Appendices — South Carolina Medical Ass'n v. Thompson

Supreme Court brief2003

Ask Donna

What actually matters in this document.

Text

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

SOUTH CAROLINA MEDICAL ASSOCIATION;

PHYSICIANS CARE NETWORK; J. CAPERS

HIOTT, M.D.; JOHN R. ROSS, M.D.; GORDON E.

PENNEBAKER, M.D.; CAROL S. NICHOLS, M.D.;

DANNETTE F. MCALHANEY, M.D.; HERBERT

MOSKOW, M.D.; LOUISIANA STATE MEDICAL

SOCIETY,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

TOMMY G. THOMPSON, sued as Secretary of the

U.S. Department of Health and Human Services; U.S.

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 02-2001

January 23, 2003, Argued

April 25, 2003, Decided

Before WILKINS, Chief Judge, and TRAXLER and

GREGORY, Circuit Judges. Judge Traxler wrote the

opinion, in which Chief Judge Wilkins and Judge Gregory

joined.

TRAXLER, Circuit Judge:

Appellants, South Carolina Medical Association,

Physicians Care Network, and several individual doctors,

filed suit seeking to have declared unconstitutional several

provisions of the Health Insurance Portability and

Accountability Act of 1996 ("HIPAA"), Pub. L. No. 104-191,

Al

110 Stat. 1936 (1996). Because Congress laid out an

intelligible principle in HIPAA to guide agency action, we

reject appellants' claim that the statute impermissibly

delegates the legislative function. We also conclude that

regulations promulgated pursuant to HIPAA are not

beyond the scope of the congressional grant of authority,

and that neither the statute nor the regulations are

impermissibly vague. Accordingly, we affirm.

I.

Recognizing the importance of protecting the privacy

of health information in the midst of the rapid evolution of

health information systems, Congress passed HIPAA in

August 1996. HIPAA's Administrative Simplification

provisions,” sections 261 through 264 of the statute, were

designed to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the

health care system by facilitating the exchange of

information with respect to financial and administrative

transactions carried out by health plans, health care

clearinghouses, and health care providers who transmit

information in connection with such transactions. The

preamble to the Administrative Simplification provisions

clarifies this goal:

-

It is the purpose of this subtitle to improve the

Medicare program..., the medicaid program..., and the

efficiency and effectiveness of the health care system,

® Subtitle F of Title II of HIPAA consists of sections 261 through

264. HIPAA § 262 amends Title XI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C.

§ 1301 et seq., toadd a Part C, entitled "Administrative Simplification,"

with sections 1171-1179, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320d through § 1320d-

8 (West Supp. 2002). Section 261 is found as a note to 42 U.S.C. §

1320d. Section 264 is found as a note to 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-2. Section 263

amends the Public Health Service Act, at 42 U.S.C. § 242k(k) (West

Supp. 2002).

sa a ae -

-

by encouraging the development of a health

information system through the establishment of

standards and requirements for the electronic

transmissior: of certain health information.

HIPAA § 261, 110 Stat. 2021.

To this end, Congress instructed the United States

Department of Health and Human Services ("HHS") to

adopt uniform standards "to enable health information to

be exchanged electronically." 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-2(a)(1).

Congress directed HHS to adopt standards for unique

identifiers to distinguish individuals, employers, health

care plans, and health care providers across the nation, see

42 U.S.C. § 1320d-2(b)(1), as well as standards for

transactions and data elements relating to health

information, see 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-2(a), (c) & (f), the

security of that information, see 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-2(d), and

verification of electronic signatures, see 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-

2(e).

Within the Administrative Simplification section,

Congress included another provision -- section 264 --

outlining a two-step process to address the need to afford

certain protections to the privacy of health information

maintained under HIPAA. First, section 264(a) directed

HHS to submit to Congress within twelve months of

HIPAA's enactment "detailed recommendations on

standards with respect to the privacy of individually

identifiable health information." HIPAA § 264(a), 110 Stat.

2033. Second, if Congress did not enact further legislation

pursuant to these recommendations within thirtysix

months of the enactment of HIPAA, HHS was to

promulgate final regulations containing such standards.

Specifically, section 264(c)(1) provided:

A3

If legislation governing standards with respect to the

privacy of individuaily identifiable health information

transmitted in connection with the transactions

described in section 1173(a) of the Social Security Act (as

added by section 262) is not enacted by [August 21,

1999], the Secretary of Health and Human Services

shall promulgate final regulations con taining such

standards not later than [February 21, 2000]. Such

regulations shall address at least the subjects described

in subsection (b).

HIPAA § 264(c)(1), 110 Stat. 2033. The subjects Congress

directed HHS to cover in promulgating privacy

regulations included the following: "(1) The rights that an

individual who is a subject of individually identifiable

health information should have. (2) The procedures that

should be established for the exercise of such rights. (3)

The uses and disclosures of such information that should

be authorized or required." HIPAA § 264(b), 110 Stat.

2033. Through individual provisions of HIPAA, Congress

outlined whom the regulations were to cover, see 42 U.S.C.

§ 1320d-1(a); what information was to be covered, see 42

U.S.C. § 1320d(6) (defining "individually identifiable

health information"); what types of transactions were to be

covered, see 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-2(a)(2); what penalties

would accrue for violations of HIPAA, see 42 U.S.C. § §

1320d-5, 1320d-6; and what time lines and standards would

govern compliance with the Act, see 42 U.S.C. § § 1320d-3,

1320d-4.

Finally, section 264(c)(2) provided that the privacy

regulations promulgated by HHS "shall not supercede a

contrary provision of State law, if the provision of State

law imposes requirements, standards, or implementation

specifications that are more stringent than the requirements,

standards, or implementation specifications imposed

A4

under the regulation." HIPAA § 264(c)(2), 110 Stat. 2033-34

(emphasis added).

Pursuant to Congress's mandate, HHS submitted

recommendations for protecting the privacy of

individually identifiable health information in September

1997. Several detailed and comprehensive medical privacy

bills were thereafter introduced; however, Congress did

not pass any additional legislation. For its part, HHS

followed Congress's directive and drafted regulations that

appeared in a November 1999 Notice of Proposed

Rulemaking. The proposed regulations drew more than

50,000 comments from affected parties. After several

further proposals and amendments were published, HHS

promulgated final regulations in February 2001,

collectively the "Privacy Rule." Although the effective date

of the Privacy Rule was set for April 14, 2001, entities

covered by the regulations were given until April 14, 2003,

to comply, while some smaller entities were granted an

additional year.

Appellants sought declaratory relief from provisions of

HIPAA and the accompanying Privacy Rule promulgated

by HHS. The district court dismissed the action and this

appeal followed. Appellants argue that 1) HIPAA violates

the non-delegation doctrine by authorizing HHS to

promulgate the regulations at issue in the absence of an

intelligible principle from Congress; 2) the Privacy Rule

exceeds the scope of authority granted to HHS under

HIPAA; and 3) HIPAA's non-preemption of "more

stringent" state privacy laws is unconstitutionally vague,

in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth

Amendment. We address each of these issues in turn.

IT.

A.

The first issue is whether HIPAA violates the non-

delegation doctrine. "In a delegation challenge, the

constitutional question is whether the statute has

delegated legislative power to [an] agency" of the

executive branch. Whitman v. American Trucking Ass'ns,

Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 472, (2001). The doctrine is "rooted in the

principle of separation of powers that underlies our

tripartite system of government." Mistretta v. United States,

488 U.S. 361, 371 (1989). The first lines of the Constitution

set forth that "all legislative Powers herein granted shall be -

vested in a Congress of the United States." U.S. Const. art.

I, § 1. Thus, from our nation's earliest days, "the integrity

and maintenance of the system of government ordained

by the Constitution [has] mandated that Congress

generally cannot delegate its legislative power to another

Branch." Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 371-72 (citation omitted).

In tension with this constitutional directive is the

practical requirement that Congress turn to the other

branches of government for assistance in carrying out its

general legislative policies: "Our jurisprudence has been

driven by a practical understanding that in our

increasingly complex society, replete with ever changing

and more technical problems, Congress simply cannot do

its job absent an ability to delegate power under broad

general directives." Id. at 372; see also American Power &

Light Co. v. S.E.C., 329 U.S. 90, 105 (1946) (acknowledging

that the "legislative process would frequently bog down if

Congress were constitutionally required to appraise

beforehand the myriad situations to which it wishes a

particular policy to be applied and to formulate specific

rules for each situation").

A6

The Supreme Court has outlined an approach to

determining the difference between prohibited delegation

and necessary cooperation between coordinate branches:

"In determining what [Congress] may do in seeking

assistance from another branch, the extent and character of

that assistance must be fixed according to common sense

and the inherent necessities of the governmental co-

ordination." J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276

U.S. 394, 406 (1928). This approach dictates that where

Congress "lays down by legislative act an intelligible

principle to which the person or body authorized to

[exercise the assigned duty] is directed to conform, such

legislative action is not a forbidden delegation of

legislative power." Id. at 409 (emphasis added). The Court

has held that a delegation of legislative power will be

found "constitutionally sufficient if Congress clearly

delineates the general policy, the public agency which is to

apply it, and the boundaries of this delegated authority."

Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 372-73 (internal quotation marks

omitted). These three factors make up the test for

determining whether an intelligible principle lies behind

the conferral of authority from Congress to an agency.

The government does not bear an onerous burden in

demonstrating the existence of an intelligible principle.

Since A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295

U.S. 495 (1935), and Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S.

388 (1935), the Supreme Court has not struck down a

statute for an impermissible delegation. See American

Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. at 474 ("In the history of the

Court we have found the requisite 'intelligible principle'

lacking in only two statutes, one of which [Panama

Refining] provided literally no guidance for the exercise of

discretion, and the other of which [A.L.A. Schechter]

conferred authority to regulate the entire economy on the

AT

basis of no more precise a standard than stimulating the

economy by assuring ‘fair competition."). Rather,

Congress has been able to delegate authority under "broad

standards." Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 373; see, e.g., Lichter v.

United States, 334 U.S. 742, 785-86 (1948) (upholding

delegation of authority to determine excessive profits);

American Power, 329 U.S. at 105-06 (upholding delegation

to SEC to prevent unfair or inequitable distribution of

voting power among security holders); Yakus v. United

States, 321 U.S. 414, 426-27 (1944) (upholding delegation to

price administrator to fix commodity prices that would be

tair and equitable); National Broadcasting Co. v. United

States, 319 U.S. 190, 225-26 (1943) (upholding delegation to

FCC to regulate broadcast licensing as public interest,

convenience, or necessity require). The only limiting factor

in each case has been the presence of an intelligible

principle behind the congressional delegation.

In light of this guidance, we conclude that HIPAA also

contains the requisite intelligible principle necessary to

survive a non-delegation challenge. Specifically, there are

at least three sources within HIPAA that provide

intelligible principles outlining and limiting the

Congressional conferral of authority on HHS. First, the

language of the statute mandates that HHS implement

regulations addressing three particular subjects: "(1) the

rights that an individual who is a subject of individually

identifiable health information should have "; "(2) the

procedures that should be established for the exercise of

such rights"; and "(3) the uses and disclosures of such

information that should be authorized or required."

HIPAA § 264, 110 Stat. 2033. The question is whether

these amount to a statement of "general policy" by

Congress. We believe that they do, particularly when read

in connection with the second source -- namely section 261,

the preamble to the statute -- which sets forth the general

A8

purpose of HIPAA as "improving the Medicare program

.., the medicaid program ..., and the efficiency and

effectiveness of the health care system, by encoura ging the

development of a health information system through the

establishment of standards and requirements for the ©

electronic transmission of certain health information."

HIPAA § 261, 110 Stat. 2021. Section 262 further refines

this goal by requiring that the Privacy Rule "be consistent

with the objective of reducing the administrative costs of

providing and paying for health care." HIPAA § 262,110

Stat. 2023 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-1(b)). The third

source of an intelligible principle is Congress's limitation

of the Privacy Rule to communications of listed

information by particular covered entities. As noted above,

individual provisions of HIPAA outline whom the Privacy

Rule was to cover, see 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-1(a); what

information was to be covered, see § 1320d(6) (defining

"individually identifiable health information"); what types

of transactions were to be covered, see § 1320d-2(a)(2);

what penalties would accrue for violations of HIPAA, see

§ § 1320d-5, 1320d-6; and what time lines and standards

would govern compliance with HIPAA, see § § 1320d-3,

1320d-4. We agree with the district court that, taken

together, the provisions of HIPAA provide a general

policy, describe the agency in charge of applying that

policy, and set boundaries for the reach of that agency's

authority -- all in keeping with the intelligible principle

test. See American Power, 329 U.S. at 105 (holding a statute

is “constitutionally sufficient" if it meets these three

requirements). Thus, we conclude that HIPAA is "well

within the outer limits of our nondelegation precedents."

American Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. at 474.

Although appellants argue that the present case is

indistinguishable from Panama Refining, one of only two

cases in which the Supreme Court has invalidated a statute

A9

on the basis of an unconstitutional delegation, we

disagree. In Panama Refining, the Court found that the

challenged portion of the statute at issue, section 9(c) of the

National Industrial Recovery Act ("NIRA"), did not provide

the President with any mandate, but rather authorized

him to pass a prohibitory law. See Panama Refining, 293

U.S. at 405-412. That is, the Court found that Congress had

offered no guidance in NIRA as to whether the President

should or should not prohibit the transportation of excess

petroleum and petroleum products, so-called "hot oil," in

interstate commerce. Rather, the Court noted that "so far

as this section is concerned, it gives to the President an

unlimited authority to determine the policy and to lay

down the prohibition, or not to lay it down, as he may see

fit." Id. at 415. Finding no limit on executive discretion in

this substantive provision of NIRA, the Court.also looked

to the preamble of the statute and, once again, found no

guidance as to whether "hot oil" was good or bad. See id. at

416-18. Thus, NIRA "provided literally no guidance for the

exercise of discretion." American Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S.

at 474. By contrast, in the case before us we have a clear

mandate from Congress directing HHS to act in

accordance with the intelligible principles set forth in

HIPAA. Further, there are clear limits upon the scope of

that authority and the type of entities whose actions are to

be regulated.

Finally, we find unavailing appellants' position that

Congress unconstitutionally relinquished its lawmaking

function by mandating that final regulations governing

standards with respect to the privacy of individually

identifiable health information be promulgated within

thirty-six months of HIPAA's enactment if no further

legislation on the subject were enacted. We do not agree

that this approach amounts to an abdication. Rather, the

procedures outlined by Congress establish a more explicit

Al10

oversight mechanism than usually accompanies a

rulemaking mandate imposed upon an agency. In

conveying rulemaking authority, Congress always

reserves the right -- indeed, never relinquishes the right --

to engage in further lawmaking. As described above,

Congress did not abdicate its legislative responsibility in

passing HIPAA, but outlined a broad set of principles to

guide HHS action. See Yakus, 321 U.S. at 426 ("Only if we

could say that there is an absence of standards for the

guidance of the Administrator's action ... would [we] be

justified in overriding its choice of means for effecting its

declared purpose."). Animated by these principles, HHS

was directed first to offer recommendations within a year

of HIPAA's enactment. That Congress did not enact

additional measures in light of these recommendations

indicates the legislature's satisfaction with HHS's

proposed approach to protecting the privacy of

individually identifiable health information. This decision

did not, and does not, limit Congress's ability to revisit the

issue, change the direction or scope of the statute or rules,

or wiiolly undo the regulatory scheme HHS has

established pursuant to HIPAA.

For these reasons, we conclude that HIPAA does not

violate the non-delegation doctrine.

B.

Appellants' second argument is that section 264(c) of

HIPAA limits HHS to regulating only electronic records

transmitted in connection with section 1173(a) of the Social

Security Act, see 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-2(a), yet HHS

impermissibly expanded HIPAA's Scope to cover not only

electronic transactions, but "every form of information for

all Americans held by covered entities." Appeliants' Brief

at 7. The government responds that neither section 264(c),

nor other portions of the Administrative Simplification

All

section to which it refers, limits HHS's authority to

regulating purely electronic information. The government

also contends that during the rulemaking process HHS

decided that protecting only electronic information would

not adequately safeguard patient privacy and that it

would be burdensome and ultimately unworkable to

distinguish the same information in various stages and

formats that could be kept in electronic or nonelectronic

form.

The disputed section includes a broad grant of

authority from Congress to HHS as to the regulation of

medical information. Section 264(c)(1) states in pertinent

part as follows:

If legislation governing standards with respect to

the privacy of individually identifiable health

information transmitted in connection with the

transactions described in section 1173(a) of the

Social Security Act (as added by Section 262) is not

enacted by [August 21, 1999], the Secretary of

Health and Human Services shall promulgate final

regulations con taining such standards not later

than [February 21, 2000}.

HIPAA § 264(c)(1), 110 Stat. 2033. In describing what

kind of information is to be protected, Congress expressly

defined "health information" to include any information,

"whether oral or recorded in any form or medium." 42 U.S.C.

§1320d-4 (emphasis added). The definition of "individually

identifiable health information" -- a subset of "health

information" -- contains no language limiting its reach to

electronic media.“ Thus, the plain language of HIPAA

“4 The phrase "individually identifiable health information" refers to

information that:

Al12

said

indicates that HHS could reasonably determine that the

regulation of individually identifiable health information

should include non-electronic forms of that information.

Although appellants argue that the reference in HIPAA

§ 264(c)(1) to information "transmitted in connection with

section 1173(a)" limits the scope of the regulations solely to

electronic transactions, another reasonable reading is that

section 1173(a) directs HHS to develop "standards for

transactions, and data elements for such transactions, to

enable health information to be exchanged electronically."

42 U.S.C. § 1320d-2(a)(1) (emphasis added). Thus, the

focus is on enabling electronic portability, not simply on

regulating purely electronic activity. This reading is

bolstered by the fact that transactions listed in connection

with section 1173(a) are not described in terms that limit

their scope to electronic media, but rather include

transactions with respect to "enrollment and disenrollment

in a health plan," "health care payment arid remittarice

advice," and "health plan premium payments" -- terms that

do not invite the limitation to a purely electronic scheme.

42 U.S.C. § 1320d-2(a)(2)(C), (E) and (EF).

The validity of a regulation promulgated by an agency

pursuant to a congressional mandate is to be sustained so

long as it is "reasonably related to the purposes of the

enabling legislation under which it was promulgated."

Thorpe v. Housing Auth. of the City of Durham, 393 U.S. 268,

(B) relates to the past, present, or future physical or mental health or

condition of an individual, the provision of health care to an

individual, or the past, present, or future payment for the provision

of health care to an individual, and ~

(i) ic _ntifies the individual; or

(ii) with respect to which there is a reasonable basis to believe that

the information can be used to identify the indi vidual.

42 U.S.C. § 1320d-6(b).

Al3

280-81, 21 L. Ed. 2d 474, 89 S. Ct. 518 (1969); see Chevron

UL.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,

844, 81 L. Ed. 2d 694, 104 S. Ct. 2778 (1984). Regulating

nonelectronic as well as electronic forms of health

information effectuates HIPAA's intent to promote the

efficient and effective portability of health information and

the protection of confidentiality. If coverage were limited

to electronic data, there would be perverse incentives for

entities covered by the rule to avoid the computerization

and portability of any medical records. Such a

development would utterly frustrate the purposes of

HIPAA. HHS's interpretation of the scope of the grant of

authority given by Congress is not inconsistent with the

language of the statute and is reasonably related to the

larger purposes of HIPAA. The agency reasonably

determined that regulating health information in such a

way as to foster effective and efficient electronic

transmission requires that the rule encompass paper

records.

A

Appellant's final argument is that HIPAA's non-

preemption provision, which provides for the preemption

of state laws unless they are "more stringent" than HIPAA,

is impermissibly vague because it necessarily calls for

subjective judgments on the part of health care providers,

who face jail or fines for incorrect determinations.

Contending that it fails to provide fair notice or minimal

guidelines to covered entities and individuals, appellants

argue that the statute violates the Due Process Clause of

the Fifth Amendment."The Court has stated that "it is a

15 The government contends that the vagueness challenge is unripe

because "the non-preemption provision has not been applied to

plaintiffs in any concrete way that would permit a fair assessment of

its clarity in the proper context." Brief of Appellees at 31. See Lyng v.

Al4

basic principle of due process that an enactment is void for

vagueness if its prohibitions are not clearly defined."

Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972). A.

challenged statutory provision will survive scrutiny

"unless it is so unclear with regard to what conduct is

prohibited that it may trap the innocent by not providing

fair warning, or it is so standardless that it enables

arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement." Greenville

Women's Clinic v. South Carolina Dep't of Health & Envtl.

Control, 317 F.3d 357, 366 (4th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation

marks omitted).

The disputed preemption provision is found in

sectiopn 264(c)(2) and states as follows:

A regulation promulgated under paragraph (1) shall!

not supercede a contrary provision of State law, if the

provision of State law imposes requirements,

standards, or implemen tation specifications that are

more stringent than the require ments, standards, or

implementation specifications imposed under the

regulation.

HIPAA § 264(c)(2), 110 Stat. 2033-34 (emphasis added). In

Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 445 (1988)

(holding that courts should "avoid reaching constitutional questions

in advance of the necessity of deciding them"); Commonwealth of

Virginia v. Browner, 80 F.3d 869, 881 n.6 (4th Cir. 1996) (holding that a

constitutional challenge to sanctions in the Clean Air Act was not ripe

for review because the threat of sanctions had not been felt by

plaintiffs "in a concrete way" (internal quotation marks omitted)). We

disagree. "Ripeness depends on the fitness of the issues for judicial

decision and the hardship to the parties of withholding court

consideration." Bituminous Coal Operators' Ass'n v. Secy. of Interior, 547

F.2d 240, 244 (4th Cir. 1977) (internal quotation marks omitted). We

believe both requirements are met here.

Al5

order to determine what state laws will be preempted

under HIPAA, we look to the regulations promulgated

pursuant to the non-preemption provision. See Village of

Hoffman Estates v. Flipside Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S.

489, 504, 71 L. Ed. 2d 362, 102 S. Ct. 1186 (1982) (holding

that "administrative regulation will often suffice to clarify

a standard with an otherwise uncertain scope").

According to the regulations promulgated by HHS, a

state law is "more stringent" than HIPAA if it "provides

greater privacy protection for the individual who is the

subject of the individually identifiable health information."

45 C.F.R. § 160.202 (2002). To further clarify this standard,

the regulation explains that a state law is "more stringent"

where it meets one or more of the following criteria: the

state law prohibits or restricts a use or a disclosure of

information where HIPAA would allow it; the state law

provides an individual with "greater rights of access or

amendment" to his medical information than provided

under HIPAA; the state law provides an individual with

a "greater amount of information" about "a use, a

disclosure, rights, and remedies"; the state law provides

for the retention or reporting of more detailed information

or for a longer duration; or the state law "provides greater

privacy protection for the individual who is the subject of

the individually identifiable health information." 45 C.F.R.

§ 160.202. These criteria will doubtless call for covered

entities to make some common sense evaluations and

comparisons between state and federal laws, but this does

not mean they are either vague or constitutionally infirm.

Because the regulations are sufficiently definite to give fair

warning as to what will be considered a "more stringent"

state privacy law, we affirm the district court's decision on

this issue as well.”

6 We summarily dispense with appellants' argument that the

. Al6

aS etery soaieien tae

4

III.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district .

court granting the motion to dismiss is hereby affirmed. :

AFFIRMED

Privacy Rule will chill patients' rights of free speech, as we find this

claim to be without merit.

Al17

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA

COLUMBIA DIVISION

SOUTH CAROLINA MEDICAL ASS’N., ET AL.,

Plaintiffs

VS.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH

AND HUMAN SERVICES, ET AL.,

Defendants

C/A: 01-CV-2965-25

ORDER

Plaintiffs, South Carolina Medical Association,

Physicians Care Network, and individual physicians,

bring a constitutional challenge to several provisions of

Subtitle F, Public Law 104-191, known as the Health

Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”).

Plaintiffs filed this action against defendants, United States

Department of Health and Human Services (“DHHS") and

Tommy G. Thompson, as Secretary of DHHS, specifically

alleging that (i) Section 264 of HIPAA is an impermissible

delegation of Congress’ legislative authority, (ii) that the

DHHS privacy regulations exceed the statutory authority

granted by HIPAA, and (iii) that Section 264’s preemption

clause is impermissibly vague and therefore violates the

due process clause under the 5 Amendment to the U. S.

Constitution.

Plaintiffs request in their complaint a declaratory

judgment that the delegation of legislative power under

section 264(c) is unconstitutional; that the DHHS privacy

A18

g

regulations promulgated pursuant to Section 264(c) are

unconstitutional and in direct contradiction to the intent of

Congress; and, that the preemption provisions of Section

1178(2)(B) of Public Law 104-191 and Section 264(c) (2) are

unconstitutionally vague. Pending before this Court is

defendants’ Motion to Dismiss.

Standard of Review

A motion made pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6)

allows a claim to be dismissed for failure to state a claim

upon which relief can be granted. The purpose of a

motion under Rule 121(b)(6) is to test the legal sufficiency

of the statement of the claim. Chertkof v. Baltimore, 497

F.Supp. 1252, 1258 (D.Md.1980). For the purposes of

ruling on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must

accept the allegations contained in the complaint as true,

and must liberally construe the complaint as a whole.

lenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421, 89S.Ct. 1843, 1848-

49, 23 L.Ed.2d 404 (1969); Finlator v. Powers, 902 F.2d 1158

(4" Cir.1990). Under such an analysis, a Motion to Dismiss

for failing to state a claim should only be granted if it is

beyond doubt that no relief could be granted, under any

set of facts, when the allegations are construed in a light

most favorable to the pleader. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v.

California, 509 U.S. 764, 811, 113 S.Ct. 2891, 125 L.Ed.2d

612 (1993); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct.

1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974); Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41,

45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957).

BACKGROUND

Congress, in order to “improve portability and

continuity of health insurance coverage in the group and

individual markets,”* enacted HIPAA on August 21, 1996.

Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996). Subtitle F of

Title II of HIPAA is entitled “Administrative

" H.R. Rep. No. 104-496, at 1, 66-67, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.AN.

1865, 1865-66.

Al19

Simplification,” and states that the purpose of the subtitle,

of which Section 264 is a part, is “to improve the Medicare

program ... the medical program . . . and the efficiency

and effectiveness of the health care system, by

encouraging the development of a health information

system through the establishment of standards and

requirements for the electronic transmission of certain

health information.” Public Law 104-191, Sec. 261, 110

Stat. 2021. Recognizing the concomitant need to guarantee

certain protections to patients’ privacy based on the

increase in volume of computerized data and the relative

ease of accessing health data, Congress included section

264 within Subtitle F, Title II of HIPAA (Public Law 104-

_ 191, 110 Stat. 2033-2034) which states: 7

(a) IN GENERAL.-Not later than the date

that is 12 months after the date of the

enactment of this Act, the Secretary of

Health and Human Services shall submit to

the Committee on Labor and Human

Resources and the Committee on Finance of

the Senate and the Committee on Commerce

and the Committee on Ways and Means of

the House of Representatives detailed

recommendations on standards with respect

to the privacy of individually identifiable

health information.

(b)SUBJECTS FOR RECOM-

MENDATIONS.-The recommendations

under subsection (a) shall address at least

the following:

(1) The rights that an individual who

is a subject of individually

identifiable health information should have.

A20

(2) The procedures that should be

established for the exercise of such rights.

(3) The uses and disclosures of such

information that should be authorized or

required.

(c) REGULATIONS.-

(1) IN GENERAL.-If legislation

governing standards with respect to the

privacy of individually identifiable

health information transmitted in

connection with the transactions

described in section 1173(a) of the Social

Security Act (as added by section 262) is

not enacted by the date that is 36

months after the date of the enactment

of this Act, the Secretary of Health and

Human Services shall promulgate final

regulations containing such standards

not later than the date that is 422 months

_ after the date of the enactment of this

Act. Such regulations shall address at

least the subjects described in

subsection (1).

(2) PREEMPTION.-A regulation

promulgated under paragraph (1) shall

not supercede a contrary provision of

State law, if the provision of State law

imposes requirements, standards, or

implementation specifications that are

more stringent than the requirements,

standards, or implementation

specifications imposed under the

regulation.

(d) CONSULTATION.-In carrying out this

section, the Secretary of Health and

Human Services shall consult with-

(1) the National Committee on Vital and

Health Statistics established under

section 306(k) of the Public Health

Service Act (42 U.S.C. 242k(k); and

(2) the Attorney General.

The following definitions are applicable to

the analysis:

(4) HEALTH INFORMATION.-The term

‘health information’ means any

information, whether oral or recorded

in any form or medium, that-

(A) is created or received by a health

care provider, health plan, public health

authority, employer, life insurer, school

or university or health care

clearinghouse; and

(B) relates to the past, present, or future

physical or mental health or condition

of an individual, the provision of health

care to an individual, or the past,

present, or future payment for the

provision of health care to an

individual.

Public Law 104-191, Sec. 262, 110 Stat. 2022 (Aug110

Stat. 2022 (August 21, 1996).

(6) INDIVIDUALLY IDENTIFIABLE

HEALTH INFORMATION .- The term

‘individually identifiable health

A22

oe nee? Sees. oe oe

information’ means any inforrnation,

including demographic information

collected from an individual, that-

(A) is created or received by a health care

provider, health plan, employer, or health

care clearinghouse; and

(B) relates to the past, present, or future

physical or mental health or condition of an

individual, the provision of health care to an

individual, or the past, present, or future

payment for the provision of health care to

an individual, and-

(i) identifies the individual; or

(ii) with respect to which there is a

reasonable basis to believe that the

information can be used to identify the

individual.

Public Law 104-191, Sec. 262, (Sec. 1171(6)), 110 Stat.

2023 (August 21, 1996).

By August 21, 1999, Congress has not enacted privacy

standards pursuant to HIPPA. Accordingly, on November

3, 1999, DHHS issued a notice of proposed rule-making.

After receiving approximately 52,000 public comments,

and following publication of several proposed rules and

amendments, on February 13, 2001, DHHS promulgated

final regulations (the “Privacy Regulations”). Although

the effective date of the Privacy Regulations was April 14,

2001, covered entities were given two years, or until April

14, 2003, to come into compliance with the Privacy

Regulations. Small health plans were given three years, or

until April 14, 2004, to comply.

ee

A23

ANALYSIS

I. Is there an Improper Delegation of Legislative

Power?

Plaintiffs first argue that the delegation of legislative

power under Section 264(c) is unconstitutional pursuant to

Article 1, § 1, because Congress has failed to articulate an

“intelligible principle” concerning policies or standards

governing DHHS’ drafting of Privacy Regulations.* In

1989, the U. S. Supreme Court explored the “intelligible

principle” and its progeriy in Mistretta v. United States,

wherein it held that, so long as Congress “shall lay down

by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the

person or body authorized to [exercise the delegated

authority] is directed to conform, such legislative action is

not a forbidden delegation of legislative power.” 488 U.S.

361, 372, 109 S.Ct. 647, 655 (1989) (citing |. W. Hampton, Jr.

& Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409, 48 S.Ct. 348, 352

(1928)). The Supreme Court “has deemed it

‘constitutionally sufficient if Congress clearly delineates

the general policy, the public agency which is to apply it,

and the boundaries of [the] delegated authority.” Id. At

372-73, (citing American Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329

U.S. 90, 105, 67 S.Ct. 133, 142 (1946)). In Mistretta, the

Court noted that it was not until 1935 that it struck down

a statute challenged on delegation grounds, and that since

1935, the Court has “upheld, again without deviation,

Congress’ ability to delegate power under broad

standards.” Méistretta, 488 U.S. at 373, (citing Lichter v.

United States, 334 U.S. 742, 785-786, 68 S.Ct. 1294 (1948)

(upholding delegation of authority to determine excessive

profits)); American Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U'S., at

105, 67 S.Ct., at 142 (upholding delegation of authority to ~

? Plaintiffs argument is based on the “nondelegation doctrine” which is

“rooted in the principle of separation of powers . . . .” Mistretta v. United

States, 488 U.S. 361, 371, 109 S.Ct. 647, 654 (1989).

A24

Securities and Exchange Commission to prevent unfair or

inequitable distribution of voting power among security

holders); Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 416, 64S.Ct.

660, 668, 88 L.Ed. 834 (1944) (upholding delegation to Price

Administrator to fix commodity prices that would be fair

and equitable, and would effectuate purposes of

Emergency Price Control Act of 1942); _FPC v. Hope

Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 600, 64 S.Ct. 281, 287, 88

L.Ed. 333 (1944) (upholding delegation to Federal Power

Commission to determine just and reasonable rates);

National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190,

225-226, 63 S.Ct. 997, 1013-1014, 87 L.Ed. 1344 (1943)

(upholding delegation to Federal Communications

Commission to regulate broadcast licensing “as public

interest, convenience, or necessity” require).

Recently, the Supreme Court in Whitman v. American

Trucking revisited the nondelegation doctrine and held

that the Clean Air Act was not unconstitutional because

Congress had articulated an intelligible principle in the

statute which limited the discretion of the agency-the EPA-

charged with drafting the regulations. 531 U.S. 457, 472-73

(2001). The Supreme Court noted that it found an

intelligible principle lacking in only two statues in the

history of its existence:

. . .[O]ne [statute] provided literally no

guidance for the exercise of discretion, and

the other . .. conferred authority to regulate

the entire economy on the basis of no more

precise standard than stimulating the

economy by assuring “fair competition.” . .

. In shot, [the Supreme Court has] ‘almost

never felt qualified to second-guess

Congress regarding the permissible degree

of policy judgment that can be left to those

A25

executing or applying the law.’

Whitman, 531 U.S. at 474-75, (citing Panama Refining

Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 55 S.Ct. 241 (1935), A.L.A.

Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 55

S.Ct. 837 (1935)); Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361,

416, 109 S.Ct. 647 (1989). Although the “intelligible

principle” was found lacking in only two statues by the

Supreme Court since the early 1930s, this Court is required

to carefully consider its application to this case.

To determine whether the statute is an unconstitutional

delegation of legislative power to the Executive branch,

the Court must decide whether Congress articulated an

intelligible principle. After reviewing the applicable

statutory language and case law, this Court concludes that

Congress has sufficiently articulated an intelligible

principle to guide, and limit the discretion of, the

Department of Health and Human Services when it

drafted the Privacy Regulations.

The starting point for the analysis should be the

language of the statute itself. First, Congress directed

DHHS to implement regulations containing standards

regarding the privacy of individually identifiable health

information, addressing at least the following subjects: “(1)

[t]he rights that an individual who is a subject of

individually identifiable health information should have,”

(2) “[t]he procedures that should be established for the

exercise of such rights;” and (3) “[t]he uses and disclosures

of such information that should be authorized or

required.” Section 264(b). However, this statutory

verbiage alone does not comprise, not does it reveal, the _

entire “intelligible principle” Congress conveyed to DHHS

when it granted DHHS the authority to draft the Privacy

Regulations. When gleaning an intelligible principle from

a statute, the law permits the Courts to look outside the

A26

verbiage of Section 264. “It is a familiar rule that the

constitutionality of a part of an act or statute is not to be

resolved in isolation from other parts of the statute and

from the purposes of the statute as a whole, particularly if

the section in question refers to or embraces other sections

of the Act... .” United Hospital Center, Inc. v.

Richardson, 757 F.2d 1445, 1451 (4™ Cir. 1985).

To discern the intelligible principle set forth by

Congress, the statutory language in Section 264 can be

read together with the other statutory provisions in

Subtitle F, such as Section 261, which sets forth the

purpose of Subtitle F:

It is the purpose of the subtitle [of which

Section 264 is a part] to improve the

Medicare program .. . the Medicaid

program .. .and the efficiency and

effectiveness of the health care system, by

encouraging the development of a health

information system through the

establishment of standards and

requirements for the electronic transmission

of certain health information.

Public Law 104-191, Sec. 261, 110 Stat. 2021, Section 261,

read together with Section 264, causes the undersigned to

conclude that Congress provided DHHS with an

intelligible principle to guide the drafting of privacy

regulations. Congress directed DHHS to draft Privacy

Regulations that would not harm federal medical

entitlement programs or the efficiency and effectiveness of

the health care system. See Section 261. Congress also

directed DHHS to avoid drafting privacy regulations that

would discourage the development of a_ health

information system through the establishment of

A27

standards and requirements for the electronic transmission

of certain health information. See id. Furthermore, DHHS

could not draft privacy regulations that would affect the

rights of a person who is the subject of individually

identifiable health information in such a manner that

would impede or hinder the electronic transmission of

certain health information. See id. The Section 264(c)

delegation is not overladen with detailed guidance.

However, these statutory provisions provide a sufficient

limitation on DHHS’ discretion. Therefore, Section 264(c)

meets the “constitutionally sufficient” standard allowing

for the delegation of authority to DHHS to draft the

Privacy Regulations.

Additionally, the applicability of the Privacy

Regulations are further limited to health plans, health care

clearinghouses, health care providers, and applicable

business associates, who transmit any health information

in electronic form in connection with certain transactions.

Pub. L. No. 104-191, Sec. 262, 110 Stat. at 2023 (Aug. 21,

1996); 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-1. Thus, DHHS could not

regulate healthcare communications, whether confidential

or not, between people who have no connection to health

plans, health care clearinghouses, health care providers, or

to covered entities who do not transmit health information

in electronic form in connection with certain transactions.

Congress created a framework within which DHHS’

could establish privacy regulations and in doing so

provided an intelligible principle to guide the drafting of

such regulations. Furthermore, Congress defined a

general policy, the public agency which was to apply it,

and the boundaries of the agency’s delegated authority. _

Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 372-73 (citing American Power &

Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 105, 67 S.Ct. 133, 142 (1946)).

Pursuant to the foregoing analysis, because this Court

finds that, accepting the allegations in the complaint are

A28-

true, this claim is subject to dismissal because it cannot

survive under any set of facts set forth by the plaintiffs.

Hartford Fire Ins., 509 U.S. at 811.

II. Did DHHS Exceed the Scope of Authority

Granted by Statute?

Plaintiffs next argue that DHHS’ decision to

regulate paper records exceeds the scope of the authority

granted by HIPAA. The Court carefully considers this

important argument. The undersigned notes the plaintiffs

make a logical argument in regard to this issue. However,

the undersigned concludes this argument is not

sufficiently persuasive for two reasons: (1) the regulation

is reasonably related to the purposes set forth in the

enabling legislation; and, (2) the term “health

information,” as defined in HIPAA, can reasonably be

read to conclude Congress intended to cover non-

electronic records.

Regulations promulgated by an administrative

agency are presumptively valid and will be sustained “so

long as [they are] ‘reasonably related to the purposes of

the enabling legislation.’” Harman Mining Co. v. United

States Dept. of Labor, 826 F.2d 1388, 1390_(4" Cir. 1987)

(quoting Mourning v. Family Publication Servs., Inc., 411

U.S. 356, 369, 93 S.Ct. 1652, 1660 (1973)). “Thus, deference

is to be accorded to the interpretation given to a statute by

the agency charged with its administration.” Id. (citing

Udall v. Tallman, 380 US. 1, 16, 85 S.Ct. 792 (1965));

United Hospital Center, Inc. v. Richardson, 757 F.2d 1445,

1451 (4" Cir. 1985). The enabling legislation states that the

purpose of “Subtitle F-Administrative Simplification’ is to

improve government sponsored medical benefits

programs and the efficiency and effectiveness of the entire

health care system through the encouragement of an

electronic health information system. 110 State. 2021;

Public Law 104-191, Section 261. DHHS has drafted

A29

Privacy Regulations in keeping with Congress’ purpose.

DHHS drafted regulations that cover electronic

records and extended that coverage to corresponding

paper records. It did so apparently to prevent a potential

loophole which may allow disclosure of health

information contained in paper records. Without

extending coverage to paper records, paper records could

be maintained and shared with no electronic transmission

of those records to avoid the restrictions imposed by the

regulation. DHHS argues that the regulation of paper

records under HIPAA, in addition to electronic records, is

reasonably related to the enabling legislation. The

undersigned finds this argument sufficiently persuasive.

After a careful review of the enabling legislation, the

statutory language employed in HIPAA can also be

reasonably interpreted to indicate that Congress intended

for the regulations to extend privacy protection to paper

records. A court must examine the statutory language to

give effect to the legislative will that is expressed in the

language. United States v. Murphy, 35 F.3d 143, 145 (4

Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1135, 115 S.Ct. 954 (1995).

A court’s inquiry must cease if the “ ‘statutory language is

unambiguous and the statutory scheme is coherent and

consistent.’ ” Murphy, 35 F.3d at 145 (quoting United

States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 240-41, 109

S.Ct. 1026, 1030 (1989)). The duty of interpretation does

not arise if the statutory language is plain and admits of no

more than one meaning. Id. (quoting Caminetti v. United

States, 242 U.S. 470, 485, 37 S.Ct. 192, 194 (1917)). -

Plaintiffs argue that since the transactions described in

section 1173(a) of the Social Security Act, which are -

referenced in Section 264 (c)(1), involve only the electronic

exchange of health information, then the Privacy

Regulations should only cover electronic health

information. While the argument of the plaintiffs warrants

A30

| ;

ee reer , Se eot rite Gpicrone Ties oe a)

POR NAO OS ATA BARES LAREN ate ON pe he ite Ree RN EEE:

MiiimNELMeot enue tk o e

5

3

3:

4

é

4

:

#

=

bid

x

s

§

careful consideration and analysis, the undersigned

reaches a conclusion unfavorable to plaintiffs’ position.

The statutory language at issue is reasonably plain and

can be read to cover paper records. In Section 262, “health

information” is defined as “any information, whether oral

or recorded in any form or medium, that-

(A) is created or received by a health care

provider, health plan, public health

authority, employer, life insurer, school or

university, or health care clearinghouse; and

(B) relates to the past, present, or future

physical or mental health or condition of an

individual, the provision of health care to an

individual, or the past, present, or future

payment for the provision of health care to

an individual.

Public Law 104-191; 110 Stat. 2022 (emphasis added).

Section 264 is entitled, “Recommendations with Respect to

Privacy of Certain Health Information.” Public Law 104-191;

110 Stat. 2033 (emphasis added). In Section 264(b)(1),

Congess states that, “[t]he recommendations under

subsection (a) shall address . . . (1) [t]he rights that an

individual who is a subject of individually identifiable

health information should have.” See id. (emphasis added).

Under Section 264(c), Congress states that if legislation

governing standards with respect to the privacy of health

information transmitted in connection with certain

transactions is not enacted by a certain date, the Secretary

is charged with promulgating final regulations, which

" were to address at least the subjects described in Section

264(b), containing such standards.

The statutory definition of “health information” and

A31

reference to the term “health information” in the privacy

provision of the statute indicates that Congress likely

sought to delegate authority to DHHS to regulate more

than electronic information. Congress chose to include the

last sentence in Section 264(c)(1), which incorporates by

reference Section 264(b). “When ‘interpreting a statute, the

court will not look merely to a particular clause in which

general words may be used, but will take in connection

with it the whole statute . . . and the objects and policy of

the law, as indicated by its various provisions, and give to

it such a construction as will carry into execution the will

of the Legislature’ ....” United Hospital Center, 757 F.2d

at 1451. This Court notes the references to other statutory

sections and would have to ignore those references to

reach the conclusion sought by the plaintiffs.

Congress could have simply limited the definition of

“health information” to electronic information, but it chose

to include the phrase “any information, whether oral or

recorded in any form or medium.” 110 Stat. 2022; Public

Law 104-191. Congress, however, apparently recognized

that limiting the definition of the term “health

information” would have narrowed the privacy

regulations to such an extent as to render them ineffective.

A finding that Congress chose to limit the regulation to

electronic information would appear to deny the intent

sought by Congress. Accordingly, this claim does not

survive dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).

III. Is Section 264’s Preemption Clause

Impermissibly Vague and Does It Violate

the Due Process Clause Under the 5™ -

Amendment to the U. S. Constitution?

The undersigned next analyzes vagueness and due

process claims raised by the plaintiffs. HIPAA’s

A32

. ea hon ae

LPR Co SYA NE EEN Ri a BS

FORE Rs peow Cet abbegitr age why on Shel A

preemption provision, Section 264(c)(2), states:

A regulation promulgated under paragraph

(1) shall not supersede a contrary provision

of State law, if the provision of State law

imposes requirements, standards, or

implementation specifications that are more

stringent than the requirements, standards,

or implementation specifications imposed

under the regulation.

Plaintiffs argue that “Section 264(c)(2)’s preemption

clause is so vague that a person of ordinary intelligence

will not know whether the regulations will apply to his or

her communications or not.” See Reply to Defendant's

Motion to Dismiss at 3C. Plaintiffs state in their complaint

that the term “more stringent” is unclearly defined in

Section 264(c)(2). See Complaint at J 50. Plaintiffs

predicate their argument that the term “more stringent” is

vague and that “it will be impossible to know for certain

until a court rules authoritatively whether the state law or

HHS Regulation is ‘more stringent.’ ” See id. at 32.

Plaintiffs also argue in their memorandum of law that this

Court should apply a strict standard of review because the

Regulations grant to DHHS unfettered access to every

American’s private health information without a warrant

or probable cause.

The Supreme Court has held in a long line of cases that

“it is a basic principle of due process that an enactment is

void for vagueness if its prohibitions are not clearly

defined.” Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 92

S.Ct. 2294 (1972). The Supreme Court in Grayned noted

concerns raised by vagueness and explained:

Vague laws offend several important values.

A33

First, because we assume that man is free to

steer between lawful and unlawful conduct,

we insist that laws give the person of

ordinary intelligence a reasonable

opportunity to know what is prohibited, so

that he may act accordingly. Vague laws

may trap the innocent by not providing fair

warning. Second, if arbitrary and

discriminatory enforeement is to be

prevented, laws must provide explicit

standards for those who apply them....

Third, but related, where a vague statute

-‘abuts upon sensitive areas of basic First

Amendment freedoms, it ‘operates to

inhibit the exercise of (those) freedoms.’

498 U.S. at 108-109.

This Court begins its vagueness analysis by

determining whether the preemption provision “ ‘abuts’

upon sensitive areas of basic First Amendment freedoms,”

as Grayned instructs. See id. The undersigned is unable to

conclude that sensitive areas of First Amendment

freedoms are sufficiently affected by the preemption

statute. The Court, after a review of the allegations in the

complaint, finds no basis to conclude that the regulations

will stifle or infringe upon rights guaranteed by the U. S.

Constitution. As discussed below, the provisions at issue

cannot reasonably be interpreted to conclude they will

inappropriately regulate free speech in regards to health

information.

The purpose of the Privacy Regulations promulgated

by DHHS is to regulate the maintenance and disclosure of

patients’ private health information contained in medical

records and related documents, such as payment invoices

A34

Sidiadcopa teas data maatih Deine er aa ia ‘iitdiaeteaiahaeel

and explanation of benefits. The attempt to characterize

this case as one relating to free speech under the First

Amendment is not sufficiently persuasive. Private health

information is highly regulated and protected by both

state and federal statutory law and, in many instances,

state common law. It is not disputed that state laws

currently provide some form of governmental access to

patient records, mandatory reporting requirements for

public health purposes, and limitations on disclosure of

health information. The Privacy Regulations were

promulgated to provide uniform protection from

wrongful disclosure of an individual's health information

when it is in the possession of a covered entity. The

undersigned concludes these regulations do not directly

impede or impair a patient's right to explain his or her

health problems to a physician, nor do they unduly

impede the disclosure of that information by a health care

professional to those who should be aware of such

information.

In light of the First Amendment analysis, to

successfully challenge a law as unduly vague on its face,

in violation of due process, “the complainant must

demonstrate that a law is impermissibly vague in all of its

applications.” Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside

Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U. S. 489, 498, 102 S.Ct. 1186

(1982). The plaintiffs in this case are unable to make such

a showing.

A court is not to mechanically apply the Grayned

standards set forth above. See id. The enactment itself will

dictate the degree of vagueness and the relative

importance of fair notice and fair enforcement that is

tolerated by the Constitution. See id. The undersigned

concludes it is appropriate to apply a less strict vagueness

test to regulations affecting, as they do here, business

interests. Because businesses, such as hospitals, physician

A35

offices, and health plans are in a position to plan and

prepare for compliance carefully through consultation of

relevant regulations well in advance of the regulation’s

enactment, the less strict vagueness standard would apply.

See Village of Hoffman Estates. 455 U.S. at 498. Plaintiffs’

facial challenge does not prevail because the preemption

provision of the HIPAA statute and its correlating

regulations are sufficiently clear as applied to health care

providers and to the plaintiffs in this action.

This Court should additionally determine whether |

health care providers have a reasonable opportunity to

know what conduct is prohibited under the HIPAA

Privacy Regulations; that is, do the plaintiffs have fair

warning of the law? The undersigned cannot lightly

dismiss these concerns raised by the plaintiffs. However,

the undersigned finds that there are sufficient reasons why

the plaintiffs would have a reasonable opportunity to

know what is prohibited with respect to the preemption

provision in the HIPAA statute: (1) the plain and ordinary

meaning of the term “more stringent” is not, while not

precisely clear and easily applied in all situations, overly

vague; (2) DHHS expressly defines the term “more

stringent” in the privacy regulations and specifically sets

forth criteria concerning the type of state privacy law that

might preempt a federal privacy law; (3) HIPAA provides

that covered entities, such as health care providers,

participate in HIPAA training and provide HIPAA

training to their employees; (4) HIPAA provides that each

covered entity designate a privacy official; and (5)

individuals can only be prosecuted if they “knowingly”

violate the privacy regulations. Applying these reasons or _

factors sufficiently demonstrates there is the requisite “ fair

warning” as to when a federal law will not preempt a

“more stringent” state law.

In summary, the undersigned concludes that health

A36

See ae RN hie Sak Pane gn ORI RAHI! SEGRE WUC EY BEA, 62

care providers can, by virtue of the plain meaning of the

term “more stringent,” and the reasons set forth, when

presented with a situation where a state law is contrary to

a federal law, determine and follow the more stringent, or

more strict, of the two laws. :

Next, plaintiffs allege in their complaint (4 90) that the

term “more stringent” is unclearly defined, thereby

leaving a person of ordinary intelligence uniformed by the

statute as to where a HIPAA Privacy Regulation or state

privacy law would govern his or her actions. Again, this

concern is one that warrants careful analysis. As noted,

the DHHS Privacy Regulations sufficiently define the term

“more stringent,” and also provide specific criteria as to

when certain state laws should preempt federal laws:

More stringent means, in the context of a

comparison of a provision of State law and

a standard, requirement, or implementation

specification adopted under Subpart E of

this subchapter (the subchapter containing

the privacy regulations), a State law that

meets one or more of the following [six]

criteria.

45 C.F.R. § 160.202 (2001). The six criteria, set forth in

detail in the Privacy Regulations, eliminate undue

confusion about the type of state law that federal law

should not preempt, and when the state law should yield

to the federal law. For example, the second criteria states:

(2) With respect to the rights of an individual

who is the subject of the individually identifiable

health information of access to or amendment of

individually identifiable health information, [a state

law that] permits greater rights of access or

A37

yo

amendment, as applicable; ....

See id. Thus, any state law that permits a patient

greater access to, or amendment of, their own medical

records should be followed, if it is contrary to a HIPAA

Privacy Regulation concerning access and amendment to

records. The Court concludes that those who routinely

handle health information, and who must undertake

privacy regulation training, should be able to understand

and apply the language set forth in criteria (2), and would

not need an interpretation of a court of law for guidance.

The other five criteria should be understood and applied

by health care professionals such as the plaintiffs. Even if

there were no training rule, those who have access to

individually identifiable health information can consult

the Privacy Regulations to clarify the application of the

regulations, as is done with state regulations. See Village

of Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 498.

The Privacy Regulations also provide for the

designation of a privacy official to assist in the

understanding of differences between state and federal

privacy regulations. The Privacy Regulations require that

every covered entity designate a privacy official “who is

responsible for the development and implementation of

the policies and procedures of the entity.” 45 C.F.R. §

164.530(a)(1)(i). Therefore, if a person is unable to

determine which privacy law to follow, state or federal, he

or she can contact the privacy officer, who should be

knowledgeable about such distinctions. While not a

complete solution to making distinctions between state

and federal law, consultation with the privacy official can -

be useful and a reasonable conclusion can be reached.

Again, the regulations set forth a framework that

militates against a finding of vagueness. Hence, the

undersigned concludes that the regulations provide

A38

sufficient notice and guidance to health care providers to

overcome the vagueness concerns raised in this case.

In regards to applying the “more stringent” standard,

there is some question as to whether or not a criminal

prosecution would lie for making the wrong decision

about following federal or state privacy laws. Section 1177

provides for criminal prosecution if a person “knowingly

. obtains . . .or . . . discloses identifiable health

information to another person... .” The focus of the

criminal prosecution is the unlawful obtaining or

disclosing health information. It is not clear to the

undersigned that a person could be prosecuted for making

the wrong judgment call as to whether state law is “more

stringent” than federal law. However, the defendants in

footnote 21 of their Memorandum in Support of their

Motion to Dismiss refer to the risk of prosecution if

plaintiffs are “unable to discern which state laws are more

stringent.” Apparently, the defendants acknowledge the

possibility of prosecution if a person cannot “discern”

correctly. The undersigned finds this somewhat troubling.

Again, there remains uncertainty by the undersigned

whether or not a prosecution would lie for a wrong

judgment call when trying to discern if a state or federal

law is more stringent. At this time, there is no prosecution

before the Court for a failure to properly “discern” which

law is “more stringent.” Should there be a criminal

prosecution for making the wrong judgment, a court

would then have to determine whether Section 1177

would reach such conduct. It would be premature to rule

on such an issue until an actual case arises so the relevant

facts and law can be fully analyzed at that time.

Moreover, if education, personal inquiry, and resort to

a privacy officer all fail to provide an adequate

determination concerning which law to follow, state or

federal, to an individual who is employed by a covered

A39

entity, there is also protection from a criminal sanction by

virtue of the scienter requirement. A scienter requirement

“may mitigate a law’s vagueness, especially with respect

to the adequacy of notice to the complainant that his

conduct is proscribed.” Village of Hoffman Estates, 455

U.S. at 499. The Privacy Regulations state that to warrant

punishement, a person who wrongfully discloses

individually identifiable health information must do so

“knowingly.” Public Law 104-191, Sec. 262, (Sec.

1177(a)(Aug. 21, 1996)); 42 U.S.C. 1320d-6. Accidental

disclosures due to a lack of knowledge of the preemption

provision will not result in criminal penalties for plaintiffs.

The next factor in the Grayned analysis is whether the

preemption provision and its clarifying regulations

provide explicit standards to prevent a court from

applying the law in an arbitrary and discriminatory

manner resulting in conflicting decisions. Courts need

only refer to the plain and ordinary meaning of the term

“more stringent” and the detailed definition of “more

stringent” when applying the law in situations where

there may be a question of whether federal law has

preempted state law. The definition of “more stringent”

is supported by six clarifying criteria. These criteria

minimize the risk of misapplication of the standards and

the risk of conflicting judicial opinions. This Court

concludes that this law can be applied in a manner that is

not sufficiently arbitrary or discriminatory. Should

conflicting opinions in fact occur, Congress can act to

correct any confusion or ambiguity in the language of the

regulations.

IV. Conclusion

Based on the analysis set forth above, this Court hereby

grants the Motion to Dismiss on all claims.

A40

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Terry L. Wooten

United States District Court Judge

August 14, 2002

Florence, South Carolina

A4l

CONSTITUTIONAL, STATUTORY

AND REGULATORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

U.S. Constitution Art. 1, section 1

Sec. 1. Legislative powers vested in Congress.

All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a

Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate

and House of Representatives.

RKKKKRKKKEKEKEKKEEEE

Sections 261, 262, and 264 of the Health Insurance

Portability and Accountability Act of 1996,

Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996)

Subtitle F--Administrative Simplification

SEC. 261. PURPOSE.

It is the purpose of this subtitle to improve the Medicare

program under title XVIII of the Social Security Act, the

medicaid program under title XIX of such Act, and the

efficiency and effectiveness of the health care system, by

encouraging the development of a health information

system through the establishment of standards and

requirements for the electronic transmission of certain -

health information.

A42

SEC. 262. ADMINISTRATIVE SIMPLIFICATION.

(a) IN GENERAL.--Title XI (42 U.S.C. 1301 et seq.) is

amended by adding at the end the following:

PART C--ADMINISTRATIVE SIMPLIFICATION

DEFINITIONS

SEC. 1171. For purposes of this part:

(1) CODE SET.--The term 'code set' means any set of codes

used for encoding data elements, such as tables of terms, medical

concepts, medical diagnostic codes, or medical procedure codes.

(2) HEALTH CARE CLEARINGHOUSE.--The term

‘health care clearinghouse' means a public or private entity that

processes or facilitates the processing of nonstandard data

elements of health information into standard data elements.

(3) HEALTH CARE PROVIDER.-—The term ‘health care

provider' includes a provider of services (as defined in section

1861(u)), a provider of medical or other health services (as

defined in section 1861(s)), and any other person furnishing

health care services or supplies.

(4) HEALTH INFORMATION.--The term ‘health

information' means any information, whether oral or recorded

in any form or medium, that-

(A) is created or received by a health care provider, health

plan, public health authority, employer, life insurer, school

or university, or health care clearinghouse; and

(B) relates to the past, present, or future physical or mental

health or condition of an individual, the provision of health

care to an individual, or the past, present, or future

payment for the provision of health care to an individual.

(5) HEALTH PLAN.--The term ‘health plan' means an

individual or group plan that provides, or pays the cost of,

medical care (as such term is defined in section 2791 of the

A43

Public Health Service Act). Such term includes the following,

and any combination thereof:

(A) A group health plan (as defined in section 2791 (a) of the

Public Health Service Act), but only if the plan-

(i) has 50 or more participants (as defined in section 3(7)

of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of

1974); or

(ii) is administered by an entity other than the employer

who established and maintains the plan.

(B) A health insurance issuer (as defined in section 2791(b)

of the Public Health Service Act).

(C) A health maintenance organization (as defined in

section 2791(b) of the Public Health Service Act).

(D) Part A or part B of the Medicare program under title X VIII.

(E) The medicaid program under title XIX.

(F) A Medicare supplemental policy (as defined in section

1882(g)(1)).

(G) A long-term care policy, including a nursing home

fixed indemnity policy (unless the Secretary determines that

such a policy does not provide sufficiently comprehensive

coverage of a benefit so that the policy should be treated as

a health plan).

(H) An employee welfare benefit plan or any other

arrangement which is established or maintained for the

purpose of offering or providing health benefits to the

employees of 2 or more employers.

(I) The health care program for active military personnel

under title 10, United States Code.

(J) The veterans health care program under chapter 17 of

title 38, United States Code.

(K) The Civilian Health and Medical Program of the

Uniformed Services (CHAMPUS), as defined in section

1072(4) of title 10, United States Code.

(L) The Indian health service program under the Indian

Health Care Improvement Act (25 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.).

A44

(M) The Federal Employees Health Benefit Plan under

chapter 89 of title 5, United States Code.

(6) INDIVIDUALLY IDENTIFIABLE HEALTH

INFORMATION.--The term ‘individually identifiable health

information' means any information, including demographic

information collected from an individual, that--

(A) is created or received by a health care provider, health

plan, employer, or health care clearinghouse; and

(B) relates to the past, present, or future physical or mental

health or condition of an individual, the provision of health

care to an individual, or the past, present, or future

payment for the provision of health care to an individual,

and--

(i) identifies the individual; or

(ti) with respect to which there is a reasonable basis to

believe that the information can be used to identify the

individual.

(7) STANDARD.--The term 'standard', when used with

reference toa data element of health information or a transaction

referred to in section 1173(a)(1), means any such data element

or transaction that meets each of the standards and

implementation specifications adopted or established by the

Secretary with respect to the data element or transaction under

sections 1172 through 1174.

(8) STANDARD SETTING ORGANIZATION.--The term

‘standard setting organization' means a standard setting

organization accredited by the American National Standards

Institute, including the National Council for Prescription Drug

Programs, that develops standards for information transactions,

data elements, or any other standard that is necessary to, or will

facilitate, the implementation of this part.

A45

GENERAL REQUIREMENTS FOR ADOPTION OF

STANDARDS

SEC. Fi7Z.

(a) APPLICABILITY.--Any standard adopted under this

part shall apply, in whole or in part, to the following

persons:

(1) A health plan.

(2) A health care clearinghouse.

(3) A health care provider who transmits any health

information in electronic form in connection with a

transaction referred to in section 1173(a)(1).

(b) REDUCTION OF COSTS.--Any standard adopted

under this part shall be consistent with the objective of

reducing the administrative costs of providing and paying

for health care.

(c) ROLE OF STANDARD SETTING

ORGANIZATIONS.--

(1) IN GENERAL.--Except as provided in paragraph

(2), any standard adopted under this part shall be a

standard that has been developed, adopted, or modified

by a standard setting organization.

(2) SPECIAL RULES.--

(A) DIFFERENT STANDARDS.--The Secretary may

adopt a standard that is different from any standard

developed, adopted, or modified by a standard setting

organization, if-

(i) the different standard will substantially reduce

administrative costs to health care providers and health

plans compared to the alternatives; and

(1i) the standard is promulgated in accordance with the

rulemaking procedures of subchapter III of chapter 5 of

title 5, United States Code.

A46

(B) NO STANDARD BY STANDARD SETTING

ORGANIZATION .--If no standard setting organization

has developed, adopted, or modified any standard relating

to a standard that the Secretary is authorized or required

to adopt under this part--

(1) paragraph (1) shall not apply; and

(11) subsection (f) shall apply.

(3) CONSULTATION REQUIREMENT.--

(A) IN GENERAL.--A standard may not be adopted

under this part unless--

(1) in the case of a standard that has been developed,

adopted, or modified by a standard setting

organization, the organization consulted with each of

the organizations described in subparagraph (B) in

the course of such development, adoption, or

modification; and

(ii) in the case of any other standard, the Secretary, in

complying with the requirements of subsection (f),

consulted with each of the organizations described in

subparagraph (B) before adopting the standard.

(B) ORGANIZATIONS DESCRIBED.--The

organizations referred to in subparagraph (A) are the

following:

(t) The National Uniform Billing Committee.

(it) The National Uniform Claim Committee.

(iii) The Workgroup for Electronic Data Interchange.

(tv) The American Dental Association.

(4) IMPLEMENTATION — SPECIFICATIONS.--The

Secretary shall establish specifications for implementing

each of the standards adopted under this part.

(e) PROTECTION OF TRADE SECRETS.--Except as

otherwise required by law, a standard adopted under this

part shall not require disclosure of trade secrets or

A47

confidential commercial information by a person required to

comply with this part.

(f) ASSISTANCE TO THE SECRETARY.--In complying

with the requirements of this part, the Secretary shall rely

on the recommendations of the National Committee on Vital

and Health Statistics established under section 306(k) of the

Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. 242k(k)), and shall

consult with appropriate Federal and State agencies and

private organizations. The Secretary shall publish in the

Federal Register any recommendation of the National

Committee on Vital and Health Statistics regarding the

adoption of a standard under this part.

(g) APPLICATION TO MODIFICATIONS OF

STANDARDS.--This section shall apply to a modification

to a standard (including an addition to a standard) adopted

under section 1174(b) in the same manner as it applies to

an initial standard adopted under section 1174(a).

STANDARDS FORINFORMATION TRANSACTIONS

AND DATA ELEMENTS

SEC. 1173.

(a) STANDARDS TO ENABLE ELECTRONIC

EXCHANGE.--

(1) IN GENERAL.--The Secretary shall adopt standards

for transactions, and data elements for such transactions,

to enable health information to be exchanged

electronically, that are appropriate for—

(A) the financial and administrative transactions

described in paragraph (2); and

(B) other financial and administrative transactions -

determined appropriate by the Secretary, consistent

with the goals of improving the operation of the health

care system and reducing administrative costs.

A48

(2) TRANSACTIONS.--The transactions referred to in

paragraph (1)(A) are transactions with respect to the

following:

(A) Health claims or equivalent encounter information.

(B) Health claims attachments.

(C) Enrollment and disenrollment in a health plan.

(D) Eligibility for a health plan.

(E) Health care payment and remittance advice.

(F) Health plan premium payments.

(G) First report of injury.

(H) Health claim status.

(I) Referral certification and authorization.

(3) ACCOMMODATION OF_ SPECIFIC

PROVIDERS.--The standards adopted by the Secretary

under paragraph (1) shall accommodate the needs of

different types of health care providers.

(b) UNIQUE HEALTH IDENTIFIERS.--

(1) INGENERAL.--The Secretary shall adopt standards

providing for a standard unique health identifier for each

individual, employer, health plan, and health care

provider for use in the health care system. In carrying out

the preceding sentence for each health plan and health

care provider, the Secretary shall take into account

multiple uses for identifiers and multiple locations and

specialty classifications for health care providers.

(2) USE OF IDENTIFIERS.--The standards adopted

under paragraph (1) shall specify the purposes for which

a unique health identifier may be used.

(c) CODE SETS.—

(1) INGENERAL.--The Secretary shall adopt standards

that—

(A) select code sets for appropriate data elements for the

transactions referred to in subsection (a)(1) from

A49

among the code sets that have been developed by private

and public entities; or

(B) establish code sets for such data elements if no code

sets for the data elements have been developed.

(2) DISTRIBUTION.--The Secretary shall establish

efficient and low-cost procedures for distribution

(including electronic distribution) of code sets and

modifications made to such code sets under section

1174(b).

(qd) SECURITY STANDARDS FOR’ HEALTH

INFORMATION.--

(1) SECURITY STANDARDS.--The Secretary shall

adopt security standards that-

(A) take into account--

(i) the technical capabilities of record systems used to

maintain health information;

(1i) the costs of security raeasures;

(iii) the need for training persons who have access to

health information;

(iv) the value of audit trails in computerized record

systems; and

(v) the needs and capabilities of small health care

providers and rural health care providers (as such

providers are defined by the Secretary); and

(B) ensure that a health care clearinghouse, if it is part

of a larger organization, has policies and security

procedures which isolate the activities of the health care

clearinghouse with respect to processing information in

a manner that prevents unauthorized access to such

information by such larger organization.

(2) SAFEGUARDS.--Each person described in section

1172(a) who maintains or transmits health information

shall maintain reasonable and appropriate administrative,

A50

technical, and physical safeguards-~

(A) toensure the integrity and confidentiality of the information;

(B) to protect against any reasonably anticipated-

(i) threats or hazards to the security or integrity of the

information; and

(ti) unauthorized uses or disclosures of the

information; and

(C) otherwise to ensure compliance with this part by

the officers and employees of such person.

(e) ELECTRONIC SIGNATURE.--

(1) STANDARDS.--The Secretary, in coordination with

the Secretary of Commerce, shall adopt standards

specifying procedures for the electronic transmission and

authentication of signatures with respect to the

transactions referred to in subsection (a)(1).

(2) EFFECT OF COMPLIANCE.--Compliance with the

standards adopted under paragraph (1) shall be deemed to

satisfy Federal and State statutory requirements for

written signatures with respect to the transactions

referred to in subsection (a)(1).

(f) TRANSFER OF INFORMATION AMONG HEALTH

PLANS.--The Secretary shall adopt standards for

transferring among health plans appropriate standard data

elements needed for the coordination of benefits, the

sequential processing of claims, and other data elements for

individuals who have more than one health ptanx——

TIMETABLES FOR ADOPTION OF STANDARDS

SEC. 1174.

(a) INITIAL STANDARDS.--The Secretary shall carry out

section 1173 not later than 18 months after the date of the

enactment of the Health Insurance Portability and

Accountability Act of 1996, except that standards relating

A51

to claims attachments shall be adopted not later than 30

months after such date.

(b) ADDITIONS AND MODIFICATIONS TO

STANDARDS.-

(1) INGENERAL.--Except as provided in paragraph (2),

the Secretary shall review the standards adopted under

section 1173, and shall adopt modifications to the

standards (including additions to the standards), as

determined appropriate, but not more frequently than

once every 12 months. Any addition or modification to a

standard shall be completed in a manner which minimizes

the disruption and cost of compliance.

(2) SPECIAL RULES.-

(A) FIRST 12-MONTH PERIOD.--Except with

respect to additions and modifications to code sets

under subparagraph (B), the Secretary may not adopt

any modification to a standard adopted under this part

during the 12- month period begnning on the date the

standard is initially adopter unless the Secretary

determines that the modificc tion is necessary in order

to permit compliance with the standard.

(B) ADDITIONS AND MODIFICATIONS TO

CODE SETS.—

(t} IN GENERAL.--The Secretary shall ensure that

procedures exist for the routine maintenance, testing,

enhancement, and expansion of code sets.

(ti) ADDITIONAL RULES.--If a code set is modified

under this subsection, the modified code set shall

include instructions on how data elements of health

information that were encoded prior to the_

modification may be converted or translated so as to

preserve the informational value of the data elements

that existed before the modification. Any modification

to a code set under this subsection shall be

A52

implemented in a manner that minimizes the

disruption and cost of complying with such

modification.

REQUIREMENTS

SEC. 1175.

(a) CONDUCT OF TRANSACTIONS BY PLANS.--

(1) IN GENERAL.--If a person desires to conduct a

transaction referred to in section 1173(a)(1) witha health

plan as a standard transaction--

(A) the health plan may not refuse to conduct such

transaction as a standard transaction;

(B) the insurance plan may not delay such transaction,

or otherwise adversely affect, or attempt to adversely

affect, the person or the transaction on the ground that

the transaction is a standard transaction; and

(C) the information transmitted and received in

connection with the transaction shall be in the form of

standard data elements of health information.

(2) SATISFACTION OF REQUIREMENTS.--A health

plan may satisfy the requirements under paragraph (1)

by—

(A) directly transmitting and receiving standard data

elements of health information; or

(B) submitting nonstandard data elements to a health

care clearinghouse for processing into standard data

elements and transmission by the health care

clearinghouse, and receiving standard data elements

through the health care clearinghouse.

(3) TIMETABLE FOR COMPLIANCE.--Paragraph (1)

shall not be construed to require a health plan to comply

with any standard, implementation specification, or

modification to a standard or specification adopted or

A53

established by the Secretary under sections 1172 through

1174 at any time prior to the date on which the plan ts

required to comply with the standard or specification

under subsection (b).

(b) COMPLIANCE WITH STANDARDS.--

(1) INITIAL COMPLIANCE.--

(A) INGENERAL.--Not later than 24 months after the

date on which an initial standard or implementation

specification is adopted or established under sections

1172 and 1173, each person to whom the standard or

implementation specification applies shall comply with

the standard or specification.

(B) SPECIAL RULE FOR SMALL HEALTH

PLANS.--In the case of a small health plan, paragraph

(1) shall be applied by substituting '36 months' for .24

months'. For purposes of this subsection, the Secretary

shall determine the plans that qualify as small health

plans.

(2) COMPLIANCE WITH MODIFIED STANDARDS.-

-If the Secretary adopts a modification to a standard or

implementation specification under this part, each person

to whom the standard or implementation specification

applies shall comply with the modified standard or

implementation specification at such time as the Secretary

determines appropriate, taking into account the time

needed to comply due to the nature and extent of the

modification. The time determined appropriate under the

preceding sentence may not be earlier than the last day of

the 180-day period beginning on the date such

modification is adopted. The Secretary may extend the

time for compliance for small health plans, if the Secretary

determines that such extension is appropriate.

(3) CONSTRUCTION.--Nothing in this subsection shall

be construed to prohibit any person from complying with

A54

eee

a standard or specification by--

(A) submitting nonstandard data elements to a health

care clearinghouse for processing into standard data

elements and transmission by the health care

clearinghouse; or

(B) receiving standard data elements through a health

care clearinghouse.

GENERAL PENALTY FOR FAILURE TO COMPLY

WITH REQUIREMENTS AND STANDARDS

SEC. 1176.

(a) GENERAL PENALTY.--

(1) IN GENERAL.--Except as provided in subsection (b),

the Secretary shall impose on any person who violates a

provision of this part a penalty of not more than $100 for

~ each such violation, except that the total amount imposed

on the person for all violations of an identical requirement

or prohibition during a calendar year may not exceed

$25,000.

(2) PROCEDURES.--The provisions of section 1128A

(other than subsections (a) and (b) and the second

sentence of subsection (f)) shall apply to the imposition of

a civil money penalty under this subsection in the same

manner as such provisions apply to the imposition of a

penalty under such section 1128A.

(b) LIMITATIONS.--

(1) OFFENSES OTHERWISE PUNISHABLE.--A

penalty may not be imposed under subsection (a) with

respect to an act if the act constitutes an offense

punishable under section 1177.

(2) NONCOMPLIANCE NOT DISCOVERED.--A

penalty may not be imposed under subsection (a) with

respect to a provision of this part if it is established to the

A55

satisfaction of the Secretary that the person liable for the

penalty did not know, and by exercising reasonable

diligence would not have known, that such person

violated the provision. ;

(3) FAILURES DUE TO REASONABLE CAUSE.--

(A) IN GENERAL.--Except as _ provided in

subparagraph (B), a penalty may not be imposed under

subsection (a) 1f--

(i) the failure to comply was due to reasonable cause

and not to willful neglect; and

(ii) the failure to comply is corrected during the 30-

day period beginning on the first date the person

liable for the penalty knew, or by exercising

reasonable diligence would have known, that the

failure to comply occurred.

(B) EXTENSION OF PERIOD.--

(i) NO PENALTY.--The period referred to in

subparagraph (A)(ii) may be extended as determined

appropriate by the Secretary based on the nature and

extent of the failure to comply.

(ti) ASSISTANCE.--If the Secretary determines that

a person failed to comply because the person was

unable to comply, the Secretary may provide technical

assistance to the person during the period described in

subparagraph (A)(i1). Such assistance shall be

provided in any manner determined appropriate by

the Secretary.

(4) REDUCTION.--In the case of a failure to comply

which is due to reasonable cause and not to willful

neglect, any penalty under subsection (a) that is not

- entirely waived under paragraph (3) may be waived to the

extent that the payment of such penalty would be

excessive relative to the compliance failure involved.

A56

WRONGFUL DISCLOSURE OF INDIVIDUALLY

IDENTIFIABLE HEALTH INFORMATION

SEC. 1177.

(a) OFFENSE.--A person who knowingly and in violation

of this part--

(1) uses or causes to be used a unique health identifier;

(2) obtains individually identifiable health information

relating to an individual; or .

(3) discloses individually identifiable health information

to another person, shall be punished as provided in

subsection (b).

(b) PENALTIES.--A person described in subsection (a)

shall--

(1) be fined not more than $50,000, imprisoned not more

than 1 year, or both;

(2) if the offense is committed under false pretenses, be

fined not more than $100,000, imprisoned not more than

5 years, or both; and

(3) if the offense is committed with intent to sell, transfer,

or use individually identifiable health information for

commercial advantage, personal gain, or malicious harm,

be fined not more than $250,000, imprisoned not more

than 10 years, or both.

EFFECT ON STATE LAW

SEC. 1178.

(a) GENERAL EFFECT.-- ,

(1) GENERAL RULE.--Except as provided in paragraph

(2), a provision or requirement under this part, or a

standard or implementation specification adopted or

established under sections 1172 through 1174, shall

supersede any contrary provision of State law, includin g

A57

a provision of State law that requires medical or health

plan records (including billing information) to be

maintained or transmitted in written rather than

electronic form.

(2) EXCEPTIONS.--A provision or requirement under

this part, or a standard or implementation specification

adopted or established under sections 1172 through 1174,

shall not supersede a contrary provision of State law, if

the provision of State law--

- (A) is a provision the Secretary determines--

(1) is necessary--

(I) to prevent fraud and abuse;

(II) to ensure appropriate State regulation of

insurance and health plans;

(III) for State reporting on health care delivery

or costs; or

(IV) for other purposes; or

(ii) addresses controlled substances; or

(B) subject to section 264(c)(2) of the Health

Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996,

relates to the privacy of individually identifiable

hec th information.

(b) PUBLIC HEALTH.--Nothing in this part shall be

construed to invalidate or limit the authority, power, or

procedures established under any law providing for the

reporting of disease or injury, child abuse, birth, or death,

public health surveillance, or public health investigation

or intervention.

(c) STATE REGULATORY REPORTING.--Nothing in

this part shall limit the ability of a State to require a

health plan to report, or to provide access to, information

for management audits, financial audits, program

monitoring and evaluation, facility licensure or

A58

certification, or individual licensure or certification.

PROCESSING PAYMENT TRANSACTIONS BY

FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS

SEC. 1179. To the extent that an entity is engaged in

activities of a financial institution (as defined in section 1101 of

the Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978), or is engaged in

authorizing, processing, clearing, settling, billing, transferring,

reconciling, or collecting payments, for a financial institution,

this part, and any standard adopted under this pert, shal! not

apply to the entity with respect to such activities, including the

following:

(1) The use or disclosure of information by the entity for

authorizing, processing, clearing, settling, billing,

transferring, reconciling or collecting, a payment for, or

related to, health plan premiums or health care, where

such payment is made by any means, including a credit,

debit, or other payment card, an account, check, or

electronic funds transfer.

(2) The request for, or the use or disclosure of,

information by the entity with respect to a payment

described in paragraph (1)--

(A) for transferring receivables;

(B) for auditing;

(C) in connection with--

(1) a customer dispute; or

(ii) an inquiry from, or to, a customer;

(D) in a communication to a customer of the entity

regarding the customer's transactions, payment card,

account, check, or electronic funds transfer;

(E) for reporting to consumer reporting agencies; or

(F) for complying with--

(1) a civil or criminal subpoena; or

(ii) a Federal or State law regulating the entity.".

A59

(b) CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.--

(1) REQUIREMENT FOR MEDICARE PROVIDERS.-

-Section 1866(a)(1) (42 US.C. 1395cc(a)(1)) is

amended--

(A) by striking "and" at the end of subparagraph

(P);

(B) by striking the period at the end of

subparagraph (Q) and inserting "; and"; and

(C) by inserting immediately after subparagraph

(Q) the following new subparagraph:

(R) to contract only with a health care

clearinghouse (as defined in section 1171)

that meets each standard and

implementation specification adopted or

established under part C of title XI on or after

the date on which the health care

clearinghouse is required to comply with the

standard or specification."

(2) TITLE HEADING.--Title XI (42 U.S.C. 1301 et

seq.) is amended by striking the title heading and

inserting the following:

“TITLE XI--GENERAL PROVISIONS, PEER

REVIEW, AND ADMINISTRATIVE

SIMPLIFICATION”.

KKK

SEC. 264. RECOMMENDATIONS WITH RESPECT TO

PRIVACY OF CERTAIN HEALTH INFORMATION.

(a) INGENERAL.--Not later than the date that is 12

A60

months after the date of the enactment of this Act,

the Secretary of Health and Human Services shall

submit to the Committee on Labor and Human

Resources and the Committee on Finance of the

Senate and the Committee on Commerce and the

Committee on Ways and Means of the House of

Representatives detailed recommendations on

standards with respect to the privacy of individually

identifiable health information.

(b) SUBJECTS FOR RECOMMENDATIONS.--The

recommendations under subsection (a) shall address

at least the following:

(1) The rights that an individual who is a subject

of individually identifiable health information

should have.

(2) The procedures that should be established for

the exercise of such rights.

(3) The uses and disclosures of such information

that should be authorized or required.

(c) REGULATIONS.--

(1) IN GENERAL.--If legislation governing

standards with respect to the privacy of

individually identifiable health information

transmitted in connection with the transactions

described in section 1173(a) of the Social Security

Act (as added by section 262) is not enacted by

the date that is 36 months after the date of the

enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Health

and Human Services shall promulgate final

regulations containing such standards not later

than the date that is 42 months after the date of

the enactment of this Act. Such regulations shall

address at least the subjects described in

subsection (b).

Aél

(2) PREEMPTION.--A regulation promulgated

under paragraph (1) shall not supercede a

contrary provision of State law, if the provision

of State law imposes requirements, standards, or

implementation specifications that are more

stringent than the requirements, standards, or

implementation specifications imposed under

the regulation.

(d) CONSULTATION.--In carrying out this section,

the Secretary of Health and Human Services shall

consult with--

(1) the National Committee on Vital and Health

Statistics established under section 306(k) of the

Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. 242k(k)); and

(2) the Attorney General

RREEKKEEKEKEEEKEEESE

45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (relevant excerpt)

§ 160.103 Definitions.

KKK

Protected health information means individually

identifiable health information:

(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this

definition, that is:

(i) Transmitted by electronic media;

(ii) Maintained in electronic media; or

(iii) Transmitted or maintained in any other form

or medium.

(2) Protected health information excludes

A62

individually identifiable health information in:

(i) Education records covered by the Family

Educational Rights and Privacy Act, as amended,

20 U.S.C. 1232;

(ii) Records described at 20 U.S.C.

1232g(a)(4)(B)(iv); and

(iii) Employment records held by a covered

entity in its role as employer.

KKKEK

A63

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.