Opposition Brief — Power Engineering Co. v. United States
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supreme Cot, U.o.
‘FLED
| APR 208
No. 02-1086 :
In the Supreme Court of the Bnited States
POWER ENGINEERING COMPANY, ET AL., PETITIONERS
Vv.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES IN OPPOSITION
THEODORE B. OLSON
Solicitor General
Counsel of Record
THOMAS L. SANSONETTI
Assistant Attorney General
GREER S. GOLDMAN
ROBERT H. OAKLEY
Attorneys
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530-0001
(202) 514-2217
QUESTION PRESENTED
The question presented, in a case in which petitioners
and the United States have settled the litigation with
no reservation of rights to appeal, is:
Whether the United States may bring an enforce-
ment action against petitioners under the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA), 42
U.S.C. 6901 et seq., after the State of Colorado had
resolved a separate enforcement action under a feder-
ally authorized program that sought compliance with
different waste regulation requirements.
(I)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
NII “assstsiorisjtsthiguniesinnplntininiigihtbeiositenghetenmnietitithanbiiesinany 1
IIIT siedieh is checrudcthniastatninndiadietiidivacasiliabdahiniohodasnctereustitte 1
Statement ......... - bilesalchagiaeetigsisdanaisin 2
Argument ....... celnbiteiehiaeininnetinisianinasiiiian 9
TEE SERRE Aa eo ONE CO TNE 15
ASSESS SEE Net clin OO Ds AOE DO la
aE ITIIIIT TIE cexanedauchaicoudusiiaiaiaivepheaeinnniateaninnintiiaganbsmananiannianeniniemnendensn 5a
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases:
Affholder, Inc. v. Preston Carroll Co., 866 F.2d 881
SUIT AUTIE ic TUITIIIIED sichictniedinnehicnsuntstinsinshascsinistndinsindasiaiatisantennsieiasenesin 10
Arizonans for Official English v. dvtabin: 520 U.S.
Sr adi astinseeiennenevicnecbienitsicisinleacceiniaecenniiniscedainaaimssinninsnine 9
Church of Scientology v. United States, 506 U. S, 9
SIP TED Mecano srbatensinniesipisssiviniaienieesniehicbeiistaninanniesshatasinntsvinens 10
Drummond v. United States, 324 U.S. 316 (1945) ....... 7, 8,13
Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868 (1991) ..........0000 13
Harmon Indus. v. Browner, 191 F.3d 894 (8th Cir.
STUTTIEy nincissbinsinlineciieacsshcebbidehseheainniticleteeanniediseggedtclukdbahdnatidinsinnuninanneae 6, 7
International Union v. Dana Corp. .. 697 F.2d 718
NINE Graiisoueiesibsisnsendineisineeeidcenibiesciasasinacimatncmei 10
Lake Coal Co. v. Roberts & Schaefer Co., 474 US. 120
SINE (icteiinaSilecsienepttitliiehebihnasininiiatniehngheinictnnntnentensninintes 10
Massachusetts Trs. v. United States, 377 U.S. 235
STII i hahaa tetieltshaleteneenibholbuinduhsnetsouenbesinhoianinnnceanontpsases 14
Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147 (1979) ...........0.... 8,13
U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall P’ship,
I ici kctstriasiainoesiteabnleneagonitionsiaimweninn 10
United States v. MacDonald & Watson Waste Oil
Co., 933 F.2d 35 (1st Cir. 1991) 3
United States v. Power E'ng’g Co., 10 F. Supp. 2d 1165
(D. Colo. 1998), aff’d, 191 F.3d 1224 (10th Cir. 1999) ...... 5
(IIT)
IV
Cases—Continued: Page
United Techs. Corp. v. EPA, 821 F.2d 714 (D.C. Cir.
ROUIED sasscsiisilinsiatditntincigpsensensinnntnnnitnitiintanmeininnnnianunantionmannnan 2
Vela v. City of Houston, 276 F.3d 659 (5th Cir. 2001) ..... 10
Constitution, statutes, and regulations:
U.S. Const. Art. ITT, § 2 .......c..-sressccssssseservevesceccers 9
Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7401 et seq. 14
Clean Water Act of 1977, 33 U.S.C. 1251 et seq... 14
Resources Conversation and Recovery Act of 1976,
42 U.S.C. 6901 et seg. 2
42 U.S.C. 6902(A)(7) .....eeceeeseerseersees 4
42 U.S.C. 6902(b) 4
GB U.S.C, GORDI nereecsczcsceesscneserecsnsesensesnenceensensscssessones 2
42 U.S.C. 6922-6924 3
42 U.S.C. 6924(a) 3
42 U.S.C. 6924(t) 3
42 U.S.C. 6926(b) 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 12
42 U.S.C. 6926(e) 6
42 U.S.C. 6928 7,8
42 US.C. 6928(a) : 4,8, 12
UA, FD eieieeeeniitinnnienncans 11
42 U.S.C. 6928(A)(2) .....erecreeeseneesenesees 4,11
42 U.S.C. 6935(d)(1) 12
42 U.S.C. 6972(D)(1)(B) «...esssescsesenecrneenseenees 12
40 C.F.R.:
Pt. 264:
I TG. BEG 66 BOE, ceciceentisiesserersicericisnninnsennsiniintnmasig 3
Bh. FETE cccssusesensesnsiennenmnennanevintinenienniannensnnnscamanicenneenasnanetnsinttantion 3
6 Colo. Code Regs. Pt. 266 (2002) ....... 4
Miscellaneous:
Enforcement of Environmental Laws: Hearing Before
the Senate Comm. on Env’t and Public Works, 105th
Cong., Ist Sess. (1997) 14
Miscellaneous—Continued: Page
Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance,
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Pub.
No. 300-R-98-008, Enforcement and Compliance
Assurance Accomplishments FY 1997 (1998) .......:s:+s++ 14
OB Peed. Rem. SIGE CRRA) sniscessesercessinnsrnseeseniersennstvmesnsinnainninn 3
47 Ved. Beaae, ME OGT (RGGI scceencerensseccesnenesncncnincenimnennenannnceinne 3
GD Fad. Reap. 41006 (RGB) ceceecessercevevsessesesmrcseesccceinnnsnsnnnsensosnens 4
Jn the Supreme Court of the Gnited States
No. 02-1086
POWER ENGINEERING COMPANY, ET AL., PETITIONERS
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES IN OPPOSITION
OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the court of appeals is reported at 303
F.3d 1232 (Pet. App. B1-B16). The decision of the
district court is reported at 125 F. Supp. 2d 1050 (Pet.
App. C1-C44).
JURISDICTION
The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on
September 4, 2002. On November 14, 2002, Justice
Breyer extended the time within which to file a petition
for a writ of certiorari to and including January 17,
2003, and the petition was filed on that date (Pet. App.
Al). The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28
U.S.C. 1254(1). Following the court of appeals’ issuance
of its mandate, the district court granted the parties’
joint motion to terminate the litigation. See App.,
(1)
2
infra, la-6a. The United States submits that the ques-
tion presented in the petition for a writ of certiorari
accordingly is moot. See pp. 9-11, infra.
STATEMENT
The United States brought an action against peti-
tioners under the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act of 1976 (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. 6901 et seqg., to compel
petitioners to comply with RCRA’s financial assurance
requirements for hazardous waste facilities. Peti-
tioners contended that the United States was precluded
from bringing that action because the State of Colorado
had previously brought an enforcement action against
petitioners, seeking compliance with different hazard-
ous waste requirements. The district court rejected
petitioners’ argument and ultimately ruled that peti-
tioners were obligated to provide financial assurances
in the amount of $2,119,044. See Pet. App. C11-C33; id.
at B5. The court of appeals affirmed. Jd. at B1-B16.
Upon joint motion of the parties, the district court
reduced the amount of the financial assurances to
$1,324,102 and terminated the litigation, subject to the
district court’s continuing jurisdiction over petitioners’
financial assurance obligations. App., infra, la-6a.
1. Congress enacted RCRA to address serious
environmental and health dangers arising from the
generation, management, and disposal of solid waste.
Subtitle C of RCRA, 42 U.S.C. 6921-6939e, establishes
a “‘cradle to grave’ regulatory structure for overseeing
the safe treatment, storage and disposal of hazardous
waste.” United Techs. Corp. v. EPA, 821 F.2d 714, 716
(D.C. Cir. 1987). Subtitle C requires the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA), which administers RCRA, to
develop a federal hazardous waste program, including
regulations that establish standards applicable to gen-
3
erators and transporters of hazardous waste, and
owners and operators of hazardous waste treatment,
storage, and disposal facilities. See 42 U.S.C. 6922-
6924.
In accordance with RCRA, EPA has promulgated
regulations requiring that owners and operators of haz-
ardous waste treatment, storage, and disposal facilities
satisfy financial requirements for closure costs, post-
closure costs, and third-party liability. See 42 U.S.C.
6924(a) and (t); 40 C.F.R. 264.140 et seg. Those regu-
lations ensure that the owner or operator of a facility
has secured funds to provide liability coverage until the
facility is finally closed and to cover the cost of closure
and post-closure care. EPA’s “financial assurance” re-
quirements protect the public from bearing those costs
at some later date. See, e.g., 46 Fed. Reg. 2821 (1981);
see also 47 Fed. Reg. 15,047 (1982).
RCRA further provides that EPA may authorize a
State to carry out a hazardous waste program “in lieu
of” the federal hazardous waste program. 42 U.S.C.
6926(b). To receive authorization, a State must estab-
lish a hazardous waste program that is equivalent to
and consistent with the federal program, and the State
must provide for adequate enforcement of the author-
ized requirements. 42 U.S.C. 6926(b); 40 C.F.R. Pt. 271.
Once EPA has authorized a State’s hazardous waste
program, the authorized State’s requirements, rather
than the equivalent federal requirements, become the
body of requirements that govern facilities within the
State. See, e.g., United States v. MacDonald & Watson
Waste Oil Co., 933 F.2d 35, 43-46 (1st Cir. 1991).
EPA’s authorization of state programs accomplishes
two principal goals: (1) the authorized state require-
ments replace the equivalent federal requirements
within the State, so that regulated entities need no
4
longer comply with a separate state hazardous waste
program as well as equivalent federal requirements (42
U.S.C. 6926(b)); and (2) the State’s authorized require-
ments become federally enforceable as requirements of
RCRA Subtitle C (see 42 U.S.C. 6928(a)(2)). Regard-
less of federal authorization, States may continue to
enforce the hazardous waste requirements in state stat-
utes and regulations using state enforcement authority.
RCRA encourages States to seek authorization of
state hazardous waste management programs. See 42
U.S.C. 6902(a)(7). At the same time, RCRA directs
EPA to ensure that hazardous wastes are managed
nationally in a consistent and effective manner. See 42
U.S.C. 6902(b). Thus, while States may assume pri-
mary responsibility for program administration, EPA
retains oversight responsibilities concerning the activi-
ties regulated under the authorized state programs.
RCRA also grants EPA independent authority to take
direct enforcement action against a violator of RCRA
requirements in a State with an authorized hazardous
waste program, so long as it informs the State before
taking action. 42 U.S.C. 6928(a).
On November 2, 1984, EPA authorized Colorado’s
hazardous waste program, which is now managed by
the Colorado Department of Public Health and Envi-
ronment (CDPHE). 49 Fed. Reg. 41,036 (1984). From
time to time, Colorado has sought and obtained from
EPA additional authorizations for revisions to its haz-
ardous waste program. Colorado’s federally authorized
financial responsibility regulations are equivalent to
and consistent with the federal regulations. See 6 Colo.
Code Regs. Pt. 266 (2002).
2. Since 1968, petitioners have operated a metal
refinishing and chrome electroplating business located
in Denver, Colorado. Pet. App. B4. Petitioners’ activi-
SSNS Me a een a a
5
ties produced 18 different waste streams and more than
1000 kilograms per month of hazardous waste. Ibid.
Nonetheless, petitioners failed to comply with federal
or state hazardous waste management requirements.
Ibid.
In August 1992, CDPHE received information that
chromium discharges traced to petitioners’ facility had
caused surface and groundwater contamination. See
Pet. App. B4. CDPHE’s inspections revealed that peti-
tioners were engaged in the unlawful treatment, stor-
age, and disposal of hazardous wastes. Ibid. CDPHE
issued a Final Administrative Compliance Order to
petitioners that identified numerous violations and re-
quired that petitioners remedy those violations. /bid.;
id. at C3-C5.
CDPHE’s order neither identified violations of, nor
directed compliance with, the RCRA-mandated finan-
cial assurance requirements. Pet. App. C5. The United
States asked CDPHE to enforce the financial assurance
requirements and informed CDPHE that, if it did not,
the United States would bring its own enforcement
action. Ibid. CDPHE failed to do so. Based on infor-
mation that petitioner Lilienthal was considering di-
vesting himself of his assets or leaving the country, the
United States filed an enforcement action against
petitioners in federal district court in Colorado, seeking
to compel petitioners to comply with the financial assur-
ance requirements and for other relief. Jbid. CDPHE
supported the United States’ effort to compel peti-
tioners to satisfy financial assurance requirements.
5/11/98 Prelim. Inj. Hr’g Tr. 33, 84. The United States
subsequently obtained a preliminary injunction requir-
ing petitioners to provide financial assurances. Pet.
App. C6; United States v. Power Eng’g Co., 10 F. Supp.
6
2d 1165 (D. Colo. 1998), aff’d, 191 F.3d 1224 (10th Cir.
1999).
Following the court of appeals’ affirmance of the
preliminary injunction, the United States dismissed all
of its claims against petitioners except the demand for
financial assurances. Pet. App. C8. On cross motions
for summary judgment, petitioners argued that the
United States’ enforcement action was barred by
CDPHE?’s prior enforcement action, citing Harmon In-
dustries v. Browner, 191 F.3d 894 (8th Cir. 1999).
The Eighth Circuit’s decision in Harmon (which is
reproduced at Pet. App. 11-119) affirmed a district court
ruling that a State’s settlement of an enforcement
action barred EPA from pursuing an ongoing EPA
administrative enforcement action addressing the same
violations. The Eighth Circuit stated that 42 U.S.C.
6926(b), which provides that EPA may authorize a state
hazardous waste program “in lieu of” the federal pro-
gram, also meant that state enforcement was “in lieu
of” federal enforcement. Harmon, 191 F.3d at 897-898.
The court recognized that RCRA expressly allows the
United States to file an enforcement action in an
authorized State, 42 U.S.C. 6928(a), but concluded that
“{hjarmonizing” this provision with Section 6926(b)
meant that EPA has a secondary enforcement role in
authorized States. Harmon, 191 F.3d at 899. Accord-
ing to the Eighth Circuit, that secondary role would
allow EPA to take action only if the State took none or,
in the alternative, to revoke federal authorization of the
State’s program pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 6926(e). 191
F.3d at 899. The Eighth Circuit also held that Section
6926(b) created a relationship of privity between EPA
and the State and concluded that res judicata therefore
barred the EPA action. Jd. at 902-904.
7
The district court in this case rejected the conclusion
reached in Harmon that Section 6926(b) limits federal
enforcement in authorized States, noting that Section
6926(b) “primarily addresses the administration and
enforcement of state regulations by authorized states,
[while] Section 6928 concerns the federal enforcement
of such regulations.” Pet. App. C17. The district court
concluded that “there is no reason to impose restric-
tions on federal authority [to enforce RCRA] not found
explicitly in the statute.” Jd. at C18.
The district court also rejected Harmon’s reasoning |
respecting the res judicata effect of a state enforcement |
action. Pet. App. C30-C33. The district court observed |
that this Court has held that the United States is bound |
by the results of a suit to which it was not a party only |
when it has “a laboring oar in a controversy.” Id. at |
C30 (quoting Drummond v. United States, 324 U.S. |
316, 318 (1945)). The district court declined to adopt the
Eighth Circuit’s conclusion that EPA effectively pulled
the “laboring oar” by authorizing the state hazardous
waste program. Id. at C31-C32 (citing Harmon, 191
F.3d at 904).
Accordingly, the district court denied petitioners’
motion for summary judgment and, instead, concluded
that petitioners were in violation of RCRA for their
failure to provide financial assurances. Pet. App. C42-
C44, The district court subsequently held a trial on the
outstanding factual issues and ultimately concluded
that petitioners were obligated to provide financial
assurances in the amount of $2,119,044. Jd. at B5.
3. The court of appeals affirmed the district court’s
judgment. Pet. App. B1-B16. The court of appeals con-
cluded that RCRA allows the United States to bring its
own enforcement action in an authorized State despite a
prior state enforcement action. Jd. at B5-B13. The
Se
8
court stated that petitioners’ contrary argument “con-
tradicts the plain language of section 6928,” which
expressly authorizes the United States to bring an
enforcement action in an authorized State. Jd. at B13.
The court of appeals reasoned that Section 6926(b)
distinguishes between adopting and implementing a
hazardous waste program and enforcing requirements
under that program. Congress authorized a State to
carry out the state program “in lieu of’ the federal
program, 42 U.S.C. 6926(b), but it expressly preserved,
through Sections 6926(b) and 6928(a), the United
States’ power to enforce the elements of the state pro-
gram, provided that the United States gives advance
notice of the federal enforcement action, 42 U.S.C. 6928.
See Pet. App. B9. The court of appeals further con-
cluded that the Eighth Circuit’s construction in Har-
mon went “well beyond the plain language of the
statute” and imposed limitations on EPA’s enforcement
authority not found in Section 6928(a). Jd. at B10. The
court of appeals accordingly embraced EPA’s construc-
tion, concluding that “EPA’s interpretation of RCRA
has substantial support in the text of the statute and is
therefore a reasonable interpretation of the statute.”
Id. at B13.
The court of appeals also concluded that the United
States was not bound by res judicata as a result of the
CDPHE enforcement action against petitioners. Pet.
App. B13-B15. Citing Montana v. United States, 440
U.S. 147, 153 (1979), and Drummond, supra, it con-
cluded that the United States could not be bound by the
results of the CDPHE suit because the United States '
was neither a party in that suit nor exercised control
over the litigation. Pet. App. B14-B15 (citing Drum- )
mond, 324 U.S. at 316, and Montana, 440 U.S. at 154-
155).
9
4, Following the court of appeals’ decision, the
parties entered into settlement negotiations. After the
court of appeals issued its mandate, the-parties filed a
“Joint Motion and Memorandum to Terminate Litiga-
tion” with the district court. App., infra, la-4a. That
motion asked the district court to modify its judgment
to reduce petitioners’ financial assurances obligation
from $2,229,044 to $1,824,102. Jd. at 3a. The joint
motion also asked the district court to dismiss all other
pending motions of the parties and to “(eJnter an order
terminating this litigation subject to the Court’s
continuing jurisdiction over its Judgment.” Ibid. The
joint motion contains no reservation by petitioners of
the right to appeal any issue in this case. On December
20, 2002, the district court issued an order granting the
joint motion. Jd. at 5a-6a.
ARGUMENT
This Court should deny the petition for a writ of
certiorari because the district court has issued an order
terminating the litigation and rendering the question
presented moot. Moreover, notwithstanding peti-
tioners’ claim that the court of appeals’ decision con-
flicts with a decision of the Eighth Circuit, there is no
current need for this Court to address the issue because
the decision in this case is correct, and the issue is
unlikely to recur with sufficient frequercy to call for
this Court’s review.
1. This Court exercises its jurisdiction only over live
cases or controversies. U.S. Const. Art. III, § 2. See,
e.g., Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520
U.S. 48, 67 (1997) (“[A]n actual controversy must be
extant at all stages of review.”). A federal court—
including this Court—has no authority to “give opinions
- upon moot questions or abstract propositions, or to
10
declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect
the matter in issue in the case before it.” Church of
Scientology v. United States, 506 U.S. 9, 12 (1992). Con-
sequently, neither this Court nor the courts of appeals
undertake review on the merits in cases that are settled
during the course of appellate proceedings. See, e.g,
U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partner-
ship, 513 U.S. 18, 28 (1994); Lake Coal Co. v. Roberts &
Schaefer Co., 474 U.S. 120 (1985) (per curiam) (denying
motion of parties requesting a decision on issues
presented in a petition for writ of certiorari after the
parties settled the case); Vela v. City of Houston, 276
F.3d 659, 682 (5th Cir. 2001) (“We have repeatedly
recognized that settlement between the parties renders
an appeal moot and requires dismissal of the issues that
have been settled.”); Affholder, Inc. v. Preston Carroll
Co., 866 F.2d 881, 885 (6th Cir. 1989) (“Settlement of a
claim before a final adjudication moots the claim and
deprives the federal judiciary of jurisdiction over the
claim.”); International Union v. Dana Corp., 697 F.2d
718, 719 (6th Cir. 1983) (dismissing as moot a case that
settled while on appeal).
The Joint Motion and Memorandum to Terminate
Litigation, signed by counsel for each of the parties,
constituted an agreement to settle the case. It pre-
scribed the amount of financial assurances to be pro-
vided by petitioners; it requested the district court to
modify the judgment amount to conform to that lower
amount; and it asked the court to enter an order ter-
minating the litigation. See App., infra, la-4a. The
district court granted the motion in full, modifying the
judgment as requested by the parties and terminating
the action. Id. at 5a-6a.
The district court’s order accordingly renders the
question presented in this case moot. By virtue of the
eee
11
Joint Motion and Memorandum to Terminate Litiga-
tion, petitioners agreed to be obligated to provide finan-
cial assurances in the agreed amount. The district court
retained only “continuing jurisdiction over the judg-
ment,” App., infra, 6a, which preserved the district
court’s authority to ensure that petitioners’ fulfilled
their obligations under the judgment. Neither the joint
motion nor the district court’s order contained a
reservation of a right to appeal any issue in this case,
and no appeal, in fact, has been taken from the district
court’s modified judgment. Accordingly, there is no
longer any controversy and the case is moot.
2. In any event, the court of appeals’ decision is cor-
rect. Section 6928(a)(1) of RCRA authorizes the United
States to take enforcement action if EPA determines
that “any person has violated or is in violation of any
requirement” of RCRA. 42 U.S.C. 6928(a)(1). Section
6928(a)(2) expressly addresses “the case of a violation of
any requirement of [RCRA] where such violation
occurs in a State which is authorized to carry out a
hazardous waste program under section 6926 of this
title.” 42 U.S.C. 6928(a)(2). In that situation, EPA
shall give notice to the State in which such violation
has occurred prior to issuing an order or com-
mencing a civil action under this section.
Ibid. Thus, the United States plainly retains the right
to bring an enforcement action in an authorized State, —
subject only to the condition that it first give notice. If
Congress had wanted to impose additional conditions or
limitations on the United States’ enforcement author-
ity, it would have placed those restrictions, along with
the notice-requirement, in Section 6928(a)(2). For
example, Congress has authorized private citizens to
bring RCRA enforcement actions, but, in the same
12
provision authorizing citizen suits, Congress has
specifically disallowed citizen action in those instances
in which the “State has commenced and is diligently
prosecuting a civil or criminal action.” 42 U.S.C.
6972(b)(1)(B). Congress’s failure to place a similar
limitation on federal enforcement actions demonstrates
that Congress did not wish to preclude federal enforce-
ment actions seeking relief that the State has declined
to pursue.
Petitioners argue at length that federal enforcement
actions would “usurp” a State’s enforcement role, Pet.
15-22, but petitioners’ sole statutory basis for urging
that RCRA precludes the federal enforeement action at
issue here is Section 6926(b), which provides that a
State that receives federal authorization to administer
a hazardous waste program under RCRA is authorized
to carry out such program “in lieu of the Federal
program.” 42 U.S.C. 6926(b). That Section, however,
does not address, much less preclude exercise of, the
federal government’s enforcement power under Section
6928(a). Rather, Section 6926(b) provides that an
authorized State
is authorized to carry out such program in lieu of the
Federal program under this subchapter in such
State and to issue and enforce permits for the stor-
age, treatment, or disposal of hazardous waste (and
to enforce permits deemed to have been issued
under section 6935(d)(1) of this title) * * *.
42 U.S.C. 6926(b) (emphasis added). As the district
court and court of appeals pointed out, RCRA refers
separately to a State’s carrying out its authorized haz-
ardous waste program “in lieu of” the federal program
and to a State’s exercise of enforcement powers that
necessarily co-exist with the federal enforcement
iii ilies
13
powers set out in Section 6928(a). Pet. App. B8-B9,
C16-C18. Section 6926(b) plainly does not provide that
a State enforces its program “in lieu of” federal enforce-
ment, and Section 6926(b) cannot sensibly be read to
displace the federal government’s express enforcement
powers. Ibid. See Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S.
868, 877 (1991) (Statutory interpretations that “render
superfluous other provisions in the same enactment”
are disfavored.).
The court of appeals also correctly concluded that the
United States could not be barred from bringing its
own enforcement suit by principles of res judicata. As
this Court made clear in Montana, 440 U.S. at 155, and
Drummond, 324 U.S. at 318, the United States cannot
be subjected to the bar of res judicata if the United
States neither was a party to nor assumed control
of the prior litigation. Petitioners point to no evidence
that the United States assumed control of the
CDPHE’s enforcement action. Indeed, any claim that
the United States controlled the state action is
particularly far-fetched where CDPHE declined EPA’s
request to seek financial assurances from petitioners.
Pet. App. B5.
3. Petitioners claim that the court of appeals’ deci-
sion in this case conflicts with the Eighth Circuit’s deci-
sion in Harmon, but even if that is so, there is no need
for this Court to resolve that asserted conflict at this
time. The United States rarely undertakes RCRA
enforcement actions against a party if an authorized
State has previously brought its own enforcement ac-
tion. Indeed, although Congress enacted RCRA in
1976, no court of appeals had occasion to address the
issue until Harmon, which was decided in 1999. The
Tenth Circuit’s decision in this case is the only other
14
court of appeals decision that squarely addresses the
issue presented here.
The issue is not likely to recur with significant
frequency. As EPA has explained to Congress, it is
unusual for the federal government to undertake
enforcement action in the wake of a state enforcement
action under any of three major federal environmental
statutes—the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 1251 et seq.,
the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7401 et seg., and RCRA.
See Enforcement of Environmental Laws: Hearing
Before the Senate Comm. on Environment and Public
Works, 105th Cong., Ist Sess. 156-162 (1997) (Hearing)
(statement of Steven A. Herman, Assistant Admin-
istrator, Office of Enforcement and Compliance, EPA).
For example, during fiscal years 1992 through 1996,
the States brought 50,856 enforcement actions under
those three major environmental programs. See Office
of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance, U.S. Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency, Pub. No. 300-R-98-008,
Enforcement and Compliance Assurance Accomplish-
ments FY 1997, at 2-1, tbl. A-6 (1998). Yet, during fiscal
years 1992 through 1994, the federal government
brought an enforcement action after the conclusion of a
state enforcement action in only 30 instances under all
three statutes combined. Hearing 161. During fiscal
years 1994 and 1995, EPA brought such actions in a
total of 18 cases. Jd. at 162. During fiscal year 1996,
EPA filed its own actions following a state action in
four cases. Ibid.
Accordingly, there is no reason to believe that “a
considerable number of suits are pending in the lower
courts which will turn on resolution of these issues.”
Massachusetts Trustees v. United States, 377 U.S. 235,
237 (1964). It is conceivable that the issue presented
here might eventually merit this Court’s examination.
| _
15
But there is no warrant for review at this time,
particularly in a case that is moot.
CONCLUSION
The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.
Respectfully submitted.
THEODORE B. OLSON
Solicitor General
THOMAS L. SANSONETTI
Assistant Attorney General
GREER S. GOLDMAN
ROBERT H. OAKLEY
Attorneys
APRIL 2003
APPENDIX A
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Civil Action No. 97-B-1654
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PLAINTIFF
Vv.
POWER ENGINEERING COMPANY, REDOUBT, LTD., AND
RICHARD J. LILIENTHAL, DEFENDANTS
JOINT MOTION AND MEMORANDUM TO
TERMINATE LITIGATION
[Filed Dec. 19, 2002]
Plaintiff, the United States and Defendants, Power
Engineering Company, Redoubt Ltd., and Richard J.
Lilienthal, respectfully hereby submit this joint motion
and-memorandum to terminate the above captioned
litigation to the Court. Plaintiff and Defendants state
as follows: :
1. On February 28, 2001 the Court entered Findings
of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order directing that:
Defendants provide $2,119,044 in financial assur-
ances within 60 days of the date of this Order in the
form of surety bond guaranteeing payment into a
closure or post closure trust fund or in any other
(la)
2a
form acceptable to the plaintiff and specified in Part
266 [6 Colo. Code Regs. 1007-3 Part 266]; and
Obtain liability coverage for sudden accidental
occurrences in the amount of at least $1 million per
occurrence with annual aggregate of at least $2
million exclusive of legal defense costs;
2. On March 7, 2001 the February 28, 2001 Order
was reduced to a Judgment;
3. On April 26, 2001 Defendants took appeal from
that Judgment. On Septembex 4, 2002, in United States
of America, v. Power Engineering Company; Redoubt,
Ltd.; and Richard J. Lilienthal, 303 F.3d 1232 (10th Cir.
2002), the Tenth Circuit affirmed the rulings of the
District Court;
4. On October 15, 2002 (hereafter “Anniversary”)
Defendants submitted to Plaintiff and the State of
Colorado an updated closure and post closure cost
estimate in the amount of $1,132,164.00 for the work
required at the Power Engineering Facility to respond
to the Colorado Department of Health and the Envi-
ronment’s (“CDPHE”) Compliance Order No. 94-07-29-
01(Final). Plaintiff, in consultation with the State of
Colorado, reviewed that estimate and found it to be
satisfactory; and
5. On October 15, 2002, Defendants submitted to
Plaintiff and the State of Colorado documents evidenc-
ing a financial assurances trust maintained by Defen-
dants for the benefit of the CDPHE in the amount of
$1,324,102.00 and documents evidencing third party
liability coverage. Plaintiff, in consultation with the
State of Colorado, reviewed those documents and found
deficiencies. Defendants have agreed to seek the
changes necessary to conform to the regulatory re-
3a
quirements and are currently working to that end with
their bank trustee and insurance carrier. In light of the
updated cost estimate for the work to be completed
under Compliance Order No. 94-07-29-01(Final) at the
Power Engineering Facility, Plaintiff, after consulta-
tion with the State of Colorado, determined that the
amount of financial assurances are sufficient in light of
the estimated cost of the remaining work.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff and Defendants jointly move
that the Court:
A. Enter an order dismissing without prejudice all
Plaintiff’s and Defendants’ pending motions;
B. Modify in part the February 28, 2001 Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order and the March 7,
2001 Judgment to amend the amount of financial
assurances to be maintained by Defendant to be no less
than $1,324,102.00 as adjusted annually per Colo. Code
Regs. 1007-3 Part 266;
C. Order Defendants to maintain financial assur-
ances and third party liability insurance in accordance
with the Order and Judgment, as modified, for the
benefit of the CDPHE and the public and to review and
update the closure and post closure cost estimates,
financial assurances, and third-party liability insurance
annually on the Anniversary date pursuant to 6 Colo.
Code Regs. 1007-3 Part 266; and
D. Enter an order terminating this litigation subject
to the Court’s continuing jurisdiction over its Judg-
ment.
4a
Dated this 19th day of December, 2002.
Respectfully submitted,
Counsel For Plaintiff Counsel for Defendants
/s/ JOHN N.MOSCATO /s/ JOHN F.X.MCBRIDE _
JOHN N. MOSCATO JOHN F. X. MCBRIDE
Environmental Enforce- 2525S. Delaware Ave
ment Section Denver, Colorado 80223
Environment & Natural Telephone: (303) 733-7888
Resources Division
United States Department
of Justice
999 18th Street - Suite 945
Denver, Colorado 80202
Telephone: (303) 312-7346
5a
APPENDIX B
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COUR T FOR THE
DISTRICT OF COLORADO
LEWIS T. BABCOCK, CHIEF JUDGE
Civil Case No. 97-B-1654 (OES)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PLAINTIFF
Vv.
POWER ENGINEERING COMPANY, REDOUBT, LTD., AND
RICHARD J. LILIENTHAL, DEFENDANTS
ORDER
[Filed Dec. 23, 2002]
Upon joint motion to terminate litigation, filed
December 19, 2002,
IT IS ORDERED as follows:
1. This action is DISMISSED WITHOUT PRE-
JUDICE,
2. The February 28, 2001, Findings of Fact, Con-
clusions of Law, and Order and the March 7, 2001 J udg-
ment are modified to amend the amount of financial
assurances to be maintained by defendants to be no less
than $1,324,102.00 as adjusted annually per 6 Colo.
Code Regs. 1007-3 Part 266;
6a
3. The defendants are to maintain financial assur-
ances and third party liability insurance in accordance
with the Order and judgment, as modified, for the
benefit of the CDPHE and the public and to review and
update the closure and post closure cost estimates,
financial assurances, and third-party liability insurance
annually on the anniversary date pursuant to 6 Colo.
Code Regs. 1007-3 Part 266; and
4, This litigation is terminated subject to this court’s
continuing jurisdiction over the judgment.
DATED: December 20, 2002
BY THE COURT:
/s/ LEWIS T. BABCOCK
_ LEWIS T. BABCOCK
Chief Judge
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