Appendix — Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Freier

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Appendix A — la

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

Docket No. 00-7724(L), 00-7728(XAP)

303 F.3d 176

RAYMOND FREIER, Individually, as Administrator of the

Estate of Rose Freier, deceased, and as surviving spouse of

Rose Freier, ARTHUR L. PHILLIPS, Administrator of the

Estate of Leo Phillips, deceased, and Dorothy Phillips, as the

surviving Spouse of Leo Phillips, TAB FUQUA,

CHARLOTTE MUCHA, individually, as Executrix of the

Estate of Alfred G. Mucha, deceased, and as surviving

spouse of Alfred Mucha, JOHN FARINO, Administrator of

the Estates of Mary Jane Farino and Robert Farino, deceased,

GRACE ASTOR, individually, and as surviving spouse of

Evo T. Astor, HARRY BASINSKI, SR., ELLEN

BASINSKI, his spouse, KATHY KAMINSKI,

Administratrix of the Estate of Joseph Inzinna, deceased,

MARY YLMAR, MARIE MANOLIS, Executrix of the

Estate of Louis Manolis, deceased, and individually as the

surviving spouse of Louis Manolis, legal representative of

the Estate of Leo Ott, deceased, and Administratrix of Mary

M. Sturm, deceased, WILLIAM NEILSEN, BETTY

BARABASZ, Executrix of the Estate of George Pagels,

deceased, GLORIA PAGELS, Individually as the surviving

spouse of George Pagels, JOSEPH GRANDILLO, executor

of the Estate of Stephen Grandillo, deceased, SHIRLEY

KUCZKA, Executrix of the Estate of Henry Kuczka,

deceased, and individually as the surviving spouse of Henry

Kuczka, MARY ANN BOXHORN, Executrix of the Estates

Appendix A - 2a

of Leo and Annabel Foisset, deceased, EILEEN FOLTS,

Administratrix of the Estate of Helen Hancock, deceased,

FRANKLIN MUELLER, FLORA MUELLER, his spouse,

ROBERT S. FIELS, DELORES FIELS, his spouse, IRENE

M. MARINO, legal representative of the Estate of Anthony J.

Marino, deceased, and individually as the surviving spouse

of Anthony J. Marino, deceased, NANCY FORMAN, CARL

P. FORMAN, SR., her spouse, JOSEPH J. WIEDENBECK,

JR., legal representative of the Estates of Isabelle A.

Wiedenbeck and Joseph J. Wiedenbeck, Sr., deceased,

LINDA KISTKA, legal representative of the Estate of

Nelson M. Hirsch, deceased, NELLY ANTHONY, legal

representative of the Estate of Diane Anthony, deceased,

ELEANOR JASINSKI, legal representative of the Estate of

Leocadia Jasinski, deceased, GEORGE SCHERRER, JR.,

legal representative of the Estate of George Scherrer, Sr.,

deceased, MARIE SCHERRER, individually as the surviving

spouse of George Scherrer, Sr., deceased, VERONICA A.

ZAWATSKI, legal representative of the Estate of Robert

Zawatski, deceased, and individually as surviving spouse,

MICHAEL LAMANCUSO, MARLENE LAMANCUSO,

his spouse, THOMAS SZYPLMAN, legal representative of

the Estate of Victoria Szyplman, deceased, GERALDINE

DAVIES, MORLEY P. DAVIES, her spouse, KEVIN

BATT, individually, as Administrator of the Estate of

Charles W. Batt, deceased, and Executor of the Estate of

Rose E. Batt, deceased, PATRICIA BATT, his spouse,

DONNA MCKOWAN, DONALD MCKOWAN, her spouse,

NORMAN WAGNER, PATRICIA WAGNER, his spouse,

EILEEN EWERT, Administratrix of the Estate of Evo T.

Astor, deceased, THOMAS F. HEWNER, Public

Administrator of the Estate of Lorraine E. Brzezicki,

deceased, LAWRENCE HEANEY, legal representative of

the Estate of Gretchen Heaney, deceased, MARIE

MARTZOLF, Executrix of the Estate of Robert Martzolf,

deceased, and individually as surviving spouse, and

Appendix A - 3a

JACQUELINE MONGIOVI, Executrix of the Estate of

Vincent Mongiovi, deceased, and individually as his

surviving spouse,

Plaintiffs-A ppellants-Cross-Appellees,

V.

WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORPORATION, ALLIED

WASTE SYSTEMS, INC., formerly known as Laidlaw

Waste Systems, Inc., DRESSER INDUSTRIES, INC.,

AMERICAN STANDARD, INC., CARBORUNDUM

COMPANY, and £.!. DUPONT DE NEMOURS & CO.,

INC.,

Defendants-Appellees-Cross-Appellants,

GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, CURTISS.

WRIGHT CORPORATION, WARNER-LAMBERT

COMPANY, and FORD MOTOR COMPANY ‘

Defendants-Third-Party-Plaintiffs-A ppellees-Cross-

Appellants,

LITTON SYSTEMS, INC.,

Defendant-Third-Party-Defendant-Appellee-Cross-

Appellant,

BROWNING-FERRIS INDUSTRIES, INC.,

Defendant-Cross-Appellant,

TRICO PRODUCTS CORPORATION, OCCIDENTAL

CHEMICAL CORPORATION, WASTE MANAGEMENT

OF NEW YORK, INC., NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER

CORPORATION, and NEW YORK STATE ELECTRIC &

GAS CORPORATION,

Third-Party-Defendants-Cross-Appellants,

Appendix A - 4a

HOWDEN FAN COMPANY, formerly known as Buffalo

Forge Company,

Defenuant-Appellee,

W.S. TYLER INC., Defendant, LANCASTER STONE

PRODUCTS CORP., PAUL M. PFOHL, PFOHL

BROTHERS, PFOHL ENTERPRISES, BRYAN PFOHL,

and TOWN OF CHEEKTOWAGA,

Third-Party-Defendants.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Intervenor.

February 15, 2001, Argued

August 15, 2002, Decided

COUNSEL:

For _ Plaintiffs-Appellants-Cross-Appellees: STEVE

JENSEN, Dallas, Texas, (Laura J. Van Pelt, Baron & Budd,

Dallas, Texas, on the brief),

For All Cross-Appellants: LAURIE STYKA BLOOM,

Buffalo, New York (Mark A. Molloy, Nixon, Peabody,

Buffalo, New York, on the brief),

For Intervenor United States of America: R. JUSTIN

SMITH, Attorney, Environment & Natural Resources

Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington,

D.C. (Lois Schiffer, Assistant Attorney General, Stephen J.

Sweeney, Attorney-Advisor, Environmental Protection

Agency, John A. Bryson, Environment & Natural Resources

Division, United States Department of Justice, on the brief),

Appendix A - 5a

For Amicus The Product Liability Advisory Council, Inc., in

support of Appellees: HERZFELD & RUBIN, New York,

New York (Michael Hoenig, Noreen M. Giusti, New York,

New York, Hugh F. Young, Jr., The Product Liability

Advisory Council, Inc., Reston, Virginia, of counsel), filed a

brief on behalf of Amicus Curiae.

JUDGES:

Before: KEARSE, LEVAL, and KATZMANN, Circuit

Judges.

ORDER

Appeal from a judgment entered in the United States District

Court for the Western District of New York pursuant to Fed.

R. Civ. P. 54(b), Richard J. Arcara, Judge, dismissing on

statute-of-limitations grounds certain claims alleging

personal injuries resulting from toxic substances transported

to and maintained in a Cheektowaga, New York landfill.

Cross-appeal seeking affirmance on the ground that the

federal statute relied on by plaintiffs, altering the starting date

of state-law-limitations period applicable to claims of injury

caused by hazardous wastes, see U.S.C. § 9658, is

unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause and the Tenth

Amendment. See, In re Pfohl Brother Landfill Litigation, 26

F.Supp.2d 512 (1998), 68 F.Supp.2d 236 (1999).

Vacated and remanded.

Judge Leval concurs, in a separate opinion.

OPINION

KEARSE, Circuit Judge:

Plaintiffs Raymond Freier et al. appeal from a judgment

entered in the United States District Court for the Western

Appendix A - 6a

District of New York pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b),

Richard J. Arcara, Judge, dismissing certain of their statelaw

tort claims alleging that personal injuries to themselves and

their decedents were caused by toxic substances transported

to and maintained in a Cheektowaga, New York landfill. The

district court granted partial summary judgment dismissing

those claims as _ untimely, ruling that under the

Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,

and Liability Act of 1980 ("CERCLA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-

9675 (1994 & Supp. V 1999), as amended by § 203 of the

Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, 42

U.S.C. § 9658, plaintiffs' claims accrued when they knew or

with reasonable diligence should have known that the injuries

resulted from exposure to hazardous substances deposited in

the landfill, see In re Pfohl Brothers Landfill Litigation, 26

F. Supp. 2d 512 (1998) ("Pfohl J"), but also ruling that

plaintiffs should have suspected the cause of their injuries no

later than the end of 1991 and that therefore, even under 42

U.S.C. § 9658, their claims, asserted beginning in 1995, were

barred by the relevant statute of limitations, see In re Pfohl

Brothers Landfill Litigation, 68 F. Supp. 2d 236 (1999)

("Pfohl II"). On appeal, plaintiffs contend principally that the

court erred in ruling as a matter of law that they should have

known no later than the end of 1991 that their injuries were

caused by the landfill. They also contend that the court

erroneously applied a one-year, rather than a three-year,

limitations period.

Various defendants and third-party defendants have cross-

appealed, urging that the judgment be affirmed in toto on the

ground that 42 U.S.C. § 9658, to the extent that it alters state

law as to the starting date of a state limitations period on

state-law claims, is unconstitutional under the Commerce

Clause and the Tenth Amendment of the Constitution. They

also urge partial affirmance on the ground that § 9658 is

inapplicable to claims involving the death of a plaintiff's

Appendix A - 7a

decedent. The United States has intervened in this Court,

arguing for the constitutionality of § 9658.

For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the district

court properly rejected defendants’ statutory-interpretation

and constitutional challenges to § 9658 and that it properly

found that plaintiffs' claims were subject to the pertinent one-

year limitations period. However, we conclude that there are

triable issues of fact as to the time when plaintiffs reasonably

should have known that the landfill materials were the cause

of the injuries. Accordingly, we vacate and remand for

further proceedings.

I. BACKGROUND

The present actions concern injuries alleged to have resulted

from the maintenance of a landfill owned and operated

principally by third-party-defendants Pfohl Brothers and

Pfohl Enterprises (the "Pfohl Landfill" or "Landfill") in

Cheektowaga, which is adjacent to Buffalo, New York. The

Pfohl Landfill is a 120-acre area used for waste disposal. It

borders Aero Lake, a fishing and swimming site, and is

within a few hundred feet of Ellicott Creek, which is fed by

three tributaries that flow through the Landfill. Ellicott Creek

empties into the Niagara River, an international waterway

between the United States and Canada. Since at least 1983,

the Landfill has been listed in the New York State Registry

of Active Hazardous Waste Disposal Sites.

A. The Parties and the Claims

The present actions, consolidated in the district court for all

pretrial purposes sub nom. In re Pfohl Brothers Landfill

Litigation, were commenced by the filing of several

essentially identical complaints between January 1995 and

January 1997 by more than 60 plaintiffs on behalf of

Appendix A - 8a

themselves or their respective decedents, alleging that the

injured parties suffered from various cancers caused by

exposure to toxic wastes deposited in the Pfohl Landfill. The

complaints alleged that most of the plaintiffs had lived or

worked in the immediate vicinity of the Landfill or had

engaged in recreational activities near the Landfill. Many of

the plaintiffs had used the Landfill area as an access route to

Aero Lake; their children had often played in the Landfill;

and residential properties were sometimes flooded when

Ellicott Creek overflowed.

The defendants are companies that, between 1946 and 1969,

either sent hazardous waste materials from _ their

manufacturing operations to the Landfill or transported

hazardous substances to, and deposited them in, the Landfill.

Plaintiffs alleged that the cancers were caused by exposure to

hazardous substances released from the Landfill through the

air and water and/or released by the defendant transporters on

their way to the Landfill. The complaints asserted survival,

wrongful death, personal injury, and loss-of-consortium

clams under New York State law, and _ requested

compensatory and punitive damages on theories of, inter

alia, strict liability, negligence, gross negligence, and failure

to warn.

B. The Pertinent Statutes of Limitations and Claim-

Accrual Dates

The present appeal focuses solely on questions relating to the

statutes of limitations applicable to plaintiffs’ claims. There

has been no adjudication or concession on the issue of

causation, and nothing in this opinion expresses any view of

this Court on the merits of the causation issue.

The timeliness of the present actions, in which federal

jurisdiction is premised on diversity of citizenship, is

Appendix A - 9a

governed by New York law, see, e.g., Guaranty Trust Co. v.

York, 326 U.S. 99, 109-110, 89 L. Ed. 2079, 65 S. Ct. 1464

(1945); Personis v. Oiler, 889 F.2d 424, 426 (2d Cir. 1989),

to the extent that state law is not preempted by federal law.

As discussed below, New York law reflects a variety of

possible dates on which a toxic tort claim may be found to

have accrued, including (1) the date of the victim's first

exposure to the toxic substance, (2) the date of discovery of

the injury, which could be as late as the time of the victim's

death, and (3) the date of discovery of the injury's cause.

New York's Estates, Powers & Trusts Law ON. YEP.T.L.”

or "EPTL") provides a two-year limitations period for

wrongful death claims, i.e., claims on behalf of a decedent's

distributees (as defined in the EPTL) who suffered pecuniary

loss because of the decedent's death. See N.Y.E.P.T.L. § 5-

4.1 (McKinney 1999). Under that section, the limitations

period begins on the date of the decedent's death.

Section 214(5) of New York's Civil Practice Law and Rules

("N.Y.C.P.L.R." or "CPLR"), and CPLR § 214¢c, which

became effective in July 1986 and modifies § 214(5), govern

claims for personal injury or property damage, including ©

claims for pre-death injuries to a decedent's person or

property ("survival claims"), see N.Y.E.P.TL. § 11-3.2(b)

(McKinney 2001). Section 214-c provides generally for a

three-year limitations period for claims of personal injury

caused by hazardous substances, see N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 214-c

(McKinney 1990); subsection (2) of that section provides

that the limitations period begins on the earlier of the date on

which the injury was discovered or the date when, with

reasonable diligence, the injury should have been discovered

(collectively the "discovery-of-injury" date), see id. § 214-

(2). Subsection (4) further provides that such a claim may

be asserted within one year after the date of discovery of the

injury's cause ("discovery-of-cause” date), so long as the

Appendix A - 10a

discovery-of-cause date is within five years after the

discovery-of-injury date. See id. § 214-c(4). Thus, § 214-

c(4) "gives the plaintiff five years after the discovery (actual

or constructive) of the injury to ascertain its cause. If he does

not (or cannot) discover the etiology within five years, then

he is barred by the statute of limitations." N.Y.C.P.L.R. §

214-c Practice Commentaries, C214-c:4, at 634 (McKinney

1990). Section 214-c(4) also provides that if the toxic tort

claim is not asserted within three years after the discovery-

of-injury date, the plaintiff is required to show that scientific

or medical knowledge "sufficient to ascertain the cause of his

injury had not been discovered, identified or determined"

within that three-year period. N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 214-c(4).

Section 214(5) provides that, except as provided in § 214-c,

claims of personal injury must be brought within three years

of the date of injury. See id . § 214(5) (McKinney 1990). For

purposes of toxic tort claims, the date of injury is interpreted

as the date of first exposure to the hazardous substance. See

Blanco v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 90 N.Y.2d

757, 767, 666 N.Y.S.2d 536, 540, 689 N.E.2d 506 (1997);

Snyder v. Town Insulation, Inc., 81 N.Y.2d 429, 432-33, 599

N.Y.S.2d 515, 516-17, 615 N.E.2d 999 (1993).

Section 9658 of 42 U.S.C., enacted by Congress in 1986 as §

309 of CERCLA, provides a uniform standard for

determining the accrual dates of claims of personal injury

due to exposure to hazardous substances. As set out in

greater detail in Part II.A. below, the section establishes a

"federally required commencement date,” 42 U.S.C. §

9658(a)(1) ("FRCD" or "Federal Commencement Date"), to

start the running of the applicable state period of limitations

governing such a claim. That date is defined as "the date the

plaintiff knew (or reasonably should have known) that the

personal injury or property damages . . .

>

Appendix A - lla

were caused or contributed to by the hazardous substance or

pollutant or contaminant concerned." Jd. § 9658(b)(4)(A).

C. Defendants' First Motion for Partial Summary

Judgment, Seeking Dismissal of the Wrongful Death,

Survival, and Loss-of-Consortium Claims, and

Challenging the Constitutionality of § 9658

Following discovery limited to Statute-of-limitations issues,

defendants moved, in two Stages, for partial summary

judgment dismissing most of plantiffs' claims on the ground

that they were time-barred. In the first Stage, in June 1997

(see Part I.E. below with respect to the second stage),

defendants sought dismissal of the survival, wrongful death,

and loss-of-consortium claims.

Defendants contended that the survival claims were barred by

either CPLR § 214(5) or CPLR § 214c. They argued

essentially that some claims accrued prior to July 1986, i.e.,

prior to the effective date of § 214-c, and hence were

governed by CPLR § 214(5)'s three-year limitations period.

Defendants contended that those Claims were time-barred

because the injured persons were first exposed to the

hazardous wastes no later than 1968, and these suits ‘were

commenced no earlier than 1995.

Defendants contended that virtually all of the remaining

survival claims were barred by CPLR § 214-c(2)'s provision

for a three-year limitations period, running from the earlier of

the date on which the injury was discovered or the date when,

with reasonable diligence, the injury should have been

discovered. Noting that the latest possible discovery-of-

injury date was either the date of diagnosis of the cancerous

condition or the date of the decedent's death, defendants

argued that at most one claim was filed within three years

after the discovery-of-injury date.

Appendix A - 12a

As to the claims for wrongful death, defendants contended

they were barred by N.Y.E.P.T.L. § 5-4.1 because these

actions were commenced more than two years after the

deaths of plaintiffs' decedents. Defendants also contended

that the claims of loss of consortium, being derivative of the

survival and wrongful death claims, could not be maintained

if the underlying claims were dismissed.

In opposing this first summary judgment motion, plaintiffs

did not dispute that their survival and wrongful death claims

were based on injuries to or the deaths of persons who died

between 1963 and 1993. However, they contended that, in

accordance with the Federal Commencement Date set out in

42 U.S.C. § 9658, their claims accrued no earlier than the

date on which they knew or reasonably should have known

the cause of the injuries, arguing that the FRCD preempts

state law with respect to the dates on which their claims

accrued if state law would use an earlier date. Plaintiffs

asserted that they should not reasonably have known the

cause of their own or their decedents' injuries earlier than

December 19, 1994, when they learned the preliminary

findings of a "Pfohl Environmental Health Study” by David

A. Rigle, M.D., and William R. Sawyer, Ph.D. ("the Rigle-

Sawyer Report"), prepared at the request of their attorneys.

Those preliminary findings stated that persons frequenting

the vicinity of the Landfill had an increased risk of

developing cancers, including cancers of the types suffered

by plaintiffs and their decedents, because of the toxic wastes

stored at the Landfill. Plaintiffs also argued that the

determination of the dates on which they reasonably should

have known the cause of the injuries was not an appropriate

matter for summary judgment.

Because pretrial discovery had not yet been completed,

defendants did not, in their first summary judgment motion,

Appendix A - 13a

argue for a reasonable discovery-of-cause date earlier than

December 1994, but they argued that the Federal

Commencement Date was either inapplicable or

unconstitutional. They contended that it was inapplicable

because, in focusing on "any action brought under State law

for personal injury or property damages," 42 U.S.C. §

9658(a)(1), the FRCD was not meant to apply to a claim

based on the death of a person other than the plaintiff. They

argued that the FRCD was unconstitutional because the

attempt to preempt state law as to the time of accrual of a

State cause of action for purposes of a state Statute of

limitations exceeded Congress's powers under the Commerce

Clause and was an intrusion on state sovereignty in violation

of the Tenth Amendment.

D. The District Court's Rejection of the Statutory

Interpretation and Constitutional Challenges, and Its

Partial Denial of Summary Judgment

In an order dated October 27, 1998, the district court adopted

the recommendations of Magistrate Judge Leslie G. F oschio,

to whom the matter had been referred, see Pfohl I, 26 F.

Supp. 2d at 516-50 (reprinting and adopting Magistrate

Judge's Report and Recommendation dated March 11, 1998),

and granted defendants' motion in part and denied it in part.

The court noted that, if federal law were not applicable, all of

plaintiffs' wrongful death claims and virtually all of their

survival claims would be time-barred. The wrongful death

claims would be barred by N.Y.E.P.T.L. § 5-4.1 because

plaintiffs' respective decedents died more than two years

prior to the commencement of these actions. The survival

claims would be barred either (a) by CPLR § 214(5) because

they were not asserted within three years after the dates of

first exposure to the Landfill's allegedly toxic substances,

which “occurred between the early 1900's . . . and the late

1960's," Pfohl I, 26 F. Supp. 2d at 520, or (b) by CPLR §

|

Appendix A - 14a

214-c because the discoveries of the injuries occurred

between 1961 and 1993, and the claims were not asserted

within three years after those discoveries or within one year

after discovery of the cause of the injuries, see Pfohl J, 26 F.

Supp. 2d at 521.

The district court ruled, however, that § 9658, which the

court concluded was intended to apply to survival and

wrongful death claims as well as to other types of personal

injury claims, provides a toxic-tort-claim accrual date that

preempts state law to the extent that state law would

otherwise set an earlier accrual date. The court thus

concluded that New York's use of the date of death as the )

accrual date for a wrongful death cause of action was 7

superseded by the Federal Commencement Date, as was the

maximum five-year period allowed, on other types of toxic

tort claims, for discovery of the cause following the

discovery of the injury.

The court also rejected defendants’ challenges to the

constitutionality of the Federal Commencement Date. It

found no violation of the Commerce Clause, reasoning that

CERCLA regulates interstate commerce and that § 9658 is an

integral part of the CERCLA regulatory scheme:

To exclude congressional regulation of accrual rules even

if limited to toxic torts arising from wholly intrastate

releases of hazardous wastes would frustrate Congress['s]

purpose to provide greater access to the courts for injured

parties as part of its comprehensive response to the

national problem of controlling and remediating the

effects of release of dangerous contaminants. Lack of

uniformity in achieving redress in state courts for toxic

torts would also lead to potential competitive imbalances

in the hazardous wastes disposal industry based on

differing schemes for invoking relevant statutes of repose.

Appendix A - 15a

Therefore, the FRCD is an essential part of a nationai

regulatory system established by CERCLA and represents

a valid exercise of congressional power.

26 F. Supp. 2d at 543; see also id. ("The deterrent effect of

[the FRCD] accrual formula, if it had existed earlier, upon

would-be polluters could have helped to prevent the well

documented assaults on the nation's natural environment by

toxic substance producing industries and others."). The court

also concluded that § 9658 does not violate the Tenth

Amendment, reasoning principally that the FRCD does not

regulate the content of state law but rather regulates access to

the courts. See id. at 545.

Nonetheless, the district court ruled that some of plaintiffs’

claims were time-barred even given the application of the

FRCD. It interpreted § 9658 as superseding a more restrictive

state law only with respect to the date on which a claim

accrues, not with respect to the length of the limitations

period. The court concluded that, given plaintiffs’ failure to

assert the survival claims within three years of the discovery-

of-injury date, those claims, to be timely, should have been

asserted within one year after plaintiffs discovered the cause

of the injuries. In light of plaintiffs’ admission that they had

discovered that cause as early as December 19, 1994, the

court ruled that survival claims that were filed later than

December 19, 1995, were time-barred. The court granted

summary judgment dismissing those claims. As the court

could not, at the time of Pfohl J, determine whether a date

earlier than December 19, 1994, might be the appropriate

discovery-of-cause date, it denied defendants’ motion to

dismiss any survival claims asserted prior to December 19,

1995.

The court also denied defendants' motion to dismiss the

wrongful death claims because, assuming that plaintiffs

Appendix A - 16a

discovered the cause of their respective decedents' injuries in

December 1994, all of those claims (except those asserted in

January 1997, which were not encompassed by the summary

judgment motion because pretrial discovery proceedings had

not been completed) had been filed within two years of the

discovery-of-cause date and hence were timely. Finally, the

court noted that it was possible that plaintiffs might have

timely claims for loss of consortium appurtenant to timely

survival claims, and it thus denied the motion to dismiss the

loss-of-consortium claims as well.

E. Defendants' Second Motion for Partial Summary

Judgment, Seeking Dismissal of Plaintiffs' Own Personal

Injury Claims

In November 1997, during the pendency of their first motion

for partial summary judgment dismissing the survival,

wrongful death, and loss-of-consortium claims, defendants

filed a second motion for partial summary judgment, this one

seeking dismissal of claims for personal injuries suffered by

the plaintiffs themselves. Defendants argued that, even

assuming the Federal Commencement Date applied, those

claims, first asserted in 1995, were barred by the one-year

statute of limitations because they had accrued no later than

the end of 1991 when, defendants contended, there existed

sufficient publicly available information to put a reasonable

person on notice to investigate whether there was a causal

connection between his or her illness and the Landfill.

1. Defendants' Evidence of Publicity and Warnings

In support of their contention that by the end of 1991

plaintiffs should have known that their cancers were caused

by the Landfill, defendants stated, inter alia, that beginning

in 1986, large bright yellow signs warning "DANGER

HAZARDOUS WASTE AREA UNAUTHORIZED

RAR SR NTANG RPA LS RH NE RETRO AD PENT PRIS, ~

Appendix A - 17a

PERSONNEL KEEP OUT" were posted around the

perimeter of the Landfill. Defendants submitted copies of

official communications of caution, numerous newspaper

articles reporting on studies by the New York State ("State"

Departments of Health ("DOH") and Environmental

Conservation ("DEC"), and many expressions of public

concem with respect to the possibility that the Pfohl Landfill

contained hazardous wastes. Defendants’ exhibits included

the following:

- An April 15, 1986 letter to DOH from a Cheektowaga

Town Councilman requesting an assessment of the

Pfohl Landfill and another site, Stating that he had

"observed flows into ditches and drainage channels

leading to Ellicott Creek as well as along public

highways. . . . Both locations are of great concern to

the Town Board and are a matter of growing public

interest."

- A May 31, 1986 article in The Buffalo News

reporting that the Pfohl Landfill was "among 194

considered by the state to pose the most serious threat

to the public and safety."

- A December 10, 1986 Memorandum of DEC stating

that

although there is a public health concern, there is

no known immediate health danger associated

with this site at this time. The waming signs

erected address our concerns with public access to

the site and to decrease the possibility of public

exposure. Nearby property owners are advised to

keep children away from site.

Appendix A - 18a

- An October 11, 1988 DEC letter to "Concerned

Citizens," noting that "preliminary investigations"

revealed that

the existence of low level radiation has been

identified in several areas of the landfill. After ;

consultation with the New York State Department |

of Health . . ., it has been determined that the site

in its present state with the levels of radiation

currently encountered does not present any

immediate threat to public health.

- An October 14, 1988 article in The Buffalo News

describing the above DEC letter and stating that

[e]vidence of low-level radiation has led state

environmental engineers to caution persons not to

enter the Pfohl Brothers landfill, a 120-acre

former garbage and industrial waste dump in the

northwest corner of Cheektowaga.

The article quoted a DEC engineer as stating:

"We have been assured by the state Health

Department that the radiation levels pose no threat

to the public, . . . . But as an added safety

precaution, we are sending letters to area residents

and businesses asking them to avoid the site."

- A November 2, 1989 article in The Buffalo News

stating that a state expert reported "very, very

minimal risk’ but that DEC officials cautioned

people to avoid the area where warnings had been

posted.

Appendix A - 19a

- An April 22, 1990 article in the suburban Buffalo

Metro Community News reporting that "one of the

area's top biologists" had criticized the methodology

of DEC's studies.

- An August 1990 announcement by DOH of a public

meeting in Cheektowaga to discuss the health

assessments relating to the Landfill and the studies

being conducted by DOH; the announcement also

Stated that DOH official Dr. James Melius would be

available for individual consultations "to discuss [the

resident's] health concerns as they relate to the Pfohl

Brothers Landfill."

- An October 24, 1990 article in The Buffalo News

reporting that tests showed lead levels at a site

adjacent to the Landfill to be in excess of state

standards.

Defendants noted that a number of concemed citizens of

Cheektowaga and neighboring towns had formed committees

to gather information about the Pfohl Landfill. In April 1990,

one such group, the Pfohl Brothers Landfill Citizen Action

Group (later renamed the Pfohl Brothers Landfill Cleanup

Committee ("Cleanup Committee")), announced a public

meeting to be held on April 24, 1990, to question the level of

danger from chemical contamination at the Pfohl Landfill.

The announcement stated that "Luella Kenny, former Love

Canal resident, will discuss her experiences at Love Canal in

the context of our concerns about action on the Pfohl

Brothers Landfill."

Defendants also submitted a March 1991 report of the Cancer

Surveillance Program of DOH's Bureau of Cancer

Epidemiology, entitled "Cancer Incidence in the

Cheektowaga/ Ellicott Creek Area, Erie County, New York"

Appendix A - 20a

for the period 1978-1987 ("1991 DOH Report on 1978-1987

Cancer Incidence"). The study, undertaken in response to

"community concerns about cancer patterns in the

Cheektowaga/Ellicott Creek area" (1991 DOH Report on

1978-1987 Cancer Incidence at 1), focused on three census

tracts, Nos. 89.00, 96.00, and 100.01. This report stated that

"the number of observed cancer cases among females was

significantly greater than the number expected” (id. at 2), and

that "only one of the three census tracts which comprised the

study area exhibited a significant excess of breast cancer

cases (census tract 100.01)" (id. at 6). Although not specified

in the report, census tract No. 100.01 included the Pfohl

Landfill.

In sum, defendants argued that before the end of 1991, the

Pfohl Landfill had been the subject of more than 100

newspaper articles, dozens of public meetings, and numerous

government reports and letters. Defendants contended that no

reasonable person who lived or worked near the Landfill

could still have been unaware of the health hazards posed by

the Landfill and that the public displays and reports of health

concems were sufficient to put a reasonable person on notice

as to the need to investigate such concerns.

2. Plaintiffs' Evidence of Official Reassurances

In opposition to this summary judgment motion, plaintiffs

reiterated that the earliest they could reasonably have known

that the Pfohl Landfill caused their cancers was December

1994, when they received the preliminary findings of the

Rigle-Sawyer Report stating that persons frequenting that

vicinity had an increased risk of developing cancers,

including cancers of the types suffered by plaintiffs and their

decedents, because of the toxic wastes stored at the Landfill.

Plaintiffs argued that although local citizens had theretofore

questioned various governmental entities as to whether the

Appendix A - 21a

Landfill wastes were carcinogenic, they had invariably

received assurances that the area was safe. As summarized by

plaintiffs’ attorney,

prior to December of 1994, not a single expert advised

residents, workers, or others that the Pfohl Brothers

Landfill had caused a higher incidence of cancer in the

area surrounding the landfill. To the contrary, the experts

that the plaintiffs/residents counted on for answers to

their health questions--the New York State Department of

Health--affirmatively stated that the landfill was not

responsible for any health problems in the area.

(Affidavit of Laura J. Van Pelt dated December 19, 1997

("Van Pelt Aff."), ¥ 3, at 3.)

In support of these assertions, plaintiffs submitted, inter alia,

the affidavit of former DOH official Dr. James M. Melius,

M.D., who had been the Director of DOH's Division of

Occupational Health and Environmental Epidemiology from

1988 to 1995 and had supervised the preparation of several

DOH studies relating to the Pfohl Landfill. These included a

1991 health survey of residents and workers in the area

surrounding the Landfill, a 1991 testing of the levels of lead

in the blood of 20 children living in the area surrounding the

Landfill, and the 1991 DOH Report on 1978-1987 Cancer

Incidence (which, as noted in Part I.E.1. above, was relied on

by defendants in support of their motion for summary

judgment).

Dr. Melius stated that "the health survey did not reveal any

unusual patterns of reported illnesses among residents or

workers." (Affidavit of Dr. James M. Melius dated December

17, 1997 ("Melius Aff."), 994.) And at a March 1991 public

meeting, Dr. Melius "told the residents that the DOH's health

survey did not reveal any general pattern of illness that could

Appendix A - 22a

be related to exposure to chemicals from the Pfohl Brothers

Landfill." (Id. ¥ 8.)

As to the 1991 blood-lead-level study, Dr. Melius stated that

it had revealed that the lead levels in the children's blood

were very low, and DOH had concluded (a) that there was no

way to determine whether such lead as was present resulted

from exposure to the Landfill, and (b) that in any event, the

sources of the lead were immaterial because the levels were

so low as to give no cause for concern. (/d. { 2.) Dr. Melius

also relayed this information to area residents at public

meetings and in writing, making an "effort to communicate

to residents that there was no cause for concern with respect

to the issue of children being exposed to lead from the Pfohl

Brothers Landfill." (/d. ¥ 3.)

As to the 1991 DOH Report on 1978-1987 Cancer Incidence,

Dr. Melius stated that "the number of observed cancer cases

among females was significantly greater than expected;

however, much of the overall excess among females was

attributable to the significant excess of breast cancers and a

non-significant excess of lung cancers." (Id. § 5). Dr. Melius

stated that he discussed these results with area residents at a

public meeting held in March 1991 immediately after

publication of the study results; that he told them that "the

observed excess of breast cancer cases may be due to

income, socioeconomic factors, increased cancer screening

activities, and personal lifestyle and medical history factors"

(id. { 7); and that neither he nor any other DOH employee "in

any way" linked the excessive number of breast cancers to

the Landfill:

I never told any member of the public, at this meeting or

otherwise, that the significant excess of breast and

prostate cancer cases was in any way related to the Pfohl

Brothers landfill. To the best of my knowledge, no

Appendix A - 23a

employee of the New York State Department of Health

ever told any member of the public, at this meeting or

otherwise, that the significant excess of breast and

prostate cancer cases was in any way related to the Pfohl

Brothers landfill.

7. At the March 1991 public meeting discussed in

paragraph 6 above, I. . . told the residents that there is

almost no information available that indicates that breast

cancer may be related to exposure to chemicals.

(/d. $f] 6-7 (emphases added).) Dr. Melius assured the

residents that DOH would follow up on the cancer-incidence

study to investigate the possible causes of the high incidence

of prostate and breast cancers.

The promised reports on follow-up studies of cancer

incidence were issued by DOH in November 1991, and none

of them revealed any linkage with the Pfohl Landfill. Dr.

Melius stated that "the follow-up study [on breast cancer] did

not find a connection between breast cancer and the Pfohl

Brothers Landfill because most of the women who had breast

cancer had little reported potential exposure to contamination

from the landfill." (Melius Aff. J 9.) The follow-up study of

prostate cancer likewise "did not find a connection between

prostate cancer and the Pfohl Brothers Landfill because no

prostate cancer cases were located east of the Greater Buffalo

International Airport, which is where the landfill is located."

(Jd. 10.) In addition,

DOH never found a statistically Significant difference

from the expected number of newly diagnosed cases for

leukemia, lymphoma and female lung cancer. However,

we examined the geographical distribution of these

cancers because we were requested to do so... . We did

not find a connection between leukemia, lymphoma or

Appendix A - 24a

female lung cancer and the Pfohl Brothers Landfill

because we did not find a clustering of any of these

cancers around the landfill.

(Id. J 11 (emphasis added).)

Dr. Melius communicated these follow-up results to the

public, both orally and in writing "as soon as they were

available." (Jd. { 12.) He also noted that

at several public meetings that I attended in the early

1990's (both before and after the DOH health survey and

cancer incidence results were announced), residents

requested that homes near the Pfohl Brothers Landfill be

bought by the State of New York. At each of these

meetings, representatives of the New York State

Departments of Health and Environmental Conservation

(including myself) explained to the public that the State

could not relocate residents unless there was documented

evidence of a health threat, and that no such documented

evidence existed.

Id. § 13 (emphasis added). Summarizing DOH's

communications with the public as to the results of its many

studies, Dr. Melius stated that

while I was the Director of the Division of Occupational

Health and Environmental Epidemiology of the New

York State Department of Health, I never told the public

or any member thereof, at a meeting or otherwise, that

any individual person's cancer, any particular type of

cancer, any increased incidence of any particular type of

cancer, or cancer in general was related in any way to the

Pfohl Brothers Landfill. To the best of my knowledge,

while I was the Director of the Division of Occupational

Health and Environmental Epidemiology of the New

Appendix A - 25a

York State Department of Health, no employee of the

Department of Health ever told the public or any member

thereof, at a meeting or otherwise, that any individual

person's cancer, any particular type of cancer, any

increased incidence of any particular type of cancer, or

cancer in general was related in any way to the Pfohl

Brothers Landfill.

(Id. 4 15.)

Along with Dr. Melius's affidavit, plaintiffs submitted the

reports and studies to which that affidavit referred. The Van

Pelt affidavit also attached several other governmental

reports, excerpts from more than a dozen depositions, and

scores of news articles, including the following:

An October 26, 1989 article in the Cheektowaga Bee

bearing the headline " Radiation at Pfohl site not over

limits" and reporting that, although DOH warned that

people should not pick up or take any objects from

the site, DEC concluded, based on supplemental

testing of the radiation level at the Landfill, that "'the

site does not represent an immediate a

health hazard."

A November 2, 1989 article in The Buffalo News

(also attached to defendants' summary judgment

motion) reporting that two studies concluded that the

radiation risks to the area were minimal, and that

elevated radiation readings were not being detected

off the Pfohl Landfill site.

A March 30, 1990 article in The Buffalo News (also

attached to defendants’ summary judgment motion)

bearing the headline "State calls Pfohl dump no big

risk" and reporting that a DEC report to be made

Appendix A - 26a

available that day stated that the Landfill contains

radioactive hot spots, but that the levels are within

safe limits, and that "‘exposure to radiation on the site

presents little, if any, public health hazard." The

article stated that

DEC minimized the exposure threat saying:

- Most of the materials are buried and exposure to

radiation is therefore reduced due to the distance

and shielding provided by the soil.

- Transport of surface radioactive material off the

site by wind is unlikely because the site has heavy

vegetation and is wet in many areas.

- Radioactivity found in samples of ground water,

sediment and seepage is at normal background

levels showing that radioactive materials are not

migrating off the site.

The department did warn, however, that "direct

contact with radioactive materials should be

discouraged" and re-emphasized its warning that

people should stay off the property. It has both

fenced and posted signs warning of hazardous

materials.

- A November 15, 1990 article in The Buffalo News

(also attached to defendants’ summary judgment

motion) bearing the headline "No health threat found

in Pfohl Road soil tests" and stating that, according to

DOH,

Appendix A - 27a

scientists found no significant health threat from

chemicals discovered in soil samples around

homes south of the Pfohl Brothers dump....

Among the state's conclusions from the site in

Cheektowaga are:

- There are no detectable levels of PCBs in the soil

at the dump or off the site.

- Levels of dioxin and furans are only a fraction of

the level necessary to require federal remedial

action.

- Levels of heavy metal are "within the expected

range for suburban areas."

A March 26, 1991 article in The Buffalo News (also

attached to defendants’ summary judgment motion)

with the headline "Study finds higher cancer rate near

Pfohl site," describing the 1991 DOH Report on

1978-1987 Cancer Incidence, including findings that

"people living near the Pfohl Brothers dump in

Cheektowaga have exhibited higher than expected

rates of breast and prostate cancer," and that there

were "higher than expected instances of lymphoma

and leukemias, but not high enough to be classified as

a ‘significant excess statistically." The article cited

Dr. Melius as stating that "preliminary conclusions

Show . . . the increase [in the incidence of breast and

prostate cancer] is likely related to income,

socioeconomic and status factors"; that, based on the

current, incomplete, information, "it's unlikely it's

related to chemical exposures"; and that "'we can't

tell whether the landfill is responsible.""

Appendix A - 28a

A December 17, 1991 article in The Buffalo News

with the headline "Study can't link Pfohl landfill to

cancer,” reporting that state health officials’ follow-up

study of the higher-than-expected rates of cancers in

the same census tract as the Landfill "failed to

uncover any evidence of ‘clustering’ of prostate

cancer, leukemia, lymphoma and female lung cancer

near the inactive dump."

A December 26, 1991 article in the Cheektowaga

Times with the headline "Health Department studies

fail to link landfill to cancer," reporting that

"according to recent reports released by the New

York State Department of Health, no link exists

between the Pfohl Brothers Landfill site and cancer

incidence for those residents living on or near the

dump site."

A December 2, 1993 article in the Cheektowaga

Times headlined "Ground water uncontaminated near

Pfohl dump" and stating that "ground water

surrounding the Pfohl Brothers dump has turned up

clean in all studies performed so far."

An August 1994 DOH report entitled, "Summary of

Cancer Inquiry for 1020 Rein Road, Cheektowaga,"

accompanied by a letter to residents of Cheektowaga

stating that "none of the patterns of a true cancer

cluster were found. . . . No evidence was found for a

common environmental cause.”

An August 1994 assessment by the United States

Department of Health and Human Services's Agency

for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry

("USATSDR") of the Pfohl Landfill that "the

proposed Pfohl Brothers Landfill National Priorities

Appendix A - 29a

List Site represents no apparent public health hazard

at the present time because available data do not

indicate exposures to contaminants in the

environmental media to be high enough to cause

adverse health effects." (Emphasis in original.) The

USATSDR report also stated that "the results of

NYSDOH's epidemiologic investigations, along with

the lack of evidence of large scale exposure to site

contaminants, indicates that the occurrence of cancer

is probably not related to the site."

- An August 26, 1994 article in The Buffalo News

stating: "Two studies by federal and state agencies

refute charges that contamination from the Pfohl

Brothers dump in Cheektowaga has caused serious

health problems."

Plaintiffs also stated that although the Pfohl Landfill Cleanup

Committee met with officials of DOH and DEC to seek

information as to whether toxic materials were emanating

from the Landfill, no more than one of the plaintiffs was a

member of the group. (See Van Pelt Aff. J 5, at 5 n.4.)

Further, plaintiffs argued that, even had they been members

of such groups, they would have had no reason to know that

the Landfill contents were carcinogenic because those groups

received assurances from the State agencies that the Landfill

was safe. For example, Cleanup Committee President and

Chairperson Elinor Weiss testified in her deposition that at

one meeting, DOH and DEC representatives told those

present that "the discovery of radioactivity at the [Landfill]

was ‘not that important’ because [the officials] 'said that you

could get more radiation from sleeping with your spouse than

from standing on the Pfohl dump.” (/d. ¥ 5, at 6 (quoting

Deposition of Elinor Weiss at 24).)

Appendix A - 30a

F. The Granting of Summary Judgment

In an order dated September 22, 1999, the district court

accepted the recommendations of Magistrate Judge Foschio

on the second summary judgment motion, see Pfohl II, 68 F.

Supp. 2d at 240-63 (reprinting and adopting Magistrate

Judge's Report and Recommendation dated February 12,

1999), and granted, as to virtually all of plaintiffs’ claims,

defendants’ motion to dismiss. The court found that plaintiffs

had not "shown . . . that a material issue of fact exists as to

the earliest time when they should have reasonably

discovered the cause of their alleged injury making their

claims timely under § 214-c(4) as modified by § 9658," Pfohl

IT, 68 F. Supp. 2d at 251.

Noting that CPLR § 214-c(4) provides that if the action is not

filed within three years of the date of discovery of the injury,

the plaintiff is required to

"allege and prove that technical, scientific or medical

knowledge and information sufficient to ascertain the

cause of his injury had not been discovered, identified or

determined prior to the expiration of the period within

which the action or claim would have been authorized,"

Pfohl IT, 68 F. Supp. 2d at 247 (quoting N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 214

c(4)), the court stated that plaintiffs were required to show

that they filed their actions

within one year of the discovery of the causes of such

injuries and . . . that the state of medical, technological

and scientific knowledge and information was insufficient

such that it was not possible to discover the cause of their

injuries within time to commence the instant actions

within three years from the discovery of their cancers,

Appendix A - 3la

Pfohl IT, 68 F. Supp. 2d at 248.

As discussed in Part II.D. below, the court found that

plaintiffs could and should have developed a "reasonable

suspicion" that their cancers were caused by the Landfill by

the end of 1991. Jd. 68 F. Supp. 2d at 253. It found that the

"plethora of exhibits" submitted by defendants,

consisting of government and media reports as well as

other publicly available information pertaining to at least

three citizen groups concerned with the effect of the

Landfill on neighboring areas and residents, indicating

that Plaintiffs should have developed a reasonable

Suspicion as to the cause of their injuries prior to the end

of 1991. These exhibits establish that a highly publicized

controversy existed within the local community over

whether the Landfill posed a threat to the health and

safety of those who resided or worked in the vicinity of

the Landfill.

Id. (footnote omitted). Based on these exhibits, the court

reiterated its view that the plaintiffs could reasonably have

Suspected the cause of their cancers by the end of 1991,

Stating that it was

more than reasonable that, given the volume of

information available to the public prior to 1992,

Plaintiffs could be expected to reasonably suspect the

cause of their cancers before the end of 1991. The vast

number of media and government reports Defendants

submitted in support of summary judgment were all

available prior to the end of 1991.

Id. at 254.

Appendix A - 32a

Noting plaintiffs' reliance on the RigleSawyer Report's

preliminary findings in December 1994 as their earliest

reason to believe that the Landfill was the cause of their own

and their decedents' injuries, the court found their reliance

flawed because plaintiffs did not show that they could not

have obtained such a report sooner:

Plaintiffs have submitted no evidence or any explanation

as required under § 214-c(4) why it was not possible to

obtain a "scientific" opinion similar to the one contained

in the Rigle-Sawyer Report on which they rely in support

of their contention that the FRCD occurred no earlier than

December 1994, substantially prior to that date. The

March and November 1991 DOH cancer incidence

reports as well as the Rigle-Sawyer Report all compare

the incidence of specific types of cancer diagnosed in

persons who lived or worked near the Landfill with the

expected incidence of similar types of cancer occurring

within the general population. It is undisputed that the

conclusions reached by the DOH reports issued in March

and November 1991 and the Rigle-Sawyer Report differ

as to whether any elevation in the incidence of any

particular type of cancers occurring among those who

lived or worked near the Landfill could be attributed to

the hazardous and toxic substances known to have been

deposited into the Landfill. A review of the February

1991 report [a DOH February 8, 1991 report based on

water samples collected in October 1990, which

"concluded that the levels of hazardous and toxic

substances detected in the residences was not sufficient to

threaten human health,” Pfohi I, 68 F. Supp. 2d at 255]

indicates that the DOH used different methods than Drs.

Rigle and Sawyer to obtain specimens for the chemical

analysis contained in those reports. Plaintiffs do not,

however, contend that the findings contained in the Rigle-

Sawyer Report are based on scientific testing techniques

Appendix A - 33a

or statistical analysis that could not have been performed

earlier than 1994. Nor do Plaintiffs deny [sic] that the

Rigle-Sawyer Report does anything other than draw

correlations between the incidence of reported cancers in

the vicinity of the Landfill and the type of hazardous and

toxic substances detected in the Landfill. In any event, if

the Rigle-Sawyer Report is based on technical, scientific

or medical knowledge developed after the dates of the

earlier DOH study, Plaintiffs have not, as required by

Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e), demonstrated it.

Pfohl II, 68 F. Supp. 2d at 259 (emphases added).

On this basis, the court concluded that Virtually all of

plaintiffs' claims were time-barred. Judgment was entered on

the dismissed claims pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b); the

claims not found untimely were severed from the

consolidated proceedings and are not at issue on this appeal.

II. DISCUSSION

On appeal, plaintiffs do not challenge the district court's

ruling that, if 42 U.S.C. § 9658 were inapplicable or

unconstitutional, their claims would be time-barred under

New York law. Rather, they contend principally that the

court erred in ruling as a matter of law that they reasonably

should have known the cause of the injuries before the end of

1991 and that the Federal Commencement Date was thus no

later than the end of 1991. They also contend that the court

erroneously ruled that they were invariably required to file

Suit within one year after the discovery-of-cause date, even if

that period would end less than three years after the

discovery-of-injury date. Various defendants and _ third-

party-defendants have cross-appealed, seeking affirmance, in

whole or in part, on the grounds (1) that the FRCD does not

apply to wrongful death or survival claims, and (2) that, in

Appendix A - 34a

purporting to alter state law as to the commencement date of

a state limitations period for state-law claims, the FRCD (a)

exceeds Congress's powers under the Commerce Clause, and

(b) violates the Tenth Amendment.

For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the district

court properly rejected defendants’ statutory-interpretation

and constitutional challenges to § 9658 and that it properly

found that plaintiffs' claims were subject to the one-year

limitations period following the discovery-of-cause date; but

we conclude that there were triable issues of fact as to the

time when plaintiffs reasonably should have known the cause

of the injuries. As the resolution of defendants' challenges to

the applicability and constitutionality of § 9658 is essential to

the resolution of this appeal, and as plaintiffs concede that

their claims would be time-barred under state law if the

Federal Commencement Date were not applied, we address

defendants’ challenges first.

A. Defendants' Statutory Interpretation Challenges

To the extent pertinent to these actions, the Superfund

Amendments to CERCLA provide as follows:

§ 9658. Actions under State law for damages from exposure

to hazardous substances

(a) State statutes of limitations for hazardous substance

cases

(1) Exception to State statutes

In the case of any action brought under State law for

personal injury, or property damages, which are caused or

contributed to by exposure to any hazardous substance, or

pollutant or contaminant, released into the environment from

Appendix A - 35a

a facility, if the applicable limitations period for such action

(as specified in the State statute of limitations or under

common law) provides a commencement date which is

earlier than the federally required commencement date, such

period shall commence at the federally required

commencement date in lieu of the date specified in such State

Statute.

(2) State law generally applicable

Except as provided in paragraph (1), the statute of

limitations established under State law shall apply in all

actions brought under State law for personal injury, or

property damages, which are caused or contriouted to by

exposure to any hazardous substance, or pollutant or

contaminant, released into the environment from a facility.

(b) Definitions.

As used in this section--

(1) Subchapter I terms

The terms used in this section Shall have the same

meaning as when used in subchapter I of this chapter.

(2) Applicable limitations period

The term "applicable limitations period" means the period

specified in a statute of limitations during which a civil

action referred to in subsection (a)(1) of this section may be

brought.

(3) Commencement date

Appendix A - 36a

The term "commencement date" means the date specified

in a statute of limitations as the beginning of the applicable

limitations period.

(4) Federally required commencement date

(A) In general

[With exceptions not relevant here,] the term "federally

required commencement date" means the date the plaintiff

knew (or reasonably should have known) that the personal

injury or property damages referred to in subsection (a)(1) of

this section were caused or contributed to by the hazardous

substance or pollutant or contaminant concerned.

42 U.S.C. § 9658. Subchapter I of CERCLA defines

"facility" to include any " landfill, storage container, [or]

motor vehicle” and "any site or area where a hazardous

substance has been deposited, stored, disposed of, or placed."

Id. § 9601(9). The term "release" includes leaking, emitting,

discharging, escaping, leaching, dumping, and disposing of

hazardous substances into the environment, id. § 9601(22);

the term "environment" includes "ambient air" and

"navigable waters" of the United States, id. § 9601(8).

The language of § 9658(a)(1), specifying that the applicable

state limitations period "shall commence at the federally

required commencement date in lieu of" an "earlier" date

provided by state law, makes it indisputably clear that

Congress intended, in the cases to which § 9658 applies, that

the FRCD preempt state law accrual rules if, under those

rules, accrual would occur earlier than the date on which the

cause of the personal injury was, or reasonably should have

been, known to be the hazardous substance. Accord Union

Pacific R.R. Co. v. Reilly Industries, Inc., 215 F.3d 830, 840

(8th Cir. 2000). Cf ABB Industrial Systems, Inc. v. Prime

Appendix A - 37a

Technology, Inc., 120 F.3d 351, 360 n.5 (2d Cir. 1997)

("Under 42 U.S.C. § 9658, if a claim is brought under state

law for property damages caused by hazardous chemicals and

State law does not provide a discovery rule, the state statute

of limitations cannot begin to run until the plaintiff knew or

Should have known that the damages were caused by

hazardous chemicals."); Tucker v. Southern Wood Piedmont

Co., 28 F.3d 1089, 1091 (11th Cir. 1994) (same).

In arguing that the district court misinterpreted § 9658,

defendants do not dispute that the section has preemptive

effect on claims that are within its intended scope; but they

contend (1) that survival claims are not within its scope

because the word "plaintiff" in § 9658(b)(4)(A)'s phrase "the

date the plaintiff knew (or reasonably should have known)"

Should be read to refer to the person who suffered the

personal injury, rather than to the individual bringing the

lawsuit, and (2) that wrongful death claims are not

encompassed by § 9658 because they are not, under New

York law, claims for "personal injury[] or property

damages."

In construing a statutory provision, we look first to see

whether it is clear or is instead ambiguous. See, é.g.,

Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340, 136 L. Ed. 2d

808, 117 S. Ct. 843 (1997). We determine whether the

Provision is ambiguous by examining its language, the

context in which the language is used, and the broader

context of the statute as a whole. See id. at 341. If the

provision is precise and unambiguous, we generally need

look no further. See, e.g., id. at 340; Connecticut National

Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 254, 117 L. Ed. 2d 391, 112

S. Ct. 1146 (1992); Greenery Rehabilitation Group, Inc. v.

Hammon, 150 F.3d 226, 231 (2d Cir. 1998) ("If the statutory

terms are unambiguous, our review generally ends and the

Statute is construed according to the plain meaning of its

Appendix A - 38a

words."). If the statute is ambiguous, we look to legislative

history as a means of determining congressional intent. See,

e.g., Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 896, 79 L. Ed. 2d 891,

104 S. Ct. 1541 (1984); Auburn Housing Authority v.

Martinez, 277 F.3d 138, 143-44 (2d Cir. 2002).

We conclude that these principles require rejection of

defendants’ contention that § 9658 does not encompass

survival and wrongful death claims, for we find that its

language unambiguously encompasses the former, and that,

in light of the statutory scheme as a whole, it was meant to

encompass the latter.

1. Applicability of the FRCD to Survival Claims

The scope of the FRCD is set in subsection (a)(1) of § 9658;

by its terms, the section applies to "any action brought under

State law for personal injury, or property damages, which are

caused or contributed to by exposure to any hazardous

substance . . . released into the environment from a facility."

42 U.S.C. § 9658(a)(1) (emphasis added). Subsection (a)(1)

does not use the term "plaintiff." Nor does it specify by

whom such personal injury actions must have been brought

or state any limitation as to the persons on whose behalf the

actions may have been brought. The absence of any such

limiting provisions suggests that the scope of the section is

sufficiently broad to encompass not only a suit brought by

the person injured, but as well a suit brought by a person who

has the right to represent the person injured, such as his

guardian or the executor of his estate. Absent any such

qualifications of the phrase "any action brought,” which on

its face is all-encompassing, the implication of subsection

(a)(1) is that § 9658 is meant to apply to any personal injury

or property damage claim asserted by any person on whom

state law confers standing to assert it.

Appendix A - 39a

Nor do we see in the language of subsection (b)(4)(A), which

does use the word "plaintiff" in defining the FRCD in terms

of the "date the plaintiff knew (or reasonably should have

known)" the cause of the injury, id. § 9658(b)(4)(A), any

intimation whatever that the plaintiff must be the person who

suffered the injury or that the person who suffered the injury

must be the person who discovered its cause. Had Congress

intended to limit the scope of the FRCD in this way, it could

more simply have drafted this subsection to refer to 'the date

the plaintiff knew (or reasonably should have known) that his

or her personal injury . . . was caused or contributed to by the

hazardous substance.' Instead, subsection (b)(4)(A) refers to

knowledge of the plaintiff that the hazardous substance

caused "the personal injury ... referred to in subsection

(a)(1)." Id. § 9658(b)(4)(A) (emphasis added). Given

subsection (a)(1)'s broad scope, encompassing "any [personal

injury] action brought," we think it plain that Congress meant

the FRCD to have potential application whenever a claim for

personal injury is brought by any person who, under state

law, has standing to bring such a claim.

Defendants' contention that this interpretation is

impermissible because it allows for an open-ended

limitations period, hinging on the fortuity of when the cause

of injury is discovered, is wide of the mark. The Federal

Commencement Date is not wholly subjective, for it is

defined not only as the time at which the plaintiff has actual

knowledge of the cause, but also as the time at which the

plaintiff reasonably should have had that knowledge. The

latter sets an objective standard, and if the two dates differ, §

9658(b)(4)(A) implicitly makes the FRCD the earlier.

Defendants also argue that reading the term "plaintiff" to

mean the person who brings the suit will facilitate "abuse" by

allowing a decedent's heirs to have the suit instituted by one

"who only recently leamed the cause" of the decedent's

Appendix A - 40a

injuries, in order to make the suit timely despite the fact that

"a myriad of others (including the decedent) may have

discovered it much earlier." (Defendants-Third-Party-

Defendants-Appellees-Cross-Appellants' brief on appeal at

88-89.) This contention is likewise unpersuasive, as §

9658(b)\(4)(A)'s objective standard for accrual will apply if

there was sufficient information that a plaintiff reasonably

should have known the cause of the injury earlier than he

actually knew. In any event, defendants’ speculative policy

concerns cannot override the clear provisions of the statute.

In sum, we conclude that the district court did not err in

ruling that survival claims are within the scope of § 9658.

2. Applicability of the FRCD to Wrongful Death Claims

Defendants’ contention that the FRCD does not apply to

wrongful death claims presents a somewhat closer question

on the surface but is ultimately unpersuasive. Defendants

argue that, although New York law characterizes survival

claims as personal injury claims, it does not so characterize

wrongful death claims, and hence the latter are not actions

"brought under State law for personal injury[] or property

damages" within the meaning of § 9658(a)(1). Given the

possible variations among the laws of the several states, that

phrase is not entirely free of ambiguity; but in light of

Congress's intent in creating the Federal Commencement

Date, we conclude that wrongful death claims under New

York law were meant to be encompassed by § 9658.

As discussed in Part II.B. below, the FRCD was introduced

as one of the 1986 Superfund Amendments to CERCLA.

Section. 301(e) of CERCLA, as originally enacted in 1920,

required Congress to obtain a study of "the adequacy of

existing common law and statutory remedies in providing

legal redress for harm to man and the environment caused by

Appendix A - 41a

the release of hazardous substances into the environment."

42 U.S.C. § 9651(e)(1) (emphasis added). After reviewing

the commissioned study, congressional committees noted

that the report, prepared "by a distinguished panel of

lawyers," concluded that because of the accrual dates

selected by state law, "certain State statutes deprive plaintiffs

of their day in court." H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 99-962 (1986)

("FRCD Conf. Rep."), at 261, reprinted in 1986

U.S.C.C.A.N. 3276, 3354; Report of the House of

Representatives Committee on Energy and Commerce, H.R.

Rep. No. 99-253(1) (1985) ("FRCD House Rep."), at 105,

reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835, 2887. The

congressional committees recognized that "in the case of a

long-latency disease, such as cancer, a party may be barred

from bringing his lawsuit if the statute of limitations begins

to run at the time of the first injury-rather than from the time

when the party ' discovers' that his injury was caused by the

hazardous substance or pollutant or contaminant concerned."

FRCD Conf. Rep. at 261, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at

3354; see also FRCD House Rep. at 105, reprinted in 1986

U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2887. As a result, the FRCD was introduced

to "address[] the problem identified in the 301(e) study," by

"providing for a Federal commencement date for State

statutes of limitations which are applicable to harm which

results from exposure to a hazardous substance," defining

that commencement date as "the date the plaintiff knew, or

reasonably should have known, that the personal injury

referred to above was caused or contributed to by the

hazardous substance or pollutant or contaminant concerned."

FRCD Conf. Rep. at 261, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.AN. at

3354 (emphases added). Thus, Congress's focus was on

hazardous wastes' "harm to man," 42 U.S.C. § 9651 (e)(1),

and its intent was to make the FRCD applicable to claims for

"harm which results from exposure to a hazardous

substance," FRCD Conf. Rep. at 261, reprinted in 1986

U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3354.

— or =... _

Appendix A - 42a

Given this background, we see no valid basis for inferring

that Congress meant § 9658 to distinguish between an action

for wrongful death, as maintainable under New York law,

and an action brought by a living victim. A living victim in a

personal injury action may recover for, inter alia, damages

for lost future earnings. See, e.g., Lopez v. Kenmore-

Tonawanda School District, 275 A.D.2d 894, 895, 713

N.Y.S.2d 607, 609 (4th Dep't 2000) (mem.). Such a recovery

would usually to some extent benefit the victim's dependents.

If the victim has died, damages for his lost future earnings

are recoverable only in a wrongful death action. Compare

Sand v. Chapin, 238 A.D.2d 862, 863, 656 N.Y.S.2d 700,

701 (3d Dep't 1997) (mem.) (lost future earnings not

recoverable in survival action), and N.Y.E.P.T.L. § 11-3.3

Practice Commentaries at 346 (McKinney 2001) (permissible

recovery in survival action "includes only damages accruing

until [the decedent's] death"), with Parilis v. Feinstein, 49

N.Y.2d 984, 985, 429 N.Y.S.2d 165, 166, 406 N.E.2d 1059

(1980) (mem.) (in a wrongful death action, recovery is

permissible for "loss of support, voluntary assistance and

possible inheritance"), and N.Y.E.P.T.L. 5-4.3(c)(ii) and (iii)

§§ (factfinder in a wrongful death action must consider the

amount of income taxes the decedent would have been

required to pay from the "sum that would otherwise be

available for the support of persons for whom the action is

brought").

Indisputably, the claim by a living victim for future earnings

lost as a result of the injuries he suffered from exposure to

hazardous wastes is one "for personal injury" within the

meaning of § 9658(a)(1). Yet under defendants’ proposed

interpretation of the FRCD, wrongful death claims by the

decedent's distributees for relief paralleling that which would

have been available to the victim had he lived, including

claims seeking their respective shares of the decedent's

Appendix A - 43a

earnings lost as a result of that exposure, would not be within

the scope of § 9658. Quite clearly then, under defendants’

view of the FRCD, a company whose handling of hazardous

wastes caused personal injury would be financially better off

if its victim died. We conclude that this was not Congress's

intent.

B. Defendants' Commerce Clause Challenge

The Commerce Clause of the Constitution grants Congress

the power "to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and

among the several States." U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.

Although the power to enact laws under the Commerce

Clause is subject to "judicially enforceable outer lmits,"

United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 566, 131 L. Ed. 2d 626,

115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995), the "power is ‘complete in itself, may

be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no

limitations, other than are prescribed in the constitution,"

Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452

U.S. 264, 276, 69 L. Ed. 2d 1, 101 S. Ct. 2352 (1981)

(quoting Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 196, 6 L.

Ed. 23 (1824)). "Due respect for the decisions of a coordinate

branch of Government demands that we invalidate a

congressional enactment only upon a plain showing that

Congress has exceeded its constitutional bounds." United

States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607, 146 L. Ed. 2d 658,

120 S. Ct. 1740 (2000).

The Supreme Court "has made clear that the commerce

power extends not only to 'the use of channels of interstate or

foreign commerce’ and to ‘protection of the instrumentalities

of interstate commerce . . . or persons or things in commerce,’

but also. to ‘activities affecting commerce." Hodel v. Virginia

Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. at 276-77

(quoting Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 150, 28 L. Ed.

2d 686, 91 S. Ct. 1357 (1971)). In determining whether

Appendix A - 44a

Congress has exceeded its authority under the Commerce

Clause, we may look to, inter alia, whether the activity

regulated is economic in nature, whether there are discernible

ties to commerce, whether the type of activity as a whole has

an effect on commerce, and what congressional findings have

been made with respect to the activity's effects on commerce.

See, e.g., Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559-63; see also Ace Auto

Body & Towing, Ltd. v. City of New York, 171 F.3d 765, 778

(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 868, 145 L. Ed. 2d 140, 120

S. Ct. 166 (1999). A federal statute will survive a Commerce

Clause challenge if it regulates activities that arise out of or

are connected with a commercial transaction when the

transaction and the activities, viewed in the aggregate,

substantially affect interstate commerce. See, e.g., Wickard v.

Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127-29, 87 L. Ed. 122, 63 S. Ct. 82

(1942) (rejecting Commerce Clause challenge to federal

statute regulating production and consumption of

homegrown wheat because wheat farming as a whole

substantially affects interstate commerce); see also Lopez,

514 U.S. at 561 (upholding Commerce Clause challenge to

federal statute prohibiting possession of firearm in school

zone, where prohibition was "not an essential part of a larger

- regulation of economic activity, in which the regulatory

scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate activity were

regulated"). "Even activity that is purely intrastate in

character may be regulated by Congress, where the activity,

combined with like conduct by others similarly situated,

affects commerce among the States or with foreign nations.”

Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452

U.S. at 277 (quoting Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547,

44 L. Ed. 2d 363, 95 S. Ct. 1792 (1975)).

Further,, when Congress has enacted a statute creating a

program to regulate aspects of commercial transactions that,

viewed in the aggregate, substantially affect interstate

commerce, it is not necessary that each element of the

Appendix A - 45a

regulatory scheme have a substantial connection with

commerce when viewed in isolation. An individual provision

will survive a Commerce Clause challenge if it is "an integral

part of the regulatory program[,] and . . . the regulatory

scheme when considered as a whole” can be shown to be

"independently and directly related to a valid congressional

goal." Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 329 n.17, 69 L. Ed. 2d

40, 101 S. Ct. 2376 (1981); see also Federal Energy

Regulatory Commission v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 757

n.22, 72 L. Ed. 2d 532, 102 S. Ct. 2126 (1982).

The FRCD is part of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675.

The stated purpose of CERCLA, which defines the term

"environment" to include "ambient air" and "navigable

waters” of the United States, 42 U.S.C. § 9601(8), is "to

provide for liability, compensation, cleanup, and emergency

response for hazardous substances released into the

environment and the cleanup of inactive hazardous waste

disposal sites," Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767, 2767

(1980). See also Report of the House of Representatives

Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, H.R. Rep.

No. 96-1016(1) (1980) ("CERCLA House Rep."), at 17,

reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 6119-20 (bill that

became CERCLA was designed to give the United States

Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") authority to deal

effectively with spills of hazardous substances as well as

with "the tragic consequences of improperly, negligently, and

recklessly hazardous waste disposal practices known as the

inactive hazardous waste site problem” (internal quotation

marks omitted)); id. at 18, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at

6120 ("In 1979 the EPA estimated that as many as 30,000 to

50,000 sites existed, of which between 1,200-2,000 present a

serious risk to public health.”).

In furtherance of its purposes, CERCLA permits the

government to address environmental emergencies by

Appendix A - 46a

removing hazardous substances immediately, see 42 U.S.C. §

9604(a); authorizes a national plan establishing procedures

and standards for responding to releases of hazardous

substances, see id. § 9605(a); authorizes the President to

issue administrative orders, or to seek court orders, directing

responsible entities to clean up hazardous waste sites, see id.

§ 9606(a) imposes liability for clean-up costs on entities

responsible for the disposal of hazardous wastes, see id. §

9607(a) (permitting the government and private parties to

recover the costs involved in the cleanup of hazardous wastes

from those responsible for their creation); and imposes

liability for damage to natural resources, see id. § 9607(f)

(permitting the government to recover for such damage).

These and other provisions are directed toward Congress's

goals of, inter alia, "providing for liability of persons

responsible for releases of hazardous waste at such sites,"

CERCLA House Rep. at 1, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N.

at 6119, and "inducing such persons voluntarily to pursue

appropriate environmental response actions with respect to

inactive hazardous waste sites," id. at 17, reprinted in 1980

U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6120 (emphasis added).

Accordingly, it is recognized that CERCLA is "principally

designed to effectuate the cleanup of toxic waste sites [and]

to compensate those who have attended to the remediation of

environmental hazards," Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc., 516

U.S. 479, 483, 134 L. Ed. 2d 121, 116 S. Ct. 1251 (1996),

and that "the 'two . . . main purposes of CERCLA' are

‘prompt cleanup of hazardous waste sites and imposition of

all cleanup costs on the responsible party," id. (quoting

General Electric Co. v. Litton Industrial Automation

Systems, Inc., 920 F.2d 1415, 1422 (8th Cir. 1990), cert.

denied, 499 U.S. 937, 113 L. Ed. 2d 446, 111 S. Ct. 1390

(1991)). -

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_— -_ << — —

Appendix A - 47a

In passing CERCLA, Congress did not include legislative

findings with respect to the statute's relationship to interstate

commerce. However, it is clear that the generation and

disposal of waste material by companies in connection with

the manufacture or processing of products is a business

activity, and that the storage of such wastes by others is

economic activity. See generally Fort Gratiot Sanitary

Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Department of Natural Resources,

504 U.S. 353, 359, 119 L. Ed. 2d 139, 112 S. Ct. 2019 (1992)

("Solid waste, even if it has no value, is an article of

commerce."); Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Hunt,

504 U.S. 334, 119 L. Ed. 2d 121, 112 S. Ct. 2009 (1992);

City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 57 L. Ed.

2d 475, 98 S. Ct. 2531 (1978). And it is clear that such

wastes are commonly transported in interstate commerce. See

generally Chemical Waste Management, 504 U.S. at 337 (in

1992, only 16 states had commercial hazardous waste

landfills); cf New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 150,

159-60, 120 L. Ed. 2d 120, 112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992) (because

few states have disposal sites for low-level radioactive waste,

and space in those sites is frequently sold by residents of one

state to residents of another, "regulation of the resulting

interstate market in waste disposal is . . . well within

Congress' authority under the Commerce Clause"). Further,

even wholly intrastate disposal of hazardous wastes can

threaten interstate and foreign commerce, as those wastes can

contaminate streams that run through landfills and feed into

tributaries of navigable waters. Thus, "Congress has

substantial power under the Constitution to encourage the

States to provide for the disposal of the radioactive waste

generated within their borders." Jd. at 149.

In considering legislation to promote safer containment of

hazardous wastes and to decrease pollution of the ambient air

and navigable waters by such materials, Congress plainly

sought to deal with matters that substantially affected

Appendix A - 48a

interstate commerce. As the Court of Appeals for the

Eleventh Circuit observed in USA v. Olin Corp., 107 F.3d

1506 (11th Cir. 1997),

[w]Jhen the Senate considered S. 1480, a bill containing

cleanup liability provisions later substantially

incorporated into CERCLA, its Committee on

Environment and Public Works ("the Committee") took

notice of many facts that show a nexus between all forms

of improper waste disposal and interstate commerce.

First, the Committee noted the growth of the chemical

industry and the concomitant costs of handling its waste.

See S.Rep. No. 96-848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1980),

reprinted in | Legislative History of the Comprehensive

Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability

Act of 1980, at 309 (1983). It also cited a 1980 report by |

the Office of Technology Assessment which gauged

agricultural losses from chemical contamination in six

states at $ 283 million. Jd. at 310. The Committee

reported that the commercial damages resulting from

unregulated waste management were not attributable

solely to interstate trafficking in hazardous materials for

disposal, but also arose from accidents associated with

purely intrastate, on-site disposal activities, such as

improper waste storage in tanks, lagoons and chemical

plants. Jd. at 312. Thus, CERCLA reflects Congress's

recognition that both on-site and off-site disposal of

hazardous waste threaten interstate commerce.

107 F.3d at 1511 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).

Clearly, CERCLA itself was enacted as a response to a

national problem, was directly related to a_ valid

congressional concern, and was within Congress's powers

under the Commerce Clause. See, e.g., id.

Appendix A - 49a

Indeed, defendants do not contend that CERCLA exceeds

Congress's powers under the Commerce Clause. Rather they

argue that the FRCD alone is unconstitutional. (See

Defendants-Third-Party-Defendants-A ppellees-Cross-

Appellants’ brief on appeal at 74-75 n.23 ("the FRCD may be

severed and the remainder of CERCLA may be left in

force").) However, defendants' Commerce Clause challenge

to the FRCD ignores the FRCD's function in furthering the

goals of CERCLA.

As noted, one of CERCLA's goals was to "induce"

companies generating, transporting, dumping, and storing,

etc., hazardous wastes "voluntarily to pursue appropriate

environmental response actions with respect to inactive

hazardous waste sites," CERCLA House Rep. at 17,

reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6120. We think it plain

that the FRCD provides such inducement. As discussed in

Part II.A.2. above, the FRCD was adopted in response to

findings, made in a study required by § 301(e) of CERCLA,

that state-law dates of accrual of claims for injuries caused by

exposure to hazardous substances--especially injuries having

a long latency period, such as cancer--frequently resulted in

such claims becoming time-barred even before the injured

person knew the cause of his injury. In requiring that the

courts apply instead, if later than the state-law date, an

objective accrual date, to wit, the date when the plaintiff

"reasonably should have known" the injury's cause, § 9658

gives companies responsible for hazardous wastes greater

incentives to clean up the waste sites, for it exposes those

companies to a longer period of liability for the harms those

sites cause to human health and the environment. The longer

the period of liability, the more likely it is that a responsible

company will bear the expense of the harms it has caused.

The greater the potential cost to the company, the greater the

likelihood that the company will strive to avoid liability by

taking appropriate remedial actions with respect to its

Appendix A - 50a

hazardous waste sites. And the more remedial action that is

undertaken voluntarily, the less the need for government

intervention, and the cleaner the environment.

In sum, we conclude that the FRCD is an integral part of the

regulatory scheme established by CERCLA, furthering

CERCLA's goals in various ways, and that the enactment of

the FRCD constituted a valid exercise of Congress's powers

under the Commerce Clause.

C. Defendants' Tenth Amendment Challenge

Defendants also contend that the FRCD violates the Tenth

Amendment, arguing that it effectively alters certain state

statutes of limitations, overruling important policy choices

made by a state legislature that had evaluated and balanced

the competing interests, and that the FRCD improperly

coerces states to regulate state-law toxic tort claims

according to a federal formula. Notwithstanding the

skepticism expressed in ABB Industrial Systems, Inc. v.

Prime Technology, Inc., in which we stated that the FRCD

was of "questionable constitutionality," 120 F.3d at 360 n.5,

while noting that the issue was not properly before us, see

id., we reject defendants' challenge.

The Tenth Amendment provides that " the powers not

delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor

prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States

respectively, or to the people." U.S. Const. amend. X. The

Tenth Amendment limits Congress's regulatory power,

preventing Congress from essentially "commandeering” a

state's legislative or executive departments "by directly

compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory

program.” New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 161

(quoting Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation

Ass'n, 452 U.S. at 288); see also Printz v. United States, 521

Appendix A - Sla

U.S. 898, 935, 138 L. Ed. 2d 914, 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997)

(Congress may "not command the States' officers, or those of

their political subdivisions, to administer or enforce a federai

regulatory program").

The FRCD, however, does not conscript into federal service

either the state's legislature or its executive branch. Rather, in

order that persons victimized by exposure to hazardous

wastes not be "deprived . . . of their day in court," FRCD

Conf. Rep. at 261, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3354,

and that the companies that substantive state law would hold

responsible not escape liability, the FRCD simply requires

courts in which state-law toxic tort claims are asserted to

recognize that such a claim did not accrue before the plaintiff

knew or reasonably should have known the cause of the

injury. This is a modest requirement that is squarely within

Congress's long established powers under the Supremacy

Clause of the Constitution.

The Supremacy Clause provides that the "Constitution, and

the Laws of the United States which shall be made in

Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land;

and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any

Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the

Contrary notwithstanding.” U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2

(emphasis added). Accordingly, consistent with the Tenth

Amendment, Congress may create federal causes of action

that state courts are obligated to adjudicate. See, e.g., Testa v.

Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 91 L. Ed. 967, 67 S. Ct. 810 (1947). Or it

may enact a federal law that preempts a state-law cause of

action, thereby foreclosing state courts from entertaining

such a state-law claim. See generally English v. General

Electric.Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78-79, 110 L. Ed. 2d 65, 110 S. Ct.

2270 (1990). Or Congress may, as it has done on occasion,

simply extend a state limitations period. See, e.g., Stewart v.

Kahn, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 493, 20 L. Ed. 176 (1870)

Appendix A - 52a

(upholding federal statute tolling limitations periods for

actions against persons who could not be served with process

because they were in Confederate territory); see also 50

U.S.C. app. § 525 (tolling limitations periods for actions by

or against persons in active military service); 28 U.S.C. §

1367(d) (tolling state limitations period on state claim

asserted in federal court based on supplemental jurisdiction,

if federal court thereafter declines to exercise such

jurisdiction); 15 U.S.C. § 6603(h) (extending limitations

periods for mortgage foreclosure actions where Y2K-related

failures impeded processing of mortgage payments).

Simply put, the Tenth Amendment does not prevent the

application of federal law in state courts even though

"federal statutes enforceable in state courts do, in a sense,

direct state judges to enforce them," because "this sort of

federal ‘direction’ of state judges is mandated by the text of

the Supremacy Clause." New York v. United States, 505 U.S.

at 178-79. The FRCD, which requires no action by a state's

legislative or executive officials, but only the application of

federal law by the courts to recognize the Federal

Commencement Date of a state-law claim, does not violate

the Tenth Amendment.

Having rejected all of defendants' statutory interpretation and

constitutional challenges to the application of the FRCD, we

turn to plaintiffs' challenges to the district court's dismissal of

their claims.

D. Plaintiffs' Challenge to the Ruling That, As a Matter

of Law, the FRCD Was Not Later Than the End of 1991

As discussed in Part I.F. above, the district court granted

summary judgment dismissing plaintiffs’ claims as time

barred on the ground that there was no genuine issue of fact

to be tried as to the date on which their claims accrued under

Appendix A - 53a

the FRCD, ruling that, as a matter of law, that date was no

later than the end of 1991. In so ruling, the court found

principally that the government and media reports and public

controversy over the health hazards posed by the Landfill

sufficed to give plaintiffs "a reasonable suspicion" as to the

cause of their cancers prior to the end of 1991, Pfohl IT, 68 F.

Supp. 2d at 253, and that plaintiffs failed to show "why it

was not possible to obtain a ‘scientific’ opinion similar to the.

one contained in the Rigle-Sawyer Report" earlier than 1994,

id. at 259. We have several difficulties with the legal

standards applied by the district court and with its view of the

factual record.

1. The Legal Standards Applied by the District Court

First, the district court erroneously imputed to the Federal

Commencement Date a standard of "reasonable suspicion."

See, e.g., Pfohl I, 68 F. Supp. 2d at 253 (plaintiffs "should

have developed a reasonable suspicion as to the cause of their

injuries prior to the end of 1991" (emphasis added)); id. at

254 ("given the volume of information available to the public

prior to 1992, Plaintiffs could be expected to reasonably

suspect the cause of their cancers before the end of 1991"

(emphasis added)); id. at 257 ("no reasonable trier of fact

could find that Plaintiffs, had they been reasonably diligent in

inquiring as to the cause of their cancers upon being

diagnosed, would not have discovered sufficient information

to develop a reasonable suspicion as to the cause of such

injuries prior to the end of 1991" (emphasis added)). In so

reasoning, the district court apparently accepted

"Defendants["] contention that a reasonable suspicion that an

injury may have been caused by exposure to toxic or

hazardous substances is sufficient to trigger a rule of

limitations that is predicated on knowledge of a fact or

event,” id. at 252 (emphases added). Insofar as the FRCD is

concerned, this contention should have been rejected.

Appendix A - 54a

The discovery-of-cause standard set by the FRCD, defined as

"the date the plaintiff knew (or reasonably should have

known) that the personal injury" was caused or contributed to

by the hazardous materials, focuses on knowledge, actual or

imputed, not on suspicion. Mere suspicion, whatever its

reasonableness, cannot be equated with knowledge; and the

fact that a claimant had only a "reasonable suspicion" that the

injuries were caused by the Landfill is not a sufficient basis

for ruling as a matter of law that the claimant "reasonably

should have known" (emphasis added) that the injuries were

caused by the Landfill. Accordingly, the district court applied

an erroneous legal standard in interpreting the FRCD.

Second, in addressing the showing that a plaintiff is required

to make under New York's CPLR § 214-c(4) as to the state of

scientific or medical knowledge as to the cause of injury, the

court applied a standard of impossibility of such knowledge.

See, e.g., Pfohl II, 68 F. Supp. 2d at 248 (plaintiffs were

required to show "that the state of medical, technological and

scientific knowledge and information was insufficient such

that it was not possible to discover the cause of their injuries

within time to commence the instant actions within three

years from the discovery of their cancers" (emphasis added));

id. at 257 ("Plaintiffs have failed to establish the existence of

a material issue of fact that such cause could not have been

determined prior to the end of 1991" (emphasis added)). As

discussed below, it is not clear to us that this is a correct

interpretation of the CPLR provision as a matter of state law;

but it is clear that to the extent the CPLR provision would

result in an earlier accrual date than that provided by the

FRCD, the CPLR provision is preempted.

The district court's interpretation that a plaintiff must show

that the cause of the injury "could not have been" dtermined

within three years after the date of discovery of the injury

Appendix A - 55a

does not match the language of the statute itself. That section

states that if the action is not filed within that period the

plaintiff is required to show that, prior to the expiration of

that period, "technical, scientific or medical knowledge and

information sufficient to ascertain the cause of his injury had

not been discovered, identified or determined."

N.Y.C.P.L.R.§ 214-c(4) (emphasis added). (We note that,

though the phrase "had not been" is straightforward enough,

some joinders of subjects and predicates in this passage are

somewhat awkward: For example, is "scientific knowledge"

"discovered"? Is "scientific knowledge" "determined"--and if

so, does the word "determined" connote a consensus? And

does "scientific knowledge” mean, as the district court

viewed it in Pfohi IJ, 68 F. Supp. 2d at 259, "'scientific'

opinion"? See also N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 214c Practice

Commentaries , C214-c:4, at 635 (The statute "reeks of the

midnight oil of political compromise. . . . The draftsmanship

cannot be described as commendable.").)

Despite the difference between the district court's phrase

"could not have been" determined and the statute's phrase

"had not been" determined, the district court's standard finds

some explicit--but not unequivocal--support in the New York

practice commentaries. For example, the official

commentator states that "the plaintiff must demonstrate [a]

that the state of medical or scientific knowledge was such

that the causation of his injury could not have been identified

within the three-year period” after the discovery of the injury,

N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 214-c(4) Practice Commentaries, C214-c:4,

at 634-35 (emphasis added), and "[b] that it was impossible

to determine the cause of his injury within three years after

the discovery of his injury,” id. at 635 (emphasis added). To

that extent, therefore, the official commentary supports the

district court's view of New York law.

Appendix A - 56a

Nonetheless, the official commentary also, after noting the

less-than-"commendable" legislative draftsmanship, states

that the New York Legislature "apparently intended .. .

[that] the test should be: Was the requisite scientific

knowledge reasonably available to the plaintiff during the

three-year discovery period?" N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 214-c Practice

Commentaries, C214-c:4, at 635 (emphasis added). This

seems to us the more reasonable interpretation of New York

law, for the district court's construction would seem to place

burdens on a would-be plaintiff that the Legislature could not

have intended. For example, the district court stated that

plaintiffs could not meet the cause-could-not-have-been-

determined standard because, before the end of 1991, they

could have commissioned experts to conduct environmental

studies and prepare a report such as the Rigle-Sawyer report.

However, "'the reasonable cost of a site-specific study to

determine whether there has been an excess number of

cancer cases related to a multiple toxic agent environmental

cause such as the Pfohl Brothers Landfill would be at least

two (2) million dollars." (Van Pelt Aff. ] 41 (quoting { 6 of

the Affidavit of Dr. Rosalie Bertell, an expert in

environmental epidemiology with more than 30 years of

experience) (emphases in original).) We doubt that the New

York Legislature meant to refer to scientific knowledge that

would not have been available to a plaintiff without the

expenditure of huge sums of money to commission

independent studies. And we certainly cannot conclude that

Congress meant the FRCD standard of what a plaintiff

"reasonably should have known" to extend to information

that was obtainable only through the private commissioning

of expensive studies.

We think it likely that the official commentary's suggestion

that the New York Legislature intended CPLR § 214-c(4) to

refer only to scientific knowledge that was "reasonably

available" to the plaintiff is the correct interpretation of that

Appendix A - 57a

section. And we think it possible that in intending to set a

reasonable-availability-of-knowledge-of-cause standard, the

New York Legislature meant to fix an accrual date no earlier

than the date the plaintiff knew or reasonably should have

known the cause of the injury--i.e., the same accrual date as

that set by the FRCD. To the extent, however, that the

scientific-knowledge provision of CPLR § 214-c(4) imposes

an accrual date earlier than the date on which the plaintiff

knew or reasonably should have known the cause of the

injury, it is, for the reasons discussed in Part II.A. above,

preempted by the FRCD.

2. The District Court's View of the Factual Record

We also conclude that the district court did not correctly

apply the principles applicable to the consideration of a

motion for summary judgment. In assessing such a motion,

the court is required to view the factual record in the light

most favorable to the party against whom summary judgment

is sought and to draw all factual inferences in favor of that

party. See, e.g., Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.

242, 255, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202, 106 S. Ct. 2505 (1986); United

States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655, 8 L. Ed. 2d 176,

82 S. Ct. 993 (1962) (per curiam). The district court, while

adverting to this standard, did not apply it.

In ruling that the FRCD was no later than the end of 1991,

the district court relied on the fact that "Defendants had

submitted a plethora of exhibits,” principally consisting of

"government and media reports"; the court found that these

documents "established that a highly publicized controversy

existed within the local community over whether the Landfill

posed a threat to the health and safety of those who resided or

worked in the vicinity of the Landfill"; and the court

concluded that these documents should have raised in

plaintiffs a "reasonable suspicion as to the cause of their

Appendix A - 58a

injuries." Pfohl IT, 68 F. Supp. 2d at 253. The court accepted

defendants' argument that as after 1991 there were no new

government studies, releases of previously undisclosed

information, nor any medical or scientific breakthroughs on

which Plaintiffs rely as having permitted them to discover the

cause of their cancers, Plaintiffs have failed to establish the

existence of a material issue of fact that such cause could not

have been determined prior to the end of 1991. Jd. at 257.

We have two difficulties with the court's reliance on the

documents submitted by defendants.

First, many of defendants' documents themselves reflected

the absence of any scientific knowledge that the Landfill was

carcinogenic; and indeed, reports of expert studies suggested

that it was not. For example, defendants submitted an

October 11, 1988 DEC letter to "Concerned Citizens," that

stated, inter alia, that the low radiation levels found in areas

of the Landfill "does not present any immediate threat to

public health." And among the statements in news articles

submitted by defendants were the following: "radiation

levels" at the Pfohl Landfill, according to DEC and DOH,

"pose no threat to the public” (The Buffalo News, October

14, 1988); radiation risks from the Pfohl Landfill, according

to State expert, are "very, very minimal” (The Buffalo

News, November 2, 1989); "‘exposure to radiation on the

site,'" according to DEC, "presents little, if any, public health

hazard" (The Buffalo News, March 30, 1990); and "no

health threat found in [DOH's] Pfohl Road soil tests" (The

Buffalo News, November 15, 1990).

Even the most alarming DOH report, issued in March 1991

and reporting excess numbers of certain types of cancers in

1978-1987, was, accurately, described in news articles as

being accompanied by State officials’ denials of any clear

linkages between the cancers and the Landfill. See, e.g., The

Buffalo News, March 26, 1991 (DOH study finds "higher

Appendix A - 59a

than expected instances of lymphoma and leukemia, but not

high enough to be classified as a ‘significant excess'

statistically"; "the increase is likely related to income,

socioeconomic and status factors"; DOH "can't tell whether

the landfill is responsible").

Thus, the district court inappropriately failed to view the

documents submitted by defendants in the light most

favorable to plaintiffs as the parties against whom summary

judgment was sought. While defendants provided abundant

evidence of the existence of controversy, much of what they

submitted was either equivocal as to whether the Landfill

could be causing cancers or contained outright denials of

such causation. No doubt the lack of any indication in these

reports and articles that there was scientific knowledge that

the Landfill was carcinogenic was an impetus for defendants'

urging the district court that the reasonably-should-have

"known" standard of § 9658 could be satisfied by showing a

basis merely for reasonable "suspicion."

Our second difficulty with the district court's application of

summary judgment principles is that, in reaching its

conclusions as to the date on which plaintiffs "reasonably

should have known” the cause of the injuries, the district

court did not acknowledge the inferences available to

plaintiffs from the record as a whole. Even had the

documents submitted by defendants supported an inference

of early constructive knowledge rather than simply of

suspicion, the court was required to consider not just those

documents but also the evidence submitted by plaintiffs. The

court's opinion does not indicate that it did so. For example,

although noting that there were no new revelatory

government studies "after 1991," Pfohl IJ, 68 F. Supp. 2d at

257, the court apparently did not take into account the fact

that the latest studies done in 1991 gave plaintiffs no reason

whatever to know that the cancers were caused by the

Appendix A - 60a

Landfill. As described in Part I.E.2. above, DOH's follow-up

studies on cancer incidence, reported in November 1991,

revealed no linkage with the Pfohl Landfill. The Melius

affidavit described the results of those studies, the reasoning

of DOH in reaching its conclusions, and the statements made

by State officials to area residents that "no . . . documented

evidence existed" of a health threat posed by the Pfohl

Landfill (Melius Aff. § 13).

The publicity surrounding the November 1991 DOH reports

surely gave plaintiffs no reason to know the cancers were

caused by the Landfill. The Buffalo News on December 17,

1991, carried the headline "Study can't link Pfohl landfill to

cancer" and reported that the DOH follow-up study of the

higher-than-expected rates of cancers in the same census tract

as the Landfill "failed to uncover any evidence of ‘clustering’

of prostate cancer, leukemia, lymphoma and female lung

cancer near the inactive dump.” Similarly, the Cheektowaga

Times on December 26, 1991, carried the headline "Health

Department studies fail to link landfill to cancer" and

reported that "according to recent reports released by the

New York State Department of Health, no link exists

between the Pfohl Brothers Landfill site and cancer incidence

for those residents living on or near the dump site."

Subsequent articles, as well as state and federal governmental

studies, continued after 1991 to report the lack of any

discovery of a link between the cancers and the Landfill.

See, e.g., Cheektowaga Times, December 2, 1993 ("Ground

water uncontaminated near Pfohl dump"; "Ground water

surrounding the Pfohl Brothers dump has turned up clean in

all studies performed so far."); The Buffalo News, August

26, 1994 ("Two studies by federal and state agencies refute

charges that contamination from the Pfohl Brothers dump in

Cheektowaga has caused serious health problems."); August

1994 DOH report (with letter to residents of Cheektowaga

Appendix A - 6la

stating that "none of the patterns of a true cancer cluster were

found. . . . No evidence was found for a ‘common

environmental cause."); August 1994 USATSDR report

("available data [on the Pfohl Landfill] do not indicate

exposures to contaminants in the environmental media to be

high enough to cause adverse health effects"; "no apparent

public health hazard at the present time" (emphasis in

original)).

Consistent with the tenor of these news reports, Dr. Melius,

who was the director of the pertinent DOH division

throughout this period, stated in his affidavit that he informed

area residents that there were many possible explanations for

observed incidences of cancer, including socioeconomic

factors, improved screening practices, personal lifestyle, and

medical history. And in the many meetings and

communications with area residents, neither Dr. Melius nor

any other member of DOH ever told any member of the

public that the cancer cases in the area were "in any way”

related to the Pfohl Brothers landfill. (See, e.g. , Melius Aff.

PP 6, 15.)

There is no question that defendants submitted to the district

court numerous documents showing that there were local

concerns and controversies as to whether health problems

were being caused by the Pfohl Landfill. And if notice of

controversy were the issue, defendants’ motion for summary

judgment would have had greater merit. But that is not the

standard for determining the Federal Commencement Date,

and the record did not permit the court to conclude that no

reasonable factfinder could fail to infer that plaintiffs

reasonably should have known prior to the end of 1991 that

the Landfill was the cause of the injuries.

In sum, many studies had been done by two State agencies,

DOH and DEC. There is no evidence that they found the

Appendix A - 62a

Pfohl Landfill to cause cancers, and the record is replete with

evidence that the State officials repeatedly assured residents,

both through the publicized reports and in personal meetings,

that there was no evidence of such causation. We cannot

endorse the proposition that, as a matter of law, when reports

issued by the responsible public officials stated that there was

no provable link between the cancers and the Landfill,

members of the public reasonably should have known to the

contrary.

E. The Length of the Limitations Period

Finally, plaintiffs also contend that the district court ruled,

erroneously, that their survival claims were governed by a

one-year limitations period. We do not so interpret the court's

opinion.

The FRCD preempts a more restrictive state law only with

respect to the date on which a claim accrues, not with respect

to the length of the limitations period. See 42 U.S.C. §

9658(a)(1) ("if the applicable [state or commonr-law]

limitations period . . . provides a commencement date which

is earlier than the federally required commencement date,

such period shall commence at the federally required

commencement date in lieu of the [state-law] date”

(emphasis added)). Thus, New York law still controls with

respect to the length of the limitations period. Section 214c,

as modified by the FRCD, gives the plaintiff one year from

the date of discovery of the cause of the injury to commence

a lawsuit (or three years from the date of discovery of the

injury, if longer) and that provision satisfies the requirements

of the FRCD.

Plaintiffs advert to statements by the district court that are

somewhat elliptical standing alone. See, e.g., Pfohl I, 26 F.

Supp. 2d at 531 ("the one year period provided by § 214-c(4)

will attach to the claim upon discovery of the cause of the

Appendix A - 63a

injury, as the FRCD permits, regardless of how much time

has elapsed since the discovery of the injury" (emphasis

added)); Pfohl II, 68 F. Supp. 2d at 249 (referring to "the

proviso to § 214-c(4) limiting the benefit of the extra year

within which to file a toxic tort claim to a maximum period

of five years from discovery of the injury"). These

statements, however, were made only in the court's

discussion of the effect of the FRCD.

In directly interpreting the New York limitations periods, the

court had noted that under § 214-c(4),

if the plaintiff discovers the cause of a toxic tort injury

within five years of the discovery of the injury, the

plaintiff may invoke the longer of (a) the three year

period from the discovery of the injury or (b) a one year

period from the discovery of the cause within which to

commence an action.

Pfohl I, 26 F. Supp. 2d at 521 (emphasis in original); see also

Pfohl I, 68 F. Supp. 2d at 247 (an action may be

commenced or a claim filed within one year of such

discovery of the cause of the injury,’ provided less than five

years have elapsed since the discovery of the injury"

(emphasis omitted)). These rulings were correct, and we do

not view the court's subsequent shorthand references as

overturning its direct interpretation of § 214-c.

In context, the elliptical statements quoted above were

intended simply to indicate that the effect of the FRCD,

where suit was not brought within three years of the

discovery-of-injury date, is to allow a plaintiff to bring suit

within one year after discovery of the cause of an injury,

even if more than five years have elapsed since discovery of

the injury. We see no indication that the district court applied

a different principle.

Appendix A - 64a

CONCLUSION

We have considered all of the parties’ arguments in support

of their respective appeals, and, except as to plaintiffs’

contention that genuine issues of material fact precluded the

granting of summary judgment, we have found them to be

without merit. We vacate the judgment summarily dismissing

the claims at issue on this appeal, and we remand for

proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

Costs to plaintiffs.

CONCUR BY: LEVAL

CONCUR:

LEVAL, J., concurring:

I concur with the majority's opinion. I agree with the majority

that "Section 214-c, as modified by the FRCD, gives the

plaintiff one year from the date of discovery of the cause of

the injury to commence a lawsuit (or three years from the

date of discovery of the injury, if longer) and that provision

satisfies the requirements of the FRCD."

I write separately to note only that, in my view, the scientific

knowledge proviso of § 214-c(4) is incompatible with the

FRCD, and that the majority's discussion of the various

possible meanings of the proviso is therefore superfluous.

The New York statute purports to establish different accrual

dates for claims of personal injury caused by hazardous

substances. Section 214-c(2) specifies plaintiffs discovery of

the injury as the accrual date (and allows a plaintiff three

years from that date). This accrual date is illegal under the

FRCD because it commences at a date earlier than the "the

Appendix A - 65a

date the plaintiff knew (or reasonably should have known)"

the cause of injury. See 42 U.S.C. § 9658(b)(4)(A). Section

214-c(4), on the other hand, specifies the plaintiff's

"discovery of the cause of the injury” as the accrual date (and

allows one year). This provision is lawful under the FRCD

because its accrual date occurs no earlier than the date the

plaintiff knew or reasonably should have known the cause of

the injury.

However, under the literal terms of the New York statute, §

214-c(4)'s discovery-of-cause accrual date is not always

available to plaintiffs. To qualify for this accrual date, a

plaintiff must satisfy two conditions. First, the discovery of

the cause of injury must have occurred less than five years

after discovery of the injury. If a plaintiff fails to satisfy this

requirement, the timeliness of his suit is judged under § 214

c(2). The latter section, however, utilizes an accrual date that

is illegal under the FRCD. Accordingly, our opinion makes

clear that the district court correctly nullified the 5-year

limitation. Because of the impact of the FRCD, a plaintiff

may bring his suit under § 214-c(4) within one year of

discovery of the cause of injury, regardless whether this

occurred within 5 years of the discovery of the injury.

The second hurdle a plaintiff must clear in order to use §

214-c(4)'s discovery-of-cause accrual date is the scientific

knowledge proviso. It requires a showing that "technical,

scientific or medical knowledge and information sufficient to

ascertain the cause of his injury had not been discovered,

identified or determined" within three years of discovering

the injury. A plaintiff who fails to make this showing is

similarly relegated to the limitation period established in §

214-c(2). As noted, however, § 214-c(2)'s limitation period is

unlawful because it uses an accrual date earlier than the

earliest accrual date allowed by the federal statute.

Appendix A - 66a

The only function the scientific knowledge proviso can serve

is to disqualify a plaintiff from using the lawful accrual date

established by § 214-c(4), requiring the plaintiff's timeliness

to be judged by the unlawful terms of § 214<c(2). The

scientific knowledge proviso, like the condition requiring the

discovery of cause to be within five years of the discovery of

injury, cannot function lawfully; it is therefore preempted by

the FRCD and must be disregarded. Accordingly, in my view

the majority opinion's discussion of the different possible

interpretations of the scientific knowledge proviso is

superfluous and moot.

The majority opinion recognizes this problem when it states,

"To the extent . . . that the scientific-knowledge provision of

CPLR § 214-c(4) imposes an accrual date earlier than the

date on which the plaintiff knew or reasonably should have

known the cause of the injury, it is . . . preempted by the

FRCD." But if the only function of the scientific knowledge

proviso is to disqualify a plaintiff from using § 214c(4)'s

lawful accrual date, thereby forcing him to use the unlawful

date of § 214-c(2), then the proviso cannot survive, and a

debate over the different meanings the New York legislature

may have intended has no useful application.

Appendix B - 67a

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

IN RE: PFOHL BROTHERS LANDFILL LITIGATION;

THIS DOCUMENT RELATES TO ALL ACTIONS

95-CV-0020A(F)

26 F. Supp. 2d 512

October 27, 1998, Decided

October 27, 1998, Filed

COUNSEL:

Baron & Budd, P.C. (Frederick M. Baron, of counsel),

Dallas, TX, Lipsitz, Green, Fahringer, Roll, Salisbury &

Cambria LLP (Laraine Kelley, of counsel), Buffalo, NY, for

Plaintiffs.

Nixon, Hargrave, Devans & Doyle LLP (Laurie Styka

Bloom, of counsel), Buffalo, NY, for Liason Group

Defendants.

ORDER

ARCARA, District Judge.

This case was referred to Magistrate Judge Leslie G. Foschio,

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), on February 16, 1996. On

June 10, 1997, defendants filed a motion for partial summary

judgment. On March 11, 1998, Magistrate Judge Foschio

filed a Report and Recommendation, recommending that: (1)

defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment be granted

Appendix B - 68a

in part and that the survival actions pertaining to decedents

Anthony J. Marino, Isabelle A. Wiedenbeck and Joseph J.

Wiedenbeck be dismissed; (2) summary judgment be denied

as to the survival actions of Mary Jane Farino, Robert L.

Farino, Stephen C. Grandillo, Nelson M. Hirsch, Henry A.

Kuczka, George Pagels and Leo N. Phillips; (3) the survival

and wrongful death actions commenced on behalf of Evo T.

Astor, Charles W. Batt, Rose E. Batt, Loraine E. Brezezicki,

Gretchen A. Heaney, Joseph A. Inzinnia, Robert A. Martzolf,

Vincent J. Mongiovi, Alfred G. Mucha and Mary M. Sturm,

decedents for whom no personal representative had been duly

appointed prior the action being filed, be dismissed with

leave to renew; (4) summary judgment as to the remaining

wrongful death actions be denied; (5) summary judgment as

to the punitive damages claims be granted in part and denied

in part; and (6) summary judgment as to the claims for loss

of consortium be denied.

On April 24, 1998, plaintiffs Irene M. Marino and Joseph J.

Wiedenbeck filed-objections to the Report and

Recommendation. Defendants also filed objections to the

Report and Recommendation on April 24, 1998. Oral

argument on the objections was held on September 20, 1998.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), this Court must make a de

novo determination of those portions of the Report and

Recommendation to which objections have been made. Upon

a de novo review of the Report and Recommendation, and

after reviewing the submissions and hearing argument from

the parties, the Court adopts the proposed Gating» of the

Report and Recommendation.

Accordingly, for the reasons set forth in Magistrate Judge

Foschio's Report and Recommendation: (1) defendants'

motion for partial summary judgment is granted in part and

the survival actions pertaining to decedents Anthony J.

Appendix B - 69a

Marino, Isabelle A. Wiedenbeck and Joseph J. Wiedenbeck

are dismissed; (2) summary judgment is denied as to the

survival actions of Mary Jane Farino, Robert L. Farino,

Stephen C. Grandillo, Nelson M. Hursch, Henry A. Kuczka,

George Pagels and Leo N. Phillips; (3) the survival and

wrongful death actions commenced on behalf of Evo T.

Astor, Charles W. Batt, Rose E. Batt, Loraine E. Brezezicki,

Gretchen A. Heaney, Joseph A. Inzinnia, Robert A. Martzolf,

Vincent J. Mongiovi, Alfred G. Mucha and Mary M. Sturm,

decedents for whom no personal representative had been duly

appointed prior to the action being filed, are dismissed with

leave to renew; (4) summary judgment as to the remaining

wrongful death actions is denied; (5) summary judgment as

to the punitive damages claims is granted in part and denied

in part; and (6) summary judgment as to the claims for loss

of consortium is denied.

This case is referred back to Magistrate Judge Foschio for

further proceedings.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

FOSCHIO, United States Magistrate Judge

JURISDICTION

This case was referred to the undersigned by the Honorable

Richard J. Arcara on February 16, 1996, for report and

recommendation on all dispositive motions. It is presently

before the court on Defendants’ motion for partial summary

judgment (Doc. # 288), filed June 10, 1997.

Appendix B - 70a

BACKGROUND

This action was commenced on January 10, 1995, by the

filing of the first of seven essentially identical complaints on

behalf of sixty-seven plaintiffs, suing on behalf of themselves

or their respective decedents, in which Plaintiffs seek

monetary damages including punitive damages from

Defendants for injuries or deaths various cancers which they

contend were caused by exposure to hazardous and toxic

substances from the Pfohl Brothers Landfill located in

Cheektowaga, New York (the "Landfill").! The death actions

' Originally assigned to Hon. John T. Elfvin, this matter was

transferred to Hon. Richard J. Arcara by order dated October

15, 1995. Judge Arcara, by order dated February 16, 1996,

consolidated these actions for all pre-trial purposes. That

order was also made applicable to any future related cases.

As no discovery regarding the timeliness of the claims in the

latest action Anthony v. Westinghouse, No. 97-CV-977A(F),

had taken place as of the filing of the instant motion,

Defendants here seek summary dismissal only as to the

motions brought regarding the decedents in the first five

actions, specifically (1) Frier v. Westinghouse, No. 95-CV-

20A(F), which covers the claims pertaining to decedents

Mary Jane Farino, Robert L. Farino, Joseph A. Inzinna and

Leo N. Phillips were filed, (2) Batt v. Westinghouse, No. 95-

CV-107A(F), which covers the claims of decedents €harles

W. Batt, Rose E. Batt, Stephen C. Grandillo, Henry A.

Kuczka, Vincent J. Mongiovi and George Pagel, (3) Astor v.

Westinghouse, No. 95-CV-247A(F), which covers the claims

pertaining to the decedents Lorraine R. Brzezicki, Robert A.

Martzolf, Alfred G. Mucha and Mary M. Sturm, (4) Davies v.

Westinghouse, No. 95-CV-444A(F), which covers the claims

of decedents Evo T. Astor and Gretchen A. Heaney, and (5)

Fiels v. Westinghouse, No. 96-CV-395A(F), which covers

the claims of Nelson M. Hirsch. Anthony J. Marino, Isabelle

(Footnote continued on next page)

Appendix B - 71a

were filed by the widows, widowers, children or estate

representatives of decedents. Plaintiffs allege that they or

their decedents lived, worked or engaged in recreational

activity in the vicinity of the Landfill and that Defendants

either owned and operated the Landfill or were otherwise

responsible for the generation or transportation of the

hazardous substances to the Landfill. Plaintiffs' claims are

based on state law negligence, strict liability, gross

negligence, loss of consortium, and wrongful death.

The instant motion seeks summary dismissal of the survival

actions and wrongful death claims asserted on behalf of

twenty decedents, most of which would be time-barred under

New York law. Plaintiffs urge that these claims are timely

under the provision of the Comprehensive Environmental

Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980, 42

U.S.C. §§ 9601 et seq., ("CERCLA"), as amended by the

Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986

("SARA"), 100 Stat. 1613, specifically, § 309, 42 U.S.C. §

9658, which preempts the accrual date for state law toxic tort

actions based on exposure to hazardous substances released

into the environment by facilities as defined by CERCLA,

permitting such claims to accrue upon the discovery of the

cause of the injury.? Defendants maintain that CERCLA

(Footote continued from previous page)

A. Wiedenbeck and Joseph J. Wiedenbeck, Sr. Defendants’

Memorandum of Law in Support of Consolidated Motion for

Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. # 290), filed June 10, 1997,

at 2 n. 2 and 3. Each of these complaints has since been

amended to correct the names of some defendants, but the _

causes of action asserted by each plaintiff have remained the

same.

For convenience, the court refers to an action based on an

exposure to an alleged hazardous substance as a "toxic tort.”

Appendix B - 72a

provision is inapplicable to the instant claims or that it is

unconstitutional.

On February 16, 1996, Defendants were granted a period of

discovery limited to their statute of limitations defense. On

June 11, 1997, Defendants filed a motion for partial summary

judgment seeking dismissal of the survival and wrongful

death actions on behalf of twenty decedents and the

consortium claims on behalf of eight surviving spouses as

time-barred under the applicable New York statutes of

limitations and _ challenging the applicability and

constitutionality of 42 U.S.C. § 9658.° Plaintiffs responded

on July 11, 1997 and Defendants replied on July 25, 1997.

Oral argument was deemed unnecessary.

For the reasons which follow, Defendants’ motion for partial

summary judgment should be GRANTED in part, and

DENIED in part.

FACTS‘

The 120 acre Pfohl Brothers Landfill ("the Landfill"), located

in the northeastern corner of the town of Cheektowaga, New

York, a suburban area adjacent to the City of Buffalo, is

> As required by 28 U.S.C. § 2403(a), the court certified on

November 6, 1997, to the Attorney General that Defendants

have challenged the constitutionality of 42 U.S.C. § 9658,

and permitted the Attorney General to intervene on behalf of

the United States by filing an application to intervene within

twenty days of receipt of such notice. To date, no such

application has been filed and the court proceeds on the basis

that the United States has waived its right to intervene

4 The fact statement is taken from the complaints, answers,

and other papers filed in this action.

Appendix B - 73a

listed on the New York State Registry of Active Hazardous

Waste Disposal Sites, indicating that the state considers the

Landfill to be a public health threat. Many industrial wastes

including hazardous substances were deposited into the

Landfill between 1932 and 1969. Aero Lake is adjacent to

the northwestern corner of the Landfill. Ellicott Creek runs

within a few hundred feet of the Landfill and is fed by three

tributaries which flow through the Landfill. Ellicott Creek

empties into the Niagara River, an international waterway

flowing between the United States and Canada.

Plaintiffs in this action have filed claims based on state law

negligence, strict liability, gross negligence, loss of

consortium, .nd wrongful death for injuries or deaths to their

respective decedents whose deaths they contend were caused

by exposure to hazardous and toxic substances in the

Landfill. Defendants are the alleged owners and operators of

the Landfill; the Third-Party Defendants assertedly generated

and transported the hazardous and toxic substances to the

Landfill. According to Plaintiffs, Defendants’ negligence is

based upon Defendants' failure to take adequate

precautionary measures to properly contain and prevent the

hazardous substances deposited into the Landfill from

escaping and migrating out of the Landfill and its

surrounding area where Plaintiffs and their decedents resided.

Plaintiffs allege exposure occurred through contact with the

ambient air and ground water when their decedents lived,

worked or engaged in recreational activity in the vicinity of

the Landfill.

Among the toxic substances allegedly deposited in the

Landfill are polychlorinated biphenol ("PCB") oils, acetone,

. Unless indicated otherwise, references herein to

Defendants include the Third-Party Defendants.

Appendix B - 74a

trichloroethane, 3-tricloroethane, perchloroethylene,

trichloroethylene, tetrachloroephylene, coolant oil, paint

treatment, waste cutting oils, degreasing materials, hydraulic

oil, waste paint, industrial wastes, fluorinated solvent waste,

cobalt, mercury, toluene, vinyl toluene, benzene, xylene,

methylene fluoride, lead, lead driers, calcium, cadmium, zinc

oxide, curing sulfur, dry metal dust, sand blast grit, foundry

wastes, pine tar pitch, pickling solutions, titanium

tetrachloride, polyvinyl alcohol film wastes, polyvinyl

chloride, naptha, mek, waste inks, heavy metal wastes, paint

thinners, paint solvents, industrial solvents, zirconium

sludge, phenolic sludges, and paint sludges such as zinc, tin,

chrome, iron, nickel, copper, asbestos, phenol, and fly ash.

Defendants who operated manufacturing facilities within the

Western New York region and who it is alleged negligently

released and disposed of hazardous substances into the

Landfill include Westinghouse Electric Corporation during

the years 1946 through 1969, General Motors Corporation

from the 1950's through 1968, Curtiss-Wright Corporation

during the years 1947 through 1966, W.S. Tyler,

Incorporated, as successor in interest to Hewitt-Robbins

Corp., during the 1950's and 1960's, Laidlaw Waste Systems,

Inc., individually, and as successor in interest to U.S. Rubber

Reclaiming Co., Inc., during the 1950's and 1960's, Warner

Lambert Company, through its subsidiary American Optical,

during the 1950's and 1960's, American Standard, Inc.,

during the 1950's and 1960's. Howden Fan Company, during

the 1950's and 1960's, Carborundum Company for the time

period 1951 through 1967, E.I. Dupont deNemours, from

1955 through 1968, F.N. Burt Co. from 1959 through 1969,

and Litton Industries, Inc., as successor in interest to Hewitt

Robbins Corp., during the late 1950's through the 1960's.

Defendants who it is alleged negligently transported and

deposited hazardous substances into the Landfill include

Appendix B - 75a

Waste Management, Inc., through its predecessor, Downing

Container Services, from 1952 through the 1960's,

Browning-Ferris Industries, Inc., as successor in interests to

Joe Ball Sanitation Services, Inc., Rapid Disposal Services,

Inc., and Niagara Sanitation Company, Inc., during the

1950's and 1960's, and Dresser Industries, Inc., during the

1950's and 1960's.

The instant motion seeks summary dismissal of the survival

actions and wrongful death claims asserted as to twenty

decedents, specifically Evo T. Astor, Charles W. Batt. Rose

E. Batt, Lorraine R. Brzezicki, Mary Jane Farino, Robert L.

Farino, Stephen C. Grandillo, Gretchen A. Heaney, Nelson

M. Hirsch, Joseph A. Inzinna, Henry A. Kuczka, Anthony J.

Marino, Robert A. Martzolf, Vincent J. Mongiovi, Alfred G.

Mucha, George Pagels, Leo N. Phillips, Mary M. Sturm,

Isabelle A. Wiedenbeck and Joseph J. Wiedenbeck, Sr.°

Dismissal of claims for loss of consortium brought in

connection with the deaths of Astor, Kuczka, Marino,

° In New York, damages recovered in a survival action are

based on pre-death personal injury and become part of the

decedent's estate to be distributed in accordance with the

decedent's will or by the laws of intestacy. N.Y. Est. Powers

& Trusts Law § 11-3.3(a)(McKinney 1967). Damages in

wrongful death actions are recoverable based on pecuniary

losses and do not become part of the decedent's estate, but

rather are distributed directly to those who demonstrate

financial dependence on the decedent. N.Y. Est. Powers &

Trust Law § 5-4.4(a)(McKinney 1997). In New York, such

beneficiaries include those who would be the decedent's

distributees pursuant to the rules governing intestate

succession, in proportion to the pecuniary damages suffered

by each such distributee. N.Y. Est. Powers & Trust Law §§

5-4.4 and 5-4.5. (McKinney 1991).

Appendix B - 76a

Martzolf, Mongiovi, Mucha, Pagels and Phillips is also

sought.

DISCUSSION

Summary judgment of a claim or defense will be granted

when the moving party demonstrates that there are no

genuine issues as to any material fact and that the moving

party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P.

56(a) and (b); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 331, 91

L. Ed. 2d 265, 106 S. Ct. 2548 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202, 106 S. Ct. 2505

(1986); Rattner v. Netburn, 930 F.2d 204, 209 (2d Cir. 1991).

The moving party for summary judgment bears the burden of

establishing the nonexistence of genuine issue of material

fact. If there is any evidence in the record based upon any

source from which a reasonable inference in the nonmoving

party's favor may be drawn, the moving party cannot obtain a

summary judgment. Celotex, supra, 477 U.S. at 331.

Summary judgment shall be granted "if the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on

file, together with the affidavits . . . show that there is no

issue as to any material fact, and the moving party is entitled

to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). "The

mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the

parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported

motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there

be no genuine issue of material fact." Anderson. supra, 477

USS. at 247-48.

Defendants have moved for partial summary judgment

seeking dismissal of the claims of twenty decedents and eight

surviving spouses on statute of limitations grounds, arguing

such claims are time-barred because 42 U.S.C. § 9658 does

not apply to the asserted causes of action, and, alternatively,

Appendix B - 77a

that the statute is unconstitutional as it constitutes legislation

beyond the scope of congressional power under the

Commerce Clause and violates the Tenth Amendment of the

United States Constitution. Defendants also seek dismissal

under New York law of all survival and wrongful death

actions which were commenced without a duly appointed

personal representative. Defendants further assert that

Plaintiffs' loss of consortium claims must be dismissed as

they are derivative of the underlying survival actions on

which they are based and therefore are also time-barred.

Finally, Defendants argue that the claims for punitive

damages must be dismissed as such claims are both legally

insufficient and their timeliness is dependent on the

underlying time-barred wrongful death, survival actions, and

loss of consortium claims.

The court will therefore first determine whether Plaintiffs’

claims are time-barred under relevant state law and if so,

whether 42 U.S.C. § 9658 is applicable and, to the extent

applicable, its preemptive effect on New York law. If the

state law is preempted, the court will determine the

constitutionality of 42 U.S.C. § 9658. Finally, the court will

address whether Defendants’ arguments regarding Plaintiffs’

failure to have properly appointed representatives requires

dismissal and whether Plaintiffs' loss of consortium and

punitive damages claims may proceed.

1. Statute of Limitations

The timeliness of a claim in federal court under diversity

jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), is governed by the statute

of limitations for the state in which the court sits. Guaranty

Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109-110, 89 L. Ed. 2079, 65

S. Ct. 1464 (1945); Personis v. Oiler, 889 F.2d 424 (2d Cir.

1989). Accordingly, the court's analysis begins with an

examination of the statutes of limitations governing the

Appendix B - 78a

timeliness of survival and wrongful death actions in New

York which reveals that, in the instant case, most of

Plaintiffs' claims are time-barred under the applicable New

York state statutes of limitations.

a. The Timeliness of Plaintiffs' Claims under New York

Law :

1. Survival Actions

In New York the traditional limitations period for personal

injury torts, including survival actions, based on negligence,

strict liability, gross negligence and loss of consortium is

three years measured from the date of the injury, defined in

toxic tort cases as the date of first exposure to the toxic

substance.’ N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. & R. § 214(5) (McKinney,

1990)("§ 214(5)"). Here, Plaintiffs seek recovery for their

decedents' injuries based on exposure to toxic substances that

: When New York's traditional limitations period

commenced to run with regard to toxic tort actions has

sometimes been misstated. See, e.g., Kulzer v. Pittsburgh-

Corning Corp., 942 F.2d 122, 126 (2d Cir. 1991)"at the

time, a cause of action for exposure to toxic substances

accrued on the last date of exposure to the toxic

substances")(applying New York caselaw). However, the

New York Court of Appeals recently affirmed that under the

traditional New York rule the limitations period for toxic

torts accrued as of the date of first, not last exposure. Blanco

v. American Telephone and Telegraph Co., 90 N.Y.2d 757,

689 N.E.2d 506, 666 N.Y.S.2d 536, 1997 WL 729116. *3

(N.Y. 1997)( "Prior to enactment of CPLR 214-c, this Court

has held that in the case of latent injuries arising out of

exposure to toxic substances, the cause of action accrued

upon plaintiff's initial exposure")(emphasis added).

Appendix B - 79a

first occurred between the early 1900's, Records of Leo N.

Phillips, attached as Exhibit 1 to Affidavit of Laurie Styka

Bloom, Esq., in Support of Liaison Group Defendants’

Consolidated Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. #

291)("Bloom Affidavit"), filed June 10, 1997, and the late

1960's. Records cf Henry A. Kuczka, Bloom Affidavit,

Exhibit 9. All the instant actions are thus untimely under §

214(5) as more than three years have passed since the date of

first exposure to the alleged toxic substances and the filing of

the claims by decedents' representatives in 1995 and 1996.

In response to complaints that the first exposure rule,

judicially established in Schmidt v. Merchants Despatch

Transp. Co., 270 N.Y. 287, 200 N.E. 824 (N.Y. 1936), barred

many plaintiffs from commencing actions for injuries caused

by latent effects of exposure to toxic chemicals and other

hazardous substances before learning they were injured and

the causes thereof, in 1986 the New York legislature enacted

§ 214-c of New York Civil Practice Law and Rules which

created special accrual rules and limitations periods allowing

more time for plaintiffs to file claims seeking damages for

injuries and deaths attributed to exposure to such substances.®

Section 214-c(2) provides that a plaintiff who suffers a

personal injury in a toxic tort case has three years from the

date of the discovery of the injury to commence an action.

N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. & R. 214-c (2)(McKinney 1990)("§ 214-

8 In Schmidt, the New York Court of Appeals held that an

"injury occurs whez there is a wrongful invasion of personal

or property rights and then the cause of action accrues.

Except in cases of fraud where the statute expressly provides

otherwise, the statutory period of limitations begins to run

from the time when liability for wrong has arisen even

though the injured party may be ignorant of the existence of

the wrong or injury." Schmidt, at 827.

Appendix B - 80a

c(2)"). Here, Plaintiffs seek recovery based on injuries to

their decedents, the earliest of which was discovered in 1961,

Records of Evo T. Astor, Bloom Affidavit, Exhibit 6, and the

latest of which was discovered in October 1993. Records of

Nelson M. Hirsch, Bloom Affidavit, Exhibit 20° An

examination of the relevant exhibits submitted on this motion

reveals that, the filing of only Nelson M. Hirsch's survival

action on June 17, 1996 was timely under § 214-c(2),

assuming that Hirsch's discovery of his injury coincided with

the diagnosis of Hirsch's cancer in October 1993. See

Records of Nelson M. Hirsch, Bloom Affidavit, Exhibit 20.

Further, pursuant to N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. & R. § 214¢

(4MMcKinney 1990 & Supp. 1997\("§ 214-c(4)"), if the

plaintiff discovers the cause of a toxic tort injury within five

years of the discovery of the injury, the plaintiff may invoke

the longer of (a) the three year period from the discovery of

the injury or (b) a one year period from the discovery of the

cause within which to commence an action. Here, all

Plaintiffs assert that they discovered the cause of their

decedents' injuries in 1994 or 1995. Bloom Affidavit,

Exhibits 1-20. As less than five years have passed between

the asserted dates of discovery of the decedents' injuries and

the discovery of the causes of those injuries only as to the

survival actions brought on behalf of the estates of Mary Jane

Farino, Nelson M. Hirsch, Isabelle A. Wiedenbeck and

Joseph J. Wiedenbeck, Sr., Bloom Affidavit, Exhibits 17, 20,

19 and 16, respectively, only those survival actions meet the

first requirement for timeliness under § 214-(c)(4). As stated,

with the exception of Hirsch, none of the instant survival

It is assumed only for the purposes of this Discussion iit

the diagnosis of each decedent's injury coincided with the

discovery of such injury, a fact which has yet to be

established by either party.

Appendix B - 81a

actions were filed within three years of the discovery of the

fatal injuries. Accordingly, the survival actions are timely

only if filed within one year of the discovery of the causes of

such injuries.

However, as 1994 is the asserted date of discovery of the

cause of the injuries pertaining to the survival actions for

Isabelle A. and Joseph J. Wiedenbeck Sr., (Bloom Affidavit,

Exhibits 16 and 19), and as those survival actions were not

filed until June 17, 1996, Case # 96-CV-395A(F)(Docket No.

1), they were not filed within one year of the discovery of the

alleged cause of death as required by the statute of limitations

period under § 214-c(4), and, as such, are time-barred under

New York law, regardless of whether 42 U.S.C. § 9658

applies.'° The survival action of Mary Jane Farino, filed

January 10, 1995 is timely under § 214-c(4), assuming, as

Plaintiffs allege, that the cause of Farino's injury was

discovered in 1995. Records of Mary Jane Farino, Bloom

Affidavit, Exhibit 17. As the asserted date of discovery of the

cause of decedent Hirsch's injuries, is "in 1995," depending

on the precise date of such discovery, the relevant survival

action, filed June 17, 1996, may be timely under § 214-c(4)

as well as § 214-c(2). Records of Nelson M. Hirsch, Bloom

Affidavit, Exhibit 20. However, even with the benefit of 42

U.S.C. § 9658, the survival action of Nelson M. Hirsch is

untimely under § 214-c(4). See Discussion, infra, at 34-35.

'0 As discussed, infra, see Discussion at 16-17, 42 U.S.C. §

9658 does not affect the applicable state limitations period,

only the manner of determining the date of accrual of the

claim.

Appendix B - 82a

2. Wrongful Death Claims

The applicable statute of limitations for wrongful death

actions under New York law is two years measured from the

date of death. N.Y. Est. Powers & Trusts Law § 5-4.1

(McKinney 1997). Plaintiffs’ wrongful death claims pertain

to the deaths of persons who died between 1963 and 1993,

Bloom Affidavit, Exhibits 1-20, and Plaintiffs concede that

all of the instant wrongful death actions, none of which were

filed within two years from any of Plaintiffs’ respective

decedents' deaths, are untimely under N.Y. Est. Powers &

Trusts Law § 5-4.1. Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law, at 1.

b. The Purpose of the Federally Required

Commencement Date

As most of the survival actions and all the wrongful death

actions are time-barred under New York law, Plaintiffs assert

that the timeliness of their survival and wrongful death

claims are governed by 42 U.S.C. § 9658, which neither

creates a separate federal cause of action based on toxic torts

within its terms nor a uniform statute of limitations related to

such torts, but rather provides a uniform accrual date from

which the applicable state period of limitations governing

such tort actions is measured. 42 U.S.C. § 9658A(4)(b).

Defendants argue that as 42 U.S.C. § 9658 refers only to

actions for personal injury and property damage it is

inapplicable to Plaintiffs' otherwise time-barred survival and

wrongful death actions. Liaison Group Defendants’

Memorandum of Law in Support of Consolidated Motion for

Partial Summary Judgment ("Defendants’ Memorandum of

Law"), filed June 10, 1997, at 21, 25.

Section 9658 of Title 42 of the United States Code is part of

the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation

and Liability Act, known as "CERCLA." CERCLA was

Appendix B - 83a

enacted in response to the increasing threat to the national

environment and public health represented by years of unsafe

disposal of hazardous substances. Meghrig v. KFC Western,

Inc., 516 U.S. 479, 116 S. Ct. 1251, 1254, 134 L. Ed. 2d 121

(1996); B.F. Goodrich v. Betkoski, 99 F.3d 505, 514 (2d Cir.

1996). As enacted on December 11, 1980, CERCLA

contained many provisions to facilitate the expeditious

cleanup of hazardous waste sites and to recover the

accompanying costs from the responsible parties. See 42

U.S.C. §§ 9601, ef. seg. For example, in addition to

permitting actions by federal and state government agencies

to remediate the unsafe storage and release of hazardous

substances, 42 U.S.C. § 9613(g), CERCLA also authorizes

actions by private individuals to accomplish its objectives. 42

U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B)(private individuals may sue for "any

other necessary costs of response incurred by any other

person consistent with the national contingency plan"); State

of New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1041-42

(2d Cir. 1985({CERCLA provides incentive to private parties

to take lead role in cleaning up hazardous waste sites).

Congress, however, also had intended that CERCLA provide

a legal remedy for private claims based on injuries to persons

and property damage attributed to the release of hazardous

substances into the environment, although Congress was

unable, at the time of CERCLA's enactment in 1980, to agree

on the form such legal redress should take. Superfund

Section 301(e) Study Group, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., Injuries

and Damages from Hazardous Wastes - Analysis and

Improvement of Legal Remedies, 16 (Comm. Print

1982)("Study Group Report"). Accordingly, § 301(e) of

CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9651(e), mandated that a study be

conducted "to determine the adequacy of existing common

law and statutory remedies in providing legal redress for

harm to man and the environment caused by the release of

Appendix B - 84a

hazardous substances into the environment."!! 42 U.S.C. §

9651(e)(1) (emphasis added). The study also was to

particularly address:

(A) the need for revisions in existing statutory or common

law, and

(B) whether such revisions should take the form of Federal

statutes or the development of a model code which is

recommended for adoption by the States.

42 U.S.C. § 9651(e)(4)(A) and (B).

The results of that study were to be delivered to Congress for

consideration in amending CERCLA to deal specifically with

these questions. 42 U.S.C. § 9651(e)(4). The Study Group

filed its report on July 1, 1982. Study Group Report, at 3.

!1 The term "hazardous substance" is used throughout the

CERCLA legislation. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14). However, the

Study Group Report refers to both "hazardous substance” and

"hazardous waste" stating "that the definition of ‘hazardous

waste" or ‘hazardous substance’ can be different for different

purposes,” and that "for regulatory purposes, depending ‘on

the authorizing statute involved, the regulator may have to

determine the risk in the light of the counterbalancing

economic benefit resulting from the manufacture and use of

the hazardous substance, before and after it becomes

hazardous waste." Study Group Report, at 24 (emphasis

added). Such language implies that "hazardous waste" is a

form of a hazardous substance and, accordingly, use of the

term "hazardous substance” in this disaussion includes

"hazardous waste."

Appendix B - 85a

Congress did not, however, adopt any of the Study Group's

ten recommendations, which included an administrative

claim procedure upon a federally created fund, and

enhancement of the states' own statutory remedies to provide

for and facilitate the redress of personal injuries and property

damage attributed to improper disposal of hazardous

substances under 42 U.S.C. § 9651(e)(4)(B). Study Group

Report, at 193-271. Instead, Congress responded to the Study

Group Report's finding that existing state private tort actions

for personal injuries and property damage were effective

mechanisms of legal redress, but for the fact that such actions

were often time-barred as the relevant state statutes of

limitations and related judicial decisions did not permit

accrual of an action based on an injury with a long latency

period such as cancer to be measured from the discovery of

the cause of the injury. Study Group Report, at 21-22, 43.

Accordingly, Congress enacted 42 U.S.C. § 9658, providing

for a uniform accrual date from which to measure the running

of the applicable periods of limitation for state law toxic torts

actions.

Specifically, the legislation provides that

(1) In the case of any action brought under State law for

personal injury, or property damages, which are caused or

contributed to by exposure to any hazardous substance,

or pollutant or contaminant, released into the environment

from a facility, if the applicable limitations period for

such action (as specified in the State statute of limitations

or under common law) provides a commencement date

which is’ earlier than the federally required

commencement date, such period shall commence at the

federally required commencement date in lieu of the date

specified in such State statute. . ..(2) Except as provided

in paragraph (1), the statute of limitations established

under State law shall apply in all actions brought under

Appendix B - 86a

State law for personal injury, or property damages, which

are caused or contributed to by exposure to any hazardous

substance, or pollutant or contaminant, released into the

environment from a facility.’

42 U.S.C. 9658(a)(1) & (2).

2 A "facility" is defined by 42 U.S.C. § 9601(9) as "(A) any

building, structure, installation, equipment, pipe or pipeline

(including any pipe into a sewer or publicly owned treatment

works), well, pit, pond, lagoon, impoundment, ditch, landfill,

storage container, motor vehicle, rolling stock, or aircraft, or

(B) any site or area where a hazardous substance has been

deposited, stored, disposed of, or placed, or otherwise come

to be located; but does not include any consumer product in

consumer use or any vessel." 42 U.S.C. § 9601(9)(A) and

(B). The parties do not dispute that the Landfill comes within

this definition. A "release" is defined as "a spilling, leaking,

pumping, pouring, emitting, emptying, discharging, injecting,

escaping, leaching, dumping, or disposing into the

environment (including the abandonment or discarding of

barrels, containers, and other closed receptacles containing

any hazardous substance or pollutant or contaminant), but

excludes (A) any release which results in exposure to persons

solely within a workplace, with respect to a claim which such

persons may assert against the employer of such persons, (B)

emissions from the engine exhaust of a motor vehicle, rolling

stock, aircraft, vessel, or pipeline pumping station, (C)

release of source, byproduct, or special nuclear material from

a nuclear incident . . . and (D) the normal application of

fertilizer." 42 U.S.C. § 9601(22). As the instant motion is

limited to their statute of limitations defenses, Defendants do

not dispute that the alleged hazardous wastes at the Landfill

have been released into the environment.

Appendix B - 87a

The "federally required commencement date" is defined as

the date plaintiff knew (or reasonably should have

known) that the personal injury or property damages

referred to in subsection (a)(1) were caused or contributed

to by the hazardous substances or pollutant or

contaminant concerned.

42 U.S.C. § 9658(b)(4)(A) ("the FRCD").

Defendants assert that the FRCD does not apply to the

survival and wrongful death actions because they are not

"actions for personal injuries" as that term appears in the

FRCD. Plaintiffs maintain that both survival and wrongful

death actions are within the ambit of the FRCD and that the

FRCD preempts the accrual rule of the New York general

statute of limitations and its wrongful death statute, which

otherwise bar their claims. Plaintiffs' Response to

Defendants’ Consolidated Motion for Partial Summary

Judgment ("Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Law”), filed July 11,

1997, at 1-2.

A cause of action "accrues" for statutory limitations periods

when "the plaintiff has 'a complete and present cause of

action.” Bay Area Laundry and Dry Cleaning Pension Trust

Fund v. Ferbar Corporation of California, Inc., 522 U.S.

192, 139 L. Ed. 2d 553, 118 S. Ct. 542, 549 (1997).

Moreover, "a cause of action does not become ‘complete and

present’ for limitations purposes until the plaintiff can file

suit and obtain relief." Bay Area Laundry and Dry Cleaning

Fension Trust Fund, supra (citing Reiter v. Cooper, 507 U.S.

258, 267, 122 L. Ed. 2d 604, 113 S. Ct. 1213 (1993)("While

it is theoretically possible for a statute to create a cause of

action that accrues at one time for the purpose of calculating

when the statute of limitations begins to run, but at another

time for the purpose of bringing suit, we will not infer such

Appendix B - 88a

an odd result in the absence of any such indication in the

statute")). Accordingly, as a plaintiff cannot in good faith file

suit to obtain relief until causality is known, see Fed.R.Civ.P.

11(b) (requiring that all actions and motions in federal court

be made with the reasonable belief that such actions are

legally warranted and not made for any improper purpose

such as to harass or cause undue delay), an action does not

accrue, and hence the relevant statute of limitations does not

commence to run, absent knowledge, or a good faith belief as

to the existence of each element of the tort including

causality.

c. The FRCD Applies to State Survival and Wrongful

Death Actions

Defendants, in their effort to demonstrate that the FRCD does

not apply to survival or wrongful death actions, contend that

the FRCD was not intended to permit knowledge of the cause

of action to accrue to one other than the decedent and that

construction of the FRCD to permit such accrual is against

public policy.”

An essential element of both survival and wrongful death

actions is that the decedent have died with a viable cause of

action against the defendant for the infliction of the injury

which caused the death. N.Y. Est. Powers & Trust Law §§

11-3.2 (survival actions) and 5-4 (wrongful death actions).

Here, the asserted FRCD with respect to the claims of each

decedent is well after the date of death of each decedent

whose claims are subject to the instant motion and who

presumably died before it was possible to determine the

'3 Defendants assert further arguments opposing application

of the FRCD to wrongful death actions. Those arguments are

addressed, infra, at 34-49.

Appendix B - 89a

causes of the decedents' injuries and resulting deaths.

Defendants argue that as the FRCD does not expressly

provide that a survival or wrongful death action may accrue

upon the discovery of the cause of a decedent's fatal injury by

one other than decedent, each decedent thus died without a

viable cause of action. Defendants’ Memorandum of Law, at

27-28. Defendants further assert that permitting a survival or

wrongful death action to accrue as of the decedent's estate

representative's discovery of the cause of the injury is against

public policy as such would create the possibility of an

infinite limitations period, thus unfairly burdening

Defendants by forcing them to defend stale claims long after

the alleged exposures and deaths. Defendants' Memorandum

of Law, at 41; Defendants' Reply Memorandum of Law, at 5-

6. The court finds Defendants’ arguments are without merit

for several reasons.

1. The FRCD Does Not Require That a Decedent

Personally Discover the Cause of the Fatal Injury Prior to

Death

Defendants oppose application of the FRCD to both survival

and wrongful death actions on the basis that "the key

requirement for invoking the FRCD statute (each decedent's

personal discovery of the cause of his or her injury) is

decidedly and admittedly absent in these cases." Defendants'

Memorandum of Law at 37-38(emphasis added). Defendants

read the FRCD too narrowly. By its terms, the FRCD is the

"date plaintiff knew (or reasonably should have known) that

the personal injury or property damages referred to in

subsection (a)(1) were caused or contributed to by the

hazardous substance or pollutant or contaminant concerned.”

42 U.S.C. § 9658(b)(4)A)(emphasis added). The issue

therefore is one of statutory interpretation: did Congress

mean to include only the physically injured person, i.e., the

person to who suffered the physical or bodily harm, in the

Appendix B - 90a

term "plaintiff" as used in the FRCD, or does the term also

include an injured party's legal representative where the

injuries result in death before the victim can institute a

lawsuit based on his own behalf? For the reasons that follow,

the court finds that the latter was Congress' intent.

Where a federal statute is concerned, unless the statute

directs otherwise, the terms contained in such federal statute

are determined in accordance with federal law. Uyrie v.

Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 174, 93 L. Ed. 1282, 69 S. Ct. 1018

(1949)(holding that definition of "negligence" as used in the

Federal Employers’ Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. § 51 was to be

determined based on federal law). The FRCD is a federal

statute and it is axiomatic that "the starting point in every

case involving construction of a statute is the language

itself." Landreth Timber Co., v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 684,

85 L. Ed. 2d 692, 105 S. Ct. 2297 (1985\(quoting Blue Chip

Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 756, 44 L. Ed.

2d 539, 95 S. Ct. 1917 (1975)). In interpreting a federal

statute the court "must not be guided by a single sentence or

member of a sentence, but look to the provisions of the whole

law and to its object and policy.” Pilot Life Ins.

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