Appendix — Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Freier
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Appendix A — la
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
Docket No. 00-7724(L), 00-7728(XAP)
303 F.3d 176
RAYMOND FREIER, Individually, as Administrator of the
Estate of Rose Freier, deceased, and as surviving spouse of
Rose Freier, ARTHUR L. PHILLIPS, Administrator of the
Estate of Leo Phillips, deceased, and Dorothy Phillips, as the
surviving Spouse of Leo Phillips, TAB FUQUA,
CHARLOTTE MUCHA, individually, as Executrix of the
Estate of Alfred G. Mucha, deceased, and as surviving
spouse of Alfred Mucha, JOHN FARINO, Administrator of
the Estates of Mary Jane Farino and Robert Farino, deceased,
GRACE ASTOR, individually, and as surviving spouse of
Evo T. Astor, HARRY BASINSKI, SR., ELLEN
BASINSKI, his spouse, KATHY KAMINSKI,
Administratrix of the Estate of Joseph Inzinna, deceased,
MARY YLMAR, MARIE MANOLIS, Executrix of the
Estate of Louis Manolis, deceased, and individually as the
surviving spouse of Louis Manolis, legal representative of
the Estate of Leo Ott, deceased, and Administratrix of Mary
M. Sturm, deceased, WILLIAM NEILSEN, BETTY
BARABASZ, Executrix of the Estate of George Pagels,
deceased, GLORIA PAGELS, Individually as the surviving
spouse of George Pagels, JOSEPH GRANDILLO, executor
of the Estate of Stephen Grandillo, deceased, SHIRLEY
KUCZKA, Executrix of the Estate of Henry Kuczka,
deceased, and individually as the surviving spouse of Henry
Kuczka, MARY ANN BOXHORN, Executrix of the Estates
Appendix A - 2a
of Leo and Annabel Foisset, deceased, EILEEN FOLTS,
Administratrix of the Estate of Helen Hancock, deceased,
FRANKLIN MUELLER, FLORA MUELLER, his spouse,
ROBERT S. FIELS, DELORES FIELS, his spouse, IRENE
M. MARINO, legal representative of the Estate of Anthony J.
Marino, deceased, and individually as the surviving spouse
of Anthony J. Marino, deceased, NANCY FORMAN, CARL
P. FORMAN, SR., her spouse, JOSEPH J. WIEDENBECK,
JR., legal representative of the Estates of Isabelle A.
Wiedenbeck and Joseph J. Wiedenbeck, Sr., deceased,
LINDA KISTKA, legal representative of the Estate of
Nelson M. Hirsch, deceased, NELLY ANTHONY, legal
representative of the Estate of Diane Anthony, deceased,
ELEANOR JASINSKI, legal representative of the Estate of
Leocadia Jasinski, deceased, GEORGE SCHERRER, JR.,
legal representative of the Estate of George Scherrer, Sr.,
deceased, MARIE SCHERRER, individually as the surviving
spouse of George Scherrer, Sr., deceased, VERONICA A.
ZAWATSKI, legal representative of the Estate of Robert
Zawatski, deceased, and individually as surviving spouse,
MICHAEL LAMANCUSO, MARLENE LAMANCUSO,
his spouse, THOMAS SZYPLMAN, legal representative of
the Estate of Victoria Szyplman, deceased, GERALDINE
DAVIES, MORLEY P. DAVIES, her spouse, KEVIN
BATT, individually, as Administrator of the Estate of
Charles W. Batt, deceased, and Executor of the Estate of
Rose E. Batt, deceased, PATRICIA BATT, his spouse,
DONNA MCKOWAN, DONALD MCKOWAN, her spouse,
NORMAN WAGNER, PATRICIA WAGNER, his spouse,
EILEEN EWERT, Administratrix of the Estate of Evo T.
Astor, deceased, THOMAS F. HEWNER, Public
Administrator of the Estate of Lorraine E. Brzezicki,
deceased, LAWRENCE HEANEY, legal representative of
the Estate of Gretchen Heaney, deceased, MARIE
MARTZOLF, Executrix of the Estate of Robert Martzolf,
deceased, and individually as surviving spouse, and
Appendix A - 3a
JACQUELINE MONGIOVI, Executrix of the Estate of
Vincent Mongiovi, deceased, and individually as his
surviving spouse,
Plaintiffs-A ppellants-Cross-Appellees,
V.
WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORPORATION, ALLIED
WASTE SYSTEMS, INC., formerly known as Laidlaw
Waste Systems, Inc., DRESSER INDUSTRIES, INC.,
AMERICAN STANDARD, INC., CARBORUNDUM
COMPANY, and £.!. DUPONT DE NEMOURS & CO.,
INC.,
Defendants-Appellees-Cross-Appellants,
GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, CURTISS.
WRIGHT CORPORATION, WARNER-LAMBERT
COMPANY, and FORD MOTOR COMPANY ‘
Defendants-Third-Party-Plaintiffs-A ppellees-Cross-
Appellants,
LITTON SYSTEMS, INC.,
Defendant-Third-Party-Defendant-Appellee-Cross-
Appellant,
BROWNING-FERRIS INDUSTRIES, INC.,
Defendant-Cross-Appellant,
TRICO PRODUCTS CORPORATION, OCCIDENTAL
CHEMICAL CORPORATION, WASTE MANAGEMENT
OF NEW YORK, INC., NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER
CORPORATION, and NEW YORK STATE ELECTRIC &
GAS CORPORATION,
Third-Party-Defendants-Cross-Appellants,
Appendix A - 4a
HOWDEN FAN COMPANY, formerly known as Buffalo
Forge Company,
Defenuant-Appellee,
W.S. TYLER INC., Defendant, LANCASTER STONE
PRODUCTS CORP., PAUL M. PFOHL, PFOHL
BROTHERS, PFOHL ENTERPRISES, BRYAN PFOHL,
and TOWN OF CHEEKTOWAGA,
Third-Party-Defendants.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Intervenor.
February 15, 2001, Argued
August 15, 2002, Decided
COUNSEL:
For _ Plaintiffs-Appellants-Cross-Appellees: STEVE
JENSEN, Dallas, Texas, (Laura J. Van Pelt, Baron & Budd,
Dallas, Texas, on the brief),
For All Cross-Appellants: LAURIE STYKA BLOOM,
Buffalo, New York (Mark A. Molloy, Nixon, Peabody,
Buffalo, New York, on the brief),
For Intervenor United States of America: R. JUSTIN
SMITH, Attorney, Environment & Natural Resources
Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington,
D.C. (Lois Schiffer, Assistant Attorney General, Stephen J.
Sweeney, Attorney-Advisor, Environmental Protection
Agency, John A. Bryson, Environment & Natural Resources
Division, United States Department of Justice, on the brief),
Appendix A - 5a
For Amicus The Product Liability Advisory Council, Inc., in
support of Appellees: HERZFELD & RUBIN, New York,
New York (Michael Hoenig, Noreen M. Giusti, New York,
New York, Hugh F. Young, Jr., The Product Liability
Advisory Council, Inc., Reston, Virginia, of counsel), filed a
brief on behalf of Amicus Curiae.
JUDGES:
Before: KEARSE, LEVAL, and KATZMANN, Circuit
Judges.
ORDER
Appeal from a judgment entered in the United States District
Court for the Western District of New York pursuant to Fed.
R. Civ. P. 54(b), Richard J. Arcara, Judge, dismissing on
statute-of-limitations grounds certain claims alleging
personal injuries resulting from toxic substances transported
to and maintained in a Cheektowaga, New York landfill.
Cross-appeal seeking affirmance on the ground that the
federal statute relied on by plaintiffs, altering the starting date
of state-law-limitations period applicable to claims of injury
caused by hazardous wastes, see U.S.C. § 9658, is
unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause and the Tenth
Amendment. See, In re Pfohl Brother Landfill Litigation, 26
F.Supp.2d 512 (1998), 68 F.Supp.2d 236 (1999).
Vacated and remanded.
Judge Leval concurs, in a separate opinion.
OPINION
KEARSE, Circuit Judge:
Plaintiffs Raymond Freier et al. appeal from a judgment
entered in the United States District Court for the Western
Appendix A - 6a
District of New York pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b),
Richard J. Arcara, Judge, dismissing certain of their statelaw
tort claims alleging that personal injuries to themselves and
their decedents were caused by toxic substances transported
to and maintained in a Cheektowaga, New York landfill. The
district court granted partial summary judgment dismissing
those claims as _ untimely, ruling that under the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,
and Liability Act of 1980 ("CERCLA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-
9675 (1994 & Supp. V 1999), as amended by § 203 of the
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, 42
U.S.C. § 9658, plaintiffs' claims accrued when they knew or
with reasonable diligence should have known that the injuries
resulted from exposure to hazardous substances deposited in
the landfill, see In re Pfohl Brothers Landfill Litigation, 26
F. Supp. 2d 512 (1998) ("Pfohl J"), but also ruling that
plaintiffs should have suspected the cause of their injuries no
later than the end of 1991 and that therefore, even under 42
U.S.C. § 9658, their claims, asserted beginning in 1995, were
barred by the relevant statute of limitations, see In re Pfohl
Brothers Landfill Litigation, 68 F. Supp. 2d 236 (1999)
("Pfohl II"). On appeal, plaintiffs contend principally that the
court erred in ruling as a matter of law that they should have
known no later than the end of 1991 that their injuries were
caused by the landfill. They also contend that the court
erroneously applied a one-year, rather than a three-year,
limitations period.
Various defendants and third-party defendants have cross-
appealed, urging that the judgment be affirmed in toto on the
ground that 42 U.S.C. § 9658, to the extent that it alters state
law as to the starting date of a state limitations period on
state-law claims, is unconstitutional under the Commerce
Clause and the Tenth Amendment of the Constitution. They
also urge partial affirmance on the ground that § 9658 is
inapplicable to claims involving the death of a plaintiff's
Appendix A - 7a
decedent. The United States has intervened in this Court,
arguing for the constitutionality of § 9658.
For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the district
court properly rejected defendants’ statutory-interpretation
and constitutional challenges to § 9658 and that it properly
found that plaintiffs' claims were subject to the pertinent one-
year limitations period. However, we conclude that there are
triable issues of fact as to the time when plaintiffs reasonably
should have known that the landfill materials were the cause
of the injuries. Accordingly, we vacate and remand for
further proceedings.
I. BACKGROUND
The present actions concern injuries alleged to have resulted
from the maintenance of a landfill owned and operated
principally by third-party-defendants Pfohl Brothers and
Pfohl Enterprises (the "Pfohl Landfill" or "Landfill") in
Cheektowaga, which is adjacent to Buffalo, New York. The
Pfohl Landfill is a 120-acre area used for waste disposal. It
borders Aero Lake, a fishing and swimming site, and is
within a few hundred feet of Ellicott Creek, which is fed by
three tributaries that flow through the Landfill. Ellicott Creek
empties into the Niagara River, an international waterway
between the United States and Canada. Since at least 1983,
the Landfill has been listed in the New York State Registry
of Active Hazardous Waste Disposal Sites.
A. The Parties and the Claims
The present actions, consolidated in the district court for all
pretrial purposes sub nom. In re Pfohl Brothers Landfill
Litigation, were commenced by the filing of several
essentially identical complaints between January 1995 and
January 1997 by more than 60 plaintiffs on behalf of
Appendix A - 8a
themselves or their respective decedents, alleging that the
injured parties suffered from various cancers caused by
exposure to toxic wastes deposited in the Pfohl Landfill. The
complaints alleged that most of the plaintiffs had lived or
worked in the immediate vicinity of the Landfill or had
engaged in recreational activities near the Landfill. Many of
the plaintiffs had used the Landfill area as an access route to
Aero Lake; their children had often played in the Landfill;
and residential properties were sometimes flooded when
Ellicott Creek overflowed.
The defendants are companies that, between 1946 and 1969,
either sent hazardous waste materials from _ their
manufacturing operations to the Landfill or transported
hazardous substances to, and deposited them in, the Landfill.
Plaintiffs alleged that the cancers were caused by exposure to
hazardous substances released from the Landfill through the
air and water and/or released by the defendant transporters on
their way to the Landfill. The complaints asserted survival,
wrongful death, personal injury, and loss-of-consortium
clams under New York State law, and _ requested
compensatory and punitive damages on theories of, inter
alia, strict liability, negligence, gross negligence, and failure
to warn.
B. The Pertinent Statutes of Limitations and Claim-
Accrual Dates
The present appeal focuses solely on questions relating to the
statutes of limitations applicable to plaintiffs’ claims. There
has been no adjudication or concession on the issue of
causation, and nothing in this opinion expresses any view of
this Court on the merits of the causation issue.
The timeliness of the present actions, in which federal
jurisdiction is premised on diversity of citizenship, is
Appendix A - 9a
governed by New York law, see, e.g., Guaranty Trust Co. v.
York, 326 U.S. 99, 109-110, 89 L. Ed. 2079, 65 S. Ct. 1464
(1945); Personis v. Oiler, 889 F.2d 424, 426 (2d Cir. 1989),
to the extent that state law is not preempted by federal law.
As discussed below, New York law reflects a variety of
possible dates on which a toxic tort claim may be found to
have accrued, including (1) the date of the victim's first
exposure to the toxic substance, (2) the date of discovery of
the injury, which could be as late as the time of the victim's
death, and (3) the date of discovery of the injury's cause.
New York's Estates, Powers & Trusts Law ON. YEP.T.L.”
or "EPTL") provides a two-year limitations period for
wrongful death claims, i.e., claims on behalf of a decedent's
distributees (as defined in the EPTL) who suffered pecuniary
loss because of the decedent's death. See N.Y.E.P.T.L. § 5-
4.1 (McKinney 1999). Under that section, the limitations
period begins on the date of the decedent's death.
Section 214(5) of New York's Civil Practice Law and Rules
("N.Y.C.P.L.R." or "CPLR"), and CPLR § 214¢c, which
became effective in July 1986 and modifies § 214(5), govern
claims for personal injury or property damage, including ©
claims for pre-death injuries to a decedent's person or
property ("survival claims"), see N.Y.E.P.TL. § 11-3.2(b)
(McKinney 2001). Section 214-c provides generally for a
three-year limitations period for claims of personal injury
caused by hazardous substances, see N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 214-c
(McKinney 1990); subsection (2) of that section provides
that the limitations period begins on the earlier of the date on
which the injury was discovered or the date when, with
reasonable diligence, the injury should have been discovered
(collectively the "discovery-of-injury" date), see id. § 214-
(2). Subsection (4) further provides that such a claim may
be asserted within one year after the date of discovery of the
injury's cause ("discovery-of-cause” date), so long as the
Appendix A - 10a
discovery-of-cause date is within five years after the
discovery-of-injury date. See id. § 214-c(4). Thus, § 214-
c(4) "gives the plaintiff five years after the discovery (actual
or constructive) of the injury to ascertain its cause. If he does
not (or cannot) discover the etiology within five years, then
he is barred by the statute of limitations." N.Y.C.P.L.R. §
214-c Practice Commentaries, C214-c:4, at 634 (McKinney
1990). Section 214-c(4) also provides that if the toxic tort
claim is not asserted within three years after the discovery-
of-injury date, the plaintiff is required to show that scientific
or medical knowledge "sufficient to ascertain the cause of his
injury had not been discovered, identified or determined"
within that three-year period. N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 214-c(4).
Section 214(5) provides that, except as provided in § 214-c,
claims of personal injury must be brought within three years
of the date of injury. See id . § 214(5) (McKinney 1990). For
purposes of toxic tort claims, the date of injury is interpreted
as the date of first exposure to the hazardous substance. See
Blanco v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 90 N.Y.2d
757, 767, 666 N.Y.S.2d 536, 540, 689 N.E.2d 506 (1997);
Snyder v. Town Insulation, Inc., 81 N.Y.2d 429, 432-33, 599
N.Y.S.2d 515, 516-17, 615 N.E.2d 999 (1993).
Section 9658 of 42 U.S.C., enacted by Congress in 1986 as §
309 of CERCLA, provides a uniform standard for
determining the accrual dates of claims of personal injury
due to exposure to hazardous substances. As set out in
greater detail in Part II.A. below, the section establishes a
"federally required commencement date,” 42 U.S.C. §
9658(a)(1) ("FRCD" or "Federal Commencement Date"), to
start the running of the applicable state period of limitations
governing such a claim. That date is defined as "the date the
plaintiff knew (or reasonably should have known) that the
personal injury or property damages . . .
>
Appendix A - lla
were caused or contributed to by the hazardous substance or
pollutant or contaminant concerned." Jd. § 9658(b)(4)(A).
C. Defendants' First Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment, Seeking Dismissal of the Wrongful Death,
Survival, and Loss-of-Consortium Claims, and
Challenging the Constitutionality of § 9658
Following discovery limited to Statute-of-limitations issues,
defendants moved, in two Stages, for partial summary
judgment dismissing most of plantiffs' claims on the ground
that they were time-barred. In the first Stage, in June 1997
(see Part I.E. below with respect to the second stage),
defendants sought dismissal of the survival, wrongful death,
and loss-of-consortium claims.
Defendants contended that the survival claims were barred by
either CPLR § 214(5) or CPLR § 214c. They argued
essentially that some claims accrued prior to July 1986, i.e.,
prior to the effective date of § 214-c, and hence were
governed by CPLR § 214(5)'s three-year limitations period.
Defendants contended that those Claims were time-barred
because the injured persons were first exposed to the
hazardous wastes no later than 1968, and these suits ‘were
commenced no earlier than 1995.
Defendants contended that virtually all of the remaining
survival claims were barred by CPLR § 214-c(2)'s provision
for a three-year limitations period, running from the earlier of
the date on which the injury was discovered or the date when,
with reasonable diligence, the injury should have been
discovered. Noting that the latest possible discovery-of-
injury date was either the date of diagnosis of the cancerous
condition or the date of the decedent's death, defendants
argued that at most one claim was filed within three years
after the discovery-of-injury date.
Appendix A - 12a
As to the claims for wrongful death, defendants contended
they were barred by N.Y.E.P.T.L. § 5-4.1 because these
actions were commenced more than two years after the
deaths of plaintiffs' decedents. Defendants also contended
that the claims of loss of consortium, being derivative of the
survival and wrongful death claims, could not be maintained
if the underlying claims were dismissed.
In opposing this first summary judgment motion, plaintiffs
did not dispute that their survival and wrongful death claims
were based on injuries to or the deaths of persons who died
between 1963 and 1993. However, they contended that, in
accordance with the Federal Commencement Date set out in
42 U.S.C. § 9658, their claims accrued no earlier than the
date on which they knew or reasonably should have known
the cause of the injuries, arguing that the FRCD preempts
state law with respect to the dates on which their claims
accrued if state law would use an earlier date. Plaintiffs
asserted that they should not reasonably have known the
cause of their own or their decedents' injuries earlier than
December 19, 1994, when they learned the preliminary
findings of a "Pfohl Environmental Health Study” by David
A. Rigle, M.D., and William R. Sawyer, Ph.D. ("the Rigle-
Sawyer Report"), prepared at the request of their attorneys.
Those preliminary findings stated that persons frequenting
the vicinity of the Landfill had an increased risk of
developing cancers, including cancers of the types suffered
by plaintiffs and their decedents, because of the toxic wastes
stored at the Landfill. Plaintiffs also argued that the
determination of the dates on which they reasonably should
have known the cause of the injuries was not an appropriate
matter for summary judgment.
Because pretrial discovery had not yet been completed,
defendants did not, in their first summary judgment motion,
Appendix A - 13a
argue for a reasonable discovery-of-cause date earlier than
December 1994, but they argued that the Federal
Commencement Date was either inapplicable or
unconstitutional. They contended that it was inapplicable
because, in focusing on "any action brought under State law
for personal injury or property damages," 42 U.S.C. §
9658(a)(1), the FRCD was not meant to apply to a claim
based on the death of a person other than the plaintiff. They
argued that the FRCD was unconstitutional because the
attempt to preempt state law as to the time of accrual of a
State cause of action for purposes of a state Statute of
limitations exceeded Congress's powers under the Commerce
Clause and was an intrusion on state sovereignty in violation
of the Tenth Amendment.
D. The District Court's Rejection of the Statutory
Interpretation and Constitutional Challenges, and Its
Partial Denial of Summary Judgment
In an order dated October 27, 1998, the district court adopted
the recommendations of Magistrate Judge Leslie G. F oschio,
to whom the matter had been referred, see Pfohl I, 26 F.
Supp. 2d at 516-50 (reprinting and adopting Magistrate
Judge's Report and Recommendation dated March 11, 1998),
and granted defendants' motion in part and denied it in part.
The court noted that, if federal law were not applicable, all of
plaintiffs' wrongful death claims and virtually all of their
survival claims would be time-barred. The wrongful death
claims would be barred by N.Y.E.P.T.L. § 5-4.1 because
plaintiffs' respective decedents died more than two years
prior to the commencement of these actions. The survival
claims would be barred either (a) by CPLR § 214(5) because
they were not asserted within three years after the dates of
first exposure to the Landfill's allegedly toxic substances,
which “occurred between the early 1900's . . . and the late
1960's," Pfohl I, 26 F. Supp. 2d at 520, or (b) by CPLR §
|
Appendix A - 14a
214-c because the discoveries of the injuries occurred
between 1961 and 1993, and the claims were not asserted
within three years after those discoveries or within one year
after discovery of the cause of the injuries, see Pfohl J, 26 F.
Supp. 2d at 521.
The district court ruled, however, that § 9658, which the
court concluded was intended to apply to survival and
wrongful death claims as well as to other types of personal
injury claims, provides a toxic-tort-claim accrual date that
preempts state law to the extent that state law would
otherwise set an earlier accrual date. The court thus
concluded that New York's use of the date of death as the )
accrual date for a wrongful death cause of action was 7
superseded by the Federal Commencement Date, as was the
maximum five-year period allowed, on other types of toxic
tort claims, for discovery of the cause following the
discovery of the injury.
The court also rejected defendants’ challenges to the
constitutionality of the Federal Commencement Date. It
found no violation of the Commerce Clause, reasoning that
CERCLA regulates interstate commerce and that § 9658 is an
integral part of the CERCLA regulatory scheme:
To exclude congressional regulation of accrual rules even
if limited to toxic torts arising from wholly intrastate
releases of hazardous wastes would frustrate Congress['s]
purpose to provide greater access to the courts for injured
parties as part of its comprehensive response to the
national problem of controlling and remediating the
effects of release of dangerous contaminants. Lack of
uniformity in achieving redress in state courts for toxic
torts would also lead to potential competitive imbalances
in the hazardous wastes disposal industry based on
differing schemes for invoking relevant statutes of repose.
Appendix A - 15a
Therefore, the FRCD is an essential part of a nationai
regulatory system established by CERCLA and represents
a valid exercise of congressional power.
26 F. Supp. 2d at 543; see also id. ("The deterrent effect of
[the FRCD] accrual formula, if it had existed earlier, upon
would-be polluters could have helped to prevent the well
documented assaults on the nation's natural environment by
toxic substance producing industries and others."). The court
also concluded that § 9658 does not violate the Tenth
Amendment, reasoning principally that the FRCD does not
regulate the content of state law but rather regulates access to
the courts. See id. at 545.
Nonetheless, the district court ruled that some of plaintiffs’
claims were time-barred even given the application of the
FRCD. It interpreted § 9658 as superseding a more restrictive
state law only with respect to the date on which a claim
accrues, not with respect to the length of the limitations
period. The court concluded that, given plaintiffs’ failure to
assert the survival claims within three years of the discovery-
of-injury date, those claims, to be timely, should have been
asserted within one year after plaintiffs discovered the cause
of the injuries. In light of plaintiffs’ admission that they had
discovered that cause as early as December 19, 1994, the
court ruled that survival claims that were filed later than
December 19, 1995, were time-barred. The court granted
summary judgment dismissing those claims. As the court
could not, at the time of Pfohl J, determine whether a date
earlier than December 19, 1994, might be the appropriate
discovery-of-cause date, it denied defendants’ motion to
dismiss any survival claims asserted prior to December 19,
1995.
The court also denied defendants' motion to dismiss the
wrongful death claims because, assuming that plaintiffs
Appendix A - 16a
discovered the cause of their respective decedents' injuries in
December 1994, all of those claims (except those asserted in
January 1997, which were not encompassed by the summary
judgment motion because pretrial discovery proceedings had
not been completed) had been filed within two years of the
discovery-of-cause date and hence were timely. Finally, the
court noted that it was possible that plaintiffs might have
timely claims for loss of consortium appurtenant to timely
survival claims, and it thus denied the motion to dismiss the
loss-of-consortium claims as well.
E. Defendants' Second Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment, Seeking Dismissal of Plaintiffs' Own Personal
Injury Claims
In November 1997, during the pendency of their first motion
for partial summary judgment dismissing the survival,
wrongful death, and loss-of-consortium claims, defendants
filed a second motion for partial summary judgment, this one
seeking dismissal of claims for personal injuries suffered by
the plaintiffs themselves. Defendants argued that, even
assuming the Federal Commencement Date applied, those
claims, first asserted in 1995, were barred by the one-year
statute of limitations because they had accrued no later than
the end of 1991 when, defendants contended, there existed
sufficient publicly available information to put a reasonable
person on notice to investigate whether there was a causal
connection between his or her illness and the Landfill.
1. Defendants' Evidence of Publicity and Warnings
In support of their contention that by the end of 1991
plaintiffs should have known that their cancers were caused
by the Landfill, defendants stated, inter alia, that beginning
in 1986, large bright yellow signs warning "DANGER
HAZARDOUS WASTE AREA UNAUTHORIZED
RAR SR NTANG RPA LS RH NE RETRO AD PENT PRIS, ~
Appendix A - 17a
PERSONNEL KEEP OUT" were posted around the
perimeter of the Landfill. Defendants submitted copies of
official communications of caution, numerous newspaper
articles reporting on studies by the New York State ("State"
Departments of Health ("DOH") and Environmental
Conservation ("DEC"), and many expressions of public
concem with respect to the possibility that the Pfohl Landfill
contained hazardous wastes. Defendants’ exhibits included
the following:
- An April 15, 1986 letter to DOH from a Cheektowaga
Town Councilman requesting an assessment of the
Pfohl Landfill and another site, Stating that he had
"observed flows into ditches and drainage channels
leading to Ellicott Creek as well as along public
highways. . . . Both locations are of great concern to
the Town Board and are a matter of growing public
interest."
- A May 31, 1986 article in The Buffalo News
reporting that the Pfohl Landfill was "among 194
considered by the state to pose the most serious threat
to the public and safety."
- A December 10, 1986 Memorandum of DEC stating
that
although there is a public health concern, there is
no known immediate health danger associated
with this site at this time. The waming signs
erected address our concerns with public access to
the site and to decrease the possibility of public
exposure. Nearby property owners are advised to
keep children away from site.
Appendix A - 18a
- An October 11, 1988 DEC letter to "Concerned
Citizens," noting that "preliminary investigations"
revealed that
the existence of low level radiation has been
identified in several areas of the landfill. After ;
consultation with the New York State Department |
of Health . . ., it has been determined that the site
in its present state with the levels of radiation
currently encountered does not present any
immediate threat to public health.
- An October 14, 1988 article in The Buffalo News
describing the above DEC letter and stating that
[e]vidence of low-level radiation has led state
environmental engineers to caution persons not to
enter the Pfohl Brothers landfill, a 120-acre
former garbage and industrial waste dump in the
northwest corner of Cheektowaga.
The article quoted a DEC engineer as stating:
"We have been assured by the state Health
Department that the radiation levels pose no threat
to the public, . . . . But as an added safety
precaution, we are sending letters to area residents
and businesses asking them to avoid the site."
- A November 2, 1989 article in The Buffalo News
stating that a state expert reported "very, very
minimal risk’ but that DEC officials cautioned
people to avoid the area where warnings had been
posted.
Appendix A - 19a
- An April 22, 1990 article in the suburban Buffalo
Metro Community News reporting that "one of the
area's top biologists" had criticized the methodology
of DEC's studies.
- An August 1990 announcement by DOH of a public
meeting in Cheektowaga to discuss the health
assessments relating to the Landfill and the studies
being conducted by DOH; the announcement also
Stated that DOH official Dr. James Melius would be
available for individual consultations "to discuss [the
resident's] health concerns as they relate to the Pfohl
Brothers Landfill."
- An October 24, 1990 article in The Buffalo News
reporting that tests showed lead levels at a site
adjacent to the Landfill to be in excess of state
standards.
Defendants noted that a number of concemed citizens of
Cheektowaga and neighboring towns had formed committees
to gather information about the Pfohl Landfill. In April 1990,
one such group, the Pfohl Brothers Landfill Citizen Action
Group (later renamed the Pfohl Brothers Landfill Cleanup
Committee ("Cleanup Committee")), announced a public
meeting to be held on April 24, 1990, to question the level of
danger from chemical contamination at the Pfohl Landfill.
The announcement stated that "Luella Kenny, former Love
Canal resident, will discuss her experiences at Love Canal in
the context of our concerns about action on the Pfohl
Brothers Landfill."
Defendants also submitted a March 1991 report of the Cancer
Surveillance Program of DOH's Bureau of Cancer
Epidemiology, entitled "Cancer Incidence in the
Cheektowaga/ Ellicott Creek Area, Erie County, New York"
Appendix A - 20a
for the period 1978-1987 ("1991 DOH Report on 1978-1987
Cancer Incidence"). The study, undertaken in response to
"community concerns about cancer patterns in the
Cheektowaga/Ellicott Creek area" (1991 DOH Report on
1978-1987 Cancer Incidence at 1), focused on three census
tracts, Nos. 89.00, 96.00, and 100.01. This report stated that
"the number of observed cancer cases among females was
significantly greater than the number expected” (id. at 2), and
that "only one of the three census tracts which comprised the
study area exhibited a significant excess of breast cancer
cases (census tract 100.01)" (id. at 6). Although not specified
in the report, census tract No. 100.01 included the Pfohl
Landfill.
In sum, defendants argued that before the end of 1991, the
Pfohl Landfill had been the subject of more than 100
newspaper articles, dozens of public meetings, and numerous
government reports and letters. Defendants contended that no
reasonable person who lived or worked near the Landfill
could still have been unaware of the health hazards posed by
the Landfill and that the public displays and reports of health
concems were sufficient to put a reasonable person on notice
as to the need to investigate such concerns.
2. Plaintiffs' Evidence of Official Reassurances
In opposition to this summary judgment motion, plaintiffs
reiterated that the earliest they could reasonably have known
that the Pfohl Landfill caused their cancers was December
1994, when they received the preliminary findings of the
Rigle-Sawyer Report stating that persons frequenting that
vicinity had an increased risk of developing cancers,
including cancers of the types suffered by plaintiffs and their
decedents, because of the toxic wastes stored at the Landfill.
Plaintiffs argued that although local citizens had theretofore
questioned various governmental entities as to whether the
Appendix A - 21a
Landfill wastes were carcinogenic, they had invariably
received assurances that the area was safe. As summarized by
plaintiffs’ attorney,
prior to December of 1994, not a single expert advised
residents, workers, or others that the Pfohl Brothers
Landfill had caused a higher incidence of cancer in the
area surrounding the landfill. To the contrary, the experts
that the plaintiffs/residents counted on for answers to
their health questions--the New York State Department of
Health--affirmatively stated that the landfill was not
responsible for any health problems in the area.
(Affidavit of Laura J. Van Pelt dated December 19, 1997
("Van Pelt Aff."), ¥ 3, at 3.)
In support of these assertions, plaintiffs submitted, inter alia,
the affidavit of former DOH official Dr. James M. Melius,
M.D., who had been the Director of DOH's Division of
Occupational Health and Environmental Epidemiology from
1988 to 1995 and had supervised the preparation of several
DOH studies relating to the Pfohl Landfill. These included a
1991 health survey of residents and workers in the area
surrounding the Landfill, a 1991 testing of the levels of lead
in the blood of 20 children living in the area surrounding the
Landfill, and the 1991 DOH Report on 1978-1987 Cancer
Incidence (which, as noted in Part I.E.1. above, was relied on
by defendants in support of their motion for summary
judgment).
Dr. Melius stated that "the health survey did not reveal any
unusual patterns of reported illnesses among residents or
workers." (Affidavit of Dr. James M. Melius dated December
17, 1997 ("Melius Aff."), 994.) And at a March 1991 public
meeting, Dr. Melius "told the residents that the DOH's health
survey did not reveal any general pattern of illness that could
Appendix A - 22a
be related to exposure to chemicals from the Pfohl Brothers
Landfill." (Id. ¥ 8.)
As to the 1991 blood-lead-level study, Dr. Melius stated that
it had revealed that the lead levels in the children's blood
were very low, and DOH had concluded (a) that there was no
way to determine whether such lead as was present resulted
from exposure to the Landfill, and (b) that in any event, the
sources of the lead were immaterial because the levels were
so low as to give no cause for concern. (/d. { 2.) Dr. Melius
also relayed this information to area residents at public
meetings and in writing, making an "effort to communicate
to residents that there was no cause for concern with respect
to the issue of children being exposed to lead from the Pfohl
Brothers Landfill." (/d. ¥ 3.)
As to the 1991 DOH Report on 1978-1987 Cancer Incidence,
Dr. Melius stated that "the number of observed cancer cases
among females was significantly greater than expected;
however, much of the overall excess among females was
attributable to the significant excess of breast cancers and a
non-significant excess of lung cancers." (Id. § 5). Dr. Melius
stated that he discussed these results with area residents at a
public meeting held in March 1991 immediately after
publication of the study results; that he told them that "the
observed excess of breast cancer cases may be due to
income, socioeconomic factors, increased cancer screening
activities, and personal lifestyle and medical history factors"
(id. { 7); and that neither he nor any other DOH employee "in
any way" linked the excessive number of breast cancers to
the Landfill:
I never told any member of the public, at this meeting or
otherwise, that the significant excess of breast and
prostate cancer cases was in any way related to the Pfohl
Brothers landfill. To the best of my knowledge, no
Appendix A - 23a
employee of the New York State Department of Health
ever told any member of the public, at this meeting or
otherwise, that the significant excess of breast and
prostate cancer cases was in any way related to the Pfohl
Brothers landfill.
7. At the March 1991 public meeting discussed in
paragraph 6 above, I. . . told the residents that there is
almost no information available that indicates that breast
cancer may be related to exposure to chemicals.
(/d. $f] 6-7 (emphases added).) Dr. Melius assured the
residents that DOH would follow up on the cancer-incidence
study to investigate the possible causes of the high incidence
of prostate and breast cancers.
The promised reports on follow-up studies of cancer
incidence were issued by DOH in November 1991, and none
of them revealed any linkage with the Pfohl Landfill. Dr.
Melius stated that "the follow-up study [on breast cancer] did
not find a connection between breast cancer and the Pfohl
Brothers Landfill because most of the women who had breast
cancer had little reported potential exposure to contamination
from the landfill." (Melius Aff. J 9.) The follow-up study of
prostate cancer likewise "did not find a connection between
prostate cancer and the Pfohl Brothers Landfill because no
prostate cancer cases were located east of the Greater Buffalo
International Airport, which is where the landfill is located."
(Jd. 10.) In addition,
DOH never found a statistically Significant difference
from the expected number of newly diagnosed cases for
leukemia, lymphoma and female lung cancer. However,
we examined the geographical distribution of these
cancers because we were requested to do so... . We did
not find a connection between leukemia, lymphoma or
Appendix A - 24a
female lung cancer and the Pfohl Brothers Landfill
because we did not find a clustering of any of these
cancers around the landfill.
(Id. J 11 (emphasis added).)
Dr. Melius communicated these follow-up results to the
public, both orally and in writing "as soon as they were
available." (Jd. { 12.) He also noted that
at several public meetings that I attended in the early
1990's (both before and after the DOH health survey and
cancer incidence results were announced), residents
requested that homes near the Pfohl Brothers Landfill be
bought by the State of New York. At each of these
meetings, representatives of the New York State
Departments of Health and Environmental Conservation
(including myself) explained to the public that the State
could not relocate residents unless there was documented
evidence of a health threat, and that no such documented
evidence existed.
Id. § 13 (emphasis added). Summarizing DOH's
communications with the public as to the results of its many
studies, Dr. Melius stated that
while I was the Director of the Division of Occupational
Health and Environmental Epidemiology of the New
York State Department of Health, I never told the public
or any member thereof, at a meeting or otherwise, that
any individual person's cancer, any particular type of
cancer, any increased incidence of any particular type of
cancer, or cancer in general was related in any way to the
Pfohl Brothers Landfill. To the best of my knowledge,
while I was the Director of the Division of Occupational
Health and Environmental Epidemiology of the New
Appendix A - 25a
York State Department of Health, no employee of the
Department of Health ever told the public or any member
thereof, at a meeting or otherwise, that any individual
person's cancer, any particular type of cancer, any
increased incidence of any particular type of cancer, or
cancer in general was related in any way to the Pfohl
Brothers Landfill.
(Id. 4 15.)
Along with Dr. Melius's affidavit, plaintiffs submitted the
reports and studies to which that affidavit referred. The Van
Pelt affidavit also attached several other governmental
reports, excerpts from more than a dozen depositions, and
scores of news articles, including the following:
An October 26, 1989 article in the Cheektowaga Bee
bearing the headline " Radiation at Pfohl site not over
limits" and reporting that, although DOH warned that
people should not pick up or take any objects from
the site, DEC concluded, based on supplemental
testing of the radiation level at the Landfill, that "'the
site does not represent an immediate a
health hazard."
A November 2, 1989 article in The Buffalo News
(also attached to defendants' summary judgment
motion) reporting that two studies concluded that the
radiation risks to the area were minimal, and that
elevated radiation readings were not being detected
off the Pfohl Landfill site.
A March 30, 1990 article in The Buffalo News (also
attached to defendants’ summary judgment motion)
bearing the headline "State calls Pfohl dump no big
risk" and reporting that a DEC report to be made
Appendix A - 26a
available that day stated that the Landfill contains
radioactive hot spots, but that the levels are within
safe limits, and that "‘exposure to radiation on the site
presents little, if any, public health hazard." The
article stated that
DEC minimized the exposure threat saying:
- Most of the materials are buried and exposure to
radiation is therefore reduced due to the distance
and shielding provided by the soil.
- Transport of surface radioactive material off the
site by wind is unlikely because the site has heavy
vegetation and is wet in many areas.
- Radioactivity found in samples of ground water,
sediment and seepage is at normal background
levels showing that radioactive materials are not
migrating off the site.
The department did warn, however, that "direct
contact with radioactive materials should be
discouraged" and re-emphasized its warning that
people should stay off the property. It has both
fenced and posted signs warning of hazardous
materials.
- A November 15, 1990 article in The Buffalo News
(also attached to defendants’ summary judgment
motion) bearing the headline "No health threat found
in Pfohl Road soil tests" and stating that, according to
DOH,
Appendix A - 27a
scientists found no significant health threat from
chemicals discovered in soil samples around
homes south of the Pfohl Brothers dump....
Among the state's conclusions from the site in
Cheektowaga are:
- There are no detectable levels of PCBs in the soil
at the dump or off the site.
- Levels of dioxin and furans are only a fraction of
the level necessary to require federal remedial
action.
- Levels of heavy metal are "within the expected
range for suburban areas."
A March 26, 1991 article in The Buffalo News (also
attached to defendants’ summary judgment motion)
with the headline "Study finds higher cancer rate near
Pfohl site," describing the 1991 DOH Report on
1978-1987 Cancer Incidence, including findings that
"people living near the Pfohl Brothers dump in
Cheektowaga have exhibited higher than expected
rates of breast and prostate cancer," and that there
were "higher than expected instances of lymphoma
and leukemias, but not high enough to be classified as
a ‘significant excess statistically." The article cited
Dr. Melius as stating that "preliminary conclusions
Show . . . the increase [in the incidence of breast and
prostate cancer] is likely related to income,
socioeconomic and status factors"; that, based on the
current, incomplete, information, "it's unlikely it's
related to chemical exposures"; and that "'we can't
tell whether the landfill is responsible.""
Appendix A - 28a
A December 17, 1991 article in The Buffalo News
with the headline "Study can't link Pfohl landfill to
cancer,” reporting that state health officials’ follow-up
study of the higher-than-expected rates of cancers in
the same census tract as the Landfill "failed to
uncover any evidence of ‘clustering’ of prostate
cancer, leukemia, lymphoma and female lung cancer
near the inactive dump."
A December 26, 1991 article in the Cheektowaga
Times with the headline "Health Department studies
fail to link landfill to cancer," reporting that
"according to recent reports released by the New
York State Department of Health, no link exists
between the Pfohl Brothers Landfill site and cancer
incidence for those residents living on or near the
dump site."
A December 2, 1993 article in the Cheektowaga
Times headlined "Ground water uncontaminated near
Pfohl dump" and stating that "ground water
surrounding the Pfohl Brothers dump has turned up
clean in all studies performed so far."
An August 1994 DOH report entitled, "Summary of
Cancer Inquiry for 1020 Rein Road, Cheektowaga,"
accompanied by a letter to residents of Cheektowaga
stating that "none of the patterns of a true cancer
cluster were found. . . . No evidence was found for a
common environmental cause.”
An August 1994 assessment by the United States
Department of Health and Human Services's Agency
for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry
("USATSDR") of the Pfohl Landfill that "the
proposed Pfohl Brothers Landfill National Priorities
Appendix A - 29a
List Site represents no apparent public health hazard
at the present time because available data do not
indicate exposures to contaminants in the
environmental media to be high enough to cause
adverse health effects." (Emphasis in original.) The
USATSDR report also stated that "the results of
NYSDOH's epidemiologic investigations, along with
the lack of evidence of large scale exposure to site
contaminants, indicates that the occurrence of cancer
is probably not related to the site."
- An August 26, 1994 article in The Buffalo News
stating: "Two studies by federal and state agencies
refute charges that contamination from the Pfohl
Brothers dump in Cheektowaga has caused serious
health problems."
Plaintiffs also stated that although the Pfohl Landfill Cleanup
Committee met with officials of DOH and DEC to seek
information as to whether toxic materials were emanating
from the Landfill, no more than one of the plaintiffs was a
member of the group. (See Van Pelt Aff. J 5, at 5 n.4.)
Further, plaintiffs argued that, even had they been members
of such groups, they would have had no reason to know that
the Landfill contents were carcinogenic because those groups
received assurances from the State agencies that the Landfill
was safe. For example, Cleanup Committee President and
Chairperson Elinor Weiss testified in her deposition that at
one meeting, DOH and DEC representatives told those
present that "the discovery of radioactivity at the [Landfill]
was ‘not that important’ because [the officials] 'said that you
could get more radiation from sleeping with your spouse than
from standing on the Pfohl dump.” (/d. ¥ 5, at 6 (quoting
Deposition of Elinor Weiss at 24).)
Appendix A - 30a
F. The Granting of Summary Judgment
In an order dated September 22, 1999, the district court
accepted the recommendations of Magistrate Judge Foschio
on the second summary judgment motion, see Pfohl II, 68 F.
Supp. 2d at 240-63 (reprinting and adopting Magistrate
Judge's Report and Recommendation dated February 12,
1999), and granted, as to virtually all of plaintiffs’ claims,
defendants’ motion to dismiss. The court found that plaintiffs
had not "shown . . . that a material issue of fact exists as to
the earliest time when they should have reasonably
discovered the cause of their alleged injury making their
claims timely under § 214-c(4) as modified by § 9658," Pfohl
IT, 68 F. Supp. 2d at 251.
Noting that CPLR § 214-c(4) provides that if the action is not
filed within three years of the date of discovery of the injury,
the plaintiff is required to
"allege and prove that technical, scientific or medical
knowledge and information sufficient to ascertain the
cause of his injury had not been discovered, identified or
determined prior to the expiration of the period within
which the action or claim would have been authorized,"
Pfohl IT, 68 F. Supp. 2d at 247 (quoting N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 214
c(4)), the court stated that plaintiffs were required to show
that they filed their actions
within one year of the discovery of the causes of such
injuries and . . . that the state of medical, technological
and scientific knowledge and information was insufficient
such that it was not possible to discover the cause of their
injuries within time to commence the instant actions
within three years from the discovery of their cancers,
Appendix A - 3la
Pfohl IT, 68 F. Supp. 2d at 248.
As discussed in Part II.D. below, the court found that
plaintiffs could and should have developed a "reasonable
suspicion" that their cancers were caused by the Landfill by
the end of 1991. Jd. 68 F. Supp. 2d at 253. It found that the
"plethora of exhibits" submitted by defendants,
consisting of government and media reports as well as
other publicly available information pertaining to at least
three citizen groups concerned with the effect of the
Landfill on neighboring areas and residents, indicating
that Plaintiffs should have developed a reasonable
Suspicion as to the cause of their injuries prior to the end
of 1991. These exhibits establish that a highly publicized
controversy existed within the local community over
whether the Landfill posed a threat to the health and
safety of those who resided or worked in the vicinity of
the Landfill.
Id. (footnote omitted). Based on these exhibits, the court
reiterated its view that the plaintiffs could reasonably have
Suspected the cause of their cancers by the end of 1991,
Stating that it was
more than reasonable that, given the volume of
information available to the public prior to 1992,
Plaintiffs could be expected to reasonably suspect the
cause of their cancers before the end of 1991. The vast
number of media and government reports Defendants
submitted in support of summary judgment were all
available prior to the end of 1991.
Id. at 254.
Appendix A - 32a
Noting plaintiffs' reliance on the RigleSawyer Report's
preliminary findings in December 1994 as their earliest
reason to believe that the Landfill was the cause of their own
and their decedents' injuries, the court found their reliance
flawed because plaintiffs did not show that they could not
have obtained such a report sooner:
Plaintiffs have submitted no evidence or any explanation
as required under § 214-c(4) why it was not possible to
obtain a "scientific" opinion similar to the one contained
in the Rigle-Sawyer Report on which they rely in support
of their contention that the FRCD occurred no earlier than
December 1994, substantially prior to that date. The
March and November 1991 DOH cancer incidence
reports as well as the Rigle-Sawyer Report all compare
the incidence of specific types of cancer diagnosed in
persons who lived or worked near the Landfill with the
expected incidence of similar types of cancer occurring
within the general population. It is undisputed that the
conclusions reached by the DOH reports issued in March
and November 1991 and the Rigle-Sawyer Report differ
as to whether any elevation in the incidence of any
particular type of cancers occurring among those who
lived or worked near the Landfill could be attributed to
the hazardous and toxic substances known to have been
deposited into the Landfill. A review of the February
1991 report [a DOH February 8, 1991 report based on
water samples collected in October 1990, which
"concluded that the levels of hazardous and toxic
substances detected in the residences was not sufficient to
threaten human health,” Pfohi I, 68 F. Supp. 2d at 255]
indicates that the DOH used different methods than Drs.
Rigle and Sawyer to obtain specimens for the chemical
analysis contained in those reports. Plaintiffs do not,
however, contend that the findings contained in the Rigle-
Sawyer Report are based on scientific testing techniques
Appendix A - 33a
or statistical analysis that could not have been performed
earlier than 1994. Nor do Plaintiffs deny [sic] that the
Rigle-Sawyer Report does anything other than draw
correlations between the incidence of reported cancers in
the vicinity of the Landfill and the type of hazardous and
toxic substances detected in the Landfill. In any event, if
the Rigle-Sawyer Report is based on technical, scientific
or medical knowledge developed after the dates of the
earlier DOH study, Plaintiffs have not, as required by
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e), demonstrated it.
Pfohl II, 68 F. Supp. 2d at 259 (emphases added).
On this basis, the court concluded that Virtually all of
plaintiffs' claims were time-barred. Judgment was entered on
the dismissed claims pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b); the
claims not found untimely were severed from the
consolidated proceedings and are not at issue on this appeal.
II. DISCUSSION
On appeal, plaintiffs do not challenge the district court's
ruling that, if 42 U.S.C. § 9658 were inapplicable or
unconstitutional, their claims would be time-barred under
New York law. Rather, they contend principally that the
court erred in ruling as a matter of law that they reasonably
should have known the cause of the injuries before the end of
1991 and that the Federal Commencement Date was thus no
later than the end of 1991. They also contend that the court
erroneously ruled that they were invariably required to file
Suit within one year after the discovery-of-cause date, even if
that period would end less than three years after the
discovery-of-injury date. Various defendants and _ third-
party-defendants have cross-appealed, seeking affirmance, in
whole or in part, on the grounds (1) that the FRCD does not
apply to wrongful death or survival claims, and (2) that, in
Appendix A - 34a
purporting to alter state law as to the commencement date of
a state limitations period for state-law claims, the FRCD (a)
exceeds Congress's powers under the Commerce Clause, and
(b) violates the Tenth Amendment.
For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the district
court properly rejected defendants’ statutory-interpretation
and constitutional challenges to § 9658 and that it properly
found that plaintiffs' claims were subject to the one-year
limitations period following the discovery-of-cause date; but
we conclude that there were triable issues of fact as to the
time when plaintiffs reasonably should have known the cause
of the injuries. As the resolution of defendants' challenges to
the applicability and constitutionality of § 9658 is essential to
the resolution of this appeal, and as plaintiffs concede that
their claims would be time-barred under state law if the
Federal Commencement Date were not applied, we address
defendants’ challenges first.
A. Defendants' Statutory Interpretation Challenges
To the extent pertinent to these actions, the Superfund
Amendments to CERCLA provide as follows:
§ 9658. Actions under State law for damages from exposure
to hazardous substances
(a) State statutes of limitations for hazardous substance
cases
(1) Exception to State statutes
In the case of any action brought under State law for
personal injury, or property damages, which are caused or
contributed to by exposure to any hazardous substance, or
pollutant or contaminant, released into the environment from
Appendix A - 35a
a facility, if the applicable limitations period for such action
(as specified in the State statute of limitations or under
common law) provides a commencement date which is
earlier than the federally required commencement date, such
period shall commence at the federally required
commencement date in lieu of the date specified in such State
Statute.
(2) State law generally applicable
Except as provided in paragraph (1), the statute of
limitations established under State law shall apply in all
actions brought under State law for personal injury, or
property damages, which are caused or contriouted to by
exposure to any hazardous substance, or pollutant or
contaminant, released into the environment from a facility.
(b) Definitions.
As used in this section--
(1) Subchapter I terms
The terms used in this section Shall have the same
meaning as when used in subchapter I of this chapter.
(2) Applicable limitations period
The term "applicable limitations period" means the period
specified in a statute of limitations during which a civil
action referred to in subsection (a)(1) of this section may be
brought.
(3) Commencement date
Appendix A - 36a
The term "commencement date" means the date specified
in a statute of limitations as the beginning of the applicable
limitations period.
(4) Federally required commencement date
(A) In general
[With exceptions not relevant here,] the term "federally
required commencement date" means the date the plaintiff
knew (or reasonably should have known) that the personal
injury or property damages referred to in subsection (a)(1) of
this section were caused or contributed to by the hazardous
substance or pollutant or contaminant concerned.
42 U.S.C. § 9658. Subchapter I of CERCLA defines
"facility" to include any " landfill, storage container, [or]
motor vehicle” and "any site or area where a hazardous
substance has been deposited, stored, disposed of, or placed."
Id. § 9601(9). The term "release" includes leaking, emitting,
discharging, escaping, leaching, dumping, and disposing of
hazardous substances into the environment, id. § 9601(22);
the term "environment" includes "ambient air" and
"navigable waters" of the United States, id. § 9601(8).
The language of § 9658(a)(1), specifying that the applicable
state limitations period "shall commence at the federally
required commencement date in lieu of" an "earlier" date
provided by state law, makes it indisputably clear that
Congress intended, in the cases to which § 9658 applies, that
the FRCD preempt state law accrual rules if, under those
rules, accrual would occur earlier than the date on which the
cause of the personal injury was, or reasonably should have
been, known to be the hazardous substance. Accord Union
Pacific R.R. Co. v. Reilly Industries, Inc., 215 F.3d 830, 840
(8th Cir. 2000). Cf ABB Industrial Systems, Inc. v. Prime
Appendix A - 37a
Technology, Inc., 120 F.3d 351, 360 n.5 (2d Cir. 1997)
("Under 42 U.S.C. § 9658, if a claim is brought under state
law for property damages caused by hazardous chemicals and
State law does not provide a discovery rule, the state statute
of limitations cannot begin to run until the plaintiff knew or
Should have known that the damages were caused by
hazardous chemicals."); Tucker v. Southern Wood Piedmont
Co., 28 F.3d 1089, 1091 (11th Cir. 1994) (same).
In arguing that the district court misinterpreted § 9658,
defendants do not dispute that the section has preemptive
effect on claims that are within its intended scope; but they
contend (1) that survival claims are not within its scope
because the word "plaintiff" in § 9658(b)(4)(A)'s phrase "the
date the plaintiff knew (or reasonably should have known)"
Should be read to refer to the person who suffered the
personal injury, rather than to the individual bringing the
lawsuit, and (2) that wrongful death claims are not
encompassed by § 9658 because they are not, under New
York law, claims for "personal injury[] or property
damages."
In construing a statutory provision, we look first to see
whether it is clear or is instead ambiguous. See, é.g.,
Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340, 136 L. Ed. 2d
808, 117 S. Ct. 843 (1997). We determine whether the
Provision is ambiguous by examining its language, the
context in which the language is used, and the broader
context of the statute as a whole. See id. at 341. If the
provision is precise and unambiguous, we generally need
look no further. See, e.g., id. at 340; Connecticut National
Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 254, 117 L. Ed. 2d 391, 112
S. Ct. 1146 (1992); Greenery Rehabilitation Group, Inc. v.
Hammon, 150 F.3d 226, 231 (2d Cir. 1998) ("If the statutory
terms are unambiguous, our review generally ends and the
Statute is construed according to the plain meaning of its
Appendix A - 38a
words."). If the statute is ambiguous, we look to legislative
history as a means of determining congressional intent. See,
e.g., Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 896, 79 L. Ed. 2d 891,
104 S. Ct. 1541 (1984); Auburn Housing Authority v.
Martinez, 277 F.3d 138, 143-44 (2d Cir. 2002).
We conclude that these principles require rejection of
defendants’ contention that § 9658 does not encompass
survival and wrongful death claims, for we find that its
language unambiguously encompasses the former, and that,
in light of the statutory scheme as a whole, it was meant to
encompass the latter.
1. Applicability of the FRCD to Survival Claims
The scope of the FRCD is set in subsection (a)(1) of § 9658;
by its terms, the section applies to "any action brought under
State law for personal injury, or property damages, which are
caused or contributed to by exposure to any hazardous
substance . . . released into the environment from a facility."
42 U.S.C. § 9658(a)(1) (emphasis added). Subsection (a)(1)
does not use the term "plaintiff." Nor does it specify by
whom such personal injury actions must have been brought
or state any limitation as to the persons on whose behalf the
actions may have been brought. The absence of any such
limiting provisions suggests that the scope of the section is
sufficiently broad to encompass not only a suit brought by
the person injured, but as well a suit brought by a person who
has the right to represent the person injured, such as his
guardian or the executor of his estate. Absent any such
qualifications of the phrase "any action brought,” which on
its face is all-encompassing, the implication of subsection
(a)(1) is that § 9658 is meant to apply to any personal injury
or property damage claim asserted by any person on whom
state law confers standing to assert it.
Appendix A - 39a
Nor do we see in the language of subsection (b)(4)(A), which
does use the word "plaintiff" in defining the FRCD in terms
of the "date the plaintiff knew (or reasonably should have
known)" the cause of the injury, id. § 9658(b)(4)(A), any
intimation whatever that the plaintiff must be the person who
suffered the injury or that the person who suffered the injury
must be the person who discovered its cause. Had Congress
intended to limit the scope of the FRCD in this way, it could
more simply have drafted this subsection to refer to 'the date
the plaintiff knew (or reasonably should have known) that his
or her personal injury . . . was caused or contributed to by the
hazardous substance.' Instead, subsection (b)(4)(A) refers to
knowledge of the plaintiff that the hazardous substance
caused "the personal injury ... referred to in subsection
(a)(1)." Id. § 9658(b)(4)(A) (emphasis added). Given
subsection (a)(1)'s broad scope, encompassing "any [personal
injury] action brought," we think it plain that Congress meant
the FRCD to have potential application whenever a claim for
personal injury is brought by any person who, under state
law, has standing to bring such a claim.
Defendants' contention that this interpretation is
impermissible because it allows for an open-ended
limitations period, hinging on the fortuity of when the cause
of injury is discovered, is wide of the mark. The Federal
Commencement Date is not wholly subjective, for it is
defined not only as the time at which the plaintiff has actual
knowledge of the cause, but also as the time at which the
plaintiff reasonably should have had that knowledge. The
latter sets an objective standard, and if the two dates differ, §
9658(b)(4)(A) implicitly makes the FRCD the earlier.
Defendants also argue that reading the term "plaintiff" to
mean the person who brings the suit will facilitate "abuse" by
allowing a decedent's heirs to have the suit instituted by one
"who only recently leamed the cause" of the decedent's
Appendix A - 40a
injuries, in order to make the suit timely despite the fact that
"a myriad of others (including the decedent) may have
discovered it much earlier." (Defendants-Third-Party-
Defendants-Appellees-Cross-Appellants' brief on appeal at
88-89.) This contention is likewise unpersuasive, as §
9658(b)\(4)(A)'s objective standard for accrual will apply if
there was sufficient information that a plaintiff reasonably
should have known the cause of the injury earlier than he
actually knew. In any event, defendants’ speculative policy
concerns cannot override the clear provisions of the statute.
In sum, we conclude that the district court did not err in
ruling that survival claims are within the scope of § 9658.
2. Applicability of the FRCD to Wrongful Death Claims
Defendants’ contention that the FRCD does not apply to
wrongful death claims presents a somewhat closer question
on the surface but is ultimately unpersuasive. Defendants
argue that, although New York law characterizes survival
claims as personal injury claims, it does not so characterize
wrongful death claims, and hence the latter are not actions
"brought under State law for personal injury[] or property
damages" within the meaning of § 9658(a)(1). Given the
possible variations among the laws of the several states, that
phrase is not entirely free of ambiguity; but in light of
Congress's intent in creating the Federal Commencement
Date, we conclude that wrongful death claims under New
York law were meant to be encompassed by § 9658.
As discussed in Part II.B. below, the FRCD was introduced
as one of the 1986 Superfund Amendments to CERCLA.
Section. 301(e) of CERCLA, as originally enacted in 1920,
required Congress to obtain a study of "the adequacy of
existing common law and statutory remedies in providing
legal redress for harm to man and the environment caused by
Appendix A - 41a
the release of hazardous substances into the environment."
42 U.S.C. § 9651(e)(1) (emphasis added). After reviewing
the commissioned study, congressional committees noted
that the report, prepared "by a distinguished panel of
lawyers," concluded that because of the accrual dates
selected by state law, "certain State statutes deprive plaintiffs
of their day in court." H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 99-962 (1986)
("FRCD Conf. Rep."), at 261, reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3276, 3354; Report of the House of
Representatives Committee on Energy and Commerce, H.R.
Rep. No. 99-253(1) (1985) ("FRCD House Rep."), at 105,
reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835, 2887. The
congressional committees recognized that "in the case of a
long-latency disease, such as cancer, a party may be barred
from bringing his lawsuit if the statute of limitations begins
to run at the time of the first injury-rather than from the time
when the party ' discovers' that his injury was caused by the
hazardous substance or pollutant or contaminant concerned."
FRCD Conf. Rep. at 261, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
3354; see also FRCD House Rep. at 105, reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2887. As a result, the FRCD was introduced
to "address[] the problem identified in the 301(e) study," by
"providing for a Federal commencement date for State
statutes of limitations which are applicable to harm which
results from exposure to a hazardous substance," defining
that commencement date as "the date the plaintiff knew, or
reasonably should have known, that the personal injury
referred to above was caused or contributed to by the
hazardous substance or pollutant or contaminant concerned."
FRCD Conf. Rep. at 261, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.AN. at
3354 (emphases added). Thus, Congress's focus was on
hazardous wastes' "harm to man," 42 U.S.C. § 9651 (e)(1),
and its intent was to make the FRCD applicable to claims for
"harm which results from exposure to a hazardous
substance," FRCD Conf. Rep. at 261, reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3354.
— or =... _
Appendix A - 42a
Given this background, we see no valid basis for inferring
that Congress meant § 9658 to distinguish between an action
for wrongful death, as maintainable under New York law,
and an action brought by a living victim. A living victim in a
personal injury action may recover for, inter alia, damages
for lost future earnings. See, e.g., Lopez v. Kenmore-
Tonawanda School District, 275 A.D.2d 894, 895, 713
N.Y.S.2d 607, 609 (4th Dep't 2000) (mem.). Such a recovery
would usually to some extent benefit the victim's dependents.
If the victim has died, damages for his lost future earnings
are recoverable only in a wrongful death action. Compare
Sand v. Chapin, 238 A.D.2d 862, 863, 656 N.Y.S.2d 700,
701 (3d Dep't 1997) (mem.) (lost future earnings not
recoverable in survival action), and N.Y.E.P.T.L. § 11-3.3
Practice Commentaries at 346 (McKinney 2001) (permissible
recovery in survival action "includes only damages accruing
until [the decedent's] death"), with Parilis v. Feinstein, 49
N.Y.2d 984, 985, 429 N.Y.S.2d 165, 166, 406 N.E.2d 1059
(1980) (mem.) (in a wrongful death action, recovery is
permissible for "loss of support, voluntary assistance and
possible inheritance"), and N.Y.E.P.T.L. 5-4.3(c)(ii) and (iii)
§§ (factfinder in a wrongful death action must consider the
amount of income taxes the decedent would have been
required to pay from the "sum that would otherwise be
available for the support of persons for whom the action is
brought").
Indisputably, the claim by a living victim for future earnings
lost as a result of the injuries he suffered from exposure to
hazardous wastes is one "for personal injury" within the
meaning of § 9658(a)(1). Yet under defendants’ proposed
interpretation of the FRCD, wrongful death claims by the
decedent's distributees for relief paralleling that which would
have been available to the victim had he lived, including
claims seeking their respective shares of the decedent's
Appendix A - 43a
earnings lost as a result of that exposure, would not be within
the scope of § 9658. Quite clearly then, under defendants’
view of the FRCD, a company whose handling of hazardous
wastes caused personal injury would be financially better off
if its victim died. We conclude that this was not Congress's
intent.
B. Defendants' Commerce Clause Challenge
The Commerce Clause of the Constitution grants Congress
the power "to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and
among the several States." U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
Although the power to enact laws under the Commerce
Clause is subject to "judicially enforceable outer lmits,"
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 566, 131 L. Ed. 2d 626,
115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995), the "power is ‘complete in itself, may
be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no
limitations, other than are prescribed in the constitution,"
Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452
U.S. 264, 276, 69 L. Ed. 2d 1, 101 S. Ct. 2352 (1981)
(quoting Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 196, 6 L.
Ed. 23 (1824)). "Due respect for the decisions of a coordinate
branch of Government demands that we invalidate a
congressional enactment only upon a plain showing that
Congress has exceeded its constitutional bounds." United
States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607, 146 L. Ed. 2d 658,
120 S. Ct. 1740 (2000).
The Supreme Court "has made clear that the commerce
power extends not only to 'the use of channels of interstate or
foreign commerce’ and to ‘protection of the instrumentalities
of interstate commerce . . . or persons or things in commerce,’
but also. to ‘activities affecting commerce." Hodel v. Virginia
Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. at 276-77
(quoting Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 150, 28 L. Ed.
2d 686, 91 S. Ct. 1357 (1971)). In determining whether
Appendix A - 44a
Congress has exceeded its authority under the Commerce
Clause, we may look to, inter alia, whether the activity
regulated is economic in nature, whether there are discernible
ties to commerce, whether the type of activity as a whole has
an effect on commerce, and what congressional findings have
been made with respect to the activity's effects on commerce.
See, e.g., Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559-63; see also Ace Auto
Body & Towing, Ltd. v. City of New York, 171 F.3d 765, 778
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 868, 145 L. Ed. 2d 140, 120
S. Ct. 166 (1999). A federal statute will survive a Commerce
Clause challenge if it regulates activities that arise out of or
are connected with a commercial transaction when the
transaction and the activities, viewed in the aggregate,
substantially affect interstate commerce. See, e.g., Wickard v.
Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127-29, 87 L. Ed. 122, 63 S. Ct. 82
(1942) (rejecting Commerce Clause challenge to federal
statute regulating production and consumption of
homegrown wheat because wheat farming as a whole
substantially affects interstate commerce); see also Lopez,
514 U.S. at 561 (upholding Commerce Clause challenge to
federal statute prohibiting possession of firearm in school
zone, where prohibition was "not an essential part of a larger
- regulation of economic activity, in which the regulatory
scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate activity were
regulated"). "Even activity that is purely intrastate in
character may be regulated by Congress, where the activity,
combined with like conduct by others similarly situated,
affects commerce among the States or with foreign nations.”
Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452
U.S. at 277 (quoting Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547,
44 L. Ed. 2d 363, 95 S. Ct. 1792 (1975)).
Further,, when Congress has enacted a statute creating a
program to regulate aspects of commercial transactions that,
viewed in the aggregate, substantially affect interstate
commerce, it is not necessary that each element of the
Appendix A - 45a
regulatory scheme have a substantial connection with
commerce when viewed in isolation. An individual provision
will survive a Commerce Clause challenge if it is "an integral
part of the regulatory program[,] and . . . the regulatory
scheme when considered as a whole” can be shown to be
"independently and directly related to a valid congressional
goal." Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 329 n.17, 69 L. Ed. 2d
40, 101 S. Ct. 2376 (1981); see also Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 757
n.22, 72 L. Ed. 2d 532, 102 S. Ct. 2126 (1982).
The FRCD is part of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675.
The stated purpose of CERCLA, which defines the term
"environment" to include "ambient air" and "navigable
waters” of the United States, 42 U.S.C. § 9601(8), is "to
provide for liability, compensation, cleanup, and emergency
response for hazardous substances released into the
environment and the cleanup of inactive hazardous waste
disposal sites," Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767, 2767
(1980). See also Report of the House of Representatives
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, H.R. Rep.
No. 96-1016(1) (1980) ("CERCLA House Rep."), at 17,
reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 6119-20 (bill that
became CERCLA was designed to give the United States
Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") authority to deal
effectively with spills of hazardous substances as well as
with "the tragic consequences of improperly, negligently, and
recklessly hazardous waste disposal practices known as the
inactive hazardous waste site problem” (internal quotation
marks omitted)); id. at 18, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
6120 ("In 1979 the EPA estimated that as many as 30,000 to
50,000 sites existed, of which between 1,200-2,000 present a
serious risk to public health.”).
In furtherance of its purposes, CERCLA permits the
government to address environmental emergencies by
Appendix A - 46a
removing hazardous substances immediately, see 42 U.S.C. §
9604(a); authorizes a national plan establishing procedures
and standards for responding to releases of hazardous
substances, see id. § 9605(a); authorizes the President to
issue administrative orders, or to seek court orders, directing
responsible entities to clean up hazardous waste sites, see id.
§ 9606(a) imposes liability for clean-up costs on entities
responsible for the disposal of hazardous wastes, see id. §
9607(a) (permitting the government and private parties to
recover the costs involved in the cleanup of hazardous wastes
from those responsible for their creation); and imposes
liability for damage to natural resources, see id. § 9607(f)
(permitting the government to recover for such damage).
These and other provisions are directed toward Congress's
goals of, inter alia, "providing for liability of persons
responsible for releases of hazardous waste at such sites,"
CERCLA House Rep. at 1, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 6119, and "inducing such persons voluntarily to pursue
appropriate environmental response actions with respect to
inactive hazardous waste sites," id. at 17, reprinted in 1980
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6120 (emphasis added).
Accordingly, it is recognized that CERCLA is "principally
designed to effectuate the cleanup of toxic waste sites [and]
to compensate those who have attended to the remediation of
environmental hazards," Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc., 516
U.S. 479, 483, 134 L. Ed. 2d 121, 116 S. Ct. 1251 (1996),
and that "the 'two . . . main purposes of CERCLA' are
‘prompt cleanup of hazardous waste sites and imposition of
all cleanup costs on the responsible party," id. (quoting
General Electric Co. v. Litton Industrial Automation
Systems, Inc., 920 F.2d 1415, 1422 (8th Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 499 U.S. 937, 113 L. Ed. 2d 446, 111 S. Ct. 1390
(1991)). -
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_— -_ << — —
Appendix A - 47a
In passing CERCLA, Congress did not include legislative
findings with respect to the statute's relationship to interstate
commerce. However, it is clear that the generation and
disposal of waste material by companies in connection with
the manufacture or processing of products is a business
activity, and that the storage of such wastes by others is
economic activity. See generally Fort Gratiot Sanitary
Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Department of Natural Resources,
504 U.S. 353, 359, 119 L. Ed. 2d 139, 112 S. Ct. 2019 (1992)
("Solid waste, even if it has no value, is an article of
commerce."); Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Hunt,
504 U.S. 334, 119 L. Ed. 2d 121, 112 S. Ct. 2009 (1992);
City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 57 L. Ed.
2d 475, 98 S. Ct. 2531 (1978). And it is clear that such
wastes are commonly transported in interstate commerce. See
generally Chemical Waste Management, 504 U.S. at 337 (in
1992, only 16 states had commercial hazardous waste
landfills); cf New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 150,
159-60, 120 L. Ed. 2d 120, 112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992) (because
few states have disposal sites for low-level radioactive waste,
and space in those sites is frequently sold by residents of one
state to residents of another, "regulation of the resulting
interstate market in waste disposal is . . . well within
Congress' authority under the Commerce Clause"). Further,
even wholly intrastate disposal of hazardous wastes can
threaten interstate and foreign commerce, as those wastes can
contaminate streams that run through landfills and feed into
tributaries of navigable waters. Thus, "Congress has
substantial power under the Constitution to encourage the
States to provide for the disposal of the radioactive waste
generated within their borders." Jd. at 149.
In considering legislation to promote safer containment of
hazardous wastes and to decrease pollution of the ambient air
and navigable waters by such materials, Congress plainly
sought to deal with matters that substantially affected
Appendix A - 48a
interstate commerce. As the Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit observed in USA v. Olin Corp., 107 F.3d
1506 (11th Cir. 1997),
[w]Jhen the Senate considered S. 1480, a bill containing
cleanup liability provisions later substantially
incorporated into CERCLA, its Committee on
Environment and Public Works ("the Committee") took
notice of many facts that show a nexus between all forms
of improper waste disposal and interstate commerce.
First, the Committee noted the growth of the chemical
industry and the concomitant costs of handling its waste.
See S.Rep. No. 96-848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1980),
reprinted in | Legislative History of the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability
Act of 1980, at 309 (1983). It also cited a 1980 report by |
the Office of Technology Assessment which gauged
agricultural losses from chemical contamination in six
states at $ 283 million. Jd. at 310. The Committee
reported that the commercial damages resulting from
unregulated waste management were not attributable
solely to interstate trafficking in hazardous materials for
disposal, but also arose from accidents associated with
purely intrastate, on-site disposal activities, such as
improper waste storage in tanks, lagoons and chemical
plants. Jd. at 312. Thus, CERCLA reflects Congress's
recognition that both on-site and off-site disposal of
hazardous waste threaten interstate commerce.
107 F.3d at 1511 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
Clearly, CERCLA itself was enacted as a response to a
national problem, was directly related to a_ valid
congressional concern, and was within Congress's powers
under the Commerce Clause. See, e.g., id.
Appendix A - 49a
Indeed, defendants do not contend that CERCLA exceeds
Congress's powers under the Commerce Clause. Rather they
argue that the FRCD alone is unconstitutional. (See
Defendants-Third-Party-Defendants-A ppellees-Cross-
Appellants’ brief on appeal at 74-75 n.23 ("the FRCD may be
severed and the remainder of CERCLA may be left in
force").) However, defendants' Commerce Clause challenge
to the FRCD ignores the FRCD's function in furthering the
goals of CERCLA.
As noted, one of CERCLA's goals was to "induce"
companies generating, transporting, dumping, and storing,
etc., hazardous wastes "voluntarily to pursue appropriate
environmental response actions with respect to inactive
hazardous waste sites," CERCLA House Rep. at 17,
reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6120. We think it plain
that the FRCD provides such inducement. As discussed in
Part II.A.2. above, the FRCD was adopted in response to
findings, made in a study required by § 301(e) of CERCLA,
that state-law dates of accrual of claims for injuries caused by
exposure to hazardous substances--especially injuries having
a long latency period, such as cancer--frequently resulted in
such claims becoming time-barred even before the injured
person knew the cause of his injury. In requiring that the
courts apply instead, if later than the state-law date, an
objective accrual date, to wit, the date when the plaintiff
"reasonably should have known" the injury's cause, § 9658
gives companies responsible for hazardous wastes greater
incentives to clean up the waste sites, for it exposes those
companies to a longer period of liability for the harms those
sites cause to human health and the environment. The longer
the period of liability, the more likely it is that a responsible
company will bear the expense of the harms it has caused.
The greater the potential cost to the company, the greater the
likelihood that the company will strive to avoid liability by
taking appropriate remedial actions with respect to its
Appendix A - 50a
hazardous waste sites. And the more remedial action that is
undertaken voluntarily, the less the need for government
intervention, and the cleaner the environment.
In sum, we conclude that the FRCD is an integral part of the
regulatory scheme established by CERCLA, furthering
CERCLA's goals in various ways, and that the enactment of
the FRCD constituted a valid exercise of Congress's powers
under the Commerce Clause.
C. Defendants' Tenth Amendment Challenge
Defendants also contend that the FRCD violates the Tenth
Amendment, arguing that it effectively alters certain state
statutes of limitations, overruling important policy choices
made by a state legislature that had evaluated and balanced
the competing interests, and that the FRCD improperly
coerces states to regulate state-law toxic tort claims
according to a federal formula. Notwithstanding the
skepticism expressed in ABB Industrial Systems, Inc. v.
Prime Technology, Inc., in which we stated that the FRCD
was of "questionable constitutionality," 120 F.3d at 360 n.5,
while noting that the issue was not properly before us, see
id., we reject defendants' challenge.
The Tenth Amendment provides that " the powers not
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people." U.S. Const. amend. X. The
Tenth Amendment limits Congress's regulatory power,
preventing Congress from essentially "commandeering” a
state's legislative or executive departments "by directly
compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory
program.” New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 161
(quoting Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation
Ass'n, 452 U.S. at 288); see also Printz v. United States, 521
Appendix A - Sla
U.S. 898, 935, 138 L. Ed. 2d 914, 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997)
(Congress may "not command the States' officers, or those of
their political subdivisions, to administer or enforce a federai
regulatory program").
The FRCD, however, does not conscript into federal service
either the state's legislature or its executive branch. Rather, in
order that persons victimized by exposure to hazardous
wastes not be "deprived . . . of their day in court," FRCD
Conf. Rep. at 261, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3354,
and that the companies that substantive state law would hold
responsible not escape liability, the FRCD simply requires
courts in which state-law toxic tort claims are asserted to
recognize that such a claim did not accrue before the plaintiff
knew or reasonably should have known the cause of the
injury. This is a modest requirement that is squarely within
Congress's long established powers under the Supremacy
Clause of the Constitution.
The Supremacy Clause provides that the "Constitution, and
the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land;
and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any
Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the
Contrary notwithstanding.” U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2
(emphasis added). Accordingly, consistent with the Tenth
Amendment, Congress may create federal causes of action
that state courts are obligated to adjudicate. See, e.g., Testa v.
Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 91 L. Ed. 967, 67 S. Ct. 810 (1947). Or it
may enact a federal law that preempts a state-law cause of
action, thereby foreclosing state courts from entertaining
such a state-law claim. See generally English v. General
Electric.Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78-79, 110 L. Ed. 2d 65, 110 S. Ct.
2270 (1990). Or Congress may, as it has done on occasion,
simply extend a state limitations period. See, e.g., Stewart v.
Kahn, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 493, 20 L. Ed. 176 (1870)
Appendix A - 52a
(upholding federal statute tolling limitations periods for
actions against persons who could not be served with process
because they were in Confederate territory); see also 50
U.S.C. app. § 525 (tolling limitations periods for actions by
or against persons in active military service); 28 U.S.C. §
1367(d) (tolling state limitations period on state claim
asserted in federal court based on supplemental jurisdiction,
if federal court thereafter declines to exercise such
jurisdiction); 15 U.S.C. § 6603(h) (extending limitations
periods for mortgage foreclosure actions where Y2K-related
failures impeded processing of mortgage payments).
Simply put, the Tenth Amendment does not prevent the
application of federal law in state courts even though
"federal statutes enforceable in state courts do, in a sense,
direct state judges to enforce them," because "this sort of
federal ‘direction’ of state judges is mandated by the text of
the Supremacy Clause." New York v. United States, 505 U.S.
at 178-79. The FRCD, which requires no action by a state's
legislative or executive officials, but only the application of
federal law by the courts to recognize the Federal
Commencement Date of a state-law claim, does not violate
the Tenth Amendment.
Having rejected all of defendants' statutory interpretation and
constitutional challenges to the application of the FRCD, we
turn to plaintiffs' challenges to the district court's dismissal of
their claims.
D. Plaintiffs' Challenge to the Ruling That, As a Matter
of Law, the FRCD Was Not Later Than the End of 1991
As discussed in Part I.F. above, the district court granted
summary judgment dismissing plaintiffs’ claims as time
barred on the ground that there was no genuine issue of fact
to be tried as to the date on which their claims accrued under
Appendix A - 53a
the FRCD, ruling that, as a matter of law, that date was no
later than the end of 1991. In so ruling, the court found
principally that the government and media reports and public
controversy over the health hazards posed by the Landfill
sufficed to give plaintiffs "a reasonable suspicion" as to the
cause of their cancers prior to the end of 1991, Pfohl IT, 68 F.
Supp. 2d at 253, and that plaintiffs failed to show "why it
was not possible to obtain a ‘scientific’ opinion similar to the.
one contained in the Rigle-Sawyer Report" earlier than 1994,
id. at 259. We have several difficulties with the legal
standards applied by the district court and with its view of the
factual record.
1. The Legal Standards Applied by the District Court
First, the district court erroneously imputed to the Federal
Commencement Date a standard of "reasonable suspicion."
See, e.g., Pfohl I, 68 F. Supp. 2d at 253 (plaintiffs "should
have developed a reasonable suspicion as to the cause of their
injuries prior to the end of 1991" (emphasis added)); id. at
254 ("given the volume of information available to the public
prior to 1992, Plaintiffs could be expected to reasonably
suspect the cause of their cancers before the end of 1991"
(emphasis added)); id. at 257 ("no reasonable trier of fact
could find that Plaintiffs, had they been reasonably diligent in
inquiring as to the cause of their cancers upon being
diagnosed, would not have discovered sufficient information
to develop a reasonable suspicion as to the cause of such
injuries prior to the end of 1991" (emphasis added)). In so
reasoning, the district court apparently accepted
"Defendants["] contention that a reasonable suspicion that an
injury may have been caused by exposure to toxic or
hazardous substances is sufficient to trigger a rule of
limitations that is predicated on knowledge of a fact or
event,” id. at 252 (emphases added). Insofar as the FRCD is
concerned, this contention should have been rejected.
Appendix A - 54a
The discovery-of-cause standard set by the FRCD, defined as
"the date the plaintiff knew (or reasonably should have
known) that the personal injury" was caused or contributed to
by the hazardous materials, focuses on knowledge, actual or
imputed, not on suspicion. Mere suspicion, whatever its
reasonableness, cannot be equated with knowledge; and the
fact that a claimant had only a "reasonable suspicion" that the
injuries were caused by the Landfill is not a sufficient basis
for ruling as a matter of law that the claimant "reasonably
should have known" (emphasis added) that the injuries were
caused by the Landfill. Accordingly, the district court applied
an erroneous legal standard in interpreting the FRCD.
Second, in addressing the showing that a plaintiff is required
to make under New York's CPLR § 214-c(4) as to the state of
scientific or medical knowledge as to the cause of injury, the
court applied a standard of impossibility of such knowledge.
See, e.g., Pfohl II, 68 F. Supp. 2d at 248 (plaintiffs were
required to show "that the state of medical, technological and
scientific knowledge and information was insufficient such
that it was not possible to discover the cause of their injuries
within time to commence the instant actions within three
years from the discovery of their cancers" (emphasis added));
id. at 257 ("Plaintiffs have failed to establish the existence of
a material issue of fact that such cause could not have been
determined prior to the end of 1991" (emphasis added)). As
discussed below, it is not clear to us that this is a correct
interpretation of the CPLR provision as a matter of state law;
but it is clear that to the extent the CPLR provision would
result in an earlier accrual date than that provided by the
FRCD, the CPLR provision is preempted.
The district court's interpretation that a plaintiff must show
that the cause of the injury "could not have been" dtermined
within three years after the date of discovery of the injury
Appendix A - 55a
does not match the language of the statute itself. That section
states that if the action is not filed within that period the
plaintiff is required to show that, prior to the expiration of
that period, "technical, scientific or medical knowledge and
information sufficient to ascertain the cause of his injury had
not been discovered, identified or determined."
N.Y.C.P.L.R.§ 214-c(4) (emphasis added). (We note that,
though the phrase "had not been" is straightforward enough,
some joinders of subjects and predicates in this passage are
somewhat awkward: For example, is "scientific knowledge"
"discovered"? Is "scientific knowledge" "determined"--and if
so, does the word "determined" connote a consensus? And
does "scientific knowledge” mean, as the district court
viewed it in Pfohi IJ, 68 F. Supp. 2d at 259, "'scientific'
opinion"? See also N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 214c Practice
Commentaries , C214-c:4, at 635 (The statute "reeks of the
midnight oil of political compromise. . . . The draftsmanship
cannot be described as commendable.").)
Despite the difference between the district court's phrase
"could not have been" determined and the statute's phrase
"had not been" determined, the district court's standard finds
some explicit--but not unequivocal--support in the New York
practice commentaries. For example, the official
commentator states that "the plaintiff must demonstrate [a]
that the state of medical or scientific knowledge was such
that the causation of his injury could not have been identified
within the three-year period” after the discovery of the injury,
N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 214-c(4) Practice Commentaries, C214-c:4,
at 634-35 (emphasis added), and "[b] that it was impossible
to determine the cause of his injury within three years after
the discovery of his injury,” id. at 635 (emphasis added). To
that extent, therefore, the official commentary supports the
district court's view of New York law.
Appendix A - 56a
Nonetheless, the official commentary also, after noting the
less-than-"commendable" legislative draftsmanship, states
that the New York Legislature "apparently intended .. .
[that] the test should be: Was the requisite scientific
knowledge reasonably available to the plaintiff during the
three-year discovery period?" N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 214-c Practice
Commentaries, C214-c:4, at 635 (emphasis added). This
seems to us the more reasonable interpretation of New York
law, for the district court's construction would seem to place
burdens on a would-be plaintiff that the Legislature could not
have intended. For example, the district court stated that
plaintiffs could not meet the cause-could-not-have-been-
determined standard because, before the end of 1991, they
could have commissioned experts to conduct environmental
studies and prepare a report such as the Rigle-Sawyer report.
However, "'the reasonable cost of a site-specific study to
determine whether there has been an excess number of
cancer cases related to a multiple toxic agent environmental
cause such as the Pfohl Brothers Landfill would be at least
two (2) million dollars." (Van Pelt Aff. ] 41 (quoting { 6 of
the Affidavit of Dr. Rosalie Bertell, an expert in
environmental epidemiology with more than 30 years of
experience) (emphases in original).) We doubt that the New
York Legislature meant to refer to scientific knowledge that
would not have been available to a plaintiff without the
expenditure of huge sums of money to commission
independent studies. And we certainly cannot conclude that
Congress meant the FRCD standard of what a plaintiff
"reasonably should have known" to extend to information
that was obtainable only through the private commissioning
of expensive studies.
We think it likely that the official commentary's suggestion
that the New York Legislature intended CPLR § 214-c(4) to
refer only to scientific knowledge that was "reasonably
available" to the plaintiff is the correct interpretation of that
Appendix A - 57a
section. And we think it possible that in intending to set a
reasonable-availability-of-knowledge-of-cause standard, the
New York Legislature meant to fix an accrual date no earlier
than the date the plaintiff knew or reasonably should have
known the cause of the injury--i.e., the same accrual date as
that set by the FRCD. To the extent, however, that the
scientific-knowledge provision of CPLR § 214-c(4) imposes
an accrual date earlier than the date on which the plaintiff
knew or reasonably should have known the cause of the
injury, it is, for the reasons discussed in Part II.A. above,
preempted by the FRCD.
2. The District Court's View of the Factual Record
We also conclude that the district court did not correctly
apply the principles applicable to the consideration of a
motion for summary judgment. In assessing such a motion,
the court is required to view the factual record in the light
most favorable to the party against whom summary judgment
is sought and to draw all factual inferences in favor of that
party. See, e.g., Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 255, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202, 106 S. Ct. 2505 (1986); United
States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655, 8 L. Ed. 2d 176,
82 S. Ct. 993 (1962) (per curiam). The district court, while
adverting to this standard, did not apply it.
In ruling that the FRCD was no later than the end of 1991,
the district court relied on the fact that "Defendants had
submitted a plethora of exhibits,” principally consisting of
"government and media reports"; the court found that these
documents "established that a highly publicized controversy
existed within the local community over whether the Landfill
posed a threat to the health and safety of those who resided or
worked in the vicinity of the Landfill"; and the court
concluded that these documents should have raised in
plaintiffs a "reasonable suspicion as to the cause of their
Appendix A - 58a
injuries." Pfohl IT, 68 F. Supp. 2d at 253. The court accepted
defendants' argument that as after 1991 there were no new
government studies, releases of previously undisclosed
information, nor any medical or scientific breakthroughs on
which Plaintiffs rely as having permitted them to discover the
cause of their cancers, Plaintiffs have failed to establish the
existence of a material issue of fact that such cause could not
have been determined prior to the end of 1991. Jd. at 257.
We have two difficulties with the court's reliance on the
documents submitted by defendants.
First, many of defendants' documents themselves reflected
the absence of any scientific knowledge that the Landfill was
carcinogenic; and indeed, reports of expert studies suggested
that it was not. For example, defendants submitted an
October 11, 1988 DEC letter to "Concerned Citizens," that
stated, inter alia, that the low radiation levels found in areas
of the Landfill "does not present any immediate threat to
public health." And among the statements in news articles
submitted by defendants were the following: "radiation
levels" at the Pfohl Landfill, according to DEC and DOH,
"pose no threat to the public” (The Buffalo News, October
14, 1988); radiation risks from the Pfohl Landfill, according
to State expert, are "very, very minimal” (The Buffalo
News, November 2, 1989); "‘exposure to radiation on the
site,'" according to DEC, "presents little, if any, public health
hazard" (The Buffalo News, March 30, 1990); and "no
health threat found in [DOH's] Pfohl Road soil tests" (The
Buffalo News, November 15, 1990).
Even the most alarming DOH report, issued in March 1991
and reporting excess numbers of certain types of cancers in
1978-1987, was, accurately, described in news articles as
being accompanied by State officials’ denials of any clear
linkages between the cancers and the Landfill. See, e.g., The
Buffalo News, March 26, 1991 (DOH study finds "higher
Appendix A - 59a
than expected instances of lymphoma and leukemia, but not
high enough to be classified as a ‘significant excess'
statistically"; "the increase is likely related to income,
socioeconomic and status factors"; DOH "can't tell whether
the landfill is responsible").
Thus, the district court inappropriately failed to view the
documents submitted by defendants in the light most
favorable to plaintiffs as the parties against whom summary
judgment was sought. While defendants provided abundant
evidence of the existence of controversy, much of what they
submitted was either equivocal as to whether the Landfill
could be causing cancers or contained outright denials of
such causation. No doubt the lack of any indication in these
reports and articles that there was scientific knowledge that
the Landfill was carcinogenic was an impetus for defendants'
urging the district court that the reasonably-should-have
"known" standard of § 9658 could be satisfied by showing a
basis merely for reasonable "suspicion."
Our second difficulty with the district court's application of
summary judgment principles is that, in reaching its
conclusions as to the date on which plaintiffs "reasonably
should have known” the cause of the injuries, the district
court did not acknowledge the inferences available to
plaintiffs from the record as a whole. Even had the
documents submitted by defendants supported an inference
of early constructive knowledge rather than simply of
suspicion, the court was required to consider not just those
documents but also the evidence submitted by plaintiffs. The
court's opinion does not indicate that it did so. For example,
although noting that there were no new revelatory
government studies "after 1991," Pfohl IJ, 68 F. Supp. 2d at
257, the court apparently did not take into account the fact
that the latest studies done in 1991 gave plaintiffs no reason
whatever to know that the cancers were caused by the
Appendix A - 60a
Landfill. As described in Part I.E.2. above, DOH's follow-up
studies on cancer incidence, reported in November 1991,
revealed no linkage with the Pfohl Landfill. The Melius
affidavit described the results of those studies, the reasoning
of DOH in reaching its conclusions, and the statements made
by State officials to area residents that "no . . . documented
evidence existed" of a health threat posed by the Pfohl
Landfill (Melius Aff. § 13).
The publicity surrounding the November 1991 DOH reports
surely gave plaintiffs no reason to know the cancers were
caused by the Landfill. The Buffalo News on December 17,
1991, carried the headline "Study can't link Pfohl landfill to
cancer" and reported that the DOH follow-up study of the
higher-than-expected rates of cancers in the same census tract
as the Landfill "failed to uncover any evidence of ‘clustering’
of prostate cancer, leukemia, lymphoma and female lung
cancer near the inactive dump.” Similarly, the Cheektowaga
Times on December 26, 1991, carried the headline "Health
Department studies fail to link landfill to cancer" and
reported that "according to recent reports released by the
New York State Department of Health, no link exists
between the Pfohl Brothers Landfill site and cancer incidence
for those residents living on or near the dump site."
Subsequent articles, as well as state and federal governmental
studies, continued after 1991 to report the lack of any
discovery of a link between the cancers and the Landfill.
See, e.g., Cheektowaga Times, December 2, 1993 ("Ground
water uncontaminated near Pfohl dump"; "Ground water
surrounding the Pfohl Brothers dump has turned up clean in
all studies performed so far."); The Buffalo News, August
26, 1994 ("Two studies by federal and state agencies refute
charges that contamination from the Pfohl Brothers dump in
Cheektowaga has caused serious health problems."); August
1994 DOH report (with letter to residents of Cheektowaga
Appendix A - 6la
stating that "none of the patterns of a true cancer cluster were
found. . . . No evidence was found for a ‘common
environmental cause."); August 1994 USATSDR report
("available data [on the Pfohl Landfill] do not indicate
exposures to contaminants in the environmental media to be
high enough to cause adverse health effects"; "no apparent
public health hazard at the present time" (emphasis in
original)).
Consistent with the tenor of these news reports, Dr. Melius,
who was the director of the pertinent DOH division
throughout this period, stated in his affidavit that he informed
area residents that there were many possible explanations for
observed incidences of cancer, including socioeconomic
factors, improved screening practices, personal lifestyle, and
medical history. And in the many meetings and
communications with area residents, neither Dr. Melius nor
any other member of DOH ever told any member of the
public that the cancer cases in the area were "in any way”
related to the Pfohl Brothers landfill. (See, e.g. , Melius Aff.
PP 6, 15.)
There is no question that defendants submitted to the district
court numerous documents showing that there were local
concerns and controversies as to whether health problems
were being caused by the Pfohl Landfill. And if notice of
controversy were the issue, defendants’ motion for summary
judgment would have had greater merit. But that is not the
standard for determining the Federal Commencement Date,
and the record did not permit the court to conclude that no
reasonable factfinder could fail to infer that plaintiffs
reasonably should have known prior to the end of 1991 that
the Landfill was the cause of the injuries.
In sum, many studies had been done by two State agencies,
DOH and DEC. There is no evidence that they found the
Appendix A - 62a
Pfohl Landfill to cause cancers, and the record is replete with
evidence that the State officials repeatedly assured residents,
both through the publicized reports and in personal meetings,
that there was no evidence of such causation. We cannot
endorse the proposition that, as a matter of law, when reports
issued by the responsible public officials stated that there was
no provable link between the cancers and the Landfill,
members of the public reasonably should have known to the
contrary.
E. The Length of the Limitations Period
Finally, plaintiffs also contend that the district court ruled,
erroneously, that their survival claims were governed by a
one-year limitations period. We do not so interpret the court's
opinion.
The FRCD preempts a more restrictive state law only with
respect to the date on which a claim accrues, not with respect
to the length of the limitations period. See 42 U.S.C. §
9658(a)(1) ("if the applicable [state or commonr-law]
limitations period . . . provides a commencement date which
is earlier than the federally required commencement date,
such period shall commence at the federally required
commencement date in lieu of the [state-law] date”
(emphasis added)). Thus, New York law still controls with
respect to the length of the limitations period. Section 214c,
as modified by the FRCD, gives the plaintiff one year from
the date of discovery of the cause of the injury to commence
a lawsuit (or three years from the date of discovery of the
injury, if longer) and that provision satisfies the requirements
of the FRCD.
Plaintiffs advert to statements by the district court that are
somewhat elliptical standing alone. See, e.g., Pfohl I, 26 F.
Supp. 2d at 531 ("the one year period provided by § 214-c(4)
will attach to the claim upon discovery of the cause of the
Appendix A - 63a
injury, as the FRCD permits, regardless of how much time
has elapsed since the discovery of the injury" (emphasis
added)); Pfohl II, 68 F. Supp. 2d at 249 (referring to "the
proviso to § 214-c(4) limiting the benefit of the extra year
within which to file a toxic tort claim to a maximum period
of five years from discovery of the injury"). These
statements, however, were made only in the court's
discussion of the effect of the FRCD.
In directly interpreting the New York limitations periods, the
court had noted that under § 214-c(4),
if the plaintiff discovers the cause of a toxic tort injury
within five years of the discovery of the injury, the
plaintiff may invoke the longer of (a) the three year
period from the discovery of the injury or (b) a one year
period from the discovery of the cause within which to
commence an action.
Pfohl I, 26 F. Supp. 2d at 521 (emphasis in original); see also
Pfohl I, 68 F. Supp. 2d at 247 (an action may be
commenced or a claim filed within one year of such
discovery of the cause of the injury,’ provided less than five
years have elapsed since the discovery of the injury"
(emphasis omitted)). These rulings were correct, and we do
not view the court's subsequent shorthand references as
overturning its direct interpretation of § 214-c.
In context, the elliptical statements quoted above were
intended simply to indicate that the effect of the FRCD,
where suit was not brought within three years of the
discovery-of-injury date, is to allow a plaintiff to bring suit
within one year after discovery of the cause of an injury,
even if more than five years have elapsed since discovery of
the injury. We see no indication that the district court applied
a different principle.
Appendix A - 64a
CONCLUSION
We have considered all of the parties’ arguments in support
of their respective appeals, and, except as to plaintiffs’
contention that genuine issues of material fact precluded the
granting of summary judgment, we have found them to be
without merit. We vacate the judgment summarily dismissing
the claims at issue on this appeal, and we remand for
proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
Costs to plaintiffs.
CONCUR BY: LEVAL
CONCUR:
LEVAL, J., concurring:
I concur with the majority's opinion. I agree with the majority
that "Section 214-c, as modified by the FRCD, gives the
plaintiff one year from the date of discovery of the cause of
the injury to commence a lawsuit (or three years from the
date of discovery of the injury, if longer) and that provision
satisfies the requirements of the FRCD."
I write separately to note only that, in my view, the scientific
knowledge proviso of § 214-c(4) is incompatible with the
FRCD, and that the majority's discussion of the various
possible meanings of the proviso is therefore superfluous.
The New York statute purports to establish different accrual
dates for claims of personal injury caused by hazardous
substances. Section 214-c(2) specifies plaintiffs discovery of
the injury as the accrual date (and allows a plaintiff three
years from that date). This accrual date is illegal under the
FRCD because it commences at a date earlier than the "the
Appendix A - 65a
date the plaintiff knew (or reasonably should have known)"
the cause of injury. See 42 U.S.C. § 9658(b)(4)(A). Section
214-c(4), on the other hand, specifies the plaintiff's
"discovery of the cause of the injury” as the accrual date (and
allows one year). This provision is lawful under the FRCD
because its accrual date occurs no earlier than the date the
plaintiff knew or reasonably should have known the cause of
the injury.
However, under the literal terms of the New York statute, §
214-c(4)'s discovery-of-cause accrual date is not always
available to plaintiffs. To qualify for this accrual date, a
plaintiff must satisfy two conditions. First, the discovery of
the cause of injury must have occurred less than five years
after discovery of the injury. If a plaintiff fails to satisfy this
requirement, the timeliness of his suit is judged under § 214
c(2). The latter section, however, utilizes an accrual date that
is illegal under the FRCD. Accordingly, our opinion makes
clear that the district court correctly nullified the 5-year
limitation. Because of the impact of the FRCD, a plaintiff
may bring his suit under § 214-c(4) within one year of
discovery of the cause of injury, regardless whether this
occurred within 5 years of the discovery of the injury.
The second hurdle a plaintiff must clear in order to use §
214-c(4)'s discovery-of-cause accrual date is the scientific
knowledge proviso. It requires a showing that "technical,
scientific or medical knowledge and information sufficient to
ascertain the cause of his injury had not been discovered,
identified or determined" within three years of discovering
the injury. A plaintiff who fails to make this showing is
similarly relegated to the limitation period established in §
214-c(2). As noted, however, § 214-c(2)'s limitation period is
unlawful because it uses an accrual date earlier than the
earliest accrual date allowed by the federal statute.
Appendix A - 66a
The only function the scientific knowledge proviso can serve
is to disqualify a plaintiff from using the lawful accrual date
established by § 214-c(4), requiring the plaintiff's timeliness
to be judged by the unlawful terms of § 214<c(2). The
scientific knowledge proviso, like the condition requiring the
discovery of cause to be within five years of the discovery of
injury, cannot function lawfully; it is therefore preempted by
the FRCD and must be disregarded. Accordingly, in my view
the majority opinion's discussion of the different possible
interpretations of the scientific knowledge proviso is
superfluous and moot.
The majority opinion recognizes this problem when it states,
"To the extent . . . that the scientific-knowledge provision of
CPLR § 214-c(4) imposes an accrual date earlier than the
date on which the plaintiff knew or reasonably should have
known the cause of the injury, it is . . . preempted by the
FRCD." But if the only function of the scientific knowledge
proviso is to disqualify a plaintiff from using § 214c(4)'s
lawful accrual date, thereby forcing him to use the unlawful
date of § 214-c(2), then the proviso cannot survive, and a
debate over the different meanings the New York legislature
may have intended has no useful application.
Appendix B - 67a
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
IN RE: PFOHL BROTHERS LANDFILL LITIGATION;
THIS DOCUMENT RELATES TO ALL ACTIONS
95-CV-0020A(F)
26 F. Supp. 2d 512
October 27, 1998, Decided
October 27, 1998, Filed
COUNSEL:
Baron & Budd, P.C. (Frederick M. Baron, of counsel),
Dallas, TX, Lipsitz, Green, Fahringer, Roll, Salisbury &
Cambria LLP (Laraine Kelley, of counsel), Buffalo, NY, for
Plaintiffs.
Nixon, Hargrave, Devans & Doyle LLP (Laurie Styka
Bloom, of counsel), Buffalo, NY, for Liason Group
Defendants.
ORDER
ARCARA, District Judge.
This case was referred to Magistrate Judge Leslie G. Foschio,
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), on February 16, 1996. On
June 10, 1997, defendants filed a motion for partial summary
judgment. On March 11, 1998, Magistrate Judge Foschio
filed a Report and Recommendation, recommending that: (1)
defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment be granted
Appendix B - 68a
in part and that the survival actions pertaining to decedents
Anthony J. Marino, Isabelle A. Wiedenbeck and Joseph J.
Wiedenbeck be dismissed; (2) summary judgment be denied
as to the survival actions of Mary Jane Farino, Robert L.
Farino, Stephen C. Grandillo, Nelson M. Hirsch, Henry A.
Kuczka, George Pagels and Leo N. Phillips; (3) the survival
and wrongful death actions commenced on behalf of Evo T.
Astor, Charles W. Batt, Rose E. Batt, Loraine E. Brezezicki,
Gretchen A. Heaney, Joseph A. Inzinnia, Robert A. Martzolf,
Vincent J. Mongiovi, Alfred G. Mucha and Mary M. Sturm,
decedents for whom no personal representative had been duly
appointed prior the action being filed, be dismissed with
leave to renew; (4) summary judgment as to the remaining
wrongful death actions be denied; (5) summary judgment as
to the punitive damages claims be granted in part and denied
in part; and (6) summary judgment as to the claims for loss
of consortium be denied.
On April 24, 1998, plaintiffs Irene M. Marino and Joseph J.
Wiedenbeck filed-objections to the Report and
Recommendation. Defendants also filed objections to the
Report and Recommendation on April 24, 1998. Oral
argument on the objections was held on September 20, 1998.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), this Court must make a de
novo determination of those portions of the Report and
Recommendation to which objections have been made. Upon
a de novo review of the Report and Recommendation, and
after reviewing the submissions and hearing argument from
the parties, the Court adopts the proposed Gating» of the
Report and Recommendation.
Accordingly, for the reasons set forth in Magistrate Judge
Foschio's Report and Recommendation: (1) defendants'
motion for partial summary judgment is granted in part and
the survival actions pertaining to decedents Anthony J.
Appendix B - 69a
Marino, Isabelle A. Wiedenbeck and Joseph J. Wiedenbeck
are dismissed; (2) summary judgment is denied as to the
survival actions of Mary Jane Farino, Robert L. Farino,
Stephen C. Grandillo, Nelson M. Hursch, Henry A. Kuczka,
George Pagels and Leo N. Phillips; (3) the survival and
wrongful death actions commenced on behalf of Evo T.
Astor, Charles W. Batt, Rose E. Batt, Loraine E. Brezezicki,
Gretchen A. Heaney, Joseph A. Inzinnia, Robert A. Martzolf,
Vincent J. Mongiovi, Alfred G. Mucha and Mary M. Sturm,
decedents for whom no personal representative had been duly
appointed prior to the action being filed, are dismissed with
leave to renew; (4) summary judgment as to the remaining
wrongful death actions is denied; (5) summary judgment as
to the punitive damages claims is granted in part and denied
in part; and (6) summary judgment as to the claims for loss
of consortium is denied.
This case is referred back to Magistrate Judge Foschio for
further proceedings.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
FOSCHIO, United States Magistrate Judge
JURISDICTION
This case was referred to the undersigned by the Honorable
Richard J. Arcara on February 16, 1996, for report and
recommendation on all dispositive motions. It is presently
before the court on Defendants’ motion for partial summary
judgment (Doc. # 288), filed June 10, 1997.
Appendix B - 70a
BACKGROUND
This action was commenced on January 10, 1995, by the
filing of the first of seven essentially identical complaints on
behalf of sixty-seven plaintiffs, suing on behalf of themselves
or their respective decedents, in which Plaintiffs seek
monetary damages including punitive damages from
Defendants for injuries or deaths various cancers which they
contend were caused by exposure to hazardous and toxic
substances from the Pfohl Brothers Landfill located in
Cheektowaga, New York (the "Landfill").! The death actions
' Originally assigned to Hon. John T. Elfvin, this matter was
transferred to Hon. Richard J. Arcara by order dated October
15, 1995. Judge Arcara, by order dated February 16, 1996,
consolidated these actions for all pre-trial purposes. That
order was also made applicable to any future related cases.
As no discovery regarding the timeliness of the claims in the
latest action Anthony v. Westinghouse, No. 97-CV-977A(F),
had taken place as of the filing of the instant motion,
Defendants here seek summary dismissal only as to the
motions brought regarding the decedents in the first five
actions, specifically (1) Frier v. Westinghouse, No. 95-CV-
20A(F), which covers the claims pertaining to decedents
Mary Jane Farino, Robert L. Farino, Joseph A. Inzinna and
Leo N. Phillips were filed, (2) Batt v. Westinghouse, No. 95-
CV-107A(F), which covers the claims of decedents €harles
W. Batt, Rose E. Batt, Stephen C. Grandillo, Henry A.
Kuczka, Vincent J. Mongiovi and George Pagel, (3) Astor v.
Westinghouse, No. 95-CV-247A(F), which covers the claims
pertaining to the decedents Lorraine R. Brzezicki, Robert A.
Martzolf, Alfred G. Mucha and Mary M. Sturm, (4) Davies v.
Westinghouse, No. 95-CV-444A(F), which covers the claims
of decedents Evo T. Astor and Gretchen A. Heaney, and (5)
Fiels v. Westinghouse, No. 96-CV-395A(F), which covers
the claims of Nelson M. Hirsch. Anthony J. Marino, Isabelle
(Footnote continued on next page)
Appendix B - 71a
were filed by the widows, widowers, children or estate
representatives of decedents. Plaintiffs allege that they or
their decedents lived, worked or engaged in recreational
activity in the vicinity of the Landfill and that Defendants
either owned and operated the Landfill or were otherwise
responsible for the generation or transportation of the
hazardous substances to the Landfill. Plaintiffs' claims are
based on state law negligence, strict liability, gross
negligence, loss of consortium, and wrongful death.
The instant motion seeks summary dismissal of the survival
actions and wrongful death claims asserted on behalf of
twenty decedents, most of which would be time-barred under
New York law. Plaintiffs urge that these claims are timely
under the provision of the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980, 42
U.S.C. §§ 9601 et seq., ("CERCLA"), as amended by the
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986
("SARA"), 100 Stat. 1613, specifically, § 309, 42 U.S.C. §
9658, which preempts the accrual date for state law toxic tort
actions based on exposure to hazardous substances released
into the environment by facilities as defined by CERCLA,
permitting such claims to accrue upon the discovery of the
cause of the injury.? Defendants maintain that CERCLA
(Footote continued from previous page)
A. Wiedenbeck and Joseph J. Wiedenbeck, Sr. Defendants’
Memorandum of Law in Support of Consolidated Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. # 290), filed June 10, 1997,
at 2 n. 2 and 3. Each of these complaints has since been
amended to correct the names of some defendants, but the _
causes of action asserted by each plaintiff have remained the
same.
For convenience, the court refers to an action based on an
exposure to an alleged hazardous substance as a "toxic tort.”
Appendix B - 72a
provision is inapplicable to the instant claims or that it is
unconstitutional.
On February 16, 1996, Defendants were granted a period of
discovery limited to their statute of limitations defense. On
June 11, 1997, Defendants filed a motion for partial summary
judgment seeking dismissal of the survival and wrongful
death actions on behalf of twenty decedents and the
consortium claims on behalf of eight surviving spouses as
time-barred under the applicable New York statutes of
limitations and _ challenging the applicability and
constitutionality of 42 U.S.C. § 9658.° Plaintiffs responded
on July 11, 1997 and Defendants replied on July 25, 1997.
Oral argument was deemed unnecessary.
For the reasons which follow, Defendants’ motion for partial
summary judgment should be GRANTED in part, and
DENIED in part.
FACTS‘
The 120 acre Pfohl Brothers Landfill ("the Landfill"), located
in the northeastern corner of the town of Cheektowaga, New
York, a suburban area adjacent to the City of Buffalo, is
> As required by 28 U.S.C. § 2403(a), the court certified on
November 6, 1997, to the Attorney General that Defendants
have challenged the constitutionality of 42 U.S.C. § 9658,
and permitted the Attorney General to intervene on behalf of
the United States by filing an application to intervene within
twenty days of receipt of such notice. To date, no such
application has been filed and the court proceeds on the basis
that the United States has waived its right to intervene
4 The fact statement is taken from the complaints, answers,
and other papers filed in this action.
Appendix B - 73a
listed on the New York State Registry of Active Hazardous
Waste Disposal Sites, indicating that the state considers the
Landfill to be a public health threat. Many industrial wastes
including hazardous substances were deposited into the
Landfill between 1932 and 1969. Aero Lake is adjacent to
the northwestern corner of the Landfill. Ellicott Creek runs
within a few hundred feet of the Landfill and is fed by three
tributaries which flow through the Landfill. Ellicott Creek
empties into the Niagara River, an international waterway
flowing between the United States and Canada.
Plaintiffs in this action have filed claims based on state law
negligence, strict liability, gross negligence, loss of
consortium, .nd wrongful death for injuries or deaths to their
respective decedents whose deaths they contend were caused
by exposure to hazardous and toxic substances in the
Landfill. Defendants are the alleged owners and operators of
the Landfill; the Third-Party Defendants assertedly generated
and transported the hazardous and toxic substances to the
Landfill. According to Plaintiffs, Defendants’ negligence is
based upon Defendants' failure to take adequate
precautionary measures to properly contain and prevent the
hazardous substances deposited into the Landfill from
escaping and migrating out of the Landfill and its
surrounding area where Plaintiffs and their decedents resided.
Plaintiffs allege exposure occurred through contact with the
ambient air and ground water when their decedents lived,
worked or engaged in recreational activity in the vicinity of
the Landfill.
Among the toxic substances allegedly deposited in the
Landfill are polychlorinated biphenol ("PCB") oils, acetone,
. Unless indicated otherwise, references herein to
Defendants include the Third-Party Defendants.
Appendix B - 74a
trichloroethane, 3-tricloroethane, perchloroethylene,
trichloroethylene, tetrachloroephylene, coolant oil, paint
treatment, waste cutting oils, degreasing materials, hydraulic
oil, waste paint, industrial wastes, fluorinated solvent waste,
cobalt, mercury, toluene, vinyl toluene, benzene, xylene,
methylene fluoride, lead, lead driers, calcium, cadmium, zinc
oxide, curing sulfur, dry metal dust, sand blast grit, foundry
wastes, pine tar pitch, pickling solutions, titanium
tetrachloride, polyvinyl alcohol film wastes, polyvinyl
chloride, naptha, mek, waste inks, heavy metal wastes, paint
thinners, paint solvents, industrial solvents, zirconium
sludge, phenolic sludges, and paint sludges such as zinc, tin,
chrome, iron, nickel, copper, asbestos, phenol, and fly ash.
Defendants who operated manufacturing facilities within the
Western New York region and who it is alleged negligently
released and disposed of hazardous substances into the
Landfill include Westinghouse Electric Corporation during
the years 1946 through 1969, General Motors Corporation
from the 1950's through 1968, Curtiss-Wright Corporation
during the years 1947 through 1966, W.S. Tyler,
Incorporated, as successor in interest to Hewitt-Robbins
Corp., during the 1950's and 1960's, Laidlaw Waste Systems,
Inc., individually, and as successor in interest to U.S. Rubber
Reclaiming Co., Inc., during the 1950's and 1960's, Warner
Lambert Company, through its subsidiary American Optical,
during the 1950's and 1960's, American Standard, Inc.,
during the 1950's and 1960's. Howden Fan Company, during
the 1950's and 1960's, Carborundum Company for the time
period 1951 through 1967, E.I. Dupont deNemours, from
1955 through 1968, F.N. Burt Co. from 1959 through 1969,
and Litton Industries, Inc., as successor in interest to Hewitt
Robbins Corp., during the late 1950's through the 1960's.
Defendants who it is alleged negligently transported and
deposited hazardous substances into the Landfill include
Appendix B - 75a
Waste Management, Inc., through its predecessor, Downing
Container Services, from 1952 through the 1960's,
Browning-Ferris Industries, Inc., as successor in interests to
Joe Ball Sanitation Services, Inc., Rapid Disposal Services,
Inc., and Niagara Sanitation Company, Inc., during the
1950's and 1960's, and Dresser Industries, Inc., during the
1950's and 1960's.
The instant motion seeks summary dismissal of the survival
actions and wrongful death claims asserted as to twenty
decedents, specifically Evo T. Astor, Charles W. Batt. Rose
E. Batt, Lorraine R. Brzezicki, Mary Jane Farino, Robert L.
Farino, Stephen C. Grandillo, Gretchen A. Heaney, Nelson
M. Hirsch, Joseph A. Inzinna, Henry A. Kuczka, Anthony J.
Marino, Robert A. Martzolf, Vincent J. Mongiovi, Alfred G.
Mucha, George Pagels, Leo N. Phillips, Mary M. Sturm,
Isabelle A. Wiedenbeck and Joseph J. Wiedenbeck, Sr.°
Dismissal of claims for loss of consortium brought in
connection with the deaths of Astor, Kuczka, Marino,
° In New York, damages recovered in a survival action are
based on pre-death personal injury and become part of the
decedent's estate to be distributed in accordance with the
decedent's will or by the laws of intestacy. N.Y. Est. Powers
& Trusts Law § 11-3.3(a)(McKinney 1967). Damages in
wrongful death actions are recoverable based on pecuniary
losses and do not become part of the decedent's estate, but
rather are distributed directly to those who demonstrate
financial dependence on the decedent. N.Y. Est. Powers &
Trust Law § 5-4.4(a)(McKinney 1997). In New York, such
beneficiaries include those who would be the decedent's
distributees pursuant to the rules governing intestate
succession, in proportion to the pecuniary damages suffered
by each such distributee. N.Y. Est. Powers & Trust Law §§
5-4.4 and 5-4.5. (McKinney 1991).
Appendix B - 76a
Martzolf, Mongiovi, Mucha, Pagels and Phillips is also
sought.
DISCUSSION
Summary judgment of a claim or defense will be granted
when the moving party demonstrates that there are no
genuine issues as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P.
56(a) and (b); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 331, 91
L. Ed. 2d 265, 106 S. Ct. 2548 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202, 106 S. Ct. 2505
(1986); Rattner v. Netburn, 930 F.2d 204, 209 (2d Cir. 1991).
The moving party for summary judgment bears the burden of
establishing the nonexistence of genuine issue of material
fact. If there is any evidence in the record based upon any
source from which a reasonable inference in the nonmoving
party's favor may be drawn, the moving party cannot obtain a
summary judgment. Celotex, supra, 477 U.S. at 331.
Summary judgment shall be granted "if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on
file, together with the affidavits . . . show that there is no
issue as to any material fact, and the moving party is entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). "The
mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the
parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported
motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there
be no genuine issue of material fact." Anderson. supra, 477
USS. at 247-48.
Defendants have moved for partial summary judgment
seeking dismissal of the claims of twenty decedents and eight
surviving spouses on statute of limitations grounds, arguing
such claims are time-barred because 42 U.S.C. § 9658 does
not apply to the asserted causes of action, and, alternatively,
Appendix B - 77a
that the statute is unconstitutional as it constitutes legislation
beyond the scope of congressional power under the
Commerce Clause and violates the Tenth Amendment of the
United States Constitution. Defendants also seek dismissal
under New York law of all survival and wrongful death
actions which were commenced without a duly appointed
personal representative. Defendants further assert that
Plaintiffs' loss of consortium claims must be dismissed as
they are derivative of the underlying survival actions on
which they are based and therefore are also time-barred.
Finally, Defendants argue that the claims for punitive
damages must be dismissed as such claims are both legally
insufficient and their timeliness is dependent on the
underlying time-barred wrongful death, survival actions, and
loss of consortium claims.
The court will therefore first determine whether Plaintiffs’
claims are time-barred under relevant state law and if so,
whether 42 U.S.C. § 9658 is applicable and, to the extent
applicable, its preemptive effect on New York law. If the
state law is preempted, the court will determine the
constitutionality of 42 U.S.C. § 9658. Finally, the court will
address whether Defendants’ arguments regarding Plaintiffs’
failure to have properly appointed representatives requires
dismissal and whether Plaintiffs' loss of consortium and
punitive damages claims may proceed.
1. Statute of Limitations
The timeliness of a claim in federal court under diversity
jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), is governed by the statute
of limitations for the state in which the court sits. Guaranty
Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109-110, 89 L. Ed. 2079, 65
S. Ct. 1464 (1945); Personis v. Oiler, 889 F.2d 424 (2d Cir.
1989). Accordingly, the court's analysis begins with an
examination of the statutes of limitations governing the
Appendix B - 78a
timeliness of survival and wrongful death actions in New
York which reveals that, in the instant case, most of
Plaintiffs' claims are time-barred under the applicable New
York state statutes of limitations.
a. The Timeliness of Plaintiffs' Claims under New York
Law :
1. Survival Actions
In New York the traditional limitations period for personal
injury torts, including survival actions, based on negligence,
strict liability, gross negligence and loss of consortium is
three years measured from the date of the injury, defined in
toxic tort cases as the date of first exposure to the toxic
substance.’ N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. & R. § 214(5) (McKinney,
1990)("§ 214(5)"). Here, Plaintiffs seek recovery for their
decedents' injuries based on exposure to toxic substances that
: When New York's traditional limitations period
commenced to run with regard to toxic tort actions has
sometimes been misstated. See, e.g., Kulzer v. Pittsburgh-
Corning Corp., 942 F.2d 122, 126 (2d Cir. 1991)"at the
time, a cause of action for exposure to toxic substances
accrued on the last date of exposure to the toxic
substances")(applying New York caselaw). However, the
New York Court of Appeals recently affirmed that under the
traditional New York rule the limitations period for toxic
torts accrued as of the date of first, not last exposure. Blanco
v. American Telephone and Telegraph Co., 90 N.Y.2d 757,
689 N.E.2d 506, 666 N.Y.S.2d 536, 1997 WL 729116. *3
(N.Y. 1997)( "Prior to enactment of CPLR 214-c, this Court
has held that in the case of latent injuries arising out of
exposure to toxic substances, the cause of action accrued
upon plaintiff's initial exposure")(emphasis added).
Appendix B - 79a
first occurred between the early 1900's, Records of Leo N.
Phillips, attached as Exhibit 1 to Affidavit of Laurie Styka
Bloom, Esq., in Support of Liaison Group Defendants’
Consolidated Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. #
291)("Bloom Affidavit"), filed June 10, 1997, and the late
1960's. Records cf Henry A. Kuczka, Bloom Affidavit,
Exhibit 9. All the instant actions are thus untimely under §
214(5) as more than three years have passed since the date of
first exposure to the alleged toxic substances and the filing of
the claims by decedents' representatives in 1995 and 1996.
In response to complaints that the first exposure rule,
judicially established in Schmidt v. Merchants Despatch
Transp. Co., 270 N.Y. 287, 200 N.E. 824 (N.Y. 1936), barred
many plaintiffs from commencing actions for injuries caused
by latent effects of exposure to toxic chemicals and other
hazardous substances before learning they were injured and
the causes thereof, in 1986 the New York legislature enacted
§ 214-c of New York Civil Practice Law and Rules which
created special accrual rules and limitations periods allowing
more time for plaintiffs to file claims seeking damages for
injuries and deaths attributed to exposure to such substances.®
Section 214-c(2) provides that a plaintiff who suffers a
personal injury in a toxic tort case has three years from the
date of the discovery of the injury to commence an action.
N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. & R. 214-c (2)(McKinney 1990)("§ 214-
8 In Schmidt, the New York Court of Appeals held that an
"injury occurs whez there is a wrongful invasion of personal
or property rights and then the cause of action accrues.
Except in cases of fraud where the statute expressly provides
otherwise, the statutory period of limitations begins to run
from the time when liability for wrong has arisen even
though the injured party may be ignorant of the existence of
the wrong or injury." Schmidt, at 827.
Appendix B - 80a
c(2)"). Here, Plaintiffs seek recovery based on injuries to
their decedents, the earliest of which was discovered in 1961,
Records of Evo T. Astor, Bloom Affidavit, Exhibit 6, and the
latest of which was discovered in October 1993. Records of
Nelson M. Hirsch, Bloom Affidavit, Exhibit 20° An
examination of the relevant exhibits submitted on this motion
reveals that, the filing of only Nelson M. Hirsch's survival
action on June 17, 1996 was timely under § 214-c(2),
assuming that Hirsch's discovery of his injury coincided with
the diagnosis of Hirsch's cancer in October 1993. See
Records of Nelson M. Hirsch, Bloom Affidavit, Exhibit 20.
Further, pursuant to N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. & R. § 214¢
(4MMcKinney 1990 & Supp. 1997\("§ 214-c(4)"), if the
plaintiff discovers the cause of a toxic tort injury within five
years of the discovery of the injury, the plaintiff may invoke
the longer of (a) the three year period from the discovery of
the injury or (b) a one year period from the discovery of the
cause within which to commence an action. Here, all
Plaintiffs assert that they discovered the cause of their
decedents' injuries in 1994 or 1995. Bloom Affidavit,
Exhibits 1-20. As less than five years have passed between
the asserted dates of discovery of the decedents' injuries and
the discovery of the causes of those injuries only as to the
survival actions brought on behalf of the estates of Mary Jane
Farino, Nelson M. Hirsch, Isabelle A. Wiedenbeck and
Joseph J. Wiedenbeck, Sr., Bloom Affidavit, Exhibits 17, 20,
19 and 16, respectively, only those survival actions meet the
first requirement for timeliness under § 214-(c)(4). As stated,
with the exception of Hirsch, none of the instant survival
It is assumed only for the purposes of this Discussion iit
the diagnosis of each decedent's injury coincided with the
discovery of such injury, a fact which has yet to be
established by either party.
Appendix B - 81a
actions were filed within three years of the discovery of the
fatal injuries. Accordingly, the survival actions are timely
only if filed within one year of the discovery of the causes of
such injuries.
However, as 1994 is the asserted date of discovery of the
cause of the injuries pertaining to the survival actions for
Isabelle A. and Joseph J. Wiedenbeck Sr., (Bloom Affidavit,
Exhibits 16 and 19), and as those survival actions were not
filed until June 17, 1996, Case # 96-CV-395A(F)(Docket No.
1), they were not filed within one year of the discovery of the
alleged cause of death as required by the statute of limitations
period under § 214-c(4), and, as such, are time-barred under
New York law, regardless of whether 42 U.S.C. § 9658
applies.'° The survival action of Mary Jane Farino, filed
January 10, 1995 is timely under § 214-c(4), assuming, as
Plaintiffs allege, that the cause of Farino's injury was
discovered in 1995. Records of Mary Jane Farino, Bloom
Affidavit, Exhibit 17. As the asserted date of discovery of the
cause of decedent Hirsch's injuries, is "in 1995," depending
on the precise date of such discovery, the relevant survival
action, filed June 17, 1996, may be timely under § 214-c(4)
as well as § 214-c(2). Records of Nelson M. Hirsch, Bloom
Affidavit, Exhibit 20. However, even with the benefit of 42
U.S.C. § 9658, the survival action of Nelson M. Hirsch is
untimely under § 214-c(4). See Discussion, infra, at 34-35.
'0 As discussed, infra, see Discussion at 16-17, 42 U.S.C. §
9658 does not affect the applicable state limitations period,
only the manner of determining the date of accrual of the
claim.
Appendix B - 82a
2. Wrongful Death Claims
The applicable statute of limitations for wrongful death
actions under New York law is two years measured from the
date of death. N.Y. Est. Powers & Trusts Law § 5-4.1
(McKinney 1997). Plaintiffs’ wrongful death claims pertain
to the deaths of persons who died between 1963 and 1993,
Bloom Affidavit, Exhibits 1-20, and Plaintiffs concede that
all of the instant wrongful death actions, none of which were
filed within two years from any of Plaintiffs’ respective
decedents' deaths, are untimely under N.Y. Est. Powers &
Trusts Law § 5-4.1. Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law, at 1.
b. The Purpose of the Federally Required
Commencement Date
As most of the survival actions and all the wrongful death
actions are time-barred under New York law, Plaintiffs assert
that the timeliness of their survival and wrongful death
claims are governed by 42 U.S.C. § 9658, which neither
creates a separate federal cause of action based on toxic torts
within its terms nor a uniform statute of limitations related to
such torts, but rather provides a uniform accrual date from
which the applicable state period of limitations governing
such tort actions is measured. 42 U.S.C. § 9658A(4)(b).
Defendants argue that as 42 U.S.C. § 9658 refers only to
actions for personal injury and property damage it is
inapplicable to Plaintiffs' otherwise time-barred survival and
wrongful death actions. Liaison Group Defendants’
Memorandum of Law in Support of Consolidated Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment ("Defendants’ Memorandum of
Law"), filed June 10, 1997, at 21, 25.
Section 9658 of Title 42 of the United States Code is part of
the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation
and Liability Act, known as "CERCLA." CERCLA was
Appendix B - 83a
enacted in response to the increasing threat to the national
environment and public health represented by years of unsafe
disposal of hazardous substances. Meghrig v. KFC Western,
Inc., 516 U.S. 479, 116 S. Ct. 1251, 1254, 134 L. Ed. 2d 121
(1996); B.F. Goodrich v. Betkoski, 99 F.3d 505, 514 (2d Cir.
1996). As enacted on December 11, 1980, CERCLA
contained many provisions to facilitate the expeditious
cleanup of hazardous waste sites and to recover the
accompanying costs from the responsible parties. See 42
U.S.C. §§ 9601, ef. seg. For example, in addition to
permitting actions by federal and state government agencies
to remediate the unsafe storage and release of hazardous
substances, 42 U.S.C. § 9613(g), CERCLA also authorizes
actions by private individuals to accomplish its objectives. 42
U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B)(private individuals may sue for "any
other necessary costs of response incurred by any other
person consistent with the national contingency plan"); State
of New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1041-42
(2d Cir. 1985({CERCLA provides incentive to private parties
to take lead role in cleaning up hazardous waste sites).
Congress, however, also had intended that CERCLA provide
a legal remedy for private claims based on injuries to persons
and property damage attributed to the release of hazardous
substances into the environment, although Congress was
unable, at the time of CERCLA's enactment in 1980, to agree
on the form such legal redress should take. Superfund
Section 301(e) Study Group, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., Injuries
and Damages from Hazardous Wastes - Analysis and
Improvement of Legal Remedies, 16 (Comm. Print
1982)("Study Group Report"). Accordingly, § 301(e) of
CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9651(e), mandated that a study be
conducted "to determine the adequacy of existing common
law and statutory remedies in providing legal redress for
harm to man and the environment caused by the release of
Appendix B - 84a
hazardous substances into the environment."!! 42 U.S.C. §
9651(e)(1) (emphasis added). The study also was to
particularly address:
(A) the need for revisions in existing statutory or common
law, and
(B) whether such revisions should take the form of Federal
statutes or the development of a model code which is
recommended for adoption by the States.
42 U.S.C. § 9651(e)(4)(A) and (B).
The results of that study were to be delivered to Congress for
consideration in amending CERCLA to deal specifically with
these questions. 42 U.S.C. § 9651(e)(4). The Study Group
filed its report on July 1, 1982. Study Group Report, at 3.
!1 The term "hazardous substance" is used throughout the
CERCLA legislation. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14). However, the
Study Group Report refers to both "hazardous substance” and
"hazardous waste" stating "that the definition of ‘hazardous
waste" or ‘hazardous substance’ can be different for different
purposes,” and that "for regulatory purposes, depending ‘on
the authorizing statute involved, the regulator may have to
determine the risk in the light of the counterbalancing
economic benefit resulting from the manufacture and use of
the hazardous substance, before and after it becomes
hazardous waste." Study Group Report, at 24 (emphasis
added). Such language implies that "hazardous waste" is a
form of a hazardous substance and, accordingly, use of the
term "hazardous substance” in this disaussion includes
"hazardous waste."
Appendix B - 85a
Congress did not, however, adopt any of the Study Group's
ten recommendations, which included an administrative
claim procedure upon a federally created fund, and
enhancement of the states' own statutory remedies to provide
for and facilitate the redress of personal injuries and property
damage attributed to improper disposal of hazardous
substances under 42 U.S.C. § 9651(e)(4)(B). Study Group
Report, at 193-271. Instead, Congress responded to the Study
Group Report's finding that existing state private tort actions
for personal injuries and property damage were effective
mechanisms of legal redress, but for the fact that such actions
were often time-barred as the relevant state statutes of
limitations and related judicial decisions did not permit
accrual of an action based on an injury with a long latency
period such as cancer to be measured from the discovery of
the cause of the injury. Study Group Report, at 21-22, 43.
Accordingly, Congress enacted 42 U.S.C. § 9658, providing
for a uniform accrual date from which to measure the running
of the applicable periods of limitation for state law toxic torts
actions.
Specifically, the legislation provides that
(1) In the case of any action brought under State law for
personal injury, or property damages, which are caused or
contributed to by exposure to any hazardous substance,
or pollutant or contaminant, released into the environment
from a facility, if the applicable limitations period for
such action (as specified in the State statute of limitations
or under common law) provides a commencement date
which is’ earlier than the federally required
commencement date, such period shall commence at the
federally required commencement date in lieu of the date
specified in such State statute. . ..(2) Except as provided
in paragraph (1), the statute of limitations established
under State law shall apply in all actions brought under
Appendix B - 86a
State law for personal injury, or property damages, which
are caused or contributed to by exposure to any hazardous
substance, or pollutant or contaminant, released into the
environment from a facility.’
42 U.S.C. 9658(a)(1) & (2).
2 A "facility" is defined by 42 U.S.C. § 9601(9) as "(A) any
building, structure, installation, equipment, pipe or pipeline
(including any pipe into a sewer or publicly owned treatment
works), well, pit, pond, lagoon, impoundment, ditch, landfill,
storage container, motor vehicle, rolling stock, or aircraft, or
(B) any site or area where a hazardous substance has been
deposited, stored, disposed of, or placed, or otherwise come
to be located; but does not include any consumer product in
consumer use or any vessel." 42 U.S.C. § 9601(9)(A) and
(B). The parties do not dispute that the Landfill comes within
this definition. A "release" is defined as "a spilling, leaking,
pumping, pouring, emitting, emptying, discharging, injecting,
escaping, leaching, dumping, or disposing into the
environment (including the abandonment or discarding of
barrels, containers, and other closed receptacles containing
any hazardous substance or pollutant or contaminant), but
excludes (A) any release which results in exposure to persons
solely within a workplace, with respect to a claim which such
persons may assert against the employer of such persons, (B)
emissions from the engine exhaust of a motor vehicle, rolling
stock, aircraft, vessel, or pipeline pumping station, (C)
release of source, byproduct, or special nuclear material from
a nuclear incident . . . and (D) the normal application of
fertilizer." 42 U.S.C. § 9601(22). As the instant motion is
limited to their statute of limitations defenses, Defendants do
not dispute that the alleged hazardous wastes at the Landfill
have been released into the environment.
Appendix B - 87a
The "federally required commencement date" is defined as
the date plaintiff knew (or reasonably should have
known) that the personal injury or property damages
referred to in subsection (a)(1) were caused or contributed
to by the hazardous substances or pollutant or
contaminant concerned.
42 U.S.C. § 9658(b)(4)(A) ("the FRCD").
Defendants assert that the FRCD does not apply to the
survival and wrongful death actions because they are not
"actions for personal injuries" as that term appears in the
FRCD. Plaintiffs maintain that both survival and wrongful
death actions are within the ambit of the FRCD and that the
FRCD preempts the accrual rule of the New York general
statute of limitations and its wrongful death statute, which
otherwise bar their claims. Plaintiffs' Response to
Defendants’ Consolidated Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment ("Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Law”), filed July 11,
1997, at 1-2.
A cause of action "accrues" for statutory limitations periods
when "the plaintiff has 'a complete and present cause of
action.” Bay Area Laundry and Dry Cleaning Pension Trust
Fund v. Ferbar Corporation of California, Inc., 522 U.S.
192, 139 L. Ed. 2d 553, 118 S. Ct. 542, 549 (1997).
Moreover, "a cause of action does not become ‘complete and
present’ for limitations purposes until the plaintiff can file
suit and obtain relief." Bay Area Laundry and Dry Cleaning
Fension Trust Fund, supra (citing Reiter v. Cooper, 507 U.S.
258, 267, 122 L. Ed. 2d 604, 113 S. Ct. 1213 (1993)("While
it is theoretically possible for a statute to create a cause of
action that accrues at one time for the purpose of calculating
when the statute of limitations begins to run, but at another
time for the purpose of bringing suit, we will not infer such
Appendix B - 88a
an odd result in the absence of any such indication in the
statute")). Accordingly, as a plaintiff cannot in good faith file
suit to obtain relief until causality is known, see Fed.R.Civ.P.
11(b) (requiring that all actions and motions in federal court
be made with the reasonable belief that such actions are
legally warranted and not made for any improper purpose
such as to harass or cause undue delay), an action does not
accrue, and hence the relevant statute of limitations does not
commence to run, absent knowledge, or a good faith belief as
to the existence of each element of the tort including
causality.
c. The FRCD Applies to State Survival and Wrongful
Death Actions
Defendants, in their effort to demonstrate that the FRCD does
not apply to survival or wrongful death actions, contend that
the FRCD was not intended to permit knowledge of the cause
of action to accrue to one other than the decedent and that
construction of the FRCD to permit such accrual is against
public policy.”
An essential element of both survival and wrongful death
actions is that the decedent have died with a viable cause of
action against the defendant for the infliction of the injury
which caused the death. N.Y. Est. Powers & Trust Law §§
11-3.2 (survival actions) and 5-4 (wrongful death actions).
Here, the asserted FRCD with respect to the claims of each
decedent is well after the date of death of each decedent
whose claims are subject to the instant motion and who
presumably died before it was possible to determine the
'3 Defendants assert further arguments opposing application
of the FRCD to wrongful death actions. Those arguments are
addressed, infra, at 34-49.
Appendix B - 89a
causes of the decedents' injuries and resulting deaths.
Defendants argue that as the FRCD does not expressly
provide that a survival or wrongful death action may accrue
upon the discovery of the cause of a decedent's fatal injury by
one other than decedent, each decedent thus died without a
viable cause of action. Defendants’ Memorandum of Law, at
27-28. Defendants further assert that permitting a survival or
wrongful death action to accrue as of the decedent's estate
representative's discovery of the cause of the injury is against
public policy as such would create the possibility of an
infinite limitations period, thus unfairly burdening
Defendants by forcing them to defend stale claims long after
the alleged exposures and deaths. Defendants' Memorandum
of Law, at 41; Defendants' Reply Memorandum of Law, at 5-
6. The court finds Defendants’ arguments are without merit
for several reasons.
1. The FRCD Does Not Require That a Decedent
Personally Discover the Cause of the Fatal Injury Prior to
Death
Defendants oppose application of the FRCD to both survival
and wrongful death actions on the basis that "the key
requirement for invoking the FRCD statute (each decedent's
personal discovery of the cause of his or her injury) is
decidedly and admittedly absent in these cases." Defendants'
Memorandum of Law at 37-38(emphasis added). Defendants
read the FRCD too narrowly. By its terms, the FRCD is the
"date plaintiff knew (or reasonably should have known) that
the personal injury or property damages referred to in
subsection (a)(1) were caused or contributed to by the
hazardous substance or pollutant or contaminant concerned.”
42 U.S.C. § 9658(b)(4)A)(emphasis added). The issue
therefore is one of statutory interpretation: did Congress
mean to include only the physically injured person, i.e., the
person to who suffered the physical or bodily harm, in the
Appendix B - 90a
term "plaintiff" as used in the FRCD, or does the term also
include an injured party's legal representative where the
injuries result in death before the victim can institute a
lawsuit based on his own behalf? For the reasons that follow,
the court finds that the latter was Congress' intent.
Where a federal statute is concerned, unless the statute
directs otherwise, the terms contained in such federal statute
are determined in accordance with federal law. Uyrie v.
Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 174, 93 L. Ed. 1282, 69 S. Ct. 1018
(1949)(holding that definition of "negligence" as used in the
Federal Employers’ Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. § 51 was to be
determined based on federal law). The FRCD is a federal
statute and it is axiomatic that "the starting point in every
case involving construction of a statute is the language
itself." Landreth Timber Co., v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 684,
85 L. Ed. 2d 692, 105 S. Ct. 2297 (1985\(quoting Blue Chip
Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 756, 44 L. Ed.
2d 539, 95 S. Ct. 1917 (1975)). In interpreting a federal
statute the court "must not be guided by a single sentence or
member of a sentence, but look to the provisions of the whole
law and to its object and policy.” Pilot Life Ins.
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