Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Muhammad v. Diamond Offshore Co.

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«ane Geurt, U.S.

FILE ®

021245 FEB 21 2003

GRICE OF THE GLERK

In The

Supreme Court of the Anited States

¢

SADAT MUHAMMAD,

Petitioner,

V.

DIAMOND OFFSHORE COMPANY,

Respondent.

*

On Petition For Writ Of Certiorari

To The Supreme Court Of The State Of Louisiana

2

v

PETITION FOR WRIT OF C.:RTIORARI

¢

LAWRENCE D. WIEDEMANN

Louisiana Bar #13457

WIEDEMANN & WIEDEMANN

821 Baronne Street

New Orleans, Louisiana 70113

Telephone: (504) 581-6180

Counsel of Record for Petitioner,

Sadat Muhammad

COCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING CO. (800) 225-6964

OR CALL COLLECT (402) 342-2831

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

Whether, or not, decisions of the 16th Judicial District

Court, State of Louisiana, the Third Circuit Court of

Appeal, State of Louisiana, and the Louisiana Su-

preme Court, refusing to apply OSHA violations of 29

C.F.R. 1910.24(f) and (g) by respondent to the unin-

spected vessel, OCEAN LEXINGTON, are in direct

conflict with this Court’s controlling decision in Chao

v. Mallard Bay Drilling, Inc., 534 U.S. 235, 122 S. Ct.

738, 151 L.Ed. 2d 659.

Whether, or not, the above State Courts in assessing

100% fault to the seaman respondent ignored this

Court’s controlling decision in Kernan v. American

Dredging Company, 355 U.S. 394 (1958), and 45

U.S.C. §53, making the violation of an applicable

regulatory statute “negligence per se” and eliminating

appiicant’s alleged comparative fault.

ii

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

Applicant

SADAT MUHAMMAD, a person of the full age of

majority and a resident of Marion County, Mississippi.

Respondent

Diamond Offshore Company, a Delaware corporation

domiciled in Wilmington, Delaware, with its principal

office in Houston, Texas, and its principal business

establishment in New Iberia, Louisiana.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

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SR On ili

NE PID ssasavescassscccnsensnecsansescvssseanessevereses v

EE AR SR rt 1

EINE ERE SERIE! “AI ES OA Oa Te 1

Statutory and Regulatory Provisions...................006.. 2

oss scennncwnesecsnaccssundesvessébesevees 2

Reasons for Granting the Writ..................c..csecceeeeeeee 4

Meastiaens rik ican evevedsbesbinekiceninns 4

Ao ac dra ci cd a hchosiesn-opnqnushnbasadaoxeundene 12

ELE ERE STOR ey a ea 15

Appendix

Appendix A

Decision dated November 27, 2002, of the Su-

preme Court, State of Louisiana......................0000. App. 1

Appendix B

Decision dated July 10, 2002, from the Court of

Appeal, Third Circuit, State of Louisiana............ App. 2

Appendix C

Written Reasons dated March 28, 2001, of the

Honorable William D. Hunter of the 16th Judi-

iv”

TABLE OF CONTENTS -— Continued

Page

Appendix D

Judgment dated May 16, 2001, rendered by the

Honorable William D. Hunter of the 16th Judi-

cial District Court, Parish of Iberia, State of Lou-

I ses cttrcitsscencrennsineiavnntnnciansidaaaaineiedite App. 33

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

CASES:

Chao v. Mallard Bay Drilling, Inc., 532 U.S. 1017,

121 S.Ct. 1954, 149 L.Ed. 2d 751 (2002) .........0.0...0.. 3,5

Chao v. Mallard Bay Driliing, Inc., 5384 U.S. 235, ;

122 S.Ct. 738; 151 L.Ed. 2d 659 (2002) ............. ce eeeeeeeee 3

Colmar S.S. Corp. v. Taylor, 303 U.S. 525, 58 S.Ct.

651, 82 L.Ed. 993 (1938) ................sererecceeceses sesveeeesesenenee 12

In Re: Complaint of Roy Cook & Sons, Inc. v. Allen,

F Gee ae BE Ce CA Bi in ensiccoscscevievecinserssabeasiontcnion 14

Dedon v. Dedon, 404 So.2d 904 (La. 1981) ....... eee 5

Jacobs v. City of Bunkie, 737 So.2d 14 (La. 1999).............. 6

Kelly v. Washington, 302 U.S. 1, 82 L.Ed. 3, 58 S.Ct.

FG Ne Paiva thaanncncaddphicuaanuntabanteeiaaniiniaiaaltishaesdadda ae;

Kernan v. American Dredging Company, 355 U.S.

Pe Ge enivastusarvniensiensntinincnaiianamaael 5, 11, 13, 14

Mallard Bay Drilling, Inc. v. Herman, 212 F.3d 898

CE Re BOD vhintiticsniscsntbiccintamsdineniemmeenene 3, 4, 11

Marceaux v. Conoco, Inc., 124 F.3d 730 (5th Cir.

NE dicsvshiastintcidinplinnchbaviinaisnaieiiadaiaimedipiaiidipialainiedaditas 10

The Pennsylvania, 88 U.S. 125 (1874)..........ccceeeeeeeeeeeeeees 11

Vendetto v. Soniat Offshore Drilling Co., 725 So.2d

TE Ces repos denicacincsn\iiticenphensiapettndonouaamiaiaonas 5,14

Vryant v. Rucker, 11 F.Supp. 309 (D.C. Ala. 1953)............. 6

Watterson v. Mallard Bay Drilling, 649 So.2d 431

CE. BD: SA Ti, FeO ves vinsnescnnsncipecnscinebnstbtamecnionian 4,5

vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued

Page

STATUTES:

SF Nts Naess siiuiscci tv wcbelcblacaadeak dade ta i 1

BO FAD, COMED, CBD. csecssesisancsonisroinitcbeonincsnccec cue 8

29 C.FR. §1910.24(f) and (g).....cccccccssesssescesesceceocess.... 2, 8, 12

OF Gi. GE vanssiciasiiomonnieinnansicuae cna eee 2

PE FO IE sacsssisnecocnccndnaneoudicies as 13

GD DB FB svessssnsssistisicsedeumates sevetibicaapiialanainaiiamalal 2,13

OF DAE, Ta onsistonnsepseisisasaneanbunpeiees ceeecana ae 2

MOOG. TE a ininniicaicmmntG. eee 2, 6

1

OPINIONS BELOW

On March 28, 2001, Honorable William D. Hunter of

the 16th Judicial District Court, Parish of Iberia, State of

Louisiana, rendered written reasons in which he found

seaman/applicant 100% at fault for his on-the-job accident.

(Appendix C).

On May 16, 2001, Honorable William D. Hunter in the

same Court entered Judgment dismissing applicant’s

claim for damages. (Appendix D).

On July 10, 2002, the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit,

State of Louisiana, affirmed the Judgment of the Trial

Court dismissing applicant’s claim for damages. (Appendix

B).

On November 27, 2002, the Supreme Court of the

State of Louisiana denied applicant’s writ of certiorari

and/or review with two dissents from the seven Court

composition. (Appendix A).

,

v

JURISDICTION

The Supreme Court, State of Louisiana, denied

applicant’s application for a writ of certiorari and/or

review on November 27, 2002. This petition for a writ of

certiorari is filed within the prescribed period of ninety

(90) days after the November 27, 2002, final judgment.

The jurisdiction of this Honorable Court is invoked

under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. §2106.

4

.

2

STATUTORY AND REGULATORY PROVISIONS

The Federal Employees Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. §53,

and 46 U.S.C. §688, incorporating the rights under 45

U.S.C. §53; 46 U.S.C. §3301, statutorily defining “in-

spected vessels;” 43 U.S.C. §2102(43), defining “unin-

spected vessels;” 29 U.S.C. §654(a)(1), (2), outlining OSHA

responsibility.

,%

vy

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Plaintifffapplicant, Sadat Muhammad, applicant

hereinafter, is a 3l-year-old African American resident of

Columbia, Mississippi. He is a high school graduate,

married, and the father of two minor children, ages 5 and

4 at the time of the trial.

Applicant began working offshore with Pool Offshore

in 1995 at age 24, and went to work with defen-

dant/respondent, Diamond Offshore Company, respondent

hereinafter, as a roustabout in October, 1996.

On March 8, 1997, applicant was a seaman/roustabout

on the OCEAN LEXINGTON, an unlicenced mobile

offshore drilling vessel owned by respondent, acting in the

course and scope of his employment with respondent.

Applicant was injured when descending an industrial

metal stair from one deck to another. The stair was in

violation of 29 C.F.R. §1910.24(f), requiring uniform tread

width and riser height and 29 C.F.R. §1910.24(g), requir-

ing platforms at the top and bottom of the stair extending

30” back in the direction of travel. The stair in question

had a 4'/" plate across the entrance, thereby eliminating

the platform and increasing the first riser from 9" to 13'/”".

SP

3

Applicant fell down the steps as a result of these breaches

of the OSHA standards and sustained disabling injuries.

On March 28, 2001, Judge William D. Hunter, His

Honor below, rendered reasons for judgment in which he

found applicant 100% at fault and denied applicant’s Jones

Act negligence and general maritime unseaworthiness

claims for damages, rejecting the testimony of Dr. Gary

Nelson, applicant’s safety engineering expert, concerning

the OSHA violations causing the accident, relying on the

United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal decision in

Mallard Bay Drilling, Inc. v. Herman, 212 F.3d 898 (5th

Cir. 2000), reversed by this Honorable Court’s decision in

Chao v. Mallard Bay Drilling, Inc., 532 U.S. 1017, 121

S.Ct. 1954, 149 L.Ed. 2d 751 (2002). Appendix C.

Applicant filed a timely devolutive appeal to the Third

Circuit Court of Appeal from the Lower Court’s denial of

damages, and also cast applicant 100% at fault.

Applicant filed a motion to remand the case for

further proceeding in the District Court predicated on the

decision by the United States Supreme Court in Chao v.

- Mallard Bay Drilling, 534 U.S. 235, 121 S.Ct. 738, 151

L.Ed. 2d 659 (2002), reversing the Fifth Circuit decision in

the same case subsequent to the Lower Court Judgment

herein and prior to submission of the case for judgment in

the Court of Appeal.

The Third Circuit Court of Appeal on July 10, 2002,

rendered judgment affirming the Lower Court’s denial of

damages in favor of applicant and, in the same decision,

denied applicant’s motion to remand. Appendix A.

Applicant filed a timely application for a writ of

certiorari, and/or review, to the Louisiana Supreme Court

4

and on November 27, 2002, the Court, with two dissents,

denied applicant’s writ application. Appendix A.

¢

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

ARGUMENT

I. WHETHER, OR NOT, DECISIONS OF THE

16TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE

OF LOUISIANA, THE THIRD CIRCUIT

COURT OF APPEAL, STATE OF LOUISIANA,

AND THE LOUISIANA SUPREME COURT,

REFUSING TO APPLY OSHA VIOLATIONS OF

29 C.F.R. 1910.24(F) AND (G) BY RESPON-

DENT TO THE UNINSPECTED VESSEL,

OCEAN LEXINGTON, ARE IN DIRECT CON-

FLICT WITH THIS COURT’S DECISION IN

CHAO V. MALLARD BAY DRILLING, INC., 534

U.S. 235, 122 S.CT. 738; 151 L.ED. 2D 659.

Honorable William D. Hunter, his Honor Below,

understandingly applied the then-controlling United

States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal decision in Mallard

Bay Drilling, Inc. v. Herman, 212 F.3d 898 (5th Cir. 2000),

excluded the testimony of Dr. Gary Nelson, applicant’s

expert, stating in his written opinion, Appendix C:

“Although Dr. Gary Nelson, a safety engineer,

testified by deposition as to the safety of the

stairwell and spoke of OSHA regulations, the

OCEAN LEXINGTON is not under any OSHA

guidelines. Watterson v. Mallard Bay Drilling,

649 So.2d 431 (La. App. Cir. 3, 10-12-94).”

We believe that His Honor was referring to Mallard v.

Herman, a federal appeals decision, and not.to Watterson

uv. Mallard, a state appeals decision, since Mallard uv.

pee MOM IUEEE NS pare oe =

Herman eliminated the applicability of OSHA regulations

to the drilling rig therein. Watterson v. Mallard held

OSHA regulations to apply to the drilling rig therein and

the violation thereof to be “negligence per se” under Ker-

nan v. American Dredging Co., 355 U.S. 426, 78 S.Ct. 394,

2 L.Ed. 2d 382 (1958). It also eliminated contributory

negligence of the seaman as a consideration under 45

U.S.C. §53.

We would accept the applicability of Watterson uv.

Mallard because it would mean that applicant should have

recovered at trial. However, Herman v. Mallard, coming

after Watterson v. Mallard, eliminated the applicability of

OSHA regulations to a drilling rig because it is a vessel

and, according to that decision, only subject to Coast

Guard regulations.

However, the United States Supreme Court in Chao v.

Mallard Bay Drilling (the same case as Herman, involving

a change in United States Secretaries of Labor from

Herman to Chao), 532 U.S. 1017, 121 S.Ct. 1954, 149

L.Ed. 2d 751 (2002), specifically reversed Herman uv.

Mallard, supra, and held OSHA regulations applicable to

drilling rigs, subsequent to the District Court decision

herein but before the Appellate Court decision herein. .

Chao v. Mallard, supra, is on all fours with Watterson v.

Mallard, supra. The Chao decision, of course, is binding on

the Louisiana Courts (District, Appeal, and Supreme),

under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Consti-

tution, Article 6, Clause 2, and Louisiana Supreme Court

decisions in Dedon v. Dedon, 404 So.2d 904 (La. 1981); and

Vendetto v. Soniat Offshore Drilling Co., 725 So.2d 474 (La.

1999) (applying the maritime law of the United States

Fifth Circuit).

6

An Appellate Court is bound to adjudge a case before

it in accordance with the law existing at the time of its

decision. When the law changes during the pendency of a

suit, the new law applies on appeal even though it re-

quires reversal of a Trial Court judgment which was

correct under the law at the time it was rendered. Jacobs

v. City of Bunkie, 737 So.2d 14 (La. 1999).

The Third Circuit Court of Appeal, unable to distin-

guish the United States Supreme Court holding in Chao v.

Mallard Bay, supra, and sidestepping applicant’s motion

to remand predicated thereon, makes the astounding, and

unsupported, conclusion that the OCEAN LEXINGTON is

an “inspected” vessel. Appendix B.

“Inspected vessel” is not a term subject to interpreta-

tion. “Inspected vessels”, subject to exclusive Coast Guard

regulation, are 14 types statutorily defined by the United

States Congress with specificity in 46 U.S.C. §3301, and a

mobile offshore drilling rig, like the OCEAN LEXING-

TON, is not one of the 14 described vessels designated as

“inspected”.

The term “inspected vessel” as used in 46 U.S.C.

§3301, because of its exclusivity, has been given a strict

interpretation. Steam vessels, one of the 14 listed in-

spected vessels, for instance, does not include motorboats.

Vryant v. Rucker, 11 F.Supp. 309 (D.C. Ala. 1953). Also

tugboats that are motor-driven, as opposed to steam

powered, are not “inspected vessels”. Kelly v. Washington,

302 U.S. 1, 82 L.Ed. 3, 58 S.Ct. 87 (1937).

It is undisputed that OSHA regulations have no

applicability to the 14 specific vessels described as “in-

spected vessels” under 46 U.S.C. §3301.

7

The mobile offshore drilling rig, OCEAN LEXING-

TON, is clearly not an “inspected” vessel as a matter of

law and the Court of Appeals characterization of it, as

such, in its opinion, is clearly erroneous as a matter of law.

Only the United States Congress, and not the State

Appellate Court, can determine what is, and what is not,

an “inspected vessel” as a matter of law.

The question then posed is whether this legally

“uninspected” vessel is subject to OSHA regulation and

that is resoundingly answered by this Honorable Court in

Chao v. Mallard, supra, as follows:

“In Coast Guard terminology, Rig 52 was an ‘un-

inspected vessel’ under 43 U.S.C. §2101(43) as

opposed to one of the 14 varieties of inspected

vessels subject to comprehensive Coast Guard

regulation. See 46 U.S.C. §3301 (1994 ed. and

Supp. V).”

The Court in Chao, supra, went on to state:

“ ... mere possession by another federal agency

of unexercised authority to regulate certain

working conditions is insufficient to displace

OSHA’s jurisdiction. Furthermore, another fed-

eral agency’s minimal exercise of some authority

over certain conditions on vessels such as Rig 52

does not result in complete pre-emption of OSHA

jurisdiction, because the statute also makes clear

that OSHA is only pre-empted if the working

conditions at issue are the particular ones ‘with

respect to which’ another federal agency has

regulated, and if such regulations ‘affect occupa-

tional safety or health.’ §653(b)(1). n7 To deter-

mine whether Coast Guard regulations

have pre-empted OSHA’s jurisdiction over

the working conditions on Rig 52, it is thus

8

necessary to examine the contours of the

Guard’s exercise of its statutory authority,

not merely the existence of such authority.”

(Bold emphasis added).

No factual determination was made by the Louisiana

Trial Court, the Appellate Court, or the Supreme Court of

“the contours of the Guard’s exercise of its authority”, or

OSHA's obligation to require the employer to provide

working conditions that “are free from recognized hazards

which are likely to cause death or serious bodily harm” to

their employees, and to require employer compliance with

safety standards promulgated by the Secretary of Labor.

29 U.S.C. §654(a)(1), (2).

29 C.F.R. 1910.24(f) and (g), the OSHA regulation

specifically applicable to fixed industrial stairs, like those

involved herein, provides:

“(f) Stair treads. All treads shall be reasonably

slip-resistant and the nosings shall be of non-

slip finish. Welded bar grating treads without -

nosings are acceptable providing the leading

edge can be readily identified by personnel de-

scending the stairway and provided the tread is

serrated or is of definite nonslip design. Rise

height and tread width shall be uniform

throughout any flight of stairs including

any foundation.” (Bold emphasis added).

“(g) Stairway platforms. Stairway platforms shall

be no less than the width of a stairway and

a minimum of 30 inches in length measured

in the direction of travel.” (Bold emphasis

added).

ceaeiiaiiiaiisiiiili tt

9

The 4'% inch plate across the top of the stair elimi-

nated the required platform and also created a grossly

disproportionate top riser.

Dr. Gary Nelson, one of applicant’s experts, testified

that the stairs involved in applicant’s accident were in

direct violation of the OSHA regulation in that there was

an absence of uniformity in the treads and risers and in

the requirement of a platform at the top and bottom no

less than the width of the stairwell and a minimum of 30

inches in length.

In his deposition, introduced into evidence at pp. 637-

639, he opined:

“Q. Now, in looking at the staircase in question,

that is, the four photographs 9 through 12,

would you tell us what, if any, deficiencies

that you find as a safety engineer in the de-

sign and construction of the stairwell?

A. Yes, there are two primary deficiencies.

First, is the introduction of a very specific

and serious hazard in the form of a tripping

hazard at the very top of the stairs, which

produces stair dimensions that are not uni-

form. It violates all design standards in

terms of uniform tread-riser dimensions,

and it also violates the sections of the stan-

dards dealing with landings, which indicate

that the landing must extend forward from

the top of the stairs at least the width of the

stairs and a minimum, I think of 36 inches,

if ’m correct.

So there is not a flat landing at the top

of the stairs. You have this plate barrier at

EE EEE OO ee

10

the very top of the stairs that you have to

step over.

Also violative of good design would be

that the handrails are essentially unaccessi-

ble until you get on the first step descend-

ing. Of course, that’s the very time you need

the handrails because you are stepping over

this physical hazard.”

Dr. Nelson also testified that the statutory defects in

the steps were the proximate cause of applicant’s accident.

Dr. Nelson was uniquely qualified to render an expert

opinion in this case. He obtained a Ph.D. in industrial

safety engineering from Texas A&M University in 1975.

His Master’s Thesis was entitled “Engineering—Human

Factors Interface in Stairway Tread-Riser Design,”

one of the specific issues in this case. Dr. Nelson taught

industrial safety engineering at Texas A&M for 12 years

and worked in the field of safety engineering for 36 years.

In short, it is respectfully submitted that Dr. Nelson’s

expertise in safety engineering, predicated on his educa-

tion, work experience, and teaching experience is self-

evident and requires no further substantiation. Applicant,

however, refers this Honorable Court to the case of Mar-

ceaux v. Conoco, Inc., 124 F3d 730 (5th Cir. 1997), in

which Dr. Nelson was accepted as an expert in the field of

safety engineering by the United States Fifth Circuit

Court of Appeal.

Retired Commander David Cole, another applicant

expert, with years of active service as a marine inspector,

accident investigator, and reconstructionist, testified that

the 4'/ inch plate across the top of the stairs eliminating

11

the OSHA required platform, was a cause in fact of appli-

cant’s accident.

Judge William D. Hunter in the State District Court

ignored this testimony under the then controlling decision

of the Fifth Circuit in Mallard Bay Drilling v. Herman,

supra,

The violation of OSHA Regulation 29 C.F.R. 1910.24(f)

and (g) by respondent in failing to have uniform treads

and risers and a platform as wide as the stairs and a

minimum of 30" back from the stairs, constitute negli-

gence per se under Kernan v. American Dredging Co., 355

U.S. 426, 78 S.Ct. 394, 2 L.Ed. 2d 382 (1958).

Applicant, in view of the foregoing law and expert

testimony, certainly cannot be held to have overcome

negligence per se under Kernan v. American Dredging Co.,

supra, and the burden under The Pennsylvania, 88 U.S.

125 (1874).

It is obvious that the trial of this matter was fatally

flawed by the state of the law at the time and the dra-

matic change in the law thereafter. It is only fair, and just,

that this matter be remanded to the Louisiana Supreme

Court with a mandate that they order a new trial so that

the critical evidence now admissible can be considered by

Honorable William D. Hunter.

As a matter of fact Mr. Cass, the defense “expert”

relied on by the Court of Appeal to incorrectly classify the

OCEAN LEXINGTON to be an “inspected vessel”, testified

that the United States Coast Guard did not have any

specifications for exterior stairs. Therefore, the Coast

Guard and no other federal agency, pre-empted OSHA’s

12

obligation to impose safety regulations and a duty on the

employer herein.

Seamen are historically “wards” of the Courts. See

Colmar S.S. Corp. v. Taylor, 303 U.S. 525, 58 S.Ct. 651, 82

L.Ed. 993 (1938). They deserve, and are afforded, special

treatment because of the hazardous nature of their em-

ployment and also because they have no compensation

scheme to fall back on. Therefore, these special laws and

statutes were enacted in recognition of their “ward” status.

To ignore the statutory benefits reduces them from “ward”

status to.a status below that of land-based employees.

II. WHETHER, OR NOT, THE ABOVE STATE

COURTS IN ASSESSING 100% FAULT TO THE

SEAMAN RESPONDENT IGNORED THIS

COURT’S CONTROLLING DECISION IN

KERNAN V. AMERICAN DREDGING COM-

PANY, 355 U.S. 394 (1958), AND 45 U.S.C. §53,

MAKING THE VIOLATION OF AN APPLICA-

BLE REGULATORY STATUTE “NEGLIGENCE

PER SE” AND ELIMINATING APPLICANT’S |

ALLEGED COMPARATIVE FAULT.

The Louisiana Lower Court, the Appellate Court, and

the Supreme Court found applicant 100% responsible for

applicant’s fall down a flight of statutorily defective stairs.

A Jones Act seaman, like applicant herein, cannot be

guilty of contributory negligence when the owner of the

vessel, respondent herein, violates a statute, or regulation,

enacted for the safety of his seaman employees.

We have shown in argument I that respondent vio-

lated the OSHA regulation, 29 C.F.R. 1910.24(f) and (g), in

failing to provide uniform risers and treads and in failing

OO

13

to provide a platform at the top of the steps at least as

wide as the steps and 30 inches back. Obviously, the OSHA

regulation was enacted to prevent the very type of acci-

dent that occurred to applicant herein.

45 U.S.C. §53 of the Federal Employees’ Liability Act

is incorporated into the Jones Act, and applies with equal

force to seamen such as applicant. See Kernan v. American

Dredging Co., 355 U.S. 426, 2 L.Ed. 2d 382, 78 S.Ct. 394

(1958).

45 U.S.C. §53 of the FELA provides:

“In all actions hereafter brought against any

such common carrier by railroad under or by vir-

tue of any of the provisions of this act [45 USCS

§§ 51 et seq.] to recover damages for personal in-

juries to an employee, or where such injuries

have resulted in his death, the fact that the em-

ployee may have been guilty of contributory neg-

ligence shall not bar a recovery, but the damages

shall be diminished by the jury in praportion to

the amount of negligence attributable to such

employee: Provided, That no such employee

who may be injured or killed shall be held

to have been guilty of contributory negli-

gence in any case where the violation by

such common carrier of any statute enacted

for the safety of employees contributed to

the injury or death of such employee.” (Bold

emphasis added).

Obviously, the OSHA regulations afore cited were

enacted specifically for the safety of users of stairways.

However under Kernan v. American Dredging Company,

supra, it is irrelevant whether, or not, the particular

provision was enacted for the safety of the crew members

just so long as the instrument in statutory violation was a

14

cause of the crew member’s injury. For instance, in Kernan

v. American Dredging Company, supra, a navigational

light in violation of a navigational regulation, having

nothing to do with crew member’s safety, was found to be a

cause of the crew member’s injury creating liability and

abrogating any contributory negligence factor.

Under the FELA, incorporated into the Jones Act, the

breach of a safety statute which is even a “slight contribut-

ing cause” makes the employer responsible for 100% of the

seaman’s injury, without consideration of, or reduction for,

the seaman’s contributory negligence, if any. See Jn Re:

Complaint of Roy Cook & Sons, Inc. v. Allen, 778 F.2d 1037

(5th Cir. 1986).

His Honor in the District Court understandably

ignored the OSHA regulation because of the state of the

law at trial but, in so doing, he also utilized the wrong

burden of proof. He _ utilized a reasonable em-

ployer/reasonable seaman standard citing Gautreaux v.

Scurlock, 107 F.3d 331 (5th Cir. 1997) and Vendetto v.

Soniat Offshore Drilling Co., 725 So.2d 474 (La. 1999),

instead of the statutory violation standard making the

employer 100% responsible when the violation is a “slight

contributing cause” and exonerating the employee from

any contributing negligence under Complaint of Roy Cook

& Sons, Inc. v. Allen, supra.

It is respectfully submitted that the Louisiana Courts

erred in finding applicant guilty of contributory negligence

under the cited law and that they all precipitated a gross

injustice in finding the applicant seaman 100% at fault

when the law requires the employer to be judicially cast

15

for 100% of the fault when a statutory violation is found to

have been committed.

+

CONCLUSION

It is respectfully submitted that this Honorable Court

should grant a writ of certiorar: to the Louisiana Supreme

Court, State of Louisiana, and after due proceedings,

.-remand this matter to the Supreme Court of Louisiana

with a mandate to order the 16th Judicial District Court,

Parish of Iberia, State of Louisiana, to retry this case in

view of this Honorable Court’s decision in Chao v. Mallard

Bay Drilling, Inc., supra, materially changing the law

applicable to the case.

Respectfully Submitted,

WIEDEMANN & WIEDEMANN

LAWRENCE D. WIEDEMANN,

Bar #13457

821 Baronne Street

New Orleans, Louisiana 70113

Telephone: (504) 581-6180

Attorneys for Applicant,

Sadat Muhammad

APPENDIX

Page

APPENDIX A

Decision dated November 27, 2002, of the Supreme

I, ee Oe BS acne vnccccnseneccerecercrcsceeesesecsees App. 1

APPENDIX B

Decision dated July 10, 2002, from the Court of

Appeal, Third Circuit, State of Louisiana)............... App. 2

APPENDIX C —s

Written Reasons signed March 28, 2001, by the

Honorable William D. Hunter of the 16th Judicial

District Court, Parish of Iberia, State of Louisiana;..App. 20

APPENDIX D

Judgment dated May 16, 2001, rendered by the

Honorable William D. Hunter of the 16th Judicial

District Court, Parish of Iberia, State of Louisiana; ..App. 33

App. 1

APPENDIX A

The Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana

SADAT MUHAMMAD

Ve. NO. 2002-C-2409

DIAMOND OFFSHORE

COMPANY

IN RE: Muhammad, Sadat; — Plaintiff; Applying for

Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Iberia, 16th

Judicial District Court Div. D, Nos. 86-273; to the Court

of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 02-0172

November 27, 2002

Denied.

CDT

CDK

JPV

JTK

JLW

CALOGERO, C.J., would grant the writ.

JOHNSON, J., would grant the writ.

Supreme Court of Louisiana

November 27, 2002

/s/ Rai L. Dayli

Deputy Clerk of Court

For the Court

App. 2

APPENDIX B

STATE OF LOUISIANA

COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

02-0172

SADAT MUHAMMAD Judgment rendered July |

VERSUS 10, 2002. Applications for

rehearing may be filed

DIAMOND OFFSHORE _ within the delays allowed

COMPANY by La. Code Civ. P. art.

2166 or La. Code Crim. P.

art. 922.

* * cd

APPEAL FROM THE

SIXTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

PARISH OF IBERIA, NUMBER 86,273

HONORABLE WILLIAM D.-HUNTER

* * *

GLENN B. GREMILLION

JUDGE

* * *

Court composed of Sylvia R. Cooks, Jimmie C. Peters, and

Glenn B. Gremillion, Judges.

AFFIRMED IN PART AND |

REVERSED IN PART |

Lawrence D. Wiedemann

WIEDEMANN & WIEDEMANN

821 Barone St.

New Orleans, LA 70113

(504) 581-6180

COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT

Sadat Muhammad

App. 3

Cameron B. Simmons

P.O. Drawer 232

Jeanerette, LA 70544

(318) 276-6034

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE

Diamond Offshore Company

Christopher Bremer Siegrist

407 Roussell St.

Houma, LA 70360

(985) 879-2427

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE

Diamond Offshore Company

Linda Jane Nelsoi

LAMBERT & NELSON

701 Magazine St.

New Orleans, LA 70130

(504) 581-1750

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE

Lambert & Nelson

GREMILEION, Judge.

The plaintiff, Sadat Muhammad, appeals the trial

court’s judgment finding that he failed to prove negligence

on the part of the defendant, Diamond Offshore Company,

and the denial of his claim of unseaworthiness. Diamond

answered the appeal seeking reversal of portions of the

trial court’s judgment. We affirm in part and reverse in

part.

FACTS

On March 8, 1997, Muhe mmad sustained injuries as a

result of a fall while traversing the stairs leading from the

port pipe rack deck to the air conditioner deck on the Rig

OCEAN LEXINGTON. Muhammad, a roustabout for

App. 4

Diamond, was carrying a five-gallon bucket of industrial

soap in one hand and a long-handled brush in the other as

he approached the stairs. He fell down the stairs as he was

attempting to step over a four and one-half inch coaming

located at the top of the stairs. Shortly thereafter, Mu-

hammad filed suit against Diamond seeking damages

pursuant to the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C.App. § 688, and the

general maritime law claim of unseaworthiness. A petition

of intervention was filed by Muhammad’s former attor-

neys, Lambert & Nelson, P.L.C., seeking attorney’s fees as

a result of a contingency fee contract entered into between

them and Muhammad. This matter was severed from the

trial of the main demand.

Following « bench trial on the merits, the trial court

held that Muhammad was solely at fault in causing the

accident and that Diamond did not breach any duty owed

to him. It further held that he failed to prove that an

unseaworthy condition of the OCEAN LEXINGTON was a

proximate cause of his accident and subsequent injuries.

The trial court also held that Diamond improperly with-

held maintenance and cure payments from Muhammad

and that he had not yet reached maximum medical recov-

ery due to the fact that further surgery was scheduled on

his lumbar spine. It awarded Muhammad maintenance of

$15 per day from November 8, 1997 until he reached

maximum medical recovery, past medical expenses of

$59,599.53, and future medical expenses of $46,309. Based

on a joint motion of the parties, Muhammad’s daily rate of

maintenance was amended from $15 to $20 per day.

A judgment was rendered on May 14, 2001, which

awarded Muhammad the above stated damages, and also

awarded him pre-judgment judicial interest on his past

and future medical expense awards from March 8, 1997,

ee ee

App. 5

and judicial interest on his maintenance award from

November 8, 1997, until he reached maximum medical

recovery. This appeal by Muhammad followed. Subsequent

to his motion for appeal, an order was issued staying

execution of the May 14, 2001 judgment pending this

appeal. A hearing on the award of attorney’s fees was held,

after which the trial court awarded Muhammad attorney’s

fees in the amount of $15,000

ISSUES

Muhammad raises six assignments of error on appeal.

He argues that the trial court erred in excluding evidence

of Diamond’s violation of applicable Occupational Safety

and Health Act (OSHA) regulations and in relying on

Vendetto v. Sonat Offshore Drilling Co., 97-3103 (La.

1/20/99), 725 So.2d 474, and Gautreaux v. Scurlock Ma-

rine, Inc., 107 F.3d 331 (5th Cir. 1997), in finding Diamond

free from fault. He further argues that the trial court

erred in failing to find the OCEAN LEXINGTON unsea-

worthy, in failing to apply the doctrine of momentary

forgetfulness, and in failing to award him general and

economic damages as a result of his cervical discectomy

and his lumbar fusion..

Diamond answered Muhammad’s appeal, arguing that

it was aggrieved by the trial court’s award of future

medical expenses and pre-judgment interest on those

expenses, and by the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees

to him based on a finding that it wrongfully terminated

his maintenance and cure benefits.

App. 6

MOTION TO REMAND

Initially, we note that Muhammad has filed a Motion

to Remand asking that we remand this matter to the trial

court for further proceedings in light of Chao v. Mallard

Bay Drilling, Inc., 534 U.S. 235, 122 S.Ct. 738 (2002).

Chao dealt with the applicability of OSHA regulations to a

vessel which had not been inspected by the Coast Guard

and in which it had not issued affirmative regulations

covering the working conditions at issue. However, we

need not remand this matter, since the trial court never

reached the issue of whether the coaming at issue was

defective. Rather, the trial court held that Muhammad

failed to carry his burden of proving that the coaming was

the proximate cause of his accident. Since the issue of

whether the coaming was defective was never reached, a

remand of this matter is not called for. Additionally, the

report of Diamond’s expert in naval architecture and

marine surveying, Sheldon Cass, states that the OCEAN

LEXINGTON requires yearly inspections in order to

maintain a current U.S. Coast Guard certificate. Thus,

this is a vessel which has been inspected by the Coast

Guard. Accordingly, the motion to remand is denied.

JONES ACT

Jones Act negligence was discussed by the supreme

court in Foster v. Destin Trading Corp., 96-0803, pp. 3-4

(La. 5/30/97), 700 So.2d 199, 208 (on rehearing):

The Jones Act allows an injured seaman to

bring a negligence suit against his employer. 46

U.S.C.App. § 688 (1994). The employer’s poten-

tial liability extends to all personal injuries aris-

ing during the course of the seaman’s

employment, but proof of negligence is essential

App. 7

to recovery. See id. Such negligence may arise in

many ways including the failure to use reason-

able care to provide a seaman with a safe place to

work, the existence of a dangerous condition on

or about the vessel, or any other breach of the

duty of care. See Davis v. Hill Engineering, Inc.,

549 F.2d 314, 329 (5th Cir.1977); 1 Thomas J.

Schoenbaum, Admiralty and Maritime Law § 6-

21, at 312 (2d ed.1994). The duty of care owed by

an employer under the Jones Act is that of ordi-

nary prudence, namely the duty to take reason-

able care under the circumstances. Gautreaux v.

Scurlock Marine, Inc., 107 F.3d 335-36 (5th

Cir.1997). The seaman bears the evidentiary

burden of proving that a breach of the duty owed

by the employer was a cause of his injuries.

However, a seaman need only present “slight

evidence” that his employer’s negligence caused

his injuries in order to reach the jury or to be

sustained upon appellate review. Jd. at 334-35.

The employer can introduce evidence of the sea-

man’s own negligence to reduce damages through

application of pure comparative fault principles.

Like his employer, the seaman must meet the

standard of ordinary prudence by acting as a

reasonable seaman would act under the same

circumstances. Id. at 339.

The manifest error — clearly wrong standard of review

applies in Jones Act and general maritime cases. Afes v.

Mallard Bay Drilling Inc., 01-836 (La. App. 3 Cir. 12/12/01),

801 So.2d 653, writ denied, 02-0100 (La. 3/15/02), 811

So.2d 915.

After reviewing the record in its entirety, we find that

the trial court was presented with differing views of the

evidence pertaining to the cause of Muhammad’s fall.

Thus, it was reasonable for the trial court to find that

App. 8

Muhammad failed to act as a reasonable seaman would

under like circumstances and that he was the sole cause of

the accident.

Muhammad testified that he was carrying a five

gallon-plastic bucket of industrial soap in one hand and a

four-foot-long brush in the other hand when he attempted

to descend the stairway. He was unsure which hand held

which item. He stated that he intended to step over the

coaming and then grasp the stair railing with the hand

holding the brush. Before he could do so, Muhammad

testified that he fell as he brought his trailing foot over the

coaming. However, in his deposition, he was unsure of the

specific cause of his fall, stating that the brush he was

carrying became caught in the coaming. After his fall, the

bristle part of the brush was found caught in the coaming

at the top of the stairs, while the handle was found at the

bottom of the stairs with him. Muhammad testified that

he had been up and down these stairs before and that he

was aware of Diamond’s policy requiring him to always

hold onto a railing with one hand while ascending or

descending stairways. However, he denied being told that

he could not traverse the stairs while carrying something

in both hands.

Diamond presented evidence pertaining to its policy

requiring employees to hold onto railings with one hand

any time they were using stairways on the OCEAN LEX-

INGTON. Its safety manual specifically states, “Traveling

up and down ladders or stairways require the employee to

use the handrails.” Diamond employees, Oliver Gandy and

Timothy Taylor, both testified that its policy requires an

employee to maintain one hand on the handrail at all

times while traversing stairways on the rig. They further

stated that Diamond’s policy required an employee

App. 9

carrying a brush and bucket to place the brush in the

bucket before using a stairway. Jerry McHenry, Diamond’s

safety representative on the rig at the time of the accident,

verified its policy required employees to keep one hand on

a handrail at all times.

Gandy testified that Muhammad admitted not having

a hand on the handrail at the time of his fall and that he

had attended a safety meeting minutes earlier, at which

this policy was discussed. Gandy further stated that he

has never had a problem with the stairs and that he first

grasps hold of the handrail before stepping over the

coaming and proceeding down the stairs. Taylor, who was

on the air conditioner deck, testified that he saw Muham-

mad approaching the stairs with the bucket and brush in

his hands and then saw him falling, but that he did not

see what caused him to fall. Both stated that the bucket

and brush handle were found on the air conditioner deck

with Muhammad, but the brush itself was found at the top

of the stairs behind the coaming. McHenry recalled that

Muhammad stated that he was not using the handrail at

the time of the accident.

Considering the foregoing evidence, we cannot say

that the trial court was manifestly erroneous in finding

that Muhammad was the sole cause of his accident.

Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court denying his

claim for damages pursuant to the Jones Act is affirmed. -

This assignment of error is dismissed as being without

merit.

UNSEAWORTHINESS

Pursuant to the general maritime law, a seaman is

entitled to work on a seaworthy vessel. Thus, a vessel

App. 10

owner has an absolute duty to furnish a seaworthy vessel,

and a breach of that duty will give rise to a claim for

general damages. Vendetto v. Sonat Offshore Drilling Co.,

97-3103 (La. 1/20/00), 725 So.2d 474. An action for unsea-

worthiness arises if a seaman alleges that he was injured

as a result of a defective condition of the vessel, its equip-

ment, or its appurtenances. Jd. The unseaworthiness of a

vessel is a question of fact, which will be determined on a

case-by-case basis. Id.

There is a more stringent causation re-

quirement for claims of unseaworthiness than

Jones Act claims. In an unseaworthiness claim,

the plaintiff must show that the unseaworthy

condition played a substantial part in bringing

about or actually causing the injury and that the

injury was either a direct result or a reasonably

probable consequence of the unseaworthiness. |

Phillips [v. Western Company of North America],

953 F.2d (923,] at 928 [(5th Cir. 1992)].

Derouen v. Mallard Bay Drilling, LLC, 00-1268, p. 7

(La.App. 3 Cir. 6/22/01), 808 So.2d 694, 705.

The trial court denied Muhammad’s claim of unsea-

worthiness, finding that he failed to meet the threshold

evidentiary standard for proving such a claim. It held that

the cause of Muhammad’s accident was likely something

other than the placement of the coaming.

After reviewing the evidence, we find that the trial

court was presented with contradictory evidence on this

issue. Therefore, we cannot say that it erred in denying

Muhammad damages based on his general maritime law

claim of unseaworthiness.

Rianne

App. 11

David Cole, an expert in admiralty and maritime

matters, testified that the coaming represented a tripping

hazard because it did not allow a person descending the

steps to progress down them as they would any other

stairs. He opined that the coaming presented a vertical

barrier requiring Muhammad to lift his foot up and over

the four inch barrier and then step down a distance

greater than the expected twelve inches in order to reach

the first tread of the stairway. Although he admitted that

coamings are used as pollution control devices on board

vessels, Cole recommended that it be moved closer to the

source of the possible oil spill, so that a person traversing

it would not have to do so while also attempting to descend

@ stairway. Based on his understanding of what had

occurred, Cole testified that the coaming was the cause of

Muhammad’s fall.

Cole further testified that the stairways handrails

presented a deficiency in their design since there was a

gap between them and the pipe rack deck’s guardrail. He

stated that the handrails should have been constructed so

that they joined the top railing of the guardrail, which

would allow a continuous railing for a person at the

transition point between the deck and the stairway. As

constructed, he stated that the stairway presented nothing

for the person descending the stairway to grab a hold of

while he was taking the exaggerated step up and over the

coaming in order to access the stairway. However, Cole

testified that there were no regulations specifying the

construction of handrails or pertaining to the placement of

coamings. He further testified that Muhammad had an

obligation to recognize and safely negotiate the hazard and

that a seaman has an obligation to hold onto a railing

whenever possible. Cole stated that he would not condone

App. 12

Muhammad traversing the coaming and the stairway

while holding a bucket in one hand and a brush in the

other.

Cass testified that neither the coaming nor the stair-

way itself presented an unreasonable risk of harm to the

men working on the rig. After physically inspecting the

stairway in question, he stated that this stairway met the

Coast Guard requirements for interior stairways, since its -

slope did not exceed fifty degrees. Cass testified that there

are no specific regulations pertaining to exterior stair-

ways. He further stated that the coaming did not present

an unreasonable risk since it was well painted and striped

and was easily observable as a hazard.

After reviewing the evidence, we find no error in the

trial court’s denial of this claim. The cause of Muhammad’s

fall was his failure to hold onto one of the stairway hand-

rails during an attempt to traverse the stairs while carry-

ing a bucket of industrial soap in one hand and a long-

handled brush in the other hand. Accordingly, we find that

he failed to carry his burden of proving that the unseawor-

thy condition of the OCEAN LEXINGTON, namely the

position of the coaming or the location of the handrails,

played a substantial part in bringing about his fall. The

judgment of the trial court denying Muhammad’s claim of

unseaworthiness is affirmed. This assignment of error is

dismissed.

MOMENTARY FORGETFULNESS

In his fifth assignment of error, Muhammad argues

that the trial court erred in failing to apply the doctrine of

“momentary forgetfulness” to the facts of this case. We

disagree. We have held that this doctrine should apply

envi" CED scm

App. 13

only in those instances where there is “evidence of circum-

stances reasonably sufficient to have diverted plaintiff’s

mind from the danger in question. Mere forgetfulness or

lapse of memory is not excusable absent adequate divert-

ing circumstances.” Hailey v. LaSalle Parish Police Jury,

302 So.2d 668, 671 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1974). Although Mu-

hammad testified that the employees were instructed to

clean the rig because Diamond personnel were arriving for

a visit, we do not find that this was the type of diverting

circumstance meant by Hailey, such that it would absolve

him of his comparative negligence. Muhammad stated

that the cleanup they were involved in was routine

cleanup. He further stated that he normally carried items

in both hands while traversing stairs on the OCEAN

LEXINGTON. Accordingly, we find no merit in this as-

signment of error.

DAMAGES

Based on our finding affirming the trial court’s judg-

ment denying Muhammad’s claims for damages pursuant

to the Jones Act and general maritime law, this assign-

ment of error is rendered moot.

FUTURE CURE

In its answer to appeal, Diamond argues that the trial

court erred in awarding Muhammad future cure since he

presented “no evidence of an immediate need for future

medical treatment within a definite time frame.” Follow-

ing the rendition of judgment, Diamond filed a Motion and

Order to Show Cause Why Future Cure Should Not Be

Reimbursed with Incorporated Memorandum in Support.

Diamond argued that it had paid Muhammad the sum

ee

App. 14

awarded by the trial court for the lumbar surgery recom-

mended by Dr. Adatto; however, it claimed that surgery

was put off until such time as Muhammad loses weight.

Thus, it argued that it was entitled to reimbursement of

the $46,309 it paid for the future surgery and the termina-

tion of its maintenance obligation. Pursuant to a January

8, 2001 consent judgment, Diamond was relieved from

paying Muhammad maintenance and cure from December

20, 2001, until such time as he undergoes the recom-

mended surgery.

The law with regard to maintenance and cure was

discussed in Domonter v. C.F. Bean Corp., 99-1204, pp. 17-

19 (La.App. 5 Cir. 4/25/00), 761 So.2d 629, 640, writ

denied, 00-1872 (La. 9/29/00), 770 So.2d 354:

“Maintenance and cure” is an ancient duty

imposed upon the owner of a ship to provide food,

lodging and necessary medical services to sea-

men who become ill or injured during service to

the ship. Burgess v. C.F. Bean Corp, 98-3072

(La.App. 4th Cir.8/18/99), 743 So.2d 251; Comeaux

v. Basin Marine, Inc., 93-1624 (La.App. lst

Cir.6/24/94), 640 So.2d 833, 836, writ denied, 94-

2307 (La.11/18/94), 646 So.2d 386; Davis uv.

Odeco, Inc., 18 F.3d 1237, 1245 (5th Cir.1994),

cert. denied, 513 U.S. 819, 115 S.Ct. 78, 130

L.Ed.2d 32 (1994). Recovery is not dependent

upon negligence of the vessel or the owner and

the burden of proof in seeking maintenance and

cure is relatively light. Jd. In addition, generally,

a seaman need only prove that the injury arose

during his service of the vessel. The seaman does

not have to prove a causal connection to his du-

ties. Liner v. J.B. Talley and Company, Inc., 618

F.2d 327, 332 (5th Cir.1980); Burgess v. C.F. Bean

Corp, supra; Comeaux v. Basin Marine, Inc., 640

App. 15

So.2d at 836. The right to maintenance and cure

exists regardless of fault. The remedy is essen-

tially curative in nature and is not intended as

compensation for injury. Boudreau v. S/V

SHERE KHAN C, in rem, 27 F.Supp.2d 72, 83

(D.Maine 1998). The right to maintenance and

cure arises from the employee-employer relation-

ship. Aguilar v. Standard Oil Co., 318 U.S. 724,

731, 63 S.Ct. 930, 934, 87 L.Ed. 1107 (1943)f.]

Thus, the liability of shipowner for maintenance

and cure will be excused only by willful misbe-

havior or deliberate act of indiscretion on part of

seaman. Aguilar v. Standard Oil Co., 318 U.S. at

731, 63 S.Ct. at 934; DiBenedetto v. Williams, 880

F.Supp. 80, 86 (D. Rhode Island 1995).

Cure is payment of the seaman’s medical,

therapeutic and hospital expenses, until that

point in time when plaintiff reaches maximum

medical recovery. Fox uv. Texaco, Inc., 97 2126

(La.App. 1st Cir.11/6/98), 722 So.2d 1064, 1067.

Because it [sic] not fault based, but arises from

the contractual relationship between the parties,

defendant cannot avail itself of the apportion-

ment of fault to reduce its liability for plaintiff’s

medical expenses. The award of medical ex-

penses can be construed as compensation related

to personal injury only when the defendant’s ac-

tions in failing to pay maintenance and cure re-

sults in the worsening of a plaintiff’s condition.

Karim v. Finch Shipping Co., Ltd., 97-2518

(La.App. 4th Cir.8/26/98), 718 So.2d 572, 580.

Additionally, a seaman may only recover maintenance and

cure for those expenses actually incurred. Davis v. Odeco,

Inc., 18 F.3d 1237 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied sub nom,

513 U.S. 819, 115 S.Ct. 78 (1994). In Calmar S.S. Corp. v.

Taylor, 303 U.S. 525, 532-33, 58 S.Ct. 651, 55 (1938), the

App. 16

Supreme Court held with regard to the award of future

maintenance and cure:

The seaman’s recovery must therefore be

measured in each case by the reasonable cost of

that maintenance and cure to which he is enti-

tled at the time of trial, including, in the discre-

tion of the court, such amounts as may be

needful in the immediate future for the mainte-

nance and cure of a kind and for a period which

can be definitely ascertained.

In this instance, we agree with Diamond that the award of

future cure should be reversed since it cannot be definitely

ascertained when Muhammad will lose enough weight in

order to undergo lumbar surgery. Muhammad has been

attempting to lose weight since early 1997, when he began

treatment with Dr. Watermeier. Since he has not been able

to lose the required weight during this length of time,

there is no way of knowing when, or if ever, he will suc-

cessfully accomplish this task. However, our decision will

not preclude Muhammad from bringing suit in the future,

should he lose the weight and decide to have the surgery.

Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court awarding

Muhammad $46,309 in future cure is reversed.

ATTORNEY’S FEES

Diamond further argues that the trial court erred in

awarding Muhammad $15,000 in attorney’s fees based on

its egregious conduct in wrongfully terminating his main-

tenance and cure benefits.

After reviewing the evidence, we find error in the trial

court’s award of attorney’s fees based on its finding that

Diamond improperly withheld maintenance and cure

App. 17

benefits from Muhammad subsequent to November 8,

1997. An award of attorney’s fees is proper only if the

employer has been found to have acted in a fashion which

is “callous and recalcitrant, arbitrary and capricious, or

willful, callous, and persistent.” Morales v. Garijak, Inc.,

829 F.2d 1355, 1358 (5th Cir. 1987) (footnote omitted).

That court went on to further state:

Thus, there is an escalating scale of liability: a

shipowner who is in fact liable for maintenance

and cure, but who has been reasonable in deny-

ing liability, may be held liable only for the

amount of maintenance and cure. If the shi-

powner has refused to pay without a reasonable

defense, he becomes liable in addition for com-

pensatory damages. If the owner not only lacks a

reasonable defense but has exhibited callousness

and indifference to the seaman’s plight, he be-

comes liable for punitive damages and attorney’s

fees as well.

Id.

A review of the record reveals no instance in which

Diamond acted in a willful, callous, or persistent manner.

Rather, we find this was an instance in which there were

differing opinions between the medical experts as to

Muhammad’s condition.

Diamond terminated Muhammad’s maintenance and

cure benefits on November 8, 1997, based on the opinion of

Dr. Christopher Cenac, an orthopedic surgeon, who exam-

ined Muhammad on four different occasions, the last

taking place on October 29, 1997. At his initial Visit, on

March 20, 1997, Muhammad did not tell either Dr. Cenac

or his nurse that he was suffering from any neck com-

plaints. He did not complain of neck pain until his October

App. 18

29th visit, at which time, he stated that his neck began

bothering him in August 1997. At that time, Dr. Cenac

released Muhammad to full unrestricted duty finding that

he was at maximum medical improvement and that he did

not require any further invasive testing or treatment.

After reviewing a pre-employment MRI performed on

Muhammad in October 1996, and a post injury MRI of

March 1997, Dr. Cenac opined that the findings on both

tests were identical. He further found some slight degen-

erative changes in the lumbar spine in the October 2, 2000

MRI, which he attributed to aging. Dr. Cenac opined that

there was no relationship between Muhammad’s present

problems, including his cervical findings, and the March 8,

1997 accident.

Diamond also had the opinion of Dr. Michael Moll-

eston, a neurosurgeon, who was chosen by both Diamond’s

and Muhammad’s original attorney’s. [sic] After his April

1, 1997 examination, Dr. Molleston found nothing wrong

neurologically with Muhammad. He admitted having

headaches, but denied any neck pain when he was directly

questioned about this by Dr. Molleston. Dr. Molleston

found him uncooperative in his examination, very sensi-

tive to trivial touching, and forcibly resistant to the

straight leg raise test. He felt that this indicted symptom

magnification. Although Muhammad complained of

headaches on the top of his head, Dr. Molleston stated that

headaches in this area were atypical for indicating the

presence of a neck injury. Although he recommended

Muhammad undergo further diagnostic testing, such as a

bone scan, these tests were never performed.

Diamond further introduced the report of Dr. Thomp-

son Dietz, a radiologist, who reviewed the MRIs performed

on Muhammad in October 1996, March 1997, and May

|

App. 19

2000. After reviewing these three tests, Dr. Dietz found

that the later MRI was comparable to the both [sic] earlier

MRIs, in that there was only a relatively subtle interval

increase in the size of the previously noted L5 S1 disc

herniation, which dated back to October 1996.

Finally, Diamond introduced evidence that Muham-

mad was involved in two automobile accidents in January

1998. In the second accident, which occurred on January

30, 1998, Muhammad stated that he struck his head into

the ceiling of the car, where it joins the windshield. Both

Drs. Adatto and Watermeier stated that this type of injury

could cause or aggravate a previous neck injury.

Considering the evidence, we find that Diamond did

have a reasonable defense for terminating Muhammad’s

maintenance and cure, and that it did not exhibit a cal-

lousness or indifference to his plight which would subject

it to attorney’s fees. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial

court awarding Muhammad $15,000 in attorney’s fees is

reversed.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial

court awarding Sadat Muhammad future cure is reversed,

as is the award of attorney’s fees. The remainder of the

trial court’s judgment is affirmed. The costs of this appeal

are assessed equally between the plaintiff-appellant,

Sadat Muhammad, and the defendant-appellee, Diamond

Offshore Company.

AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART.

App. 20

APPENDIX C

SADAT MUHAMMAD 16TH JUDICIAL

DISTRICT COURT

VS. NO. 86273-D PARISH OF IBERIA

DIAMOND OFFSHORE CO. STATE OF LOUISIANA

For the Plaintiff: Lawrence D. Wiedemann,

New Orleans, LA

For the Defendant: Cameron B. Simmons,

Jeanerette, LA

Christopher B. Siegrist,

Houma, LA

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

(Filed March 29, 2001)

This suit was heard in Iberia Parish on November 14

and 15, 2000. The case was taken under advisement with

a deposition of Jerry McHenry still to be taken as well as

post-trial memorandums to be submitted by all parties. All

matters have been submitted to the Court, with the

exception of attorney’s fees, and the case is now in posture

for decision.

FACTS:

Sadat Muhammad (Sadat) worked as a roustabout for

Diamond Offshore (Diamond) from October 11, 1996 until

March 8, 1997. Prior to starting work for Diamond, Sadat

underwent a comprehensive pre-employment physical and

was cleared for employment in a heavy labor capacity. On

March 8, 1997, Sadat sustained injury when he fell on an

external stairway leading from the pipe deck to the air

App. 21

conditioning (A/C) deck while he was carrying a long

handled cleaning brush in one hand and a bucket of

cleaning fluid in the other. There are handrails situated at

the top of the stairway and along the stairway. There is

also a four-inch deck coaming marked with black and

yellow striping, used for pollution control, in the area by

the stairwell. Sadat was found by another worker, Timo-

thy Taylor, at the bottom of the stairwell on the A/C deck.

After a brief accident report was filled out with the safety

technician, Jerry McHenry, Sadat was taken off the vessel

by helicopter to Terrebonne General Hospital in a neck

brace and on a back board. He was treated and released

whereupon Sadat was picked up by his wife. Sadat com-

plained of various injuries over the 22 day period following

the accident, namely dizziness, left shoulder pain, low

back pain, and headaches.

Sadat had several follow-up visits for his injuries. He

was seen by Dr. John Watermeier on March 19, 1997,

complaining of moderate to severe low back and neck pain,

headaches, and numbness in both feet. In April 1997, less

than one month following the accident, Dr. Watermeier

made a diagnosis of post-traumatic disc disease in the

cervical and lumbar spine.

On March 17, 1999, Dr. Kenneth Adatto performed an

anterior cervical discectomy and fusion at C5-6. He was

also seen by Dr. Christopher Cenac, at the request of

Diamond, in March of 1997 and in October of 1997. Dr.

Cenac, based on his findings and those of Dr. Michael

Molleston released the plaintiff to full duty; however, the

plaintiff never returned to work. This suit followed.

This is a Jones Act case where general maritime law

will be used. The plaintiffs allege negligence on the part of

App. 22

Diamond as well as assert a claim of nnseaworthiness of

the vessel, Ocean Lexington.

The plaintiff, Sadat, testified that he did not know

exactly how he tripped and fell down the stairwell. He

stated that he was carrying a long-handled brush in one

hand and a bucket with cleaning fluid in the other hand.

He also stated that he was unable to use the handrail at

the top of the stairwell. He did testify that he knew he was

supposed to have one hand on the handrail. He stated that

he stepped over the four-inch deck coaming with his front

foot then somehow tripped when he proceeded with his

next foot as he approached the first step. It was apparent

from his testimony that he was uncertain as to what

exactly caused his fall. He stated it may have been his

second foot that got caught in the coaming, or the brush

which was dangling at his side that may have got caught

in the coaming. In his deposition, which was admitted into

evidence, he stated that the brush got caught in the

coaming. He further testified that he fell down the stairs

and the bucket and handle of the brush ended up with him

at the bottom, while the actual brush remained at the top

of the stairwell. Sadat also gave extensive testimony about

his injuries and his capacity to perform certain daily tasks.

He also testified that he had a previous back injury for —

which he was treated at Charity Hospital. He also testified

that he had a car accident in January of 1998, and that he

had leg pain after that incident.

The plaintiffs wife, Mrs. Muhammad, testified about

what she has observed regarding her husband’s injuries.

Since his accident, she stated that Sadat has had much

difficulty with his neck and back. She said that he is

unable to play sports and unable to have a physical rela-

tionship with her. She also said that Sadat was unable to

App. 23

do any heavy lifting including picking his children up off

the ground.

Mr. Timothy Taylor, who was also a roustabout on the

Ocean Lexington, testified as to his perceptions of the

accident since he came upon the scene as Sadat was falling

down the stairs. He also testified about the procedure he

and Sadat were supposed to follow as roustabouts in

carrying the bucket and brush as well as walking down a

stairwell. Mr. Taylor stated that they were told several

times at safety meetings that they were supposed to put

the brush inside the bucket and put it in one hand, while

the other is to be kept free to utilize the handrail as they

go down a stairwell. There was a safety meeting the

morning of the accident where proper procedure was

discussed. Mr. Taylor also testified that Diamond’s safety

procedures call for one hand to be on the handrail at all

times when using a stairwell. Mr. Taylor did not see what

caused the accident, however, he testified that he saw

Sadat, the bucket, and the handle of the brush at the

bottom of the stairwell on the A/C deck. Mr. Taylor testi-

fied that he has used the stairwell several times and has

performed the task of cleaning the A/C deck. He stated

that the proper procedure was to carry the bucket and

brush in one hand while leaving the other hand free to use

the handrail while descending the stairwell. He also

testified that the handrail is accessible when you approach

the steps.

Dr. John Watermeier testified by deposition. He

stated that he saw Sadat eleven days after the accident

and diagnosed him with a cervical and lumbar disk syn-

drome after performing several tests including an MRI. He

testified that surgery was the only way to cure the prob-

lem. He also stated that the fall on the Ocean Lexington

App. 24

was the cause of the injuries to Sadat. (Watermeier dep.

Pgs 16, 17.)

Dr. Kenneth Adatto also testified by deposition. Dr.

Adatto testified to similar findings as Dr. Watermeier. He

performed an anterior cervical discectomy and fusion at

C5-6 on Sadat on March 17, 1999, and has scheduled an

anterior lumbar discectomy and fusion at L5-S1. He also

testified that the injuries were more likely than not a

result of the fall.

Dr. Michael Molleston testified, by deposition, that he

saw Sadat only once. He testified that he thought some of

Sadat’s injuries were “emotional” and he did not relate the

plaintiffs headaches to his neck pain. He did not treat

Sadat, but scheduled a follow-up appointment for further

tests. Sadat did not attend this appointment.

Dr. Christopher Cenac testified at trial that he saw

Sadat at the request of Diamond on March 20, 1997 and

October 29, 1997. Dr. Cenac testified that there was

nothing wrong with his neck, but noted complaints of

numbness with his neck, right foot pain, pain in his back,

and headaches. He thought that the headaches were non-

cervical in nature and not related to the fall on the Ocean

Lexington. Dr. Cenac saw him again in October, and after

reviewing the reports of Dr. Molleston and evaluating the

patient himself, found that Sadat was ready to return to

work at full capacity. Dr. Cenac also testified that there

was no difference in the appearance of the lumbar in the

plaintiffs pre-employment MRI and post-injury MRI. He

also did not find any signs of nerve root impingement or

entrapment.

Dr. Thompson Dietz, a board certified radiologist,

testified that he could find no nerve root impingement and

a

App. 25

also stated, as Dr. Cenac did, that there was no difference

in the lumbar in the pre and post MRI’s.

LAW AND ANALYSIS:

Jones Act Negligence: Relying on Vendetto v. Sonat

Offshore Drilling Co., 725 So.2d 474 (La. 1999) and Gaut-

reaux v. Scurlock, 107 F.3d 331 (5th Cir. 1997), the court

must apply the standard of proof outlined in both cases. In

overruling Spinks v. Chevron, 507 F.2d 216 (5th Cir.

1975), the court in Gautreaux held that a Jones Act

seaman is required to act as a reasonable seaman under

like circumstances, and a Jones Act employer is required

to act as a reasonable employer under like circumstances.

Although not bound by the 5th Circuit decision, the

Supreme Court and the 3rd Circuit have applied this

standard, therefore, we must do the same. The so-called

slight negligence standard is not appropriate in Jones Act

cases as a result.

A seaman, then, is obligated under the Jones Act to

act with ordinary prudence under the circumstances,

Gautreaux, supra. The circumstances of a seaman’s

employment include not only his reliance on his employer

to provide a safe workplace but also his own experience,

training, or education. The reasonable person standard,

therefore, under a Jones Act negligence action becomes

one of the reasonable seaman in like circumstances.

In Vendetto, supra, the plaintiff was undertaking a

common, ordinary task which he had done many times

beford, and he chose the method by which to lower the

tools, which weighed no more than forty pounds. There

was no testimony that the method he chose to use was

unsafe, merely that there were other methods which he

App. 26

could have used. The Supreme Court held that the em-

ployer could not be held liable by applying the standard

set out in Gautreaux. The employer was held to a standard

as that of an employer in like circumstances, and since the

plaintiff could not prove that the employer breached any

duty to the employee, the negligence claim failed.

It is clear that there was a policy and an instruction to

the roustabouts that they should follow certain safety

procedures when attempting to descend the stairwell from

the pipe deck to the A/C deck in order to perform the

cleaning duties. It is clear from the testimony of Sadat,

Timothy Taylor, and Jerry McHenry that a seaman in like

circumstances would not have attempted to descend a

staircase with a five gallon bucket filled with soap in one

hand and a long-handled brush in the other. (McHenry

dep. Pgs. 25-31.) The policy was for the brush to be put

inside the bucket so that the other hand could be free to

use the handrail. Diamond cannot be held liable to a

seaman who did not act with ordinary care while perform-

ing his cleaning duties.

In Vendetto, the Court found that the employer was

not liable merely for the failure to instruct; however, in

this case, we do have a specific policy and instruction.

Sadat testified that he knew he was supposed to have one

hand on the railing. Timothy Taylor testifies that the crew

was instructed at the safety meetings about the proper

way to perform this task. There was to be one hand free to

utilize the handrail while stepping over the coaming and

descending the stairwell.

Absent a showing that the method taught was unsafe,

namely using one hand on the handrail to step over the

coaming and proceed down the stairwell, there can be no

App. 27

finding against the Jones Act employer on a negligence

claim, Vendetto, supra. Clearly from all the testimony at

trial, there was no proof that the method taught was

unsafe. The plaintiff failed to exercise the care a reason-

able seaman would in like circumstances. He did not

follow the policy nor did he use the method that was

taught to him.

Accordingly, the Court finds that the plaintiff was

100% at fault as he did not act as a reasonable seaman in

like circumstances, and that the employer did not breach

any duty owed to the plaintiff. Additionally, the Court

finds that Diamond acted as a reasonable employer in like

circumstances. The Jones Act negligence claim fails.

UNSEAWORTHINESS

The Court in Foster v. Destin Trading Corp, No. 96-

0803 (La. 5-30-97); 700 So.2d 199, stated that an owner of

a vessel is responsible to the captain or any seaman

thereof for injuries received because of the unseaworthi-

ness of the vessel and that there is an implied obligation

that all reasonable means shall be employed to insure the

seaworthiness of the vessel. To prevail on an unseawor-

thiness claim a seaman must prove that the unseaworthy

condition was the proximate cause of his injury, Youn v.

Maritime Overseas Corp, 605 So.2d 187, (La.App. 5th Cir

1992.) Although the duty of seaworthiness is absolute and

does not require negligence, the mere fact an accident

occurred does not establish unseaworthiness, Vendetto,

supra. The plaintiff must prove that the unseaworthy

condition played a substantial part in bringing about or

actually causing plaintiffs injury and that injury was

App. 28

either a direct result or a reasonably probable consequence

of the unseaworthiness.

The plaintiff did not carry his burden in proving by a

preponderance of the evidence the coaming was the

proximate cause of his accident. Using the standard in

Vendetto, the plaintiff, by his own testimony could not

establish how he tripped. He testified that it may have

been the coaming or it may have been the brush. This

testimony, along with all other evidence, does not meet the

threshold evidentiary standard to prove unseaworthiness

under Vendetto. It is more likely than not that something

other than the placement of the coaming caused the

accident.

Although Dr. Gary Nelson, a safety engineer, testified

by deposition as to the safety of the stairwell and spoke of

OSHA regulations, the Ocean Lexington is not under

OSHA guidelines. Watterson v. Mallard Bay Drilling, 649

So.2d 431 (La.App Cir 3 10-12-94.)

Accordingly, this Court finds that the plaintiff did not

prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the unsea-

worthy condition of the vessel was the proximate cause of

his injuries. The unseaworthiness claim fails.

MAINTENANCE AND CURE:

The duty to provide maintenance and cure arises from

the seaman’s employment contract and comprises most

illnesses or injuries which occur during the existence of

the employment arrangement. The shipowner’s obligation

to provide maintenance and cure ends when the seaman

reaches maximum medical cure. Maximum medical cure is

reached when the seaman’s injuries are determined by the

a

a

App. 29

seaman’s treating physician to be of a permanent nature.

An injured plaintiff is not required to choose the best

method of treatment, or select the most skilled and compe-

tent physician, and cannot be faulted for accepting a

course of treatment offered by his orthopedic surgeon as a

means of reducing his pain. Use v. Use, 654 So.2d 1355

(La.App Ist Cir. 1995.)

This Court finds that maintenance and cure was

improperly withheld. Dr. Cenac’s testimony does not

persuade the court on the extent of the plaintiffs injuries.

It is the trial court’s discretion to determine the weight

and credibility it gives to the testimony offered at trial.

There is ample medical evidence that establishes that the

plaintiff had not reached maximum medical recovery at

the time the defendant stopped maintenance and cure

payments on November 8, 1997. The depositions of Dr.

Watermeier and Dr. Adatto provide the evidence of the

plaintiffs injuries and the treatment that was rendered to

cure these injuries. Both doctors attribute the fall on the

Ocean Lexington to the back injuries suffered by the

plaintiff. Both thought surgery was necessary to resolve

the problems resulting from the injuries. There is a differ-

ence of opinion among the doctors regarding the lumbar

surgery proposed by Dr. Adatto. Dr. Cenac feels that any

nerve root impingement was not caused by the accident,

and in fact his pre-employment MRI was the same as his

post-injury MRI.

The test for determining causal relationship between

accident and subsequent injury is whether the plaintiff

provided through medical testimony that it is more prob-

able than not that subsequent injuries were caused by the

accident. Mart v. Hill, 505 So.2d 1120 (La. 1987.) The

claimant’s disability is presumed to have resulted from an

App. 30

accident, if before the accident the injured person was in

good health, but commencing with the accident if the

symptoms of the disabling condition appear and continu-

ously manifest themselves afterwards, providing the

medical evidence shows there to be a reasonable connec-

tion between the accident and the disabling condition.

Johnson v. Manuel, 670 So.2d 273 (La.App 3rd Cir. 1996.)

In order to defeat this presumption, the defendant must

show some other particular incident that could have

caused the injury in question.

The plaintiff underwent a full medical examination as

part of his pre-employment physical by Dr. Howard

Nelson. He was cleared to perform heavy duty after the

testing was reviewed. He had no cervical or lumbar com-

plaints or problems. The defendant has not proven by a

preponderance of the evidence that another event caused

the injuries claimed by the plaintiff. The plaintiff proved

by a preponderance of the evidence that the injury to the

C5-6 level of his back was caused by the accident on the

Ocean Lexington. The testimony of both Dr. Adatto and

Dr. Watermeier, by deposition, provides the proof neces-

sary to meet the threshold burden provided in Mart. The

injuries that led Dr. Adatto to perform the fusion were,

according to him, a direct result of the fall, (Adatto dep. Pg

36.) There is more of a difference of opinion regarding the

future fusion in the lumbar region; however, the plaintiff

carried his burden in that it is more probable than not

that the injuries in the lumbar region were caused by the

accident. Again, Dr. Cenac’s view of the plaintiffs injuries

do not persuade the Court. Evidence is again found in the

deposition testimony of Dr. Adatto and Dr. Watermeier.

Dr. Watermeier states that Sadat was asymptomatic

before the accident, but continually symptomatic after the

App. 31

accident; therefore, lumbar surgery was a reasonable

solution to the lumbar problem. (Watermeier dep. Pgs. 14,

15.) Dr. Adatto also referred his decision for further

approval to Dr. Adinolfi who gave the approval for surgery

to the lumbar area.

Maintenance costs are due until the plaintiff reaches

maximum medical recovery. Jordan v. Intercontinental

Bulktank Corp, 621 So.2d 1141 (La.App 1st Cir 2/19/93.)

The plaintiff was being paid a rate of $15 a day when

the payments stopped on November 8, 1997. This Court

finds that the plaintiff had not reached maximum medical

recovery at that point, and still has not because of the

future surgery needed in the lumbar area of the plaintiff;

and awards the plaintiff maintenance at a rate of $15 a

day from November 8, 1997 until he reaches maximum

medical recovery.

This Court finds that the defendant improperly

withheld maintenance and cure when it stopped payments

in November of 1997. This was egregious conduct and the

Court is persuaded by the deposition testimony of Dr.

Adatto regarding the extent of the plaintiffs injuries.

Therefore, the plaintiff is awarded his past and future

medical costs for his injuries as part of the cure obligation

owed by the defendant.

This Court calculates the following to be awarded to

Sadat Muhammad:

Past Medical Cost: $ 59,599.53

Future Medical Cost: $ 46,309.00 -

Maintenance at the rate of $15 per day from No-

vember 8, 1997.

App. 32

The defendant, Diamond Offshore Company, is cast

for all court costs. Pre-judgment interest is awarded, at

the discretion of the Court.

ATTORNEY’S FEES:

Because the Court has found that maintenance and

cure were wrongfully terminated, the plaintiff should be

awarded attorney’s fees. Consistent with the agreement of

counsel during the trial, the attorney for the plaintiff

will move for a hearing on the amount of attorney’s fees

to be awarded, and the Court will hear evidence on that

issue at that time.

Let a formal judgment consistent with these Reasons

for Judgment be prepared by the attorney for the plaintiff,

submitted to the attorneys for Diamond for approval as to

form, then presented to the Court for signature.

Officially in Chambers, New Iberia, Iberia Parish,

Louisiana. March 28, 2001.

App. 33

APPENDIX D

16TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE PARISH OF IBERIA

STATE OF LOUISIANA

NO. 86-273 DIVISION “D” DOCKET NO.

SADAT MUHAMMAD

VERSUS

DIAMOND OFFSHORE COMPANY

FILED:

DEPUTY CLERK

JUDGMENT

(Filed May 16, 2001)

This cause was tried before the Honorable William D.

Hunter on November 14 and 15, 2000, and taken under

advisement to be held open for the submission of addi-

tional depositions and post-trial memoranda. After sub-

mission to the Court, the Court finds for the written

reasons assigned on the 28th day of March, 2001, in favor

of Diamond Offshore Company, dismissing with prejudice

any and all claims by plaintiff against Diamond Offshore

Company herein, except as follows:

IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED, that

there be judgment herein in favor of plaintiff, Sadat

Muhammad, and against defendant, Diamond Offshore

Company, for past medical costs for his injuries as part of

the cure obligation owed by the defendant in the sum of

Fifty-Nine Thousand Five Hundred Ninety-Nine and

53/100 ($59,599.33) Dollars with pre-judgment judicial

interest from March 8, 1997, until paid;

App. 34

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND

DECREED that there be judgment granted herein in favor

of Sadat Muhammad and against Diamond Offshore

Company for the future medical costs for his injuries as

part of the cure obligation owed by the defendant in the

amount of Forty-Six Thousand Three Hundred Nine and

No/100 ($46,309.00) Dollars with pre-judgment judicial

interest from March 8, 1997, until paid;

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND

DECREED that maintenance at the rate of $20.00 a day

be paid Sadat Muhammad from November 8, 1997, until

Sadat Muhammad reaches maximum medical recovery

with judicial interest on the past due amount from No-

vember 8, 1997, until paid;

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND

DECREED that maintenance and cure was wrongfully

terminated and that Sadat Muhammad be awarded

attorneys fees in an amount to be determined after

hearing on motion of plaintiff.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND

DECREED that Diamond Offshore Company is liable for

costs of court.

JUDGMENT READ, RENDERED AND SIGNED, in

Chambers in New Iberia, Iberia Parish, Louisiana, this 14

day of May, 2001.

/s/ William D. Hunter

WILLIAM D. HUNTER,

JUDGE

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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