Appendix — Campbell v. Hilton Head No. 1 Public Service District

la

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Supreme Court

Irvin W. Campbell, J. C. Lawyer, Backus Ferguson, and

Thomas Hanahan, III, on behalf of themselves and all others

similarly situated, Respondents

V.

Hilton Head No. 1 Public Service District and Beaufort

County South Carolina, Appellants.

Appeal From Beaufort County

Perry M. Buckner, Circuit Court Judge

Opinion No. 25635

Heard February 20, 2003 - Filed April 28, 2003

JUSTICE WALLER: This is a direct civil appeal. On

cross-motions for summary judgment, the trial court granted

summary judgment for respondents and also granted

respondents’ request for class certification. Appellants appeal

both decisions. We reverse.

FACTS'

In 1969, the Legislature created appellant Hilton Head

' The facts in this matter are undisputed.

2a

No. 1 Public Service District (the District) as a special purpose

district to supply water and sewer services to the northern

portion of Hilton Head Island. The District is governed and

managed by a commission whose members are appointed by the

Governor upon the recommendation of the Beaufort County

legislative delegation. Prior to this Court’s decision in Weaver

v. Recreation Dist., 328 S.C. 83, 492 S.E.2d 79 (1997), the

District levied taxes on property within the District’s service

area. Appellant Beaufort County collected the taxes.

In Weaver, we ruled that the statute which authorized the

recreation district’s appointed commission to levy a property tax

violated the State Constitution’s provision forbidding taxation

by unelected officials.?, The general holding from Weaver is

that any legislative delegation of taxing authority to an

appointed body unconstitutionally permitted “taxation without

representation.” Jd. The Weaver Court, however, ordered only

prospective relief, stating the following:

We are cognizant ... of the disruptive effect

today’s holding could have on the financial

operation of numerous special purpose districts,

local commissions and boards throughout this

state. Accordingly, in order to give the General

Assembly an opportunity to address this

problem, we hold this decision shall be applied

prospectively beginning December 31, 1999.

Id. at 87-88, 492 S.E.2d at 82. In response, the Legislature

passed legislation in 1998 that removed the taxing power from

appointed bodies such as the District’s commission. See S.C.

? See S.C. Const. art. X, § 5 (“No tax ... shall be established,

fixed, laid or levied, under any pretext whatsoever, without the.

consent of the people or their representatives lawfully assembled....”).

3a

Code Ann. § 6-11-271 (Supp. 2002).

The individual respondents in the instant action

represent people who own real and/or personal property located

in the District, paid taxes on the property in the years 1995

through 1998, and did not receive water or sewer service from

the District. On June 1, 1998, respondents filed their lawsuit.

The case has a tortured procedural history;* however,

respondents’ only remaining cause of action is a 42 U.S.C. §

1983 claim based on an alleged violation of the United States

Constitution.*

* Additionally, respondents include only those who still do

not receive any water or sewer service from the District.

* For example, the case began with two similar complaints

filed in state and federal court, each alleging several causes of action.

The state court case was removed to federal court, consolidated with

the federal case, and then eventually remanded to state court. Sze

Lawyer v. Hilton Head Public Serv. Dist No. 1, 220 F.3d 298 (4th

Cir. 2000), aff’g Campbell v. Hilton Head No. | Public Serv. Dist.,

114 F.Supp.2d 482 (D.S.C. 1999).

> Section 1983 provides:

Every person who, under color of any statute,

ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State

or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or

causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United

States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof

to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or

immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,

shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,

suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.

(Emphasis added). Thus, the statute creates a civil rights action for

(continued...)

4a

The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of

respondents finding that taxation without representation is a

violation of the federal Constitution. Specifically, the trial court

found that the privilege of no taxation without representation is

embodied in Article IV, section 4 of the federal constitution,

which guarantees a republican form of government. The trial

court noted “it was taxation without representation that spurred

on the American Revolution,” and therefore could not accept

appeliants’ argument that the federal constitution did not forbid

taxation without representation. In addition, the trial court

granted respondents’ motion for class certification.

ISSUES

~ 1. Did the trial court err in finding that taxation

without representation violates the Republican

Guarantee Clause of the United States

Constitution?

2. Did the trial court err in certifying the class?

DISCUSSION

Respondents argued to the trial court that “taxation

without representation” is not permitted under the United States

Constitution. Respondents reasonably continue to contend that

this founding principle of our nation necessarily is embodied in

the federal constitution. Appellants, on the other hand, argue

the trial court erred in finding the Republican Guarantee Clause

prohibits taxation without representation. Moreover, appellants

do not suggest that our nation has abandoned its founding

‘(...continued)

the deprivation of a federal right.

Sa

principles, but rather argue that the limited delegation of taxing

power that occurred prior to Weaver in no way violated a right

guaranteed by the federal constitution. After reviewing the

relevant authorities, we agree with appellants, and reverse the

trial court’s decision.

The Republican Guarantee Clause of the federal

Constitution provides as follows: “The United States shall

guarantee to every state in this Union a republican form of

government, and shall protect each of them against invasion;

and on application of the legislature, or of the executive (when

the legislature cannot be convened) against domestic violence.”

U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. By its express terms, this clause does

not guarantee against taxation without representation.

Furthermore, “[a]lthough it may surprise innumerable

generations of American schoolchildren and adults who have

studied the American [R]evolution and the Boston Tea Party,

there is firm Supreme Court precedent to support taxation

without representation.” Samuel B. Johnson, The District of

Columbia and the Republican Form of Government Guarantee, —

37 How. L.J. 333, 337 (1994); see also Emily M. Calhoun, The

First Amendment and _ Distributional Voting Rights

Controversies, 52 Tenn. L. Rev. 549, 574 (1985) (“The Court

.-. has refused to transmute the Revolutionary slogan ‘no

taxation without representation’ into a constitutional

principle.”).

Indeed, the United States Supreme Court (USSC) has

repeatedly rejected the contention that the federal constitution

guarantees no taxation without representation. For instance, in

Heald v. District of Columbia, 259 U.S. 114 (1922) (Brandeis,

J.), residents of the District of Columbia challenged a property

tax which Congress levied, arguing it subjected them to taxation

without representation. The USSC clearly stated: “There is no

constitutional provision which so limits the power of Congress

6a

that taxes can be imposed only upon those who have political

representation.” Jd. at 124.

Likewise, in Loughborough v. Blake, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.)

317 (1820) (Marshall, C.J.), residents of the District of

Columbia challenged the right of Congress to impose a direct

tax on the District. They argued that Congress’ right to legislate

on matters related to the District “must be limited by that great

principle which was asserted in our revolution, that

representation is inseparable from taxation.” Jd. at 324.

However, Chief Justice Marshall, writing for a unanimous

Court, noted that it was “obvious” the situation was completely

different from that complained of during the Revolution, and

held “that Congress possesses, under the constitution, the power

to lay and collect direct taxes within the District of Columbia.”

Id. at 324-25.°

~

® See also Thomas v. Gay, 169 U.S. 264 (1898). In this case,

the appellants were non-residents of Oklahoma who objected to

Oklahoma’s tax on their personal property — herds of cattle that were

kept and grazed on an Indian reservation in Oklahoma. The

appellants argued the tax constituted taxation without representation.

The USSC commented as follows:

Undoubtedly there are general principles, familiar to

our systems of state and federal government, that the

people who pay taxes imposed by laws are entitled to

have a voice in the election of those who pass the

laws, and that taxes must be assessed and collected

for public purposes, and that the duty or obligation to

pay taxes by the individual is founded in his

participation in the benefits arising from their

expenditure. But these principles, as practically

administered, do not mean that no person, man,

woman, or child, resident or nonresident, shall be

(continued...)

Ta

Heald and Loughborough remain good law. Revently,

a three-judge panel of the federal district court rejected a claim

by residents of the District of Columbia that they had a right to

vote for Congress. Adams v. Clinton, 90 F.Supp.2d 35

(D.D.C.), aff'd, 531 U.S. 941 (2000). As part of the extensive

discussion on the plaintiffs’ various constitutional claims, the

Adams court reviewed Heald and Loughborough, as well as

other authorities that have rejected “the cry of ‘no taxation

without representation.” Jd. at 55. Interestingly, the court

commented as follows on Loughborough:

If there were a Justice who would have been

particularly sensitive to this reprise of the

Revolutionary War battle cry of “no taxation

without representation,” surely it would have

been Marshall-- who served as a company

commander at Valley Forge. See Jean Edward

Smith, JOHN MARSHALL: DEFINER OF A NATION

62-65 (1996). Nonetheless, speaking for a

°(...continued)

taxed, unless he was represented by some one for

whom he had actually voted, nor do they mean

that no man’s property can be taxed unless some

benefit to him personally can be pointed out.

Thus it has been held that personal allegiance has no

necessary connection with the right of taxation; an

alien may be taxed as well as a citizen.... So,

likewise, it is settled law that the property, both real

and personal, of nonresidents may be lawfully

subjected to the tax laws of the state in which they

are situated.

[d. at 276-77 (emphasis added, citation omitted).

8a

unanimous Court, Marshall held that Congress

had the power to tax residents of the District of

Columbia despite their lack of representation.

Id. The USSC affirmed Adams.

Respondents rely on Kelley v. Metropolitan County Bd.

of Educ. of Nashville and Davidson County, 836 F.2d 986 (6th

Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1206 (1988), in support of

their argument. In Kelley, the court held that the federal district

court erred in ruling that the state of Tennessee, as opposed to

the local school board, should bear certain costs of school

desegregation. In dicta, the Kelley court commented as follows:

In language of majestic simplicity, our

Constitution provides that “The United States

shall guarantee to every State in this Union a

Republican Form of Government....” U.S.

Const. Art. IV, § 4. A “republican” form of

government, as Madison suggested in Number

Ten of the Federalist Papers, is “a Government

in which the scheme of representation takes

place.” (Emphasis supplied.) In few (if any)

areas of government is Madison’s “scheme of

representation” more important than it is in the

area of government finance and taxation. A

principal cause of our Revolutionary War, after

all, was the imposition of taxes without

representation. The concept that “taxation

without representation is tyranny” was one for

which a number of the Framers had put their

very lives on the line. Our Constitution was not

adopted to perpetuate the evil that led us to

break our ties with the British Crown.

9a

Id. at 997. Kelley, however, is inapposite to the issue in the

instant case. The Keliey court was concerned with a federal

judge apportioning state money the court felt was more

appropriately done by the legislative branch. Kelley did not

resolve the issue of whether there is an independent, federal

right to no taxation without representation.

Accordingly, while the American Revolution may have

been spurred on by the rallying cry ‘no taxation without

representation,’ the federal Constitution that was subsequently

drafted contained no express provision guaranteeing that as a

right. In contrast, this Court has interpreted the South Carolina

constitution as clearly prohibiting taxation without

representation. See, e.g., Weaver, supra. Respondents simply

cannot rest on the Weaver holding for their federal section 1983

claim. Because we find there is no independent, federal right

found in the Republican Guarantee Clause prohibiting taxation

without representation, respondents have no available section

1983 action against appellants.’

We therefore hold the trial court erred in granting

summary judgment to respondents; instead, summary judgment

should have been granted in appellants’ favor. Given this

conclusion, we need not address the issue of whether the trial

’ In addition, we note that claims made pursuant to the

Republican Guarantee Clause generally have been held by the USSC

to be nonjusticiable, political questions. See, e.g., Pacific States Tel.

& Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1912); see also Baker v. Carr,

369 U.S. 186, 223-24 (1962) (stating the USSC has “consistently held

that a challenge to state action based on the Guaranty Clause presents

no justiciable question”) (and cases cited therein); Adams v. Clinton,

90 F.Supp.2d at 71; but see New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144,

185 (1992) (questioning whether all claims under the Republican

Guarantee Clause present nonjusticiable, political questions).

10a

court erred in certifying a plaintiff class.

REVERSED.

TOAL, C.J., MOORE, BURNETT, JJ., and Acting

Justice John W. Kittredge, concur.

lla

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS

COUNTY OF BEAUFORT

Irvin W. Campbeli, J. C. Lawyer

Backus Ferguson, and Thomas

Hanahan, III, on behalf of themselves

and all others similarly situated,

Plaintiffs,

VS.

Hilton Head No. 1 Public Service

District and Beaufort County,

South Carolina,

Defendants

Civil Action No.: 98-CP-07-842

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS'

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

AND DENYING DEFENDANTS’

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

This matter came before the Court on cross-motions for

Summary Judgment on November 28, 2001. For the reasons

explained below, I grant Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary

Judgment and deny Defendants' Motion for Summary

Judgment.

12a

Factual Background

Plaintiffs are individuals who own real or personal

property geographically located within the territory of Hilton

Head No. 1 Public Service District (hereinafter “PSD#1”’). The

PSD#1 was created by the General Assembly in 1969 to provide

water and sewer services to the north end of Hilton Head Island,

South Carolina. It is governed and controlled by a Board of

Commissioners, the members of which are appointed, rather

than elected.

Customers within the territory of the PSD#1 are charged

a base rate, plus the charges for actual consumption. In

addition, PSD#1 has historically levied real and property taxes

that were collected by Beaufort County. The PSD#I taxes all

persons who own real or personal property within its territory,

even if they do not receive service from the PSD#1. The

Defendants did not list the assessments as line items in the tax

notices. In 1997, the South Carolina Supreme Court issued a

ruling in Weaver v. Recreation District, 328 S.C. 83,492 S.E.2d

79 (1997), holding that taxation by unelected bodies was

impermissible taxation without representation. However, the

Court provided that its ruling would not take effect until

December 31, 1999. Thus, Defendants continued to tax the

Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs sued on various grounds; however, after a

complicated procedural history, the only remaining cause of

action is an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a violation of the

United States Constitution.

Standard of Review

Summary judgment is a very well recognized vehicle to

secure the “just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every

action.” Celotex Corp. v. Catreit, 477 U.S. 317 (1986).

Summary judgment serves the useful purpose of

l3a

disposing of meretricious, pretended claims

before the court and parties become ‘entrenched

in a frivolous and costly trial. The courts,

therefore, should not be reluctant to grant

summary judgment in appropriate cases; indeed,

summary judgment is mandated where

appropriate.”

Myrtle Beach Pipeline Co. v. Emerson Electric Co., 843 F.

Supp. 1027, 1035 (D.S.C. 1993); see also, Trico Surveying, Inc.

v. Godley Auction, Co., 314 S.C. 542, 431 S.E.2d 565 (1993).

Summary judgment is an integral part of the rules of

procedure, intended to expedite the disposition of cases not

requiring the services of a fact finder.” Bankers Trust of S.C. v.

Benson, 267 S.C. 152, 226 S.E.2d 703 (1976). Because the

facts in this case are undisputed, I find that it is entirely

appropriate for summary judgment.

LAW/DISCUSSION

Plaintiffs' claim involves only one cause of action: an

action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.' Section 1983 states:

Every person who, under color of any statute,

ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any

State or Territory or the District of Columbia,

subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen

of the United States or other person within the

jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any

'This court has concurrent jurisdiction over such actions

according to the United States Supreme Court. Maine v. Thiboutot,

448 U.S. 1 (1980).

14a ©

rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party

injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or

other proper proceeding for redress, except that

in any action brought against a judicial officer

for an act or omission taken in such officer’s

judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be

granted unless a declaratory decree was violated

or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the

purposes of this section, any Act of Congress

applicable exclusively to the District of

Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of

the District of Columbia.

The key issue in this case is whether a policy of the State of

South Carolina permitted Plaintiffs to be subject to taxation

without representation in violation of the United States

Constitution.

In Weaver v. Recreation District, 328 S.C. 83, 492

S.E.2d 79 (S.C. 1997), the South Carolina Supreme Court held

that taxation by an unelected body is taxation without

representation and thus is unconstitutional under the South

Carolina Constitution. Jd. However, under the South Carolina

Constitution, they allowed it to continue for two years. Jd.

While the question of continuing taxation without

representation has been decided under the South Carolina

Constitution, Plaintiffs allege that the continued taxation

without representation is a violation of their rights under the

Federal Constitution. The question is a simple one: is taxation

withoui representation a violation under the United States

Constitution and can a body continue to violate such a right?

For the reasons set forth below, this Court finds that the

continuing allowance of an unconstitutional taxation is a

violation of Plaintiffs' Federal Constitutional nights, and thus a

15a

violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

The purpose of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is to provide

compensation for injuries arising from the violation of

constitutional rights and deter future violations. City of

Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey Ltd., 526 U.S. 687

(1999). The aim of § 1983 was “to afford a federal right in

federal courts because, by reason of prejudice, passion,

negligence, intolerance or otherwise, state laws might not be

enforced and the claims of citizens to the enjoyment of rights,

privileges, and immunities guaranteed by the Fourteenth

Amendment might be deprived by state agencies.” Monroe v.

Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 180 (1961). A broad construction of §

1983 is compelled by the statutory language, which speaks of

deprivations of “any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by

the Constitution and laws.” The United States Supreme Court

has “repeatedly held that the coverage of [§ 1983] must be

broadly construed.” Golden State Transit Corp. v. Los Angeles,

493 U.S. 103, 105, 110 S.Ct. 444, 448, 107 L.Ed.2d 420 (1989).

The legislative history of the section also stresses that as a

remedial statute, it should be “ ‘liberally and beneficently

construed.’ ”’ Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services,

436 US. 658, 684, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2032, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978)

(quoting Rep. Shellabarger, Cong.Globe, 42d Cong., 1* Sess.,

App. 68 (1871)). In Dennis v. Higgins, 498 U.S. 439, 444-445

(1991), the Supreme Court stated:

the “prime focus” of § 1983 and related

provisions was to ensure “a right of action to

enforce the protections of the Fourteenth

Amendment and the federal laws enacted

pursuant thereto,” Chapman v. Houston Welfare

?State courts have concurrent jurisdiction. See, Footnote

No. 1, supra.

16a

Rights Organization, 441 U.S. 600, 611, 99

S.Ct. 1905, 1913, 60 L.Ed.2d 508 (1979), but |

the Court has never restricted the section’s scope |

to the effectuation of that goal. Rather, we have |

given full effect to its broad language,

recognizing that § 1983 “provide[s] aremedy, to

be broadly construed, against all forms of

official violation of federally protected rights.”

Monell, supra, 436 U.S., at 700-701, 98 S.Ct., at

2041.

_ A state’s policy in allowing taxation without |

representation is surely a United States Constitutional violation

for which 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was intended to provide relief.

Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United

States Constitution states: “No state shall make or enforce any

law which shall abridge the privileges and immunities of

citizens of the United Statesf.]” The continued taxation without

representation is a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of

the United States Constitution, which prohibits any state from

enforcing laws that abridge a citizen’s privileges. Taxation

without representation is one of the founding privileges of this

Country. This privilege is embodied in Article IV, Section 4 of

the Federal Constitution, which guarantees our citizens a

republican form of government.

A republican form of government is a

government administered by representatives

chosen or appointed by the people or by their

authority. Madison says it is a “government

which derives all its powers directly or

indirectly form the great body of the people, and

is administered by persons holding their offices

during pleasure, for a limited period, or during

good behavior.” (Federalist No.39)

17a

_Vansickle v. Shanahan, 511 P.2d 223, 243 (1973). As the Court

stated in Kelley v. Metropolitan County Bd. of Education of

Nashville and Davidson Cty., 836 F.2d 986, 997 (6" Cir. 1987):

In the language of majestic simplicity, our

Constitution provides that “The United States

shall guarantee to every State in the Union a

Republican Form of Government....” U.S.

Const. Article IV, §4. A “republican” form of

government, as Madison suggested in Number

Ten of the Federalist Papers is ““a Government in

which the scheme of representation takes place.”

In few (if any) areas of government is Madison's

“scheme of representation” more important than

it is in the area of government finance and

taxation. A principal cause of our Revolutionary

War, after all, was the imposition of taxes

without representation. The concept that

“taxation without representation is tyranny” was

one for which a number of the Framers had put

their very lives on the line. Our Constitution was

not adopted to perpetuate the evil that led us to

break out ties with the British Crown.

That case also noted that “it is inconceivable that the guaranties

embedded in the Constitution of the United States may be

manipulated out of existence.” Jd. (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369

U.S.186, 230 (1962)). It is clear that the United States

Constitution does not permit taxation without representation.’

*Indeed it was taxation without representation that spurred on

the American Revolution. As the American Revolutionists James

Otis and John Hancock said, “Taxation without representation is

tyranny.” The Court cannot accept Defendants’ argument that the

(continued...)

18a

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs are not entitled to any

further or retroactive relief under Weaver. It is true that

Plaintiffs-are not entitled to any further relief on the grounds

that the taxation scheme violated the South Carolina State

Constitution; Weaver has already decided that issue. Here,

however, Plaintiffs are requesting relief under the United States

Constitution through 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983

specifically provides relief for a plaintiff who has been injured

by a policy or procedure of the state. In fact, the very goal of §

1983 was to permit relief to citizens whose “rights, privileges,

and immunities guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment

might be deprived by state agencies.” Monroe v. Pape, 365

U.S. 167, 180 (1961). The fact that the Plaintiffs have no relief

under Weaver does not prevent Plaintiffs’ recovery under 42

U.S.C. § 1983. Since a policy of the state permitted taxation

without representation, in violation of the United States

Constitution and Plaintiffs’ rnghts thereunder, Plaintiffs are

entitled to summary judgment for their 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim.

THEREFORE, Plaintiffs Motion for Summary

Judgment is hereby GRANTED and Defendants’ Motion is

hereby DENIED.

_/s/

Perry M. Buckner

Fourteenth Judicial Circuit

Walterboro, South Carolina

- December 12, 2001

3(...continued)

United States Constitution prohibits [sic] taxation without

representation.

19a

CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA

1976 ANNOTATED

TITLE 6. LOCAL GOVERNMENT - PROVISIONS

APPLICABLE TO SPECIAL PURPOSE

DISTRICTS AND OTHER POLITICAL

SUBDIVISIONS

CHAPTER 11. SPECIAL PURPOSE OR PUBLIC SERVICE

DISTRICTS GENERALLY

ARTICLE 1. GENERAL PROVISIONS

§ 6-11-271. Millage levy for special purpose district.

(A) For purposes of this section, "special purpose

district" means any special purpose district or public service

authority, however named, created prior to March 7, 1973, by

or pursuant to an act of the General Assembly of this State.

(B)(1) This subsection applies only to those special

purpose districts the governing bodies of which are not elected

but are presently authorized by law to levy for operations and

maintenance in each year millage up to or not exceeding a given

amount and did impose this levy in fiscal year 1997-98.

(2) There must be levied annually in each special

purpose district described in item (1) of this subsection,

beginning with the levy for fiscal year 1999, ad valorem

property tax millage in the amount equal to the millage levy

imposed in fiscal year 1998.

(C)(1) This subsection applies only to those special

purpose districts, the governing bodies of which are not elected

but are presently authorized by law to levy for operations and

maintenance in each year millage without limit as to amount.

(2) There must be levied annually in each special

purpose district described in item (1) of this subsection,

oe

20a

beginning with the levy for fiscal year 1999, ad valorem

property tax millage in the amount equal to the millage levy

imposed in that special purpose district for operations and

maintenance for fiscal year 1998.

(D) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any

special purpose district within which taxes are authorized to be

levied for maintenance and operation in accordance with the

provisions of subsections (B) or (C) of this section, or

otherwise, may request the commissioners of election of the

county in which the special purpose district is located to

conduct a referendum to propose a modification in the tax

millage of the district. Upon receipt of such request, the

commissioners of election shall schedule and conduct the

requested referendum on a date specified by the governing body

of the district. If approved by referendum, such modification in

tax millage shall remain effective until changed in a manner

provided by law.

(E)(1) All special purpose districts located wholly within

a single county and within which taxes are authorized to be

levied for maintenance and operation in accordance with the °

provisions of subsections (B) or (C) of this section, or

otherwise, are authorized to modify their respective millage

limitations, provided the same is first approved by the

governing body of the district and by the governing body of the

county in which the district is located by resolutions duly

adopted. Any increase in millage effectuated pursuant to this

subsection is effective for only one year.

(2) Any millage increase levied pursuant to the

provisions of item (1) of this subsection must be levied and

collected by the appropriate county auditor and county

treasurer.

HISTORY: 1998 Act No. 397, § 4.

PRN Re LORENA FEL ORRIN 4+

TRIE EO CMON GSMs