Opposition Brief — Power Engineering Co. v. United States

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supreme Cot, U.o.

‘FLED

| APR 208

No. 02-1086 :

In the Supreme Court of the Bnited States

POWER ENGINEERING COMPANY, ET AL., PETITIONERS

Vv.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES IN OPPOSITION

THEODORE B. OLSON

Solicitor General

Counsel of Record

THOMAS L. SANSONETTI

Assistant Attorney General

GREER S. GOLDMAN

ROBERT H. OAKLEY

Attorneys

Department of Justice

Washington, D.C. 20530-0001

(202) 514-2217

QUESTION PRESENTED

The question presented, in a case in which petitioners

and the United States have settled the litigation with

no reservation of rights to appeal, is:

Whether the United States may bring an enforce-

ment action against petitioners under the Resource

Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA), 42

U.S.C. 6901 et seq., after the State of Colorado had

resolved a separate enforcement action under a feder-

ally authorized program that sought compliance with

different waste regulation requirements.

(I)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

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Statement ......... - bilesalchagiaeetigsisdanaisin 2

Argument ....... celnbiteiehiaeininnetinisianinasiiiian 9

TEE SERRE Aa eo ONE CO TNE 15

ASSESS SEE Net clin OO Ds AOE DO la

aE ITIIIIT TIE cexanedauchaicoudusiiaiaiaivepheaeinnniateaninnintiiaganbsmananiannianeniniemnendensn 5a

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

Affholder, Inc. v. Preston Carroll Co., 866 F.2d 881

SUIT AUTIE ic TUITIIIIED sichictniedinnehicnsuntstinsinshascsinistndinsindasiaiatisantennsieiasenesin 10

Arizonans for Official English v. dvtabin: 520 U.S.

Sr adi astinseeiennenevicnecbienitsicisinleacceiniaecenniiniscedainaaimssinninsnine 9

Church of Scientology v. United States, 506 U. S, 9

SIP TED Mecano srbatensinniesipisssiviniaienieesniehicbeiistaninanniesshatasinntsvinens 10

Drummond v. United States, 324 U.S. 316 (1945) ....... 7, 8,13

Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868 (1991) ..........0000 13

Harmon Indus. v. Browner, 191 F.3d 894 (8th Cir.

STUTTIEy nincissbinsinlineciieacsshcebbidehseheainniticleteeanniediseggedtclukdbahdnatidinsinnuninanneae 6, 7

International Union v. Dana Corp. .. 697 F.2d 718

NINE Graiisoueiesibsisnsendineisineeeidcenibiesciasasinacimatncmei 10

Lake Coal Co. v. Roberts & Schaefer Co., 474 US. 120

SINE (icteiinaSilecsienepttitliiehebihnasininiiatniehngheinictnnntnentensninintes 10

Massachusetts Trs. v. United States, 377 U.S. 235

STII i hahaa tetieltshaleteneenibholbuinduhsnetsouenbesinhoianinnnceanontpsases 14

Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147 (1979) ...........0.... 8,13

U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall P’ship,

I ici kctstriasiainoesiteabnleneagonitionsiaimweninn 10

United States v. MacDonald & Watson Waste Oil

Co., 933 F.2d 35 (1st Cir. 1991) 3

United States v. Power E'ng’g Co., 10 F. Supp. 2d 1165

(D. Colo. 1998), aff’d, 191 F.3d 1224 (10th Cir. 1999) ...... 5

(IIT)

IV

Cases—Continued: Page

United Techs. Corp. v. EPA, 821 F.2d 714 (D.C. Cir.

ROUIED sasscsiisilinsiatditntincigpsensensinnntnnnitnitiintanmeininnnnianunantionmannnan 2

Vela v. City of Houston, 276 F.3d 659 (5th Cir. 2001) ..... 10

Constitution, statutes, and regulations:

U.S. Const. Art. ITT, § 2 .......c..-sressccssssseservevesceccers 9

Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7401 et seq. 14

Clean Water Act of 1977, 33 U.S.C. 1251 et seq... 14

Resources Conversation and Recovery Act of 1976,

42 U.S.C. 6901 et seg. 2

42 U.S.C. 6902(A)(7) .....eeceeeseerseersees 4

42 U.S.C. 6902(b) 4

GB U.S.C, GORDI nereecsczcsceesscneserecsnsesensesnenceensensscssessones 2

42 U.S.C. 6922-6924 3

42 U.S.C. 6924(a) 3

42 U.S.C. 6924(t) 3

42 U.S.C. 6926(b) 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 12

42 U.S.C. 6926(e) 6

42 U.S.C. 6928 7,8

42 US.C. 6928(a) : 4,8, 12

UA, FD eieieeeeniitinnnienncans 11

42 U.S.C. 6928(A)(2) .....erecreeeseneesenesees 4,11

42 U.S.C. 6935(d)(1) 12

42 U.S.C. 6972(D)(1)(B) «...esssescsesenecrneenseenees 12

40 C.F.R.:

Pt. 264:

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Bh. FETE cccssusesensesnsiennenmnennanevintinenienniannensnnnscamanicenneenasnanetnsinttantion 3

6 Colo. Code Regs. Pt. 266 (2002) ....... 4

Miscellaneous:

Enforcement of Environmental Laws: Hearing Before

the Senate Comm. on Env’t and Public Works, 105th

Cong., Ist Sess. (1997) 14

Miscellaneous—Continued: Page

Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance,

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Pub.

No. 300-R-98-008, Enforcement and Compliance

Assurance Accomplishments FY 1997 (1998) .......:s:+s++ 14

OB Peed. Rem. SIGE CRRA) sniscessesercessinnsrnseeseniersennstvmesnsinnainninn 3

47 Ved. Beaae, ME OGT (RGGI scceencerensseccesnenesncncnincenimnennenannnceinne 3

GD Fad. Reap. 41006 (RGB) ceceecessercevevsessesesmrcseesccceinnnsnsnnnsensosnens 4

Jn the Supreme Court of the Gnited States

No. 02-1086

POWER ENGINEERING COMPANY, ET AL., PETITIONERS

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES IN OPPOSITION

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals is reported at 303

F.3d 1232 (Pet. App. B1-B16). The decision of the

district court is reported at 125 F. Supp. 2d 1050 (Pet.

App. C1-C44).

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on

September 4, 2002. On November 14, 2002, Justice

Breyer extended the time within which to file a petition

for a writ of certiorari to and including January 17,

2003, and the petition was filed on that date (Pet. App.

Al). The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28

U.S.C. 1254(1). Following the court of appeals’ issuance

of its mandate, the district court granted the parties’

joint motion to terminate the litigation. See App.,

(1)

2

infra, la-6a. The United States submits that the ques-

tion presented in the petition for a writ of certiorari

accordingly is moot. See pp. 9-11, infra.

STATEMENT

The United States brought an action against peti-

tioners under the Resource Conservation and Recovery

Act of 1976 (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. 6901 et seqg., to compel

petitioners to comply with RCRA’s financial assurance

requirements for hazardous waste facilities. Peti-

tioners contended that the United States was precluded

from bringing that action because the State of Colorado

had previously brought an enforcement action against

petitioners, seeking compliance with different hazard-

ous waste requirements. The district court rejected

petitioners’ argument and ultimately ruled that peti-

tioners were obligated to provide financial assurances

in the amount of $2,119,044. See Pet. App. C11-C33; id.

at B5. The court of appeals affirmed. Jd. at B1-B16.

Upon joint motion of the parties, the district court

reduced the amount of the financial assurances to

$1,324,102 and terminated the litigation, subject to the

district court’s continuing jurisdiction over petitioners’

financial assurance obligations. App., infra, la-6a.

1. Congress enacted RCRA to address serious

environmental and health dangers arising from the

generation, management, and disposal of solid waste.

Subtitle C of RCRA, 42 U.S.C. 6921-6939e, establishes

a “‘cradle to grave’ regulatory structure for overseeing

the safe treatment, storage and disposal of hazardous

waste.” United Techs. Corp. v. EPA, 821 F.2d 714, 716

(D.C. Cir. 1987). Subtitle C requires the Environmental

Protection Agency (EPA), which administers RCRA, to

develop a federal hazardous waste program, including

regulations that establish standards applicable to gen-

3

erators and transporters of hazardous waste, and

owners and operators of hazardous waste treatment,

storage, and disposal facilities. See 42 U.S.C. 6922-

6924.

In accordance with RCRA, EPA has promulgated

regulations requiring that owners and operators of haz-

ardous waste treatment, storage, and disposal facilities

satisfy financial requirements for closure costs, post-

closure costs, and third-party liability. See 42 U.S.C.

6924(a) and (t); 40 C.F.R. 264.140 et seg. Those regu-

lations ensure that the owner or operator of a facility

has secured funds to provide liability coverage until the

facility is finally closed and to cover the cost of closure

and post-closure care. EPA’s “financial assurance” re-

quirements protect the public from bearing those costs

at some later date. See, e.g., 46 Fed. Reg. 2821 (1981);

see also 47 Fed. Reg. 15,047 (1982).

RCRA further provides that EPA may authorize a

State to carry out a hazardous waste program “in lieu

of” the federal hazardous waste program. 42 U.S.C.

6926(b). To receive authorization, a State must estab-

lish a hazardous waste program that is equivalent to

and consistent with the federal program, and the State

must provide for adequate enforcement of the author-

ized requirements. 42 U.S.C. 6926(b); 40 C.F.R. Pt. 271.

Once EPA has authorized a State’s hazardous waste

program, the authorized State’s requirements, rather

than the equivalent federal requirements, become the

body of requirements that govern facilities within the

State. See, e.g., United States v. MacDonald & Watson

Waste Oil Co., 933 F.2d 35, 43-46 (1st Cir. 1991).

EPA’s authorization of state programs accomplishes

two principal goals: (1) the authorized state require-

ments replace the equivalent federal requirements

within the State, so that regulated entities need no

4

longer comply with a separate state hazardous waste

program as well as equivalent federal requirements (42

U.S.C. 6926(b)); and (2) the State’s authorized require-

ments become federally enforceable as requirements of

RCRA Subtitle C (see 42 U.S.C. 6928(a)(2)). Regard-

less of federal authorization, States may continue to

enforce the hazardous waste requirements in state stat-

utes and regulations using state enforcement authority.

RCRA encourages States to seek authorization of

state hazardous waste management programs. See 42

U.S.C. 6902(a)(7). At the same time, RCRA directs

EPA to ensure that hazardous wastes are managed

nationally in a consistent and effective manner. See 42

U.S.C. 6902(b). Thus, while States may assume pri-

mary responsibility for program administration, EPA

retains oversight responsibilities concerning the activi-

ties regulated under the authorized state programs.

RCRA also grants EPA independent authority to take

direct enforcement action against a violator of RCRA

requirements in a State with an authorized hazardous

waste program, so long as it informs the State before

taking action. 42 U.S.C. 6928(a).

On November 2, 1984, EPA authorized Colorado’s

hazardous waste program, which is now managed by

the Colorado Department of Public Health and Envi-

ronment (CDPHE). 49 Fed. Reg. 41,036 (1984). From

time to time, Colorado has sought and obtained from

EPA additional authorizations for revisions to its haz-

ardous waste program. Colorado’s federally authorized

financial responsibility regulations are equivalent to

and consistent with the federal regulations. See 6 Colo.

Code Regs. Pt. 266 (2002).

2. Since 1968, petitioners have operated a metal

refinishing and chrome electroplating business located

in Denver, Colorado. Pet. App. B4. Petitioners’ activi-

SSNS Me a een a a

5

ties produced 18 different waste streams and more than

1000 kilograms per month of hazardous waste. Ibid.

Nonetheless, petitioners failed to comply with federal

or state hazardous waste management requirements.

Ibid.

In August 1992, CDPHE received information that

chromium discharges traced to petitioners’ facility had

caused surface and groundwater contamination. See

Pet. App. B4. CDPHE’s inspections revealed that peti-

tioners were engaged in the unlawful treatment, stor-

age, and disposal of hazardous wastes. Ibid. CDPHE

issued a Final Administrative Compliance Order to

petitioners that identified numerous violations and re-

quired that petitioners remedy those violations. /bid.;

id. at C3-C5.

CDPHE’s order neither identified violations of, nor

directed compliance with, the RCRA-mandated finan-

cial assurance requirements. Pet. App. C5. The United

States asked CDPHE to enforce the financial assurance

requirements and informed CDPHE that, if it did not,

the United States would bring its own enforcement

action. Ibid. CDPHE failed to do so. Based on infor-

mation that petitioner Lilienthal was considering di-

vesting himself of his assets or leaving the country, the

United States filed an enforcement action against

petitioners in federal district court in Colorado, seeking

to compel petitioners to comply with the financial assur-

ance requirements and for other relief. Jbid. CDPHE

supported the United States’ effort to compel peti-

tioners to satisfy financial assurance requirements.

5/11/98 Prelim. Inj. Hr’g Tr. 33, 84. The United States

subsequently obtained a preliminary injunction requir-

ing petitioners to provide financial assurances. Pet.

App. C6; United States v. Power Eng’g Co., 10 F. Supp.

6

2d 1165 (D. Colo. 1998), aff’d, 191 F.3d 1224 (10th Cir.

1999).

Following the court of appeals’ affirmance of the

preliminary injunction, the United States dismissed all

of its claims against petitioners except the demand for

financial assurances. Pet. App. C8. On cross motions

for summary judgment, petitioners argued that the

United States’ enforcement action was barred by

CDPHE?’s prior enforcement action, citing Harmon In-

dustries v. Browner, 191 F.3d 894 (8th Cir. 1999).

The Eighth Circuit’s decision in Harmon (which is

reproduced at Pet. App. 11-119) affirmed a district court

ruling that a State’s settlement of an enforcement

action barred EPA from pursuing an ongoing EPA

administrative enforcement action addressing the same

violations. The Eighth Circuit stated that 42 U.S.C.

6926(b), which provides that EPA may authorize a state

hazardous waste program “in lieu of” the federal pro-

gram, also meant that state enforcement was “in lieu

of” federal enforcement. Harmon, 191 F.3d at 897-898.

The court recognized that RCRA expressly allows the

United States to file an enforcement action in an

authorized State, 42 U.S.C. 6928(a), but concluded that

“{hjarmonizing” this provision with Section 6926(b)

meant that EPA has a secondary enforcement role in

authorized States. Harmon, 191 F.3d at 899. Accord-

ing to the Eighth Circuit, that secondary role would

allow EPA to take action only if the State took none or,

in the alternative, to revoke federal authorization of the

State’s program pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 6926(e). 191

F.3d at 899. The Eighth Circuit also held that Section

6926(b) created a relationship of privity between EPA

and the State and concluded that res judicata therefore

barred the EPA action. Jd. at 902-904.

7

The district court in this case rejected the conclusion

reached in Harmon that Section 6926(b) limits federal

enforcement in authorized States, noting that Section

6926(b) “primarily addresses the administration and

enforcement of state regulations by authorized states,

[while] Section 6928 concerns the federal enforcement

of such regulations.” Pet. App. C17. The district court

concluded that “there is no reason to impose restric-

tions on federal authority [to enforce RCRA] not found

explicitly in the statute.” Jd. at C18.

The district court also rejected Harmon’s reasoning |

respecting the res judicata effect of a state enforcement |

action. Pet. App. C30-C33. The district court observed |

that this Court has held that the United States is bound |

by the results of a suit to which it was not a party only |

when it has “a laboring oar in a controversy.” Id. at |

C30 (quoting Drummond v. United States, 324 U.S. |

316, 318 (1945)). The district court declined to adopt the

Eighth Circuit’s conclusion that EPA effectively pulled

the “laboring oar” by authorizing the state hazardous

waste program. Id. at C31-C32 (citing Harmon, 191

F.3d at 904).

Accordingly, the district court denied petitioners’

motion for summary judgment and, instead, concluded

that petitioners were in violation of RCRA for their

failure to provide financial assurances. Pet. App. C42-

C44, The district court subsequently held a trial on the

outstanding factual issues and ultimately concluded

that petitioners were obligated to provide financial

assurances in the amount of $2,119,044. Jd. at B5.

3. The court of appeals affirmed the district court’s

judgment. Pet. App. B1-B16. The court of appeals con-

cluded that RCRA allows the United States to bring its

own enforcement action in an authorized State despite a

prior state enforcement action. Jd. at B5-B13. The

Se

8

court stated that petitioners’ contrary argument “con-

tradicts the plain language of section 6928,” which

expressly authorizes the United States to bring an

enforcement action in an authorized State. Jd. at B13.

The court of appeals reasoned that Section 6926(b)

distinguishes between adopting and implementing a

hazardous waste program and enforcing requirements

under that program. Congress authorized a State to

carry out the state program “in lieu of’ the federal

program, 42 U.S.C. 6926(b), but it expressly preserved,

through Sections 6926(b) and 6928(a), the United

States’ power to enforce the elements of the state pro-

gram, provided that the United States gives advance

notice of the federal enforcement action, 42 U.S.C. 6928.

See Pet. App. B9. The court of appeals further con-

cluded that the Eighth Circuit’s construction in Har-

mon went “well beyond the plain language of the

statute” and imposed limitations on EPA’s enforcement

authority not found in Section 6928(a). Jd. at B10. The

court of appeals accordingly embraced EPA’s construc-

tion, concluding that “EPA’s interpretation of RCRA

has substantial support in the text of the statute and is

therefore a reasonable interpretation of the statute.”

Id. at B13.

The court of appeals also concluded that the United

States was not bound by res judicata as a result of the

CDPHE enforcement action against petitioners. Pet.

App. B13-B15. Citing Montana v. United States, 440

U.S. 147, 153 (1979), and Drummond, supra, it con-

cluded that the United States could not be bound by the

results of the CDPHE suit because the United States '

was neither a party in that suit nor exercised control

over the litigation. Pet. App. B14-B15 (citing Drum- )

mond, 324 U.S. at 316, and Montana, 440 U.S. at 154-

155).

9

4, Following the court of appeals’ decision, the

parties entered into settlement negotiations. After the

court of appeals issued its mandate, the-parties filed a

“Joint Motion and Memorandum to Terminate Litiga-

tion” with the district court. App., infra, la-4a. That

motion asked the district court to modify its judgment

to reduce petitioners’ financial assurances obligation

from $2,229,044 to $1,824,102. Jd. at 3a. The joint

motion also asked the district court to dismiss all other

pending motions of the parties and to “(eJnter an order

terminating this litigation subject to the Court’s

continuing jurisdiction over its Judgment.” Ibid. The

joint motion contains no reservation by petitioners of

the right to appeal any issue in this case. On December

20, 2002, the district court issued an order granting the

joint motion. Jd. at 5a-6a.

ARGUMENT

This Court should deny the petition for a writ of

certiorari because the district court has issued an order

terminating the litigation and rendering the question

presented moot. Moreover, notwithstanding peti-

tioners’ claim that the court of appeals’ decision con-

flicts with a decision of the Eighth Circuit, there is no

current need for this Court to address the issue because

the decision in this case is correct, and the issue is

unlikely to recur with sufficient frequercy to call for

this Court’s review.

1. This Court exercises its jurisdiction only over live

cases or controversies. U.S. Const. Art. III, § 2. See,

e.g., Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520

U.S. 48, 67 (1997) (“[A]n actual controversy must be

extant at all stages of review.”). A federal court—

including this Court—has no authority to “give opinions

- upon moot questions or abstract propositions, or to

10

declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect

the matter in issue in the case before it.” Church of

Scientology v. United States, 506 U.S. 9, 12 (1992). Con-

sequently, neither this Court nor the courts of appeals

undertake review on the merits in cases that are settled

during the course of appellate proceedings. See, e.g,

U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partner-

ship, 513 U.S. 18, 28 (1994); Lake Coal Co. v. Roberts &

Schaefer Co., 474 U.S. 120 (1985) (per curiam) (denying

motion of parties requesting a decision on issues

presented in a petition for writ of certiorari after the

parties settled the case); Vela v. City of Houston, 276

F.3d 659, 682 (5th Cir. 2001) (“We have repeatedly

recognized that settlement between the parties renders

an appeal moot and requires dismissal of the issues that

have been settled.”); Affholder, Inc. v. Preston Carroll

Co., 866 F.2d 881, 885 (6th Cir. 1989) (“Settlement of a

claim before a final adjudication moots the claim and

deprives the federal judiciary of jurisdiction over the

claim.”); International Union v. Dana Corp., 697 F.2d

718, 719 (6th Cir. 1983) (dismissing as moot a case that

settled while on appeal).

The Joint Motion and Memorandum to Terminate

Litigation, signed by counsel for each of the parties,

constituted an agreement to settle the case. It pre-

scribed the amount of financial assurances to be pro-

vided by petitioners; it requested the district court to

modify the judgment amount to conform to that lower

amount; and it asked the court to enter an order ter-

minating the litigation. See App., infra, la-4a. The

district court granted the motion in full, modifying the

judgment as requested by the parties and terminating

the action. Id. at 5a-6a.

The district court’s order accordingly renders the

question presented in this case moot. By virtue of the

eee

11

Joint Motion and Memorandum to Terminate Litiga-

tion, petitioners agreed to be obligated to provide finan-

cial assurances in the agreed amount. The district court

retained only “continuing jurisdiction over the judg-

ment,” App., infra, 6a, which preserved the district

court’s authority to ensure that petitioners’ fulfilled

their obligations under the judgment. Neither the joint

motion nor the district court’s order contained a

reservation of a right to appeal any issue in this case,

and no appeal, in fact, has been taken from the district

court’s modified judgment. Accordingly, there is no

longer any controversy and the case is moot.

2. In any event, the court of appeals’ decision is cor-

rect. Section 6928(a)(1) of RCRA authorizes the United

States to take enforcement action if EPA determines

that “any person has violated or is in violation of any

requirement” of RCRA. 42 U.S.C. 6928(a)(1). Section

6928(a)(2) expressly addresses “the case of a violation of

any requirement of [RCRA] where such violation

occurs in a State which is authorized to carry out a

hazardous waste program under section 6926 of this

title.” 42 U.S.C. 6928(a)(2). In that situation, EPA

shall give notice to the State in which such violation

has occurred prior to issuing an order or com-

mencing a civil action under this section.

Ibid. Thus, the United States plainly retains the right

to bring an enforcement action in an authorized State, —

subject only to the condition that it first give notice. If

Congress had wanted to impose additional conditions or

limitations on the United States’ enforcement author-

ity, it would have placed those restrictions, along with

the notice-requirement, in Section 6928(a)(2). For

example, Congress has authorized private citizens to

bring RCRA enforcement actions, but, in the same

12

provision authorizing citizen suits, Congress has

specifically disallowed citizen action in those instances

in which the “State has commenced and is diligently

prosecuting a civil or criminal action.” 42 U.S.C.

6972(b)(1)(B). Congress’s failure to place a similar

limitation on federal enforcement actions demonstrates

that Congress did not wish to preclude federal enforce-

ment actions seeking relief that the State has declined

to pursue.

Petitioners argue at length that federal enforcement

actions would “usurp” a State’s enforcement role, Pet.

15-22, but petitioners’ sole statutory basis for urging

that RCRA precludes the federal enforeement action at

issue here is Section 6926(b), which provides that a

State that receives federal authorization to administer

a hazardous waste program under RCRA is authorized

to carry out such program “in lieu of the Federal

program.” 42 U.S.C. 6926(b). That Section, however,

does not address, much less preclude exercise of, the

federal government’s enforcement power under Section

6928(a). Rather, Section 6926(b) provides that an

authorized State

is authorized to carry out such program in lieu of the

Federal program under this subchapter in such

State and to issue and enforce permits for the stor-

age, treatment, or disposal of hazardous waste (and

to enforce permits deemed to have been issued

under section 6935(d)(1) of this title) * * *.

42 U.S.C. 6926(b) (emphasis added). As the district

court and court of appeals pointed out, RCRA refers

separately to a State’s carrying out its authorized haz-

ardous waste program “in lieu of” the federal program

and to a State’s exercise of enforcement powers that

necessarily co-exist with the federal enforcement

iii ilies

13

powers set out in Section 6928(a). Pet. App. B8-B9,

C16-C18. Section 6926(b) plainly does not provide that

a State enforces its program “in lieu of” federal enforce-

ment, and Section 6926(b) cannot sensibly be read to

displace the federal government’s express enforcement

powers. Ibid. See Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S.

868, 877 (1991) (Statutory interpretations that “render

superfluous other provisions in the same enactment”

are disfavored.).

The court of appeals also correctly concluded that the

United States could not be barred from bringing its

own enforcement suit by principles of res judicata. As

this Court made clear in Montana, 440 U.S. at 155, and

Drummond, 324 U.S. at 318, the United States cannot

be subjected to the bar of res judicata if the United

States neither was a party to nor assumed control

of the prior litigation. Petitioners point to no evidence

that the United States assumed control of the

CDPHE’s enforcement action. Indeed, any claim that

the United States controlled the state action is

particularly far-fetched where CDPHE declined EPA’s

request to seek financial assurances from petitioners.

Pet. App. B5.

3. Petitioners claim that the court of appeals’ deci-

sion in this case conflicts with the Eighth Circuit’s deci-

sion in Harmon, but even if that is so, there is no need

for this Court to resolve that asserted conflict at this

time. The United States rarely undertakes RCRA

enforcement actions against a party if an authorized

State has previously brought its own enforcement ac-

tion. Indeed, although Congress enacted RCRA in

1976, no court of appeals had occasion to address the

issue until Harmon, which was decided in 1999. The

Tenth Circuit’s decision in this case is the only other

14

court of appeals decision that squarely addresses the

issue presented here.

The issue is not likely to recur with significant

frequency. As EPA has explained to Congress, it is

unusual for the federal government to undertake

enforcement action in the wake of a state enforcement

action under any of three major federal environmental

statutes—the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 1251 et seq.,

the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7401 et seg., and RCRA.

See Enforcement of Environmental Laws: Hearing

Before the Senate Comm. on Environment and Public

Works, 105th Cong., Ist Sess. 156-162 (1997) (Hearing)

(statement of Steven A. Herman, Assistant Admin-

istrator, Office of Enforcement and Compliance, EPA).

For example, during fiscal years 1992 through 1996,

the States brought 50,856 enforcement actions under

those three major environmental programs. See Office

of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance, U.S. Envi-

ronmental Protection Agency, Pub. No. 300-R-98-008,

Enforcement and Compliance Assurance Accomplish-

ments FY 1997, at 2-1, tbl. A-6 (1998). Yet, during fiscal

years 1992 through 1994, the federal government

brought an enforcement action after the conclusion of a

state enforcement action in only 30 instances under all

three statutes combined. Hearing 161. During fiscal

years 1994 and 1995, EPA brought such actions in a

total of 18 cases. Jd. at 162. During fiscal year 1996,

EPA filed its own actions following a state action in

four cases. Ibid.

Accordingly, there is no reason to believe that “a

considerable number of suits are pending in the lower

courts which will turn on resolution of these issues.”

Massachusetts Trustees v. United States, 377 U.S. 235,

237 (1964). It is conceivable that the issue presented

here might eventually merit this Court’s examination.

| _

15

But there is no warrant for review at this time,

particularly in a case that is moot.

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.

Respectfully submitted.

THEODORE B. OLSON

Solicitor General

THOMAS L. SANSONETTI

Assistant Attorney General

GREER S. GOLDMAN

ROBERT H. OAKLEY

Attorneys

APRIL 2003

APPENDIX A

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

DISTRICT OF COLORADO

Civil Action No. 97-B-1654

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PLAINTIFF

Vv.

POWER ENGINEERING COMPANY, REDOUBT, LTD., AND

RICHARD J. LILIENTHAL, DEFENDANTS

JOINT MOTION AND MEMORANDUM TO

TERMINATE LITIGATION

[Filed Dec. 19, 2002]

Plaintiff, the United States and Defendants, Power

Engineering Company, Redoubt Ltd., and Richard J.

Lilienthal, respectfully hereby submit this joint motion

and-memorandum to terminate the above captioned

litigation to the Court. Plaintiff and Defendants state

as follows: :

1. On February 28, 2001 the Court entered Findings

of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order directing that:

Defendants provide $2,119,044 in financial assur-

ances within 60 days of the date of this Order in the

form of surety bond guaranteeing payment into a

closure or post closure trust fund or in any other

(la)

2a

form acceptable to the plaintiff and specified in Part

266 [6 Colo. Code Regs. 1007-3 Part 266]; and

Obtain liability coverage for sudden accidental

occurrences in the amount of at least $1 million per

occurrence with annual aggregate of at least $2

million exclusive of legal defense costs;

2. On March 7, 2001 the February 28, 2001 Order

was reduced to a Judgment;

3. On April 26, 2001 Defendants took appeal from

that Judgment. On Septembex 4, 2002, in United States

of America, v. Power Engineering Company; Redoubt,

Ltd.; and Richard J. Lilienthal, 303 F.3d 1232 (10th Cir.

2002), the Tenth Circuit affirmed the rulings of the

District Court;

4. On October 15, 2002 (hereafter “Anniversary”)

Defendants submitted to Plaintiff and the State of

Colorado an updated closure and post closure cost

estimate in the amount of $1,132,164.00 for the work

required at the Power Engineering Facility to respond

to the Colorado Department of Health and the Envi-

ronment’s (“CDPHE”) Compliance Order No. 94-07-29-

01(Final). Plaintiff, in consultation with the State of

Colorado, reviewed that estimate and found it to be

satisfactory; and

5. On October 15, 2002, Defendants submitted to

Plaintiff and the State of Colorado documents evidenc-

ing a financial assurances trust maintained by Defen-

dants for the benefit of the CDPHE in the amount of

$1,324,102.00 and documents evidencing third party

liability coverage. Plaintiff, in consultation with the

State of Colorado, reviewed those documents and found

deficiencies. Defendants have agreed to seek the

changes necessary to conform to the regulatory re-

3a

quirements and are currently working to that end with

their bank trustee and insurance carrier. In light of the

updated cost estimate for the work to be completed

under Compliance Order No. 94-07-29-01(Final) at the

Power Engineering Facility, Plaintiff, after consulta-

tion with the State of Colorado, determined that the

amount of financial assurances are sufficient in light of

the estimated cost of the remaining work.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff and Defendants jointly move

that the Court:

A. Enter an order dismissing without prejudice all

Plaintiff’s and Defendants’ pending motions;

B. Modify in part the February 28, 2001 Findings of

Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order and the March 7,

2001 Judgment to amend the amount of financial

assurances to be maintained by Defendant to be no less

than $1,324,102.00 as adjusted annually per Colo. Code

Regs. 1007-3 Part 266;

C. Order Defendants to maintain financial assur-

ances and third party liability insurance in accordance

with the Order and Judgment, as modified, for the

benefit of the CDPHE and the public and to review and

update the closure and post closure cost estimates,

financial assurances, and third-party liability insurance

annually on the Anniversary date pursuant to 6 Colo.

Code Regs. 1007-3 Part 266; and

D. Enter an order terminating this litigation subject

to the Court’s continuing jurisdiction over its Judg-

ment.

4a

Dated this 19th day of December, 2002.

Respectfully submitted,

Counsel For Plaintiff Counsel for Defendants

/s/ JOHN N.MOSCATO /s/ JOHN F.X.MCBRIDE _

JOHN N. MOSCATO JOHN F. X. MCBRIDE

Environmental Enforce- 2525S. Delaware Ave

ment Section Denver, Colorado 80223

Environment & Natural Telephone: (303) 733-7888

Resources Division

United States Department

of Justice

999 18th Street - Suite 945

Denver, Colorado 80202

Telephone: (303) 312-7346

5a

APPENDIX B

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COUR T FOR THE

DISTRICT OF COLORADO

LEWIS T. BABCOCK, CHIEF JUDGE

Civil Case No. 97-B-1654 (OES)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PLAINTIFF

Vv.

POWER ENGINEERING COMPANY, REDOUBT, LTD., AND

RICHARD J. LILIENTHAL, DEFENDANTS

ORDER

[Filed Dec. 23, 2002]

Upon joint motion to terminate litigation, filed

December 19, 2002,

IT IS ORDERED as follows:

1. This action is DISMISSED WITHOUT PRE-

JUDICE,

2. The February 28, 2001, Findings of Fact, Con-

clusions of Law, and Order and the March 7, 2001 J udg-

ment are modified to amend the amount of financial

assurances to be maintained by defendants to be no less

than $1,324,102.00 as adjusted annually per 6 Colo.

Code Regs. 1007-3 Part 266;

6a

3. The defendants are to maintain financial assur-

ances and third party liability insurance in accordance

with the Order and judgment, as modified, for the

benefit of the CDPHE and the public and to review and

update the closure and post closure cost estimates,

financial assurances, and third-party liability insurance

annually on the anniversary date pursuant to 6 Colo.

Code Regs. 1007-3 Part 266; and

4, This litigation is terminated subject to this court’s

continuing jurisdiction over the judgment.

DATED: December 20, 2002

BY THE COURT:

/s/ LEWIS T. BABCOCK

_ LEWIS T. BABCOCK

Chief Judge

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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