Opposition Brief — Sodexho Marriott Services, Inc. v. McReynolds

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No. 02-1781 ~ | JUL ce Y eens

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Supreme Court of the Anited States

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SODEXHO MARRIOTT SERVICES, INC.,

Petitioner,

v.

CYNTHIA CARTER MCREYNOLDS, et al.,

Respondents.

¢

On Petition For Writ Of Certiorari

To The United States Court Of Appeals

For The District Of Columbia Circuit

¢

BRIEF FOR RESPONDENTS IN OPPOSITION

TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

¢

KERRY ALAN SCANLON*

DAVID O. BICKART

STEVEN S. ROSENTHAL

T. MELINDAH BUSH

NICOLE J. BECTON

KAYE SCHOLER LLP

901 15th Street, N.W., Suite 1100

Washington, DC 20005

(202) 682-3500

Attorneys for Respondents

* Counsel of Record

COCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING CO. (800) 225-6964

OR CALL COLLECT (402) 342-2831

QUESTION PRESENTED

Should this Court review a decision by the court of

appeals denying an interlocutory appeal under Rule 23(f)

of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, where the decision

is one committed to the sole and unfettered discretion of

the courts of appeals?

ii

‘TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

QUESTION PRESENTE D)........0cssceverssvssesssnvavsesevesss i

COUNTER-STATEMENT OF THE CASE ................ 1

REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT.................... 10

A.

The Court of Appeals’ Decision Not to Accept

Sodexho’s Petition for Interlocutory Review

Was Committed to that Court’s Discretion

and Does Not Warrant This Court’s Review...

. The Language, History and Advisory

Committee Notes of Rule 23(f) Support the

Conclusion that the Decision Whether to

Grant Interlocutory Review is Committed to

the Sole, Unfettered Discretion of the Courts

OC DRDOUAB: oss0cssninessniiincimaiinmaatin

There is No Circuit Conflict on Rule 23(f)

UTR oncnsvsinnnsvnsiiintacsiqnadiminiananecmmacatons,

The Committee on Rules of Practice and

Procedure Has Identified No Problems with

Rule 23(f) that Require Fixing at This Time;

Any Efforts to Circumscribe the Courts of

Appeals’ Discretion As to Whether to Review

Class Certification Orders Should be Left to

the Committee or to Congress...............:0ecce00s

Even if the District Court’ Partial

Certification Order Presented Unsettled

Issues of Class Action Law for D.C. Circuit

Review, That Fact Provides No Reason for

This Court to Review This Case................0006

CONCLUEEIN coscnrrevsssneciannsanbionnieanaiimmemnntanineiiinia

10

12

14

18

LUST

ill

TABLE OF CONTENTS -- Continued

i cospccssnvissensnisienasbvovoaunsnbone App. 1

Letter from Judge Anthony J. Scirica to Honorable

F. James Sensenbrenruer, Jr.

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

CASES

Blair v. Equifax Check Servs., Inc., 181 F.3d 832

CE SE. SEE chiianicnniimiatiiananmnneian 15, 16

Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463 (1978) ...10, 13

Cook v. Boorstin, 763 F.2d 1462 (D.C. Cir. 1989) ............... 4

General Telephone Company of the Southwest v.

Fetes, GBF UB. BAT CI vice cvcsccescoscssnsiissessassovessoveenss 3

Hartman v. Duffey, 19 F.3d 1459 (D.C. Cir. 1994).............. 3

In re Delta Air Lines, 310 F.3d 953 (6th Cir. 2002),

cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 2252 (2003) ........... sihlinialcaiilatal 15,17

In re Lorazepam & Clorazepate Antitrust Litig., 289

Ae BO CES... CR, cis csencacevasesessosesvicssess 11, 15, 16, 17

Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, Inc., 338 U.S.

He ticks ciiiciniennncaistaseiaessnenbintiaseiienelaisiesanaiainmcodaen 13, 14

Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co. v. Norris, 529 U.S.

1107 (2000), denying cert., 191 F.3d 283 (2d Cir.

Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co. v. Robinson, 535

U.S. 951 (2002), denying cert., 267 F.3d 147 (2d

Se: Bn eiish sins cinnierinlaiichtnndasneennaiaascpd tutabucneidinianssiebiasades 21

ivewton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,

Inc., 259 F.3d 154 (3d Cir. 2001)................ eee ee 16, 17, 19

Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Chase, No. 02-1447

(June 6, 2003), denying cert., 310 F.3d 953 (6th

NG SI cicnesssnecunsincicsgsannliniadtte ecccaietiianeitiniadgaieapeeneddlaacasininesies 20

Prado-Steinman ex rel. Prado v. Bush, 221 F.3d

SA GEE Se CN va niiececnsskevintinpinvarsennontnnerniantantesebucns 16

~

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued

Page

Segar v. Civiletti, 508 F. Supp. 690 (D.D.C. 1981),

aff’d, 738 F.2d 1249 (D.C. Cir. 1984)...........ccsscceseeeeeeees 4

Swint v. Chambers County Comm’n, 514 U.S. 35

(FID ciosinisscistssincecntensinpiiviisin academician 15

Szabo v. Bridgeport Machs., Inc., 584 U.S. 951

(2001), denying cert., 249 F.3d 672 (7th Cir. 2001)........ 20

Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989)...........::cecsesrereeeeeeeees 14

United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55 (2002)... eens 13

Visa U.S.A., Inc. v. Walmart Stores, Inc., 536 U.S.

~ 917 (2002), denying cert., 280 F.2d 124 (2d Cir.

ED sicssisickinsncosvercsnkitenienteteniunssakasesancbiabalimdentsliaeman ial 20

STATUTES

28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) cenisiiisaneceadidieh nbiiaead astlidealamniiaiaadeiaenaacamal 11

43 UB.C. GF BOG 00 OF BOG, sevsivesievnvesiesscsncssamassationeaninervmintin 2

GRU BL. 6 Th kidman: 2

Rules Enabling Act, Pub. L. No. 102-572, § 101, 106

Stat. 4506 (codified as 28 U.S.C. § 1292(e)).................65 10

RULES

Pek, Kh. Aanth. Fi GG) scevvesivcisssvevnsninvivecnicsmetiecensiagmmeniananl 15

Pad. B: Bee. Pe NG covnioccinniceeenneee 15

Pod, Fy Cae Fe Be vistcssssertnianiviccniominmnncnieneaeena 4

Ped. Th, Ce Fe a icecccncccesiansitosusieninccnnsinmintinncaanisin passim

vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued

Page

MISCELLANEOUS

Administrative Office of U.S. Courts, “Judicial

Business of the United States Courts 2002,”

Table X-4, available at http:/;www.uscourts.gov/

JUDAS UIA TREIIUE DEINE wens nessienrevinininiionnsncemmmnnnontnenaes 18

Letter from Judge Anthony J. Scirica to Honorable

F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., reprinted in H.R.

Rep. No. 106-144 at 127 (2O0SB)........::.ss0sveseorssesssrsssssverses 19

1

COUNTER-STATEMENT OF THE CASE’

This employment discrimination case challenges a

promotion process that used to be common 40 and 50 years

ago. Supervisors and senior officials, who are overwheln -

ingly white, have been given free reign to handpick their

selections from lower management ranks without a

competitive posting process, without using any predeter-

mined selection criteria and without recording why they

selected their favored promotion candidates and rejected

or declined to consider disfavored candidates. A leading

industrial psychologist described this system as “lax and

corruptible,” and prone to discrimination against racial

minorities. Prien Rep. J 4, Exhibit 11 to Motion for Class

Certification, Docket No. 34.’ No one should be surprised

that the company’s “good old boy network,” as some of its

white managers described it, did in fact discriminate

against black managers. Hendrickson Dep. at 164, 166,

184, Exhibit 7 to Motion for Class Certification, Docket

No. 34. Racism flourished in this system and the com-

pany’ own human resources personnel, including a

corporate vice president, agreed that the supervisors

involved in most of the promotion decisions “won't hire

[black people].” Petitioner’s Appendix (hereinafter “Pet.

App.”) B at lla.

The Respondents charge that the Petitioner, Sodexho

Marriott Services, Inc. (“Sodexho”), has denied its

African-American managers promotions and promotion

* This Counter-Statement of the Case, accompanied by record

citations, is submitted in response to Petitioner’s Statement of the

Case, which is devoid of record citations.

? The record citations in this brief are to the district court record

and docket numbers because no record on appeal was created

2

opportunities, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights

Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seg. and the Civil Rights

Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, in the following ways,

among others: “(1) positions are filled without being posted

at all; (2) when jobs are posted, favored employees are

preselected for the positions; and (3) when ‘more than one

person is actually considered for an opening, hiring man-

agers have virtually total discretion in their promotion

decisions because they are not given job-related or objec-

tive criteria and are not required to document the reasons

for their decisions, making them unreviewable.’” Pet. App.

B at 9a-10a. The Complaint further alleges that Sodexho’s

African-American managers face a “glass wall” as well as a

“glass ceiling,” because they have been shunted into dead-

end “black” accounts that serve and are supervised mostly

by African-Americans. See Class Complaint at { 24k, 27,

Docket No. 1. The Complaint seeks extensive and highly

detailed injunctive relief, including requiring Sodexho to

adopt and implement a validated promotion selection

procedure, including job posting and interview policies and

to keep records of its selection criteria and its promotion

decisions. Id. at 52-54. The Complaint also seeks back pay

and compensatory and punitive damages. Id. at 54.°

* The Complaint seeks no particular amount of damages, let alone

the $1 billion cited in the Petition, Pet. at 4, which assumes without a

shred of record support that every class member would recover

$300,000 — the statutory maximum under Title VII. The Petition

provides no record support for this assumption, and the only class

member testimony relied on by Petitioner in the District Court merely

observed that the amount of damages was for a jury to decide. See, e.g.,

Richardson Dep. at 214-21, Exhibit 98 to Motion for Class Certification,

Docket No. 34.

After six months of discovery, the respondents moved

to certify the case as a class action on behalf of all ad-

versely impacted African-American salaried employees at

Sodexho or its predecessors during the class period who

held or sought to hold upper-level managerial or supervi-

sory positions or jobs leading to those positions. See Pet.

App. B at 10a. Petitioner estimated that 2,600 Sodexho

employees are included in the certified class and Respon-

dents do not dispute that the number of class members is

roughly in the range of a few thousand.

Under D.C. Circuit law applying this Court’s holding

in General Telephone Company of the Southwest v. Falcon,

457 U.S. 147 (1982), the class representatives are required

to make a “significant showing” that Sodexho’s promotion

practices operated under a “common policy” of discrimina-

tion. Hartman v. Duffey, 19 F.3d 1459, 1472 (D.C. Cir.

1994) (citing Wagner v. Taylor, 836 F.2d 578, 589 (D.C. Cir.

1987)). Pet. App. B at 27a-28a, 32a. In evaluating whether

Respondents made a “significant showing,” the district

court considered nine volumes of Sodexho documents,

depositions, transcripts and expert reports. Jd. at 3a. The

portrait that emerged from this “comprehensive record,”

id., was of a promotion process that was typical of the

early 1960s, which is rife with the risk that managers,

exercising unlimited and unreviewable discretion, will

continue promoting white employees to higher positions

previously occupied by whites and keeping black employ-

ees in lower-level positions traditionally held by blacks.

Sodexho’s selection procedures do not represent, as

Petitioner suggests, merely “decentralized” decisionmak-

ing. Instead, as the district court found, “the testimony of

Sodexho’s own witness, as well as that of other company

employees confirms that Sodexho’s policy and practice is to

4

allow each manager to make promotion decisions based on

whatever crite:ia he or she chooses, with no guidance or

rules.” Id. at 3la-32a. Sodexho’s hiring managers have

“complete discretion” to decide whom to interview for each

position. Jd. at 9a. They are subject to no rules and are

given no guidelines on how to evaluate or rank those

promotion candidates that they do interview. Jd. And they

typically keep no notes or other documentation to explain

their selection. Jd. Upon reviewing this system, whose

elements Sodexho’s own witnesses repeatedly confirmed,

one of this countrys foremost industrial psychologists

testified that in 40 years he had never encountered a

company of Sodexho’s size with such “lax and corruptible

selection criteria and procedures.” Motion for Class Certi-

fication at 1, Docket No. 34.

The D.C. Circuit has long recognized that promotion

systems, like Sodexho’s, that are “unchecked,” “unvali-

dated” and “subjective” present a great risk of racial bias

when the decisionmakers are predominantly white. See,

e.g., Cook v. Boorstin, 763 F.2d 1462, 1472 (D.C. Cir. 1989);

Segar v. Civiletti, 508 F. Supp. 690, 706 (D.D.C. 1981),

aff’d, 738 F.2d 1249 (D.C. Cir. 1984).* However, Respon-

dents did not rely solely on facts that showed a risk of

* Sodexho’s class certification opposition ignored these controlling

precedents. Its petition for certiorari compounds its earlier error by

misstating that the district court found a “lack of controlling precedent”

on whether subjective selection criteria may-represent a common issue

of fact or law supporting certification under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). Pet. at

23. The “controlling precedent” which the district court found lacking

consisted of district court opinions in other circuits upon which Sodexho

had relied. These opinions were not “controlling” because they involved

very different facts. Pet. App. B at 35a.

5

bias. They presented, and the district court considered,

admissions by high-ranking Sodexho managers that their

companys promotion system was indeed “corrupt.” For

example, human resource managers from across the

country, who work closely with the promotion system,

admitted that “our district managers won’t hire black

people.” Pet. App. B at 1la-12a. Sodexho’s top official and

corporate representative for equal employment opportu-

nity issues testified that the sparse number of “African-

American promotions ‘indicated a problem’ and ‘would be

considered low.’” Jd. at 11a. A senior-level white manager

also provided several examples of preselection of white

managers for promotions and racist statements by other

white upper-level managers, such as “African Americans

were genetically inferior to whites, and genetically most of

the criminals in the world were African Americans, and

that they didn’t deserve to have promotions.” Jd. at 12a.

Contrary to Sodexho’s unsupported assertions in its

petition about its “aggressive pursuit of affirmative ac-

tion,” Pet. at 5, the record also shows, and the district

court found, that Sodexho’s top managers admitted that

they had a problem promoting blacks to upper-level jobs

but did nothing to remedy the problem. They tried instead

to cover it up. For example, in 1995, company executives

“were made aware of the lack of African-Americans” in

upper-level jobs by members of the company’s own diver-

sity roundtable group, yet they did nothing to address or

remedy the problem. Pet. App. B at 12a-13a. In fact, a

Sodexho executive refused to permit a class member to

6

review its workforce diversity data because “the numbers

really don’t look very good.” Id. at 13a.°

The Respondents buttressed their showing of class-

wide discrimination with a statistical analysis of Sodexho’s

company-wide promotion data by Dr. Bernard Siskin,

whose opinions Petitioner concedes satisfy Fed. R. Evid.

702, i.e., are “based upon sufficient facts or data,” are the

“product of reliable principles and methods” and have been

applied “reliably to the facts of the case.” Pet. at 8 (conced-

ing that Dr. Siskin’s report satisfied threshold for admissi-

bility). Dr. Siskin concluded that Sodexho’s company-wide

promotion process had resulted in statistically significant

racial disparities in promotions adverse to African-

Americans. See Pet. App. B at 15a-16a. After examining

over 10,000 promotions from 1995-2001, Dr. Siskin esti-

mated, with a high degree of confidence (statistically

significant at more than eight standard deviations, far

* Sodexho also argues, with no record citation whatsoever, that its

“employment practices have been reviewed numerous times by the U.S.

Department of Labor’s Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs

(“OFCCP”) and have repeatedly received a clean bill of health.” Pet. at

5. However, Sodexho’s own corporate witness for equal employment

opportunity and affirmative action issues admitted that although the

Department of Labor requires annual affirmative action plans for each

individual unit with more than 50 employees, of which Sodexho has

hundreds, Petitioner has produced only about 20 affirmative action

plans (“AAPs”), none of which covered more than a single year. See

Watkis Dep. v.2 at 181-83, Exhibit 4 to Motion for Class Certification,

Docket No. 34. Those AAPs appear to have been created only in

response to the handful of audits by the OFCCP for a few individual

units. Such threadbare affirmative action compliance is hardly “aggres-

sive,” but instead falls short of even the basic affirmative action

requirements. Moreover, an OFCCP audit of only a handful of units

cannot be construed as a “clean bill of health.”

NTR AAAS AT NI A

above the 1.96 standard deviations which the D.C. Circuit

has accepted) that African-Americans had received far

fewer promotions than one would expect in a race-neutral

promotion process. See Pet. App. B at 15a-l6a & n.12;

Siskin Rep. at {9 24, 33, Exhibit 9 to Motion for Class

Certification, Docket No. 34; Siskin Supp. Rep. at 76,

Exhibit 50 to Motion for Class Certification, Docket No.

34. The district court recognized that under controlling

D.C. Circuit precedent, such a statistically significant

disparity, standing alone, is sufficient to establish the

presence of a class-wide discriminatory practice. Pet. App.

B at 16a n.12 (citing Anderson v. Zubieta, 180 F.3d 329,

339-40 (D.C. Cir. 1999)). Dr. Siskin’s analysis also sup-

ported the plaintiffs’ “glass wall” allegation. He found that

African-American managers are segregated by race into

predominantly “black accounts,” with nearly two-thirds of

all African-American managers in large accounts concen-

trated in less than ten percent of those accounts, while

two-thirds of those accounts (596 out of 878) have no

African-American managers at all. See id. at 16a.

The district court declined Petitioner’s request to

weigh Dr. Siskin’s analysis against the competing analysis

of the same data offered by its expert. Although the

district court ruled that the case law did not support

weighing conflicting expert opinions at the class certifica-

tion stage, id. at 13a-14a and n.10, it nevertheless consid-

ered Sodexho’s criticisms of Dr. Siskin’s statistical analysis

that have now been recycled in the certiorari petition.

First, contrary to Sodexho’s contention that Dr. Siskin

“failed to assess whether the shortfall [of African-

American promotions] was national in scope or was

limited to particular divisions, regions, or local operating

units,” see Pet. at 4, the district court recognized that he

8

had indeed found that these statistically significant racial

disparities existed company-wide. See Pet. App. B at 17a.

Next, the district court rejected Petitioner’s criticism,

which it raises again in this Court, that Dr. Siskin failed to

consider whether disparities in education or work experi-

ence explained the racial disparity in promotions. See Pet.

at 8-9. Because Sodexho had no computerized data on

education or work experience that an expert could use, the

district court refused to “penalize” respondents for So-

dexho’s own “lack of centralized controls and record

keeping.” Pet. App. B at 38a n.25.°

The district court also rejected Petitioner’s contention

that the class representatives were inadequate, because

the class potentially included managers who had super-

vised other class members. Jd. at 48a-49a. Consistent with

other district court decisions in the circuit, the district

court read the leading D.C. Circuit decision on intra-class

conflicts to require a case-by-case evaluation of the impact

of a potential conflict among supervisors on the class

member’s adequacy, and on the particular facts of this

* The testimony of its statistical expert; Dr. Haworth, was neither

(as described by Sodexho) more “objective” nor “more accurate” (Pet. at

5, 6) than Dr. Siskin’s. To take but one example, Dr. Haworth unac-

countably assumed the only qualified candidates for “open” positions

came from those few, other units from which successful candidates had

previously been selected. For example, Dr. Haworth’s “pool” of two

white managers who were, by her assumption, the only ones “available”

for a position at American University in Washington, D.C., included a

white man from North Carolina, who was selected for the job, and

excluded 31 blacks in the same job category in the Washington, D.C.

area, five of whom already worked at American University. See Siskin

Decl. at J 4, Exhibit 92 to Respondent’s Reply Memorandum In Support

of Its Motion for Class Certification, Docket No. 47.

9

case, found the potential for conflict to be minimal. Jd. at

47a (citing Wagner v. Taylor).

Therefore, the district court found that Respondents

had “made a ‘significant showing’ [as required by D.C.

Circuit precedent] that Sodexho’s lack of any uniform

promotion policy or guidelines has had a disparate impact

on the promotion of African-American employees, and has

enabled or even fostered an environment at the company

in which officials intentionally discriminate against blacks

by denying them promotions to upper-level managerial

positions.” Id. at 32a. On June 25, 2002, the Court certi-

fied, for liability purposes only, a class of African-American

managers employed by Sodexho since March 27, 1998. Id.

at 3a-4a, 53a-54a. Pending a determination on liability,

the Court deferred decision on certifying any remedial

issues, such as those involving back pay or any other

monetary relief. Id. at 5la-52a.

On July 10, 2002, Petitioner filed a Rule 23(f) petition

for interlocutory appeal, which the court of appeals denied

because it did not present “any ‘unsettled and fundamen-

tal issue[s] of law relating to class actions, important both

to the specific litigation and generally, that [are] likely to

evade end-of-the-case review.’” Pet. App. A at la-2a.

Sodexho now seeks review of the court of appeals’ discre-

tionary order denying its Rule 23(f) petition.

¢

10

REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT

A. The Court of Appeals’ Decision Not to Accept

Sodexho’s Petition for Interlocutory Review

Was Committed to that Court’s Discretion and

Does Not Warrant This Court’s Review

With very limited exceptions, the U.S. courts of

appeals have jurisdiction to review only “final” district

court orders, and district court orders granting or denying

class certification are “interlocutory,” not “final.” In Coo-

pers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463 (1978), this Court

held that class certification orders are not reviewable

unless both the district court certifies the order under 28

U.S.C. § 1292(b) and the would-be appellant persuades the

court of appeals that “exceptional circumstances justify a

departure from the basic policy of postponing appellate

review until after the entry of a final judgment.” 437 U.S.

at 475 (quoting Fisons, Ltd. v. United States, 458 F.2d

1241, 1248 (7th Cir. 1972)). Coopers & Lybrand recognizes

that section 1292(b)’s screening procedure requires sepa-

rate, independent discretionary decisions by the district

court and the court of appeals. Id. at 474-75. Thus, even if

the district court exercises its discretionary power to

recommend an interlocutory appeal, “[t]he appellate court

may deny the appeal for any reason, including docket

congestion.” Jd. at 475.

Congress subsequently amended the Rules Enabling

Act to authorize this Court to “prescribe rules ... to

provide for an appeal of an interlocutory decision to the

Courts of Appeals.” Pub. L. No. 102-572, § 101, 106 Stat.

4506 (codified as 28 U.S.C. § 1292(e)). The Committee on

Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference

of the United States then proposed, and this Court

adopted, a new Civil Procedure Rule 23(f), which allows a

11

court of appeals “in its discretion [to] permit an appeal

from an order of a district court granting or denying class

action certification.... ” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(f). Rule 23(f)

was “designed on the model of § 1292(b),” and it built upon

§ 1292(b) jurisprudence. Proposed Amendments to the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 167 F.R.D. 523, 565

(1996). The new rule modified the § 1292(b) standard in

two respects, both of which increased the court of appeals’

discretion whether to accept an interlocutory appeal from

a class certification order: The court of appeals was given

discretion to accept an appeal without a district court

certification ruling, and the court of appeals’ jurisdiction

was not limited to orders that involved “a controlling

question of law as to which there is a substantial ground

for difference of opinion. ... ” Advisory Committee Notes

to Rule 23(f). The net effect of these modifications was that

Rule 23(f) vested the courts of appeals with broad and

standardless discretion as to whether to grant review of

class certification orders.

In the four and one-half years since Rule 23(f) went

into effect, many courts of appeals have described the

criteria they will use to guide themselves in the exercise of

their discretion under Rule 23(f). Although relatively few

class actions are filed in the D.C. Circuit, last year in In re

Lorazepam & Clorazepate Antitrust Litig., 289 F.3d 98

(D.C. Cir. 2002), the Court of Appeals for the District of

Columbia Circuit described the factors that would influ-

ence its discretion to accept an interlocutory appeal from a

class certification order. Like every other court before it

the D.C. Circuit announced that it would exercise its

discretion flexibly, mindful of the considerations that

underlie the rule, and the Advisory Committee Notes. “In

our view,” the court wrote, “interlocutory appellate review

12

under Rule 23(f) is properly directed by the guidance set

forth in the advisory committee’s note.” Id. at 104. None-

theless, agreeing with every other circuit court, the D.C.

Circuit retained ample discretion to accept review “in

special circumstances that neither the advisory commit-

tee’s note nor the courts foresaw.” Jd. at 105.

Exercising its discretion in light of Rule 23(f)’s back-

ground and language, the Advisory Committee Notes, and

its own recent writings, the D.C. Circuit chose not to

review the district court’s interlocutory order in this case.

Given the broad and standardless discretion granted the

courts of appeals by Rule 23(f), there is nothing in the D.C.

Circuit’s ruling that justifies this Court’s review.

B. The Language, History and Advisory Commit-

tee Notes of Rule 23(f) Support the Conclusion

that the Decision Whether to Grant Interlocu-

tory Review is Committed to the Sole, Unfet-

tered Discretion of the Courts of Appeals

Under congressionally-delegated authority, this Court

has provided that a court of appeals may “in its discretion”

permit an appeal from a district court’s interlocutory order

granting or denying class action certification. Fed. R. Civ.

P. 23(f). By committing class certification review to the

“discretion” of the courts of appeals, the rule provides no

standard uuder which this Court, through the exercise of

its own discretionary certiorari jurisdiction, can second-

guess how the courts of appeals exercise that discretion.

Furthermore, as discussed above, Rule 23(f) was created to

enhance the discretion that the courts of appeals had

exercised under § 1292(b), which (where the district court

has certified an interlocutory order for appeal) authorizes

13

the appellate court to “deny the appeal for any reason....”

Coopers & Lybrand, 437 U.S. at 475.

The Advisory Committee Notes “provide a reliable

source of insight into the meaning of a rule, especially

when, as here, the rule was enacted precisely as the

Advisory Committee proposed.” United States v. Vonn, 535

U.S. 55, 64 n.6 (2002). The Advisory Committee Notes to

Rule 23(f) describe the appellate court’s decision to accept

an appeal as “unfettered” and subject to that court’s “sole

discretion” based on “any consideration that the court of

appeals finds persuasive.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(f) Advisory

Committee Notes. The exercise of discretionary jurisdic-

tion would not be “unfettered” if this Court were to second-

guess how the appellate court exercised its discretion,

applying a legal standard of this Court’s making.

Moreover, in committing the decision whether to

entertain interlocutory review to the “sole discretion” of

the courts of appeals, Rule 23(f) was intended to allow a

court of appeals to grant or deny review based upon the

overall status of its docket, a factor which this Court is in

no position to reassess. It is, thus, entirely understandable

why the Advisory Committee Notes liken the discretion of

a court of appeals under Rule 23(f) to “the discretion of the

Supreme Court acting on a petition for certiorari.” At its

essence, the decision whether to grant a writ of certiorari

is a highly individualistic determination as to whether the

demands of this Court’s docket and the need for clarifying

the law make it desirable to review “a particular case at a

particular time.” Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, Inc.,

338 U.S. 912, 918 (1950). Rule 23(f), likewise, expressly

granted the courts of appeals “unfettered” discretion to

14

grant review based upon the desirability of reviewing a

particular case at a particular point in time.

Because it would undermine the unfettered discretion

that Rule 23(f) has given to the federal appellate courts to

determine whether to accept an appeal thereunder, So-

dexho’s petition for a writ of certiorari to review the

appellate court’s Rule 23(f) denial should be denied.

C. There is No Circuit Conflict on Rule 23(f)

Standards

Rule 23(f) contemplates that the circuit courts will

evaluate each petition for interlocutory review on a case-

by-case basis, without being confined to any hard-and-fast

rules. In analogizing discretionary review under the new

rule to this Court’s certiorari jurisdiction, the Advisory

Committee knew that “different reasons not infrequently

move different members of the Court in concluding that a

particular case at a particular time makes review undesir-

able.” Baltimore Radio Show, 338 U.S. at 918; see also

Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 296 (1989) (noting variety of

considerations behind certiorari denial). It is therefore not

necessary or even desirable for each panel of each circuit

to employ an identical standard in choosing whether to

accept a petition for interlocutory review. Indeed, some

circuits have not announced the criteria they would

employ in acting on petitions for review, and there is

15

nothing in the rule that requires them to do so.’ The rule-

making process that culminated in Rule 23(f) concluded

that each appellate court should have free reign to pass on

interlocutory review petitions as that court sees fit, and

that decision is entitled to “full respect.” Swint v. Cham-

bers County Comm’n, 514 U.S. 35, 48 (1995). It is unneces-

sary and undesirable for this Court to grant certiorari to

impose any single review standard on the courts of ap-

peals.

In any event, there is no circuit conflict. Consistent

with the Advisory Committee Notes, and beginning with

Blair v. Equifax Check Servs., Inc., 181 F.3d 832 (7th Cir.

1999), every circuit that has spoken to the issue has

declined to adopt a “bright-line approach,” or to issue a

definitive “catalog of factors.” Jd. at 834. Last year, after

surveying the decisions of the seven circuits (including the

D.C. Circuit) that had already written on the issue, the

Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit found that they all

sounded the same theme: they “eschew any hard-and-fast

test in favor of a broad discretion to evaluate relevant

factors that weigh in favor of or against an interlocutory

appeal.” In re Delta Air Lines, 310 F.3d 953, 959 (6th Cir.

2002), cert. denied, 123 S.Ct. 2252 (2003). The D.C.

Circuit’s Lorazepam opinion falls squarely within the

consensus view of every circuit: “Interlocutory appellate

review under Rule 23(f) is properly directed by the guid-

ance set forth in the advisory commiitee’s note,” and any

" Federal Appellate Rules 5(c) and 32(c) treat petitions for inter-

locutory review as “other papers,” just like petitions for rehearing,

which are commonly determined by order, without any explanation.

16

further written guidance on the subject should be under-

stood as “guidance, not a rigid test.” 289 F.3d at 104, 105.

The D.C. Circuit’s “further written guidance” as ta

when interlocutory review is appropriate is also consistent

with that of other circuits. Sodexho inaccurately portrays

the D.C. Circuit as having adopted a “death knell” rule for

class certification orders, because the court has empha-

sized that end-of-the case review remains available for

run-of-the mill challenges. Pet. at 12-13. But almost every

circuit has said much the same thing. For example the

Third Circuit, whose standards are said to present an

“irreconcilable” conflict with the D.C. Circuit, has observed

that “interlocutory review will generally prove unneces-

sary” if “allowing the litigation to follow its natural course

would provide the moving party with an adequate rem-

edy.” Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,

Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 164-65 (3d Cir. 2001). The Eleventh

Circuit has similarly cautioned against interlocutory

review of class certification orders absent “a compelling

need for resolution of the legal issue sooner, rather than

later.” Prado-Steinman ex rel. Prado v. Bush, 221 F.3d

1266, 1274 (1lth Cir. 2000). The Seventh Circuit has

agreed. In accepting review in blair v. Equifax, the court

of appeals emphasized that the certification order was

likely to “evade review at the end of the case,” because the

pending action was one of multiple suits pending in

various jurisdictions. 181 F.3d at 838.

Nor have the courts of appeals perceived any conflict

among themselves. In Newton v. Merrill Lynch, the Third

Circuit drew on the “thoughtful opinions of four other

circuits, including the First Circuit.” 259 F.3d at 163 n.3,

164 n.5. If there is anything in the First Circuit’s guidance

that is “highly restrictive” (Pet. at 14 n.9), it has escaped

17

the notice of many federal appellate judges.” Likewise,

although the Petition seeks to portray the D.C. Circuit as

unusually hostile to interlocutory review, the Sixth Circuit

has read the D.C. Circuit’s warning that interlocutory

review is the exception, rather than the rule, as consistent

with “the other courts before it.” In re Delta Air Lines, 310

F.3d at 959. In fact far from having adopted a standard

that is more restrictive than other circuits, the D.C.

Circuit regards its criteria as being more flexible and less

hostile to interlocutory review thah that of the Seventh

Circuit, the Petitioner’s paragon of liberality. In Loraze-

pam, the D.C. Circuit observed that, where the district’s

order did not sound the “death knell” for the litigation, the

Seventh Circuit would ignore entirely the likelihood that

the district court’s order was simply wrong. 289 F.3d at

105. In contrast the D.C. Circuit will not ignore district

court error, at least where such error is “manifest.” Jd.°

* Sodexho deals with this incongruity only by accusing the First

Circuit of dissimulation: “Thus the First Circuit has adopted a highly

restrictive standard closer to that of the D.C. Circuit, even though it

professes affinity with the Seventh Circuit.” Pet. at 18 n.9. And in

Sodexho’s warped world, the Second Circuit’s guidance is “significantly

more liberal” than the D.C. Circuit’s, id. at 15 n.7 (citing In re Visa-

Check /Master Money Antitrust Litig, 280 F.3d at 124, 132 n.2 (2d Cir.

2001), in which review was granted), but, nevertheless, is calculated to

“shut the door on Rule 23(f) appeals.” Pet. at 15 (citing In re Sumitomo

Copper Litig., 262 F.3d 134, 140 (2d Cir. 2001)).

* Contrary to Sodexho’s claim (Pet. at 12), it is not at all certain

that mandamus is available to correct erroneous certification orders.

Indeed, Rule 23(f) was adopted in part because courts and scholars

were “uneas[y]” that the use of mandamus to reverse class certification

orders may have unduly “stretched the writ’s traditionally restrictive

parameters.” Newton v. Merrill Lynch, 259 F.3d at 163.

18

In its attempt to manufacture a circuit conflict,

Sodexho misuses statistics, as well as words. It is neither

surprising nor significant that the Seventh Circuit has

heard quite a few Rule 23(f) appeals, while the D.C.

Circuit has not heard any. Only a handful of Rule 23(f)

petitions have reached the D.C. Circuit, in contrast to the

multitude of petitions in the Seventh Circuit and many

other circuits. The disparity in petitions reflects the

twenty-fold difference between the very few class actions

of any sort that are pending in the D.C. Circuit (23) and

the large number that are pending in the Seventh Circuit

(453). Administrative Office of U.S. Courts, “Judicial Busi-

ness of the United States Courts 2002,” Table X-4, available at

http://www.uscourts.gov/judbususcjudbus.html.” It should

not take a statistician to recognize that meaningful com-

parisons between the circuits cannot be drawn from raw

numbers of petition grants.

D. The Committee on Rules of Practice and Pro-

cedure Has Identified No Problems with

Rule 23(f) that Require Fixing at This Time;

Any Efforts to Circumscribe the Courts of Ap-

peals’ Discretion As to Whether to Review

Class Certification Orders Should be Left to

the Committee or to Congress

Sodexho’s reliance on pending legislation to support

its view that “de minimis review” under Rule 23(f) is

” According to the latest Administrative Office Report, as of

September 30, 2002, only 0.5 percent of the 4,835 class actions pending

in the federal courts were filed in the District of Columbia, and only

three of these were civil rights employment cases. Jd.

19

“unfair” (Pet. at 27), merely confirms that adjustment of

the standards for interlocutory review is best left to

Congress. After Sodexho filed the Petition, the House of

Representatives approved H.R. 1115, sections 6 and 8 of

which make any class certification order that is entered

after this proposed law’s enactment appealable as of right.

If courts acting under the five-year-old legal regime of

Rule 23(f) do not exercise their discretion sufficiently

frequently, Congress can easily strip appellate courts of

their discretion entirely, as H.R. 1115 would do, although

even the House bill would not affect pending cases, like

this one. Other than to change the result in this case,

there is no reason for this Court to exercise its certiorari

authority to craft a new standard to govern interlocutory

review of class action orders.

Furthermore, this Court should consider that the

Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the

Judicial Conference has opposed H.R. 1115. In a letter to

the Chair of the House Committee on the Judiciary, Judge

Scirica," writing for the Rules Committee, reminded the

House Committee that interlocutory appeals have gener-

ally been “disfavored because they cause unwarranted,

expensive, and wasteful interruption;” that the Rules

Committee was “unaware of any dissatisfaction expressed

by the bench and bar with ... Rule [23(f)];” and that “any

consideration of amending it should be deferred until the

bench and bar have had more experience with it.” Letter

from Judge Anthony J. Scirica to Honorable F. James

" Judge Scirica wrote Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &

Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154 (3d Cir. 2001).

20

Sensenbrenner, Jr., reprinted in H.R. Rep. No. 108-144 at

127, 128 (2003) (Appendix A).

E. Even if the District Court’s Partial Certifica-

tion Order Presented Unsettled Issues of Class

Action Law for D.C. Circuit Review, That Fact

Provides No Reason for This Court to Review

This Case

Sodexho dedicates a significant portion of its petition

to an attempt to convince this Court that the district

court’s decision presents “fundamental, unsettled issues of

class action law” worthy of D.C. Circuit review. Even if

Sodexho’s premise were correct, that premise would not

| justify certiorari review in this case. Each of the questions

that Sodexho maintains is “unsettled” has been recently

presented in petitions for certiorari to this Court, and this

Court has not found any of them worthy of review. So-

dexho posits a “conflict” between the Second. Circuit and

the Seventh Circuit (among others) on how closely courts

should scrutinize conflicting expert opinions at the class

certification stage. Pet. at 20-22. But this Court has

recently denied certiorari to review these supposedly

conflicting authorities. Szabo v. Bridgeport Machs., Inc.,

534 U.S. 951 (2001), denying cert., 249 F.3d 672 (7th Cir.

2001); Visa U.S.A., Inc. v. Walmart Stores, Inc., 536 U.S.

917 (2002), denying cert., 280 F.2d 124 (2d Cir. 2001);

Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co. v. Norris, 529 U.S. 1107

(2000), denying cert., 191 F.3d 283 (2d Cir. 1999). See also

Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Chase, No. 02-1447 (June 6,

2003), denying cert., 310 F.3d 953 (6th Cir. 2002). Like-

wise, although Sodexho claims a circuit split on when a

class may be certified for liability purposes only (Pet. at

26), this Court did not find it necessary to resolve that

ee ee a

21

supposed “conflict” last year. Metro-North Commuter R.R.

Co. v. Robinson, 535 U.S. 951 (2002), denying cert., 267

F.3d 147 (2d Cir. 2001).” If these issues are “unsettled” —

and we do not believe that they are unsettled — this Court

has had and will continue to have ample opportunity to

resolve them in cases which present these issues. This

Court clearly has no need to follow the “roundabout”

practice of compelling the D.C. Circuit to exercise its

discretionary jurisdiction merely to set the stage for

possible consideration by this Court of issues that may

possibly be decided by the D.C. Circuit. The possible

existence of unsettled issues of class action law that might

justify D.C. Circuit review in no way supports this Court’s

grant of a Writ of Certiorari.

* Even Sodexho does not claim a circuit conflict on its third

“unsettled” issue - whether the existence of “decentralized” and

“subjective” decisionmaking can constitute a discriminatory “policy.”

(Pet. at 23-26). It cites numerous district court decisions that it claims

favor its view, but no appellate decision. And as noted in the text, this

Court has recently denied certiorari in the Caridad case, which

Sodexho describes as similar to its case. In our view, the district court’s

evaluation of all the case law as turning on the application of widely

different factual patterns, rather than any fundamental doctrinal

disagreement, is a fairer reading, and one that argues strongly against

any discretionary review, either by an appellate court under Rule 23(f),

or by this Court.

22

CONCLUSION

For all the foregoing reasons, the Petition for a Writ of

Certiorari should be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

KERRY ALAN SCANLON*

DAVID O. BICKART

STEVEN S. ROSENTHAL

T. MELINDAH BUSH

NICOLE J. BECTON

KAYE SCHOLER LLP

901 15th Street, N.W., Suite 1100

Washington, DC 20005

(202) 682-3500

Attorneys for Respondents

* Counsel of Record

App. 1

APPENDIX A

COMMITTEE ON RULES OR

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

OF THE

JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20544

[Names Omitted In Printing]

May 12, 2003

Honorable F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr. _

Chair

Committee on the Judiciary

United States House of Representatives

2138 Rayburn House Office Building

Washington, DC 20515-6216

Dear Chairman Sensenbrenner:

On March 26, 2003, the Director of the Administrative

Office of the United States Courts, Leonidas Ralph

Mecham, advised you of the March 18, 2003, Judicial

Conference resolution recognizing “that the use of minimal

diversity of citizenship may be appropriate to the mainte-

nance of significant multi-state class action litigation in

__ the federal courts, while continuing to oppose class action

legislation that contains jurisdictional provisions that are

similar to those in the bills-introduced in the 106th and

107th Congresses.” I am writing you about two specific

provisions of the “Class Action Fairness Act of 2003” (H.R.

1115), which are not affected by the Judicial Conference

resolution but which directly affect Rule 23 of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure and are inconsistent with the

Rules Enabling Act rulemaking process. (28 U.S.C.

§§ 2072-2077.)

App. 2

The first provision requires courts of appeals to rule

on all interlocutory appeals of class-action certification

decisions. It directly conflicts with Rule 23(f). The second

provision imposes extensive plain-English requirements

on settlement notice. It overlaps with amendments to Rule

23(c(2\B) approved by the Supreme Court that are

presently before the Congress and will take effect on

December 1, 2003, unless Congress acts otherwise. We

respectfully request your committee to withdraw both

provisions from H.R. 1115.

Party Entitled to Interlocutory Appeal .-

of Class-Action Certification Decision

Section 6 of H.R. 1115 amends 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)

and would provide a party the right to an interlocutory

appeal of a court’s decision granting or denying class-

action certification, if an appeal notice is filed within 10

days. The provision also stays all c‘scovery and other

proceedings during the pendency of the appeal.

Rule 23(f) was added by the Supreme Court in 1998. It

provides courts of appeals with discretion to permit an

appeal from an order granting or denying class-action

certification. This provision also gives the district court

and court of appeals discretion to stay proceedings in the

district court pending outcome of the appeal.

Rule 23(f) was promulgated as a result of an exhaus-

tive study of class-action practices by the Advisory Com-

mittee on Civil Rules. In its study of Rule 23, the

committee considered hundreds of public comments,

empirical studies, discussions at several major conferences

of practitioners and judges well experienced in class

actions, and statements given at public hearings at which

App. 3

witnesses from major corporations, law firms, and law

schools testified. The final Rule 23(f) was reviewed and

approved by the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules,

Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, Judicial

Conference of the United States, and Supreme Court of

the United States before it was transmitted to the United

States Congress in accordance with the Rules Enabling

Act.

Rule 23(f) made the necessary changes to reduce

unwarranted procedural obstacles in obtaining appellate

review of a district court’s class-action certification deci-

sion. At the same time, however, it addressed concerns

expressed by many judges and lawyers that interlocutory

appeals are often unnecessary and would be abused as a

procedural tactic to delay proceedings and unfairly in-

crease litigation expense in many class actions. These

concerns would be heightened by an automatic-stay

provision, which could disrupt the district court’s ability to

manage the case. Providing an appeal as of right might

tempt a party to file an interlocutory appeal solely for

tactical reasons. Staying discovery and other proceedings

in the district court would only increase the tactical

advantages of filing an interlocutory appeal, particularly

because resolution of the appeal may not occur for 12 to 18

months.

Interlocutory appeals in general have been tradition-

ally disfavored because they can cause unwarranted,

expensive, and wasteful interruptions. Rule 23(f) vests

discretion in the appellate judges to permit interlocutory

appeal of class-action certifications in appropriate cases

and gives both the district court and the appellate court

discretion to decide whether to stay proceedings pending

App. 4

appeal. It has been working well, as evidenced by a signifi-

cant and growing body of appellate law. The courts of

appeals have announced detailed criteria to guide practi-

tioners in deciding whether to seek leave to appeal. And

the decisions that have granted leave to appeal are devel-

oping much-needed guidance on class action certification.

The rules committees are unaware of any dissatisfaction

expressed by the bench and bar with the rule. Moreover,

the rule was only recently promulgated. Any consideration

of amending it should be deferred until the bench and bar

have had more experience with it.

Plain-English Settlement Notice Requirement

Section 3 of H.R. 1115 adds a new § 1715 to title 28,

United States Code, prescribing detailed requirements

governing the contents of proposed class-action settlement

notices. On March 27, 2003, the Supreme Court transmit-

ted to Congress amendments to Rule 23, which take effect

on December 1, 2003, unless Congress acts otherwise. The

amendments prescribe the contents of class-certification

notices and also require that the court direct notice of a

proposed settlement in a reasonable manner to all class

members. The matters addressed by these amendments

overlap to a certain extent with § 1715. We also believe

that in its present form § 1715 may undermine the bill’s

stated objectives by requiring notices so elaborate that

most class members will not even attempt to read them.

Moreover, if H.R. 1115 is enacted without revision before

December 1, 2003, reconciling any differences between the

bill’s notice provisions and the notice provisions in Rule 23

that are due to take effect in December 2003 may generate

unnecessary confusion and litigation.

App. 5

In the course of our Rule 23 study, we examined

proposals that would have required extensive notices, but

found that requiring detailed information in a class notice

would be counterproductive, resulting in more complicated

and unclear notices. It would defeat the goal of providing

clearer and simpler information to putative class mem-

bers. H.R. 1115’s settlement-notice requirements are

detailed and would likely encounter the same types of

problems. Moreover, H.R. 1115’s provisions are directed

primarily at settlement notices, while the Rule 23 amend-

ments address not only settlement notices but also the

class-certification notice in which putative class members

are first notified of the action and, when appropriate,

given an opportunity to exercise their right to opt out of

the ¢lass. The interface between Rule 23 and § 1715 is

complicated by the growing number of “prepackaged” class

actions that combine the first notice of class certification,

including the opportunity to opt out, with notice of pro-

posed settlement provisions. -

At our request, the Federal Judicial Center worked

with expert communications and linguistics consultants to

develop sample plain-English class-action certification and

settlement notices in products liability and securities

cases. These notices are available on the Center’s web site

_ at <http://www.fic.gov>. The illustrative forms were sub-

jected to consumer testing by representative focus groups.

The forms were well publicized and appeared in Law Week

and BNA’s Class Action Reporter. The Center’s sample

notices together with the Rule 23 amendments represent

the culmination of many years of intensive study and work

addressing the problems raised by unclear class-action

notices. It is our belief that these models will significantly

improve class-action notices.

App. 6

_ At the same time, the rules committees do not con-

sider that their class-action work has ended with the Rule

23 amendments. They will continue to monitor the status

of class-action practice, including the use of class-action

notices.

We recommend that section 6 and new §1715 as

added by H.R. 1115 be withdrawn. Thank you for consider-

ing our request.

Sincerely,

/s/ A. Scirica

Anthony J. Scirica

United States Court of

Appeals

cc: Honorable John Conyers, Jr., Ranking Democrat

Members of the House Judiciary Committee

Honorable David F. Levi, Chair, Advisory

Committee on Civil Rules

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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