Appendices — King v. City of Bainbridge

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APPENDIX A

SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA

No. S02A1685.

KING,

V.

CITY OF BAINBRIDGE.

March 10, 2003.

Reconsideration Denied April 11, 2003.

FLETCHER, Chief Justice.

The City of Bainbridge filed suit against Ethel King to

enforce its zoning ordinance that precluded her placement of

a mobile home in an R-2 residential district. King contended

that the City’s zoning ordinance was unconstitutional and that

it was preempted by federal law. The trial court rejected these

arguments and King appeals. Because the City’s ordinance

restricting mobile homes to mobile home parks and

subdivisions is not preempted by federal law and is not

unconstitutional, we affirm. Ethel King owns a tract of land,

the majority of which lies within the city limits of Bainbridge,

Georgia and is zoned R-2. The City’s zoning ordinance

specifically excludes mobile homes from R-2 districts. In

1995, three days after placing her mobile home on her

property, the City informed King that she was in violation of

the City’s zoning ordinance. She was also informed that the

mobile home could be legally placed on a portion of her

property falling outside the city limits. Instead of complying

with the City’s demand to move the mobile home, King

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installed electricity, a septic tank, and a porch, all without

first obtaining the required permits or seeking an amendment

to the zoning ordinance. When the City filed suit in January

1996, King defended on the basis that the zoning ordinance

violated her substantive ‘ue process rights. After a reversal

by this Court on a prvcedural ground,’ the trial court

ultimately heid that the zoning ordinance was constitutional

and was not preempted by the National Manufactured

Housing and Safety Standards Act of 1974 (“the Act”).

Federal Preemption

The Act sets minimum standards for the construction of

manufactured homes and was passed to reduce injuries,

deaths, insurance costs, and property damage related to

manufactured homes and to improve the quality of

manufactured homes.’ “Manufactured homes” are built on a

permanent chassis,’ and are also referred to as mobile homes

in the regulations and in common parlance.” The regulations

promulgated under the Act by the United States Department

of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) require that each

mobile home bear a special label certifying that it is built in

compliance with HUD safety standards and has been

inspected in accordance with HUD regulations.° The Act also

recognizes “modular homes.” In contrast to mobile homes,

modular homes are built on a temporary chassis that is

removed upon installation on a permanent foundation.’ The

' King v. City of Bainbridge, 272 Ga. 427, 531 S.E.2d 350 (2000).

? 42 U.S.C. §§ 5401-5426.

342 U.S.C. § 5401.

* 42 U.S.C. § 5402(6), 24 C.F.R. § 3280.2.

°24 C.F.R. § 3282.8.

© 24 C.F.R. § 3280.11.

742 U.S.C. § 5403(f), 24 C.F.R. § 3282.12.

3a

Act specifically provides for the exclusion of modular homes

from its coverage.®

The preemptive scope of the Act over safety and

construction standards for mobile homes is expressly defined

in the Act: Whenever a Federal manufactured home con-

struction and safety standard established under this [chapter]

is in effect, no State or political subdivision of a State shall

have any authority either to establish, or to continue in effect,

with respect to any manufactured home covered, any standard

regarding construction or safety applicable to the same aspect

of performance of such manufactured home which is not

identical to the Federal manufactured home construction and

safety standard.”

Thus, any attempt to place higher construction standards on

mobile homes than those established under the Act is invalid.

However, nothing in the Act prevents localities from

excluding mobile homes from certain zoning districts. The

City’s zoning ordinance creates such an exclusion. Under the

City’s ordinance, mobile homes must bear the HUD

certification label and these homes are specifically excluded

from the R-2 zoning district: “Permitted uses. (a) Any use

permitted in the R-1 residential district, except mobile

homes.” By excluding HUD-certified mobile homes from the

R-2 district, the City has not imposed any safety or

construction requirement on the homes, but has simply

determined that this type of housing is inappropriate in an R-2

district. The Eleventh Circuit has expressly held that

“{u}ndoubtedly [a city] could limit Zone R-AA to convention-

ally-built residences and exclude mobile homes.” '® Because

the City has not infringed on the federal government’s control

8 id.

” 42 U.S.C. § 5403(d).

Scurlock v. City of Lynn Haven, 858 F.2d 1521, 1525 (llth

Cir.1988).

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over safety and construction standards for mobile homes, its

zoning ordinance is not preempted by the Act.

King argues that the City imposes safety and construction

standards on mobile homes by permitting “a mobile home

with a DCA sticker” in R-2 districts. This argument fails to

recognize the factual and legal distinction between a modular

home and a mobile home. Modular homes are separately

defined in the City’s ordinance and are built in accordance

with OCGA §§ 8-2-110—8-2-121 and the rules of the

Department of Community Affairs. The requirements of

OCGA § 8-2-110, et seg. are virtually identical to the

requirements for a modular home exempt under the federal

act.'' Thus, a modular home is not simply a mobile home

with a DCA sticker; instead modular homes and mobile

homes are distinct uses, which both the state and federal

statutes recognize, and the City’s different treatment of them

in its zoning ordinance is not an infringement on federal

safety standards for mobile homes.

Courts considering similar zoning ordinances have

concluded that they are not preempted by the Act. For

example, in Bibco Corporation v. City of Sumter,'? the

Supreme Court of South Carolina held that the Act did not

preempt an ordinance excluding HUD-certified mobile homes

from a specific zoning district, but permitting modular homes

built under South Carolina’s Modular Building Construction

Act.

''42 U.S.C § 5403(f); 24 C.F.R. § 3282.12; OCGA § 8-2-110—8-2-

121; Ga. Ruk» and Regs. 110-2-7 et seg. See also Hill v. Duncan, 249

Ga.App. 342, 548 S.E.2d 83 (2001) (using “modular” to describe home

built under OCGA § 8-2-110, ef seg. and Atty. Gen. Op. 84- 4 (referring

to OCGA § 8-2-110 et seq. as a “modular home statute”)).

'2 332 S.C. 45, 504 S.E.2d 112 (1998).

'? See also Texas Manufactured Housing Ass’n v. City of Nederland,

101 F.3d 1095, 1100-1101 (Sth Cir.1996) (ordinance restricting mobile

Sa

King’s reliance on Scurlock v. City of Lynn Haven “4 is

inapposite because of the significant difference between Lynn

Haven’s and Bainbridge’s zoning ordinances. Lynn Haven’s

ordinance provided no specific uses or exclusions in the

relevant zoning district. Instead, the ordinance relied solely

on its safety code to distinguish appropriate uses. The

Eleventh Circuit concluded that the ordinance would require

greater safety and construction standards on mobile homes in

that district, and therefore, federal law preempted the local

ordinance.'” The court contrasted the impermissible Lynn

Haven statute with a permissible one that specifically

excluded mobile homes from a particular zoning district.'®

The City does not rely on its safety codes, as Lynn Haven did,

but instead excludes HUD-certified mobile homes -from R-2

districts regardless of safety and construction standards.

King also relies heavily upon the testimony of one City

official that a mobile home that could meet the City’s

building codes could be placed in an R-2 district: The

official’s testimony is in conflict with the plain language of

the ordinance and is unsupported by any evidence that the

City has ever applied the ordinance except as it is written.

Therefore, this testimony fails to support the argument that

the ordinance conflicts with federal law.'”

homes to mobile home parks not preempted); Brookside Village v.

Comeau, 633 S.W.2d 790 (Tex.1982) (same); Burton v. City of Alexander

City, No. Civ. A.99-D-1233-E, 2001 WL 527415 (M.D.Ala. March 20,

2001) (same).

* 858 F.2d 1521 (11th Cir.1988).

'’ See also Colorado Manufactured Housing Ass'n v. County of

Pueblo, 946 F.Supp. 1539, 1552-1553 (D.Colo.1996) (ordinances that

permit mobile homes in residential districts if they also meet Uniform

Building Code standards are preempted).

'© 858 F.2d at 1525.

"” See Clark v. Winnebago County, 817 F.2d 407, 409 n. 4 (7th Cir.

1987) (County’s position that mobile homes not excluded if they meet

6a

Additionally, we acknowledge the Catch-22 in which the

City finds itself. Under Cannon v. Coweta County,'® which

did not address the preemption issue, this Court held that a

zoning ordinance that restricted mobile homes to mobile

home parks, based on aesthetic and protection of property

values concerns, was unconstitutional.’ Instead, the Court

held that a municipality can only regulate the placement of

mobile homes based on construction standards.”°

Constitutionality of Ordinance

King also contends that the zoning ordinance is

unconstitutional because it exceeds the police powers of the

City under Cannon.?'_ We now conclude that Cannon was

wrongly decided and hereby overrule it. A zoning ordinance

does not exceed a city’s police powers unless it is “clearly

arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to

the public health, safety, morals or general welfare.””” Courts

routinely uphold zoning ordinances broadly restricting mobile

home placement.”° A wide variety of rationales have been

building code untenable in light of ordinance providing that mobile homes

may not be placed outside mobile home district).

'8 960 Ga. 56, 389 S.E.2d 329 (1990).

'° Td. at 60, 389 S.E.2d 329.

© Id. (municipality can regulate placement of mobile homes only if

they meet standards “designed to assure that the home will compare

favorably with other housing that would be allowed on that site,” quoting

case that held that acceptable standards included insulation, adequacy of

plumbing, and windstorm damage). See Robinson Township v. Knoll, 410

Mich. 293, 302 N.W.2d 146, 152 (1981).

2 rg

2 Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395, 47 S.Ct.

114, 71 L.Ed. 303 (1926).

3 See, e.g., Town of Scranton v. Willoughby, 306 S.C. 421, 412 S.E.2d

424 (S.C.1991); McCollum v. City of Berea, 53 S.W.3d 106 (Ky.App.

2000) and cases cited in n. 17-29. See also Rathkoph, The Law of

Planning and Zoning § 19.04; Annot., 17 A.L.R.4th 106, 111 § 3 (1982).

Ta

found sufficient to justify these ordinances: preserving land

for low density, single-family dwellings,” protection of prop-

erty values,” guarding against increased crime,”° guarding

8

against traffic congestion,”’ maintaining aesthetics,“ regu-

lating popuiation density,”’ preventing waste and sewage

problems,” regulating quality of housing stock,’' and

concerns about wind vulnerability.”

The evidence in this case showed that the City’s purpose it

restricting mobile home placement was to regulate the quality

of housing stock and promote general safety concerns.

These reasons are not arbitrary or unreasonable and bear a

substantial relation to the public health, safety, and gen-

eral welfare. Therefore, the City’s ordinance is not

unconstitutional.

Judgment affirmed.

All the Justices concur, except BENHAM and THOMP-

SON, JJ., who dissent.

4 Bibco, 504 S.E.2d at 116-117

> Texas Manufactured Housing Ass’x at 1106; Colorado

Manufactured Housing Ass'n v. City of Salida, 977 F.Supp. 1080, 1085

(D.Colo.1997).

6 Bibco, 504 S.E.2d at 116-117.

27 Bibco, 504 S.E.2d at 116-117.

8 Clark, 817 F.2d at 409.

- Duggins v. Town of Walnut Cove, 63 N.C.App. 684, 306 S.E.2d 186

(N.C.App. 1983).

*° Brookside Village, 633 S.W.2d 790; Barre Mobile Home Park vy.

Town of Petersham, 592 F.Supp. 633, 636 (D.Mass. 1984).

*' Burton, 2001 WL 527415, * 10.

*° Grant v. Seminole County, 817 F.2d 731, 736 (11th Cir.1987).

8a

THOMPSON, Justice, dissenting.

I believe the City’s zoning ordinance is an unconstitutional

encroachment upon federal law. Accordingly, I dissent.

1. Federal preemption occurs when a federal law conflicts

with a state law, including zoning ordinances and other laws

created by municipalities. See Scurlock v. City of Lynn

Haven, 858 F.2d 1521, 1524 (11th Cir.1988). In such cases, if

the two conflicting laws cannot be reconciled to serve the full

purposes and objectives of Congress in passing the federal

law, the supremacy clause dictates that the State law must

give way to the federal law. States do not have the

constitutional power to legislate in federally preempted areas

of law. /d. at 1523-1524. At issue before us is a conflict

between a City of Bainbridge zoning ordinance and 42 U.S.C.

§ 5403(d), which provides:

Whenever a Federal [mobile] home construction and

safety standard established under this chapter is-in effect,

no State or political subdivision of a State shall have

authority either to establish, or to continue in effect, with

respect to any [mobile] home covered, any standard

regarding construction or safety applicable to the same

aspect of performance of such [mobile] home which is

not identical to the Federal [mobile] home construction

and safety standard.

This statute clearly evidences congressional intent to “pre-

clude[ ] states and municipalities from imposing construction

and safety standards upon mobile homes that differ in any

respect from those developed by HUD.” (Emphasis omitted.)

Scurlock, supra.

The evidence presented in this case demonstrated that

modular homes, which are prefabricated, but are not built on

a chassis, could be placed in an R-2 zoning district if they

bore a Department of Community Affairs (“DCA”) certifi-

cation sticker; that a DCA sticker certifies that a modular

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home is built in accordance with the Georgia Industrialized

Building Act; and that, aesthetically, as long as a “skirt” is

placed around a mobile home, there is very little, if any,

difference between a modular home and a mobile home.

There was also evidence that modular homes bearing a DCA

sticker are safer than mobile homes bearing a HUD sticker;

and that the City adopted its ordinance restricting mobile

homes to mobile home parks and subdivisions for safety

purposes. In this regard, the city manager testified that the

City would not permit a mobile home with only a HUD

sticker in an R-2 zoning district; but it would permit a mobile

home with a DCA sticker in such a district because it would

have been “built stronger and safer.”

In Scurlock, a City of Lynn Haven zoning ordinance

permitted mobile homes that met the City’s building codes to

be placed anywhere within city limits; mobile homes with

only a HUD sticker, however, were restricted to licensed

trailer parks. The City argued that the ordinance passed

constitutional muster because mobile homes were built to a

lesser standard and were less safe. The court determined that

the City’s rationale for limiting the siting of mobile homes

was impermissible because safety standards for such homes

were preempted by federal law. The court reasoned that if

HUD has set the standard for safe construction, a munici-

pality cannot create barriers to the full implementation of that

standard. /d. at 1524-1525.

Like the zoning ordinance in Scurlock, supra, the purpose

and effect of the zoning ordinance in this case are to limit the

siting of mobile homes based solely on their manner of

construction. Because this zoning rationale impedes the full

implementation of federal building standards, the City’s

zoning ordinance is unconstitutional.

True, on its face, the zoning ordinance appears to restrict

the location of mobile homes appropriately. However, as

noted above, the City enacted, and intends to enforce, its

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ordinance on the basis of construction and safety concerns.

Thus, the ordinance was enacted as a thinly veiled attempt to

circumvent the HUD safety and construction standards, ' and

to frustrate the federal objective,” to wit: the regulation of

mobile home safety standards.

When all is said and done, it is clear that in enacting its

ordinance the City was motivated by a desire to legislate in

the mobile home safety arena; and the City’s interpretation of

the ordinance gives it that effect. The ordinance should not be

saved simply because it appears to be regular on its face. See

Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 105 S.Ct. 1916, 85

L.Ed.2d 222 (1985) (although law disenfranchising persons

convicted of crimes appears neutral on its face, it will be held

to violate equal protection if its original enactment was

motivated by a desire to discriminate and it continues to have

that effect).

Compare Texas Manufactured Housing Assn. v. City of Nederland,

101 F.3d 1095, 1100 (Sth Cir. 1996).

* In determining preemption vel non, it is the practical impact of the

ordinance that counts. See Gade v. National Solid Wastes Mgmt. Assn.,

505 U.S. 88, 105-106, 112 S.Ct. 2374, 120 L.Ed.2d 73 (1992). See also

Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 651-652, 91 S.Ct. 1704, 29 L.Ed.2d 233

(1971), in which the Supreme Court observed: We can no longer adhere to

the aberrational doctrine . . . that state law may frustrate the operation of

federal law as long as the state legislature in passing its law had some

purpose in mind other than one of frustration. Apart from the fact that it is

at odds with the approach taken in nearly all our Supremacy Clause cases,

such a doctrine would enable state legislatures to nullify nearly all un-

wanted federal legislation by simply publishing a legislative committee

report articulating some state interest or policy—other than frustration of

the federal objective—that would be tangentially furthered by the

proposed state law .... [A]ny state legislation which frustrates the full

effectiveness of federal law is rendered invalid by the Supremacy Clause.

In this case, the articulated purpose of the ordinance was one which

frustrates the federal objective. When pressed at oral arguments, counsel

for the City was unable to provide any rationale other than safety for

limiting the placement of mobile homes.

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2. In Cannon v. Coweta County, 260 Ga. 56, 389 S.E.2d

329 (1990), this Court held that an ordinance restricting the

placement of mobile homes exceeds the police power if it is

enacted to protect property values. Unlike the ordinance in

Cannon, the ordinance in this case was enacted for safety

reasons. Thus, this case does not present a Cannon issue, and

I see no need to debate its merits at this time.

I am authorized to state that Justice BENHAM joins in

this dissent.

Se Ee Oe fe ee ne

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APPENDIX B

SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA

Case No. S02A1685

Atlanta, April 11, 2003

The Honorable Supreme Court met pursuant to adjourn-

ment. The following order was passed:

ETHEL KNIGHT KING a/k/a ANNIE ETHEL KING,

Vv.

CITY OF BAINBRID.

Upon consideration of the Motion for Reconsideration filed

in this case, it is ordered that it be hereby denied.

All the Justices concur, except Benham and Thompson, JJ.,

who dissent.

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA

Clerk’s Office, Atlanta

I herby certify that the above is a true extract from the

minutes of the Supreme Court of Georgia.

Witness my signature and the_seal of said court hereto

affixed the day and year last above written.

Sherie M. Welch, Clerk |

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APPENDIX C

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF DECATUR COUNTY

STATE OF GEORGIA

[Filed Sep. 27, 2001]

Civil Action File No. 96-V-040

THE CITY OF BAINBRIDGE, GEORGIA,

Plaintiff,

VS.

ETHEL KNIGHT KING, a/k/a ANNIE ETHEL KING,

Defendant.

ORDER ON PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT FOR

INTERLOCUTORY AND PERMANENT INJUNCTION

The Georgia Supreme Court having reversed this Court’s

Order of August 24, and remanded the case to this Court for

consideration of the constitutional issues raised by Defendant,

and upon remand, the Parties having waived the opportunity

to present additional evidence or argument, and each of the

Parties having agreed to submit the matter to the Court for

decision based on the existing record, the Court makes the

following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law:

FINDINGS OF FACT

eM

Technically, there is no such thing as a “mobile home.”

The proper names for residences commonly called “mobile

homes” that have been manufactured since 1976 and are

located in Georgia are either industrialized buildings that bear

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a DCA sticker or manufactured housing that bear a HUD

sticker (T., pg. 68, lines 15-25; T., pg. 74, lines 2-9; T.,

pg. 133, lines 10-25; T., pg. 154, lines 18-20).

2.

A layman in the field or an ordinary citizen could not

distinguish between a “mobile home” with a DCA sticker and

a “mobile home” with a HUD sticker while it is being

transported nor could they distinguish between them after it

has been set up if it had a “skirting” around it (T., pg. 70,

lines 6-16; T. pg. 72, lines 6-9).

mm

Defendant owns, and has owned since May 27, 1986, a

tract of land in Decatur County, Georgia, that is shown on

Decatur County Tax Map B-80 as Parcel 14 F. A part of said

land is within the City Limits of the City of Bainbridge.

(Plaintiffs Exhibit 1—reduced Tax Map B-80; Plaintiffs

Exhibit 2—part_of Tax Map B-80 including Defendant’s

property; Plaintiffs Exhibit 7--Deed from Thurman L.

Knight, Jr., as Executor under the Last Will and Testament of

Thurman L. Knight, Sr., to Defendant dated May 27, 1986,

and recorded in Deed Book G-14, Page 411, Land Records of

Decatur County, Georgia; Plaintiffs Exhibit 6--plat of survey

by Grogan; Plaintiffs Exhibit 3-plat of Defendant’s property

on which witness Seymour plotted the City Limit’s line).

-4-

The City Limit’s sign is near Defendant’s property and the

Grogan survey shows that a substantial part of Defendant’s

property, and all of the road frontage of Defendant’s property,

is within the City Limits of Bainbridge (Plaintiff's Exhibit 6;

T. pg. 26, lines 12-22).

a

Pursuant to Article 1X of the Zoning Ordinance of the City

of Bainbridge, the part of Defendant’s property that lies

lSa

within the City of Bainbridge is zoned as a “R-2 Two Family

and Multiple Family Residential District” (Plaintiff's Exhibit

8; Plaintiffs Exhibit 10).

-6-

Pursuant to Article [IX of the Zoning Ordinance of the City

of Bainbridge, mobile homes bearing a DCA sticker are

permitted in “R-2 Two Family and Multiple Family Resi-

dential Districts,” but mobile homes bearing a HUD sticker

are not permitted in “R-2 Two Family and Multiple Family

Residential Districts” (Plaintiff's Exhibit 8, pg. 27, Sect.

9.02a; Plaintiff's Exhibit 8, pg. 4 definition of Mobile Home

and definition of Modular Home).

i.

A permit from the City of Bainbridge is required in order

to put any house, stick-built, mobile home, modular home,

industrialized building, manufactured housing, or anv other

kind of building in the City of Bainbridge. Defendant never

made an application to the City for a permit to put the house

in question or any other house on her property that is located

within the City of Bainbridge, and no such permit was ever

issued (T., pg. 104, lines 20 thru pg. 105, line 3; T., pg. 40,

lines 9-18; pg. 210, line 23 thru pg. 211, line 8; Plaintiffs

Exhibit 8, pg. 51, Sect. 21.02 and 21.03).

-

On September 2, 1995 (Saturday before Labor Day),

Defendant, without obtaining a permit from the City of Bain-

bridge to do so, caused a “mobile home” bearing a HUD

sticker to be delivered to a part of her land that was within the

City Limits of Bainbridge (T., pg. 213, lines 19-22: Plaintiffs

Exhibit 3; T., pg. 101, line 20 thru pg. 102, line 1).

-9.

On Tuesday, September 5, 1995, Charles Seymour, a build-

ing officer of the City of Bainbridge, went to the property of

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Defendant and found a mobile home with a HUD sticker

sitting on the Defendant’s property (T., pg. 30, line 2 thru pg.

31, line 17).

-10-

On September 5, 1/995, Charles Seymour notified the

Defendant that the mobile home with the HUD sticker was on

the part of her land that was within the City Limits and that it

had to be moved (T., pg. 31, lines 11-17).

(See Findings of Fact 5 and 6 that the zoning on the

part of Defendant’s land that is within the City Limits

permitted mobile homes with a DCA sticker, but did not

permit mobile homes with a HUD sticker.)

it.

On September 5, 1995, there had been no improvements on

the property other than the delivery of the mobile home with

the HUD sticker to the property, except that the power

company had started to set up a pole, (T., pg. 31, line 18 thru

pg. 32, line 1) and except that Defendant contends that “the

septic tank was already in” (T., pg. 207, lines 19-25).

As.

On September 6, 1995, at the request of Mr. Knight

(Defendant’s brother), Charles Seymour, John. Busby, who

was employed as a buildings inspector part-time for the City

of Bainbridge under the supervision of Charles Seymour, and

Mr. Knight (Defendant’s brother), with the benefit of plats of

the property supplied by Mr. Knight (Defendant’s brother)

(Plaintiff's Exhibit 4), measured the property and agreed as to

the location of the City Limits line, which when plotted

on the plat provided by Mr. Knight, showed that approxi-

mately 90 percent of the mobile home was within the City

Limits of Bainbridge (Plaintiff's Exhibit 3; T., pg. 32, line 24

thru pg. 36, line 9).

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oh %.

On September 6, 1995, Mr. Seymour, Mr. Bushy, and Mr.

Knight, after making the necessary measurements, deter-

mined that the mobile home could be placed on Defendant’s

property outside of the City Limits and still have the proper

setbacks (T., pg. 36, lines 9-19).

-14-

On September 6, 1995, Mr. Seymour again informed

Defendant that the mobile home with the HUD sticker was

within the City Limits and would have to be moved (T., pg.

37, iines 2-8).

(See Findings of Fact 5 and 6 that the zoning on the

part of Defendant’s land that is within the City Limits

permitted mobile homes with a DCA sticker, but did not

permit mobile homes with a HUD sticker.)

ane.

A permit is required from the City of Bainbridge before

electricity can be connected to any building within the City

Limits of Bainbridge; a permit from the City of Bainbridge is

required before the installation of air conditioning in any

building located in the City Limits of Bainbridge; a permit is

required from the City of Bainbridge before the installation of

a septic tank and the construction of a drain field within

the City Limits of Bainbridge (T., pg. 40, line 9 thru pg. 41,

line 15).

-16-

After having received numerous warnings from the City

that the mobile home with the HUD sticker was within the

City Limits and must be moved, Defendant, without obtaining

a permit from the City of Bainbridge to do so, caused

electricity to be installed, air conditioning to be installed, and

a porch to be added to the mobile home (T., pg 209, line 17

thru pg. 210, line 8).

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ah

Defendant neither applied for nor obtained any permits

from the City of Bainbridge either before or after causing the

mobile home to be placed on her land within the City of

Bainbridge, causing electricity to be supplied to the mobile

home, causing the air conditioning to be installed in the

mobile home, causing the septic tank to be installed on the

premises, and causing the drain field to be constructed on the

premises (T., pg. 104, line 20 thru pg. 106, line 2).

-18-

The City of Bainbridge has never declined any application

by Defendant to place the home in question or any kind of

home on Defendant’s property that is located within the City

Limits of Bainbridge (T., pg. 217, line 24 thru pg. 218, line

1;T., pg. 105, lines 4-7).

-19-

Section 21.05 thru Section 21.8 of the Zoning Ordinance of

the City of Bainbridge provides a procedure for the amend-

ment of the Zoning Ordinance upon application of a citizen or

a property owner (Plaintiffs Exhibit 8). Defendant has never

filed an application pursuant to the Zoning Ordinance of the

City of Bainbridge for the rezoning of her property that lies

within the City Limits of Bainbridge (T., pg. 217, line 24 thru

pg. 218, line 8).

-20-

At all times relevant to this case, the Southern Building

Code, the National Electric Code, the Standard Mechanical

Code, the Georgia State Plumbing Code, and the Standard

Plumbing Code were in effect in the City of Bainbridge as a

part of the Ordinances of the City of Bainbridge (T., pg. 15,

lines 9-18; T., pg. 18, lines 2-20).

19a

c'

The duties of an inspector in the Building Department of

the City of Bainbridge are to-inspect remodeling, repair, and

new construction within the City of Bainbridge to make sure

that all buildings and construction comply with the various

building codes (T., pg. 61, lines 1015).

ae

The purpose of requiring construction in accordance with

the various building codes and to inspect to confirm and

enforce compliance with the various building codes is to

protect the lives and the safety of the citizens of the City of

Bainbridge (T., pg. 108, lines 3-8; T., pg. 79, line 21 thru

pg. 80, line 2).

23.

Mobile Homes bearing the DCA sticker are subject to and

built in accordance with the identical building codes that are

enforcrd in the City of Bainbridge (T., pg. 85, line 20 thru

pg. 86, line 1).

he

Mobile Homes bearing the HUD sticker are built to a

minimum standard (T., pg. 134, line 24) and to less stringent

building codes as to both safety and strength than the Mobile

Homes codes that are enforced in the City of Bainbridge and

which apply to buildings bearing the DCA sticker (T., pg. 85,

line 20 thru pg. 86, line 12).

-25-

Due to construction under the more stringent codes, the

mobile home bearing the DCA sticker is safer for the citizens

of Bainbridge than is a building bearing the HUD sticker (T.,

pg. 85, lines 14-19), and Plaintiff adopted the zoning

ordinance to protect the lives of its citizens and for safety

purposes (T., pp. 108-109).

20a

-26-

HUD standards and requirements are “unconcerned with a

locality’s imposition of construction or safety standards that

do not directly diverge from a specific, identifiable HUD

standard[s]” and requirements. See Burton v. City of

Alexander City, Ala., 2001 WL 527415 at 7 (M.D. Ala.

2001).

a

HUD standards, regulations, and requirements do not

prevent a locality from regulating the siting of manufactured

homes within its jurisdiction without regard to the federally-

required construction and safety standards of the home itself.

See Burton at 7.

-28-

Defendant has failed to prove that the City of Bainbridge

acted on the basis that Defendant’s “mobile home” met HUD

standards but not the Southern Building Code, the National

Electric Code, the Standard Mechanical Code, the Georgia

State Plumbing Code, or the Standard Plumbing Code. See

Burton at 7.

-29-

On proper application to the City of Bainbridge, a permit

will be issued for any home, including a Mobile Home, that

complies with all of the City of Bainbridge building codes to

be placed in any residential zone in the City of. Bainbridge

(T., pg. 107, line 5 thru pg. 108, line 2).

-30-

Even with a proper application to the City of Bainbridge, a

permit will not be issued for any house that does not comply

with all of the City of Bainbridge building codes to be placed

in any residential zone in the City of Bainbridge, with the

single exception in favor of mobile homes with the HUD

2la

sticker and, upon proper application to the City of Bain-

bridge, mobile homes with the HUD sticker can be placed in

mobile home subdivisions or in mobile home parks (T., pg.

106, line 10 thru pg. 108, line 1), even though they do not

comply with the City of Bainbridge’s building codes.

91.

Even houses that comply with the code cannot be placed

anywhere in the City of Bainbridge without first obtaining a

permit (T., pg. 109, lines 13-18), and there are mobile home

parks/subdivisions in the City of Bainbridge in which the

Defendant is not precluded from placing a home bearing a

HUD sticker.

92.

The Zoning Ordinances of the City of Bainbridge do not

address the subject of quality of manufacture of mobile

homes independent of the DCA and HUD sticker provisions

(T., pg. 115, lines 6-9).

-33-

Defendant was advised by certified mail dated December

13, 1995, which she acknowledged that she received, among

other things, that:

“The Zoning Ordinance can only be changed or

modified by the Mayor and City Council.

If you would like to appear before the City Council to

further discuss your mobile home dilemma, please con-

tact City Manager Charles Tyson so that he can schedule

you for the next City Council meeting to be held on

December 19,1995.”

Defendant did not ask Mr. Tyson to arrange for Defendant’s

appearance before the City Councii, nor did Defendant go

before the City Council or the Mayor. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 5;

T., pg. 212, line 13 thru pg. 213, line 3).

22a

-34-

Plaintiff was notified that her “mobile home” was in

violation of the City of Bainbridge’s zoning ordinance

without ay regard to the standards of Plaintiffs mobile home.

See Burton at 9.

."s

The Defendant ignored the notice by Charles R. Seymour,

Building Official/Zoning Administrator of the City of Bain-

bridge on September 5, 1995, described in Finding of Fact 7

and the further notices in Finding of Facts 11 and 12 and

“never slowed down” in completing the installation of the

mobile home on her property within the City Limits of

Bainbridge (T., pg. 213, line 23 thru pg. 214, line 1).

-36-

Defendant did not raise a constitutional attack against the

Zoning Ordinance before or to the governing authority of

Plaintiff prior to filing her answer to the Plaintiffs Complaint

For Injunctive Relief in this case.

37

The Zoning Ordinance of the City of Bainbridge was

admitted in evidence as Plaintiffs Exhibit 8 without objection

(T., pg. 23, lines 18-20).

. 3%

The evidence of Defendant was factually insufficient to

show by clear and convincing evidence that she will suffer a

significant detriment under the existing zoning of her

property or that the existing zoning bears an insubstantial

relationship to the public interest. See Gradous v. Bd. of

Commissioners of Richmond County, 256 Ga. 469, 471

(1986), citing, 250 Ga. 658 (1983). Brown v. Dougherty

County

23a

-39-

The evidence of Plaintiff was factually sufficient to

establish that the existing zoning of Defendant’s property

bears a substantial relationship to the public interest. See

Gradous at 471.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

its

The Zoning Ordinances of the City of Bainbridge, having

been admitted into evidence without objection, is presumed to

be valid.

¥

The evidence of Defendant was legally insufficient to show

by clear and convincing evidence that she will suffer a

significant detriment under the existing zoning of her

property or that the existing zoning bears an insubstantial

relationship to the public interest. See Gradous at 471.

=3-

The evidence of the Plaintiff was legally sufficient to

establish that the existing zoning of Defendant’s property

bears a substantial relationship to the public interest. See

Gradous at 471.

-4-

The Court is aware of the Scurlock v. City of Lynn Haven,

Fla., 858 F.2d 1521(1 1th Cir. 1988) decision, but it appears

that Scurlock does not apply in this case. The City of

Bainbridge has not imposed greater safety requirements for a

mobile home than the HUD standards and requirements;

therefore, Scurlock does not apply in this case.

-5-

The preemption doctrine does not apply since the City of

Bainbridge’s ordinance does not conflict with any HUD

24a

requirements nor deal with construction and safety and does

not impose any additional requirements on a home with a

HUD sticker. See Scurlock at 1524.

-6-

The City of Bainbridge’s zoning ordinance is rationally and

reasonably calculated to protect the safety and general

welfare of the community by regulating the quality of

housing stock. See Burton at 10.

a %

The City of Bainbridge’s zoning ordinance establishes

rational and reasonable guidelines by which prospective

home buyers can determine which parts of the city will

accommodate housing stock commensurate to their prefer-

ences and desires. See Burton at 10.

In order for Defendant to raise a question as to the con-

stitutionality of the City of Bainbridge’s zoning ordinance,

Defendant must show: (1) the ordinance or the particular

parts of the ordinance which the Defendant challenges, stated

with fair precision; (2) the provision of the Constitution,

which the ordinance is claimed to violate, must be clearly

designated; and (3) wherein the ordinance, or some desig-

nated part of it, violates such constitutional provision.

Richmond Concrete Products Co., Inc. v. Ward, 212 Ga. 773,

774-75 (1956), reversed on other grounds by State v. Crane,

224 Ga. 643 (1968).

-9-

It appearing that Defendant has failed to clearly designate

the violated provision of the Constitution and how the

ordinance violates the Constitution, Defendant has failed io

meet her burden. See Richmond Concrete at 774-75.

A Spar Soares i>

a ae ad

AON eg

Tye are

LYN RE

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Sp heds REL tet LP

25a

-10-

Based on this Court’s Conclusions of Law, the City of

Bainbridge’s zoning ordinance is found to be constitutional,

and Defendant has failed to provide clear and convincing

evidence otherwise.

-l1-

That the Defendant is in violation of the Zoning Ordinance

of the City of Bainbridge in each of the ways alleged by the

- Plaintiff in its Complaint.

IT IS THEREFORE, CONSIDERED, ORDERED AND

DECREED by the Court that the zoning ordinance in ques-

tion is constitutional, Plaintiff's prayer for an interlocutory

and a permanent injunction is hereby granted, Defendant is

- hereby enjoined from continuing to violate the Zoning

Ordinance of the City of Bainbridge in the ways specified in

the Complaint and in any other way, and Defendant is hereby

ordered to remove the mobile home described in the

Complaint from that portion of her land that lies within the

City Limits of Bainbridge within ninety (90) days of the date

of this Order.

This 26th day of September, 2001.

/s/ J. Richard Porter, III

J. RICHARD PorTER, III

Judge, Superior Court of

Decatur County, Georgia

Prepared by the Court

26a

APPENDIX D

ZONING ORDINANCE

CITY OF BAINBRIDGE, GEORGIA

(Plaintiff's Exhibit 8)

[Logo]

Adopted October 20, 1987

Amended January 5, 1988

Amended July 6, 1993

Prepared by:

Southwest Georgia Regional Development Center

ZONING ORDINANCE

CITY OF BAINBRIDGE, GEORGIA

ARTICLE I

INTRODUCTION

Section 1.01. Short Title 1

Section 1.02. Authority for Enactment |

ARTICLE II

I, sesccisewssncsinscecnsicisntiiicitsteiishsciiaihitieiiia lesesteiteciasnsaee eee ee

ARTICLE III

LIST OF DISTRICTS

Section 3.01. Districts 6

Section 3:02. Limited Use Provision 6

Section 3.03. Official Zoning Map 6

27a

ARTICLE IV

GENERAL PROVISIONS

Section 4.01. Conflicting Regulations 7

Section 4.02. Scope 7

Section 4.03. Street, Alleys, And Railroad Rights-

Of-way 7

Section 4.04. Permitted Uses 7

Section 4.05. Permitted Area 7

Section 4.06. Permitted Height 7

Section 4.07. Continuance of A Non-Conforming Use 7

Section 4.08. Only One Main Structure On A Lot 8

Section 4.09. Substandard Lots 8

Section 4.10. Frontage 8

Section 4.11. Site Distance At Intersections 8

Section 4.12. Reduction Of Lot Area Prohibited 8

Section 4.13. Accessory Residential Building 8

Section 4.14. Prohibited Uses In All Residential

Districts 9

Section 4.15. Automobile Service Stations And Public

Garages 10

Section 4.16. Protective Screening 10

Section 4.17. Signs 10

Section 4.18. Radio, Television Stations 14

Section 4.19. Satellite Receiving Dish Antenna 15

Section 4.20. Special Approval 15

Section 4.21. Zoning Of Annexed Areas 16

ARTICLE V

NON-CONFORMING BUILDINGS AND USES

Section 5.41. Non-Conforming Use Of Land,

Continuation Of Use 17

Section 5.02. Restoration 17

Section 5.03. Discontinuance Or Abandonment t7—-

Section 5.04. Change Of Tenancy Or Ownership 17

28a

ARTICLE VI

OFF-STREET PARKING AND LOADING

REQUIREMENTS

Section 6.01. Parking Requirements 18

Section 6.02. Off-Street Parking Design Regulations 21

Section 6.03. Planted Areas 22

Section 6.04. Off-Street Loading Requirements 22

Section 6.05. Off-Street Waiting Area For Drive

Through Facilities 23

ARTICLE VII

R4A, SINGLE FAMILY RESIDENTIAL DISTRICT

Section 7.01. Statement Of Purpose 24

Section 7.02. Permitted Uses 24

Section 7.03. Uses Permitted After Special Review By

The Planning Commission And

Approved By The City Council 24

Area, Height, And Placement

Section 7.04. Requirements 25

ARTICLE VIII

R-1, SINGLE FAMILY RESIDENTIAL DISTRICT

Section 8.01. Statement of Purpose 26

Section 8.02. Permitted Uses 26

Section 8.03. Uses Permitted After Special Review By

The Planning Commission And

Approved By The City Council 26

Section 8.04. Area, Height, And Placement

Requirements 26

29a

ARTICLE IX

R-2, TWO FAMILY AND MULTIPLE-FAMILY

RESIDENTIAL DISTRICTS

Section 9.01. Statement of Purpose 27

Section 9.02. Permitted Uses 27

Section 9.03. Uses Permitted After Special Review By

The Planning Commission And

Approved By The City Council 27

Section 9.04. Area, Height, And Placement

Requirements 27

ARTICLE X

R-PUD, RESIDENTIAL PLANNED UNIT

DEVELOPMENT DISTRICT

Section 10.01. | Statement Of Purpose 28

Section 10.02. Procedures For PUD (,R-PUD, C-PUD)

Approval 28

Section 10.03. Permitted Uses 28

Section 10.04. | Uses Permitted After Special Review By

The Planning Commission And

Approval By The City Council 28

Section 10.05. — Preliminary Review 28

Section 10.06. Procedure For Preliminary Approval 28

Section 10.07. Procedure For Final Plan Approval 29

Section 10.08. Area, Height, And Placement

Requirements 30

Section 11.04.

Section 11.05.

Section 11.06.

Section 11.07.

Section 11.08.

30a

ARTICLE XI

R-TH, TOWN HOUSE DEVELOPMENT DISTRICT

Section 11.01.

Section 11.02.

Section 11.03.

Statement Of Purpose 31

Permitted Uses 31 :

Uses Permitted After Special Review of

The Planning Commission And

Approval Of The City Council 31

Area, Height, And Placement and

Development Requirements 31

Preliminary Review 32

Procedure For Preliminary Approval 32

Procedure For Final Plan Approval 33

The Rezoning Of Any Property For

Town House Development Will Follow -

Established Rezoning Policies

And Procedures 34

ARTICLE XII

R-M, MOBILE HOME PARK AND MOBILE HOME

Section 12.01.

Section 12.02.

Section 12.03.

Section 12.04.

Section 12.05.

Section 12.06.

Section 12.07.

Section 12.08.

Section 12.09.

SUBDIVISION DISTRICT

Statement Of Purpose 35

R-M Mobile Home Park And Subdivision

District 35

Permitted Uses 35

Uses Permitted After Special Review By

The Planning Commission and

Approval By The City Council 35

Travel Trailers 35

Mobile Home Parks 36

Mobile Home Parks: Improvements 38

Mobile Home Parks: Accessory Uses

Permitted 39

Mobile Home Subdivision: General

Requirements 40

3la

ARTICLE XIII

R-0, RESTRICTED OFFICE-INSTITUTIONAL DISTRICT

Section 13.01. Statement of Purpose 41

Section 13.02. Permitted Uses 41

Section 13.03. Uses Permitted After Special Review By

The Planning Commission and

Approval By The City Council 41

Section 13.04. Area, Height, and Placement

Requirements 41

ARTICLE XIV

B, NEIGHBORHOOD BUSINESS DISTRICT

Section 14.01. Statement of Purpose 42

Section 14.02. Permitted Uses 42

Section 14.03. Uses Permitted After Special Review Of

The Planning Commission and

Approval By The City Council 42

Section 14.04. Protective Screening 43

Section 14.05. Area, Height, and Placement

Requirements 43

ARTICLE XV

CBD, CENTRAL BUSINESS DISTRICT

Section 15.01. Statement Of Purpose 44

Section 15.02. Permitted Uses 44

Section 15.03. Uses Permitted After Special Review Of

The Planning Commission and ©

: Approval By The City Council 44

Section 15.04. Protective Screening 44

Section 15.05. Area, Height, and Placement

Requirements 44

Section 16.01.

Section 16.02.

Section 16.03.

Section 16.04.

Section 16.05.

32a

ARTICLE XVI

C, HIGHWAY COMMERCIAL DISTRICT

Statement Of Purpose 45

Permitted Uses 45

Uses Permitted After Special Review Of

The Planning Commission And

Approval By The City Council 45

Protective Screening 45

Area, Height, And Placement

Requirements 45

ARTICLE XVII

C-PUD, COMMERCIAL PLANNED UNIT

Section 17.01.

Section 17.02.

Section 17.03.

Section 17.04.

Section 17.05.

Section 17.06.

DEVELOPMENT DISTRICT

Statement Of Purpose 46

Permitted Uses 46

Uses Permitted After Special Review By

The Planning Commission And

Approval Of The City Council 46

Procedure For Project Approval 46

Procedure For Preliminary And Final

Approval 46

Area, Height, And Placement

Requirements 46

ARTICLE XVIII

I-1, LIGHT INDUSTRIAL DISTRICT

Section 18.01.

Section 18.02.

Section 18.03.

Section 18.04.

I-1, Light Industrial District 47

Permitted Uses 47

Uses Permitted After Special Review of

The Planning Commission And

Approval Of The City Council 48

Area, Height, And Placement

Requirements 48

Section 19.01.

Section 19.02.

Section 19.03.

Section 19.04.

33a

ARTICLE XIX

I-2, HEAVY INDUSTRIAL DISTRICT

I-2, Heavy Industrial District 49

Permitted Uses 49

Uses Permitted After Special Review of

The Planning Commission And

Approval By The City Council 49

Area, Height, And Placement

Requirements 49

ARTICLE XX

ICRC COT ROMERO ociessccescecicesssicciccerssoscessescessiopnsesesens 50

ARTICLE XXI

ADMINISTRATION AND ENFORCEMENT

Section 21.01.

Section 21.02.

Section 21.03.

Section 21.04.

Section 21.05.

Section 21.06.

Section 21.07.

Section 21.08.

Enforcement 51

Permits 51

Certificates Of Occupancy 51

Fees 52

Amendments 52

Zoning Policies And Procedures 53

Policies And Procedures For City Initiated

Zoning Activities 53

Procedures For Rezoning Request By

Citizen/Property Owner 55

34a

ARTICLE XXII

BOARD OF ZONING APPEALS

Section 22.01. Creation Of Board Of Zoning Appeals 56

Section 22.02. Membership And Appointments 56

Section 22.03. Term of Office 56

Section 22.04. Compensation 56

Section 22.05. Rules And Procedures 56

Section 22.06. Administrative Assistance 56

Section 22.07. Meetings 56

Section 22.08. Appeals And Review 57

Section 22.09. Fee For Appeals 57

Section 22.10.

Section 22.11.

Section 22.12.

Powers Of Board Of Zoning Appeals

Concerning Variances 57

Notice of Hearing 59

Approval Period 60

ARTICLE XXIll

INTERPRETATION, APPLICATION, VIOLATIONS,

VALIDITY CONFLICT AND EFFECTIVE DATE

Section 23.01. Interpretation, Purpose And Conflict 61

Section 23.02. Violations And Penalties 61

Section 23.03. Validity |

Section 23.04. Conflicting Provisions Repealed 61

Section 23.05. Effective Date 61

ZONING ORDINANCE

CITY OF BAINBRIDGE GEORGIA

PREAMBLE

An Ordinance of the City of Bainbridge. Georgia, to

regulate and restrict the use of land and buildings by dividing

the City of Bainbridge into districts; defining certain terms

used therein; imposing regulations, prohibitions and restric-

tions governing the erection, construction and reconstruction

35a

of structures and buildings and the use of lands for business,

industry, residence. social and other specified purposes; regu-

lating and limiting the height of buildings and open spaces;

regulating and limiting the density of population; limiting

congestion on the public streets by providing for off-street

parking and loading of vehicles; providing for the gradual

elimination of non conforming uses of land, buildings and

structures; establishing the boundaries of districts; providing

the means of enforcing said Ordinance and providing a

penalty for violation of said Ordinance, and repealing

conflicting ordinances.

ARTICLE I

INTRODUCTION

Section 1.01. Short Title. This Ordinance shall be known as

the Zoning Ordinance of the City of Bainbridge.

Section 1.02. Authority for Enactment The Mayor and Coun-

cil of the City of Bainbridge enact this Ordinance under the

exercise of powers conferred upon it by the Georgia State

Constitution, Article IX, Section II, Paragraph IV.

ARTICLE II

DEFINITIONS

ACCESSORY BUILDING: A subordinate building or struc-

ture on the same lot, or part of the main building, occupied by

or devoted exclusively to an accessory use.

ACCESSORY USE: A use naturally and normally incidental

to, subordinate to, and auxiliary to the permitted use of the

premises. —

ADAPTIVE RE-USE: The development of a new use for an

older building or for a building originally designed for a

special or specific purpose.Adaptive reuse is particularly

useful as a technique for preserving older buildings or historic

or architectural significance in the Central Business District

of the City.

36a

APARTMENT HOUSE: A residential structure containing

three (3) or more apartments.

BILLBOARD: Any construction or portion thereof upon

which a sign or advertisement is placed, painted, or otherwise

designated for the purpose of making anything known to the

general public, but not including bulletin boards used to

display official court or public office notices.

BOARD OF ZONING APPEALS: The words “Board of

Zoning Appeals” or, “Board” shall mean the Board of Zoning

Appeals of the City of Bainbridge.

BOARDING HOUSE: A dwelling where meals or lodging

and meals, are provided for compensation to three or more

persons by pre-arrangement for definite periods. A boarding

house is to be distinguished from a hotel, motel or a nursing

home.

BUILDING, PRINCIPAL: A building in which is conducted

the principal use of the lot on which it is located.

BUILDING HEIGHT: The vertical distance measured from

the curb level to the highest point of the roof surface, if a flat

roof: to the deck line of mansard roofs; and to the mean

height level between eaves and ridge of gable, hip, and

gambrel roofs.

CLINIC: A professional office where the services of more

than one practitioner can be obtained and where patients are

studied or treated on an out-patient basis and where no over-

night accommodations are provided.

COMMISSION: The word “Commission” shall mean the

Planning Commission of Bainbridge.

CONVALESCENT HOME: A convalescent home is a home

for the care of children or the aged or infirm, or a place of rest

for those suffering bodily disorders, wherein two or more

persons are cared for. Said home shall conform and qualify

for license under State laws.

37a

CONDOMINIUM HOME: A form of ownership of less than

the whole of a building or system of buildings under a statute

which provides the mechanics and facilities for formal filing

and recording of divided interest in real property, whether the

division is vertical or horizontal.

DAY CARE FACILITY: A day care facility is any indi-

vidual or jointly owned facility designated to offer care

and/or training to children unrelated to the owner or director

for any part of a day on some kind of a regular basis. Such

facility may or may not be operated for profit. Day care is not

a baby-sitting service to be used for the convenience of the

parents at irregular intervals (Drop-ins).

DENSITY: The number of families residing on, or dwelling

units developed on an acre or land. As used in this ordinance,

all densities are stated in families per gross acre.

DRIVE-IN ESTABLISHMENT: A business establishment,

other than a drive-in restaurant. so developed that its retail or

service character is dependent on providing a driveway

approach or parking spaces for motor vehicles so as to serge

patrons while in the motor vehicle.

DRIVE-IN RESTAURANT: A drive-in restaurant or. other

drive-in establishment serving food and/or drink so developed

that its retail or service character is dependent on providing a

driveway approach or parking spaces for motor vehicles so as

to serve patrons while in the motor vehicle.

DWELLING, SINGLE FAMILY: A building or portion

thereof used or designed for use as a residence for a single

family.

DWELLING, MULTIPLE: A building or portion thereof

used or designed as a residence for three or more families

living independently or each other and doing their own

cooking in said building. This definition includes three-family

38a

houses, four-family houses, and apartment houses, but

does not include hotels, motels, trailer camps or mobile

home parks.

FAMILY: One or more persons living together and related

by blood, marriage, or legal adoption, and occupying a

dwelling unit as a single non-profit housekeeping unit as

distinguished from a group occupying a hotel, club. boarding

house, fraternity or sorority house. A family shall be deemed

to include domestic servants. gratuity guests, and not more

than three foster or boarded children whose room and board is

paid by a recognized child care agency or organization.

FLEA MARKET: A market at which second hand articles

are displayed and sold.

GARAGE, PRIVATE: An accessory building designed or

used for the storage of not more than three motor driven

vehicles owned and used by the occupants of the building to

which it is accessory.

GARAGE, PUBLIC: Any premises used for the storage or

care of motor driven vehicles, or place where any such

vehicles are equipped for operation, repaired or kept for

remuneration. hire or sale.

GROUP HOME: A group home is a residential use (home)

of a property in residential areas of the City of Bainbridge for

the care of individuals in the home environment which have

mental and/or developmental disabilities or individuals who

will benefit socially from living in a group environment. All

group homes must be licensed by the appropriate state

agency.

GUEST HOUSE: A building or portion thereof used or

esigned for uses as a residence, specifically as an accessory

use to be the principal building. Z

39a

HALF-WAY-HOME: A group home facility which is

licensed or supervised by any Federal, State, or County

health/welfare agency relating to drug abuse problems,

offender rehabilitation or similar purposes.

HOME OCCUPATION: Any use conducted entirely within

the dwelling and carried on by the inhabitants thereof, which

use is incidental and secondary to the use of the dwelling for

dwelling purposes and does not change the character thereof.

Provided further, that no article or service is sold or offered

for sale on the premises, except such as is produced by such

occupation; that such occupation shall not require internal or

external alterations or construction features, equipment,

machinery, outdoor storage, or signs not customary in resi-

dential areas. One (1) non-illuminated name plate, which is

not more than two (?) square feet in area. may be attached to

the building which shall contain only the name and

occupation of the resident of the premises. Clinics. hospitals,

barber shops, beauty parlors, and child care center day

nurseries, among others. shall not be deemed to be home

occupations.

KENNEL: Any lot or premises on which three (3) or more

dogs, four (4) months or more old. are kept either perm-

anently or temporarily, for purpose of sale, care, breeding or

training for which any fee is charged.

MINI-WAREHOUSE: A buildings s that contains varying

sizes or individual. compartmentalized and control-access

stalls or lockers for storing the excess personal property of an

individual or tamily. No business agtivities other than the

rental of storage units shall be conducted on the premises.

MOBILE HOME: “Mobile Home” is a detached single

family dwelling unit, designed for longterm occupancy,

which has been prefabricated and then transported to its site

or to a sales lot usually on its own wheels, except the units

commonly referred to as the “Double-wiles”, and requires

40a

only minor work before occupancy such as connection to

utilities or to a foundation. Such units are usually fully

equipped and furnished. Mobile Homes must bear the

insignia issued by the U. S. Department of Housing and

Urban Development (H. U. D.) All mobile homes within the

City of Bainbridge will either be located within a mobile

home park or mobile home ‘subdivision.

MOBILE HOME PARK: “Mobile Home Park” shall mean a

licensed business operation which leases spaces for

permanent or for temporary occupancy for periods exceeding

thirty (30) days for mobile homes and, under some con-

ditions, travel trailers.

MOBILE HOME SUBDIVISION: A “Mobile Home Sub-

division” is defined as at least a three (3) acre site which has

been designed for the subdivision of individual lots for

exclusive mobile home development.

MODULAR HOMES: “Modular Homes” means a factory-

fabricated single family dwelling which is constructed in one

or more sections. “These units are manufactured in accord-

ance with the Georgia Industrialized Building Act and the

rules of the Department of Community Affairs issued

pursuant thereto.” Each unit must bear a seal of approval

issued by the Commissioner of DCA.

OPEN AIR BUSINESS USES: Open air business uses shall

include the following:

a. Retail sale of trees, shrubbery, plants, flowers, seed,

topsoil, humus, fertilizer, trellises, lawn furniture,

playground equipment and other home garden sup-

plies and equipment.

b. Retail sale of fruit and vegetables.

c. Miniature golf, golf driving range, children’s amuse-

ment park or similar recreation uses.

4la

d. Bicycle, trailer. motor vehicles. boats or home equip-

ment sales, service or rental services.

e. Outdoor display and sale of garages, swimming pools,

and similar use.

PLANNED UNIT DEVELOPMENT: A Planned Unit De-

velopment is a single parcel of land within which a number of

buildings are located or intended to be located in accordance

with an overall plan of design and not in relation to a

prearranged pattern of land subdivision. Examples of a

Planned Unit Development (P.U.D.) include a complex of

apartment buildings or a shopping center with a number of

stores.

SERVICE STATION: A building or structure designed or

used for the retail sale or supple of fuels, lubricants, air, water

and other operating commodities for motor vehicles, aircraft

or boats. and including the customary space and facilities for

the installation of such commodities on or in such vehicles,

and including space for facilities for the temporary storage of

vehicles not over forty-eight (48) hours, minor repair, or

servicing, but not including buffing, painting, refinishing,

steam cleaning, rust-proofing, or high speed washing thereof.

SIGN, OUTDOOR ADVERTISING: Any card, cloth, paper,

metal, glass, plastic, wood. plaster, stone or sign of other

material of any kind, placed for outdoor advertising purposes

on the ground or on any tree. wall, bush, rock, post, fence,

building, structure, or thing whatsoever. The term “placed: as

used in the definition of “Outdoor Advertising Sign”, and

“Outdoor Advertising Structure’’ shall include erecting, con-

structing, posting, painting, printing, tacking, nailing, gluing,

sticking, carving or other fastening, affixing or making visible

in any manner whatsoever. See also ‘‘BILLBOARD”.

TOWN HOUSE: One of a group of two or more attached

single family residences. Each town house unit is separated

from the adjoining unit or units by an approved fire wall or

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walls. Fire walls shall be located on the lot line. Each town

house has a front and rear ground level entrance. The town

house is located on its own approved. recorded “lot”.

VARIANCE: A variance is a relaxation of the terms of the

Zoning Ordinance where such variance will not be contrary to

the public interest and where, owing to conditions peculiar to

the particular property and not the result of any action of the

applicant, a literal enforcement of this Ordinance’s require-

~ ments would result in unnecessary and undue hardship (see

Section 22.10).

ARTICLE VII

R4A, SINGLE FAMILY RESIDENTIAL DISTRICT

Section 7.01. STATEMENT OF PURPOSE. The Single

Family Residential District is established as a district in

which the principal use of land is for single family dwellings.

For the single family residential district, the specific intent of

this Section is:

a. To encourage the construction of and the continued

use of the land for single family dwellings.

b. To discourage any land use which would generate

traffic on minor or local streets, other than normal

traffic to serve the residences on those streets.

Section 7.02. PERMITTED USES.

a. Single family detached dwellings, except mobile

homes.

b. Accessory buildings or uses customarily incidental to

any of the permitted uses, when located on the same

lot and not involving any business, profession, trade

or occupation. One (1) private garage for each

residential lot in which there are housed not more than

four (4) automobiles, not more than one (1) of which

may be a commercial vehicle not larger than a reg-

ularly manufactured pick-up or panel truck of 7500

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lbs. gross vehicle weight capacity, which shall be

housed within a garage and provided said commercial

vehicle is owned and operated by a member of the

family that resides in said living unit.

Section 7.03. USES PERMITTED AFTER SPECIAL

REVIEW BY THE PLANNING COMMISSION AND

APPROVED BY THE CITY COUNCIL.

a. Churches, provided that the proposed site is not less

than two (2) acres and a complete site development

sketch is submitted with the application and provision

is made for off-street parking.

b. Public and private schools.

. c. Recreational developments.

d. Cemeteries, provided that a complete site develop-

ment sketch is submitted with the application.

e. Clubs and fraternal organizations not operating for

profit provided that:

1. The buildings are not placed closer than fifty (50)

feet to any property lines; and

2. There is a planted buffer-strip at least ten (10) feet

wide along the side and rear lot lines.

f. Public buildings, structures or land uses.

g. Hospitals and clinics.

h. Home Occupations—Home occupations as limited

and defined in Article II.

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ARTICLE VIII

R-I, SINGLE-FAMILY RESIDENTIAL DISTRICT

Section 8.01. STATEMENT OF PURPOSE. The Single-

Family Residential Districts are established as districts in

which the principal use of land is for single-family dwell-

ings. For the R-1 single-family residential districts, in

promoting the general purpose of these regulations. the

specific intent of this Section is:

a. To encourage the construction of, and the continued

use of the land for single-family dwellings.

Section 8.02. PERMITTED USES

Any permitted use in the R-1 A district, except mobile

homes.

Section 8.03. USES PERMITTED AFTER SPECIAL

REVIEW BY THE PLANNING COMMISSION AND

APPROVED BY THE CITY COUNCIL.

a. Any use listed under Section 7.03 of R-1 A district.

Section 8.04. AREA, HEIGHT, AND PLACEMENT

REQUIREMENTS. (In accordance with the Schedule of

Regulations. Article XX).

ARTICLE IX

R-2. TWO-FAMILY AND MULTIPLE-FAMILY

RESIDENTIAL DISTRICT

Section 9.01. STATEMENT OF PURPOSE, The intent of the

R-2 Residential District is to provide for medium to higher

density residential development; to provide for variety in the

City’s housing stock, to encourage neighborhood mainten-

ance and preservation by allowing the conversion of large

single-family homes to two family and multi-family use; and

to provide suitable areas for new multi-family development.

45a

Section 9.02. PERMITTED USES.

a. Any use permitted in the R-1 residential district,

except mobile homes.

b. Two family (Duplex) residential.

Multi-family (apartments and condominiums) *

d. Townhouses (subject to the provisions of Article XI,

Sections 11.04 through 11.07.)

Section 9.03. USES PERMITTED AFTER SPECIAL

REVIEW BY THE PLANNING COMMISSION AND

APPROVAL BY THE CITY COUNCIL.

a. Mortuaries.

b. Cemeteries.

c. Professional offices.

d. Public and private schools.

e. Public Buildings.

f. Art, music, photographic and dance studies.

g. Recreation development.

h. Boarding homes.

i. Home occupations.

j. Clinics.

k. Hospital and rest homes.

1. Nursery school, kindergarten, day care facilities.

m. Half-way houses.

* For development of apartment units of only one building on a given

site. The R-PUD development standards Article X, Sections 10.05

through 10.08, will apply to multiple dwellings of more than one building

on a given site.

46a

n. Other uses similar to the above and compatible with

the local neighborhood and environment as interpreted

by the Planning Commission and approved by the

City Council.

Section 9.04. AREA HEIGHT -AND PLACEMENT

REQUIREMENTS. (In accordance with the Schedule of

Regulations, Article XX). -

ARTICLE X

R-PUD, RESIDENTIAL PLANNED UNIT

DEVELOPMENT DISTRICT

Section 10.01. STATEMENT OF PURPOSE. It is the

intention of this section to provide areas of sufficient size and

allowing reasonable flexibility in design and orientation for

the establishment of a structure, or group of structures, which

includes multiple dwellings designed in a planned unit

development of more than one building on a given site.

Therefore, the Zoning Ordinance regulations relative to

area, height, bulk and placement may, in the Planned Unit

Development District, be modified by the Planning Com-

mission and City Council, in the case of a plan for a large

scale development which, in the judgment of the Planning

Commission and City Council, provides adequate open space

and improvements for circulation. recreation, light, air and

service needs of the tract when fully developed, provided that

in no case may the density of the proposed planned unit

development exceed 13 dwelling units per acre and provided

further that the minimum site size for the residential planned

unit development is three (3) acres.

Section 10.02. PROCEDURES FOR PUD (R-PUD, C-PUD)

APPROVAL. Any proposed property for PUD development

must first be rezoned to the appropriate (R-PUD or CPUD)

zoning classification. The PUD rezoning procedure will

generally follow the same procedures as other rezoning

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requests. However, the applicant for PUD zoning shall submit

a preliminary site development plan of the proposed

development at the same time a petition for PUD zoning

is made.

No rezoning for PUD will be granted to a petitioner until

the preliminary site plan is reviewed by the Planning

Commission and approved by the City Council, respecting

other property rezoning criteria established by the City.

Section 10.03. PERMITTED USES. In all R-PUD Districts,

no building or land, except as otherwise provided in this

Ordinance, shall be erected or used except for one or more of

the following specified uses:

a. One, two, and multi-family dwelling units including

town house dwellings.

b. Mobile home parks, provided that the density of the

proposed mobile home park shall not exceed ten ( 10)

dwelling units per acre and provided further that the

minimum size of the proposed mobile home park shall

be not less than four (4) acres, and meet appropriate

design standards.

Section 10.04. USES PERMITTED AFTER SPECIAL

REVIEW BY THE PLANNING COMMISSION AND

APPROVAL BY THE CITY COUNCIL.

Any use listed under Sections 9.03 of R-2 District.

Section 10.05. PRELIMINARY REVIEW. Preliminary re-

view is recommended as an aid to both the developer and to

the City. Under this procedure, a developer provides the

information which is described below and the Planning

Commission then acts on the information provided. This

review is intended to then serve as a guide for the immediate

inspection of the Planning Commission, subject to a thorough

study and analysis. Changes and additions which may have to

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be made before a mutual agreement is reached can be made

at such time without excessive engineering costs to the

developer.

Section 10.06. PROCEDURE FOR PRELIMINARY AP-

PROVAL. An application shall be submitted to the Planning

Commission by the owner or his authorized representative for

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Appendices — King v. City of Bainbridge · 540 U.S. 876 | Frix