Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Koz v. United States, 124 S. Ct. 77 (2003) (No. 02-1699)

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(y! Supreme Court, U.S.

LED

021699 may 12 2003

No.

OFFICE OF THE CLERK

The Supreme Court of the United States

JOSEPH P. KOZ,

Petitioner

v.

UNITED STATES,

Respondent.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Guy J. FERRANTE, ESQ.

KING & EVERHARD, P.C.

8019 Daffodil Court

Springfield, VA 22152

(703) 644-2009

Counsel of Record for

Petitioner

Questions Presented

When a statute states that a military officer “shall ...

be retired in the highest grade in which he served on

active duty satisfactorily ... for not less than six

months,” is en officer entitled to retire in a grade in

which he served more-than-satisfactorily for 12

years?

If a statute enacted for the benefit of military

personnel is susceptible to two different readings, are

veterans entitled to the benefit of the most favorable

reading?

Are statutes afforded their plain meaning unless

doing so would be truly and genuinely absurd?

Table of Conten

Questions Presented.....................sscessresseerssssesedones i

Table of Authorities.....................::ccserceseeees aerate” iv

Citations sissies leg cK ep nO Reena NIALL siete l

I sckctcrccneamnen B icisaspbaceammeieonel 2

Statutory Provision .................csrccersessserssensesessees 2

Statemnent Of Ghe Came «........:...cccesiscsicccieceebesesescenet 2

= gf. CNC e tte. 3

2. The Proceedings Below ..................::ccseeseeeeee 6 :

ATQUMENS...............000.0-ccssscnsceneersecensesecsnesssonssenseeres 8

1. The Plain Meaning of the Statutory Language......8

2. Any Ambiguity Should be Resolved in

Men DOOR Wi. BR Res 9

3. The iain Meaning of Section 1370(aX1)

Bb UE IIE on oi cassirenicsicrrnrtrvoneteuinaionnes 10

CII asco cicvisiccicsinsitoremenarneeennnenene 12

Appendix

Judgment, Koz v. United States,

Fed. Cir. 02-5081 (Feb. 12, 2003).......... ae Al

Judgment, Koz v. United States,

Fed. Cl. 00-727C (Dec. 20, 2001).............0++- A3

il

Koz v. United States,

Fed. Cl. 727C (Dec. 19, 2001).......0.ccccccceeeee A4

Record of Proceedings, Air Force Board

for Correction of Military Records,

Docket No. 98-01802..................ccccccccssecsees A 10

Memorandum for the Executive Director,

Air Force Board for Correction of

Military Records, Feb. 22, 2000................... A 19

oc ssihicmroecdnve A 23

111

Cases

See WON icicdalic. dace 9

happell v lace,

462 U.§.: 296 (1983). 5 resssseserssesecrivereenensevees O

Clinton v. Goldsmith,

$26 U.S. S2D C1999). «....0..00.00c0s0000 PAE ee 6

Conroy v. Aniskoff,

507 U.S. 511 (1993)............-ccccccsssscrreescoensees 10

Crooks v. Harrelson,

Be I i oisscvcencscried oornivntonen 10

v. Uni

620 F.2d 247 (Ct. Cl. 1980)............eeeeeeeee: 5

Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock Repair Corp.,

ST Ear 9

eS nee 10

H rv. Uni

326 F.2d 982 (Ct. Cl.), ;

cert. denied, 377 U.S. 977 (1964)............-+ 11

King v. St. Vincent’

GEE UES, BET CI ian cn inn ncn cecb ces nensesennes 9

v

Fed. Cl. 00-CV-727 (December 20, 2001).... 1

Koz v. United States,

Fed. Cir. 02-5081 (February 12, 2003)......... 1

MCI Telecommunications Corp. v.

BC ives 12

Personnel Administrator of Mass. v. Feeney,

Pee ES Pe, , Seneeeeanee ov Sree 11

itizen v ice, é

BBA CG SAB ooasssnsccssenigenretoones 10

F v. Taxation With R —_

Washington,

ee SI oo iectcnonmineendiuinn ll

Robinson v. Shell Oil Co.,

SID-U.S. FFF CGS ) avisicsesssicsciccssssccessscnesssess 8

24 M.J. 309 (CMA),

cert. denied, 484 U.S. 976 (1987)................ 11

BES U.S. FEISS Pe vcsvsscvscessceressresvesscennqensoess 12

Statutes

10 U.S.C: Chapter 47...............::ccsscsssecseesssessessesensens 11

BIR Coke | | Anne erernennennner tm prvsnioedaneieende 4

10 U.S.C. § 815()).................cescscssecserrsnserssecssenneees 5

10 U.S.C. § 1370 0.0... eececeesecseeecseeeeeneneenennennenceenens passim

10U

U.S.C. & LEED ...cssscsssvenssoessssescsconssvevecceseneveosenneses 1]

ite 6 IS: cliccacdnnaacee 12

St |. Caen ainanontnNes 6

iret CO ss een 2

PUCE SIT ikon ose ae 2

BULC. (OL... Le 2

Miscellaneous Authorities

SE IR SOBA icictiicrsinor lens. 8

ask CUE ie ccssced ode nee l

S. Rep: No. 1911, 87" Cong., 2d Sess. ...........-:000 5

S. Rep. 2420, 84™ Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted

in 1956 U.S. Code and Administrative News............ 12

In the Supreme Court of the United States

JOSEPH P. KOZ,

Petitioner,

¥.

UNITED STATES,

‘Respondent.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

This case is about military officers who dedicate their

lives to defending and protecting this nation’s rule of law.

Citati

The Court of Federal Claims dismissed Petitioners’

complaint in an unpublished decision. Koz v. United States,

Fed. Cl. 00-CV-727 (December 20, 2001). A4 - A9. That

decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the

Federal Circuit pursuant to Fed. Cir. R. 36. Koz v. United

States, Fed. Cir. 02-5081 (February 12, 2003). A1.

Jurisdicti

The Federal Circuit judgment was entered on

February 12, 2003. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1254(1).

Statutory Proviel

This case involves the interpretation of 10 U.S.C. §

1370(a), which states in pertinent part:

(1) Unless entitled to a higher retired grade

under some other provision of law, a

commissioned officer (other than a

commissioned warrant officer) of the Army,

Navy, Air Force, or Marine Corps who retires

under any provision of law other than chapter

61 or chapter 1223 of this title shall, except as

provided in paragraph (2), be retired in the

highest grade in which he served on active

duty satisfactorily, as determined by the

Secretary of the military department

concerned, for not less than six months.

(2)(A) In order to be eligible for voluntary

retirement under any provision of this title in

a grade above major or lieutenant

commander, a commissioned officer of the

Army, Navy, Air Force, or Marine Corps

must have served on active duty in that grade

for not less than three years....

m f th

Tucker Act jurisdiction (28 U.S.C. § 1491) is

predicated upon 10 U.S.C. §§ 1370 and 8991. Retired

military officers are entitled to retired pay commensurate

with the grade at which they retire and the number of years

of active service they performed.

The Petitioner, Joseph P. Koz, served for 13 years as

a colonel in the United States Air Force. He was retired as a_

lieutenant colonel on July 1, 1995, however, after the

Secretary of the Air Force determis2d that his service as a

colonel during portions of 1994 was not satisfactory. Mr.

Koz maintains that he was entitled by law to retire as a

colonel by virtue of his 12 illustrious years of service in that

grade.

1. Statement of Facts

Mr. Koz served his country as an active duty Air

Force officer and fighter pilot for more than 30 years. His

career began with a 1965 graduation from the United States

Military Academy at West Point, and included 2 tours of

duty in Vietnam and 350 combat missions during which he

received 27 Air Medals, 5 Distinguished Flying Crosses, and

a Bronze Star.

Having steadily progressed through the ranks, often

at an accelerated pace, Mr. Koz was promoted to the grade of

colonel in 1981. For the mext 12 years, Mr. Koz’

performance was nothing short of magnificent and

impeccable. The direct national security implications of his

efforts were nowhere more evident than from his service as

the Defense and Air Attache at the U.S. Embassy in Israel

during the sensitive time leading up to Operation Desert

Storm, which earned him personal commendations from two

United States ambassadors. He then moved on to the

Defense Intelligence Agency, where his spectacular

management of the U.S. Attache System worldwide earned

him a second Defense Superior Service Medal.

1993 saw Mr. Koz serving as the Commandant of the

highly respected Air Force Institute of Technology [AFIT].

But 1993 also saw Mr. Koz’ personal life take a dramatic

turn when a leukemia diagnosis was confirmed. This

revelation was so devastating to Mr. Koz that he did not even

tell his wife until many years later. As a Command Pilot with

more than 2,500 hours in the cockpit, this trauma was

compounded by his resulting removal from flying status for

the first time in 28 years. And finally came the realization

that the only way of life that he had known since high school

would come to an end when he would have to retire from

military service upon accumulating 30 years of service in

1995. 10 U.S.C. § 634.

Spurred by these cumulative developments, Mr. Koz

became preoccupied with two overwhelming goals: to enjoy

life while he was still physically able, and to find a civilian

job. Unfortunately, these preoccupations caused lapses of

judgment that, in turn, led to uncharacteristically

inappropriate behavior on Mr. Koz’ part. As his second-in-

command would later describe it:

I believe it was possible that Joe Koz was not

entirely responsible emotionally for what I

characterize as the bizarre behavior that led to

his being relieved of command and

subsequently disciplined. ... Colonel Koz

started to become noticeably very tense

during the summer of 1994.... It was apparent

to me that he was becoming especially

apprehensive about obtaining suitable

employment upon his retirement from the Air

Force. Our conversations and his behavior

convinced me that his level of employment

seeking activity and the related apprehension

were more~ than what I would consider

“norma!” for a retiring Air Force member. To

me, Joe was beginning to exhibit what I

would characterize as a level of “panic.” ...

This was a man in distress. ... These actions,

in my view, are not those of a calculating,

rational individual. I now see them as

possibly the actions of an intellectually

4

disoriented, emotionally panicked human

being who was frightened over the prospect of

being unemployed and unemployable after

being mandatorily retired from a 30-year Air

Force career. Additionally, there were vague

indications of serious Koz family health

problems, though, except for Mrs. Koz’ hip

surgery, I have no direct knowledge of other

This second-in-command was unaware of the impact that the

leukemia diagnosis had also had on the “panic” that Mr. Koz

was experiencing.

Nonetheless, frequent absences from work inspired

an anonymous complaint that triggered an Inspector General

investigation that revealed various questionable and

uncharacteristic activities associated with Mr. Koz’ quest to

find and secure a civilian job. On May 11, 1995, Mr. Koz

was offered non-judicial punishment ' for misconduct

flowing from the IG investigation. During this process, Mr.

Koz called attention for the first time to the “profound

effect” that the leukemia diagnosis had had on his conduct.

He accepted the imposition of non-judicial punishment “to

get the matter resolved as quickly and painlessly as possible

for himself and the Air Force.” A10.

In light of this non-judicial punishment, however,

Mr. Koz’ immediate commander initiated proceedings to

determine the grade at which he would be permitted to retire.

Article 15 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice

(10 U.S.C. § 815(b)) permits commanders to impose

“disciplinary punishments for minor offenses without the

intervention of a court-martial.” See Dumas v. United States,

620 F.2d 247, 251 (Ct. Cl. 1980), quoting, S. Rep. No. 1911,

87" Cong., 2d Sess. at 2-4 (“The legislative history states

definitely that nonjudicial punishment is noncriminal in

character and ‘in this sense has no connection with the

military court-martial system.””).

Mr. Koz made no excuses, but relied solely upon his

illustrious and unblemished record during the previous 12

years. That commander recommended that Mr. Koz be

retired as a colonel because anything less “would be

disproportionate to the offenses he committed and would not

properly account for the many valuable years of service he

gave to the United States Air Force.” The next-higher

commander disagreed and recommended retirement as a

lieutenant colonel because, “Although superb performance

record through a career marked by significant responsibilities

stands clear, this illegal action and poor attitude concerning

obligations to the USAF during 1994 warrant strong

disciplinary measures.” The Secretary’s designee adopted the

latter recommendation, found that Mr. Koz had not served

satisfactorily in the grade of colonel, and directed his

retirement as a lieutenant colonel on July 1, 1995.

2. The Proceedings Below

Following his retirement as a lieutenant colonel, Mr.

Koz applied to the Air Force Board for Correction of

Military Records [AFBCMR] ” asking that his retired grade

be changed to colonel. He maintained, inter alia, that he met

the standard contemplated by Section 1370 through

“demonstrated excellence in all that he accomplished on

behalf of the Air Force for 12 years [notwithstanding that] in

the 13" year he took some missteps.” ° A majority of the

2 10 U.S.C. § 1552. See Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296,

303 (1983); Clinton v. Goldsmith, 526 U.S. 529, 539 (1999).

> Mr. Koz also maintained that his lapses of judgment were

mitigated by the emotional trauma that he underwent at the

time, which a clinic psychologist described as follows:

The response to a terminal illness can best be

understood by recognizing that typically the

initial diagnosis is in and of itself a shock and

often met with disbelief, anxiety and denial.

AFBCMR members recommended that Mr. Koz’ record be

corrected to show that “he served satisfactorily in the grade

of colonel within the meaning of Section 1370(a), Title 10,

United States Code.” A17. They did so in recognition of Mr.

Koz’ “outstanding career for 28 years,” including 12 years of

excellence as a colonel. A16-A17. A lone dissenting

AFBCMR member urged that Mr. Koz’ application be

denied because his “one year of significant misconduct

offsets his prior years of distinguished service.”

... The patient’s behavioral and psychological

responses in such circumstances are most

likely not representative of a rational, logical

individual. ... It would not be unusual for a

patient’s behavior when diagnosed with any

form of terminal cancer to be characterized by

fear and anxiety regarding all aspects of the

future. ... It is very important to note the fact

that [Mr.] Koz did not discuss or reveal his

diagnosis to even his wife. ... Thus, it is

likely to assume that he had very little support

or empathy in his interpersonal environment

at the time of this diagnosis. Thus, his

behavior is described to have been out of the

norm for him as he faced both the diagnosis

of terminal illness and simultaneously a

mandatory retirement after 30 years as an Air

Force officer. It is within reasonable

psychological probability to conclude that he

was experiencing extreme apprehension and

anxiety about his future in terms of survival.

... It was my opinion as I understood [Mr.]

Koz that he wanted to live as fully as possible

in the present with the knowledge that his

time without symptoms was not predictable.

Although “majority vote constitutes the action of the

Board,” favorable actions have no finality unless unanimous.

32 CFR §§ 865.4 (1) and (p). Thus, Mr. Koz’ case was

forwarded for final action to the Secretary’s designee who

agreed. with the AFBCMR minority and denied the

application. A 21-22.

Mr. Koz filed suit in the U.S. Court of Federal

Claims maintaining that Section 1370(a)(1) mandated his

retirement as a colonel because he had “served on active

duty satisfactorily ... for not less than six months” in that

grade. The Court acknowledged that “the statute may support

such an interpretation grammatically.” A5. It granted

summary judgment for the Air Force, however, because “a

Court cannot attribute absurd results to acts of Congress [and

we] cannot imagine that Congress intended to guarantee

retirement to an officer based on his or her first six months

of duty.” A5, A7.

Mr. Koz reiterated his position before the U.S. Court

of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which affirmed without

comment or opinion. Al.

Arguments

1. The Plain Meaning of the e.

The “first step in interpreting a statute is to determine

whether the language at issue has a plain and unambiguous

meaning with regard to the particular dispute in the case.”

Robinson v. Shell Oil Co. 519 U.S. 337, 340 (1997).

Analysis of the statutory provision at issue is facilitated by

simply obscuring the discretion-conferring clause (“as

determined by the Secretary of the military department

concerned”) from the middle of the sentence. The operative

language would then state that an officer “shall ... be retired

in the highest grade in which he served on active duty

satisfactorily for not less than six months.” It is hard to

imagine any more plain and unambiguous language. Because

8

the phrase “for not less than six months” qualifies the

_ immediately preceding word “satisfactorily,” Mr. Koz was

legally entitled to retire as a colonel by virtue of his 12 years

of more-than-satisfactory service in that grade.

If Congress had meant to provide that officers are

retired at the highest grade in which they have served at least

six months provided the Secretary determines that all of that

service was satisfactory, there were many ways for it to say

so. One way was to use those words in the statute. Another

was to provide that officers must have “served satisfactorily

on active duty for not less than six months,” thereby having

the six-month clause modify the active duty requirement

rather than the subordinate satisfactory determination. As

enacted, however, Section 1370(a)(1)’s six-month clause

applies directly to the satisfactory determination, and means

that Mr. Koz was unlawfully denied retirement as a colonel.

2. Any Ambiguity Should be Resolved in Veterans’

Favor.

Even if the statutory language is susceptible to two

different interpretations, veterans should receive the benefit

of the most favorable reading.

This Court has repeatedly invoked that interpretive

canon that statutes enacted to benefit servicemembers must

be liberally construed in their favor. King v. St. Vincent’s

Hospital, 502 U.S. 215, 220-21 n. 9 (1991), citing, Fishgold

v. Sullivan Drydock Repair Corp., 328 U.S. 275, 285 (1946);

Boone v. Lightner, 319 U.S. 561, 575 (1943). Retirement is

one of the paramount tangible benefits that Congress has

conferred upon servicemembers. Section 1370 is central to

that benefit because it affects the grade in which they will

enjoy it. Z

Mr. Koz maintains that six months is the minimum

period of satisfactory service that will authorize retirement in

a grade. To the extent that the text of Section 1370(a)(1)

might also be read to mean that all of an officer’s service in a

grade must be satisfactory, that reading should be rejected in

favor of Mr. Koz’ more beneficial (and faithful)

interpretation.

3. The Plain Meaning of ion 137 1) is not

Absurd.

The rule that absurd interpretations of statutes should

be rejected

remains a legitimate tool of the Judiciary,

however, only as long as the Court acts with

self-discipline by limiting the exception to

situations where the result of applying the

plain language would be, in a genuine sense,

absurd, i.e., where it is quite impossible that

Congress could have intended the result, and

where the alleged absurdity is so clear as to be

obvious to most anyone.

Public Citizen v. Department of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 470

(1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring). See Conroy v. Aniskoff,

507 U.S. 511, 517-18 (1993) (“we cannot say that Congress

would have found our straight-forward interpretation and

application of its words either absurd or illogical”). * A

literal interpretation of Section 1370(a)(1) is not absurd in

the least.

* See also Crooks v. Harrelson, 282 U.S. 55, 60 (1930)

(‘Laws enacted with good intention, when put to the test,

frequently, and to the surprise of the law maker himself, turn

out to be mischievous, absurd or otherwise objectionable.

But in such case the remedy lies with the law making

authority, and not with the courts.”); Griffin _v. Oceanic

Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 576 (1982) (“The remedy

for any dissatisfaction with the results in particular cases lies

with Congress [which] may amend the statute; we may

not.”).

First, no military member is ever “guaranteed”

retirement. ° All are subject to dismissal for criminal conduct

that is deemed serious enough to warrant court-martial under

the Uniform Code of Military Justice. 10 U.S.C. Chapter 47.

Indeed, even already-retired personnel may be dismissed

from the military, and thereby stripped of the retirement

benefits that they previously enjoyed. United States _v.

Overton, 24 M.J. 309 (CMA), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 976

(1987); Hooper v. United States, 326 F.2d 982 (Ct. Cl.), cert.

denied, 377 U.S. 977 (1964). In_ less egregious

circumstances, service members are subject to administrative

separation for wrongdoing ranging from substandard

performance to outright misconduct. 10 U.S.C. § 1181. In

short, it is not absurd for Section 1370 to be excluded from

the arsenal of disciplinary mechanisms that are available to

military authorities, but that it chose not to employ in his

case.

Moreover, a literal reading of Section 1370(a)(1) is

entirely compatible with related statutory provisions. Section

(a)(1) :prescribes the minimum time (6 months) that an

officer must serve satisfactorily in a grade in order to retire

in that grade. Section (a)(2) adds an additional requirement

before officers may retire in the higher grades. Reading

(a1) and (2) together, retirement in the higher grades

requires at least 3 years of service in that grade, at least 6

months of which was satisfactory. This is not absurd because

it does not apply “looser standards” to senior officers (A7); it

applies the same standard plus a longevity requirement.

Finally, “Our country has a long-standing policy of

compensating veterans for their past contributions by

providing them with numerous advantages. This policy has

‘always been deemed to be legitimate.”” Regan v. Taxation

With Representation of Washington, 461 U.S. 540, 551

(1983), quoting, Personnel Administrator of Mass. _v.

Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279, n. 25 (1979) (footnote omitted).

. Contra A7.

11

A literal interpretation of Section 1370(a)(1) is consistent

both with that policy as well as overall legislative intent.

Congress has explained that officers’ commissions

entail a form of job security akin to tenure. S. Rep. 2420, gq”

Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1956 US. Code and

Administrative News at 3351. It is not genuinely absurd,

illogical, or even unexpected for that tenure to include the

attachment of retirement eligibility upon six months of

satisfactory service in a grade. ,

Just as courts should avoid rejecting administrative

interpretations just because they are deemed susceptible of

improvement, courts should avoid overriding the plain

meaning of statutes with which they might simply disagree.

Conclusion.

It has been said, “Law has reached its finest moments

when it has freed man from the unlimited discretion of some

ruler, some civil or military official, some bureaucrat.”

ited v. ich 342 U.S. 98, 101 (1951)

(Douglas, J., dissenting). If so, the law has reached its lowest

point here. Under the Air Force interpretation that the lower

courts have sanctioned, the Secretary of a military

department has unlimited discretion to determine not only

whether a prescribed period of service was “satisfactory,”

but also whether an entire period of service merited

retirement in a particular grade. This “goes beyond the

meaning that the statute can bear.” MCI

Telecommunications Corp. v. A.T. & T. Corp., 512 US.

218, 229 (1994). :

© See also 10 U.S.C. § 1401(b) (retirees receive benefit of

most favorable calculation of retired pay).

12

Respectfully submitted,

Guy J. Ferrante

King & Everhard, P.C.

8019 Daffodil Court

Springfield, VA 22152

(703) 644-2009

Counsel of Record

for Petitioner

May 12, 2003

13

Appendix

NOTE: Pursuant to Fed. Cir. R. 47.6, this disposition is not citable as

precedent. It is a public record. This disposition will appear in tables

published periodically.

United States Court of Appeals for the

Federal Circuit

02-5081

JOSEPH P. KOZ,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

UNITED STATES,

Defendant-Appellee.

JUDGMENT

ON APPEAL from the United States Court of Federal

Claims

In CASE NO(S). 00-C V-727

This CAUSE having been heard and considered, it is

ORDERED and ADJUDGED: AFFIRMED. See Fed. Cir. R.

36

Per Curiam (NEWMAN, MICHEL, and PROST, Circuit

Judges).

ENTERED BY ORDER OF THE COURT

Jan Horbaly, Clerk

DATED: FEB 12 2003

A 2

In the United States Court of Federal Claims

No. 00-727 C

JOSEPH P. KOZ,

V. JUDGMENT

THE UNITED STATES

Pursuant to the court’s Opinion and Order, filed

December 19, 2001, granting defendant’s motion for

judgment on the Administrative Record and denying

plaintiff’ s cross-motion,

IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED this date,

pursuant to Rule 58, that judgment is for defendant and the

complaint is dismissed. No costs.

Margaret M. Earnest

Clerk of Court

December 20, 2001 By:

Deputy Clerk

NOTE: As to appeal, 60 days from this date, see RCFC

72, re number of copies and listing of all plaintiffs. Filing fee

is $105.00.

A 3

In the United States Court of Federal Claims

No. 00-727C

(Filed: December 19, 2001)

a am we * a *

JOSEPH P. KOZ, a

THIS OPINION

Plaintiff, . AND ORDER

WILL NOT BE

V. . PUBLISHED

fen ; .

* * * * * ~

Guy J. Ferrante, King & Everhard, P.C., Springfield, VA, for

plaintiff.

John C. Einstman, United State Department of Justice,

Washington, D.C., for defendant.

OPINION and ORDER

HODGES, Judge.

Plaintiff was a Colonel in the Air Force from 1981

until his voluntary retirement in 1994. He agreed to retire

after an investigation by the Inspector General determined

that he had violated various provisions of the Uniform Code

of Military Justice.

The Air Force allowed plaintiff to retire but not at the

rank of Colonel. A designee of the Secretary of the Air Force

A 4

determined that plaintiff's service as Colonel had not been

“satisfactory” within the meaning of 10 U.S.C. § 1370(a)

(2001). This case turns on the proper interpretation of that

statute.

Plaintiff argues that the statute requires only that an

officer serve satisfactorily for six months after which he

cannot be retired at a lower grade. While the statute may

support such an interpretation grammatically, a court cannot

attribute absurd results to acts of Congress. We grant

defendant’s motion for summary judgment.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff became a Colonel in the Air Force in

December 1981. After several years of satisfactory service,

an Inspector General’s investigation established that plaintiff

had violated Uniform Code of Military Justice in several

respects. These included inappropriate off-duty employment,

misuse and abuse of temporary duty assignments, and being

AWOL. Plaintiff was offered non-judicial punishment

proceedings for charges of disobeying an order, dereliction

of duty, false monetary claims against the United States, and

conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman.

Plaintiff accepted non-judicial punishment rather than

trial by court martial. He was found guilty in May 1995, and

he agreed not to appeal. His sentence was forfeiture of a

portion of his pay for 2 months. Plaintiff then asked to be

allowed to be retired as a Colonel, but the Staff Judge

Advocate recommended to plaintiff's commander that he be

retired in the grade Lt. Colonel. The Judge Advocate found

that the plaintiff's conduct “jeopardized the core values of

the Air Force, and indicated a reckless disregard of

regulations and a lack of integrity.” His judgment of plaintiff —

in that regard is fully and carefully documented in the record.

“Colonel Koz repeatedly used his position for his own

gain... [He] lost sight of his duty as an officer and a member

of the Air Force. Leadership carries with it responsibilities

A 5

and certainly, accountability. Colonel Koz must be held

accountable for his actions.”

The Secretary of the Air Force determined in June

1995 that plaintiff had not served satisfactorily in the grade

of Colonel and directed that he be retired as Lt. Colonel.

Plaintiff appealed to the Board for Correction of Military

Records, arguing that an earlier diagnosis of leukemia and

anxiety over his retirement had caused the behavioral

problems that stained an otherwise sterling career. A

majority of the Board agreed that plaintiff's misconduct had

been offset by many years of distinguished service, but the

Secretary of the Air Force rejected the Board’s

recommendation that plaintiff be retired in the grade of

Colonel. Plaintiff filed suit here asking that his military

records be corrected to reflect that he retired as a full

Colonel.

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff makes the following arguments to support his

case: (1) The plain language of §1370(a)(1) does not permit

retirement of an officer in a lower rank after 6 months

satisfactory service in that grade; and (2) the actions of the

Secretary of the Air Force in overruling the Board for

Corrections of Military Records were “manifestly arbitrary

and capricious.”

It is important to note what plaintiff does » argue. He

does not argue that he was promised retirement at the grade

of Colonel if he retired voluntarily. He does not argue that

any other promises were made to him that might have

rendered an otherwise voluntary retirement involuntary. He

does not argue that an officer cannot be retired in a lesser

grade absent a court martial conviction or other proceedings

that did not occur.

-

The primary issue in this case is the meaning of Title

10, § 1370. That section provides:

A 6

(a) Rule for Retirement in Highest Grade

Held Satisfactorily. (1) Unless entitled to a higher

retired grade ... a commissioned officer ... who

retires ... shall, except as provided in paragraph (2),

be retired in the highest grade in which he served on

active duty satisfactorily, as determined by the

Secretary of the military department concerned, for

not less than 6 months.

(2)(A) In order to be eligible for voluntary

retirement ... in a grade above Major or Lt.

Commander, a commissioned officer ... must have

served on active duty in that grade for not less than 3

years ....

10 U.S.C. § 1370(aX1)-(2){A).

Plaintiff interprets section (a)(I) to mean that once an

officer has served 6 months in a given rank satisfactorily,

that person can never be retired at a lesser rank. He also

argues, apparently in the alternative, that section (a)(I) does

not apply at all because section (a)(2) covers ranks above

Major or Lt. Commander. We cannot imagine that Congress

intended to guarantee retirement to an officer based on his or

her first six months of duty, or that even looser standards

should apply to higher ranking officers. ;

Statutes should be interpreted so that meaning is

given to each provision. Magnesium Corp. of America v.

United States, 166 F.3d 1364, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 1999). Both

paragraphs of this section have logical meaning if they are

_ read to require that an officer serve in his current rank for at

least 6 months and serve satisfactorily during his tenure in

that rank, before he may retire at that rank. If the officer is a

Lt. Colonel or Commander or higher, he must serve in rank

for at least 3 years before he can retire. In other words,

lower-ranking officers must serve at least 6 months in grade;

senior officers at least 3 years. Everyone must serve

satisfactorily as determined by the Secretary. Whether a

A 7

particular officer has served satisfactorily is a decision to be

made exclusively by the military, so we do not address that

issue. ~

2:

Plaintiff's second argument, that the Secretary acted

arbitrarily and capriciously, seems to depend mostly on his

interpretation of the statute. That is, the Secretary determined

that plaintiff's retirement in a lesser grade was lawful and

that determination was erroneous, therefore, her

determination was arbitrary and capricious. This is a circular

argument that in any event is disposed of by the statutory

interpretation described above.

Plaintiff claims that the Secretary’s decision to

disagree with the majority of the AFBCMR, which

recommended that Mr. Koz be retired as Colonel, is

“manifestly arbitrary and capricious.” The Secretary has the

authority to disagree with the Board’s recommendation,

however. Exercising the option to disagree is not arbitrary or

capricious. It was not contrary to law, regulation, or

procedure either. The Secretary of the Air Force made her

decision after having “carefully considered all of the

circumstances of this case” and having concluded that she

“(does) not agree with the recommendation of the majority

of the AFBCMR Panel.”

Plaintiff makes an assertion that the Secretary found

his service unsatisfactory “merely because of dissatisfaction

with the punishment he had previously received.” That

charge is not supported by the record. We have reviewed the

administrative record carefully in light of plaintiff allegations

and found no reason to question the Secretary’s diligence.

This case highlights the importance of a court's

deference to persons who are authorized by Congress to

make military personnel decisions. Plaintiff complains that

the Secretary “ignored and/or disregarded the mitigating

effect that Lt. Colonel Koz’s leukemia diagnosis had on his

judgment in 1994. There is no evidence that that factor was

considered at any stage of the grade determination action.”

ae

Yet the record contains the following statement of a medical

consultant to the Board for Correction of Military Records:

Therefore, to assert that concern over a “life

threatening” disease was proximate to a “panic” state

that affected [plaintiff's] judgment and ational

thinking is untenable and unsupportable. Indeed,

[plaintiff] met a Medical Evaluation Board in 1993

that found him fit and returned him to duty to finish

out his 30 year career.

The medical consultant seviewed plaintiff's “entire

case file” and the Air Force Secretary “carefully considered

all of the circumstances of this case” before issuing her

ruling. Assuming as we must that the Secretary carried out

her official duties correctly, fairly, in good faith, and in

accordance with the law and governing regulations, such

facts are dispositive of plaintiffs charges.

CONCLUSION

Congress requires that appropriate military authorities

determine whether an officer has served satisfactorily at the

rank in which the officer wishes to retire. In this case, the

Secretary of the Air Force determined that plaintiff's service

asa Colonel was not satisfactory. Her decision to retire

plaintiff in the grade of a Lt. Colonel was lawful. Her actions

in all respects were supported by the Administrative Record.

She did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in carrying out her

responsibilities.

Defendant’s motion for judgment on _ the

Administrative Record is GRANTED. Plaintiffs cross-

motion is DENIED. The Clerk will enter judgment for

defendant. No costs.

Robert H. Hodges, Jr.

Judge-

A9

RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

AIR FORCE BOARD FOR CORRECTION OF MILITARY

RECORDS

IN THE MATTER OF: DOCKET NUMBER: 98-01802

INDEX CODE: 133.00

JOSEPH P. KOZ COUNSEL: FRANK J. SPINNER

027—32—3544 HEARING DESIRED: NO

APPLICANT REQUESTS THAT:

His grade of colonel (0-6) be reinstated and his records be

corrected to reflect retirement in the grade of colonel,

effective 1 Jul 95.

APPLICANT CONTENDS THAT:

In mid-1994, he faced the prospect of mandatory retirement

and was also living with a diagnosis of leukemia. In

retrospect, and after talking to a psychologist, he realized

that both matters affected his judgment and behavior to a

degree that he did not appreciate at the time. In his last year

of service as the Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT)

commandant, he was confronted with the realization that his

military career had to end and he had to look for new

employment. His response to this realization led him to

engage in conduct that was questioned by his commander

and some of his subordinates. An IG investigation was

initiated and Article 15 punishment was subsequently

imposed. The primary claims against him involved

questionable TDY practices and off-duty employment.

He accepted nonjudicial punishment proceedings because he

wanted to get the matter resolved as quickly and painlessly

as possible for himself and the Air Force. In his letter to

A 10

SAF/IGQ and in his response to the Article 15, he explained

his state of mind at the time he began off-duty employment

and the circumstances related to the TDY trips in question.

Additionally, in making the decision to accept Article 15

proceedings, it never occurred to him that by receiving

punishment, his record would actually be reviewed to

determine his retirement grade. His Air Force defense

counsel never informed him that such a possibility was

likely. Had he been properly informed before the fact, he

may well have made a number of different decisions to

develop and present evidence. The potential emotional and

financial impact of retiring at a lesser grade is considerably

higher than the impact flowing from nonjudicial punishment.

He feels as though he was blindsided by the Air Force.

He was granted a 30% disability for his leukemia by the

Department of Veteran’s Affairs. In support of his request,

applicant sulnits an affidavit, counsel’s Brief, letters from

former AFIT vice commandants, a letter from a clinical

psychologist, copies of the Secretarial grade determination,

the Article 15 and additional documents associated with the

issues cited in his contentions. These documents are

appended at Exhibit A.

STATEMENT OF FACTS:

On 9 Jun 65, the applicant was commissioned a second

lieutenant in the Regular Air Force. He was progressively

promoted to the grade of colonel, with a date of rank (DOR)

of 28 Dec 81 and an effective date of 1 Aug 82.

The applicant’s 8 Dec 94 request for voluntary retirement,

effective 31 Jan 95, was approved by the commander.

A SAF/IG inquiry was conducted concerning the applicant’s

alleged inappropriate off-duty employment, misuse and

abuse of temporary duty (TDY) assignment and permissive

A ll

TDY, absent from Air Force duties while not on leave, and

not wearing a uniform to work. The 19 Jan 95, IG Summary

Report of Investigation indicated that allegations of holding

full-time employment, holding basketball practices during

normal duty hours, coming to work for only short periods of

time, not wearing a uniform to work, and using permissive

TDY for inappropriate purposes were substantiated. The

allegations of not being on leave while performing off-duty

employment and making dubious TDY trips were partially

substantiated (see Exhibit B).

On 11 May 95, applicant was notified of his commander's

intent to impose nonjudicial punishment (Article 15) for

alleged misconduct, on divers occasions between the periods

of 2 Feb 94 and 8 Dec 94, in violation of Articles 90, 92, 132

and 133, UCMJ. The applicant consulted a lawyer, waived

his right to demand trial by court-martial, accepted

nonjudicial punishment and attached a written presentation.

After considering all matters presented to him, the

commander found that the applicant did commit one or more

of the offenses alleged. The commander imposed

punishment of forfeiture of $2,979 pay per month for two

months. Applicant did not appeal the nonjudicial

punishment.

On 15 May 95, the applicant was notified of his

commander’s intent to request the Secretary of the Air Force

determine whether the applicant served satisfactorily in the

grade of colonel under the provisions of 10 USC 1370. The

applicant - acknowledged receipt of the notification and

subsequently submitted a personal statement requesting that

he be retired in the grade of colonel. On 25 May 95,

applicant’s commander recommended the applicant be

retired in the grade of colonel. On May 95, the Air Education

and Training Command (AETC) vice commander

recommended the applicant be retired in the grade of

lieutenant colonel and requested the case file be forwarded to

A 12

the Secretary of the Air Force. On 20 Jun 95, the Secretary

of the Air Force found that the applicant did not serve

satisfactorily in the grade of colonel and directed that he be

retired as a lieutenant colonel on 1 Jul 95.

On 30 Jun 95, the applicant was relieved from active duty

and retired effective 1 Jul 95 in the grade of lieutenant

colonel under the provisions of AFI 36-3203 (maximum

service or time in grade). He had completed a total of 30

years and 22 days of active service for retirement. .

The relevant facts pertaining to the applicant’s medical

condition are contained in the letter prepared by the

AFBCMR Medical Consultant. Accordingly, there is no need

to recite these facts in this Record of Proceedings.

F EE A

The AFBCMR Medical Consultant, stated that the applicant

was diagnosed in Nov 92 with chronic lymphocytic leukemia

(CLL), an overproduction of lymphatic cells in the bone

marrow. Erratic and uncharacteristic behavior between Feb

and Dec 94 led to an Article 15, which was the basis for the

grade determination. Applicant/counsel argue that excessive

concern over the applicant’s approaching mandatory

retirement date plus the diagnosis of leukemia caused the

applicant to perform irrationally in the last year of his

service; that he was not responsible for his actions; and,

therefore, should not have been subject to his grade

reduction.

The AFBCMR Medical Consultant indicated that at the time

the diagnosis of CLL was made, the applicant’s treating

physician stated the applicant “has an excellent prognosis

with no change in life expectancy.” The appticant has never

required any treatment for this disease, and most likely never

will other than periodic checks of his blood count. CLL,

A 13

while diagnostically a cancer, is not a disease that normally

affects a person’s longevity or general health. Therefore, to

<~—___ assert that concern over a “life-threatening” disease was

proximate to a “panic” state that affected the applicant’s

judgment and rational thinking iis untenable and

unsupportable. The applicant met a Medical Evaluation

Board (MEB) in 1993 that found him fit and tured him to

duty to finish out his 30-year career.

The AFBCMR Medical Consultant stated that nothing in the

records available for review supports the contention that the

applicant had a medical condition that could conceivably

have contributed to his 1994 behavior that resulted in his

nonjudicial punishment and lowered retirement grade. The

AFBCMR Medical Consultant is of the opinion that no

change in the records is warranted and the application should

be denied (Exhibit D). :

The General Law Division, HQ USAF/JAG, stated that the

applicant agues his distinguished service as a colonel (0-6)

from 1981 through 1994 greatly outweighs the relatively

minor misconduct alleged in 1994, making his service as an

0-6 more than satisfactory. He denies that he committed the

alleged offenses in 1994. The applicant indicated that his

earlier diagnosis of leukemia, when coupled with his anxiety

over his impending mandatory retirement, caused adverse

psychological effects and maladaptive behavior.

JAG stated that the clinical psychologist’s opinion is based

or the applicant’s representation that he was diagnosed with

terminal cancer. However, as the AFBCMR Medical

Consultant explained, the applicant was diagnosed with a

type of leukemia that is not only non-terminal, but normally

requires no treatment and has no adverse effect on the

person’s longevity or general health. JA indicated that the

applicant had ample opportunity to convince the commander

imposing nonjudicial punishment that he was not guilty of

A 14

any offense, but he was unale to do so. The applicant has

failed to provide any new evidence that would compel a

different conclusion, save the psychologist’s report discussed

(dismissed) above and the suggestion of a former colleague

that the applicant’s “bizarre” behavior was indicative of a

lack of mental responsibility at the time. The MAJCOM

legal review of the grade determination action contains a

sufficient recitation of the facts to persuade JAG that the

misconduct allegations were well founded.

JAG stated that there is no dispute the applicant served the

Air Force admirably in all assignments as a colonel except

the last; and, a grade determination should consider the

member’s entire service at the higher grade to determine

whether, on the whole, it was “satisfactory.” However, there

is no simple mathematical formula for balancing 12 years of

excellent service against one year of significant misconduct.

The Secretary’s designee determined the repeated and

serious nature of the misconduct warranted retirement in the

lower grade. JAG indicated that the AFBCMR should

overturn the designee’s decision only if it finds it so lacking

in reason or factual support as to constitute an injustice. JAG

sees no compelling reason to do so. Accordingly JAG

recommended the applicant’s request be denied (Exhibit E).

APP ; Ww FOR V. ATI

Counsel reviewed the advisory opinions and indicated that

the applicant is not claiming any sort of complete mental

responsibility “defense.” Psychological factors, however, are

relevant to issues of mitigation and extenuation. Therefore,

the evidence and statements provided with the application

warrant consideration in balancing the applicant’s record as a

colonel over 13 years against the stresses he faced in his final

year of active duty. The applicant has also provided an

additional statement addressing the points raised by the JAG

advisory writer with respect to what he [applicant]

A 15

experienced when he learned of his leukemia diagnosis.

Ultimately, they believe that an injustice occurred (refer to

Exhibit G).

THE BOARD CONCLUDES THAT:

1. The applicant has exhausted all remedies provided by

existing law or regulations.

2. The application was timely filed.

3. Sufficient relevant evidence has been presented to

demonstrate the existence of probable error or injustice. The

evidence of record reflects that, subsequent to his receipt of

nonjudicial punishment under Article 15, a Secretarial

determination was made that the applicant had not served

satisfactorily in the grade of colonel, and that he should be

retired in the grade of lieutenant colonel. While we have

founds no evidence which has shown to our satisfaction that

the Article 15 punishment was improper or an abuse of

discretionary authority, it is the opinion of the Board

majority that approval of the requested relief would be

appropriate based on the following considerations. After a

thorough review of the evidence, the Board majority noted

that the applicant had an outstanding Air Force career for 28

years and prior to the grade determination, with the

exception of the infractions which led to the imposition of

the Article 15, he had performed his duties faithfully and

well in the grade of colonel for more than 12 years. The

Board majority believes it is significant that the applicant

could have been tried by court-martial for the offenses for

which the Article 15 was imposed. A conviction by a court-

‘martial would have carried a more severe punishment than

that imposed by the nonjudicial punishment, ¢.g., reduction

in grade and/or dismissal from the service. At the time the

officer grade determination package was initiated, the

applicant’s superior (the Air University commander and a

A 16

lieutenant general) recommended the applicant be retired in

the grade of colonel, noting that the vast majority of his

service career and particularly that as a colonel, the applicant

was an “excellent” performer and expressing the opinion that

a “reduction in his rank would be disproportionate to the

offenses he committed and would not properly account for

the many valuable years of service he gave to the Air Force.”

Based on the above, the Board majority believes that, being

closer to events, the opinion of the applicant’s superior

deserves considerable deference in this matter. In view of the

above, the Board majority believes that_the applicant’s

retirement in the grade of lieutenant colonel was excessively

harsh and, therefore, unjust and that the Article 15 was

sufficient punishment for his misconduct. Accordingly, the

Board majority recommends that the applicant’s records be

corrected to reflect that he retired in the grade of colonel.

THE BOARD RECOMMENDS THAT:

The pertinent military records of the Department of the Air

Force relating to APPLICANT be corrected to show that:

a. The Secretary of the Air Force found that he serve

satisfactorily in the grade of colonel within the meaning of

Section 1370(a), Title 10, United States Code, and directed

that be retired in that grade.

b. On 30 June 1995, he was relieved from active duty

and effective 1 July 1995, he retired for length of service in

the grade of colonel.

The following members of the Board considered this

application in Executive Session on 27 September 1999,

under the provisions of AFI 36-2603:

Mrs. Barbara A. Westgate, Panel Chair

Mr. Vaughn E. Schlunz, Member

A 17

Mr. Steven A. Shaw, Member

Messrs. Schlunz and Shaw voted to grant the relief sought in

this application. Mrs. Westgate voted to deny the applicant’s

request and submitted a minority report which is attached at

Exhibit H. The following documentary evidence was

considered:

Exhibit A. DD Form 149, dated 25 Jun 98, w/atchs.

Exhibit B. Applicant’s Master Personnel Records.

Exhibit C. SAF/IG Report of Inquiry, dated 19 Jan 95

(withdrawn).

Exhibit D. Letter, AFBCMR Medical Consultant, dated

22 Sep 98.

Exhibit E. Letter, HQ USAF/JAG, dated 18 Dec 98.

Exhibit F. Letter, AFBCMR, dated 18 Jan 99.

Exhibit G. Letter from counsel, dated 19 Mar 99, and

letter from applicant, dated 19 Mar 99.

Exhibit H. | Minority Report.

BARBARA A. WESTGATE, Panel Chair

A 18

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

WASHINGTON, DC

Office of the Assistant Secretary _ 22 Feb 2000

MEMORANDUM FOR THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR,

AIR FORCE BOARD FOR CORRECTION OF

MILITARY RECORDS (AFBCMR)

FROM: SAF/MI

SUBJECT: BCMR Case on Lieutenant Colonel Joseph P.

Koz, 027-32-3 544, USAF, Retired

I have carefully considered all of the circumstances

of this case and do not agree with the recommendation of the

majority of the AFBCMR panel that the Secretarial decision

that the applicant did not serve satisfactorily in the grade of

colonel pursuant to Section 1370(a), Title 10, United States

Code, was too harsh, and, therefore, unjust.

On May 15, 1995, the Commander, Air University

(AU) notified the applicant of his intention to request a

Secretarial Determination of Satisfactory Service pursuant to

AFI 36-3203 and 10 USC 1370(a). He based his request on

applicant’s application to retire from active duty and his

receipt of an Article 15 under the Uniform Code of Military

Justice (UCMJ) on the same date. On this date, applicant was

punished for three specifications of dereliction of duty, three

specifications of filing false claims and one specification of

conduct unbecoming an officer. He received a forfeiture of

$2,979.00 per month for two months. Upon being given the

Opportunity to present matters for the Secretary to consider

in determining whether his service was satisfactory, the

applicant asked to be allowed to retire in the grade of

colonel. On May 25, 1995, after considering the matters

presented by the applicant, the AU Commander

A 19

recommended that he be retired in the grade of colonel.

On May 31, 1995, the Vice Commander, Air

Education and Training Command (AETC/CV) disagreed

and recommended the applicant be retired in the grade of

lieutenant colonel because of his documented misconduct.

He stated that although a superb performance record through

a career marked by significant responsibilities stands clear,

this illegal action and poor attitude concerning obligations to —

the USAF during 1994 warrant strong disciplinary measures.

If his only error had been one of judgment in pursuing post

retirement employment opportunities prematurely, he could

concur with the recommendation for retirement as a colonel.

In his view, however, it was clear that, with premeditation,

the applicant concocted several TDYs simply to facilitate

interviews. Moreover, despite strong feedback from his

subordinates that his actions were affecting both the morale

and performance of his people, and despite a direct order

from his commander to cease and desist, he continued with

inappropriate, unauthorized, and illegal activities. The

AETC/CV concluded by stating that this reflects a total

disregard for his unit, his people, the organizational Air

Force or established standards of conduct for an officer

particularly of his grade.

On June 20, 1995, the then Deputy for Air Force

Review Boards announced that the Secretary of the Air

Force found that the applicant did not serve satisfactorily in

the grade of colonel within the meaning of Section 1370(a),

Title 10, United States Code. However, the Secretary found

that he served satisfactorily in the grade of 0-5 and directed

that he be retired as lieutenant colonel on July 1, 1995.

In his application to the AFBCMR, applicant asserts,

essentially, that his distinguished service as a colonel from

1981 through 1994 greatly outweighs the relatively minor

misconduct alleged in 1994, making his service as a colonel

A 20

more than satisfactory; that his behavior caused

“perceptions” of impropriety, but he accepted the Article 15

process not because he was guilty but solely to resolve the

matter quickly; and that his earlier diagnosis of leukemia,

when coupled with his anxiety over his impending

mandatory retirement, caused adverse psychological effects

and maladaptive behavior.

HQ USAF/JAG and the Chief Medical Consultant,

AFBCMR, found no merit in the applicant’s assertions and

recommend that his application be denied. HQ USAF/JAG,

advises, among other things, that whether a string of

incidents in the final year is sufficient to render the entire

service as a colonel unsatisfactory is a matter of judgment to

be exercised by the Secretary or his designee. Here, the

designee determined that the repeated and serious nature of

the misconduct warranted retirement in the lower grade. The

AFBCMR’s task is not to decide whether it would have

reached the same conclusion had it been the decision-maker.

Rather; the AFBCMR should overturn the designee’s

decision only if it finds it so lacking in reason or factual

support as to constitute an injustice.

The AFBCMR panel finds no error in the Secretarial

decision that the applicant did not serve satisfactorily in the

grade of colonel. Nonetheless, in consideration of all of the

circumstances of this case (i.e., the applicant’s lengthy

record of outstanding service, the fact that the misconduct

was disposed of by nonjudicial punishment as opposed to

courts-martial and the recommendation from the AU

Commander), the majority of the AFBCMR panel concludes -

that the Secretarial determination that the applicant did net

serve satisfactorily in the grade of colonel was too harsh and,

therefore, unjust. Noting the flagrant misconduct committed

by the applicant, the minority member of the AFBCMR

panel does not believe that the Secretarial decision was

overly harsh and believes the applicant’s request should be

A 21

denied. I agree.

The AFBCMR has_ considerable discretion in

determining what set of circumstances constitute either an

error or an injustice and, as 4 consequence, its

recommendation is entitled to considerable deference. I note,

however, that the courts have defined injustice as treatment

by military authorities which shocks the sense of justice.

Given the gravity of the offenses committed, I do not find his

treatment by the military shocking in the least. Quite the

contrary, he appears to have been fortunate that courts-

martial charges were not preferred whereby, if convicted, the

penalty could have far exceeded retirement in a lower grade.

In view of the foregoing and in the absence of clear-cut

evidence that he was falsely accused, it is my decision that

his application be denied.

RUBY B. DEMESME

Assistant Secretary of the Air Force

(Manpower, Reserve Affairs,

Installations and Environment)

A 22

10 U.S.C. § 137

(1) Unless entitled to a higher retired grade under some other

provision of law, a commissioned officer (other than a

commissioned warrant officer) of the Army, Navy, Air

Force, or Marine Corps who retires under any provision of

law other than chapter 61 or chapter 1223 of this title shall,

except as provided in paragraph (2), be retired in the highest

grade in which he served on active duty satisfactorily, as

determined by the Secretary of the military department

concemed, for not less than six months.

(2)(A) In order to be eligible for voluntary retirement under

any provision of this title in a grade above major or

_ lieutenant commander, a commissioned officer of the Army,

Navy, Air Force, or Marine Corps must have served on

active duty in that grade for not less than three years, except

that the Secretary of Defense may authorize the Secretary of

a military department to reduce such period to a period not

less than two years in the case of retirements effective during

the period beginning on October 1, 1990, and ending on

December 31, 2001.

(B) The President may waive subparagraph (A) in

individual cases involving extreme hardship or exceptional

or unusual circumstances. The authority of the President

under the preceding sentence may not be delegated.

(C) In the case of a grade below the grade of lieutenant

general or vice admiral, the number of members of one of

the armed forces in that grade for whom a reduction is made

during any fiscal year in the period of service-in-grade

otherwise required under this paragraph may not exceed the

‘number equal to two percent of the authorized active-duty

strength for that fiscal year for officers of that armed force in

that grade. :

(3) A reserve or temporary officer who is notified that he

will be released from active duty without his consent and

A 23

thereafter requests retirement under section 3911, 6323, or

8911 of this title and is retired pursuant to that request is

considered for purposes of this section, to have been retired

involuntarily. An officer retired pursuant to section

1186(b)(1) of this title is considered for purposes of this

section to have been retired voluntarily.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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