Appendix — Nova Chemicals Inc. v. Adams

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COURT OF APPEAL OF LOUISIANA

FOURTH CIRCUIT

In re NEW ORLEANS TRAIN CAR LEAKAGE FIRE

LITIGATION

No. 2000-CA-0479

June 27, 2001

This is a class action. It arises out of a chemical leak and

fire involving a railroad tank car. After a two-phase trial,

the jury found all defendants liable for compensatory

damages and several defendants liable for punitive damages.

The quantum of compensatory damages was determined as

to each of twenty selected plaintiffs. The quantum of

punitive damages was determined as to each of the several

defendants found liable for punitive Ccamages. All but three

of the defendants settled. The three non-settling defendants

bring the present appeal.

Defendant-appellant CSX Transportation, Inc. (“CSX”)

was held liable for 15% of the compensatory damages and

was held liable for punitive damages. Defendant-appellant

AMF-BRD, Inc. (“AMF-BRD”) was held liable for 5% of the

compensatory damages but was not held liable for punitive

damages. Defendant-appellant Nova Chemicals, Inc.

(“Polysar”) was held liable for 5% of the compensatory

damages but was not held liable for punitive damages.

AMF-BRD and Polysar appeal as to liability for

compensatory damages. AMF-BRD, Polysar and CSX all

appeal as to the quantum of compensatory damages. CSX

appeals as to liability for, and quantum of, punitive damages.

The plaintiffs have answered these appeals and seek

additional damages and prejudgment interest on punitive

damages. For the reasons given below, we affirm the

judgment of the trial court. Additionally, we remand this

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| 2a

| case to the trial court for proceedings as to the quantum of

compensatory damages with respect to the remaining class

members and for any other proceedings as are necessary to

| conclude this action.

On September 9, 1987, a pressurized railroad tank car

which was loaded with butadiene (“GATX 55996”) was

parked on the interchange tracks of CSX in a residential

area, Gentilly, of New Orleans. At about 1:50 a.m., GATX

55996 leaked and ignited. Butadiene is a carcinogenic

hazardous chemical. It is flammable and also volatile, so that

it can explode. The chemicals produced by burning

butadiene include several carcinogenic hazardous chemicals.

The butadiene leaked from.GATX 55996 as a heavier-than-

air gas so, as it leaked from GATX 55996, it spread out along

the ground to the surrounding residential areas. Eventually,

the butadiene reached an ignition source, possibly the hot

water heater of a home, ignited, and flashed back to GATX

| 55996, which itself ignited. Five other pressurized tank cars

loaded with butadiene were coupled to the now-flaming

GATX 55996.

GATX 55996 burned for two days and, throughout that

time, butadiene and the products of burning butadiene were

carried by the wind, and deposited as soot, throughout the

surrounding residential area. There was a danger that

GATX 55996 might either explode, possibly destroying a

number of city blocks, or even take off like a missile and

travel as far as a mile through the surrounding residential

area. There also was a danger that the fire might spread

from GATX 55996 to the other five pressurized tank cars of

butadiene to which'GATX 55996 was coupled. Such a spread

of the fire would result in further hazardous chemical release

and further danger of explosions.

The neighborhood around the fire was evacuated. As it

turned out, GATX 55996 did not explode (although some of

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the released butadiene did explode) and, after two days, the

fire burned itself out. Also, the other five pressurized tank

cars loaded with butadiene were successfully uncoupled and

moved away from GATX 55996, so the fire never did spread

to those five tank cars. After the fire burned itself out, the

people of the Surrounding areas were allowed to return

home.

Class action suits were filed against nine defendants

which, after some corporate name changes, are now known

as: The Alabama Great Southern Railroad Company

(“AGS”), AMF-BRD, Inc. (“AMF-BRD”), CSx

Transportation Inc. (“CSX”), GATX Terminals Corporation

(“GATX”), General American Transportation Corporation

(“GATC”), Illinois Central Railroad Company (“Illinois

Central”), Mitsui & Company (U.S.A.), Ine. (“Mitsui”), Nova

Chemicals, Inc. (“Polysar”), and Phillips Petroleum Company

(“Phillips”). The plaintiffs sought not only compensatory

damages, but also punitive damages under Article 2315.3 of

the Civil Code; because the butadiene leak and fire involved

a hazardous or toxic substance. The roles of the nine

defendants are, briefly and generally described, as follows:

AMF-BRD manufactured the pressurized tank which was

installed in GATX 55996. The installation of the tank, and

the overall assembly of GATX 55996, was done by non-party

North American Car Corporation (“NACC”), which is now

out of business. The pressurized tank on GATX 55996 which

was manufactured by AMF-BRD had a “manway” (an

opening through which the car is cleaned) on the bottom.

The bottom manway was sealed using an asbestos gasket.

NACC sold GATX 55996 to Phillips. During the course of

apparently routine maintenance, Phillips replaced the

asbestos gasket with a rubber gasket. Butadiene can react

with a rubber gasket causing a leak. Also, Phillips

misaligned the rubber gasket and this; too, could cause a

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leak. Phillips then sold GATX 55996 to GATC. GATC

labeled GATX 55996 as a butadiene tank car and owned

GATX 55996 at the time of the butadiene leak and fire at

issue. At the time of the butadiene leak, GATX 55996 was

leased by GATC to Mitsui. On September 4, 1987, five days

before the butadiene leak and fire, GATX, which is an

affiliate of GATC, loaded GATX 55996 with butadiene at

GATX’s Good Hope, Louisiana terminal. The butadiene was

owned by Polysar and was being shipped to a Polysar plant

in Chattanooga, Tennessee. Polysar bought the butadiene

overseas and arranged for it to be brought by ship to

Louisiana and then off loaded to rail tank cars at GATX’s

Good Hope terminal. Polysar did not send anyone to Good

Hope to inspect the rail tank cars or observe their loading.

On September 5, 1987, Illinois Central, at GATX’s Good

Hope terminal, put GATX 55996 into a train with other

butadiene tank cars and transported it to an Illinois Central

train yard. Illinois Central then moved GATX 55996 to

interchange tracks where Illinois Central and AGS exchange

railroad cars. (An “interchange” is an area of track where

one railroad leaves rail cars for another railroad.) AGS then

moved GATX 55996 to CSX’s interchange tracks in Gentilly.

AGS delivered GATX 55996 and some other rail cars to CSX,

and notified CSX’s employees to pick up GATX 55996 and

the other rail cars, at about 7:25 p.m. on September 8, 1987.

GATX 55996 remained on CSX’s interchange tracks for over

six-and-a-half hours until the fire broke out.

Another panel of this court affirmed the trial court’s

certification of a class. See Adams v. CSX Railroads, 615

So.2d 476 (La.App. 4th Cir.1993). Later, on defense writ

applications, another panel of this court reversed the trial

court’s denials of motions for summary judgment with

respect to punitive damages, and granted summary

judgment with respect to punitive damages, as to defendants

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AMF-BRD, Phillips and GATC, but affirmed the trial court’s

denials of motions for summary judgment by other

defendants with respect to punitive damages. In re New

Orleans Train Car Leakage Fire Litigation, 95- 27 10, 95-

2721, 96-0016, 95-2734, 95-2811, 96-0017, 95-2797, 96-0015 (La.

App 4 Cir. 3/20/96), 671 So.2d 540, writ denied, 96-0972, 96-

0984, 96-1287, 96-0977, 96-1311, 96-0978 (La.6/28/96), 675

So.2d 1120-22, cert denied, 519 U.S. 1009, 117 S.Ct. 512, 136

L.Ed.2d 402 (1996). Just prior to trial, the Louisiana

Supreme Court, on defense writ applications, ruled that the

jury should not be instructed to determine the amount of

punitive damages (if any) by applying a multiplier to the

amount of compensatory damages. In re New Orleans Train

Car Leakage Fire Litigation, 97-1150, 97-1161 (La.6/27/97),

697 So.2d 239.

In the first phase of the trial, the jury determined

liability for compensatory damages, quantum of

compensatory damages as to twenty plaintiffs (ten selected

by plaintiffs’ counsel and ten selected by defense counsel)

and liability for punitive damages (but not quantum of

punitive damages). The jury found all nine defendants liable

for compensatory damages and fixed varying amounts of

compensatory damages for each of the twenty selected

plaintiffs. Defendant-appellant CSX was assessed 15% of the

liability for compensatory damages while defendant-

appellants AMF-BRD and Polysar were each assessed 5% of

the liability for compensatory damages. The jury found five

of the defendants liable for punitive damages—CSX, AGS,

GATX, Illinois Central and Mitsui. In the second phase of

the trial, the jury determined the amounts of punitive

damages—$2.5 billion as to CSX, and a total of $865 million

in varying amounts against GATC, AGS, Mitsui and Illinois

Central.

6a

On September 25, 1997, the trial court rendered a

judgment in accordance with the jury’s verdicts which

judgment assessed liability for compensatory damages,

assessed liability for punitive damages, awarded

compensatory damages to the twenty selected plaintiffs and

awarded punitive damages “payable to class members who

now or hereafter are awarded compensatory damages....”

Subsequently, upon a CSX writ application, the Louisiana

Supreme Court ruled that “the trial court erred in rendering

a judgment awarding damages prior to rendering a

judgment adjudicating all liability issues”. In re New

Orleans Train Car Leakage Litigation, 97-2547

(La.10/13/97), 702 So.2d 677. The trial court then, on June 17,

1998, rendered a judgment that awarded neither

compensatory damages nor punitive damages.

Subsequently, upon defense writ applications and a plaintiff's

motion for clarification, the Louisiana Supreme Court held

that the trial court should “enter judgment in favor of the

twenty phase I plaintiffs on the issue of liability, allocation of

fault and damages, both compensatory and exemplary” and

designate that judgment as final “for purposes of post-trial

motions and appellate review”. In re New Orleans Train

Car Leakage Litigation, 98-2399, 98-2622 (La. 2/24/99), 728

So.2d 853.

On April 8, 1999, the trial court rendered a judgment as

directed by the Supreme Court. All of the defendants filed

post-judgment motions. Those post-trial motions raised

issues as to liability for compensatory damages, quantum of

compensatory damages, liability for punitive damages and

quantum of punitive damages. Prior to the trial court’s

ruling upon those defense post- judgment motions, six of the

defendants, AGS, GATX, GATC, Illinois Central, Mitsui and

Phillips, settled. Thus, as of the time of the trial court’s

decision of the post-judgment motions, the three remaining

é Ta

defendants were CSX, AMF-BRD and Polysar and, of those

three, only CSX was Subject to a judgment for punitive

damages. On November 5, 1999, the trial court rendered

reasons for judgment on the post-judgment motions and: (1)

upheld the determination of liability for compensatory

damages: (2) set aside the awards of compensatory damages

as to every one of the twenty selected plaintiffs and awarded

lower compensatory damages to each of the twenty selected

plaintiffs; (8) upheld the determination of CSX’s liability for

punitive damages and (4) reduced the quantum of punitive

damages imposed upon CSX from $2.5 billion to $850 million.

The trial court also held that interest would run on

compensatory damages from the date of judicial demand and

interest would run upon punitive damages from the date of

signing of judgment. On November 17, 1999, the trial court

rendered a judgment in accordance with its November 5,

1999 reasons for judgment. With respect to punitive

damages, the trial court allocated small fractions of the $850

million awarded to the twenty selected plaintiffs (using a

formula proposed by CSX and the plaintiffs and agreed to by

the trial court) which totaled about $2.1 million and, as to the

remainder of the punitive damages award, held that it should

be paid into escrow and allocated to the remaining 8,000 +

class members in accordance with further proceedings. The

trial court certified its judgment for immediate appeal.

CSX, AMF-BRD and Polysar appeal the trial court’s

November 17, 1999 judgment and the plaintiffs have

answered that appeal.

CSX’s Appeal As To

Punitive Damages

CSX argues on appeal that the punitive damages

judgment against it should be reversed, vacated or reduced

to no more than $1 million. CSX advances four arguments.

8a

g First, CSX argues that its conduct was not sufficiently

egregious to warrant the imposition of punitive damages.

| Article 2315.3 of the Civil Code, at the time of the chemical

| leak and fire, provided that:

In addition to general and special damages,

exemplary damages may be awarded, if it is

proved that plaintiffs injuries were caused by

the defendant’s wanton or reckless disregard

for public safety in the storage, handling, or

transportation of hazardous or _ toxic

substances. (emphasis added).

The leading case on liability under Article 2315.3 is Billiot v.

BP Oil Co., 98-1118 (La.9/29/94), 645 So.2d 604. In Billiot,

the Supreme Court stated the purposes of Article 2315.3

thus:

Accordingly, we conclude that the purpose of

Article 2315.3 is threefold: (1) to penalize and

punish defendants for engaging in wanton or

reckless disregard for public safety in the

storage, handling, or transportation of

| hazardous or toxic substances that causes

| injury to others; (2) to deter the tortfeasor

and others who might follow their example

from exposing the public to dangers of that

kind in the future; and (3) to provide victims

injured by such conduct with the incentive to

act as the prosecutors of penal laws against

such wrongdoers. Article 23153 is not

designed to repair the injuries of tort victims.

645 So.2d at 612-13.

The Supreme Court’s Billiot decision also identifies four

elements of a cause of action under Article 2315.3:

9a

In establishing the Separate and distinct right

to seek the exemplary or punitive award,

however, the introductory clause of Article

2315.3 does not relieve the plaintiff of the

burden of proving the basic factual elements

of a tort case. To the contrary, Article 2315.3

itself, by its narrow authorization of punitive

damages awards under special circumstances,

imposes a more onerous proof requirement

than plaintiffs face in ordinary negligence

cases. In order to obtain an award of

exemplary or punitive damages, the plaintiff

first must prove that the defendant’s conduct

was wanton or reckless. In practice, this

standard obliges the plaintiff to prove at least

that the defendant proceeded in disregard of a

high and excessive degree of danger, either

known to him or apparent to a reasonable

person in his position. Prosser & Keeton,

supra, § 34, at 213-14. In other words, the

“wanton” or “reckless” conduct that must be

proved is highly unreasonable conduct,

involving an extreme departure from ordinary

care, in a situation where a high degree of

danger is apparent. Id. at 214; see also

Griffin v. Tenneco Oil Co., 531 So.2d 498, 501

(La.App. 4 Cir.1988) (quoting Cates v.

Beauregard Electric Cooperative, Inc., 316

So.2d 907, 918 (La.App. 3 Cir.1975)). Second,

the plaintiff must show that the danger

created by the defendant’s wanton or reckless

conduct threatened or endangered the public

safety. Third, the statute requires proof that

the defendant’s wanton or reckless conduct

10a

occurred in the storage, handling or

transportation of hazardous or _ toxic

substances. Finally, the plaintiff is required

to prove that his or her injury was caused by

the defendant’s wanton or reckless conduct

consisting of all of these elements.

645 So.2d at 613. See also Gaspard v. Orleans Parish School

Board, 96-1754 (La.App. 4 Cir. 2/5/97), 688 So.2d 1298."

| It is clear from Billiot that liability under Article 2315.3

| does not require any intentional wrong. Instead, the degree

of culpability required under Article 2315.3 and Billiot

“fall[s] somewhere between simple negligence and

intentional wrong doing”. Griffin v. Tenneco Oil Co., 625

So.2d 1090, 1091 (La.App. 4th Cir.1993), writ denied, €31

So.2d 449 (La.1994). The requisite conduct is, in effect,

“gross negligence”. Id. See Sharp v. Daigre, 555 So.2d 1361,

1364 n. 10 (La.1990) (“Wanton negligence is still

negligence[.]”).

We review the jury’s determination of liability for

punitive damages under the clearly wrong-manifestly

erroneous standard of review. See Dekeyser v. Automotive

Cas. Ins. Co., 97-1251 (La.App. 4th Cir 2/4/98), 706 So.2d 676,

684 (discussing punitive damages under Article 2315.4).

Thus, we may not set aside the jury’s finding if it is one as to

which reasonable minds could differ. See, e.g., Stobart v.

State Through DOTD, 617 So2d 880 (La.1993). The

question is not whether we, as an initial matter, would make

the same finding as did the jury on the issue of liability for

! The Billiot opinion’s reference to “a more onerous proof requirement”

refers to the four elements that need to be shown rather than to the

evidentiary burden of proof. Rivera v. United Gas Pipeline Co., 96-502,

96-508, 97-161 (La.App. 5th Cir 6/30/97), 697 So.2d $27, 834-35. The usual

“preponderance of the evidence” standard applies to claims under Article

2315.3. Id.

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lla

punitive damages but, instead, whether, in light of the record

as a whole, the jury’s finding was unreasonable. Id. This is a

function of the allocation of responsibility between the finder

of fact and the appellate court.

It is undisputed that, from the time GATX 55996 and the

other five pressurized butadiene tank cars were left at CSX’s

interchange by AGS, about six and one-half hours passed

before the leaking butadiene ignited. It is also undisputed

that, during that six and one-half hours, no inspection was

made of GATX 55996 or the other five pressurized butadiene

tank cars. There was expert testimony that a simple

inspection of GATX 55996 would have detected the leak.

Butadiene has a low odor threshold and can be smelled at

concentrations in the air of two parts per million. For

fact, the ignition source was some ways away from GATX

55996 and, nearer the source of the leak (i.e. the tank car),

the concentrations of butadiene in the air must have been

car leaks in Gentilly, it dealt with the situation by isolating

the leaking tank car, repairing the leak or offloading the

hazardous cargo onto trucks. In short, the jury reasonably

could have concluded that a simple inspection of GATX 55996

would have prevented the butadiene fire.

The issue boils down to whether the jury reasonably

could find that, by not inspecting GATX 55996 and the other

five pressurized butadiene tank cars for a period of six and

one-half hours while they sat on CSX’s interchange tracks in

the Gentilly residential area, CSX acted in “wanton or

reckless disregard of the public safety”, Civ.Code art. 2315.3,

as that element is described in Billiot. The actual

explanation for why CSX did not inspect GATX 55996 for so

long is that GATX 55996 was never brought from CSX’s

'

12a

interchange tracks into CSX’s main yard. CSX’s Gentilly

yard employees testified that CSX’s Gentilly interchange

tracks are located outside of CSX’s main Gentilly yard.

After rail cars are left for CSX on CSX’s interchange tracks,

they are brought into the main yard by CSX. Once the rail

cars are brought into the main yard, they are inspected for

leaks. Rail cars are not inspected for leaks while they are on

CSX’s interchange tracks.

CSX’s employees testified that there were two possible

reasons why rail cars would be left upon CSX’s interchange

tracks for such an extended period. First, there could be a

shortage of track space in the main yard upon which to park

the rail cars. Second, there could be insufficient CSX

personnel on duty to move the rail cars into the main yard in

the timely manner. In the present case, there were tracks

available in the main yard on the night of September 8- 9,

1987, so the lengthy delay in moving GATX 55996 and the

other five pressurized butadiene tank cars into the main yard

was caused by lack of sufficient CSX personnel on duty. In

any event, the important issue is not per se the delay in

moving GATX 55996 and the other pressurized butadiene

tank cars into the main yard but, rather, the delay in

inspecting the tank cars for leaks. Put another way,

regardless of whether CSX brought the tank cars into the

main yard and inspected them for leaks there, or whether

CSX broke with its standard practice and inspected the tank —

-- cars for leaks while they were still on CSX’s interchange

tracks, the fire would have been prevented if GATX 55996

had been inspected in a timely manner.

The several CSX employees who worked in the Gentilly

yard and testified gave no explanation for CSX’s apparent

policy of not inspecting hazardous materials tank cars so long

as they were on CSX’s interchange tracks. The rationale for

CSX’s apparent policy as to inspection of hazardous material

13a

tank cars in Gentilly, ice. inspecting them for leaks

(apparently promptly) once they are brought into CSX’s

main yard but not inspecting them at all so long as they

remained on CSX’s interchange tracks, regardless of how

long they remain on CSX’s interchange tracks, is not

apparent to us. The tank cars would in no way be any less

hazardous while they were on CSX’s interchange tracks (as

might be the case if, for example, the interchange tracks

were located in a remote, unpopulated area). The issue of

Safety is affected by how promptly the tank cars are

inspected for leaks, not whether they are located on the

interchange tracks versus tracks in the main yard.

The record reveals at least five circumstances that could

have led the jury to find that failure to inspect for leaks in a

timely manner pressurized butadiene tank cars on CSX’s

interchange tracks constituted “wanton or reckless

disregard for public safety” as provided in Article 2315.3 and

discussed in Billiot. First, butadiene is an extremely

hazardous substance and, in fact, is considered one of the 100

most hazardous substances. It is carcinogenic, flammable

and volatile/explosive. The products of burning butadiene

include several carcinogenic hazardous chemicals. Thus, any

release of butadiene creates a very substantial risk. An

inspection of a tank car or other rail car carrying non-

hazardous cargo might be deferred properly as a matter of

convenience. However, a rail car carrying a hazardous

cargo, particularly a pressurized tank car carrying a liquid or

gaseous ultrahazardous chemical cargo, should be inspected

promptly for leaks.

Second, the six pressurized butadiene tank cars parked

on CSX’s interchange tracks, including GATX 55996,

contained a very large quantity of butadiene. GATX 55996

carried 30,000 gallons of butadiene and, presumably, each of

the other five tank cars carried a similar amount. The leak

l4a

and two-day fire involving GATX 55996 alone contaminated

many city blocks of homes with butadiene as well as soot

containing the carcinogenic products of burning butadiene.

Obviously, if the fire had spread from GATX 55996 to the

other five tank cars, the amount of butadiene and butadiene

burn products released would have been increased fivefold.

The explosion of GATX 55996 alone could have destroyed

city blocks of homes. The explosion of all six tank cars

would, of course, have been even more devastating. There

also was the possibility that GATX 55996 would take off like

a missile, flying as much as a mile in any direction and

wrecking havoc far and wide. It is difficult to imagine the

death and destruction that could result from a single such

missile, much less six. Thus, the risk presented by a

butadiene leak was, in the present case, massive because of

the large amount of butadiene involved. The large quantity

of butadiene involved made the need for prompt inspection

for leaks more urgent.

Third, CSX’s interchange tracks, where the butadiene

tank cars were left until GATX 55996 caught fire, are located

in a densely-populated residential area. A butadiene leak on

a remote stretch of railroad track in an uninhabited rural

area is not nearly so serious as such a leak in an urban area

and, in particular, in a residential area. Thus, while an

inspection of a hazardous tank car in some locations properly

might be deferred as a matter of convenience, a hazardous

cargo tank car arriving in a densely-populated residential

area, such as Gentilly, presents the strongest possible need

for prompt inspection for leaks. In fact, the New Orleans

Fire Chief, well prior to the leak and fire at issue, had

requested of CSX that, when tank cars were parked near the

residential area of the French Quarter for more than two

hours, CSX have someone keep watch over them. CSX

argues that this request was related specifically to the

oo

lia

French Quarter and did not relate to Gentilly. That is correct

but the point that CSX should have drawn from the Fire

Chief's request is that the Fire Department did not want

tank cars left unattended near residential areas for more

than two hours. The hazard presented to the residents of

Gentilly was the same as the hazard presented to the

residents of the French Quarter. 4

Fourth, as testified to by defense expert witness William

Cruice, the railroad industry is well aware that all tank cars

leak. Thus, the butadiene leak in this case was not at all an

unforeseeable type of accident. Obviously, it is because of:

CSX’s knowledge that rail tank cars leak that CSX inspects

them for leaks once they are brought into CSX’s main yard

at Gentilly. Yet, there is no reason that rail tank cars are

any less likely to leak while on CSX’s Gentilly interchange

tracks than while in CSX’s Gentilly main yard. Thus, CSX’s

knowledge that rail tank cars leak, combined with the

obvious fact that rail tank cars can leak on the interchange

tracks just as easily as they can leak in the main yard, could

well have suggested to the jury that there was a need for

CSX to inspect promptly for leaks pressurized butadiene

tank cars delivered to CSX’s interchange tracks.

Fifth, at least ten tank car leaks were detected in

Gentilly’s main yard in the three and one-half year period

prior to the GATX 55996 butadiene leak and fire and, in fact,

six of them occurred in the seven months preceding the

GATX 55996 leak and fire. This certainly put CSX on notice

of the need to inspect hazardous materials tank cars in

Gentilly. CSX argues that these ten prior leaks are of no

import to this case because these leaks were detected in the

Gentilly main yard rather than on the Gentilly interchange

tracks. The fact that the ten leaks were detected in the CSX

main yard, rather than on the CSX interchange tracks, is

explained simply by the fact that CSX does not inspect tank

16a

cars for leaks while they are on the interchange tracks and,

instead, inspects them only once they are brought into the

main yard. The general point is that CSX was aware that,

from time to time, leaking tank cars were arriving in Gentilly

and the jury could reasonably find that this was another

reason for CSX to inspect promptly for leaks in arriving tank

cars carrying hazardous materials even while they were on

the interchange tracks.

CSX argues that there is no evidence that its employees

actually knew that GATX 55996 was leaking prior to the

ignition of the butadiene. However, the issue is whether

CSX should have known of the GATX 55996 leak in time to

prevent the fire. If CSX should have known that GATX

55996 was leaking, then, in legal terms, CSX is said to have

“constructive knowledge” of the leak even if it had no actual

knowledge of the leak.

The Louisiana Supreme Court discussed the concept of

constructive knowledge in tort law at some length in its

decision in Levi v. Southwest Louisiana Electric

Membership Cooperative, 542 So.2d 1081 (La.1989). The

question in Levi was whether the defendant power company

should be held liable for an electrical hazard of which it did

not have actual knowledge. The Levi court analyzed the

issue thus:

A power company is required to recognize

that its conduct involves a risk of causing

harm to another if a reasonable person would

do so while exercising such attention,

perception of the circumstances, memory,

knowledge of other pertinent matters,

intelligence and judgment as a reasonable

person would have ... If the company has in

fact more than a minimum of these qualities, it

is required to exercise the superior qualities

———

17a

that it has in a manner reasonable under the

circumstances ... The standard becomes, in

other words, that of a reasonable person with

such superior attributes ...

It is well recognized that those who engage in

certain activities or come into certain

relationships with people or things are under

a peculiar obligation to acquire knowledge and

experience about that activity, person or

thing. A carrier owes to its passengers the

duty of discovering all detectable defects.

Manufacturers must learn of dangers that

lurk their products _... Traditionally,

professionals as well as manufacturers must

keep reasonably abreast of current advances

in their fields ...

By the same token, a company which

maintains and employs high power lines is

required to exercise the utmost care to reduce

hazards to life as far as practicable...

Pursuant to this duty, a power company has

an obligation to make reasonable inspections

of wires and other instrumentalities in order

to discover and remedy hazards and defects ...

Consequently, a company will be considered

to have constructive knowledge of an

electrical hazard which has existed for a

period of time which would reasonably permit

discovery had the company adequately

> performed its duties ...

542 So.2d at 1085-86 (citations omitted).

In Levi, the power company was held to have a duty to

make reasonable inspections to discover hazards and was

held to have constructive knowledge of hazards which had

18a

existed for a sufficient length of time to permit discovery had

reasonable inspections been made. We believe that a similar

analysis applies to the present case because the

transportation of hazardous materials involves risks at least

as great as those involved with the provision of electricity.

As a professional transporter of hazardous substances by

rail, CSX has an obligation to be knowledgeable about the

possible hazards involved and the means and methods of

preventing or remediating them. This would include

knowledge of both the possibility of leaks in pressurized tank

cars and the hazardous nature of butadiene. CSX also has

“an obligation to make reasonable inspections” “in order to

discover and remedy hazards and defects”, Levi, supra, in

pressurized tank cars carrying hazardous materials in urban

areas. CSX also is properly considered to have constructive

knowledge of a leak of hazardous cargo “which has existed

for a period of time which would reasonably permit discovery

had the company adequately performed its duties [of

inspection]}”. Id.

There is substantial evidence in the record from which

the jury reasonably could have concluded that GATX 55996

was already leaking when it was delivered to CSX’s

interchange tracks six-and-a-half hours before the leaking

butadiene ignited. The plaintiffs expert mechanical

engineer, Andrew McPhate, opined that GATX 55996 began

leaking as soon as it was loaded with butadiene in Good Hope

and that the leak became worse and worse up to the start of

the fire. CSX’s expert witness Steve Verret found physical

evidence, in the form of higher butadiene readings along the

tracks in the direction from which GATX 55996 had come to

CSX’s interchange tracks, which suggests that the tank car

already was leaking when it was delivered to the interchange

tracks. Thus, the jury reasonably could conclude that CSX

had a period of six-and-a-half hours, prior to the fire, to

19a

inspect GATX 55996 and discover and remediate the leak.

The jury also reasonably could conclude that an inspection of

the six pressurized butadiene tank cars should have taken

Place less than six-and-a-half hours after their delivery to

CSX’s interchange tracks. In making such a finding, it is

appropriate to consider that, even if the chance of any

particular tank car leaking and igniting is small, the possible

harm that can occur from even a single leak is enormous, and

the additional cost of a more timely inspection is little or

nothing. Levi, 542 So.2d at 1086-87.

We recognize that the Levi case did not involve Article

2315.3 and that Levi dealt with ordinary negligence and not

the “reckless or wanton” conduct addressed in Article 2315.3

and discussed in Billiot. Thus, we hold that, while it is

permissible to apply the Levi rule of constructive knowledge

in an Article 2315.3 case, it must be done in the context of

proving reckless or wanton misconduct and not mere

ordinary negligence. While the doctrine of constructive

knowledge can be used to prove fault in both ordinary

negligence cases and in Article 2315.3 cases, the Article

2315.3 plaintiff must use it to prove “highly unreasonable

conduct, involving extreme departure from ordinary care”,

Billiot, 645 So.2d at 618 (emphasis added), as opposed to the

ordinary negligence plaintiff who need prove only any

unreasonable conduct and any departure from ordinary care.

doctrine of constructive knowledge in an Article 2315.3 case.

We disagree because the doctrine of constructive knowledge

is, as we have just discussed, a means of proof rather than a

standard as to what must be proven. Further, we believe

CSX’s argument is foreclosed by the Billiot decision which

States that wanton or reckless conduct involves the

defendant proceeding in the face of danger either known to

him “or apparent to a reasonable person in his position”. 645

20a

So.2d at 613. This language in Billiot appears to embrace the

concept of constructive knowledge and obviate any

requirement of actual knowledge of danger in Article 2315.3

cases.”

CSX’s second argument as to punitive damages is based

upon the procedural circumstance that the quantum of

punitive damages was determined when the quantum of

compensatory damages had been determined as to only 20 of

8,047 plaintiff class members. CSX argues that there is a

constitutional Due Process requirement of a “reasonable

relationship” between the amount of punitive damages and

the amount of compensatory damages. Thus, so CSX’s

argument goes, as the jury did not know the amount of

compensatory damages for the class as a whole, it could not

have determined the amount of punitive damages in a

constitutionally proper way. Consequently, CSX argues,

there must be a new trial as to the amount of the punitive

damages. (Thus, CSX is not, by this argument, literally

challenging liability for punitive damages, which was decided

in the Phase I trial, but rather the Phase II trial which

determined the amount of punitive damages.) Although

CSX does not explicitly so state, the logical implication of

CSX’s argument is that the new trial as to the amount of

punitive damages would not take place until there have been

? CSX points out that there is no evidence that CSX was cited by any

regulatory authority in connection with the GATX 55996 leak and fire.

Neither Billiot nor Article 2315.3 itself makes regulatory citation a

predicate to an Article 2315.3 action. In fact, it already has been held, in

an Article 2315.3 case, involving the GATX 55996 leak and fire, that

compliance with government regulations does not preclude tort liability.

Galjour v. General American Tank Car Corp., 764 F.Supp. 1093, 1101

(E.D.La.1991).

2la

determinations of the compensatory damages to be awarded

to each one of the 8,047 class members.?

punitive damages.

The status of the “reasonable relationship” factor as part

of a Due Process constitutional analysis of whether an award

of punitive damages is excessive was established by BMW of

North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 116 S.Ct. 1589,

1601-1603, 134 L.Ed.2d 809 (1996), and was discussed in TXO

Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 443,

113 S.Ct. 2711, 2721-22, 125 L.Rd24 366 (1993), and was

mentioned in Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1,

111 S.Ct. 1082, 1045-46, 1138 L.Ed.2d 1 (1991). In all three of

these cases, the “reasonable relationship” Due Process factor

was addressed in the context of appellate review of the

quantum of punitive damages awards. None of these three

cases holds that the “reasonable relationship” factor must be

considered by the jury. In Haslip, the jury instruction on

punitive damages did not include any reference to the

* There has been an additional Phase III trial in which there have been

determinations of the compensatory damages to be awarded to each of an

additional 20 selected plaintiffs.

22a

“reasonable relationship” factor, see 111 S.Ct. at 1087 n. 7,

but, despite the fact that the Haslip court “carefully

reviewed” that jury instruction, 111 S.Ct. at 1044, it was

found to be acceptable. Also, the Haslip court appears to

have contemplated that the “reasonable relationship” factor

would be applied on appeal when it stated: “The Alabama

Supreme Court’s postverdict review ensures that punitive

damages awards are not grossly out of proportion to the

severity of the offense and have some understandable

relationship to compensatory damages.”

The Louisiana Supreme Court, in a decision upon a

defense writ application in this case, closely approached the

question of whether the jury should consider the amount of

compensatory damages in setting the amount of punitive

damages:

In addition to compensatory damages, the

class seeks punitive damages under former

Louisiana Civil Code article 2315.8. Under

the trial plan set out in the trial court’s case

management orders, the trial court’s plan

indicates that after the jury has determined

whether or not to assess punitive damages:

The jury will determine punitive damages for

the class as a whole as punishment for the

defendant’s conduct by use of a multiplier

based on what the compensatory damages to a

given plaintiff are. -

It is this instruction, that the jury should use

a multiplier in assessing punitive damages, to

which defendants complain.

In BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517

U.S. 559, 116 S.Ct. 1589, 184 L.Ed.2d 809

(1996), the United States Supreme Court, in

- 23a

reviewing the punitive damages award to the

plaintiff for excessiveness, examined the

amount of punitive damages and

compensatory damages awarded and

compared the ratio between the two. Thus, a

multiplier is used as a standard of review to

determine if the punitive damage award is

excessive and unreasonable. BMW of North

America, 517 U.S. at 580-581, 116 S.Ct. at

1601.

Therefore, considering the foregoing, in the

event the jury in this matter determines that

defendants are liable for punitive damages,

the trial court is prohibited from instructing

the jury that it may use a multiplier when

determining the amount of punitive damages

that can be awarded, but should instruct the

jury to determine that amount of punitive

damages by consideration of all relevant

factors.

In re New Orleans Train Car Leakage Fire Litigation,

97-1150, 97- 1161 (La. 6/27/97), 697 So2d 239 (emphasis

added) (footnotes omitted). It appears that the Louisiana

Supreme Court, using the term “multiplier” to refer to the

BMW “reasonable relationship” factor, held that factor to be

applicable to appellate (or trial court) review of jury verdicts

rather than to the jury’s determination of the amount of

punitive damages as an initial matter. Thus, under the

Louisiana Supreme Court’s decision, there is certainly no

Due Process requirement that the jury, in setting the

amount of punitive damages, consider the amcunt of

compensatory damages.

Lastly, to the extent that CSX is arguing that, because

there has not yet been a determination of the amount of

24a

| compensatory damages as to all of the plaintiff class

members, CSX is denied Due Process by a lack of appellate

(or trial court) review of the “reasonable relationship” factor,

we disagree with CSX’s argument for a new trial on the

quantum of punitive damages for two reasons. First, even if

the present lack of a determination of the amount of

| compensatory damages prevented appellate court (or trial

| court) review of the jury’s determination of the amount of

| punitive damages (a position with which we do not agree),

that would not require a new trial on the quantum of

\ punitive damages. Rather, it would be necessary merely to

| await the determination of the amounts of compensatory

| damages before subjecting the jury verdict on amount of

| punitive damages to appellate (or trial court) review. CSX’s

| appeal could be stayed or dismissed without prejudice

| perhaps with a stay of execution of judgment. Second, and

| more to the point in light of our appellate review of the

| quantum of punitive damages set forth below, we believe

| that the BMW mandated Due Process review of the jury’s

| verdict can be performed on the present record despite the

procedural circumstance that the amounts of compensatory

| damages for most of the plaintiff class members have not yet

been determined. We will address this point further below in

our review of the quantum of punitive damages.

CSX’s third argument on appeal as to punitive damages

is that, by entering a judgment on punitive damages as to

the whole plaintiff class, rather than limiting the judgment

on punitive damages to the 20 selected plaintiffs whose

compensatory damages were determined in the Phase I trial,

the trial court violated the instructions of the Louisiana

Supreme Court given in two decisions upon writ

applications. In the first of those two decisions, In re New

Orleans Train Car Leakage Fire Litigation, 97-2547

(La.10/31/97), 707 So.2d 677, the Louisiana Supreme Court

|

25a

did hold that the trial court should not render a judgment

upon punitive damages until “all liability issues” had been

adjudicated. The Court based this upon Article 593.1 of the

Code of Civil Procedure. However, in the second decision

upon writ applications, the Court took a different approach.

In re New Orleans Train Car Leakage Fire Litigation, 98-

2399, 98-2622 (La.2/24/99), 728 So.2d 853. In its February 24,

1999 decision, the Court directed the trial court to enter

judgment in favor of the 20 selected plaintiffs as to liability,

allocation of fault and damages, both compensatory and

punitive, and to designate that judgment as final for

purposes of post-trial motions and appellate review. Id.

However, the Court did not prohibit the trial court from

entering a judgment as to punitive damages with respect to

the entire class. Thus, in its February 24, 1999 decision,

which appears to supercede its October 31, 1997 decision, the

Court appears to have left open for the trial court to decide,

at least as an initial matter, whether to enter judgment on

punitive damages as to all class members.

Also, the October 31, 1997 decision, which prohibited

entry of any judgment as to punitive damages, was based

upon Article 593.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure and, in its

February 24, 1999 decision, the Court stated:

On reconsideration, we have some doubt that

Article 593.1 (now repealed) was applicable at

all, since all issues of the liability of the

defendants apparently had been adjudicated

by the trial court, although there are still

causation issues to be decided as to the

remaining plaintiffs.

728 So.2d at 854 n. 3. As the issue of CSX’s liability for

punitive damages was decided in the Phase I trial, and even

the issue of the overall quantum of punitive damages was

decided in the Phase II trial, so that the only punitive

26a

damages issue left to be determined is the allocation of the

total punitive damages award among the individual class

members (an issue in which CSX has no interest), it does

appear that Article 593.1 does not bar entry of a judgment as

to the total amount of punitive damages owed to the entire

class.

Lastly, in its February 24, 1999 decision, the Court

remarked “given the size of this verdict and the length of

time since its entry, as well as the length of this litigation

over the 1987 incident, immediate review of this judgment

would be beneficial to both sides”. 728 So.2d at 854. It

seems more consistent with the Court’s expressed intent

(now over two years ago) to speed the resolution of this long-

running litigation, for the trial court to proceed with entry of

an immediately-appealable judgement as to the total

punitive damages owed to the entire class than to defer

entry of that judgment to what could be a much later date.

The trial court did not err by entering a judgment as to the

total punitive damages owed to the entire class.

CSX’s fourth and final argument as to punitive damages

is that the $850 million judgment (which the trial court

entered after rejecting the jury’s $2.5 billion verdict) is so

excessive as to constitute (1) an unconstitutional arbitrary

deprivation of property without due process of law and (2) an

abuse of discretion under Louisiana tort law.

We will address first CSX’s Due Process argument. We

turn to the guidance supplied by the United States Supreme

Court in its BMW, TXO and Haslip decisions. While BMW

provides the most recent, and perhaps most systematic,

analysis of whether a punitive damages award is so large as

to constitute a denial of Due Process, BMW does not

overrule TXO or Haslip and, in fact, relies upon those two

earlier decisions. Thus, we will apply all three of the Court’s

pronouncements upon this issue. We address the Due

27a

Process issue on a de novo review basis. Cooper Industries,

Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group Inc., 582 U.S. 424, 121 S.Ct.

1678, 149 L.Ed.2d 674 (2001).

In BMW, the defendant was found liable for $4,000 in

compensatory damages for purely economic harm because it

sold a car to the plaintiff without disclosing that the car had

been repainted prior to sale. The BMW jury awarded

$4,000,000 in punitive damages which was reduced to

$2,000,000 by the Alabama Supreme Court. The Court looked

to three “guideposts”, 116 S.Ct. at 1598, as to whether the

$2,000,000 punitive damages award was unconstitutional:

the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct, the

ratio of punitive damages to the compensatory damages (i.e.

the “reasonable relationship” factor) and the difference

between the punitive damages and the criminal and civil

penalties that could be awarded by statute.

The BMW court described the degree of reprehensibility

of the defendant’s conduct as “perhaps the most important”

of the guideposts to the constitutionality of a punitive

damages award. The Court then stressed that the harm in

the BMW case was “purely economic” and presented no

danger to health or safety:

In this case, none of the aggravating factors

associated with particularly reprehensible

conduct is present. The harm BMW inflicted

on Dr. Gore was purely economic in nature.

The presale refinishing of the car had no

effect on its performance or safety features, or

even its appearance for at least nine months

after his purchase. BMW’s conduct evinced

no indifference to or reckless disregard for the

health and safety of others. |

116 S.Ct. at 1599 (emphasis added). Both the potential harm

in the present case, widespread death, injury and destruction

28a

for miles across a city, and the actual harm in the present

case, particularly the exposure of an entire residential

neighborhood to carcinogenic hazardous chemicals, make the

harm in the BMW case the very antithesis of the present

case. The jury determined that CSX acted wantonly or

recklessly, a finding which we have found to not be clearly

wrong/manifestly erroneous, and that wantonness or

recklessness created a danger to the health and safety of

others of truly extraordinary magnitude. Clearly the “degree

of reprehensibility” guidepost, perhaps the most important

guidepost, weighs heavily in favor of the conclusion that the

punitive damages award is not unconstitutionally excessive.

CSX argues that the second BMW “guidepost”, the ratio

of punitive damages to the compensatory damages (i.e., the

“reasonable relationship” factor), cannot be applied here

because the amounts of compensatory damages to be

awarded to each of the bulk of the plaintiff class members

have not yet been determined. Therefore, CSX argues, it is

necessarily deprived of one element of a constitutionally-

mandated appellate (or trial court) review of the jury’s

verdict. We disagree with CSX for two reasons.

First, in BMW, the Court compared the punitive -

damages to only the compensatory damages because, in

BMW, there was only factual harm and no potential harm.

However, in 7TXO, there had been a large amount of

potential harm. In fact, in BMW, the Court, after discussing

the “potential harm” analysis of TXO, distinguished TXO by

stating that “there is no suggestion that Dr. Gore [the BMW

plaintiff] or any other BMW purchaser was threatened with

any additional potential harm by BMW’s nondisclosure

policy”. 116 S.Ct. at 1602. Usually, juries are asked to

determine the amount of actual harm (i.e. compensatory

damages) but are not asked to determine the amount of

potential harm that could have occurred. In TXO, the jury

se

29a

determined the compensatory damages to be $19,000 and

awarded $10,000,000 in punitive damages. Yet, in finding the

TXO punitive damages not unconstitutional, the TXO Court

compared the punitive damages, not to the compensatory

damages, but, rather, to the potential harm that could have

occurred despite the fact that there was no jury

determination of the amount of such potential harm. If

CSX’s argument were correct, that there can be no

constitutionally-adequate review of punitive damages in the

absence of a determination of the amount of compensatory

damages, then the bulk of the analysis in TXO would have

been impossible and the BMW Court would not have

approved of T.X0’s potential harm analysis.

Second, we do not agree with CSX’s position that we

have no way to compare the amount of the punitive damages

to the actual harm in this case. CSX argues that the awards

of compensatory damages to just 20 of the 8,047 plaintiff

class members are meaningless because 20 plaintiffs are such

a small percentage of the overall class and because those

plaintiffs were selected half by the plaintiffs’ counsel and half

by the defense counsel rather than by any statistically valid

sampling technique. We disagree because, while we

recognize that the trial court’s determinations of the

compensatory damages (made after the trial court rejected

the jury’s awards) may not be sufficient evidence from which

to draw an inference of the average compensatory damages

of all members of the class, we believe that the

determinations do give an indication of the likely range and

approximate order of magnitude of the compensatory

damages of all of the plaintiff class members. The trial

courts’ awards range from a high of $116,800 to a low of

$5,500. We presume that this wide range reflects the fact

that the plaintiffs’ counsel would have selected plaintiffs who

were closest to the fire and suffered the worst. damages

30a

while the defense counsel would have selected plaintiffs who

were farthest from the fire and suffered the least damages.

Four plaintiffs were awarded less than $10,000, eight were

awarded between $11,000 and $29,900, six were awarded

$33,900 to $63,000 and two were awarded $116,800 and

$116,000 respectively. From this, we generalize to say that a

typical award of compensatory damages in this case is in the

low to middle tens of thousands of dollars albeit with a

significant number of atypical awards. The $850 million

punitive damages award averages $105,562.42 per class

member (although we understand that, ultimately, it may be

allocated among the class members differently) so there does

not seem to be an outrageous ratio of punitive damages to

compensatory damages and nothing at all like the 526 to 1

ratio approved in 7'‘XO or the 500 to 1 ratio disallowed in

BMW.

Although the term “ratio”, used by the BMW Court in

relation to the “reasonable relationship” factor, conjures up

notions of exact mathematical calculation, the BMW Court in

fact emphasized that the analysis involves, not mathematical

formulae, but, instead, general concerns of reasonableness:

Of course, we have consistently rejected the

notion that the constitutional line is marked

by a simple mathematical formula, even one

that compares actual and potential damages

to the punitive award. TXO, 509 U.S., at 458,

113 S.Ct., at 2720. Indeed, low awards of

compensatory damages may properly support

a higher ratio than high compensatory

awards, if, for example, a particularly

egregious act has resulted in only a small

amount of economic damages. A higher ratio

may also be justified in cases in which the

injury is hard to detect or the monetary value

3la

of noneconomic harm might have been

difficult to determine. It is appropriate,

therefore, to reiterate our rejection of a

categorical approach. Once again, “we return

to what we said ... in Haslip: ‘We need not,

and indeed we cannot, draw a mathematical

bright line between the constitutionally

acceptable and the constitutionally

unacceptable that would fit every case. We

can say, however, that [a] general concer[n] of

reasonableness ... properly enter[s] into the

constitutional calculus.’ “ Id., at 458, 113

S.Ct., at 2720 (quoting Haslip, 499 U.S., at 18,

111 S.Ct., at 1043). In most cases, the ratio

will be within a constitutionally acceptable

range, and remittitur will not be justified on

this basis. When the ratio is a breathtaking

500 to 1, however, the award must surely

“raise a suspicious judicial eyebrow.” TX O,”

509 US. at 481, 113 S.Ct. at 2732

(O'CONNOR, J., dissenting).

BMW, 116 S.Ct. at 1602-16038 (emphasis added).

Consequently, in view of BMWs eschewing of mathematical

exactitude, in favor of what we would describe as a ratio

used as a rough quantitative aid toa qualitative judgment as

to reasonableness, we feel that our above use of the limited

number of awards of compensatory damages (in terms of

range of awards and rough order of magnitude) is

appropriate.

We also believe that, implicit in CSX’s argument, is the

notion that an award of compensatory damages is the only

possible information about the amount of harm suffered by

the plaintiff class members. However, there was eyewitness

and expert testimony as to the exposure of the plaintiff class

32a

members to carcinogenic hazardous chemicals (butadiene

and its burn products), expert testimony about the risks

associated with that exposure due to the soot in the

plaintiffs’ homes, and eyewitness testimony about the

sudden, forced middle-of-the-night evacuation of the

residential neighborhood around the fire. Fright and shock

among the plaintiffs must have accompanied and followed

the fire and evacuation. We believe that the BMW Court’s

“general concern of reasonableness”, discussed in the above.

quotation from BMW, is sufficiently broad to allow us to

compare the amount of the punitive damages, not just to

dollar amounts of compensatory damages, but also to the

type and severity of the actual harm suffered by the

plaintiffs which gives rise to their claims for compensatory

damages.

As mentioned above, the quantum of punitive damages

awarded by the trial court (after it rejected the jury’s

verdict) amounts to $105,562.42 per plaintiff. Is that amount

of punitive damages too great relative to the actual harm

suffered by a typical member of the plaintiff class? If a

single member of the plaintiff class had sued CSX

individually and been awarded $105,562.42 in punitive

damages, would the acute and long-term exposure of the

plaintiff to carcinogenic hazardous chemicals and the shock

and fright of the fire and evacuation have been insufficient to

justify constitutionally a punitive damages award of that

quantum? We think not. The $105,562.42 figure is not

shocking relative to the eyewitness and expert evidence of

actual harm. The $850 million figure is driven by the fact that

so very many people, as many as 8,047, were harmed by

CSX’s wanton or reckless conduct. The fact that one’s

wanton or reckless conduct has harmed thousands, as

opposed to a few, is hardly the basis for striking down a

33a

punitive damage award as unconstitutional (if anything, the

opposite seems more likely).

We also assess the quantum of punitive damages relative

to, not only the actual harm that occurred, but also relative

to the potential harm that could have occurred as a result of

the wanton or reckless conduct of CSX. This assessment of

the ratio of the quantum of punitive damages to the potential

harm (i.e., assessing whether there is a “reasonable

relationship” between the quantum of punitive damages and

the potential harm) was a key factor in the determination of

the TXO Court that the $10,000,000 punitive damages award

in that case, while 526 times the amount of the $19,000 actual

damages, was not unconstitutional. 118 S.Ct. at 2721-22.

The TXO Court discussed a hypothetical in which a man fires

a gun wildly into a crowd, by sheer chance injuring no one,

but damaging a $10 pair of glasses. The jury reasonably

could find only $10 in compensatory damages but thousands

of dollars in punitive damages. 113 S.Ct. at 2721. (The “$10

pair of glasses” and “thousands” of dollars in punitive

damages reflect the fact that the hypothetical was derived

from a 1931 law review article.) The BMW Court approved

the TXO opinion’s comparison of the amount of punitive

damages to the potential harm from the defendant’s conduct.

BMW, 116 S.Ct. at 1602.

In the present case, the potential harm that could have

resulted from CSX’s wanton, reckless conduct is truly

extraordinary. If GATX 55996 had exploded, whole city

blocks of a residential area could have been destroyed. No

doubt if all six of the pressurized butadiene tank cars had

exploded, the devastation would have been even greater. If

such an explosion had occurred prior to the evacuation of the

residential area surrounding CSX’s interchange tracks,

hundreds or even thousands of deaths and injuries could

have ensued. GATX 55996 could have taken off like a

34a

missile, as could have the other five pressurized butadiene

tank cars, wreaking death and destruction for up to a mile in

any direction from the scene of the fire. It is difficult to even

imagine, in financial terms, the extent of liability for such a

monumental catastrophe, but it is apparent that the

compensatory damages resulting from it could easily exceea

the quantum of punitive damages in this case. It most

certainly cannot be said that the ratio of the punitive

damages to the potential harm is_ unconstitutionally

excessive. Indeed, the potential harm in this case could

cause a reasonable trier of fact to award, and a reasonable

court to approve, a sum more than $850 million.

The third Due Process “guidepost” applied by the BMW

Court to the quantum of punitive damages is a comparison to

the civil or criminal penalties that could be imposed for

comparable conduct. CSX argues that the maximum fine

that could be imposed for violation of Louisiana

environmental law is a little more than $1,000,000 under La

R.S. 30:2025. Thus, CSX argues, the maximum quantum of

punitive damages that can be imposed in this case is

$1,000,000. We disagree.

The BMW Court applies three “guideposts” to the Due

Process analysis of quantum of punitive damages. It is a safe

assumption that the BMW Court did not select and use the

term “guideposts” without reason. The term “guideposts”

does not connote or suggest a cumulative series of three

“tests” or “elements” which must each be met. Rather, we

see the three guideposts as (a) considerations to be expressly

taken into account in order to give coherence and some

degree of structure to the Due Process analysis of quantum

of punitive damages and (b) a multifactor balancing test in

which the three guideposts might give contradictory

indications which must be weighed against one another to

achieve a final result. In the present case, the first

35a

guidepost, reprehensibility, fully supports the quantum of

punitive damages awarded, the second guidepost,

comparison to the actual harm and, especially, to the

potential harm, would support a quantum of punitive

damages much larger than was awarded, and the third

guidepost, fines for comparable conduct, suggests a much

lower award. Giving each of the three guideposts equal

weight leads to the conclusion that Due Process is not denied

by the quantum of punitive damages in this case. Thus, we

reject the notion that the third guidepost, comparable fines,

standing alone, “caps” punitive damages in this case at $1

million.

The $850 million punitive damages award in this case is

not so “grossly excessive”, BMW, 116 S.Ct. at 1595, as to

amount to a denial of Due Process.

We turn now to the question of whether, under Louisiana

tort law, the $850 million punitive damages award must be

reduced. The question is whether the trial court abused its

“much discretion” in setting the amount of the award.

Dekeyser v. Automotive Cas. Ins. Co., 97-1251 (La.App. 4

Cir. 2/4/98), 706 So.2d 676, 685. Accord Chinigo v. Geismar

Marine, Inc., 512 So.2d 487, 498 (La.App. 1st Cir.), writ

denied, 514 So.2d 457 (La.1987).

“Many factors may be considered when determining the

amount of a reasonable award of punitive damages, including

‘the defendant, the defendant’s conduct, the magnitude of the

potential harm arising from it, and even the defendant’s net

worth, to assess the probability of deterrence”. Dekeyser,

706 So.2d at 687 (quoting Laris v. Parker, 92-1448 (La.App. 4

Cir 3/29/94), 685 So.2d 442, 444). Thus, Louisiana tort law, as

previously determined in this Circuit by the Dekeyser

decision, does not use a fixed list of exclusive factors to be

considered in order to determine whether a punitive

36a

damages award is so great (or small) as to constitute an

abuse of discretion.

We do believe, however, that the selection and evaluation

of factors to consider in any particular case, and the

evaluation of whether or not a particular quantum of

punitive damages is an abuse of discretion, must be governed

by the three purposes of punitive damages identified in the

Billiot decision: punishment of the defendant, deterrence of

the defendant and others, and incentive to plaintiffs. 645

So.2d at 612-613. The punitive damages should be sufficient

in amount to clearly and fully meet the three Billiot

purposes but should be no more than that amount.

Two of the three examples of factors to consider given in

the Dekeyser decision, “the defendant’s conduct” and “the

magnitude of the potential harm” are paralleled in two of the

three BMW “guideposts” and what we said above as to the

“reprehensibility” and “ratio” (of potential harm to punitive

damages) BMW guideposts is applicable to the question of

whether or not the quantum of punitive damages in this case

is an abuse of discretion. Thus, those two Dekeyser factors

strongly suggest that there is no abuse of discretion in the

quantum of punitive damages in this case. (The third BMW

guidepost, comparison to civil and criminal penalties for

comparable misconduct, is addressed more narrowly to the

question of “prior notice” of large financial consequences to

particular misconduct, and thus is peculiar to the Due

Process analysis and is inapplicable to the Louisiana tort law

abuse of discretion analysis.)

The Dekeyser decision also suggests that the net worth

of the defendant is a proper factor to be considered “to

assess the probability of deterrence”. 706 So.2d at 687. We

believe net worth is also a proper factor to consider with

respect to the effectiveness of punishment. The importance

of the defendant’s financial situation to the goals of

37a

punishment and deterrence is obvious: What “may be

awesome punishment for an impecunious individual

defendant [may be] wholly insufficient to influence the

behavior of a prosperous corporation”. Continental Trend

Resources, Inc. v. OXY USA, Inc., 101 F.3d 634, 641 (10th

Cir.1996) (post-BMW analysis of quantum of punitive

damages), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1241, 117 S.Ct. 1846, 137

L.Ed.2d 1049 (1997). Thus, in order to assess the extent of

the punishment and deterrence that will be inflicted by a

particular amount of punitive damages, it is necessary to

consider the financial situation of the defendant. We note

that consideration of the financial situation of the defendant

is noted approvingly in TXO, 113 S.Ct. at 2722 n. 28, and

Haslip, 111 S.Ct. at 1045, and does not appear to be excluded

by the BMW decision. Continental Trend, supra. The

question is, in effect, how much will this defendant be

punished or deterred by an $850 million punitive damages

award? The record reflects that CSX has a net worth of

about $4.8 billion. The $850 million punitive damages award

is about 18% of CSX’s net worth. We do not find that

percentage to be an abuse of discretion in this case because

we cannot say that 18% is indisputably more than necessary

to effectuate the Billiot purposes of punishment and

deterrence.‘

Quantum of Compensatory Damages

The three defendants-appellants all argue that the

awards of compensatory damages made by the trial court

‘ The plaintiffs, in their Answer To Appeal, argue that the trial court

erred by rejecting the jury’s $2.5 billion punitive damages verdict against

CSX. We share the trial court’s conviction that the $2.5 billion verdict was

manifestly excessive. The sum of $2.5 billion is more than necessary to

fully effect the three purposes of punitive damages as set out in Billiot.

We are convinced that punishment beyond what is purposeful is not

authorized by Article 2315.3.

38a

(after it rejected all of the jury’s verdicts) to the 20 selected

plaintiffs are excessive and should be reduced. The

defendants-appellants’ first argument is that the testimony

of two expert witnesses for the plaintiffs, which testimony

was introduced to support the reasonableness and extent of

the plaintiffs’ fear of increased risk of cancer, should have

been excluded. In particular, the defendants-appellants

argue that, under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,

Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993), as

adopted by State v. Foret, 628 So.2d 1116 (La.1993), the trial

court, as the “gatekeeper” with respect to expert testimony,

should have excluded the testimony of plaintiffs’ experts Dr.

Lawrence Miller and Dr. Drew Gouvier.

Dr. Miller is a physician and medical researcher. He

testified that the plaintiff class members, including the 20

selected plaintiffs, were at a “small” but “definite” increased

risk of cancer as a result of their exposure to butadiene and

its breakdown products and burn products following the

GATX 55996 fire.

Dr. Miller is a graduate of Harvard Medical School and

has been a physician for more than twenty years. He did his

internship and residency in Internal Medicine at

Massachusetts General Hospital. He also did fellowships in

Pulmonary Disease and Critical Medicine at Massachusetts

General Hospital. He did a two-year fellowship in Clinical

Pharmacology at Tufts University School of Medicine. He

received a Master’s in Public Health, in toxicology, from the

Boston University School of Public Health. He is associated

with the Department of Pharmacology and Experimental

Therapeutics at Tufts University where he does research on

the effects of drugs and other chemicals on the human brain.

He teaches part-time at Harvard Medical School and at Tufts

University School of Medicine. He has hospital privileges at

Massachusetts General Hospital and sees patients on a

ee

39a

weekly basis. He is Board Certified in Internal Medicine,

Pulmonary Disease, Critical Medicine and _ Clinical

Pharmacology. He has treated patients for cancer resulting

from exposure to butadiene and styrene (styrene is a burn

product of butadiene). At the time of the GATX 55996 fire,

he was teaching at LSU Medical Center in New Orleans. He

was accepted as an expert witness, and testified in court,

fourteen times in the twelve years prior to trial in this case.

Dr. Miller testified at length as to the carcinogenic

nature of butadiene and its breakdown products and burn

products. In the daytime, butadiene breaks down into

several other chemicals due to exposure to the sun’s

ultraviolet rays and, at night, butadiene breaks down into

several other chemicals due to interaction with nitrates from

automobile exhaust. Butadiene and at least one of its

breakdown products are clearly established in the scientific

literature as carcinogenic. The Federal Agency for Toxic

Substance and Disease Registry, the International Agency

for Research In Cancer, and OSHA all classify butadiene as

very likely a carcinogen in humans.

The burn products of butadiene (i.e. the chemicals

produced by burning butadiene) are even more dangerous.

Another expert witness, Dr. Catallo, did a burn test and

researched the literature to determine the burn products of

butadiene. Dr. Miller testified that several of the chemicals

that are burn products of butadiene are known to be “very

powerful carcinogens” and that they include one of the most

powerful carcinogens ever studied. Dr. Catallo’s burn test

showed that these carcinogenic chemicals are contained in

the soot produced by burning butadiene.

Dr. Miller opined that the members of the plaintiff class

had a small but definite increase in their risk of cancer due to

their exposure to butadiene and its breakdown products and

burn products from GATX 55996. He based his opinion on a

40a

four-part toxicological methodology which includes

consideration of: (1) the particular chemicals to which

someone is exposed; (2) an estimate of the amount of the

chemical to which someone is exposed; (3) the length of time

to which someone is exposed to the chemical; and (4) the

genetic background of the person exposed to the chemical

(although he testified that not much is yet known about this

fourth factor).

The defendants-appellants argue that Dr. Miller’s

methodology in this case was so flawed as to have made his

testimony completely inadmissible. However, the only part

of Dr. Miller’s methodology which they specifically attack is

the second (amount of the chemical) factor. They argue that

Dr. Miller did not know the “dose” of chemical to which the

plaintiffs were exposed.

Dr. Miller did address the question of “dose” in his

testimony. He explained that, in toxicology, the “dose” is a

matter of both the quantity of the chemical and the length of

time to which someone is exposed to the chemical. Dr. Miller

testified that exposure to the chemicals involved in this case

in a concentration of thousands of parts per million for a

period of weeks to months would result in an increased risk

of cancer. (He did not testify that lesser exposure

necessarily would not result in a greater risk of cancer.

There is no known safe exposure level.) Dr. Miller also

testified that the members of the plaintiff class, including the

20 selected plaintiffs, were exposed to thousands of parts per

million for a period of weeks to months.

Dr. Miller explained that, because chemical concentration

measurements are often not taken at the time people are

exposed to hazardous chemicals, it is often necessary to

estimate the concentrations after the fact. There were

several facts upon which Dr. Miller relied as to the

concentration of chemicals and period of exposure. A large

4la

quantity, some 30,000 gallons, of butadiene was released or

burned into the air. The ignition source of the fire was four-

and-a-half blocks away, and the flash point of butadiene is

20,000 parts per million, so the concentration of the

butadiene in the atmosphere was at least 20,000 parts per

million at a distance of four and-a-half blocks from GATX

55996. Also, the concentration of butadiene in the

atmosphere would have been even higher closer to the tank

car.

What seems to be of most concern to Dr. Miller was the

soot produced by the burning butadiene. Dr. Miller

emphasized that this soot contained several extraordinarily

powerful carcinogens. This soot, which was carried by the

plumes of smoke that shifted in all directions from the

burning tank car, was observed in the homes of the plaintiffs

and took up to a month to clean up. Dr. Miller testified that,

despite ordinary clean-up efforts, the plaintiffs would remain

exposed to the carcinogenic soot. The soot remains in air

conditioning filters where it is recirculated back into the

homes, collects in vacuum cleaners and is blown back into the

homes each time the vacuum cleaner is used, and collects in

attics and other inaccessible places. Dr. Miller testified that

there are “known protocols” to remove carcinogens in these

types of situations but that the plaintiffs had not been

instructed as to them. The result is that the carcinogenic

soot remains in homes indefinitely. Dr. Miller conceded that

he could not measure precisely the exposure of the plaintiffs

but, he testified, he concluded that the exposure was

sufficient to create an increased risk of cancer. Lastly, the

defendants’ brief cites no expert testimony in rebuttal to Dr.

Miller’s methodology. The points raised by the defendants

with respect to Dr. Miller’s methodology were proper ones

for cross-examination and for consideration by the jury and

42a

by the trial court as trier of fact, but they do not render Dr.

Miller’s opinion so unreliable as to be inadmissible.

Dr. Gouvier is a clinical psychologist, a Ph.D., who is a

tenured Associate Professor at LSU in Baton Rouge. He

also has a private practice in Clinical Psychology, is a

licensed clinical psychologist, and sees patients regularly.

He is on the boards of editors of several scholarly journals,

has extensive publications in peer-reviewed journals and has

qualified as an expert witness in federal and state courts on

several dozen occasions.

He conducted a study, in the summer and fall of 1988, as

to the psychological effects of the GATX 55996 fire on the

residents of the neighborhood in the vicinity of the fire. He

selected one hundred families, made up of two hundred

eighteen individuals, to interview and test. The families

were selected using statistical sampling techniques. Among

other things, Dr. Gouvier drew three “rings” at a distance of

a half-mile, one mile and one-and-a-half miles from the site of

the GATX 55996 fire and sampled all three of the areas. He

also divided the area into northeast, northwest, southwest

and southeast quadrants and sampled all four of those areas.

Interviews with and tests of the one hundred selected

families were pursued diligently in order to avoid self-

selection bias. The result of these procedures, Dr. Gouvier

testified, is a sample of the plaintiffs which is representative

of the class as a whole.

The one hundred families of two hundred eighteen

individuals were interviewed and subjected to a series of

standardized psychological tests. These tests included the

Zung Depression Inventory, the Anxiety Sensitivity Index

and an Anxiety Inventory. He also interviewed and tested a

comparison group of new residents who had moved into the

neighborhood since the tank car fire and then used statistical

analysis to compare the two groups.

43a

The testing of the two hundred eighteen individuals of

the plaintiff class revealed that they suffered from increased

depression, anxiety and anxiety sensitivity after the GATX

55996 fire. (Dr. Gouvier referred some persons to mental

health care providers.) The depression decreased a year

after the fire but anxiety remained high. Of the two hundred

eighteen individuals, 98.9% had been exposed to smoke or

fumes from the fire and 76% had been evacuated. Those

further away from the fire were much less likely to have

evacuated but they also tended to suffer anxiety about risks

they might have incurred due to their lack of evacuation. Dr.

Gouvier opined that, based upon studies of other disasters,

the increased anxiety among members of the plaintiff class

was unlikely to go away by itself for a very long time.

Lastly, Dr. Gouvier testified that the findings of his study of

the plaintiff class were consistent with studies done in

connection with other disasters.

The defendants-appellants make four very brief

arguments that Dr. Gouvier’s testimony should have been

excluded: First, they complain that the twenty selected

plaintiffs were not examined by Dr. Gouvier and were not

among the two hundred eighteen individuals interviewed

and tested. However, Dr. Gouvier was in court for most of

the trial and heard all or most of the twenty selected

plaintiffs testify. He read proof of claim forms by and heard

taped interviews with all of the twenty selected plaintiffs.

Second, the defendants-appellants complain that the two-

hundred eighteen individuals who were studied by Dr.

Gouvier had been told that he was working with the

plaintiffs’ lawyers in connection with their case. However, -

this source of possible bias of the two hundred individuals

studied was made known to the jury and to the trial court as

trier of fact, the two hundred eighteen individuals studied

were warned of the anticipated discovery and cross-

44a

examination and the need to be completely truthful, and Dr.

Gouvier’s interviews and testing included measures to detect

fabrications or exaggerations. Third, the defendants-

appellants complain that Dr. Gouvier was unable to study a

control group of residents of the affected area who were not

plaintiffs. However, Dr. Gouvier was able to study a

comparison group of persons who moved to the affected area

after the GATX 55996 fire. Fourth, the defendants-

appellants complain that Dr. Gouvier’s study has not been

subjected to “formal” peer review. Dr. Gouvier’s study in

connection with the GATX 55996 fire has not been subjected

to “formal” peer review because it has not been submitted

for publication. However, it has been subjected to peer

review by other professors at LSU who are not connected to

the study. Moreover, a similar railroad tank car disaster

study performed by the same group at LSU had been

published and, presumably, subject to formal peer review.

None of these complaints about Dr. Gouvier’s testimony,

either individually or collectively, amounts to a reason to

exclude Dr. Gouvier’s testimony (although all were fair game

for the vigorous cross-examination to which Dr. Gouvier was

subjected before the trial court and jury).

Lastly, we believe that if there was any error in

admission of Dr. Gouvier’s testimony, it was harmless. The

twenty selected plaintiffs testified as to their experiences

and their distress. Based upon that testimony, the trial

court would almost certainly have concluded that the twenty

selected plaintiffs, having been traumatized by the GATX

55996 fire, would tend to suffer short-term depression and

long-term anxiety (particularly about the CSX tracks and

the tank cars which remain in their neighborhood). The trial

court, as finder of fact, is unlikely to have given undue

weight to Dr. Gouvier’s testimony when setting the amount

of compensatory damages.

45a

The defendants-appellants also argue that the trial court,

as finder of fact, awarded excessive damages to each of the

twenty selected plaintiffs. Almost all of the damages

awarded to the twenty selected plaintiffs were general

damages for physical pain and suffering, mental anguish and

evacuation and inconvenience. Appellate review of general

damage awards is quite limited. The trial court, as finder of

fact, has “vast discretion” in setting the amount of general

damages. E.g., Youn v. Maritime Overseas Corp., 623 So.2d

1257 (La.1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1114, 114 S.Ct. 1059,

127 L.Ed.2d 379 (1994). So long as the amount of general

damages awarded is not clearly higher (or lower) than

reasonable minds could accept, it may not be disturbed upon

appeal. We may not look to other cases as to the amount of

general damages in the absence of an abuse of discretion by

the trier of fact. Id.

The testimony of the twenty selected plaintiffs

regarding their experiences varies a fair amount which, no

doubt, accounts for the broad range in the amounts of the

awards of damages made by the trial court. The amounts of

the differences between the jury verdicts (which were

rejected by the trial court) and the trial court’s awards vary

also and, presumably, this reflects the trial court’s own

observations of the demeanor and credibility of the twenty

selected plaintiffs. These factors make it somewhat difficult

to generalize about the evidence and the amounts awarded

by the trial court. They also highlight the highly subjective

nature of general damages and the need to avoid second-

guessing the trier of fact in the absence of a clear abuse of

discretion. |

Nevertheless, a few general themes emerge from the

plaintiffs’ testimony and bear noting. The sound of an

explosion, the sight of flames, the smell of smoke and fumes

and the middle-of-the night evacuation combined to produce

46a

fear and confusion which aggravated the fear. The plaintiffs

were exposed to chemical fumes which irritated their eyes —

and respiratory systems and, most of all, made them fearful

for their health. Although their fears are not always

particularized towards cancer, they have the general sense

(correctly) that the chemical exposure they underwent is a

threat to their health. The fact that tank cars continue to

arrive in the neighborhood is a reminder of the GATX 55996

fire and a source of continued anxiety. The security which

one normally feels in one’s home has been eroded and that is

exhibited by behaviors such as keeping a packed suitcase by

the door or sleeping with one’s clothes on.

We believe that there was no abuse of discretion by the

trial court in its awards of compensatory damages to the

twenty selected plaintiffs. The defendants-appellants’

concerns that the jury acted out of bias and prejudice in

setting the amounts of compensatory damages are obviated

because the trial court rejected the jury’s verdicts and set

the amounts of the compensatory damages itself. While this

court, or some other court, may have selected different

general damages awards as an original matter, that isnot the

issue. The trial court’s awards of compensatory damages,

being within a reasonable range, must be affirmed.°

Polysar’s Appeal As To Liability

Polysar was assessed 5% of the liability for compensatory

damages but found not liable for punitive damages. (The

overall assessment of liability for compensatory damages

was: Phillips, 20%; GATC, 20%; CSX, 15%; Mitsui, 15%;

5 In their Answer To Appeal, the plaintiffs argue that the trial court

erred by rejecting the jury verdicts as to compensatory damages and

request that the jury verdicts be reinstated. A review of the facts as to

the compensatory damages as to each of the twenty selected plaintiffs

convinces us that the trial court did not err and that the awards of

compensatory damages made by the trial court were fair and reasonable.

i eeahiiiiimeiaaaaaitailiiaaaaaiaiiaaitiiiiiaiiiiiaiditeaisiiiliiand

47a

AGS, 5%; Illinois Central, 5%, AMF-BRD, 5%; and Polysar,

5%.) Polysar appeals and argues that it should not have been

assessed any liability.

We will pretermit a number of Polysar’s arguments as to

jury instructions, standard of review, whether certain

regulatory duty issues are ones of law or fact, and

admissibility of certain testimony as to regulatory duty

issues by conducting a de novo review of Polysar’s liability.

In doing so, we do not hold that the trial court erred in any

respect. We are simply giving Polysar every benefit of the

doubt so as to simplify the analysis by obviating certain

issues raised by Polysar. Also in the interest of

simplification, we will base our analysis upon only the

plaintiffs’ negligence theory and not upon strict liability. In

accordance with Polysar’s argument, we will analyze the

applicability of the relevant federal regulations as an issue of

law rather than fact.

Polysar argues that it was “simply awaiting delivery” of

the butadiene at the time of the tank car fire. However, it is

also true that Polysar: owned the butadiene when it was

loaded onto GATX 55996 and at the time of the fire;

coordinated the shipment of the butadiene from Good Hope,

Louisiana, through New Orleans and on to Chattanooga;

paid for that shipment; had the authority to tell Mitsui

which tank cars to use; and chose the shipping route through

New Orleans. Polysar was not merely a passive recipient of

the butadiene but was, instead, an active participant in the

transportation of the butadiene. What Polysar did not do

was make any inspection of GATX 55996 (or the other

pressurized tank cars) or take any other actions to determine

whether its butadiene was being transported safely. Polysar

in effect admits that it did nothing to determine whether the

butadiene was being transported safely but contends that it

had no duty to do so.

48a

Whether Polysar had a duty with respect to the safety of

the transportation of its butadiene is an issue of law which

we address de novo:

This court has adopted a duty-risk analysis to

determine whether liability exists under the

particular facts presented. Under this

analysis the plaintiff must prove that the

conduct in question was the cause-in-fact of

the resulting harm, the defendant owed a

duty of care to the plaintiff, the requisite duty

was breached by the defendant and the risk of

harm was within the scope of protection

afforded by the duty breached. Syrie v.

Schilhab, 96-1027, p. 4-5 (La.5/20/97), 693

So.2d 1173, 1176-77; Berry v. State, 93- 2748,

p. 4 (La.5/23/94), 687 So.2d 412, 414. Under

the duty-risk analysis, all four inquiries must

be affirmatively answered for plaintiff to

recover. LeJeune v. Union Pacific R.R., 97-

1843, p. 6 (La.4/14/98), 712 So.2d 491, 494.

A threshold issue in any negligence action is

whether the defendant owed the plaintiff a

duty. Meany v. Meany, 94-0251, p. 6

(La.7/5/94), 689 So.2d 229, 233. Whether a

duty is owed is a question of law. Peterson v.

Gibraltar Sav. & Loan, 98-1601, 98-1609, p. 7

(La.5/18/99), 733 So.2d 1198, 1204; Mundy v.

Dep't of Health & Human Resources, 620

So.2d 811, 818 (La.1998); Fauwcheaux v.

Terrebonne Consol. Gov't, 615 So.2d 289, 292

(La.1993). In deciding whether to impose a

duty in a particular case, the court must make

a policy decision in light of the unique facts

and circumstances presented. See Socorro v.

49a

City of New Orleans, 579 So.2d 931, 938

(La.1991). The court may consider various

moral, social, and economic factors, including

the fairness of imposing liability; the

economic impact on the defendant and on

similarly situated parties; the need for an

incentive to prevent future harm; the nature

of defendant’s activity; the potential for an

unmanageable flow of litigation; the historical

development of precedent; and the direction

in which society and its institutions are

evolving. See Meany, 639 So.2d at 238; Pitre

v. Opelousas Gen. Hosp., 580 So.2d 1151, 1161

(La.1988); Entrevia v. Hood, 427 So.2d 1146,

1149 (La.1983).

Posecai v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 99-1222 (La.11/30/99), 752

So.2d 762, 765-66.

The key dispute with respect to Polysar’s duty revolves

around several federal regulations, which provide as follows:

49 C.F.R. § 171.2(a): General requirements:

No person may offer or accept a hazardous

material for transportation in commerce

unless that person is registered in

conformance with subpart G of part 107 of this

chapter, if applicable, and the hazardous

material is properly classed, described,

packaged, marked, labeled, and in condition

for shipment as required or authorized by

applicable requirements of this subchapter

(including § § 171.11, 171.12, and 176.11 ...).

49 C.F.R. § 172.204(a): Shipper’s

certification: ...Each person who offers a

hazardous material for transportation shall

certify that the material is offered for

50a

transportation in accordance with this

subchapter by printing...on the shipping

paper containing the required shipping

description the certification contained in

paragraph (a)(1) of this section...[ (a) (1) ]

“This is to certify that the above-named

materials are properly classified, described,

packaged, marked and labeled, and are in

proper condition for transportation according

to the applicable regulations of the

Department of Transportation.”

49 C.F.R. § 178.1(b): Purpose and scope: A

shipment of hazardous materials that is not

prepared in accordance with this subchapter

may not be offered for transportation by air,

highway, rail, or water. It is the duty of each

person who offers hazardous materials for

transportation to instruct each of his officers,

agents, and employees having any

responsibility for preparing hazardous

materials for shipment as to applicable

regulations in this subchapter.

49 C.F.R. § 178.81(b)(1): Loading and

Shipping: When tanks are loaded and prior to

shipping, the shipper must determine to the

extent practicable, that the tank, safety

appurtenances and fittings are in proper

condition for the safe transportation of the

lading. Tanks with bottom discharge outlets

must have their outlet caps off, or outlet cap

plugs open, during the entire time tanks are

being loaded. After loading, tanks...which

permit more than a dropping of the liquid

with the outlet caps off...must not be offered

5la

for transportation until proper repairs have

been made. Tanks which show any dropping

or leaking of liquid contents at seams or

rivets, must not be offered for transportation

until proper repairs are made.

49 C.F.R. § 173.31(b)(8): Securing closures:

All closures of openings in tank cars and of

their protective housings must be properly

secured in place by the use of a bar, wrench or

other suitable tool...Manway covers...must be

made tight against leakage of vapor and

liquid, by use of gaskets of suitable materials,

before cars are tendered to carrier for

transportation...all closures of openings in

tenk cars must be inspected to the extent

practical for corrosion of or damage to the

gasket seating surface and for serviceability

of packing, gaskets, and hold-down bolts. All

defective packing, gaskets, bolting or

threaded elements must be replaced.

These regulations, promulgated by the federal

Department of Transportation, do not create any private

right of action for damages. Any claim for damages in this

case arises under Louisiana tort law. However, public safety

regulations such as these, issued by an agency presumed to

have expertise in the relevant subject matter and

statutorily-charged with protecting public safety, are very

useful in determining the standard of care applicable in a

negligence action (i.e. defining the “duty” that is owed by

someone).

It is undisputed that GATX 55996 did not comply with

the above-quoted regulations, and that the required

documentation applicable to GATX 55996 was incorrect, at

the time Polysar’s butadiene was loaded onto GATX 55996

aaa icc ie me es ncn cane

52a

and at the time of the fire. Polysar’s position is that the

federal regulations are not applicable to Polysar. Polysar’s

argument is as follows: The regulations apply only to a

“shipper”, the regulations do not define “shipper” but, in the

present case, Mitsui, and not Polysar, is the “shipper”. We

disagree with Polysar’s initial proposition. The federal

regulations quoted above do not state that, as a group, they

are applicable only to a “shipper” (whatever a “shipper” is).

Section 171.2(a) applies to any “person [who] may offer or

accept a hazardous material for transportation in commerce”.

This seems as applicable to Polysar, whose butadiene was

being transported, as it is to Mitsui. Section 172.204(a)

applies to “[eJach person who offers a hazardous material for

transportation”. This seems more applicable to Polysar,

whose butadiene was being transported, than to Mitsui.

Section 173.1(b) applies to “each person who offers hazardous

materials for transportation”. Again, this seems to apply

more to Polysar, whose butadiene was being transported,

than to Mitsui. Section 173.31(b)(1) refers to the “shipper”

without specifying what is a “shipper”. This could apply ts

either Polysar, the owner of the butadiene seeking to have it

transported, or to Mitsui, the party supplying the tank cars

to carry the butadiene. Section 173.31(b)(8) says nothing as

to whom it is applicable.

Our interpretation of these federal regulations is that

they are applicable to, and thus impose duties upon, both

Polysar and Mitsui. Because of the importance of those

duties to the public safety, we view those duties as non-

delegable as a matter of Louisiana tort law. (Thus, whether

Mitsui is an “independent contractor” to Polysar is of no

moment.) The result is that Polysar (along with Mitsui) had

a duty, as a matter of Louisiana tort law, to exercise the

degree of care specified in the federal regulations. Polysar’s

acknowledged failure to meet the standard of care specified

53a

in the federal regulations mandates the finding that Polysar

was negligent.

AMF-BRD’s Appeal As To Liability

AMF-BRD was held liable for 5% of the compensatory

damages but was held not liable for punitive damages.

AMF-BRD argues that it should not have been held liable at

all or, in the alternative, some of its 5% share of liability

should have been assigned to NACC. AMF-BRD also argues

that, because certain jury charges it requested were not

given, the issue of its liability should be reviewed de novo on

appeal.

We will review de novo the issue of AMF-BRD’s liability.

We will do so not because we decide that the trial court

erred, but in order to simplify the analysis and give AMF-

BRD every possible benefit of the doubt.

AMF-BRD argues that NACC, not AMF-BRD, was at

fault. AMF-BRD manufactured the pressure tank which

NACC then placed on the GATX 55996 rail car chassis.

AMF- BRD notes that it was NACC that specified a bottom

manway for the tank. Thus, AMF-BRD argues, it was not at

fault with respect to the design of the rail car.

However, we do not believe that specification of a bottom

manway is what is most important as to the causation of the

leak and fire. It was established at trial that only an

asbestos gasket should ever have been used with the GATX

55996 bottom manway and, if the asbestos gasket had not

been replaced by Phillips with a rubber gasket, then the leak

and fire would not have occurred. Thus, the key issue with

respect to the liability of AMF-BRD is the failure of AMF-

BRD to stencil or otherwise place a warning on the bottom

manway advising that only an asbestos gasket should be

used.

54a

AMF-BRD argues that it did, in effect, give such a

warning because the specifications and drawings which it

supplied to NACC provided for an asbestos gasket.

However, for a piece of equipment such as a rail car, which is

likely to remain in service for many years, which may well

change hands over the years, and which will undergo

periodic maintenance and repair and perhaps modification,

the specificationsand drawings delivered to the original

owner are no substitute for a warning appearing on the piece

of equipment itself.

AMF-BRD also argues that the GATX 55996 rail car was

intended to be used by sophisticated users and, therefore,

there was no need for AMF-BRD to provide any warning.

However, while intended use by sophisticated users might

weigh against the need for a warning in some circumstances

(at least prior to the enactment of the Louisiana Products

Liability Act), we do not believe that it obviates the need for

a warning when there is a grave and substantial risk to the

public safety at stake. In view of the great risk presented to

the public at large from a leak in a chemical tank car, the fact

that GATX 55996 was intended to be used by professional

rail shippers or railroads does not eliminate the need for an

adequate warning. In that connection, we note that AMF-

BRD, as the designer of the hatch mechanism which closed

the manway, had greatly superior knowledge of the critical

need for an asbestos gasket, and thus should have been well

aware of the need for a warning as to the gasket.

AMF-BRD further argues that, when it placed the

designation “114A” on each end of the tank, it provided a

warning to use an asbestos gasket. However, what the

designation “114A” actually calls for is an asbestos gasket or

an approved high pressure temperature-resistant

equivalent. Thus, the “114A” designation relates to pressure

and temperature. In the present case, the problems with

55a

substituting a rubber gasket for an asbestos gasket result

from the fact that a rubber gasket could be displaced

(apparently because rubber gaskets are less rigid than

asbestos gaskets) and because rubber gaskets, unlike

asbestos gaskets, can react with butadiene so as to develop

leaks. In any event, in light of the critical nature of the need

for an asbestos gasket, and the potential for great danger to

the public, the designation “114A” on the ends of the tank

was not a substitute for an express warning on the manway

to use only asbestos gaskets.

Lastly, AMF-BRD argues that prudent maintenance of

the rail car would have called for substitution of parts of like

kind, i.e., an asbestos gasket for an asbestos gasket.

However, designation “114A” contemplates the possibility of

substitution with a non-asbestos gasket. Moreover, in view

of the critical need for an asbestos gasket and the potential

for danger to the public, it should not be simply assumed that

only an asbestos gasket will be installed during periodic

maintenance. There should be an express warning to use

only an asbestos gasket. We do not mean to suggest that

AMF-BRD’s negligence is equivalent to the fault of Phillips.

However, the 20% allocation of fauit to Phillips was four

times the 5% allocation of fault to AMF-BRD, and that

seems perfectly reasonable. We believe the allocation of a

small percentage of the liability for compensatory damages

to AMF-BRD, 5%, is appropriate.

Interest on Punitive Damages

The trial court awarded prejudgment interest on the

compensatory damages and interest from the date of

judgment on the punitive damages. The plaintiffs, by their

Answer To Appeal, argue that the trial court erred by not

awarding prejudgment interest on the punitive damages.

Based upon the limited available authority from the

56a

Louisiana Supreme Court, we believe that the trial court did

not err.

In Jordan v. Intercontinental Bulktank Corp., 621 So.2d

1141 (La.App. Ist Cir.), writ denied, 623 So.2d 1335, 1336

(La.1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1094, 114 S.Ct. 926-27, 127

L.Ed.2d 219 (1994), it was held:

The trial court also erred in awarding prejudgment

interest on the punitive damages award. Under both

Louisiana and federal law, a plaintiff is entitled to interest on

punitive damages only from date of judgment. Alexander v.

Burroughs Corp., 359 So.2d 607, 613-614 (La.1978);

Malbrough v. Wallace, 594 So.2d 428, 438 (La.App. Ist

Cir.1991), writ denied, 596 So.2d 196 (La.1992); United

States v. Reul, 959 F.2d 1572 (Fed.Cir.1992); Wickham

Contracting Co. v. Local Union No. 3, 955 F.2d 831 (2d

Cir.1992).

621 So.2d at 1158. .

Later, in Sharbono v. Steve Lang & Son Loggers, 97-0110

(La.7/1/97), 696 So.2d 1382, the Louisiana Supreme Court, in

holding that interest on penalties in worker’s compensation

cases runs only from the date of judgment, cited the Jordan

decision with apparent approval:

Finally, there is the matter of interest on

penalties. Both federal and _ state

jurisprudence is nearly uniform in holding

that penalty interest is entirely of the post-

judgment variety, and thus is calculated only

from the date the penalties are awarded until

the date they are paid. E.g., United States v.

Reul, 959 F.2d 1572 (Fed.Cir.1992)

(“Prejudgment interest may not be awarded

on punitive damages.”); Jordan v.

Intercontinental Bulktank Corp., 621 So.2d

57a

1141 (La.Ct.App. Ist Cir.1993), cert. denied,

510 U.S. 1094, 114 S.Ct. 926, 127 L.Ed.2d 219

(1994) (“Under both Louisiana and federal

law, a plaintiff is entitled to interest-on

punitive damages only from date of

judgment.”), citing Alexander, 359 So.2d at

613-14.

696 So.2d at 1389. From this, we believe it most likely that

the Louisiana Supreme Court adopted the Jordan-rule that

prejudgment interest is not to be applied tc punitive

damages. See also Owens v. Anderson, 93-1566 (La.App. 4

Cir. 1/27/94), 631 So.2d 1318, writ denied, 94-0462, 94-0494

(La.4/7/94), 635 So.2d 1135 (rendering decree with

prejudgment interest on compensatory damages and with

interest from date of judgment on punitive damages). The

plaintiffs cite Demarest v. Progressive American Ins. Co.,

552 So.2d 1329 (La.App. 5th Cir.1989), but that case predates

both Sharbono and Jordan and relies upon much earlier

decisions awarding prejudgment interest on penalties and

attorney’s fees, 552 So.2d at 1338-39.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the

trial court. We also remand this case to the trial court for

proceedings as to the question of compensatory damages

with respect to the remaining class members and for any

other proceedings as are necessary to conclude this action.

AFFIRMED. CASE REMANDED FOR FURTHER

PROCEEDINGS.

795 So.2d 364, 2000-0479 (La.App. 4 Cir. 6/27/01)

58a

COURT OF APPEAL OF LOUISIANA

FOURTH CIRCUIT

In re NEW ORLEANS TRAIN CAR LEAKAGE FIRE

LITIGATION.

No. 2000-CA-0479.

Aug. 1, 2001.

Appeal from Civil District Court, Orleans Parish No. 87-

16374, Division “Ad Hoc-B”, Honorable Wallace A. Edwards,

Judge Ad Hoc.

ON APPLICATION FOR REHEARING

JOAN BERNARD ARMSTRONG, Judge.

The application for rehearing of Nova Chemicals, Inc.

(“Polysar’”) is denied. The duty and liability of Polysar was

not determined solely by the ownership of the butadiene, or

by any other single factor, but by the several factors

discussed in our opinion on original hearing.

794 So.2d 956, 2000-0479 (La.App. 4 Cir. 8/1/01)

59a

SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA

In re NEW ORLEANS CAR LEAKAGE FIRE

LITIGATION

No. 2001-C-2492

Oct. 14, 2002

Prior report: La.App., 795 So.2d 364

In re AMF/BRD Inc.;-Defendant; Applying for Writ of

Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District

Court Div. B, Nu. 87-16374; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth

Circuit, No. 2000-CA-0479.

Denied.

VICTORY, J., would grant the writ.

TRAYLOR, J., would grant the writ.

WEIMER, J., would grant the writ.

827 So.2d 411, 2001-2492 (La. 10/14/02)

STATUTORY PROVISIONS

TITLE 49 -APPENDIX. TRANSPORTATION

CHAPTER 27—HAZARDOUS MATERIALS

TRANSPORTATION

NOTE (1993)

(Congressional! Findings: 1990 Amendment)

(Quoting Pub. L. No. 101-615, § 2, 104 Stat. 3244, 3245

(Nov. 16, 1990))

§ 1801. Congressional Declaration of Policy.

* * *

“(3) many States and localities have enacted iaws and

regulations which vary from Federal laws and regulations

pertaining to the transportation of hazardous materials,

thereby creating the potential for unreasonable hazards in

other jurisdictions and confounding shippers and carriers

which attempt to comply with multiple and conflicting

registration, permitting, routing, notification, and other

regulatory requirements,

“(4) because of the potential risks to life, property, and

the environment posed by unintentional releases of

hazardous materials, consistency in laws and regulations

governing the transportation of hazardous materials is.

necessary and desirable,

“(5) in order to achieve greater uniformity and to

promote the public health, welfare, and safety at all levels,

Federal standards for regulating the transportation of

hazardous materials in intrastate, interstate, and foreign

commerce are necessary and desirable.”

“(6) in order to provide reasonable, adequate, and cost-

effective protection from the risks posed by the

transportation of hazardous materials, a network of

6la

adequately trained State and locai emergency response

personnel is required,

“(7) the Office of Technology Assessment has

estimated that approximately 1,500,000 emergency response

personnel need better basic or advanced training for

responding to the unintentional release of hazardous

materiais at fixed facilities and in transportation, and

“(8) the movement of hazardous materials in

commerce is necessary and desirable to maintain economic

vitality and meet consumer demands, and shall be conducted

in a safe and efficient manner.”

* * *

62a

TITLE 49 -APPENDIX. TRANSPORTATION

CHAPTER 27—HAZARDOUS MATERIALS

TRANSPORTATION

(1990)

§ 1811. Relationship to other laws

(a) General

Except as provided in subsection ‘b) of this section, any

requirement, of a State or political subdivision thereof,

which is inconsistent with any requirement set forth in

this chapter, or in a regulation issued under this chapter,

is preempted.

(b) State laws

Any requirement, of a State or political subdivision

thereof, which is not consistent with any requirement set

forth in this chapter, or in a regulation issued under this

chapter, is not preempted if, upon the application of an

appropriate State agency, the Secretary determines, in

accordance with procedures to be prescribed by

regulation, that such requirement (1) affords an equal or

greater level of protection to the public than is afforded

by the requirements of this chapter or of regulations

- issued under this chapter and (2) does not unreasonably

burden commerce. Such requirement shall not be

preempted to the extent specified in such determination

by the Secretary for so long as such State or political

subdivision thereof continues to administer and enforce

effectively such requirement.

(c) Other federal laws

The provisions of this chapter shall not apply to pipelines

which are subject to regulation under the Natural Gas

Pipeline Safety Act of 1968 (section 1671 et seq. of this

title) or to pipelines which are subject to regulation

63a

under Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Safety Act of 1979 [49

U.S.C.A. § 2001 et seq.].

(Pub.L. 93-633, Title I, § 112, Jan. 3, 1975, 88 Stat. 2161.)

(As amended Pub.L. 96-129, Title II, § 216(a), Nov. 30,

1979, 93 Stat. 1015.)

64a

TITLE 49. TRANSPORTATION

SUBTITLE III—GENERAL AND INTERMODAL PROGRAMS

CHAPTER 51—TRANSPORTATION OF HAZARDOUS

MATERIAL

§ 5125. Preemption

(a) General.--Except as provided in subsections (b), (c),

and (e) of this section and unless authorized by another

law of the United States, a requirement of a State,

political subdivision of a State, or Indian tribe is

preempted if—

(1) complying with a requirement of the State,

political subdivision, or tribe and a requirement of

this chapter or a regulation prescribed under this

chapter is not possible; or

(2) the requirement of the State, political subdivision,

or tribe, as applied or enforced, is an obstacle to

accomplishing and carrying out this chapter or a

regulation prescribed under this chapter.

(b) Substantive differences.—(1) Except as provided in

subsection (c) of this section and unless authorized by

another law of the United States, a law, regulation,

order, or other requirement of a State, political

subdivision of a State, or Indian tribe about any of the

following subjects, that is not substantively the same as a

provision of this chapter or a regulation prescribed under

this chapter, is preempted:

(A) the designation, description, and classification

of hazardous material.

(B) the packing, repacking, handling, labeling,

marking, an placarding of hazardous material.

65a

(C) the preparation, execution, and use of

shipping documents related to hazardous material

and requirements related to the number,

contents, and placement of those documents ....

66a

ARTICLE I—THE CONGRESS /

Section 8, Clause 3. Regulation of Commerce

The Congress shall have the power . . . To regulate

Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several

States, and with the Indian Tribes.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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