Appendix — Sheridan v. Trustees of Columbia University

la

APPENDIX 1

Tom, J.P., MAZZARELLI, ROSENBERGER, ELLERIN,

RUBIN, J/.

1533-1534

CHRISTOPHER F. SHERIDAN,

Plaintiff-Appellant-Respondent,

James H. Rodgers

—against—

THE TRUSTEES OF COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

IN THE CITY OF NEW YORK,

Defendant-Respondent-Appellant.

Brian K. Bernstein

en eel ~

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Marilyn Shafer,

J.), entered January 19, 2001, which, in an action arising out

of defendant Trustees of Columbia University’s refusal to for-

ward plaintiff degree holder’s college transcript to graduate

schools, inter alia, granted defendant’s motion to dismiss the

complaint insofar as addressed to the causes of action for

declaratory judgment, breach of contract and intentional

infliction of emotional distress, and denied the motion insofar

as addressed to the causes of action for fraud and negligent

misrepresentation, unanimously modified, on the law, to dis-

miss the causes of action, fraud and negligent misrepresenta-

tion, and to declare that defendant is not in violation of either

its charter or New York law by conditioning its forwarding of

2a

plaintiff’s transcript to graduate schools upon his payment of

outstanding tuition, and otherwise affirmed, without costs.

The Clerk is directed to enter judgment accordingly. Appeal

from order, same court and Justice, entered October 11, 2001,

which, inter alia, granted defendant’s motion to reargue inso-

far as addressed to plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages

under his causes of action for fraud and negligent misrepre-

sentation, and, upon reargument, dismissed such claim, unan-

imously, without costs, as academic.

We reject plaintiffs argument that as a degree holder he is

in a fundamentally different position from the plaintiffs in

cases holding that a university has no legal obligation to pro-

vide a diploma or transcript to a graduating student or former

student with outstanding financial obligations to the universi-

ty (see, Gray v St. John’s Univ., __ Misc 2d _, 2001 NY Misc

LEXIS 1044 [App Term, Ist Dept];Martin v Pratt Inst., 278

AD2d 390 [2d Dept]; /v denied 96 NY2d 715; Matter of Spas

v Wharton, 106 Misc 2d 180 [Sup Ct, Albany County]). There

is no merit to plaintiff’s argument that defendant’s refusal to

forward his transcript to graduate schools effectively revokes

his degree in violation of defendant’s charter, Education Law

§ 226(9), and an implied promise by a university to its gradu-

ates not to interfere with the privileges and immunities of his

or her degree. The challenged policy is clearly “expedient for

carrying into effect the designs of [defendant’s] institution”,

as expressly permitted by its charter, and, while the policy

may compromise plaintiff’s applications to graduate schools,

it does not revoke defendant’s certification that plaintiff pos-

sesses all of the knowledge and skills represented by the

degree.

Plaintiff’s other causes of action all lack merit. The breach

of contract claim, based on an alleged, post-degree agreement

under which plaintiff gave defendant a promissory note in

3a

exchange for defendant’s promise to release his transcript,

does not allege the essential terms of the note or the agree-

ment in nonconclusory language, or plaintiff’s performance

of his obligations thereunder (see, Matter of Sud v Sud, 211

AD2d 423, 424). Plaintiff’s claim for intentional infliction of

emotional distress fails because the challenged policy does

not violate defendant’s charter or the law, and also because

the policy is not so outrageous as to go beyond all possible

bounds of decency and be utterly intolerable in a civilized

community (see, Wolkstein v Morgenstern, 275 AD2d 635,

636-637). Plaintiff's fraud claim, based on an allegation that

defendant misrepresented to him that it would release his

transcript if he obtained a bank loan and used it to reduce his

obligation to the university, should have been dismissed

because plaintiff could not have been defrauded into doing

what he was already legally bound to do, i.e., pay his tuition

(see, Megaris Furs v Gimbel Bros., 172 AD2d 209, 212).

Plaintiffs negligent misrepresentation claim, based on the

same alleged misrepresentation, should also have been dis-

missed, since, at the time of the alleged misrepresentation, the

parties were clearly acting at arm’s length (see, Kimmel v

Schaefer, 89 NY2d 257, 263). We have considered and reject-

ed plaintiff’s other arguments.

M-2439 — Sheridan v. Trustees of Columbia University

Motion seeking leave to strike reply brief granted.

THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE

SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT.

ENTERED: JULY 2, 2002

By /s/ CATHERINE O’HAGAN WOLFE

Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, CLERK

4a

APPENDIX 2

NEW YORK SUPREME COURT

APPELLATE DIVISION—FIRST DEPARTMENT

M-4096

Index No. 103062/00

At a Term of the Appellate Division of the Supreme

Court held in and for the First Judicial Department in the

County of New York on October 8, 2002.

Present — HON. PETER TOM, Justice Presiding,

ANGELA M. MAZZARELLI

ERNST H. ROSENBERGER

BETTY WEINBERG ELLERIN

ISRAEL RUBIN,

Justices.

-- ne te

CHRISTOPHER F. SHERIDAN,

Plaintiff-Appellant-Respondent,

—against—

THE TRUSTEES OF COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

IN THE CITY OF NEW YORK,

Defendant-Respondent-Appellant.

he ahs

Sa

Plaintiff-appellant-respondent having moved for reargu-

ment of or, in the alternative, for leave to appeal to the

Court of Appeals from the decision and order of this Court

entered on July 2, 2002 (Appeal Nos. 1533-1534),

Now, upon a reading and filing the papers with respect

to the motion, and due deliberation having been had there-

on,

It is ordered that the motion is denied.

ENTER:

By /s/ CATHERINE O’HAGAN WOLFE

Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk.

6a

APPENDIX 3

STATE OF NEW YORK

COURT OF APPEALS

1-14 Mo. No. 1251

At a session of the Court of Appeals Hall in the City of

albany on the ninth day.of January, 2003.

Present — HON. JUDITH S. KAYE, Chief Judge, presiding.

—~ == dd

CHRISTOPHER F. SHERIDAN,

Appellant,

v.

THE TRUSTEES OF COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

IN THE CITY OF NEW YORK,

Respondent.

eee

A motion for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals in

the above cause having heretofore been made upon the part

of the appellant herein and papers having been submitted

thereon and due deliberation having been thereupon had,

it 1S

ORDERED, that the said motion be and the same hereby is

denied.

Judge Read took no part.

By /s/ STUART M. COHEN

Stuart M. Cohen

Clerk of the Court

7a

APPENDIX 4

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK —

NEW YORK COUNTY

Filed January 1, 2001

Present — HON. MARILYN SHAFER PART 36.

Justice

CHRISTOPHER SHERIDAN,

Plaintiff, INDEX No. 103062/00

—against— MOTION DATE

MOTION SEQ. No. 02.

TRUSTEES OF COLUMBIA

UNIVERSITY,

MOTION CAL. NO.

Defendant.

The following papers, numbered | to 4 were read on this

motion to DISMISS

PAPERS NUMBERED

Notice of Motion/Order to Show

Cause—A ffidavits—Exhibits l

Cross-Motion—Exhibits 2

Replying Affidavits 3,4

Cross-Motion: [J Yes 1 No

8a

Upon the foregoing papers, it is ordered that defendant’s

motion to dismiss the complaint and plaintiff’s cross-

motion to amend the complaint are partially granted, in

accordance with the decision below.

Plaintiff Christopher Sheridan brings this action for

declaratory relief on claims of breach of implied contract,

fraud, and intentional infliction of emotional distress

against defendant Columbia University.

To plead a cause of action for breach of contract, plain-

tiff must set forth the provisions of the contract upon

which the claim is based. (Atkinson v Mobil Oil Corp, 205

AD2d 719.) It is undisputed that plaintiff owes unpaid

tuition to the defendant. Plaintiff fails to allege the exis-

tence of any contract that would entitle plaintiff to release

of his transcript prior to paying what he owes to the uni-

versity. Plaintiff has failed to set forth legally cognizable

grounds which would entitle him to receive his transcript

while his tuition debt remains unpaid.

The cause of action for intentional infliction of emo-

tional distress must also be dismissed. It is well settled

that in order to set forth a claim, plaintiff must allege

extreme and outrageous conduct which either intentionally

or recklessly caused plaintiff’s severe emotional distress.

(Herlihy v. Metropolitan Museum of Art, 214 AD2d 250;

Howell v. New York Post Co., Inc., 81 NY2d 115.) To sur-

vive a motion to dismiss, the conduct must be “so outra-

geous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go

beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded

as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized commu-

nity.” (Murphy v. American Home Products, 58 NY2d

293.) While the inability to complete his application to

Harvard Business School is certainly unsettling, the facts

9a

alleged by plaintiff in the instant case do not rise to the

requisite level for an emotional distress claim.

Regarding plaintiff’s cross-motion to amend the com-

plaint, it is granted only to the extent of permitting the

causes of action for negligent representation and fraud, as

this Court finds that plaintiff has sufficiently stated a cause

of action for both in the amended complaint.

Accordingly, the action continues for plaintiff’s fraud

and negligent representation claims. The remaining causes

of action in the complaint and proposed amendment com-

plaint are dismissed.

Counsel are directed to appear in Part 36 for a discovery

conference on Friday, _ 1-26-01 at 9:30 A.M.

[STAMP]

FILED JAN 19 2001

COUNTY CLERK’S OFFICE

NEW YORK

Dated: 1/01/01

By /signature stamped/ MARILYN SHAFER, J.S.C. |

JS.C.

Check one: [ ] FINAL Disposition [ X ] NON-FINAL DISPOSITION

10a

APPENDIX 5

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

COUNTY OF NEW YORK: I.A.S. PART 36

Index No. 103062/00

Filed: October 11, 2001

Pe sit

CHRISTOPHER F. SHERIDAN,

Plaintiff,

—against—

THE TRUSTEES OF COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

IN THE CITY OF NEW YORK,

Defendant.

MARILYN SHAFER, J.:

Defendant the Trustees of Columbia University in the

City of New York (the “University”) moves: (1) pursuant

to CPLR 2221, for leave to renew and reargue this court’s

decision and order dated January 1, 2001 (the “Prior

Order”), and in the event leave is granted, to (a) dismiss

the fraud and negligent representation claims that plaintiff

was given leave to amend; or alternatively, to (b) dismiss

the request for punitive damages asserted in the fraud and

negligent misrepresentation claims, and limit the conse-

quential damages to $1,600; and (2) pursuant to CPLR

325, for removal of this case to the Civil Court. Plaintiff

Christopher F. Sheridan cross-moves, pursuant to CPLR

lla

2221, for leave to renew and reargue the Prior Order to the

extent that it dismisses plaintiff’s causes of action for

breach of contract, declaratory relief and intentional inflic-

tion of emotional distress.

In October 1990, plaintiff graduated from the Universi-

ty’s School of General Studies with a Bachelor of Arts in

History. Plaintiff alleges that, since receiving his degree,

the University has repeatedly refused to release his tran-

scripts to university graduate programs, including the Har-

vard University Graduate School of Business, in February

2000. He originally commenced this action for breach of

contract, fraud and intentional infliction of emotional dis-

tress.

In the prior motion, the University moved to dismiss the

complaint. Plaintiff cross-moved for leave to amend his

complaint to include causes of action for a declaratory

judgment and negligent misrepresentation. In the Prior

Order, this court granted the University’s dismissal

motion, only to the extent of dismissing the claims for

breach of contract, intentional infliction of emotional dis-

tress and a declaratory judgment asserted in the complaint

and proposed amended complaint. Plaintiff’s cross motion

was granted only to the extent of granting leave to amend

his claims to assert causes of action for fraud and negligent

misrepresentation, finding that plaintiff sufficiently stated

these claims in the proposed amended complaint.

The University now moves for leave to renew and rear-

gue this court’s Prior Order.

Although the University characterizes its motion as one

for reargument and renewal, it does not submit any new

evidence or additional facts not previously known to it

(Rubinstein v Goldman, 225 AD2d 328 [lst Dept], /v

denied 88 NY2d 815 [1996]). A motion to renew under

12a

CPLR 2221 is intended to draw the court’s attention to new

or additional facts which, although in existence at the time

of the original motion, were unknown to the party seeking

renewal and, therefore, not brought to the court’s attention

(Foley v Roche, 68 AD2d 558 [1st Dept 1979]; see also,

Dankner v Szurzan and Dorf, Inc., 226 AD2d 669 [2d Dept

1996]). Thus, the University’s motion is not for renewal.

A motion for leave to reargue, pursuant to CPLR 2221,

is addressed to the sound discretion of the court and may

be granted only upon a showing that the court overlooked

or misapprehended any relevant facts or misapplied any

controlling principles of law (Foley v Roche, supra). The

purpose of reargument is not to serve as a vehicle to per-

mit the unsuccessful party to advance arguments different

from those tendered on the original application (id.; see

also, Mariani v Dyer, 193 AD2d 456 [1st Dept], /v denied

82 NY2d 658 [1993]).

The University’s arguments for dismissing plaintiff’s

claims for fraud and negligent misrepresentation are essen-

tially a reiteration of those made in support of its original

dismissal motion. Further, the University’s belated attempt

to proffer different arguments from those previously made

in the prior motion is not permitted under reargument

(Foley v Roche, supra; see also, Mariani v Dyer, supra).

The University’s alternate request, for leave to reargue a

limitation of plaintiff’s consequential damages in the fraud

and negligent misrepresentation, is also denied. The Uni-

versity simply reiterates the prior arguments it made in

opposition to plaintiff’s cross motion for leave to amend,

which were rejected by this court. The purpose of reargu-

ment is not to serve as a vehicle to permit the unsuccessful

party to proffer the same arguments previously made in the

prior motion (Foley v Roche, supra). Further, the Univer-

s

13a

sity does not demonstrate that this court overlooked or

misapprehended relevant facts or misapplied relevant law

in allowing plaintiff leave to amend its fraud and negligent

misrepresentation claims to include consequential dam-

ages (Foley v Roche, supra).

However, although this court properly granted leave to

plaintiff to assert claims in fraud and negligent misrepre-

sentation, as asserted in the proposed amended pleading,

it should have dismissed the requests for punitive damages

asserted therein. “ ‘Punitive damages are warranted where

the conduct of the party being held liable evidences a high

degree of moral culpability, or where the conduct is so

flagrant as to transcend mere carelessness, or where the

conduct constitutes willful or wanton negligence or reck-

lessness’” (Lee v Health Force, Inc., 268 AD2d 564 [2d

Dept 2000], quoting Rey v Park View Nursing Home, Inc.,

262 AD2d 624, 627 [2d Dept 1999]). Plaintiff’s fraud and

negligent misrepresentation claims, as asserted in the pro-

posed pleading, are devoid of any factual allegations that

would constitute wilful or wanton negligence, or rise to the

level of moral culpability necessary to support a request

for punitive damages (see, ig).

Therefore, that branch of the University’s motion for

leave to renew and reargue is granted to the extent of

granting reargument, and upon reargument, granting the

motion only to the extent of modifying the Prior Order to

dismiss the extent for punitive damages contained in the

fraud and negligent misrepresentation claims.

In view of the foregoing discussion, that branch of the

University’s motion, pursuant to CPLR 325, for removal of

the instant action to the Civil Court is denied. The grava-

men of the University’s argument relied on a limit being

placed on plaintiff’s damages of $1,600.

14a

Plaintiff also cross-moved for leave to renew and rear-

gue the Prior Order. That branch of plaintiff’s cross-

motion for leave to reargue the Prior Order is denied as

untimely. Although plaintiff timely served his cross

motion, pursuant to CPLR 2215, it was not timely under

the time limitations set by CPLR 2221. A motion for leave

to reargue must be made within thirty days after service of

a copy of the order determining the prior motion and writ-

ten notice of its entry (CPLR 2221[d][3]). Since service of

the Prior Order was made on plaintiff on January 29, 2001,

plaintiff’s cross-motion to reargued served on March 9,

2001 is untimely.

That branch of plaintiff’s cross motion for renewal is

also denied. Although the 30-day time limitation under

CPLR 2221[d][3] does not apply to motions to renew, the

new evidence relied on by plaintiff consists of affidavits

and correspondence which plaintiff acknowledges that he

had prior to the dismissal motion and failed to submit

(Foley v Roche, supra). Additionally, plaintiff does not

provide a reasonable excuse for not previously proffering

this new evidence (see, Pappas v Saatchi and Saatchi Co.,

227 AD2d 109 [1st Dept], /v dismissed 88 NY2d 1016,

rearg denied 89 NY2d 862 [1996]). Renewal is not a sec-

ond chance freely given to parties who have not exercised

due diligence in making their first factual presentation

(Rubinstein v Goldman, supra).

Accordingly, it is

ORDERED that the branch of the motion of the Trustees of

Columbia University in the City of New York to reargue

this court’s memorandum decision and order dated January

1, 2001, is granted, and upon reargument, plaintiff’s

request for punitive damages, as asserted in the fraud and

15a

negligent misrepresentation claims in the proposed

Amended Complaint, is dismissed; and it is further

ORDERED that the branch of the motion of the Trustees of

Columbia University in the City of New York to renew this

court’s memorandum decision and order dated January 1,

2001 is denied; and it is further

ORDERED that the branch of the motion of the Trustees of

Columbia University in the City of New York, pursuant to

CPLR 325, for removal of the instant action to the Civil

Court is denied; and it is further

ORDERED that the branch of the plaintiff’s cross motion

for leave to renew this court’s memorandum decision and

order dated January 1, 2001 is denied.

Dated: October 4, 2001

ENTER:

By /signature stamped/

MARILYN SHAFER J.S.C.

l6a

APPENDIX 6

THE FACE OF THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS A WATERMARK OF

THE UNIVERSITY SEAL

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY IN THE CITY OF NEW YORK

NaME: Christopher F. Sheridan

SSN#: 134-62-3514

SCHOOL: SCHOOL OF GENERAL STUDIES UNDERGRADUATE

DEGREE(S) AWARDED: DATE AWARDED:

Bachelor of arts October 24, 1990

MAJOR: HISTORY

SUBJECT COURSE TITLE POINTS GRADE

Autumn 1988

English F1102 College

Composition II 3.00 B

Fine Arts F1011 Introduction

the Arts 3.00 A-

Philosophy F1401 Elementary Logic 3.00 C

Spanish F1201 Intermediate

Spanish I 4.00 Bt

GPA 3.025

SUBJECT

English

History

History

Music

Spanish

English

History

History

History

History

COURSE

F1124

BD3052

W3648

F1001

F1202

F1125

BC3056

W3205

W3227

W3855

17a

TITLE

Spring 1989

American

Literature Study 3.00

Constitutn — Histor-

ical Perspectv 3.00

History of the

South 3.00

Introduction to

Music 3.00

Intermediate

Spanish II 4.00

GPA

Autumn 1989

World Literature

Study 3.00

The Amer Civil

Rights Movement 3.00

Europe Politics —

Socity 1870-1919 3.00

British History,

1688-1832 3.00

The Medieval

City 4.00

GPA

POINTS GRADE

2.167

2.438

18a

SUBJECT COURSE TITLE POINTS GRADE

Spring 1990

History W3228 _ British History,

1832-1988 3.00 Bt

History W3361 History of the

Soviet Union 3.00 + B-

History W3892 The Crusades 4.00 B-

History W3934 The Immigrant

and the City 400 C+

Phys Ed C1002 =~ Physical Education

Activities 100 P

GPA 2.714

REMARKS

Cumulative GPA: 2.559

40.00 Credits Transferred from SUNY Maritime Coll

30.00 Credits Transferred from St John’s University

4.00 Credits Transferred from Suffolk County Comm

Coll Ammer

This official transcript was produced on MAy 20, 1996

and released to:

SFC BUTCH BINKHAM

NJNG

NORTH EVERGREEN AVE

Woopsury, NJ 08096 USA

[ROUND] LEGAL SEAL

/s/ JOSEPH P. CAPOBLANCO_ oi

Joseph P. Capoblanco

University Registrar

19a

APPENDIX 7

A.

REP _Y BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT/

CROSS-RESPONDENT (“SHERIDAN”)

I.

COLUMBIA IS PROHIBITED FROM ENACTING

BY-LAWS OR ORDINANCES IN VIOLATION OF

ITS 1810 CHARTER

Columbia’s reliance on Section IX of the 18/0 Charter

is not only misplaced, but is inconsistent with the law of

New York governing interpretation of charter powers and

the permissible scope of by-laws, ordinances and regula-

tions. Moreover, Columbia did not quote Section IX in its

entirety, thereby omitting a crucial component of the sec-

tion necessary for interpretation. The full language of Sec-

tion IX states as follows:

“IX And be it further enacted, that the said trustees,

and their successors, shall have full power and author-

ity to make all ordinances and bye-laws which to them

shall seem expedient for carrying into effect the

designs of their institution; Provided always, That

such ordinances. or bye-laws shall not make the reli-

~ gious tenets of any person a condition of admission to

any privilege or office in the said college, nor be

inconsistent with the constitution and laws of this

state, nor with the constitution and laws of the United

States.” (emphasis added) Section IX, 181C Charter,

supra at Footnote 2 of Sheridan’s Appeal Brief.

20a

Thus, when read as a whole, the by-law or ordinance

1) must be expedient for carrying out the designs of the

institution and, 2) must not be inconsistent with the laws of

New York State. Firstly, the revoking or restricting of a

degree-holder’s degree and privileges is not a power grant-

ed Columbia by the /8/0 Charter and therefore is clearly

not a “design of the institution” and any by-law or ordi-

nance that revokes or restricts a degree-holder’s degree or

privileges is invalid and not within the scope of Section

IX. Secondly, as that part of Section IX omitted in Colum-

bia’s Response Brief clearly states: no by-law or ordinance

can be inconsistent with the laws of New York State. Since

the applicable law, Sections VII and VIII of the 18/0

Charter, unambiguously entitles the possessor of the

degree to all privileges and immunities held by others with

similar or identical degrees, and the withholding of tran-

scripts revokes or restricts the degree and its privileges,

any by-law or ordinance which has the effect of withhold-

ing transcripts of degree-holders is unlawful and in vio-

lation of Sections VII and VIII of the 18/0 Charter.

Therefore, Columbia is in violation of Section IX of the

1810 Charter, the very section Columbia relies on in an

attempt to circumvent the express legislative mandate that

grants the privileges and immunities entitlement to degree-

holders.

2la

—

APPENDIX 8

Plaintiff attempts to overcome Spas v. Wharton, 106

Misc. 2d 180; 431 N.Y.S.2d 638 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co. 1980)

and Sirohi v. The Trustees of Columbia University, 1998

U.S. App. Lexis 22519 (2nd Cir. 1998) by claiming that

each is “irrelevant”. Both Spas and Sirohi are very much

relevant to this case as Spas, cited with approval by this

Court in Gray and by the Second Circuit in Sirohi, and

Sirohi itself, endorse the mechanism of a university with-

holding transcripts and diplomas in order to insure the col-

lection of outstanding tuition obligations.

Finally, plaintiff’s characterization of Spas as “not even

good law” is also mistaken as this Court only last year

adopted Spas in its own decision in Gray, supra.

One final point is necessary. In addition to the reasons

set forth in Columbia’s Brief (pages 11-12), plaintiff’s

reliance on the 1810 Charter, Laws of 1810, Chap. 85,

Webster’s and Skinner’s Law of the State of New York,

1812 Edition, is inappropriate because the provisions

relied upon by plaintiff do not afford an individual a pri-

vate right of action under which he may sue to obtain his

relief. See generally, Carrier v. Salvation Army, 88 N.Y.2d

298 (1996). Furthermore, and to the extent plaintiff sug-

gests that a supposed violation by Columbia of the 18/0

Charter is a violation of the Federal and State Constitu-

tions, Columbia is a private university and not a “state

actor” and therefore is not bound by the New York State

and Federal Constitutions. See, Odom v. Columbia Univer-

sity, 906 F.Supp. 188, 195 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (“Columbia, as

a private institution, does not act under color of State

law’’); Sirohi, supra, (“defendants are not state actors’’).

22a

APPENDIX 9

“permanent academic records” of the college. Article 5,

Section 219 of the Education Law states in paragraph 4, in

part:

“Whenever the charter or incorporation of an insti-

tution is revoked or an order of dissolution made pur-

suant to the provision of this section, it shall be the

duty of the trustees and/or the custodians of the per-

manent academic records of such institution to file the

same with the state education department, or with

such other agency as may be approved by said depart-

ment where they shall be kept available for future ref-

erence...” Id.

Thus, the New York State legislature recognizes that the

permanent academic records (which would include official

transcripts of graduates) are public documents that are held

in trust by all universities and mandates that upon dissolu-

tion of a university or college, the trustees or custodians of

the permanent academic records must file the same with the

state education department. Moreover, the Court of Appeals

has held that the dissolution of a private university chartered

by the New York legislature must be dissolved by the

Regents pursuant to Section 219 of the Education Law. See

St. Lawrence University, supra, 282 N.Y.S.2d at p. 748.

Consequently, Columbia’s “permanent academic records”

are, like all such college records in New York, documents

that Columbia does not “own” but holds in trust for both the

State of New York and the degree holder. Clearly, each grad-

uate’s official transcripts evidencing courses completed and

the degree conferred are “permanent academic records” as

described in Section 219 of the Education Law.