Appendices — South Carolina Medical Ass'n v. Thompson
Supreme Court brief2003
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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
SOUTH CAROLINA MEDICAL ASSOCIATION;
PHYSICIANS CARE NETWORK; J. CAPERS
HIOTT, M.D.; JOHN R. ROSS, M.D.; GORDON E.
PENNEBAKER, M.D.; CAROL S. NICHOLS, M.D.;
DANNETTE F. MCALHANEY, M.D.; HERBERT
MOSKOW, M.D.; LOUISIANA STATE MEDICAL
SOCIETY,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
TOMMY G. THOMPSON, sued as Secretary of the
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services; U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 02-2001
January 23, 2003, Argued
April 25, 2003, Decided
Before WILKINS, Chief Judge, and TRAXLER and
GREGORY, Circuit Judges. Judge Traxler wrote the
opinion, in which Chief Judge Wilkins and Judge Gregory
joined.
TRAXLER, Circuit Judge:
Appellants, South Carolina Medical Association,
Physicians Care Network, and several individual doctors,
filed suit seeking to have declared unconstitutional several
provisions of the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act of 1996 ("HIPAA"), Pub. L. No. 104-191,
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110 Stat. 1936 (1996). Because Congress laid out an
intelligible principle in HIPAA to guide agency action, we
reject appellants' claim that the statute impermissibly
delegates the legislative function. We also conclude that
regulations promulgated pursuant to HIPAA are not
beyond the scope of the congressional grant of authority,
and that neither the statute nor the regulations are
impermissibly vague. Accordingly, we affirm.
I.
Recognizing the importance of protecting the privacy
of health information in the midst of the rapid evolution of
health information systems, Congress passed HIPAA in
August 1996. HIPAA's Administrative Simplification
provisions,” sections 261 through 264 of the statute, were
designed to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the
health care system by facilitating the exchange of
information with respect to financial and administrative
transactions carried out by health plans, health care
clearinghouses, and health care providers who transmit
information in connection with such transactions. The
preamble to the Administrative Simplification provisions
clarifies this goal:
-
It is the purpose of this subtitle to improve the
Medicare program..., the medicaid program..., and the
efficiency and effectiveness of the health care system,
® Subtitle F of Title II of HIPAA consists of sections 261 through
264. HIPAA § 262 amends Title XI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1301 et seq., toadd a Part C, entitled "Administrative Simplification,"
with sections 1171-1179, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320d through § 1320d-
8 (West Supp. 2002). Section 261 is found as a note to 42 U.S.C. §
1320d. Section 264 is found as a note to 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-2. Section 263
amends the Public Health Service Act, at 42 U.S.C. § 242k(k) (West
Supp. 2002).
sa a ae -
-
by encouraging the development of a health
information system through the establishment of
standards and requirements for the electronic
transmissior: of certain health information.
HIPAA § 261, 110 Stat. 2021.
To this end, Congress instructed the United States
Department of Health and Human Services ("HHS") to
adopt uniform standards "to enable health information to
be exchanged electronically." 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-2(a)(1).
Congress directed HHS to adopt standards for unique
identifiers to distinguish individuals, employers, health
care plans, and health care providers across the nation, see
42 U.S.C. § 1320d-2(b)(1), as well as standards for
transactions and data elements relating to health
information, see 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-2(a), (c) & (f), the
security of that information, see 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-2(d), and
verification of electronic signatures, see 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-
2(e).
Within the Administrative Simplification section,
Congress included another provision -- section 264 --
outlining a two-step process to address the need to afford
certain protections to the privacy of health information
maintained under HIPAA. First, section 264(a) directed
HHS to submit to Congress within twelve months of
HIPAA's enactment "detailed recommendations on
standards with respect to the privacy of individually
identifiable health information." HIPAA § 264(a), 110 Stat.
2033. Second, if Congress did not enact further legislation
pursuant to these recommendations within thirtysix
months of the enactment of HIPAA, HHS was to
promulgate final regulations containing such standards.
Specifically, section 264(c)(1) provided:
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If legislation governing standards with respect to the
privacy of individuaily identifiable health information
transmitted in connection with the transactions
described in section 1173(a) of the Social Security Act (as
added by section 262) is not enacted by [August 21,
1999], the Secretary of Health and Human Services
shall promulgate final regulations con taining such
standards not later than [February 21, 2000]. Such
regulations shall address at least the subjects described
in subsection (b).
HIPAA § 264(c)(1), 110 Stat. 2033. The subjects Congress
directed HHS to cover in promulgating privacy
regulations included the following: "(1) The rights that an
individual who is a subject of individually identifiable
health information should have. (2) The procedures that
should be established for the exercise of such rights. (3)
The uses and disclosures of such information that should
be authorized or required." HIPAA § 264(b), 110 Stat.
2033. Through individual provisions of HIPAA, Congress
outlined whom the regulations were to cover, see 42 U.S.C.
§ 1320d-1(a); what information was to be covered, see 42
U.S.C. § 1320d(6) (defining "individually identifiable
health information"); what types of transactions were to be
covered, see 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-2(a)(2); what penalties
would accrue for violations of HIPAA, see 42 U.S.C. § §
1320d-5, 1320d-6; and what time lines and standards would
govern compliance with the Act, see 42 U.S.C. § § 1320d-3,
1320d-4.
Finally, section 264(c)(2) provided that the privacy
regulations promulgated by HHS "shall not supercede a
contrary provision of State law, if the provision of State
law imposes requirements, standards, or implementation
specifications that are more stringent than the requirements,
standards, or implementation specifications imposed
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under the regulation." HIPAA § 264(c)(2), 110 Stat. 2033-34
(emphasis added).
Pursuant to Congress's mandate, HHS submitted
recommendations for protecting the privacy of
individually identifiable health information in September
1997. Several detailed and comprehensive medical privacy
bills were thereafter introduced; however, Congress did
not pass any additional legislation. For its part, HHS
followed Congress's directive and drafted regulations that
appeared in a November 1999 Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking. The proposed regulations drew more than
50,000 comments from affected parties. After several
further proposals and amendments were published, HHS
promulgated final regulations in February 2001,
collectively the "Privacy Rule." Although the effective date
of the Privacy Rule was set for April 14, 2001, entities
covered by the regulations were given until April 14, 2003,
to comply, while some smaller entities were granted an
additional year.
Appellants sought declaratory relief from provisions of
HIPAA and the accompanying Privacy Rule promulgated
by HHS. The district court dismissed the action and this
appeal followed. Appellants argue that 1) HIPAA violates
the non-delegation doctrine by authorizing HHS to
promulgate the regulations at issue in the absence of an
intelligible principle from Congress; 2) the Privacy Rule
exceeds the scope of authority granted to HHS under
HIPAA; and 3) HIPAA's non-preemption of "more
stringent" state privacy laws is unconstitutionally vague,
in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment. We address each of these issues in turn.
IT.
A.
The first issue is whether HIPAA violates the non-
delegation doctrine. "In a delegation challenge, the
constitutional question is whether the statute has
delegated legislative power to [an] agency" of the
executive branch. Whitman v. American Trucking Ass'ns,
Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 472, (2001). The doctrine is "rooted in the
principle of separation of powers that underlies our
tripartite system of government." Mistretta v. United States,
488 U.S. 361, 371 (1989). The first lines of the Constitution
set forth that "all legislative Powers herein granted shall be -
vested in a Congress of the United States." U.S. Const. art.
I, § 1. Thus, from our nation's earliest days, "the integrity
and maintenance of the system of government ordained
by the Constitution [has] mandated that Congress
generally cannot delegate its legislative power to another
Branch." Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 371-72 (citation omitted).
In tension with this constitutional directive is the
practical requirement that Congress turn to the other
branches of government for assistance in carrying out its
general legislative policies: "Our jurisprudence has been
driven by a practical understanding that in our
increasingly complex society, replete with ever changing
and more technical problems, Congress simply cannot do
its job absent an ability to delegate power under broad
general directives." Id. at 372; see also American Power &
Light Co. v. S.E.C., 329 U.S. 90, 105 (1946) (acknowledging
that the "legislative process would frequently bog down if
Congress were constitutionally required to appraise
beforehand the myriad situations to which it wishes a
particular policy to be applied and to formulate specific
rules for each situation").
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The Supreme Court has outlined an approach to
determining the difference between prohibited delegation
and necessary cooperation between coordinate branches:
"In determining what [Congress] may do in seeking
assistance from another branch, the extent and character of
that assistance must be fixed according to common sense
and the inherent necessities of the governmental co-
ordination." J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276
U.S. 394, 406 (1928). This approach dictates that where
Congress "lays down by legislative act an intelligible
principle to which the person or body authorized to
[exercise the assigned duty] is directed to conform, such
legislative action is not a forbidden delegation of
legislative power." Id. at 409 (emphasis added). The Court
has held that a delegation of legislative power will be
found "constitutionally sufficient if Congress clearly
delineates the general policy, the public agency which is to
apply it, and the boundaries of this delegated authority."
Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 372-73 (internal quotation marks
omitted). These three factors make up the test for
determining whether an intelligible principle lies behind
the conferral of authority from Congress to an agency.
The government does not bear an onerous burden in
demonstrating the existence of an intelligible principle.
Since A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295
U.S. 495 (1935), and Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S.
388 (1935), the Supreme Court has not struck down a
statute for an impermissible delegation. See American
Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. at 474 ("In the history of the
Court we have found the requisite 'intelligible principle'
lacking in only two statutes, one of which [Panama
Refining] provided literally no guidance for the exercise of
discretion, and the other of which [A.L.A. Schechter]
conferred authority to regulate the entire economy on the
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basis of no more precise a standard than stimulating the
economy by assuring ‘fair competition."). Rather,
Congress has been able to delegate authority under "broad
standards." Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 373; see, e.g., Lichter v.
United States, 334 U.S. 742, 785-86 (1948) (upholding
delegation of authority to determine excessive profits);
American Power, 329 U.S. at 105-06 (upholding delegation
to SEC to prevent unfair or inequitable distribution of
voting power among security holders); Yakus v. United
States, 321 U.S. 414, 426-27 (1944) (upholding delegation to
price administrator to fix commodity prices that would be
tair and equitable); National Broadcasting Co. v. United
States, 319 U.S. 190, 225-26 (1943) (upholding delegation to
FCC to regulate broadcast licensing as public interest,
convenience, or necessity require). The only limiting factor
in each case has been the presence of an intelligible
principle behind the congressional delegation.
In light of this guidance, we conclude that HIPAA also
contains the requisite intelligible principle necessary to
survive a non-delegation challenge. Specifically, there are
at least three sources within HIPAA that provide
intelligible principles outlining and limiting the
Congressional conferral of authority on HHS. First, the
language of the statute mandates that HHS implement
regulations addressing three particular subjects: "(1) the
rights that an individual who is a subject of individually
identifiable health information should have "; "(2) the
procedures that should be established for the exercise of
such rights"; and "(3) the uses and disclosures of such
information that should be authorized or required."
HIPAA § 264, 110 Stat. 2033. The question is whether
these amount to a statement of "general policy" by
Congress. We believe that they do, particularly when read
in connection with the second source -- namely section 261,
the preamble to the statute -- which sets forth the general
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purpose of HIPAA as "improving the Medicare program
.., the medicaid program ..., and the efficiency and
effectiveness of the health care system, by encoura ging the
development of a health information system through the
establishment of standards and requirements for the ©
electronic transmission of certain health information."
HIPAA § 261, 110 Stat. 2021. Section 262 further refines
this goal by requiring that the Privacy Rule "be consistent
with the objective of reducing the administrative costs of
providing and paying for health care." HIPAA § 262,110
Stat. 2023 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-1(b)). The third
source of an intelligible principle is Congress's limitation
of the Privacy Rule to communications of listed
information by particular covered entities. As noted above,
individual provisions of HIPAA outline whom the Privacy
Rule was to cover, see 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-1(a); what
information was to be covered, see § 1320d(6) (defining
"individually identifiable health information"); what types
of transactions were to be covered, see § 1320d-2(a)(2);
what penalties would accrue for violations of HIPAA, see
§ § 1320d-5, 1320d-6; and what time lines and standards
would govern compliance with HIPAA, see § § 1320d-3,
1320d-4. We agree with the district court that, taken
together, the provisions of HIPAA provide a general
policy, describe the agency in charge of applying that
policy, and set boundaries for the reach of that agency's
authority -- all in keeping with the intelligible principle
test. See American Power, 329 U.S. at 105 (holding a statute
is “constitutionally sufficient" if it meets these three
requirements). Thus, we conclude that HIPAA is "well
within the outer limits of our nondelegation precedents."
American Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. at 474.
Although appellants argue that the present case is
indistinguishable from Panama Refining, one of only two
cases in which the Supreme Court has invalidated a statute
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on the basis of an unconstitutional delegation, we
disagree. In Panama Refining, the Court found that the
challenged portion of the statute at issue, section 9(c) of the
National Industrial Recovery Act ("NIRA"), did not provide
the President with any mandate, but rather authorized
him to pass a prohibitory law. See Panama Refining, 293
U.S. at 405-412. That is, the Court found that Congress had
offered no guidance in NIRA as to whether the President
should or should not prohibit the transportation of excess
petroleum and petroleum products, so-called "hot oil," in
interstate commerce. Rather, the Court noted that "so far
as this section is concerned, it gives to the President an
unlimited authority to determine the policy and to lay
down the prohibition, or not to lay it down, as he may see
fit." Id. at 415. Finding no limit on executive discretion in
this substantive provision of NIRA, the Court.also looked
to the preamble of the statute and, once again, found no
guidance as to whether "hot oil" was good or bad. See id. at
416-18. Thus, NIRA "provided literally no guidance for the
exercise of discretion." American Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S.
at 474. By contrast, in the case before us we have a clear
mandate from Congress directing HHS to act in
accordance with the intelligible principles set forth in
HIPAA. Further, there are clear limits upon the scope of
that authority and the type of entities whose actions are to
be regulated.
Finally, we find unavailing appellants' position that
Congress unconstitutionally relinquished its lawmaking
function by mandating that final regulations governing
standards with respect to the privacy of individually
identifiable health information be promulgated within
thirty-six months of HIPAA's enactment if no further
legislation on the subject were enacted. We do not agree
that this approach amounts to an abdication. Rather, the
procedures outlined by Congress establish a more explicit
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oversight mechanism than usually accompanies a
rulemaking mandate imposed upon an agency. In
conveying rulemaking authority, Congress always
reserves the right -- indeed, never relinquishes the right --
to engage in further lawmaking. As described above,
Congress did not abdicate its legislative responsibility in
passing HIPAA, but outlined a broad set of principles to
guide HHS action. See Yakus, 321 U.S. at 426 ("Only if we
could say that there is an absence of standards for the
guidance of the Administrator's action ... would [we] be
justified in overriding its choice of means for effecting its
declared purpose."). Animated by these principles, HHS
was directed first to offer recommendations within a year
of HIPAA's enactment. That Congress did not enact
additional measures in light of these recommendations
indicates the legislature's satisfaction with HHS's
proposed approach to protecting the privacy of
individually identifiable health information. This decision
did not, and does not, limit Congress's ability to revisit the
issue, change the direction or scope of the statute or rules,
or wiiolly undo the regulatory scheme HHS has
established pursuant to HIPAA.
For these reasons, we conclude that HIPAA does not
violate the non-delegation doctrine.
B.
Appellants' second argument is that section 264(c) of
HIPAA limits HHS to regulating only electronic records
transmitted in connection with section 1173(a) of the Social
Security Act, see 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-2(a), yet HHS
impermissibly expanded HIPAA's Scope to cover not only
electronic transactions, but "every form of information for
all Americans held by covered entities." Appeliants' Brief
at 7. The government responds that neither section 264(c),
nor other portions of the Administrative Simplification
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section to which it refers, limits HHS's authority to
regulating purely electronic information. The government
also contends that during the rulemaking process HHS
decided that protecting only electronic information would
not adequately safeguard patient privacy and that it
would be burdensome and ultimately unworkable to
distinguish the same information in various stages and
formats that could be kept in electronic or nonelectronic
form.
The disputed section includes a broad grant of
authority from Congress to HHS as to the regulation of
medical information. Section 264(c)(1) states in pertinent
part as follows:
If legislation governing standards with respect to
the privacy of individually identifiable health
information transmitted in connection with the
transactions described in section 1173(a) of the
Social Security Act (as added by Section 262) is not
enacted by [August 21, 1999], the Secretary of
Health and Human Services shall promulgate final
regulations con taining such standards not later
than [February 21, 2000}.
HIPAA § 264(c)(1), 110 Stat. 2033. In describing what
kind of information is to be protected, Congress expressly
defined "health information" to include any information,
"whether oral or recorded in any form or medium." 42 U.S.C.
§1320d-4 (emphasis added). The definition of "individually
identifiable health information" -- a subset of "health
information" -- contains no language limiting its reach to
electronic media.“ Thus, the plain language of HIPAA
“4 The phrase "individually identifiable health information" refers to
information that:
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said
indicates that HHS could reasonably determine that the
regulation of individually identifiable health information
should include non-electronic forms of that information.
Although appellants argue that the reference in HIPAA
§ 264(c)(1) to information "transmitted in connection with
section 1173(a)" limits the scope of the regulations solely to
electronic transactions, another reasonable reading is that
section 1173(a) directs HHS to develop "standards for
transactions, and data elements for such transactions, to
enable health information to be exchanged electronically."
42 U.S.C. § 1320d-2(a)(1) (emphasis added). Thus, the
focus is on enabling electronic portability, not simply on
regulating purely electronic activity. This reading is
bolstered by the fact that transactions listed in connection
with section 1173(a) are not described in terms that limit
their scope to electronic media, but rather include
transactions with respect to "enrollment and disenrollment
in a health plan," "health care payment arid remittarice
advice," and "health plan premium payments" -- terms that
do not invite the limitation to a purely electronic scheme.
42 U.S.C. § 1320d-2(a)(2)(C), (E) and (EF).
The validity of a regulation promulgated by an agency
pursuant to a congressional mandate is to be sustained so
long as it is "reasonably related to the purposes of the
enabling legislation under which it was promulgated."
Thorpe v. Housing Auth. of the City of Durham, 393 U.S. 268,
(B) relates to the past, present, or future physical or mental health or
condition of an individual, the provision of health care to an
individual, or the past, present, or future payment for the provision
of health care to an individual, and ~
(i) ic _ntifies the individual; or
(ii) with respect to which there is a reasonable basis to believe that
the information can be used to identify the indi vidual.
42 U.S.C. § 1320d-6(b).
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280-81, 21 L. Ed. 2d 474, 89 S. Ct. 518 (1969); see Chevron
UL.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
844, 81 L. Ed. 2d 694, 104 S. Ct. 2778 (1984). Regulating
nonelectronic as well as electronic forms of health
information effectuates HIPAA's intent to promote the
efficient and effective portability of health information and
the protection of confidentiality. If coverage were limited
to electronic data, there would be perverse incentives for
entities covered by the rule to avoid the computerization
and portability of any medical records. Such a
development would utterly frustrate the purposes of
HIPAA. HHS's interpretation of the scope of the grant of
authority given by Congress is not inconsistent with the
language of the statute and is reasonably related to the
larger purposes of HIPAA. The agency reasonably
determined that regulating health information in such a
way as to foster effective and efficient electronic
transmission requires that the rule encompass paper
records.
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Appellant's final argument is that HIPAA's non-
preemption provision, which provides for the preemption
of state laws unless they are "more stringent" than HIPAA,
is impermissibly vague because it necessarily calls for
subjective judgments on the part of health care providers,
who face jail or fines for incorrect determinations.
Contending that it fails to provide fair notice or minimal
guidelines to covered entities and individuals, appellants
argue that the statute violates the Due Process Clause of
the Fifth Amendment."The Court has stated that "it is a
15 The government contends that the vagueness challenge is unripe
because "the non-preemption provision has not been applied to
plaintiffs in any concrete way that would permit a fair assessment of
its clarity in the proper context." Brief of Appellees at 31. See Lyng v.
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basic principle of due process that an enactment is void for
vagueness if its prohibitions are not clearly defined."
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972). A.
challenged statutory provision will survive scrutiny
"unless it is so unclear with regard to what conduct is
prohibited that it may trap the innocent by not providing
fair warning, or it is so standardless that it enables
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement." Greenville
Women's Clinic v. South Carolina Dep't of Health & Envtl.
Control, 317 F.3d 357, 366 (4th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
The disputed preemption provision is found in
sectiopn 264(c)(2) and states as follows:
A regulation promulgated under paragraph (1) shall!
not supercede a contrary provision of State law, if the
provision of State law imposes requirements,
standards, or implemen tation specifications that are
more stringent than the require ments, standards, or
implementation specifications imposed under the
regulation.
HIPAA § 264(c)(2), 110 Stat. 2033-34 (emphasis added). In
Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 445 (1988)
(holding that courts should "avoid reaching constitutional questions
in advance of the necessity of deciding them"); Commonwealth of
Virginia v. Browner, 80 F.3d 869, 881 n.6 (4th Cir. 1996) (holding that a
constitutional challenge to sanctions in the Clean Air Act was not ripe
for review because the threat of sanctions had not been felt by
plaintiffs "in a concrete way" (internal quotation marks omitted)). We
disagree. "Ripeness depends on the fitness of the issues for judicial
decision and the hardship to the parties of withholding court
consideration." Bituminous Coal Operators' Ass'n v. Secy. of Interior, 547
F.2d 240, 244 (4th Cir. 1977) (internal quotation marks omitted). We
believe both requirements are met here.
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order to determine what state laws will be preempted
under HIPAA, we look to the regulations promulgated
pursuant to the non-preemption provision. See Village of
Hoffman Estates v. Flipside Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S.
489, 504, 71 L. Ed. 2d 362, 102 S. Ct. 1186 (1982) (holding
that "administrative regulation will often suffice to clarify
a standard with an otherwise uncertain scope").
According to the regulations promulgated by HHS, a
state law is "more stringent" than HIPAA if it "provides
greater privacy protection for the individual who is the
subject of the individually identifiable health information."
45 C.F.R. § 160.202 (2002). To further clarify this standard,
the regulation explains that a state law is "more stringent"
where it meets one or more of the following criteria: the
state law prohibits or restricts a use or a disclosure of
information where HIPAA would allow it; the state law
provides an individual with "greater rights of access or
amendment" to his medical information than provided
under HIPAA; the state law provides an individual with
a "greater amount of information" about "a use, a
disclosure, rights, and remedies"; the state law provides
for the retention or reporting of more detailed information
or for a longer duration; or the state law "provides greater
privacy protection for the individual who is the subject of
the individually identifiable health information." 45 C.F.R.
§ 160.202. These criteria will doubtless call for covered
entities to make some common sense evaluations and
comparisons between state and federal laws, but this does
not mean they are either vague or constitutionally infirm.
Because the regulations are sufficiently definite to give fair
warning as to what will be considered a "more stringent"
state privacy law, we affirm the district court's decision on
this issue as well.”
6 We summarily dispense with appellants' argument that the
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aS etery soaieien tae
4
III.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district .
court granting the motion to dismiss is hereby affirmed. :
AFFIRMED
Privacy Rule will chill patients' rights of free speech, as we find this
claim to be without merit.
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
COLUMBIA DIVISION
SOUTH CAROLINA MEDICAL ASS’N., ET AL.,
Plaintiffs
VS.
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
AND HUMAN SERVICES, ET AL.,
Defendants
C/A: 01-CV-2965-25
ORDER
Plaintiffs, South Carolina Medical Association,
Physicians Care Network, and individual physicians,
bring a constitutional challenge to several provisions of
Subtitle F, Public Law 104-191, known as the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”).
Plaintiffs filed this action against defendants, United States
Department of Health and Human Services (“DHHS") and
Tommy G. Thompson, as Secretary of DHHS, specifically
alleging that (i) Section 264 of HIPAA is an impermissible
delegation of Congress’ legislative authority, (ii) that the
DHHS privacy regulations exceed the statutory authority
granted by HIPAA, and (iii) that Section 264’s preemption
clause is impermissibly vague and therefore violates the
due process clause under the 5 Amendment to the U. S.
Constitution.
Plaintiffs request in their complaint a declaratory
judgment that the delegation of legislative power under
section 264(c) is unconstitutional; that the DHHS privacy
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g
regulations promulgated pursuant to Section 264(c) are
unconstitutional and in direct contradiction to the intent of
Congress; and, that the preemption provisions of Section
1178(2)(B) of Public Law 104-191 and Section 264(c) (2) are
unconstitutionally vague. Pending before this Court is
defendants’ Motion to Dismiss.
Standard of Review
A motion made pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6)
allows a claim to be dismissed for failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted. The purpose of a
motion under Rule 121(b)(6) is to test the legal sufficiency
of the statement of the claim. Chertkof v. Baltimore, 497
F.Supp. 1252, 1258 (D.Md.1980). For the purposes of
ruling on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must
accept the allegations contained in the complaint as true,
and must liberally construe the complaint as a whole.
lenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421, 89S.Ct. 1843, 1848-
49, 23 L.Ed.2d 404 (1969); Finlator v. Powers, 902 F.2d 1158
(4" Cir.1990). Under such an analysis, a Motion to Dismiss
for failing to state a claim should only be granted if it is
beyond doubt that no relief could be granted, under any
set of facts, when the allegations are construed in a light
most favorable to the pleader. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v.
California, 509 U.S. 764, 811, 113 S.Ct. 2891, 125 L.Ed.2d
612 (1993); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct.
1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974); Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41,
45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957).
BACKGROUND
Congress, in order to “improve portability and
continuity of health insurance coverage in the group and
individual markets,”* enacted HIPAA on August 21, 1996.
Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996). Subtitle F of
Title II of HIPAA is entitled “Administrative
" H.R. Rep. No. 104-496, at 1, 66-67, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.AN.
1865, 1865-66.
Al19
Simplification,” and states that the purpose of the subtitle,
of which Section 264 is a part, is “to improve the Medicare
program ... the medical program . . . and the efficiency
and effectiveness of the health care system, by
encouraging the development of a health information
system through the establishment of standards and
requirements for the electronic transmission of certain
health information.” Public Law 104-191, Sec. 261, 110
Stat. 2021. Recognizing the concomitant need to guarantee
certain protections to patients’ privacy based on the
increase in volume of computerized data and the relative
ease of accessing health data, Congress included section
264 within Subtitle F, Title II of HIPAA (Public Law 104-
_ 191, 110 Stat. 2033-2034) which states: 7
(a) IN GENERAL.-Not later than the date
that is 12 months after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of
Health and Human Services shall submit to
the Committee on Labor and Human
Resources and the Committee on Finance of
the Senate and the Committee on Commerce
and the Committee on Ways and Means of
the House of Representatives detailed
recommendations on standards with respect
to the privacy of individually identifiable
health information.
(b)SUBJECTS FOR RECOM-
MENDATIONS.-The recommendations
under subsection (a) shall address at least
the following:
(1) The rights that an individual who
is a subject of individually
identifiable health information should have.
A20
(2) The procedures that should be
established for the exercise of such rights.
(3) The uses and disclosures of such
information that should be authorized or
required.
(c) REGULATIONS.-
(1) IN GENERAL.-If legislation
governing standards with respect to the
privacy of individually identifiable
health information transmitted in
connection with the transactions
described in section 1173(a) of the Social
Security Act (as added by section 262) is
not enacted by the date that is 36
months after the date of the enactment
of this Act, the Secretary of Health and
Human Services shall promulgate final
regulations containing such standards
not later than the date that is 422 months
_ after the date of the enactment of this
Act. Such regulations shall address at
least the subjects described in
subsection (1).
(2) PREEMPTION.-A regulation
promulgated under paragraph (1) shall
not supercede a contrary provision of
State law, if the provision of State law
imposes requirements, standards, or
implementation specifications that are
more stringent than the requirements,
standards, or implementation
specifications imposed under the
regulation.
(d) CONSULTATION.-In carrying out this
section, the Secretary of Health and
Human Services shall consult with-
(1) the National Committee on Vital and
Health Statistics established under
section 306(k) of the Public Health
Service Act (42 U.S.C. 242k(k); and
(2) the Attorney General.
The following definitions are applicable to
the analysis:
(4) HEALTH INFORMATION.-The term
‘health information’ means any
information, whether oral or recorded
in any form or medium, that-
(A) is created or received by a health
care provider, health plan, public health
authority, employer, life insurer, school
or university or health care
clearinghouse; and
(B) relates to the past, present, or future
physical or mental health or condition
of an individual, the provision of health
care to an individual, or the past,
present, or future payment for the
provision of health care to an
individual.
Public Law 104-191, Sec. 262, 110 Stat. 2022 (Aug110
Stat. 2022 (August 21, 1996).
(6) INDIVIDUALLY IDENTIFIABLE
HEALTH INFORMATION .- The term
‘individually identifiable health
A22
oe nee? Sees. oe oe
information’ means any inforrnation,
including demographic information
collected from an individual, that-
(A) is created or received by a health care
provider, health plan, employer, or health
care clearinghouse; and
(B) relates to the past, present, or future
physical or mental health or condition of an
individual, the provision of health care to an
individual, or the past, present, or future
payment for the provision of health care to
an individual, and-
(i) identifies the individual; or
(ii) with respect to which there is a
reasonable basis to believe that the
information can be used to identify the
individual.
Public Law 104-191, Sec. 262, (Sec. 1171(6)), 110 Stat.
2023 (August 21, 1996).
By August 21, 1999, Congress has not enacted privacy
standards pursuant to HIPPA. Accordingly, on November
3, 1999, DHHS issued a notice of proposed rule-making.
After receiving approximately 52,000 public comments,
and following publication of several proposed rules and
amendments, on February 13, 2001, DHHS promulgated
final regulations (the “Privacy Regulations”). Although
the effective date of the Privacy Regulations was April 14,
2001, covered entities were given two years, or until April
14, 2003, to come into compliance with the Privacy
Regulations. Small health plans were given three years, or
until April 14, 2004, to comply.
ee
A23
ANALYSIS
I. Is there an Improper Delegation of Legislative
Power?
Plaintiffs first argue that the delegation of legislative
power under Section 264(c) is unconstitutional pursuant to
Article 1, § 1, because Congress has failed to articulate an
“intelligible principle” concerning policies or standards
governing DHHS’ drafting of Privacy Regulations.* In
1989, the U. S. Supreme Court explored the “intelligible
principle” and its progeriy in Mistretta v. United States,
wherein it held that, so long as Congress “shall lay down
by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the
person or body authorized to [exercise the delegated
authority] is directed to conform, such legislative action is
not a forbidden delegation of legislative power.” 488 U.S.
361, 372, 109 S.Ct. 647, 655 (1989) (citing |. W. Hampton, Jr.
& Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409, 48 S.Ct. 348, 352
(1928)). The Supreme Court “has deemed it
‘constitutionally sufficient if Congress clearly delineates
the general policy, the public agency which is to apply it,
and the boundaries of [the] delegated authority.” Id. At
372-73, (citing American Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329
U.S. 90, 105, 67 S.Ct. 133, 142 (1946)). In Mistretta, the
Court noted that it was not until 1935 that it struck down
a statute challenged on delegation grounds, and that since
1935, the Court has “upheld, again without deviation,
Congress’ ability to delegate power under broad
standards.” Méistretta, 488 U.S. at 373, (citing Lichter v.
United States, 334 U.S. 742, 785-786, 68 S.Ct. 1294 (1948)
(upholding delegation of authority to determine excessive
profits)); American Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U'S., at
105, 67 S.Ct., at 142 (upholding delegation of authority to ~
? Plaintiffs argument is based on the “nondelegation doctrine” which is
“rooted in the principle of separation of powers . . . .” Mistretta v. United
States, 488 U.S. 361, 371, 109 S.Ct. 647, 654 (1989).
A24
Securities and Exchange Commission to prevent unfair or
inequitable distribution of voting power among security
holders); Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 416, 64S.Ct.
660, 668, 88 L.Ed. 834 (1944) (upholding delegation to Price
Administrator to fix commodity prices that would be fair
and equitable, and would effectuate purposes of
Emergency Price Control Act of 1942); _FPC v. Hope
Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 600, 64 S.Ct. 281, 287, 88
L.Ed. 333 (1944) (upholding delegation to Federal Power
Commission to determine just and reasonable rates);
National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190,
225-226, 63 S.Ct. 997, 1013-1014, 87 L.Ed. 1344 (1943)
(upholding delegation to Federal Communications
Commission to regulate broadcast licensing “as public
interest, convenience, or necessity” require).
Recently, the Supreme Court in Whitman v. American
Trucking revisited the nondelegation doctrine and held
that the Clean Air Act was not unconstitutional because
Congress had articulated an intelligible principle in the
statute which limited the discretion of the agency-the EPA-
charged with drafting the regulations. 531 U.S. 457, 472-73
(2001). The Supreme Court noted that it found an
intelligible principle lacking in only two statues in the
history of its existence:
. . .[O]ne [statute] provided literally no
guidance for the exercise of discretion, and
the other . .. conferred authority to regulate
the entire economy on the basis of no more
precise standard than stimulating the
economy by assuring “fair competition.” . .
. In shot, [the Supreme Court has] ‘almost
never felt qualified to second-guess
Congress regarding the permissible degree
of policy judgment that can be left to those
A25
executing or applying the law.’
Whitman, 531 U.S. at 474-75, (citing Panama Refining
Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 55 S.Ct. 241 (1935), A.L.A.
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 55
S.Ct. 837 (1935)); Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361,
416, 109 S.Ct. 647 (1989). Although the “intelligible
principle” was found lacking in only two statues by the
Supreme Court since the early 1930s, this Court is required
to carefully consider its application to this case.
To determine whether the statute is an unconstitutional
delegation of legislative power to the Executive branch,
the Court must decide whether Congress articulated an
intelligible principle. After reviewing the applicable
statutory language and case law, this Court concludes that
Congress has sufficiently articulated an intelligible
principle to guide, and limit the discretion of, the
Department of Health and Human Services when it
drafted the Privacy Regulations.
The starting point for the analysis should be the
language of the statute itself. First, Congress directed
DHHS to implement regulations containing standards
regarding the privacy of individually identifiable health
information, addressing at least the following subjects: “(1)
[t]he rights that an individual who is a subject of
individually identifiable health information should have,”
(2) “[t]he procedures that should be established for the
exercise of such rights;” and (3) “[t]he uses and disclosures
of such information that should be authorized or
required.” Section 264(b). However, this statutory
verbiage alone does not comprise, not does it reveal, the _
entire “intelligible principle” Congress conveyed to DHHS
when it granted DHHS the authority to draft the Privacy
Regulations. When gleaning an intelligible principle from
a statute, the law permits the Courts to look outside the
A26
verbiage of Section 264. “It is a familiar rule that the
constitutionality of a part of an act or statute is not to be
resolved in isolation from other parts of the statute and
from the purposes of the statute as a whole, particularly if
the section in question refers to or embraces other sections
of the Act... .” United Hospital Center, Inc. v.
Richardson, 757 F.2d 1445, 1451 (4™ Cir. 1985).
To discern the intelligible principle set forth by
Congress, the statutory language in Section 264 can be
read together with the other statutory provisions in
Subtitle F, such as Section 261, which sets forth the
purpose of Subtitle F:
It is the purpose of the subtitle [of which
Section 264 is a part] to improve the
Medicare program .. . the Medicaid
program .. .and the efficiency and
effectiveness of the health care system, by
encouraging the development of a health
information system through the
establishment of standards and
requirements for the electronic transmission
of certain health information.
Public Law 104-191, Sec. 261, 110 Stat. 2021, Section 261,
read together with Section 264, causes the undersigned to
conclude that Congress provided DHHS with an
intelligible principle to guide the drafting of privacy
regulations. Congress directed DHHS to draft Privacy
Regulations that would not harm federal medical
entitlement programs or the efficiency and effectiveness of
the health care system. See Section 261. Congress also
directed DHHS to avoid drafting privacy regulations that
would discourage the development of a_ health
information system through the establishment of
A27
standards and requirements for the electronic transmission
of certain health information. See id. Furthermore, DHHS
could not draft privacy regulations that would affect the
rights of a person who is the subject of individually
identifiable health information in such a manner that
would impede or hinder the electronic transmission of
certain health information. See id. The Section 264(c)
delegation is not overladen with detailed guidance.
However, these statutory provisions provide a sufficient
limitation on DHHS’ discretion. Therefore, Section 264(c)
meets the “constitutionally sufficient” standard allowing
for the delegation of authority to DHHS to draft the
Privacy Regulations.
Additionally, the applicability of the Privacy
Regulations are further limited to health plans, health care
clearinghouses, health care providers, and applicable
business associates, who transmit any health information
in electronic form in connection with certain transactions.
Pub. L. No. 104-191, Sec. 262, 110 Stat. at 2023 (Aug. 21,
1996); 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-1. Thus, DHHS could not
regulate healthcare communications, whether confidential
or not, between people who have no connection to health
plans, health care clearinghouses, health care providers, or
to covered entities who do not transmit health information
in electronic form in connection with certain transactions.
Congress created a framework within which DHHS’
could establish privacy regulations and in doing so
provided an intelligible principle to guide the drafting of
such regulations. Furthermore, Congress defined a
general policy, the public agency which was to apply it,
and the boundaries of the agency’s delegated authority. _
Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 372-73 (citing American Power &
Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 105, 67 S.Ct. 133, 142 (1946)).
Pursuant to the foregoing analysis, because this Court
finds that, accepting the allegations in the complaint are
A28-
true, this claim is subject to dismissal because it cannot
survive under any set of facts set forth by the plaintiffs.
Hartford Fire Ins., 509 U.S. at 811.
II. Did DHHS Exceed the Scope of Authority
Granted by Statute?
Plaintiffs next argue that DHHS’ decision to
regulate paper records exceeds the scope of the authority
granted by HIPAA. The Court carefully considers this
important argument. The undersigned notes the plaintiffs
make a logical argument in regard to this issue. However,
the undersigned concludes this argument is not
sufficiently persuasive for two reasons: (1) the regulation
is reasonably related to the purposes set forth in the
enabling legislation; and, (2) the term “health
information,” as defined in HIPAA, can reasonably be
read to conclude Congress intended to cover non-
electronic records.
Regulations promulgated by an administrative
agency are presumptively valid and will be sustained “so
long as [they are] ‘reasonably related to the purposes of
the enabling legislation.’” Harman Mining Co. v. United
States Dept. of Labor, 826 F.2d 1388, 1390_(4" Cir. 1987)
(quoting Mourning v. Family Publication Servs., Inc., 411
U.S. 356, 369, 93 S.Ct. 1652, 1660 (1973)). “Thus, deference
is to be accorded to the interpretation given to a statute by
the agency charged with its administration.” Id. (citing
Udall v. Tallman, 380 US. 1, 16, 85 S.Ct. 792 (1965));
United Hospital Center, Inc. v. Richardson, 757 F.2d 1445,
1451 (4" Cir. 1985). The enabling legislation states that the
purpose of “Subtitle F-Administrative Simplification’ is to
improve government sponsored medical benefits
programs and the efficiency and effectiveness of the entire
health care system through the encouragement of an
electronic health information system. 110 State. 2021;
Public Law 104-191, Section 261. DHHS has drafted
A29
Privacy Regulations in keeping with Congress’ purpose.
DHHS drafted regulations that cover electronic
records and extended that coverage to corresponding
paper records. It did so apparently to prevent a potential
loophole which may allow disclosure of health
information contained in paper records. Without
extending coverage to paper records, paper records could
be maintained and shared with no electronic transmission
of those records to avoid the restrictions imposed by the
regulation. DHHS argues that the regulation of paper
records under HIPAA, in addition to electronic records, is
reasonably related to the enabling legislation. The
undersigned finds this argument sufficiently persuasive.
After a careful review of the enabling legislation, the
statutory language employed in HIPAA can also be
reasonably interpreted to indicate that Congress intended
for the regulations to extend privacy protection to paper
records. A court must examine the statutory language to
give effect to the legislative will that is expressed in the
language. United States v. Murphy, 35 F.3d 143, 145 (4
Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1135, 115 S.Ct. 954 (1995).
A court’s inquiry must cease if the “ ‘statutory language is
unambiguous and the statutory scheme is coherent and
consistent.’ ” Murphy, 35 F.3d at 145 (quoting United
States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 240-41, 109
S.Ct. 1026, 1030 (1989)). The duty of interpretation does
not arise if the statutory language is plain and admits of no
more than one meaning. Id. (quoting Caminetti v. United
States, 242 U.S. 470, 485, 37 S.Ct. 192, 194 (1917)). -
Plaintiffs argue that since the transactions described in
section 1173(a) of the Social Security Act, which are -
referenced in Section 264 (c)(1), involve only the electronic
exchange of health information, then the Privacy
Regulations should only cover electronic health
information. While the argument of the plaintiffs warrants
A30
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careful consideration and analysis, the undersigned
reaches a conclusion unfavorable to plaintiffs’ position.
The statutory language at issue is reasonably plain and
can be read to cover paper records. In Section 262, “health
information” is defined as “any information, whether oral
or recorded in any form or medium, that-
(A) is created or received by a health care
provider, health plan, public health
authority, employer, life insurer, school or
university, or health care clearinghouse; and
(B) relates to the past, present, or future
physical or mental health or condition of an
individual, the provision of health care to an
individual, or the past, present, or future
payment for the provision of health care to
an individual.
Public Law 104-191; 110 Stat. 2022 (emphasis added).
Section 264 is entitled, “Recommendations with Respect to
Privacy of Certain Health Information.” Public Law 104-191;
110 Stat. 2033 (emphasis added). In Section 264(b)(1),
Congess states that, “[t]he recommendations under
subsection (a) shall address . . . (1) [t]he rights that an
individual who is a subject of individually identifiable
health information should have.” See id. (emphasis added).
Under Section 264(c), Congress states that if legislation
governing standards with respect to the privacy of health
information transmitted in connection with certain
transactions is not enacted by a certain date, the Secretary
is charged with promulgating final regulations, which
" were to address at least the subjects described in Section
264(b), containing such standards.
The statutory definition of “health information” and
A31
reference to the term “health information” in the privacy
provision of the statute indicates that Congress likely
sought to delegate authority to DHHS to regulate more
than electronic information. Congress chose to include the
last sentence in Section 264(c)(1), which incorporates by
reference Section 264(b). “When ‘interpreting a statute, the
court will not look merely to a particular clause in which
general words may be used, but will take in connection
with it the whole statute . . . and the objects and policy of
the law, as indicated by its various provisions, and give to
it such a construction as will carry into execution the will
of the Legislature’ ....” United Hospital Center, 757 F.2d
at 1451. This Court notes the references to other statutory
sections and would have to ignore those references to
reach the conclusion sought by the plaintiffs.
Congress could have simply limited the definition of
“health information” to electronic information, but it chose
to include the phrase “any information, whether oral or
recorded in any form or medium.” 110 Stat. 2022; Public
Law 104-191. Congress, however, apparently recognized
that limiting the definition of the term “health
information” would have narrowed the privacy
regulations to such an extent as to render them ineffective.
A finding that Congress chose to limit the regulation to
electronic information would appear to deny the intent
sought by Congress. Accordingly, this claim does not
survive dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).
III. Is Section 264’s Preemption Clause
Impermissibly Vague and Does It Violate
the Due Process Clause Under the 5™ -
Amendment to the U. S. Constitution?
The undersigned next analyzes vagueness and due
process claims raised by the plaintiffs. HIPAA’s
A32
. ea hon ae
LPR Co SYA NE EEN Ri a BS
FORE Rs peow Cet abbegitr age why on Shel A
preemption provision, Section 264(c)(2), states:
A regulation promulgated under paragraph
(1) shall not supersede a contrary provision
of State law, if the provision of State law
imposes requirements, standards, or
implementation specifications that are more
stringent than the requirements, standards,
or implementation specifications imposed
under the regulation.
Plaintiffs argue that “Section 264(c)(2)’s preemption
clause is so vague that a person of ordinary intelligence
will not know whether the regulations will apply to his or
her communications or not.” See Reply to Defendant's
Motion to Dismiss at 3C. Plaintiffs state in their complaint
that the term “more stringent” is unclearly defined in
Section 264(c)(2). See Complaint at J 50. Plaintiffs
predicate their argument that the term “more stringent” is
vague and that “it will be impossible to know for certain
until a court rules authoritatively whether the state law or
HHS Regulation is ‘more stringent.’ ” See id. at 32.
Plaintiffs also argue in their memorandum of law that this
Court should apply a strict standard of review because the
Regulations grant to DHHS unfettered access to every
American’s private health information without a warrant
or probable cause.
The Supreme Court has held in a long line of cases that
“it is a basic principle of due process that an enactment is
void for vagueness if its prohibitions are not clearly
defined.” Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 92
S.Ct. 2294 (1972). The Supreme Court in Grayned noted
concerns raised by vagueness and explained:
Vague laws offend several important values.
A33
First, because we assume that man is free to
steer between lawful and unlawful conduct,
we insist that laws give the person of
ordinary intelligence a reasonable
opportunity to know what is prohibited, so
that he may act accordingly. Vague laws
may trap the innocent by not providing fair
warning. Second, if arbitrary and
discriminatory enforeement is to be
prevented, laws must provide explicit
standards for those who apply them....
Third, but related, where a vague statute
-‘abuts upon sensitive areas of basic First
Amendment freedoms, it ‘operates to
inhibit the exercise of (those) freedoms.’
498 U.S. at 108-109.
This Court begins its vagueness analysis by
determining whether the preemption provision “ ‘abuts’
upon sensitive areas of basic First Amendment freedoms,”
as Grayned instructs. See id. The undersigned is unable to
conclude that sensitive areas of First Amendment
freedoms are sufficiently affected by the preemption
statute. The Court, after a review of the allegations in the
complaint, finds no basis to conclude that the regulations
will stifle or infringe upon rights guaranteed by the U. S.
Constitution. As discussed below, the provisions at issue
cannot reasonably be interpreted to conclude they will
inappropriately regulate free speech in regards to health
information.
The purpose of the Privacy Regulations promulgated
by DHHS is to regulate the maintenance and disclosure of
patients’ private health information contained in medical
records and related documents, such as payment invoices
A34
Sidiadcopa teas data maatih Deine er aa ia ‘iitdiaeteaiahaeel
and explanation of benefits. The attempt to characterize
this case as one relating to free speech under the First
Amendment is not sufficiently persuasive. Private health
information is highly regulated and protected by both
state and federal statutory law and, in many instances,
state common law. It is not disputed that state laws
currently provide some form of governmental access to
patient records, mandatory reporting requirements for
public health purposes, and limitations on disclosure of
health information. The Privacy Regulations were
promulgated to provide uniform protection from
wrongful disclosure of an individual's health information
when it is in the possession of a covered entity. The
undersigned concludes these regulations do not directly
impede or impair a patient's right to explain his or her
health problems to a physician, nor do they unduly
impede the disclosure of that information by a health care
professional to those who should be aware of such
information.
In light of the First Amendment analysis, to
successfully challenge a law as unduly vague on its face,
in violation of due process, “the complainant must
demonstrate that a law is impermissibly vague in all of its
applications.” Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside
Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U. S. 489, 498, 102 S.Ct. 1186
(1982). The plaintiffs in this case are unable to make such
a showing.
A court is not to mechanically apply the Grayned
standards set forth above. See id. The enactment itself will
dictate the degree of vagueness and the relative
importance of fair notice and fair enforcement that is
tolerated by the Constitution. See id. The undersigned
concludes it is appropriate to apply a less strict vagueness
test to regulations affecting, as they do here, business
interests. Because businesses, such as hospitals, physician
A35
offices, and health plans are in a position to plan and
prepare for compliance carefully through consultation of
relevant regulations well in advance of the regulation’s
enactment, the less strict vagueness standard would apply.
See Village of Hoffman Estates. 455 U.S. at 498. Plaintiffs’
facial challenge does not prevail because the preemption
provision of the HIPAA statute and its correlating
regulations are sufficiently clear as applied to health care
providers and to the plaintiffs in this action.
This Court should additionally determine whether |
health care providers have a reasonable opportunity to
know what conduct is prohibited under the HIPAA
Privacy Regulations; that is, do the plaintiffs have fair
warning of the law? The undersigned cannot lightly
dismiss these concerns raised by the plaintiffs. However,
the undersigned finds that there are sufficient reasons why
the plaintiffs would have a reasonable opportunity to
know what is prohibited with respect to the preemption
provision in the HIPAA statute: (1) the plain and ordinary
meaning of the term “more stringent” is not, while not
precisely clear and easily applied in all situations, overly
vague; (2) DHHS expressly defines the term “more
stringent” in the privacy regulations and specifically sets
forth criteria concerning the type of state privacy law that
might preempt a federal privacy law; (3) HIPAA provides
that covered entities, such as health care providers,
participate in HIPAA training and provide HIPAA
training to their employees; (4) HIPAA provides that each
covered entity designate a privacy official; and (5)
individuals can only be prosecuted if they “knowingly”
violate the privacy regulations. Applying these reasons or _
factors sufficiently demonstrates there is the requisite “ fair
warning” as to when a federal law will not preempt a
“more stringent” state law.
In summary, the undersigned concludes that health
A36
See ae RN hie Sak Pane gn ORI RAHI! SEGRE WUC EY BEA, 62
care providers can, by virtue of the plain meaning of the
term “more stringent,” and the reasons set forth, when
presented with a situation where a state law is contrary to
a federal law, determine and follow the more stringent, or
more strict, of the two laws. :
Next, plaintiffs allege in their complaint (4 90) that the
term “more stringent” is unclearly defined, thereby
leaving a person of ordinary intelligence uniformed by the
statute as to where a HIPAA Privacy Regulation or state
privacy law would govern his or her actions. Again, this
concern is one that warrants careful analysis. As noted,
the DHHS Privacy Regulations sufficiently define the term
“more stringent,” and also provide specific criteria as to
when certain state laws should preempt federal laws:
More stringent means, in the context of a
comparison of a provision of State law and
a standard, requirement, or implementation
specification adopted under Subpart E of
this subchapter (the subchapter containing
the privacy regulations), a State law that
meets one or more of the following [six]
criteria.
45 C.F.R. § 160.202 (2001). The six criteria, set forth in
detail in the Privacy Regulations, eliminate undue
confusion about the type of state law that federal law
should not preempt, and when the state law should yield
to the federal law. For example, the second criteria states:
(2) With respect to the rights of an individual
who is the subject of the individually identifiable
health information of access to or amendment of
individually identifiable health information, [a state
law that] permits greater rights of access or
A37
yo
amendment, as applicable; ....
See id. Thus, any state law that permits a patient
greater access to, or amendment of, their own medical
records should be followed, if it is contrary to a HIPAA
Privacy Regulation concerning access and amendment to
records. The Court concludes that those who routinely
handle health information, and who must undertake
privacy regulation training, should be able to understand
and apply the language set forth in criteria (2), and would
not need an interpretation of a court of law for guidance.
The other five criteria should be understood and applied
by health care professionals such as the plaintiffs. Even if
there were no training rule, those who have access to
individually identifiable health information can consult
the Privacy Regulations to clarify the application of the
regulations, as is done with state regulations. See Village
of Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 498.
The Privacy Regulations also provide for the
designation of a privacy official to assist in the
understanding of differences between state and federal
privacy regulations. The Privacy Regulations require that
every covered entity designate a privacy official “who is
responsible for the development and implementation of
the policies and procedures of the entity.” 45 C.F.R. §
164.530(a)(1)(i). Therefore, if a person is unable to
determine which privacy law to follow, state or federal, he
or she can contact the privacy officer, who should be
knowledgeable about such distinctions. While not a
complete solution to making distinctions between state
and federal law, consultation with the privacy official can -
be useful and a reasonable conclusion can be reached.
Again, the regulations set forth a framework that
militates against a finding of vagueness. Hence, the
undersigned concludes that the regulations provide
A38
sufficient notice and guidance to health care providers to
overcome the vagueness concerns raised in this case.
In regards to applying the “more stringent” standard,
there is some question as to whether or not a criminal
prosecution would lie for making the wrong decision
about following federal or state privacy laws. Section 1177
provides for criminal prosecution if a person “knowingly
. obtains . . .or . . . discloses identifiable health
information to another person... .” The focus of the
criminal prosecution is the unlawful obtaining or
disclosing health information. It is not clear to the
undersigned that a person could be prosecuted for making
the wrong judgment call as to whether state law is “more
stringent” than federal law. However, the defendants in
footnote 21 of their Memorandum in Support of their
Motion to Dismiss refer to the risk of prosecution if
plaintiffs are “unable to discern which state laws are more
stringent.” Apparently, the defendants acknowledge the
possibility of prosecution if a person cannot “discern”
correctly. The undersigned finds this somewhat troubling.
Again, there remains uncertainty by the undersigned
whether or not a prosecution would lie for a wrong
judgment call when trying to discern if a state or federal
law is more stringent. At this time, there is no prosecution
before the Court for a failure to properly “discern” which
law is “more stringent.” Should there be a criminal
prosecution for making the wrong judgment, a court
would then have to determine whether Section 1177
would reach such conduct. It would be premature to rule
on such an issue until an actual case arises so the relevant
facts and law can be fully analyzed at that time.
Moreover, if education, personal inquiry, and resort to
a privacy officer all fail to provide an adequate
determination concerning which law to follow, state or
federal, to an individual who is employed by a covered
A39
entity, there is also protection from a criminal sanction by
virtue of the scienter requirement. A scienter requirement
“may mitigate a law’s vagueness, especially with respect
to the adequacy of notice to the complainant that his
conduct is proscribed.” Village of Hoffman Estates, 455
U.S. at 499. The Privacy Regulations state that to warrant
punishement, a person who wrongfully discloses
individually identifiable health information must do so
“knowingly.” Public Law 104-191, Sec. 262, (Sec.
1177(a)(Aug. 21, 1996)); 42 U.S.C. 1320d-6. Accidental
disclosures due to a lack of knowledge of the preemption
provision will not result in criminal penalties for plaintiffs.
The next factor in the Grayned analysis is whether the
preemption provision and its clarifying regulations
provide explicit standards to prevent a court from
applying the law in an arbitrary and discriminatory
manner resulting in conflicting decisions. Courts need
only refer to the plain and ordinary meaning of the term
“more stringent” and the detailed definition of “more
stringent” when applying the law in situations where
there may be a question of whether federal law has
preempted state law. The definition of “more stringent”
is supported by six clarifying criteria. These criteria
minimize the risk of misapplication of the standards and
the risk of conflicting judicial opinions. This Court
concludes that this law can be applied in a manner that is
not sufficiently arbitrary or discriminatory. Should
conflicting opinions in fact occur, Congress can act to
correct any confusion or ambiguity in the language of the
regulations.
IV. Conclusion
Based on the analysis set forth above, this Court hereby
grants the Motion to Dismiss on all claims.
A40
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Terry L. Wooten
United States District Court Judge
August 14, 2002
Florence, South Carolina
A4l
CONSTITUTIONAL, STATUTORY
AND REGULATORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED
U.S. Constitution Art. 1, section 1
Sec. 1. Legislative powers vested in Congress.
All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a
Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate
and House of Representatives.
RKKKKRKKKEKEKEKKEEEE
Sections 261, 262, and 264 of the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996)
Subtitle F--Administrative Simplification
SEC. 261. PURPOSE.
It is the purpose of this subtitle to improve the Medicare
program under title XVIII of the Social Security Act, the
medicaid program under title XIX of such Act, and the
efficiency and effectiveness of the health care system, by
encouraging the development of a health information
system through the establishment of standards and
requirements for the electronic transmission of certain -
health information.
A42
SEC. 262. ADMINISTRATIVE SIMPLIFICATION.
(a) IN GENERAL.--Title XI (42 U.S.C. 1301 et seq.) is
amended by adding at the end the following:
PART C--ADMINISTRATIVE SIMPLIFICATION
DEFINITIONS
SEC. 1171. For purposes of this part:
(1) CODE SET.--The term 'code set' means any set of codes
used for encoding data elements, such as tables of terms, medical
concepts, medical diagnostic codes, or medical procedure codes.
(2) HEALTH CARE CLEARINGHOUSE.--The term
‘health care clearinghouse' means a public or private entity that
processes or facilitates the processing of nonstandard data
elements of health information into standard data elements.
(3) HEALTH CARE PROVIDER.-—The term ‘health care
provider' includes a provider of services (as defined in section
1861(u)), a provider of medical or other health services (as
defined in section 1861(s)), and any other person furnishing
health care services or supplies.
(4) HEALTH INFORMATION.--The term ‘health
information' means any information, whether oral or recorded
in any form or medium, that-
(A) is created or received by a health care provider, health
plan, public health authority, employer, life insurer, school
or university, or health care clearinghouse; and
(B) relates to the past, present, or future physical or mental
health or condition of an individual, the provision of health
care to an individual, or the past, present, or future
payment for the provision of health care to an individual.
(5) HEALTH PLAN.--The term ‘health plan' means an
individual or group plan that provides, or pays the cost of,
medical care (as such term is defined in section 2791 of the
A43
Public Health Service Act). Such term includes the following,
and any combination thereof:
(A) A group health plan (as defined in section 2791 (a) of the
Public Health Service Act), but only if the plan-
(i) has 50 or more participants (as defined in section 3(7)
of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974); or
(ii) is administered by an entity other than the employer
who established and maintains the plan.
(B) A health insurance issuer (as defined in section 2791(b)
of the Public Health Service Act).
(C) A health maintenance organization (as defined in
section 2791(b) of the Public Health Service Act).
(D) Part A or part B of the Medicare program under title X VIII.
(E) The medicaid program under title XIX.
(F) A Medicare supplemental policy (as defined in section
1882(g)(1)).
(G) A long-term care policy, including a nursing home
fixed indemnity policy (unless the Secretary determines that
such a policy does not provide sufficiently comprehensive
coverage of a benefit so that the policy should be treated as
a health plan).
(H) An employee welfare benefit plan or any other
arrangement which is established or maintained for the
purpose of offering or providing health benefits to the
employees of 2 or more employers.
(I) The health care program for active military personnel
under title 10, United States Code.
(J) The veterans health care program under chapter 17 of
title 38, United States Code.
(K) The Civilian Health and Medical Program of the
Uniformed Services (CHAMPUS), as defined in section
1072(4) of title 10, United States Code.
(L) The Indian health service program under the Indian
Health Care Improvement Act (25 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.).
A44
(M) The Federal Employees Health Benefit Plan under
chapter 89 of title 5, United States Code.
(6) INDIVIDUALLY IDENTIFIABLE HEALTH
INFORMATION.--The term ‘individually identifiable health
information' means any information, including demographic
information collected from an individual, that--
(A) is created or received by a health care provider, health
plan, employer, or health care clearinghouse; and
(B) relates to the past, present, or future physical or mental
health or condition of an individual, the provision of health
care to an individual, or the past, present, or future
payment for the provision of health care to an individual,
and--
(i) identifies the individual; or
(ti) with respect to which there is a reasonable basis to
believe that the information can be used to identify the
individual.
(7) STANDARD.--The term 'standard', when used with
reference toa data element of health information or a transaction
referred to in section 1173(a)(1), means any such data element
or transaction that meets each of the standards and
implementation specifications adopted or established by the
Secretary with respect to the data element or transaction under
sections 1172 through 1174.
(8) STANDARD SETTING ORGANIZATION.--The term
‘standard setting organization' means a standard setting
organization accredited by the American National Standards
Institute, including the National Council for Prescription Drug
Programs, that develops standards for information transactions,
data elements, or any other standard that is necessary to, or will
facilitate, the implementation of this part.
A45
GENERAL REQUIREMENTS FOR ADOPTION OF
STANDARDS
SEC. Fi7Z.
(a) APPLICABILITY.--Any standard adopted under this
part shall apply, in whole or in part, to the following
persons:
(1) A health plan.
(2) A health care clearinghouse.
(3) A health care provider who transmits any health
information in electronic form in connection with a
transaction referred to in section 1173(a)(1).
(b) REDUCTION OF COSTS.--Any standard adopted
under this part shall be consistent with the objective of
reducing the administrative costs of providing and paying
for health care.
(c) ROLE OF STANDARD SETTING
ORGANIZATIONS.--
(1) IN GENERAL.--Except as provided in paragraph
(2), any standard adopted under this part shall be a
standard that has been developed, adopted, or modified
by a standard setting organization.
(2) SPECIAL RULES.--
(A) DIFFERENT STANDARDS.--The Secretary may
adopt a standard that is different from any standard
developed, adopted, or modified by a standard setting
organization, if-
(i) the different standard will substantially reduce
administrative costs to health care providers and health
plans compared to the alternatives; and
(1i) the standard is promulgated in accordance with the
rulemaking procedures of subchapter III of chapter 5 of
title 5, United States Code.
A46
(B) NO STANDARD BY STANDARD SETTING
ORGANIZATION .--If no standard setting organization
has developed, adopted, or modified any standard relating
to a standard that the Secretary is authorized or required
to adopt under this part--
(1) paragraph (1) shall not apply; and
(11) subsection (f) shall apply.
(3) CONSULTATION REQUIREMENT.--
(A) IN GENERAL.--A standard may not be adopted
under this part unless--
(1) in the case of a standard that has been developed,
adopted, or modified by a standard setting
organization, the organization consulted with each of
the organizations described in subparagraph (B) in
the course of such development, adoption, or
modification; and
(ii) in the case of any other standard, the Secretary, in
complying with the requirements of subsection (f),
consulted with each of the organizations described in
subparagraph (B) before adopting the standard.
(B) ORGANIZATIONS DESCRIBED.--The
organizations referred to in subparagraph (A) are the
following:
(t) The National Uniform Billing Committee.
(it) The National Uniform Claim Committee.
(iii) The Workgroup for Electronic Data Interchange.
(tv) The American Dental Association.
(4) IMPLEMENTATION — SPECIFICATIONS.--The
Secretary shall establish specifications for implementing
each of the standards adopted under this part.
(e) PROTECTION OF TRADE SECRETS.--Except as
otherwise required by law, a standard adopted under this
part shall not require disclosure of trade secrets or
A47
confidential commercial information by a person required to
comply with this part.
(f) ASSISTANCE TO THE SECRETARY.--In complying
with the requirements of this part, the Secretary shall rely
on the recommendations of the National Committee on Vital
and Health Statistics established under section 306(k) of the
Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. 242k(k)), and shall
consult with appropriate Federal and State agencies and
private organizations. The Secretary shall publish in the
Federal Register any recommendation of the National
Committee on Vital and Health Statistics regarding the
adoption of a standard under this part.
(g) APPLICATION TO MODIFICATIONS OF
STANDARDS.--This section shall apply to a modification
to a standard (including an addition to a standard) adopted
under section 1174(b) in the same manner as it applies to
an initial standard adopted under section 1174(a).
STANDARDS FORINFORMATION TRANSACTIONS
AND DATA ELEMENTS
SEC. 1173.
(a) STANDARDS TO ENABLE ELECTRONIC
EXCHANGE.--
(1) IN GENERAL.--The Secretary shall adopt standards
for transactions, and data elements for such transactions,
to enable health information to be exchanged
electronically, that are appropriate for—
(A) the financial and administrative transactions
described in paragraph (2); and
(B) other financial and administrative transactions -
determined appropriate by the Secretary, consistent
with the goals of improving the operation of the health
care system and reducing administrative costs.
A48
(2) TRANSACTIONS.--The transactions referred to in
paragraph (1)(A) are transactions with respect to the
following:
(A) Health claims or equivalent encounter information.
(B) Health claims attachments.
(C) Enrollment and disenrollment in a health plan.
(D) Eligibility for a health plan.
(E) Health care payment and remittance advice.
(F) Health plan premium payments.
(G) First report of injury.
(H) Health claim status.
(I) Referral certification and authorization.
(3) ACCOMMODATION OF_ SPECIFIC
PROVIDERS.--The standards adopted by the Secretary
under paragraph (1) shall accommodate the needs of
different types of health care providers.
(b) UNIQUE HEALTH IDENTIFIERS.--
(1) INGENERAL.--The Secretary shall adopt standards
providing for a standard unique health identifier for each
individual, employer, health plan, and health care
provider for use in the health care system. In carrying out
the preceding sentence for each health plan and health
care provider, the Secretary shall take into account
multiple uses for identifiers and multiple locations and
specialty classifications for health care providers.
(2) USE OF IDENTIFIERS.--The standards adopted
under paragraph (1) shall specify the purposes for which
a unique health identifier may be used.
(c) CODE SETS.—
(1) INGENERAL.--The Secretary shall adopt standards
that—
(A) select code sets for appropriate data elements for the
transactions referred to in subsection (a)(1) from
A49
among the code sets that have been developed by private
and public entities; or
(B) establish code sets for such data elements if no code
sets for the data elements have been developed.
(2) DISTRIBUTION.--The Secretary shall establish
efficient and low-cost procedures for distribution
(including electronic distribution) of code sets and
modifications made to such code sets under section
1174(b).
(qd) SECURITY STANDARDS FOR’ HEALTH
INFORMATION.--
(1) SECURITY STANDARDS.--The Secretary shall
adopt security standards that-
(A) take into account--
(i) the technical capabilities of record systems used to
maintain health information;
(1i) the costs of security raeasures;
(iii) the need for training persons who have access to
health information;
(iv) the value of audit trails in computerized record
systems; and
(v) the needs and capabilities of small health care
providers and rural health care providers (as such
providers are defined by the Secretary); and
(B) ensure that a health care clearinghouse, if it is part
of a larger organization, has policies and security
procedures which isolate the activities of the health care
clearinghouse with respect to processing information in
a manner that prevents unauthorized access to such
information by such larger organization.
(2) SAFEGUARDS.--Each person described in section
1172(a) who maintains or transmits health information
shall maintain reasonable and appropriate administrative,
A50
technical, and physical safeguards-~
(A) toensure the integrity and confidentiality of the information;
(B) to protect against any reasonably anticipated-
(i) threats or hazards to the security or integrity of the
information; and
(ti) unauthorized uses or disclosures of the
information; and
(C) otherwise to ensure compliance with this part by
the officers and employees of such person.
(e) ELECTRONIC SIGNATURE.--
(1) STANDARDS.--The Secretary, in coordination with
the Secretary of Commerce, shall adopt standards
specifying procedures for the electronic transmission and
authentication of signatures with respect to the
transactions referred to in subsection (a)(1).
(2) EFFECT OF COMPLIANCE.--Compliance with the
standards adopted under paragraph (1) shall be deemed to
satisfy Federal and State statutory requirements for
written signatures with respect to the transactions
referred to in subsection (a)(1).
(f) TRANSFER OF INFORMATION AMONG HEALTH
PLANS.--The Secretary shall adopt standards for
transferring among health plans appropriate standard data
elements needed for the coordination of benefits, the
sequential processing of claims, and other data elements for
individuals who have more than one health ptanx——
TIMETABLES FOR ADOPTION OF STANDARDS
SEC. 1174.
(a) INITIAL STANDARDS.--The Secretary shall carry out
section 1173 not later than 18 months after the date of the
enactment of the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act of 1996, except that standards relating
A51
to claims attachments shall be adopted not later than 30
months after such date.
(b) ADDITIONS AND MODIFICATIONS TO
STANDARDS.-
(1) INGENERAL.--Except as provided in paragraph (2),
the Secretary shall review the standards adopted under
section 1173, and shall adopt modifications to the
standards (including additions to the standards), as
determined appropriate, but not more frequently than
once every 12 months. Any addition or modification to a
standard shall be completed in a manner which minimizes
the disruption and cost of compliance.
(2) SPECIAL RULES.-
(A) FIRST 12-MONTH PERIOD.--Except with
respect to additions and modifications to code sets
under subparagraph (B), the Secretary may not adopt
any modification to a standard adopted under this part
during the 12- month period begnning on the date the
standard is initially adopter unless the Secretary
determines that the modificc tion is necessary in order
to permit compliance with the standard.
(B) ADDITIONS AND MODIFICATIONS TO
CODE SETS.—
(t} IN GENERAL.--The Secretary shall ensure that
procedures exist for the routine maintenance, testing,
enhancement, and expansion of code sets.
(ti) ADDITIONAL RULES.--If a code set is modified
under this subsection, the modified code set shall
include instructions on how data elements of health
information that were encoded prior to the_
modification may be converted or translated so as to
preserve the informational value of the data elements
that existed before the modification. Any modification
to a code set under this subsection shall be
A52
implemented in a manner that minimizes the
disruption and cost of complying with such
modification.
REQUIREMENTS
SEC. 1175.
(a) CONDUCT OF TRANSACTIONS BY PLANS.--
(1) IN GENERAL.--If a person desires to conduct a
transaction referred to in section 1173(a)(1) witha health
plan as a standard transaction--
(A) the health plan may not refuse to conduct such
transaction as a standard transaction;
(B) the insurance plan may not delay such transaction,
or otherwise adversely affect, or attempt to adversely
affect, the person or the transaction on the ground that
the transaction is a standard transaction; and
(C) the information transmitted and received in
connection with the transaction shall be in the form of
standard data elements of health information.
(2) SATISFACTION OF REQUIREMENTS.--A health
plan may satisfy the requirements under paragraph (1)
by—
(A) directly transmitting and receiving standard data
elements of health information; or
(B) submitting nonstandard data elements to a health
care clearinghouse for processing into standard data
elements and transmission by the health care
clearinghouse, and receiving standard data elements
through the health care clearinghouse.
(3) TIMETABLE FOR COMPLIANCE.--Paragraph (1)
shall not be construed to require a health plan to comply
with any standard, implementation specification, or
modification to a standard or specification adopted or
A53
established by the Secretary under sections 1172 through
1174 at any time prior to the date on which the plan ts
required to comply with the standard or specification
under subsection (b).
(b) COMPLIANCE WITH STANDARDS.--
(1) INITIAL COMPLIANCE.--
(A) INGENERAL.--Not later than 24 months after the
date on which an initial standard or implementation
specification is adopted or established under sections
1172 and 1173, each person to whom the standard or
implementation specification applies shall comply with
the standard or specification.
(B) SPECIAL RULE FOR SMALL HEALTH
PLANS.--In the case of a small health plan, paragraph
(1) shall be applied by substituting '36 months' for .24
months'. For purposes of this subsection, the Secretary
shall determine the plans that qualify as small health
plans.
(2) COMPLIANCE WITH MODIFIED STANDARDS.-
-If the Secretary adopts a modification to a standard or
implementation specification under this part, each person
to whom the standard or implementation specification
applies shall comply with the modified standard or
implementation specification at such time as the Secretary
determines appropriate, taking into account the time
needed to comply due to the nature and extent of the
modification. The time determined appropriate under the
preceding sentence may not be earlier than the last day of
the 180-day period beginning on the date such
modification is adopted. The Secretary may extend the
time for compliance for small health plans, if the Secretary
determines that such extension is appropriate.
(3) CONSTRUCTION.--Nothing in this subsection shall
be construed to prohibit any person from complying with
A54
eee
a standard or specification by--
(A) submitting nonstandard data elements to a health
care clearinghouse for processing into standard data
elements and transmission by the health care
clearinghouse; or
(B) receiving standard data elements through a health
care clearinghouse.
GENERAL PENALTY FOR FAILURE TO COMPLY
WITH REQUIREMENTS AND STANDARDS
SEC. 1176.
(a) GENERAL PENALTY.--
(1) IN GENERAL.--Except as provided in subsection (b),
the Secretary shall impose on any person who violates a
provision of this part a penalty of not more than $100 for
~ each such violation, except that the total amount imposed
on the person for all violations of an identical requirement
or prohibition during a calendar year may not exceed
$25,000.
(2) PROCEDURES.--The provisions of section 1128A
(other than subsections (a) and (b) and the second
sentence of subsection (f)) shall apply to the imposition of
a civil money penalty under this subsection in the same
manner as such provisions apply to the imposition of a
penalty under such section 1128A.
(b) LIMITATIONS.--
(1) OFFENSES OTHERWISE PUNISHABLE.--A
penalty may not be imposed under subsection (a) with
respect to an act if the act constitutes an offense
punishable under section 1177.
(2) NONCOMPLIANCE NOT DISCOVERED.--A
penalty may not be imposed under subsection (a) with
respect to a provision of this part if it is established to the
A55
satisfaction of the Secretary that the person liable for the
penalty did not know, and by exercising reasonable
diligence would not have known, that such person
violated the provision. ;
(3) FAILURES DUE TO REASONABLE CAUSE.--
(A) IN GENERAL.--Except as _ provided in
subparagraph (B), a penalty may not be imposed under
subsection (a) 1f--
(i) the failure to comply was due to reasonable cause
and not to willful neglect; and
(ii) the failure to comply is corrected during the 30-
day period beginning on the first date the person
liable for the penalty knew, or by exercising
reasonable diligence would have known, that the
failure to comply occurred.
(B) EXTENSION OF PERIOD.--
(i) NO PENALTY.--The period referred to in
subparagraph (A)(ii) may be extended as determined
appropriate by the Secretary based on the nature and
extent of the failure to comply.
(ti) ASSISTANCE.--If the Secretary determines that
a person failed to comply because the person was
unable to comply, the Secretary may provide technical
assistance to the person during the period described in
subparagraph (A)(i1). Such assistance shall be
provided in any manner determined appropriate by
the Secretary.
(4) REDUCTION.--In the case of a failure to comply
which is due to reasonable cause and not to willful
neglect, any penalty under subsection (a) that is not
- entirely waived under paragraph (3) may be waived to the
extent that the payment of such penalty would be
excessive relative to the compliance failure involved.
A56
WRONGFUL DISCLOSURE OF INDIVIDUALLY
IDENTIFIABLE HEALTH INFORMATION
SEC. 1177.
(a) OFFENSE.--A person who knowingly and in violation
of this part--
(1) uses or causes to be used a unique health identifier;
(2) obtains individually identifiable health information
relating to an individual; or .
(3) discloses individually identifiable health information
to another person, shall be punished as provided in
subsection (b).
(b) PENALTIES.--A person described in subsection (a)
shall--
(1) be fined not more than $50,000, imprisoned not more
than 1 year, or both;
(2) if the offense is committed under false pretenses, be
fined not more than $100,000, imprisoned not more than
5 years, or both; and
(3) if the offense is committed with intent to sell, transfer,
or use individually identifiable health information for
commercial advantage, personal gain, or malicious harm,
be fined not more than $250,000, imprisoned not more
than 10 years, or both.
EFFECT ON STATE LAW
SEC. 1178.
(a) GENERAL EFFECT.-- ,
(1) GENERAL RULE.--Except as provided in paragraph
(2), a provision or requirement under this part, or a
standard or implementation specification adopted or
established under sections 1172 through 1174, shall
supersede any contrary provision of State law, includin g
A57
a provision of State law that requires medical or health
plan records (including billing information) to be
maintained or transmitted in written rather than
electronic form.
(2) EXCEPTIONS.--A provision or requirement under
this part, or a standard or implementation specification
adopted or established under sections 1172 through 1174,
shall not supersede a contrary provision of State law, if
the provision of State law--
- (A) is a provision the Secretary determines--
(1) is necessary--
(I) to prevent fraud and abuse;
(II) to ensure appropriate State regulation of
insurance and health plans;
(III) for State reporting on health care delivery
or costs; or
(IV) for other purposes; or
(ii) addresses controlled substances; or
(B) subject to section 264(c)(2) of the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996,
relates to the privacy of individually identifiable
hec th information.
(b) PUBLIC HEALTH.--Nothing in this part shall be
construed to invalidate or limit the authority, power, or
procedures established under any law providing for the
reporting of disease or injury, child abuse, birth, or death,
public health surveillance, or public health investigation
or intervention.
(c) STATE REGULATORY REPORTING.--Nothing in
this part shall limit the ability of a State to require a
health plan to report, or to provide access to, information
for management audits, financial audits, program
monitoring and evaluation, facility licensure or
A58
certification, or individual licensure or certification.
PROCESSING PAYMENT TRANSACTIONS BY
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
SEC. 1179. To the extent that an entity is engaged in
activities of a financial institution (as defined in section 1101 of
the Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978), or is engaged in
authorizing, processing, clearing, settling, billing, transferring,
reconciling, or collecting payments, for a financial institution,
this part, and any standard adopted under this pert, shal! not
apply to the entity with respect to such activities, including the
following:
(1) The use or disclosure of information by the entity for
authorizing, processing, clearing, settling, billing,
transferring, reconciling or collecting, a payment for, or
related to, health plan premiums or health care, where
such payment is made by any means, including a credit,
debit, or other payment card, an account, check, or
electronic funds transfer.
(2) The request for, or the use or disclosure of,
information by the entity with respect to a payment
described in paragraph (1)--
(A) for transferring receivables;
(B) for auditing;
(C) in connection with--
(1) a customer dispute; or
(ii) an inquiry from, or to, a customer;
(D) in a communication to a customer of the entity
regarding the customer's transactions, payment card,
account, check, or electronic funds transfer;
(E) for reporting to consumer reporting agencies; or
(F) for complying with--
(1) a civil or criminal subpoena; or
(ii) a Federal or State law regulating the entity.".
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(b) CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.--
(1) REQUIREMENT FOR MEDICARE PROVIDERS.-
-Section 1866(a)(1) (42 US.C. 1395cc(a)(1)) is
amended--
(A) by striking "and" at the end of subparagraph
(P);
(B) by striking the period at the end of
subparagraph (Q) and inserting "; and"; and
(C) by inserting immediately after subparagraph
(Q) the following new subparagraph:
(R) to contract only with a health care
clearinghouse (as defined in section 1171)
that meets each standard and
implementation specification adopted or
established under part C of title XI on or after
the date on which the health care
clearinghouse is required to comply with the
standard or specification."
(2) TITLE HEADING.--Title XI (42 U.S.C. 1301 et
seq.) is amended by striking the title heading and
inserting the following:
“TITLE XI--GENERAL PROVISIONS, PEER
REVIEW, AND ADMINISTRATIVE
SIMPLIFICATION”.
KKK
SEC. 264. RECOMMENDATIONS WITH RESPECT TO
PRIVACY OF CERTAIN HEALTH INFORMATION.
(a) INGENERAL.--Not later than the date that is 12
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months after the date of the enactment of this Act,
the Secretary of Health and Human Services shall
submit to the Committee on Labor and Human
Resources and the Committee on Finance of the
Senate and the Committee on Commerce and the
Committee on Ways and Means of the House of
Representatives detailed recommendations on
standards with respect to the privacy of individually
identifiable health information.
(b) SUBJECTS FOR RECOMMENDATIONS.--The
recommendations under subsection (a) shall address
at least the following:
(1) The rights that an individual who is a subject
of individually identifiable health information
should have.
(2) The procedures that should be established for
the exercise of such rights.
(3) The uses and disclosures of such information
that should be authorized or required.
(c) REGULATIONS.--
(1) IN GENERAL.--If legislation governing
standards with respect to the privacy of
individually identifiable health information
transmitted in connection with the transactions
described in section 1173(a) of the Social Security
Act (as added by section 262) is not enacted by
the date that is 36 months after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Health
and Human Services shall promulgate final
regulations containing such standards not later
than the date that is 42 months after the date of
the enactment of this Act. Such regulations shall
address at least the subjects described in
subsection (b).
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(2) PREEMPTION.--A regulation promulgated
under paragraph (1) shall not supercede a
contrary provision of State law, if the provision
of State law imposes requirements, standards, or
implementation specifications that are more
stringent than the requirements, standards, or
implementation specifications imposed under
the regulation.
(d) CONSULTATION.--In carrying out this section,
the Secretary of Health and Human Services shall
consult with--
(1) the National Committee on Vital and Health
Statistics established under section 306(k) of the
Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. 242k(k)); and
(2) the Attorney General
RREEKKEEKEKEEEKEEESE
45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (relevant excerpt)
§ 160.103 Definitions.
KKK
Protected health information means individually
identifiable health information:
(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this
definition, that is:
(i) Transmitted by electronic media;
(ii) Maintained in electronic media; or
(iii) Transmitted or maintained in any other form
or medium.
(2) Protected health information excludes
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individually identifiable health information in:
(i) Education records covered by the Family
Educational Rights and Privacy Act, as amended,
20 U.S.C. 1232;
(ii) Records described at 20 U.S.C.
1232g(a)(4)(B)(iv); and
(iii) Employment records held by a covered
entity in its role as employer.
KKKEK
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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.