could mean their demise.

In Parts II and III we discuss several aspects of the Ninth

Circuit’s ruling that are particularly troubiing for consumer

organizations. In Part II we explain that the Ninth Circuit’s

reliance on Petitioner’s financial position as evidence that

Petitioner had a motive to embellish its Suzuki Samurai study

4

sets a dangerous precedent that will permit courts to use a

defendant’s finances, standing alone, as_ possibly

determinative evidence of product disparagement or libel. In

Part III we show that First Amendment principles cannot be

squared with the Ninth Circuit’s view that Petitioner’s failure

to explain to the court’s satisfaction why the results of its

Samurai study differed from the government’s conclusions

constitutes possibly determinative evidence that Petitioner

may have purposefully avoided the truth. Consumer

organizations should not stand trial simply because a court is

not convinced that they have fully explained why the results

of their studies are not in line with the views of the

government.

ARGUMENT |

I. A Summary Judgment Standard That Permits

District Courts To Dispose of Cases Where a Jury

Verdict in Favor of the Plaintiff Would Not Survive

the Court’s Independent Review of the Evidence Is |

Important to Organizations That Comment on

Consumer Products. |

The Ninth Circuit’s conclusion that courts may not

independently review the whole record when considering

motions for summary judgment in product disparagement and |

libel actions would have far-reaching, negative implications

for the many organizations that comment on consumer

products. Such a rule would limit the ability of media

defendants to dispose of such claims at a relatively early stage

of litigation. It would subject those organizations—many of

which are poorly funded and could not survive the expense of

even a single substantial libel trial—to the continued threat of

libel suits, any one of which could effectively drain its entire

budget. And the prospect of expensive libel trials may limit

the vigor with which consumer organizations perform their

valuable roles. For all of these reasons, certiorari is

warranted.

ee ee Te

5

A. There are a large number of organizations that test and

comment on consumer products. These organizations range

from giant media conglomerates to well-known product

reviewers (such as Petitioner), to national organizations that

review a limited range of products and services (such as

AARP), to many local organizations that review particular

types of products (such as many of CFA’s members).

These organizations are often short on funds, and they rely

on year-round fundraising campaigns to ensure their

continued viability. See Stephen Brobeck, Fund-Raising, in

Encyclopedia of the Consumer Movement 283, 283-85

(Stephen Brobeck ed., 1997). The prime “commodity”

offered by these consume. organizations is their unbiased

judgment about the value of products, services, or other

government or private initiatives. In contrast, the products

that consumer organizations test and review are typicaily

offered by large, well-funded corporations with significant

litigation budgets. Those product producers have substantial

incentives to bring lawsuits as one method of defending their

products against damaging criticism, whether the product

review at issue was actionable or not. The incentive for a

product manufacturer to defend itself through litigation is

especially great when the target of the action is a small,

poorly funded consumer organization that may not be able to

afford the costs of defencing itself. See Robert O. Herrmann

& Robert N. Mayer, U.S. Consumer Movement: History and

Dynamics, in Encyclopedia of the Consumer Movement 584,

599 (Stephen Brobeck ed., 1997) (“[T]he organizations of the

consumer movement constantly face the problem[] of

financial insecurity * * *. Even those organizations that have

established a relatively firm financial base usually cannot

match resources with business-financed opponents.”).

This incentive for product manufacturers to litigate

negative product reviews is particularly troublesome because

of the great cost of defending such actions. By some

estimates, te’ ng a libel case to trial costs a defendant four

6

times as much as if the matter is resolved on summary

judgment. See Donald M. Gillmor, Power, Publicity, and the

Abuse of Libel Law 130-31 (1992); see also Roselle L.

Wissler et al., Resolving Libel Disputes Out of Court: The

Libel Dispute Resolution Program, in Reforming Libel Law

286, 287 (John Soloski & Randall P. Bezanson eds., 1992)

(“[T]he main economic impact of libel on the media today is

the high cost of defending a seriously litigated suit. To

defend such a suit through trial typically costs the media

$150,000.”) (footnote omitted).

B. The high costs of taking a libel case to trial makes

summary judgment a particularly important procedural device

in such actions. “One of the principal purposes of the

summary judgment rule is to isolate and dispose of factually

unsupported claims or defenses * * *.” Celotex Corp. v.

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986). Summary judgment

““allows courts and litigants to avoid full-blown trials in

unwinnable cases, thus conserving the parties’ time and

money and permitting courts to husband scarce judicial

resources.” 11 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore’s Federal

Practice § 56.02, at 56-20 (2003) (citation omitted). As

another group of commentators put it: “Growing concern over

cost and delay in civil litigation has focused increased

attention on Rule 56 as a vehicle to implement the objectives

of Fed.R.Civ.P. 1—the just, speedy, and inexpensive

resolution of litigation.” William W. Schwarzer et al., The

Analysis and Decision of Summary Judgment Motions, 139

F.R.D. 441, 445 (1991). Accordingly, “[s}ummary judgment

has become recognized * * * as a procedure for avoiding

unnecessary trials on insufficient claims or defenses * * *.”

Id. at 451.” Indeed, “defendants in libel cases depend on

? As one of the seminal articles on summary judgment stated: “Except

where a trial is necessary to scitle an issue of fact, the whole judicial

process is, by [the summary judgment] procedure, made to function more

quickly and with less complexity than in the ordinary long drawn out

7

summary judgment to quickly and (relatively) cheaply

dispose of most libel cases.” Susan M. Gilles, Taking First

Amendment Procedure Seriously: An Analysis of Process, in

Libel Litigation, 58 Ohio St. L.J. 1753, 1764 (1997-1998).

The Ninth Circuit’s rule, which makes summary judgment

more difficult to obtain in product disparagement and libel

cases, would undermine Sullivan, which provides heightened

protection to speech about public figures. The significant

costs associated with taking libel suits to trial could force

consumer organizations to spend most—or all—of their

limited budgets defending even meritless suits at trial. Libel

insurance provides only limited relief for some consumer

organizations, as it is expensive and not universally available.

And such insurance is often not renewed—or its cost

increases dramatically—once an insurer is forced to incur the

costs of a libel trial. ~

Finally, the risk of facing the costs of a libel trial will

inevitably lead consumer organizations to attempt to limit

their exposure by publishing fewer articles that are

substantially critical of consumer products and services and

by soft-pedaling the legitimate problems and inadequacies

that their research uncovers. This chilling of the valuable

work that consumer organizations perform would create “an

atmosphere in which the First Amendment freedoms cannot

survive.” Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 278.

II. The Ninth Circuit’s Reliance on Petitioner’s

Financial Situation Is Dangerous to Consumer

Organizations and to the Public Interest in Candid

Product Evaluations.

The Ninth Circuit panel majority permitted Suzuki to use

evidence of a particular financial outlay by Petitioner as

possibly determinative evidence in favor of a finding that

suit.” Charles E. Clark & Charles U. Samenow, The Summary Judgment,

38 Yale L.J. 423, 423 (1929).

8

Petitioner had acted with actual malice. 330 F.3d at 1127 n.1

& 1135-36, Pet. App. 3a n.1 & 22a. It concluded that while

“financial motive cannot, by itself, prove actual malice, it

nonetheless is a relevant factor bearing on the actual malice

inquiry.” 330 F.3d at 1136, Pet. App. 22a. The panel added

that “(t]he fact that CU needed to boost its revenues to

complete its capital campaign lends credence to Suzuki's

contention that CU rigged the Samurai testing to produce the

predetermined rollover result.” 330 F.3d at 1136, Pet. App.

22a—23a.

These conclusions are contrary to Harte-Hanks

Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657 (1989),

in which this Court held that a media defendant’s “motive in

publishing a story,” including “to increase * * * circulation”

or “to increase its profits” “cannot provide a sufficient basis

for finding actual malice.” /d. at 665, 667. The Ninth Circuit

tried to side-step Harte-Hanks by stating that Petitioner’s

financial motive was simply “a relevant factor” that

“dovetails” with the other evidence. 330 F.3d at 1136. Pet.

App. 22a. But if financial motive is not sufficient by itself to

show actual malice, it certainly cannot be sufficient to tip the

scales in favor of such a finding when combined with other

evidence of alleged actual malice, thus providing a ground for

denying summary judgment in favor of the defendant.

This holding also has important negative consequences for

consumer organizations. It means that the often tenuous

financial position of consumer groups—which they face by

the very nature of the work they perform—will always be

relevant and perhaps outcome-determinative evidence of an

intention to exaggerate results that disparage the products

being reviewed and to disregard evidence that an

organization’s conclusions are false. Consumer organizations

will therefore automatically have one strike against them in

product disparagement and libel actions. And this negative

inference will exist regardless of whether the organization’s

finances have any direct connection to the review of the

——

9

product at issue. It would be extraordinarily damaging to

First Amendment values to force an organization to undergo

an expensive trial simply because there exists some evidence

that the organization has financial difficulties. That result

goes a long way towards making the freedom on speech

protected by the First Amendment a perquisite of the rich

alone. Certiorari is warranted to correct this error by the

Ninth Circuit.

Iti. The Ninth Circuit’s Reliance on the Existence of an

Inconsistent Government Report Is Dangerous to

Consumer Organizations and to the Public Interest

in Candid Product Evaluations.

The Ninth Circuit also concluded that Petitioner failed to

adequately explain why it relied on human drivers to test the

Samurai, when the National Highway Traffic Safety

Administration (“NHTSA”) had criticized such testing

methods. The court found this discrepancy to be evidence

warranting a trial whether Petitioner “purposely avoided the

truth.” 330 F.3d at 1136, Pet. App. 24a. In particular, the

Ninth Circuit concluded that even though Petitioner

“challenged the NHTSA report head on, stating its

disagreement in detail and supporting its alternative

conclusions with substantive justifications,” it nonetheless did

not “respond to the criticism of its testing procedures as

overly influenced by driver input.” 330 F.3d at 1138, Pet.

App. 28a.

This conclusion simply cannot be consistent with the First

Amendment. Consumer organizations do not exist merely to

replicate the testing procedures the government may prefer.

Similarly, they should not be required to stand tral simply

because their tests do not match those preferred by the

government, or because they do not sufficiently explain why

they used different testing procedures. Here, Petitioner

disclosed fully its testing procedures. Petitioner did not

report testing that had never occurred or falsify the results of

its tests. If a reader was interested in whether Petitioner’s

10

testing protocol differed from that preferred by the

government and whether that protocol made sense, all they

needed to do was review Petitioner’s report. This disclosure

satisfies any legitimate expectation that a product

manufacturer could have concerning the truthfulness of a

product review such as that at issue here. As Judge Kozinski

noted, “[t]he appropriate response to a poorly designed

experiment is to conduct a better one and then convince

people that your method is more accurate—not to sue the

other guy into silence.” 330 F.3d at 1121, Pet. App. 68a.

This issue has significant ramifications for all product

reviewers. After the Ninth Circuit’s decision, reviewers will

risk an expensive trial if they neither replicate the

government’s testing techniques nor satisfy a court that they

were justified in testing a different way. That standard cannot

be squared with the First Amendment’s commitment to robust

debate. For this additional reason, certiorari is warranted to

correct the Ninth Circuit’s unprecedented decision.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth in the Petition and above, this

Court should grant the petition for writ of certiorari.

Respectfully submitted,

JOHN TOWNSEND RICH*

ADAM M. CHUD

SHEA & GARDNER

1800 Massachusetts Ave., N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20036

(202) 828-2000

Counsel for Amicus Curiae

September 22, 2003 *Counsel of Record

la

APPENDIX

Members of the Consumer Federation of America

lst Advantage Federal Credit Union (VA)

Ist Credit Union (MO)

ist Rochdale Cooperative Group, Ltd. (NY

AARP

Aiken Electric Cooperative (SC)

Alabama Arise :

Alabama Municipal Electric Authority

Alabama Rural Electric Association

Alabama Watch

Alaska Public Interest Research Group

Alliance Credit Union (CA)

Alliance for Retired Americans

American Association of Homes and Services for the Aging

American Council on Consumer Awareness

American Council on Consumer Interests

American Homeowners Grassroots Alliance

American-Public Health Association

American Public Power Association

Arizona Consumers Council

Arizona Credit Union League

Arkansas Credit Union League

Arkansas Federal Credit Union

Arkansas Public Policy Panel

Association. of Louisiana Electric Cooperatives

Basin Electric Power Cooperative (ND)

Bay Ridge Consumer Federation (NY)

Bayer Credit Union (MO)

Bread for the World Institute

Broward County Consumer Affairs Division (FL)

Bucks County Consumer Protection (PA)

California Consumer Affairs Association

California Department of Consumer Affairs

California Labor Federation AFL-CIO

California & Nevada Credit Union Leagues

2a

California Public Interest Research Group

Campaign for Tobacco—Free Kids

Carolina Collegiate Federal Credit Union (SC)

Carolina Foothills Federal Credit Union (SC)

Center for Auto Safety

Center for Community Self—Help

Center for Economic Justice

Center for Economic Progress

Center for Insurance Research

Center for Justice and Democracy

Center for Public Interest Law

Center for Science in-the Public Interest

Center for the Study of Services

Central Electric Cooperative (SD)

Central Power Electric Cooperative (ND)

Champaign County Health Care Consumers (IL)

Chartway Federal Credit Union (VA)

Chicago Consumer Coalition

Citizen Equity First Credit Union (IL)

Citizen’s Utility Board of Oregon

City of Anaheim Public Utilities (CA)

City of Detroit Consumer Affairs Department

City of Mesa, Utilities Department (AZ)

City Utilities of Springfield (MO)

Cleveland Consumer Action

Coalition for Consumer Rights

Coastal Federal Credit Union (NC)

Colorado Credit Union League

Colorado Public Interest Research Group

Colorado Rural Electric Association

Columbia Consumer Education Council (SC)

Community Action Partnership of Mercer County (PA)

Connecticut Public Interest Research Group

Consumer Action

Consumer Assistance Council

Consumer Credit Counseling Service of St. Louis, Inc. (MO)

Consumer Energy Council of America

3a

Consumer Federation of California

Consumer Fraud Watch

Consumer League for Education and Reform

Consumer Protection Association

Consumers Cooperative Society of Santa Monica (CA)

Consumers for Auto Reliability and Safety

Consumers for Auto Reliability and Safety Federation

Consumers League of New Jersey

Consumers League of Ohio

Consumers Union

Consumers Union/Southwest Regional Office (TX)

Consumers United Association

Consumers United/Minnesotan’s for Safe Foods

Council of New York Cooperatives & Condominiums

Credit Union Executives Society

CUNA and Affiliates

CUNA Credit Union (WI)

CUNA Mutual Group (WI)

Defense Credit Union Council

Democratic Processes Center

Department of Family & Consumer Studies (UT)

Disability Policy Consortium

District of Columbia Credit Union League

East River Electric Power Cooperative (SD)

Economic Justice Institute

Empire State Consumer Association

ESL Federal Credit Union (NY)

Families Advocating Injury Reduction

Family Trust Federal Credit Union (SC)

First Missouri Credit Union

Florence Educators Federal Credit Union (SC)

Florida Action Coalition Team

Florida Attorney General’s Office

Florida Consumer Action Network

Florida Credit Union League

Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services

Florida Electric Cooperatives Association

4a

Florida Funeral & Cemetery Consumer Advocacy

Florida Municipal Electric Association

Florida Public Interest Foundation

Florida Public Interest Research Group

Food & Allied Service Trades

Food Research and Action Center

FreedomFirst Credit Union (VA)

Ft. Collins Light & Power Utility (CO)

Fund Democracy, Inc.

Funeral Consumers Alliance

Georgetown Kraft Credit Union (SC)

Georgia Public Interest Research Group

Greater Lawrence Community Action Council, Inc. (MA)

Greenbelt Consumer Cooperative (MD)

Group Health Cooperative (WA)

HALT

Handgun Control

Harbour Credit Counseling Services, Inc. (VA)

Harlem Consumer Education Council

Heartland Community Credit Union (MO)

Hillsborough County Consumer Protection Agency (FL)

Human Solutions

Idaho Consumer Affairs

Illinois Credit Union League

Illinois PIRG Education Fund

Indiana Credit Union League

Indiana Statewide Association of Rural Electric Cooperatives

International Association of Lemon Law Administrators

Iowa Association of Municipal Utilities

Iowa Credit Union League

Iowa Public Interest Research Group

Kalamazoo District Bell Federal Credit Union (MI)

Kansas City Neighborhood Alliance (MO)

Kansas Credit Union Association

Kansas Municipal Utilities

Kids In Danger

Laclede Family Savings Credit Union (MO)

Sa

Lafayette Utilities System (LA)

Legal Services of North Florida

Liberty Federal Credit Union (SC)

Lincoln Electric System (NE)

Lockheed Federal Credit Union (CA)

Lyon-Lincoln Electric Cooperative, Inc. (MN)

Maryland Consumer Rights Coalition

Maryland Public Interest Research Group

Massachusetts Consumers’ Coalition

Massachusetts Credit Union League

Massachusetts Office of Consumer Affairs and Business

Regulation

Massachusetts Public Interest Research Group

Mazuma Credit Union (MO)

MCAS Beaufort Federal Credit Union (SC)

McCoy Federal Credit Union (FL)

Mecklenburg Electric Cooperative (VA)

Michigan Consumer Federation

Michigan Municipal Electric Association

Michigan State AFL-CIO

Mid—West Electric Consumers Association

Minnesota AFL-CIO

Minnesota Credit Union Network

Minnesota Municipal Utilities Association

Minnesota Public Interest Research Group

Minnesota Valley Cooperative Light and Power Association

Missouri Central Credit Union

Missouri Credit Union Association

Missouri Public Interest Research Group

Missouri River Energy Services (SD)

Missourians for Affordable Reliable Energy Service

Montana Public interest Research Group

Montgomery County Division of Consumer Affairs (MD)

Moorhead Public Service (MN)

Municipal Electric Systems of Oklahoma

National Association of Consumer Advocates

National Association of Consumer Agency Administrators

6a

National Association of Federal Credit Unions

National Association of Housing Cooperatives

National Association of Unclaimed Property Administrators

National Center for Appropriate Technology

National Center on Poverty Law

National Citizens Coalition for Nursing Home Reform

National Consumer Law Center

National Consumers League

National Cooperative Bank

National Cooperative Business Association

National Farmers Union

National Low Income Housing Coalition

National Rural Electric Cooperative Association

National Rural Telecommunications Cooperative

Navy Federal Credit Union (VA)

New Jersey Public Interest Research Group Citizen Lobby

New Mexico Public Interest Research Group

New York Citizens Utility Board

New York City Board of Education Employees, Local 372

New York City Department of Consumer Affairs

New York City Consumer Assembly

New York Public Interest Research Group

Niagara Frontier Consumer Association (NY)

North Carolina Association of Electric Cooperatives

North Carolina Consumers Council

North Carolina Hunger Network

North Carolina Justice & Community Development Center

North Carolina Public Interest Research Group

North Dakota Association of Rural Electric Cooperatives

Northeast Public Power Association

Northwestern Rural Electric Cooperative Association (PA)

NRL Federal Credit Union (MD)

Nutritional Resource Center

Ohio Consumers’ Counsel

Ohio Municipal Electric Association

Ohio Public Interest Research Group

Ohio State AFL-CIO

7a

Oklahoma Association of Electric Cooperatives

Orange County Teachers Federal Credit Union (CA)

Oregon Consumers League

Oregon State Public Interest Research Group

ORNL Federal Credit Union (TN)

PACE, International Union

Palmetto Citizens Federal Credit Union (SC)

Pennsylvania Credit Union Association

Pennsylvania Public Interest Research Group

Pentagon Federal Credit Union

Public Interest Research Group in Michigan

Public Utility Law Project of New York

Purina Credit Union (MO)

Quackwatch (PA)

Renville-Sibley Cooperative Power Association (MN)

Rhode Island Public Interest Research Group

Royal Oakland Community Credit Union (MI)

S.T.O.P.-Safe Tables Our Priority

SAC Federal Credit Union (NE)

Salt River Project (AZ)

Service Employees International Union

SHISA (FL) ;

South Carolina Credit Union League

South Dakota Credit Union League

South Dakota Rural Electric Association

Southeastern Electric Cooperative, Inc. (SD)

SRP Federal Credit Union (SC)

St. Louis Community Credit Union (MC)

St. Louis Postal Credit Union (MO)

St. Paul Postal Employees Credit Union (MN)

State Department Federal Credit Union

State of Connecticut Department of Consumer Protection

Sumter Electric Cooperative (FL)

Tallahassee—Leon Federal Credit Union (FL)

Tennessee Valley Public Power Association

Texas Alliance for Human Needs

Texas Citizen Action

NP OR MM a ee ees

8a

Texas Consumer Association

Texas Credit Union League

Texas Legal Services Center

Texas Low Income Housing Information Service

Texas Watch

The Consumer Alliance

The Danny Foundation

The Newspaper Guild of New York, AFL—CIO, Local 3

Tower Federal Credit Union (MD)

Treasury Department Federal Credit Union

U.S. Federal Credit Union

UCAN/Privacy Rights Clearinghouse

Union of Needletrades, Industrial & Textile Employees

UNITE Southwest Credit Union (MO)

United Association of Plumbers & Pipefitters

United Auto Workers

United Auto Workers, Local 2195

United Auto Workers, Local 599

United Food and Commercial Workers International Union

Vantage Credit Union (MO)

Vermont Public Interest Research Group

Victim’s Committee for Recall of Defective Vehicles

Violence Policy Center

Virginia AFL-CIO

Virginia Citizens Consumer Council

Virginia Credit Union League

W.E. Morris Institute for Justice

Washington Credit Union League

Washington Public Interest Research Group

Washington Public Utility Districts Association

Waverly Light & Power (IA)

Wells Rural Electric Company (NV)

Wescom Credit Union (CA)

West River Electric Association (SD)

West Virginia Credit Union League

Western Fuels Association

Wisconsin Consumers League

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Wisconsin Public Interest Research Group

Wisconsin State AFL-CIO

Woodstock Institute

Wright Patman Congressional Federal Credit Union (DC)

Wyoming Credit Union League