Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Miller v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co.

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Supreme Court, U.S.

FILED

oe 1026 JAN 6 2003

NO. orrtee-or-THE CLERK

Sun the

Supreme Court of the Anited States

MIcHAEL L. MILLER,

Petitioner,

V.

SOUTHWESTERN BELL TELEPHONE COMPANY,

Respondent.

On PetiTION For Writ Or CERTIORARI

To Tue Unitep States Court Or APPEALS

For THe Firts Circuit

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

ELLEN SPROVACH

Counsel of Record

c/o GreGG M. ROSENBERG

& ASSOCIATES

11 GREENWAY PLAZA

SurrE 2810

Houston, TX 77046

(713) 960-8300 (TEL)

(713) 621-6670 (Fax)

Counsel for Petitioner

BECKER GALLAGHER LEGAL PUBLISHING, INC.,

CINCINNATI, OHIO 800-890-5001

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

Whether there is a compelling reason to grant the

Petition for Writ of Certiorari because the United States Court

of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has decided an important

question of Federal Law that has not been but should be

settled by this Court.

1. Specifically, the Fifth Circuit determined that

Petitioner Miller did not check the correct box on the EEOC

complaint form or otherwise disclose his retaliation claim and

thereby exhaust his administrative remedies. The Fifth Circuit

referred to a Seventh Circuit case’ in making its argument.

However, the Fifth Circuit misinterpreted the Seventh Circuit

precedent’. Because the Fifth Circuit misapplied and

misinterpreted Seventh Circuit precedent and this Court has

not ruled on this issue, there is compelling reason to grant this

Petition for Writ of Certiorari.

y i Whether doctor prescribed limitations on

ability to work overtime is a substantial limitation when

overtime is mandatory. The Fifth Circuit determined that

Petitioner’s ability to work overtime was not a substantial

"Cable v. Ivy Tech State College, 200 F.3d 467,477 (7 Cir.

1999).

2 The Fifth Circuit stated that the Cable Court, “found that there

was no indication form the EEOC charge boxes, narrative or

supplemental material that the Plaintiff sought redress for the

retaliation claim...” Order affirming summary judgment, page 8.

When in actuality, the Cable Court found that the dismissal of

Cable’s retaliation charge for failure to exhaust administrative

remedies was error as Cuble had put the Respondent on notice of

his retaliation charge and exhausted his administrative remedies. Id.

at 473.

limitation on Petitioner Miller’s ability to work under the

Americans with Disabilities Act. Again, this Court has not

ruled on this issue and the cases cited by the Fifth Circuit did

not take into account scenarios like Petitioner’s where

overtime was substantial and mandatory, there is compelling

reason to grant this Petition for Writ of Certiorari. *

* Cotter v. Ajilon Servs., Inc., 287 F.3d 593 (6" Cir. 2002) and

Brennan v. Nat'l Tei. Directory Corp., 850 F.Supp. 331 (E.E. Pa.

1994). In the instant case, Defendant was requiring Plaintiff and

others to work seven days at a total of 84 hours per week. Plaintiff

was restricted to 50 hours per week. Appeliant’s brief to the 5®

Circuit, page 6.

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CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 29.6, Petitioner is not

required to file a corporate disclosure statement.

Petitioner/Plaintiff is an individual. Respondent/Defendant

Southwestern Bell Telephone Company is a Missouri

Corporation. SBC Communications Inc. is a Delaware

Corporation and the parent company of Southwestern Bell

Telephone Company.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW ........-.- a

CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT ....... ili

TABLE OF CONTENTS ........-.:+.--; sees iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...........--+:+-: Vii

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION ........-.--- 1

OPINIONS BELOW - 0 wc cme ereecnens 1

I STATEMENT OF THE CASE ..........--- | 1

A, Statutes Involved as the Basis for

Federal Jurisdiction in the Court of the

free ee ee ee ee 1

B. Facts Material to the Consideration of

the Questions Presented ...........- 2

Il SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT ........ 4

Ill REASONS FOR GRANTING WRIT ........ 7

A. Michael Miller Has Brought an

Important Question of Federal Law

That Has not Been, but Should be

Settled by this Court. .......++-+++: 7

B. The Standard Necessary to Survive

Summary Judgment/Application of Law

2 Eka eee A ee we eee 10

1. Miller established a Prima

Facie Case of Discrimination

and Retaliation pursuant to the

Americans with Disabilities

a tea og 66 eek OS be 4 10

2. Defendant does not have a

legitimate business reason to

explain why it dismissed Miller

after 24 years of work. ....... 12

: H Miller has established a Prima

Facie Case of Retaliation ...... 14

4. Inference of Retaliation........ 15

IV I Gs ba ak ad 6 6a be eee 16

APPENDIX

Appendix A

Fifth Circuit Opinion - 10/7/02 ............ la

Appendix B

District Court Memorandum and Order -

PR soo ee a ea we es be 19a

Appendix C

District Court Final Judgment - 10/24/01 .... 21a

Appendix D

District Court Memorandum and Order -

ME oko O44 8 0 080 0 8 94 60:40 8 eo ws 23a

vi

a ee rs — —— - —

emmaminannetit

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES: PAGE

Alexander v. Gardner-Denver,

ae TE oy sb a oe 006 hoe eae 7

Brennan v. Nat’l Tel. Directory Corp.,

850 F.Supp. 331 (E.D. Pa. 1994) ......... 6,9

Bridges v. City of Bossier,

Pe bee Le A eer arr 10

Cable v. Ivy Tech State College,

200 F.3d 467 (7th Cir. 1999) ............ ey

Cotter v. Ajilon Servs., Inc.,

poe el | er ere ii, 6, 9

Downes v. Volkswagen of America, Inc.,

41 F.36 1152 (7 Ce. -199S) 0 ww ccc cee 7-8

Long v. Eastfield College,

Be Pie ee GP es BUD wc cee cc cccese 15

Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co.,

Fe & fhe | ere 14

Mayberry v. Voight Aircraft Co.,

Se ee SO Get CR. BGPP wc ccc ccc ccces 15

McDaniel v. Temple Indep. Sch. Dist.,

770 F.2d 1340 (Sth Cir. 1985) ............ 15

Vii

McInnis v. Alamo Community College Dist.,

207 F.3d 276 (Sth Cir. 2000) ........--- 10, 12

Nowlin v. Resolution Trust Corp..,

33 F.3d 498 (Sth Cir. 1994) .......----5es 15

~ Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc.,

530 U.S. 133 (2000)... . 2... - eee reese 15, 16

Sherrod v. American Airlines, Inc.,

132 F.3d 1112 (Sth Cir. 1998) .......-- 10, 11

Taylor v. Virginia Union Univ.,

193 F.3d 219 (4th Cir. 1999) .......------> 8

Webb v. Cardiothoracic Surgery Ass'N.,

139 F.3d 532 (Sth Cir. 1998) .......--- 14-15

STATUTES:

28 U.S.C. $2101) .. 1. eee eer ere ceeenes l

SiR Leg br) ee ee 1

SUPREME COURT RULES:

Supreme Court Rules 12.1, 13.1, 13.3 amd DD .. 220s 1

Supreme Court Rule 29.6 .....--- ++ seer ee reees i

Viii

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

This Honorable Court has jurisdiction to hear this case

under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101

(1994). Jurisdiction is also proper and timely pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2101 (c), Supreme Court Rules 12.1, 13.1, 13.3,

and 29.

OPINIONS BELOW

Appellant is appealing an Order affirming Summary

Judgment entered October 7, 2002 by the United States Court

of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.

The United States District Court for the Southern

District of Texas entered a final order on November 20, 2001

and a Summary Judgment order on October 24, 2001.

I

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. r isdiction

in the C. F the First I

42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.

§ 12112 Discrimination

(a) General Rule

No covered entity shall discriminate

against a qualified individual with a disability

because of the disability of such individual in

regard to job application procedures, the

1

hiring, advancement, or discharge of

employees, employee compensation, job

training, and other terms, conditions, and

privileges of employment.

B. Facts Material to the Consideration of the

Questions Presented

Summary Judgment was granted for the Defendant and

Miller appealed to the Fifth Circuit. The case was ultimately

dismissed by an order entered on October 7, 2002.

Petitioner Michael L. Miller was a 24-year veteran of

Defendant Southwestern Bell’s workforce who began

employment in 1974 as a splicer’s helper and ultimately

became a customer service technician. In 1996 and again in

1998, Mike Miller underwent heart surgery. Miller went out

on disability leave from July 17, 1998 through September 7,

1998 for surgery related to his heart: Alcohol Septal

Reduction Procedure. Miller’s doctor diagnosed him with

Hypertropic Obstructive Cardiomyopathy.

Immediately upon return to work in September of

1998, Miller informed his supervisor Dale Dugas, that his

doctor restricted him to work only 40 hours a week. Miller’s

doctor then restricted Plaintiff to work only 10 hours of

overtime. During that time frame, and contemporaneously

with Miller’s overtime restrictions, Defendant declared a

service emergency and required all individuals in Miller’s job

position to work 12 hour shifts seven days a week, a total of

84 hours per week mandatory. Though to many, a restriction

of 50 hours per week does not sound like a serious job

restriction, it impacted Miller severely, as his doctor

mandated restriction required him to work 34 hours less per

week than his fellow employees.

2

meen: wom cael:

Mr. Miller began to experience chest pains in the

middle of September 1998. In fact, Defendant’s agent and

Miller’s supervisor, Dale Dugas stated that in the short, less

than three week period, that Miller was back on the job, she

noticed that on the days Miller worked 10 hours a day, he

appeared more tired. On September 21, 1998, Miller’s heart

condition worsened, he experienced chest pains and he had to

stop working and rest.

On the day Miller had to stop working and rest, he

was assigned two jobs at 17534 Golden Glade. Another

customer service technician, Tony Figliola, was assigned to

the same job site on that same day.

On September 21, 1998, Miller left a job site

(Cedarwood), drove to the Golden Glade site, put out the

cones to secure the road, inspected the job and realized that it

had been repaired. When Miller left the site, he drove to the

Central Office, received phone calls from customers and

returned a page from his daughter. While Miller was at the

Central Office he experienced those chest pains hit so he also

stopped working, rested and took some medication. Miller

went from the Central Office to the garage where he cleaned

out his truck, gassed it up and went into the office.

Miller attributed driving to Golden Glade, setting out

the cones, inspecting the site, driving to the Central Office,

returning, the phone calls and resting and taking medication at

the Central Office, driving from the Central Office to the

garage, and cleaning and gassing up his truck as time for the

Golden Glade job pursuant to Southwestern Bell policy.

|

Mike Miller worked 13 hours on September 21, 1998.

Defendant’s policy as it related to “charging time” is

to charge time to the new job as soon as they completed the

old job. Policy dictates discretion for travel, cleaning the

trucks and gassing up the vehicle. In fact, if a technician

gassed up in the afternoon, they would probably charge the

time to the last job in the afternoon and if they did it in the

morning they would charge that activity to the first job of the

new day. Miller did not commit fraud or forge any

documents.

Three days later on September 23, 1998, Defendant's

agent, Dale Dugas spoke with Miller and asked him about the

Golden Glade job. Miller did not remember some of the

information and Dugas said she would meet with him the next

day. Dugas and another manager went to the Golden Glade

address to see what work was done. However, they did not,

at any time, retrace Miller’s steps to validate or justify the

length of time Miller had attributed to the Golden Glade job -

pursuant to policy.

Less than three weeks after returning from a disability

leave and after requesting accommodations regarding

overtime and to rest due to chest pains, Defendant suspended

then terminated a 24-year long employee. Miller was not on

any progressive discipline at the time of his suspension.

Il

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

Both the District Court and the United States Court of

Appeals for the Fifth Circuit decided, erroneously, an

important question of Federal law that has not been, but

4

should be, settled by this Court. There are compelling reasons

why this Court should grant this Petition for Writ of

Certiorari and consider these important questions.

First, Specifically, the Fifth Circuit determined that

Petitioner Miller did not check the correct box on the EEOC

complaint form or otherwise disclose his retaliation claim and

thereby exhaust his administrative remedies. The Fifth Circuit

referred to a Seventh Circuit case* in making its argument.

However, and with due respect, the Fifth Circuit

misinterpreted the Seventh Circuit precedent’. Because the

Fifth Circuit misapplied and misinterpreted Seventh Circuit

precedent and this Honorable Court has not ruled on this

issue, there is compelling reason to grant this Petition for

Writ of Certiorari.

Additionally, the Fifth Circuit determined that

restrictions on working overtime were not substantially

limiting on the major life activity of working. However, the

cases cited by the Fifth Circuit do not deal with cases such as

the instant case where large amounts of overtime (34 hours)

are required. The cases cited do not consider any required

* Cable v. Ivy Tech State College, 200 F.3d 467,477 (7 Cir.

1999).

° The Fifth Circuit stated that the Cable Court, “found that there

was no indication form the EEOC charge boxes, narrative or

supplemental material that the Plaintiff sought redress for the

retaliation claim...” Order affirming summary judgment, page 8.

When in actuality, the Cable Court found that the dismissal of

Cable’s retaliation charge for failure to exhaust administrative

remedies was error as Cable had put the Respondent on notice of

his retaliation charge and exhausted his administrative remedies. Jd.

at 473.

overtime. Finally, the two cases cited® are in the Sixth Circuit

and Eastern District of Pennsylvania, respectively, and the

Supreme Court of the United States has not ruled on whether

limitations on mandatory overtime is substantially limiting on

the major life activity of working.

The District Court and the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning

was incorrect that the District Court misapplied (and

misinterpreted from other circuits) law to fact and settled an

important question of law that should be settled by this

Honorable Court. Moreover, Miller further asserts that in

evaluating the summary judgment standard, the District Court

inappropriately weighed the evidence in favor of Southwestern

Bell Telephone Company. In effect, the District Court

assumed there was fact issues present and went on to assume

the role of fact finder. The District Court granted summary

judgment on its own factual determinations, which are best

left to the proper fact finder, the jury. Therefore, despite the

existence of Miller’s prima facie case, the District Court

denied Miller his right to a jury trial. The United States

Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit went on to affirm that

ruling.

” Cotter v. Ajilon Services, Inc., 287 F.3d 593 (6" Cir. 2002) and

Brennan v. National Telephone Directory Corporation, 850F.Supp.

331 (1994).

iil

REASONS FOR GRANTING WRIT

Michael Miller Has Brought an Important

Question of Federal Law That Has not Been,

but Should be Settled by this Court.

Actually, Michael Miller has brought two important

questions of Federal Law that have not been but should be

settled by this Court. Generally, a Plaintiff may not bring

claims that were not in the EEOC charge. Alexander v.

Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. 36 (1974). This requirement

allows the EEOC to investigate the claim while also providing

the employer with full notice of the charges against it. Jd. In

its Order dated October 7, 2002, the Fifth Circuit stated that

Miller is precluded from making a retaliation claim regarding

his disability claim because he did not check a box or

otherwise disclose that claim. There are two things inherently

wrong with that reasoning.

First, the case utilized by the Fifth Circuit to support

its reasoning is from the Seventh Circuit and does not purport

to rule the way the Fifth Circuit says it does. The Fifth

Circuit stated that the Cable court deemed the plaintiff's

narrative to have given insufficient indication to the EEOC or

the employer that he was seeking redress for unlawful

retaliation. Order affirming summary judgment, page 18.

Actually, Cable supports a reversal of summary judgment.

The Cable Court found that the dismissal of Cable’s

retaliation charge for failure to exhaust the administrative

remedy was [emphasis ours] error. Cable, 200 F.3d 467. The

EEOC charge filing requirement is not intended to “let the

form of the purported charge prevail over its substance”.

Downes v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 41 F.3d 1132 (7"

7

PO

Cir. 1994). Courts have allowed various types of filings to

satisfy the EEOC filing requirement. Taylor v. Virginia Union

Univ., 193 F.3d 219 (4" Cir. 1999).

In the instant case, Miller went to the EEOC and

completed a charge of discrimination along with a charge

information form, which was filed with the EEOC. In that

charge information form, Miller stated that he was

discriminated for age and disability, “heart condition, Grade

II spondlylithesis and degenerative arthritis in knee and

shoulder.” He went on to say, “[t]he alleged misconduct was

a subterfuge to fire an employee nearing retirement. I had

taken a break from work due to chest pains and had included

this time on my time report. They alleged fraud”. In other

words, Miller who had requested accommodations by way of

reduced mandatory overtime stemming from his heart

condition, took a break for chest pains and was retaliated

against by being fired. Miller gave notice to the EEOC and

the employer that he was retaliated against for engaging in

protected activity relating to his disability.

On page 10 of its Order affirming Summary Judgment,

the Fifth Circuit cited to Miller’s narrative, however, ignoring

and omitting the language, “[t]his charge is amended to cure

a technical defect in the omission of an additional basis and

statute, “Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990", indicated

on the Charging Party’s initial information. (See Attached).

The Fifth Circuit went as far as to say, “[w]orth noting is that

there was no continuation sheet for t his narrative filed, nor

a supplemental documents of any kind in the trial record,”

Order affirming Summary Judgment, page 19.’

‘ This amended charge was attached as Exhibit “B” to Plaintiff's

Original Complaint.

The Fifth Circuit applied the law of another Circuit,

misinterpreted it and misinterpreted the facts, specifically that

Miller did not supply a continuation sheet or amendment. This

Honorable Court has not ruled as to whether when Plaintiff

fails to mark a box for retaliation but supplies information to

the EEOC indicating such a claim whether administrative

remedies are exhausted. Therefore, Petitioner Miller prays

this Writ be granted.

The second important area of Federal law that has not

been decided by this Court is whether restrictions on overtime

qualify as a substantial limitation to one’s ability to work. In

its Order affirming Summary Judgment at page 12, the Fifth

Circuit determined that courts have held that the inability to

work overtime is not a substantial limitation on the ability to

work under the ADA. Cotter v. Ajilon Servs., Inc., 287 F.3d

593 (2002). The Court of Appeals also cited Brennan v. Nat'l

Tel. Directory Corp., 850 F.Supp. 331 (E.D. Pa. 1994), for

its premise that the inability to work overtime hardly makes

a plaintiff handicapped. While one of these cases is from a

sister circuit and one from district court, neither address the

issues in Miller’s case. Both cases cited by the Fifth Circuit

involve situations where there are overtime restrictions but no

evidence of overtime. In Méiller’s case, the overtime

restrictions were significant as he was only allowed to work

50 hours per week and was required to work 84. As this

Court has never addressed the issue of whether restrictions of

Overtime in a mandatory overtime situation constitute a

substantial limitation on an individual’s ability to perform the

major life task of working, Petitioner Miller prays this Court

grant this Petition for Writ.

Therefore, the United States Court of Appeals for the

Fifth Circuit decided an important issue of law that should

properly be decided by this Court and this Petition should be

granted.

B.

Plaintiff has offered evidence to this Court that 1) he

is disabled or is regarded as disabled; 2) that he is qualified

for the job; 3) that he was subject to an adverse employment

action on account of his disability or perceived disability; and

4) that he was replaced by or treated less favorable than non-

disabled employees. McInnis v. Alamo Community College

Dist. 207 F.3d 276 (5" Cir. 2000). Defendant has stipulated

that Plaintiff was qualified for his job and that an adverse

employment action occurred.

Plaintiff fulfills the required elements to prove a prima

facie discrimination case. Plaintiff has established that he was

regarded as having a disability and that he was treated less

favorably than a non-disabled employee. The adverse

employment action occurred because of the disability. Sherrod

v. American Airlines, Inc., 132 F.3d 1112 (5" Cir. 1998)

citing 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). First, Plaintiff must offer

evidence that he falls within the meaning of “disabled”.

Bridges v. City of Bossier, 92 F.3d 329 (5" Cir. 1996).

Plaintiff must establish that he has a disability or is

qualified as disabled by one of three ways: Plaintiff must

show that (1) he has a physical or mental impairment that

substantially limits one or more major life activity, or (2) a

10

record of such impairment, or (3) that Defendant regarded

him as having such an impairment. Sherrod v. American

Airlines, Inc., 132 F.3d 1112 (5" Cir. 1998). Plaintiff is only

required to satisfy one prong of this test but he can clearly

meet at least two.

First, Defendant regarded Mike Miller as disabled.

The evidence that Defendant regarded Plaintiff as being

disabled is powerful and overwhelming. As shown

previously, a reasonable jury could find - indeed would be

compelled to find - that the Plaintiff meets the definition of

disabled because Defendant Southwestern Bell regarded him

as disabled. It was only after Miller returned from a six week

disability leave, began to look tired after 10 hour days, and

Miller gave his restriction of being able to only work 50 hours

a week (in a mandatory 84 hour work week) that Defendant

began the process of dismissing Miller. Miller’s restriction of

only 10 hours overtime might not normally seem significant.

In the instant case, all Miller’s comparators were required to

work mandatory 12-hour day, seven day a week shifts. Miller

informed Defendant that on the day of the Golden Glade job

(less than three weeks after returning from disability leave)

that he had chest pains, needed to rest and take medication

that Defendant suspended and then fired Plaintiff for

something that Dale Dugas freely admits is policy (attributing

travel time and down time to certain jobs). Ms. Dugas admits

in page 85 of her deposition that other technicians have

arrived at a job site only to find the work already done, and

that they attribute travel time and inspection time to that job

and that these employees are not considered to be falsifying

records.

Mike Miller had a physical impairment that

substantially limited one of his major life activities, working.

A major life activity includes “caring for oneself, performing

11

manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing speaking breathing,

learning and working.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2. Plaintiff was

substantially limited because he was restricted as to the

duration under which he could perform that life activity,

working. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2. This is a substantial limitation

because out of an 84 hour work week, Miller could only work

50 - almost part time under the service emergency.

Put simply, Defendant may not fire Mike Miller

because it perceived him to be disabled regardless of whether _

Plaintiff asked for, or received, an accommodation (the

overtime restriction or the rest on September 21, 1998

because of the chest pains).

Mike Miller may have had no impairment at all but

Defendant treated him as having a substantial limiting

impairment. McInnis v. Alamo Community College Dist., 207

F.3d at 281. Miller clearly demonstrated to the District Court

that his impairments, as perceived by Defendant, were

substantially limiting.

Miller has shown this Court that he made a prima facie

case that he was discriminated against because he was

regarded as disabled and summary judgment at the District

Court level was not merited.

2. Defendant does not have a legitimate

busi gpm sag age

r r 24

work

Unfortunately, once the smoke clears, theré is nothing

left of this defense but a lingering and distasteful smell.

12

Defendant asserts in its motion and supporting

evidence that Defendant fired Plaintiff for violations of the

Code of Business Conduct, specifically that Plaintiff falsified

documents. Plaintiff did not falsify documents. Plaintiff

merely followed company policy with regard to keeping track

of his time.

As a service technician, Plaintiff was required to keep

time reports even though he did not charge actual funds for

jobs. The term “charging time” refers to the time reports, not

to actual billing of clients as no clients are actually billed.

When charging time, employees would begin charging time

to the new job as soon as they completed the old job.

Employees had discretion to charge time for travel, cleaning

the truck and gassing up the vehicle. For instance if Plaintiff

cleaned his truck in the afternoon and gassed it up he would

probably charge the time to the last job of the day even

though Plaintiff had not done any work on that specific job.

All service technicians were instructed as such. Dale Dugas

again agrees with Plaintiff as was evidenced during her

deposition.

Q. Okay. And there are situations from time to

time where a technician will get to a job and

then somebody has already done the work; is

that right? A. On occasions. Q. And they still

attribute the time to travel time and the getting

out and inspecting and checking to see if

there’s something wrong, correct? A. The

time—you’re talking about hours they report?

Q. Yes, ma’am. A. Yes. Q. And you wouldn’t

say they’re falsifying records, are you? A. As

far as the time, no.

Deposition of Dale Dugas, page 85.

13

When Defendant offers the general description of its

time keeping policies for service technicians, Plaintiff is in

compliance. Defendant can offer no evidence that Plaintiff did

not comply with its policies with regard to time keeping other

than the fact that Plaintiff may not actually have repaired the

job at Golden Glade. However, according to the time keeping

policy, Plaintiff is not required to repair the job. Dale Dugas

admitted in her deposition that many factors (i.e., travel,

cleaning the vehicle) go into record keeping. She even

admitted that the technicians had complete discretion as to

which job to attribute it to. Not only did Defendant not have

a legitimate reason to fire Plaintiff, according to Plaintiff's

own supervisor, Plaintiff followed the procedures to a “T”.

At the very least, the issue of whether Plaintiff complied with

company policy regarding time keeping is not a matter of law

but rather a matter of fact for the jury.

In paragraph 6.6 of Mike Miller’s Amended Original

Complaint, he asserted that he was retaliated against for

engaging in a protected activity. Defendant does not dispute

that Miller engaged in a protected activity by seeking

accommodations for his overtime restrictions. In fact, in its

Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendant failed to address

Plaintiff's retaliation claims and as such, at the very least, that

claim should have survived for trial before a jury. Mattern v.

Eastman Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 702 (5" Cir. 1997). As Miller

as shown, supra, he did exhaust his administrative remedies.

Plaintiff has shown this Court that he engaged in

protected activity (by requesting accommodations via

restrictions from his doctor) and that he suffered an adverse

employment action. Webb v. Cardiothoracic Surgery Ass'n.,

14

139 F.3d 532 (5" Cir. 1998). All that is left for Plaintiff to

show is that there was a causal connection between that

protected activity and the adverse employment action. /d.

In establishing the causal link between Plaintiff's

protected activity and Defendant’s adverse employment

action, Plaintiff must simply prove that either a discriminatory

reason more than likely than not motivated Defendant, or by

showing that the proffered legitimate reason is unworthy of

credence. McDaniel v. Temple Indep. Sch. Dist., 770 F.2d

1340 (5" Cir. 1985). The burden of proving the causal link is

much less stringent than proving that Plaintiff's protected

activity was the sole motivating factor for the Defendant’s

adverse employment action. Long v. Eastfield College, 88

F.3d 300(5" Cir. 1996).

The Fifth Circuit has held that the timing of the

protected activity and the bad event or adverse action can be

a significant factor. Mayberry v. Voight Aircraft Co., 55 F.3d

1086 (5 Cir. 1995). Miller engaged in the protected activity

of requesting accommodations by way of overtime restrictions

three weeks after coming back from major heart surgery.

Miller need not show the Court that the protected activity was

the sole motivating factor for the adverse action, but he must

show that “but for” the protected activity, he would not have

been subjected to the adverse employment action. Nowlin v.

Resolution Trust Corp., 33 F.3d 498 (5" Cir. 1994).

4. Inference of Retaliation

On June 12, 2000, the United States Supreme Court

issued its opinion in Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products,

Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000). Although Reeves is an age

discrimination case, the method of proof in an age

discrimination case is similar to the method of proof used in

15

a retaliation case arising under the ADA and therefore, a

review of Reeves will be helpful at bar. In Reeves, the

plaintiff successfully sued his employer for age discrimination

after he was terminated from his position as a hinge-

department supervisor in a toilet seat plant. He was 57 years

old at the time and had worked at the plant for 40 years. This

Court vacated the trial court verdict in Reeves’ favor holding

that Reeves did not offer enough proof of an illegal bias. The

Supreme Court overturned the decision because Reeves

introduced enough evidence to show discrimination based on

the prima facie case and evidence to show that the proffered

reason was false. The Supreme Court unanimously held that

a jury can, but is not required, to find intentional

discrimination from a plaintiff’ s prima facie case and evidence

that the proffered reason for terminating the plaintiff was

false.

IV

CONCLUSION

Michael Miller has shown this Court that at least one

if not two important federal questions of law should be, but

have not been decided by this Court and that compelling

reasons exist to do so. Michael Miller has met his prima facie

case of discrimination and retaliation and offered evidence to

rebut the “legitimate” ~ business reason offered by

Southwestern Bell Telephone Company for its actions toward

Michael Miller. Michael Miller respectfully requests that his

Petition for Writ of Certiorari be GRANTED.

Respectfully submitted,

ELLEN SPROVACH

Counsel of Record

Gregg M. Rosenberg & Associates

11 Greenway Plaza, Suite 2810

Houston, Texas 77046

(713) 960-8300

(713) 621-6670 (Facsimile)

of Counsel:

GREGG M. ROSENBERG & ASSOCIATES

ATTORNEYS FOR PETITIONER

17

APPENDIX A

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

' FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 01-21318

Summary Calendar

[riled October 7, 2002]

MICHAEL L. MILLER,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

SOUTHWESTERN BELL

TELEPHONE COMPANY,

Defendant-Appellee

Ne NN Nee Nee See”

Appeal from the United States — sirict Court

for the Southern District of Texas

No. H-00-1869 |

Before KING, Chief Judge, and WIENER and PARKER,

Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM:”

Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. KR.

47.5.4.

la

OPINION

Plaintiff-Appellant Michael L. Miller appeals from the

district court’s decision granting summary judgment to

Defendant-Appellee Southwestern Bell Telephone Company

(“SWBT”) on Miller’s claims for disability discrimination and

retaliation under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42

U.S.C. § 12101 (1994) (“the ADA”) For the reasons set

forth below, we AFFIRM the district court’s grant of

summary judgment to SWBT.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff-Appellant Miller is a fifty-three year-old male

who has been employed by SWBT since 1974. Miller began

his career at SWBT as a cable splicer’s helper and, by 1998,

had advanced within the company ranks to the position of

customer service technician, or “CST.” Also by 1998, Miller

had developed a condition called spondylolisthesis, which is

the displacement of vertebrae, as well as arthritis in both of

his knees. In addition to these maladies, Miller suffered from

a heart condition that required surgery in 1994,1996, and

1998.

While working at SWBT, Miller received disciplinary

action from his employer on several occasions. On January

11, 1993, SWBT suspended Miller for one day, with pay, for

shopping at an Academy Store during a period of time in

which he should have been working. In May 1997, SWBT

gave Miller a written reprimand for failing to allot the actual

amount of time he worked on his time report.

The record indicates that Miller’s case of

spondylolisthesis and arthritis of the knees did not impede his

ability to perform in his occupational capacity at SWBT. After

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Fifth Circuit Opinion - 10/7/02

undergoing heart surgery, Miller returned to his CST position

in September 1998. Following his return to work, Miller’s

physician provided Dale Dugas, Miller’s immediate

supervisor, a written note indicating the limitations of Miller’s

post-operation work schedule. According to physician’s

orders, Miller was permitted to work forty hours per week

plus ten hours of overtime without physical restriction, but

only under the condition that Miller received two consecutive

days off per week. When Miller initially returned to work,

Dugas scheduled Miller to work six days (excluding

Sundays), but altered the schedule to allow him to work no

longer than fifty hours with two consecutive days off per

week. Miller concedes that SWBT fully accommodated the

physician’s proposed work schedule.

On November 10, 1998, SWBT fired Miller for

misrepresenting his time reports because, according to SWBT,

he indicated on his reports that he performed work that he

never performed. SWBT eventually replaced Miller with a

fifty-six year-old male. Miller maintains that he did not falsify

his time report on September 21, 1998, but instead designated

the time taken for travel, cleaning, and gassing his vehicle, on

his time report.

On October 21, 1999, Miller filed a charge with the

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”),

claiming that he was discriminated against on account of his

age and disability. Miller received a right to sue letter from

the EEOC on April 20, 2000. Miller filed the instant action in

the United States District Court for the Southern District of

Texas on June 5, 2000, alleging, inter alia, (i) that SWBT

violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29

U.S.C. § 621 et seg. (1994) (“ADEA”) because age was a

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Fifth Circuit Opinion - 10/7/02

motivating factor and made a difference in the decision to

replace Miller with a person that was younger and less-

qualified; (2) that SWBT violated the ADA by discriminating

against and treating Miller in a light less favorable than its

non-disabled workers; (3) that SWBT retaliated against Miller

because he had informed SWBT of his disability and asserted

his rights under the ADA; (4) that SWBT acted intentionally

or with reckless disregard to cause Miller severe emotional

distress; and (5) that Miller violated the Fair Labor Standards

Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seg. (1994) (“FLSA”).

In response to Miller’s complaint, SWBT moved for

summary judgment on August 31, 2001, arguing (i) that

Miller’s ADA and ADEA claims should be dismissed because

he could not establish a prima facie case of discrimination; (2)

that SWBT had provided a legitimate, non-discriminatory

reason for dismissing Miller; and (3) that Miller could not

show that SWBT’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for

his dismissal was a pretext for discrimination. SWBT also

urged summary judgment on Miller’s infliction of emotional

distress claims, asserting that he could not provide evidence

of either severe emotional distress or intentional or reckless

conduct.

In its Memorandum and Order of October 22, 2001,

the district court awarded summary judgment in favor of

SWBT on all claims, finding that Miller had not demonstrated

a prima facie case of discrimination or retaliation under either

the ADA or the AEDA, and that he had failed to adduce

evidence of extreme and outrageous conduct supporting the

intentional infliction of emotional distress or FLSA claims.

The district court then dismissed Miller’s case with prejudice.

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Fifth Circuit Opinion - 10/7/02

Miller timely appeals the district court’s grant of

summary judgment on his disability discrimination and

retaliation claims under the ADA.’

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review the district court’s grant of summary

judgment to SWBT de novo, applying the same standards as

the district court. Rivers v. Cent. & S.W. Corp., 186 F.3d

681, 683 (Sth Cir. 1999). Summary judgment is appropriate

if no genuine issue of material fact exists, and the moving

party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See FED. R.

Civ. P. 56(c). A factual dispute is genuine when a reasonable

jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party.

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

The substantive law dictates which facts are material,

Stewart v. Murphy, 174 F.3d 530, 533 (Sth Cir. 1999), and

an issue is material if its resolution could affect the outcome

of the action, Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. Moreover, in

summary judgment proceedings, the record is considered in

the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Dupre v.

Charter Behav. Health Sys. of Lafayette, Inc., 242 F.3d 610,

613 (Sth Cir. 2001) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.

Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587-66 (1986). Summary

' This court need not address whether plaintiff raised a

genuine issue of material fact regarding his claims for

discrimination under the ADEA, infliction of emotional distress,

and violation of the FLSA. Miller waived review of these issues by

not incorporating them into the Argument of his Brief. See, e.g.,

Sherrod v. Am. Airlines, 132 F.3d 1112, 1119 n.5 (Sth Cir. 1998)

(citing cases and FED. R. APP. P. 28).

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Fifth Circuit Opinion - 10/7/02

judgment is ultimately appropriate if the non-movant fails to

establish facts supporting an essential element of his prima

facie claim. Mason v. United Air Lines, 274 F.3d 314, 316

(Sth Cir. 2001) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.

317, 322 (1986)).

III. MILLER’S ADA CLAIM BASED ON .

REGARDED DISABILITY

The ADA: prohibits discrimination by private

employers against any qualified individual with a disability.

See, e.g., Dupre, 242 F.3d at 613. When claiming

discrimination based on disability, a plaintiff must establish

that: (1) he was disabled; (2) he was none-the-less qualified to

do the job; (3) an adverse employment action was taken

against him; and (4) that he was replaced by or treated less

favorably than non-disabled employees. E.g., id. If a plaintiff

can assert a prima facie case for disability discrimination, the

burden shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, non-

discriminatory reason for the adverse employment action;

should the employer succeed in doing so, the burden the shifts

back to the plaintiff to establish that the articulated reason was

merely a pretext for discrimination. Mcinnis v. Alamo Cmty.

Coll. Dist., 207 F.3d 276, 282 (Sth Cir. 2000).

An individual qualifies as disabled under the ADA if

he demonstrates: (1) he has a physical or mental impairment

that substantially limited one or more of his major life

activities; (2) he has a record of such impairment; or (3) he is

regarded as having such an impairment. E.g., Aldrup v.

Caldera, 274 F.3d 282, 286 (Sth Cir. 2001); Mcinnis, 207

F.3d at 279-80.

Fifth Circuit Opinion - 10/7/02

When asserting a regarded disability, a plaintiff such

as Miller is required to demonstrate that his employer

mistakenly believed that either (1) he had a physical

impairment that substantially limited one or more major life

activities; or (2) he had an actual, non-limiting impairment

that substantially limits one or more major life activities.

Aldrup, 274 F.3d at 287 (citing Sutton v. United Air Lines,

527 U.S. 471, 489 (1999)). Under each of these scenarios, an

employer must “entertain some misperception regarding the

individual-either that he has a_ substantially limiting»

impairment that he does not have or the impairment is not so

limiting as believed.” /d.

On appeal, Miller insists that his employer regarded

him as suffering a physical impairment that substantially

limited a major life activity. Hence, the key inquiry is

whether SWBT mistakenly perceived that Miller had an

impairment that substantially limited his major life activity of

“working.”? The Supreme Court recently reemphasized that

2 Miller does not argue that SWBT had the mistaken

perception that he had a substantial, non-limiting impairment.

3 The Supreme Court has defined major life activity as

those activities that are “of central importance to daily life.” Toyota

Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 122 S. Ct. 681,

691 (2002). Examples of major life activities include speaking,

breathing, learning, and working. E.g., Aldrup, 274 F.3d at 286.

Throughout this litigation, Miller has asserted only that his major

life activity of working has been implicated. Had Miller. asserted

another major life activity, the analysis on substantial limitation

would be drastically different. Williams, 122 S. Ct. at 693. (“Sutton

did not suggest that a class-based analysis should be applied to any

major life activity other than working.”).

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Fifth Circuit Opinion - 10/7/02

when working is the major life activity under consideration,

the statutory phrase “substantially limits” requires a plaintiff

to allege that he was unable to work in a broad range or class

of jobs, rather than one specific job. Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky.,

Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, - - -, 122 S. Ct. 681, 692

(2002) (quoting Sutton, 527 U.S. at 491). Combining the

relevant analytical criteria yields the following standard,

which is directly applicable to the instant case: To

demonstrate that SWBT regarded him as disabled, Miller must

produce evidence that SWBT mistakenly believed that he had

an impairment that made him unable to work in a broad class

or range of jobs, as opposed to one specific job.

In granting summary judgment to SWBT, the district

court determined that Miller had not met the requirements for

being regarded as having a disability. The trial court found

that Miller had not offered sufficient evidence to raise any

inference that SWBT believed that Miller’s Impairments

would substantially limit him in the major life activity of

working. This precluded Miller from successfully asserting

his prima facie case for disability discrimination. The court

also concluded that even had Miller established a prima facie

case, he still would not have been able to advance a viable

claim that SWBT’s legitimate, non-discriminatory reason was

a mere pretext for discrimination. We find it unnecessary to

discuss whether SWBT’s proffered reason was

nondiscriminatory because it is quite clear that Miller did not

fulfill his initial burden of meeting his prima facie case for

disability discrimination.

Miller asserts that he can fulfill his summary judgment

burden by demonstrating that SWBT did regard him as being

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disabled prior to his termination.‘ He offers the following

arguments for consideration: that it was only after he returned

from six-week disability leave that SWBT began the process

of dismissing him; that he was substantially limited because

he was restricted as to the duration he could work under the

physician’s orders, and his work schedule was thus cut from

eighty-four hours per week to fifty; and that three weeks afer

his return from disability leave, upon his request for rest and

medication, he was suspended and then fired.

On the other hand, SWBT contends that the summary

judgment evidence established that SWBT did not regard

Miller as having an impairment that substantially limited a

major life activity. SWBT also asserts that an employer

should not be held liable under the ADA for “regarding” an

individual with having a disability where the employer merely

relies upon restrictions placed upon the employee by the

* In his Brief, Miller asserts that he can “clearly meet at

least two” of the factors, i.e., that he had a substantially limiting

physical impairment (actually disabled) and that he was regarded as

such, that would qualify him as disabled. However, he offers no

real support for this contention. The district court recognized that

Miller did not contend that he was actually disabled, but only that

SWBT regarded him as disabled, and therefore did not rule on the

actual disability. Further, on appeal, Miller states that he “may

have had no impairment at all but Defendant treated him as having

a substantial limiting impairment.” Given this statement, it appears

that Miller is not taking his claim of actual disability very seriously;

but in the unlikely circumstance that he were, this argument cannot

be asserted for the first time on appeal since Miller’s initial

argument on the issue was insufficient for the district court to rule

on it. See, e.g., Brown v. Ames, 201 F.3d 654, 663 (Sth Cir.

2000).

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Fifth Circuit Opinion - 10/7/02

employer. It argues further that Miller was allowed to work

as a fully functioning CST without any restrictions beyond

those prescribed by his doctor

Viewing any factual disputes in the light most

favorable to the nonmoving party, we will assume that all of

Miller’s allegations are true. However, even in the light most

favorable to him, Miller’s contentions fall short of raising a

genuine issue of fact. Initially, Miller fails to adduce evidence

to support a claim that SWBT believed that he was unable to

participate in a broad range of jobs. He does not even appear

to introduce evidence that SWBT believed that he was unable

to participate in one specific job, as he was allowed to

continue working as a CST subsequent to his return from

disability leave. Moreover, Miller’s supervisor Dugas testified

that it was his understanding that Miller had difficulty with his

knees if he squatted for too long and his back hurtifhe sat for _

long periods of time. Miller does not dispute the additional

testimony in which Dugas indicated that these kinds of

complaints were not unusual from members on his crew, and

therefore he did not perceive these physical ailments as

significantly limiting.

The fact that Miller was terminated weeks after his

return and that he was suspended after his request for rest and

medication does not sufficiently establish that SWBT believed

that he was unable to work a broad range of jobs. While his

termination may (merely in a circumstantial sense) indicate

that SWBT believed that he was unable to be employed as a

CST, this .... does not sufficiently raise a genuine issue as to

whether SWBT believed that Miller was unable to work in a

range of occupational positions. See Dupre, 242 F.3d at 616

(denying plaintiff's regarded disability claim even though

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defendant fired plaintiff because “an employer does not

necessarily regard an employee as having a substantially

limiting impairment simply because it believes the employee

is incapable of performing a particular job”).

Miller’s assertion that he suffered a substantial

limitation on his ability to work because instead of laboring

for his usual eighty-four hour week, he had to work fifty, is

equally problematic. When evaluating the traditional forty-

hour work week, courts have determined that the inability to

work overtime is not a substantial limitation on the ability to

work under the ADA. E.g., Cotter v. Ajilon Servs., Inc., 287

F.3d 593, 598-99 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing cases); see also

Brennan v. Nat’! Tel. Directory Corp., 850 F. Supp. 331, 343

(E.D. Pa. 1994) (“The inability to work overtime hardly

makes a plaintiff handicapped.”). In addition, this argument

does not address the critical issue of whether Méiller’s

supervisors regarded him as being unable to work a broad

range of jobs. Indeed, the uncontroverted evidence indicates

that Miller’s supervisor believed that he could and would,

despite his physician’s directions, exceed his allotted work

time.

Further, SWBT cannot be considered tc have regarded

Miller as being disabled simply because of its receipt of the

note from Miller’s physician. Significantly, Miller forgets that

the standard for regarded disability hinges on the mistaken

belief of impairment. “[I]f the employer’s belief [about the

employee’s condition] corresponds to the employee’s or his

physician’s description of his limitations, the employer cannot

be viewed as improperly regarding him as disabled.” Eber v.

Harris County Hosp. Dist., 130 F. Supp. 2d 847, 863 (S.D.

Tex. 2001). Even assuming arguendo that this evidence

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Fifth Circuit Opinion - 10/7/02

satisfactorily raises the issue of SWBT’s belief of his

impairment, Miller’s introduction of the doctor’s note is

ultimately counterproductive to his cause because it suggests

hat SWBT was correct, i.e., not mistaken, to assume some

sort of impairment.

Because Miller has not demonstrated that SWBT

regarded his physical condition to substantially limit his

ability to perform the major life activity of working during his

tenure at SWBT, a reasonable jury could not find that he was

qualifiedly disabled. Miller’s failure to introduce facts

supporting this essential element of his prima facie claim of

disability discrimination indicates that the trial court acted

properly in granting summary judgment to SWBT on Miller’s

claim of disability discrimination.

IV. MILLER’S CLAIMS BASED ON RETALIATION

Miller also asserts that he suffered unlawful retaliation

for participating in an act protected by the ADA. On this

claim, we find it important to delve into issues that are more

procedural in nature than those discussed by the district court.

SWBT has asserted both at the trial level and on appeal that

bliller failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as to his —

claim for retaliation. Throughout the course of this litigation,

Miller, for reasons unknown to this court, has completely

disregarded this line of argument. Miller’s failure to articulate

some modicum of rebuttal argument on this point proves

injurious to his cause, as the failure to exhaust administrative

remedies serves as an independent basis to affirm summary

judgment. See Randel v. United States Dep’t of Navy, 157

F.3d 392, 395 (Sth Cir. 1998) (stating that a plaintiff asserting

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Fifth Circuit Opinion - 10/7/02

racial discrimination must exhaust his administrative remedies

on the claim before seeking review in federal court).

The trial court did not rule on this issue, instead opting

to evaluate the substantive requirements of Miller’s retaliation

claims, concluding eventually that he failed to raise a genuine

issue of material fact on one element of his prima facie case.

Since we conclude that the district court lacked jurisdiction to

consider Miller’s retaliation claim on the merits, we need not

address the merits.

The jurisdictional problem here relates to the fact that

in the charge Miller filed with the EEOC, he did not check

the box corresponding with “retaliation,” but did so for “age”

and “disability.” From a procedural standpoint, SWBT

argues, Miller only properly raised allegations of intentional

discrimination under the ADA and the ADEA. Citing a

number of cases, SWBT asserts that because the alleged

retaliation in the instant case occurred before Miller filed the

initial EEOC charge, Miller should have exhausted his

administrative remedies on that claim prior to filing.

Given this argument, directly at issue is whether

Miller’s failure to fill in the appropriate box for retaliation,

when he already marked the box for disability and age

discrimination, compels the conclusion that he failed to

exhaust his administrative remedies before filing a lawsuit

under the ADA. A review of this case using the same

standards as the lower court produces the same exact

outcome, but on a dissimilar basis: Summary judgment is

appropriate because Miller failed to exhaust his administrative

remedies on his claim for retaliation.

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Fifth Circuit Opinion - 10/7/02

There are several reasons why we believe this the

correct outcome in this matter. First, the federal anti-

discrimination statutes, most notably, Title VII have

consistently required claimants to fill in the appropriate

corresponding boxes when filing their claim for unlawful

employment action. See, e.g., Price v. Harrah’s Md, Heights

Operating Co., 117 F. Supp. 2d 919, 921-22 (E.D. Mo.

2000) (granting summary judgment on failure to exhaust

administrative remedies grounds for employer because

plaintiff did not check the box for retaliation and did not

specifically allege retaliation in the text of the charge);

McCray v. DPC Indus., Inc., 942 F. Supp. 288, 294 (E.D.

Tex. 1996) (informing that when asserting a claim for

discrimination under Title VII, it is necessary for the

appropriate box be checked in the EEOC claim).° By simply

checking the box corresponding to the alleged basis for

unlawful employment action, a plaintiff sufficiently exhausts

his administrative remedies prior to a Title VII lawsuit. See,

€.g., id.

° It is well-established that summary judgment may be

granted against a non-movant solely on the basis of failure to

exhaust administrative remedies. E.g., Inst. for Tech. Dev. v.

Brown, 63 F.3d 445, 447 (Sth Cir. 1995). The Supreme Court has

held that a plaintiff may not bring claims in a lawsuit that were not

included in the filed EEOC charge. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver

_ Co., 415 U.S. 36, 47 (1974). This requirement serves to enhance

the administrative enforcement process by ensuring that the EEOC

can conduct a full investigation while also providing the employer

with advanced notice of the claim and an opportunity to resolve the

dispute. See Harper v. Godfrey Co., 45 F.3d 143, 148 (7th Cir.

1995).

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Fifth Circuit Opinion - 10/7/02

Second, the same procedural requirements for Title

VII have been interpreted to apply to EEOC charges filed

under the ADA as well. This court has also held that the ADA

incorporates by reference the administrative procedural

requisites found in Title VII, Dao v. Auchan Hypermarket, 96

F.3d 787, 789 (Sth Cir. 1996), and that adherence to these

prerequisites is necessary: prior to commencing an ADA

action in federal court against an employer, id.Although this

court has not addressed the issue of whether an ADA case cab

be dismissed for failure to fill in the appropriate box, other

courts encountering this issue support the granting of

summary judgment. See, e.g., Talbot v. U.S. Foodservice,

Inc., 191 F. Supp. 2d 637, 640 (D. Md. 2002) (“Where a

litigant has neither checked the box for discrimination, nor

mentioned disability discrimination or the ADA anywhere in

his charge of discrimination, the EEOC cannot reasonably

have been expected to have investigated disability

discrimination.”); cases cited infra. Hence, the “box filling”

requirement cited by SWBT appears to arise in the ADA

context as well as the Title VII context.

Third, one of our sister circuits has indicated that in

the ADA context, a plaintiff's failure to fill in the appropriate

box in the filed charge, coupled with the inability to describe

the general nature of the claim in the narrative section of the

charge, forms a sufficient basis for summary judgment. The

Seventh Circuit decided that when a plaintiff fails to mark the

appropriate box for “retaliation” but continues to seek relief

for disability discrimination and retaliation, the plaintiff has

nevertheless failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as

to the retaliation claim. Cable v. Ivy Tech State College, 200

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F.3d 467, 477 (7th Cir. 1999).° The Cable court observed that

the body of the plaintiff's EEOC charge did not even “hint at

retaliation, much less develop [a] factual basis for the claim.”

Id. Even when viewed in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff, the statement of discrimination did not implicate the

behavior that plaintiff asserted to be the basis of his retaliation

claim. Jd. The Seventh Circuit deemed the plaintiff's narrative

to have given insufficient indication to the EEOC or the

employer that he was also seeking redress for unlawful

retaliation. Jd.

In affirming summary judgment on plaintiff's

retaliation claim, the Cable court found that there was no

indication from the EEOC charge boxes, narrative, or

supplemental material that the plaintiff sought redress for the

retaliation claim, or even, for the matter, that the alleged

retaliation “was like or reasonably related to” his statutory

rights stemming from the ADA. Id.; see also Thompson v. KN

Energy, Inc., 177 F. Supp. 2d 1238, 1254-55 (D. Kan.

2001)(granting summary judgment against plaintiff for failing

to exhaust administrative remedies under the ADA when

marked boxes for “sex” and “disability” but not

“retaliation”). The similarity between Cable and the instant —

case is marked, particularly with the absence of narrative or

other supplemental EEOC materials indicating that Miller was

seeking redress for unlawful retaliation, The information, or

® In his EEOC charge, Cable checked the “Other” box

only, but did not write in the narrative portion of the claim that he

was discriminated against on the basis of his disability.

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Fifth Circuit Opinion - 10/7/02

lack thereof,’ included on Miller’s filed EEOC charge creates

a strong presumption in favor of a finding of failure to

exhaust administrative remedies.

Further compounding the difficulty for Miller is the

timing of the alleged retaliation and his filing of the

complaint. Miller would be able to file a supplemental or

additional charge if the retaliation claim, in the parlance of

this court, “grow[s] out” of his claims for disability. Gupta v.

E. Tex. State Univ., 654 F.2d 411, 414 (Sth Cir. Unit A Aug.

1981). SWBT is correct to emphasize that the alleged adverse

employment action prompting Miller’s claim for retaliation

occurred prior to the filing of his discrimination charge. Since

7 The entirety of Miller’s narrative reads as follows:

I. On or about November 10, 1998, I was discharged

from the position of Customer Services

Technician. Respondent is public telephone

system.

Il. On or about November 10, 1998, Ernie Carey,

Division Manager, Installation and Repair,

informed me that I was discharged for allegedly

falsifying a time report and a form called 6218,

trouble ticket.

Il. I believe that I was discriminated against because

of my age, 48, in violation of the Age

Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967.

Worth noting is that there was no continuation sheet for this

narrative filed, nor a supplemental document of any kind in the trial

record.

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the alleged retaliation occurred prior to his filing of the

complaint, Miller was well aware of the conduct and actions

that would give rise to his claim of retaliation under the ADA.

Given these factual circumstances, Miller’s retaliation cause

of action would not fall under the Gupta exception; thus he is

precluded from filing a new EEOC charge based on disability.

See id.

Despite the trial court’s disregard of this issue, SWBT

persisted in its failure to exhaust administrative remedies

argument. This court concludes that because Miller did not

check the check the correct box on the EEOC complaint form

or otherwise disclose his retaliation claim and thereby exhaust

its administrative remedies, he is procedurally precluded from

asserting a retaliation claim under the ADA.

V.CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment

of the district court.

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APPENDIX B

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

HOUSTON DIVISION

CIVIL ACTION NO. H-00-1869

[Filed November 20, 2001]

MICHAEL L. MILLER,

Plaintiff,

V.

SOUTHWESTERN BELL

TELEPHONE CO.,

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

Defendant. )

)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Plaintiff Michael Miller (“Miller”) moves for

Rehearing and Reconsideration of Summary Judgment (Entry

#36) entered on behalf of Defendant. See Final Judgment

(Entry #35). Miller maintains that entry of Judgment in favor

of Defendant Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. (“ SWBT”)

was improper, as genuine issues of material fact were

presented indicating that SWBT discriminated against Miller

because he was regarded as disabled; and, that SWBT

retaliated against Miller. See Plaintiff's Motion for Rehearing

and Reconsideration (Entry #36). The Court, having reviewed

19a

the motion, finds that it lacks merit, as it fails to persuade that

the Court erred in finding that Miller failed to show that

genuine issues of material fact existed because among other

things, he did not demonstrate that his impairments were

perceived, by SWBT, as substantially limiting, see McGinnis

v. Alamo Community College Dist., 207 F.3d 276, 281

(S"Cir. 2000); Deas v. River West, L.P., 152 F.3d 471,476

n.10 (5 Cir. 1998); or, that Miller suffered an adverse

employment action causally connected to a protected activity

and, therefore, suffered retaliation. See McKennon v.

Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 513 U.S. 352, 359-60

(1995); Chaney v. New Orleans Public Facility Management,

179 F.3d 164, 168 (5" Cir. 1999). It is, therefore,

ORDERED that Miller’s Motion for Reconsideration

and Rehearing (Entry #36) is DENIED.

The Clerk of Court shall file this Memorandum and

Order and provide the parties a true copy.

SIGNED at Houston, Texas, on this the 19" day of

November, 2001.

/s/

Calvin Botley

| United States Magistrate Judge

20a

APPENDIX C

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

HOUSTON DIVISION |

CIVIL ACTION NO. H-00-1869

[Filed October 24, 2001]

MICHAEL L. MILLER,

Plaintiff,

V.

SOUTHWESTERN BELL

TELEPHONE CoO.,

Defendant.

Ne eee eee ee ee”

FINAL JUDGMENT

Following this Court’s review of this matter, as recited

in the Memorandum and Order (Entry #31) and for the

reasons set forth therein, it is

ORDERED that Defendant Southwestern Bell

Telephone Co.’s (“SWBT”) Motion for Summary Judgment

(Entry #24) is GRANTED. Further, it is

2la

ORDERED that summary judgment is entered in

SWBT’s favor and this matter is DISMISSED with prejudice

from the dockets of this Court.

The Clerk of Court shall file this Final Judgment and

provide the parties with a true copy.

SIGNED at Houston, Texas, on this the 22nd day of

October, 2001.

/s/

Calvin Botley

United States Magistrate Judge

22a

APPENDIX D

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

HOUSTON DIVISION

CIVIL ACTION NO. H-00-1869

[Filed October 24, 2001]

MICHAEL L. MILLER,

Plaintiff,

V.

SOUTHWESTERN BELL

TELEPHONE Co.,

Defendant.

i A i a a a

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Defendant Southwestern Bell Telephone Company

(“SWBT”) moves, pursuant to Rule 56(c), Fed. R. Cir, P.,

for summary dismissal of Plaintiff Michael L. Miller’s

(“Miller”) employment discrimination lawsuit, in which

Miller alleges that SWBT is culpable for intentional infliction

of emotional distress, retaliation and violations of the ©

Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) at 42 U.S.C. §

12102,*et seq., the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29

U.S.C. § 216, et seq., and the Age Discrimination in

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Employment Act (“ADEA”) at 29 U.S.C.§ 621, ef seq. See

Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Entry #24) and

Reply to Plaintiff's Response to Motion for Summary

Judgment (Entry #30). SWBT maintains that Miller has failed

to establish a prima facie case of age or disability

discrimination and has no viable claims for retaliation or

FLSA violations. See id. Miller contends that summary

judgment would be improper as SWBT’s attempts to articulate

legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for terminating his

employment are a mere pretext for its actual discriminatory

motives and, accordingly, requests that Defendant’s Motion

for Summary Judgment (Entry #24) be denied. See Plaintiff's

Response to Motion for Summary Judgment (Entries #25 and

#27).

BACKGROUND

Miller, a fifty-three (53) year old male, began working

for SWBT as a cable splicer’s helper in March of 1974. By

1998, Miller had advanced with the company to the position

of customer service technician (“cst”) and developed

spondylolisthesis,” arthritis in both knees and a heart

condition, requiring surgery in 1994, 1996 and 1998. See

Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint (Entry #17); affidavit of .

Miller (Entry #27). On January 11, 1993, Miller was

! Michael L. Miller’s affidavit in support of his Response

to Motion for Summary Judgment (Entry #25) was submitted and

filed as Entry #27, but on occasion may be referred to herein as if

it were incorporated with the Response to Motion for Summary

Judgment, as Entry #25.

2 the displacement of a vertebrae.

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suspended from work one day, with pay, for shopping at an

Academy Store during a period of time he was to be working.

-See Miller deposition at p. 56, Exhibit B, Defendant’s Motion

for Summary Judgment (Entry #24). In May of 1997, Miller

was given a written reprimand for failing to allot the actual

amount of time he worked on his time report. See affidavit of

Dale Dugas at para. 9, Exhibit C, Defendant’s Motion for

Summary Judgment (Entry #24).

Miller’s spondylolisthesis and arthritis of the knees did

not impede his ability to perform his job at SWBT. See

deposition of Miller at pp. 146-147, Exhibit B, Defendant's

Motion for Summary Judgment (Entry #24). In September of

1998, however, Miller returned to his cst position at SWBT,

after undergoing heart surgery. See deposition of Dale Dugas

at pp. 98-99, Exhibit B, Plaintiff's Response to Motion for

Summary Judgment (Entry #25); affidavit of Dale Dugas at

para. 3, Exhibit C, Defendant’s Motion for Summary

Judgment (Entry #24). Following his return to work, Miller’s

physician provided Dale Dugas (“Dugas”), Miller’s

immediate supervisor, a written note indicating that Miller

was able to work fifty hours per week (including ten hours of

overtime) with no physical restrictions, if Miller was allowed

two consecutive days off. See affidavit of Miller at para. 4

(Entry #27). During a service emergency that followed shortly

thereafter, Miller requested that he be allowed to work

Sunday thru Friday, having Friday and Saturday off, rather

than the customary twelve hour shifts, seven days per week

that csts were required to work during emergencies. See

affidavit of Miller at para. 5-6 (Entry #27). SWBT surmises

that Miller sought to work on Sundays because that was a pay

differential day, mandating pay at overtime computations. See

affidavit of Dale Dugas, Exhibit C, Motion for Summary

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District Court Memorandum and Order - 10/24/01

Judgment (Entry #24). Initially, Dugas scheduled Miller to

work six days (excluding Sundays) per week, but altered the

schedule allowing him to work no longer than fifty hours per

week with two consecutive days off. See deposition of Miller

at pp. 149-150, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment

(Entry #24). Miller concedes SWBT fully accommodated his

physician’s request to limit his work schedule to more than

fifty hours (including ten hours overtime) with two

consecutive days off.’

Miller was fired by SWBT on November 10, 1998, for

indicating on time reports that he performed work (i.e., drop :

cut - two pair) that he did not perform. See affidavit of Dugas ;

at paras. 5-8, Exhibit C, Defendant's Motion for Summary é

Judgment (Entry #24); affidavit of David M. Mehaffey

(“Mehaffey”), id. at Exhibit D; see also written and

mechanized time reports at pp. 135-136, 141-148, attached to

affidavit of Claire Milliken (“Milliken”), SWBT Senior

Human Resources Manager, Exhibit E, Defendant’s Motion

for Summary Judgment (Entry #24). SWBT replaced Miller

with a fifty-six (56) year old male. See affidavit of Dugas at

para. 11, Exhibit C, Defendant's Motion for Summary

Judgment (Entry #24). Miller maintains that he did not falsify

his time report on September 21, 1998, but attributed the time -

taken for travel, cleaning and gassing his vehicle, to his time

3 Miller does not appear to urge that SWBT did not

comply with his physician’s suggested limitations of his work, but

rather is contending that SWBT’s refusal to allow him to work on

Sundays like the other technicians, was discriminatory. See Miller’s

deposition at pp. 149-150, Defendant's Motion for Summary

Judgment (Entry #24); see also Miller’s affidavit, para. 6, Entry

#27.

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District Court Memorandum and Order - 10/24/01

report. See affidavit of Miller at para. 10, Entry #27. On

October 21, 1999, Miller filed a charge with the Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission, contending that he

was discriminated against because of his age and disability.

See EEOC Charge at p. 3, Exhibit I, Defendant’s Motion for

Summary Judgment (Entry #24). Miller received his right to

sue letter from the EEOC on April 20, 2000. See id. at p. 2.

On June 5, 2000, Miller filed his lawsuit, invoking the

Court’s jurisdiction, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1331.‘

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Motion for Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is proper if there is no genuine

dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled

to judgment as a matter of law. See Celotex Corp v. Catrett,

477 U.S. 317,322 (1986); see also Fed. R. Cir. P. 56(c). A

factual dispute is “genuine” when a reasonable jury could

return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); see also PYCA

Industries, Inc. v. Harrison County Waste Water Management

District, 177 F.3d 351,361 (Sth Cir. 1999). The substantive

law dictates which facts are material. See Stewart v. Murphy,

-174 F.3d 530, 533 (Sth Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 906

(1999); Duplantis v. Shell Offshore, Inc., 948 F.2d 187, 189

(Sth Cir. 1991). An issue is material if its resolution could

affect the outcome of the action. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby

‘ The parties consented to trial before a magistrate judge,

in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636, the Cost and Delay Reduction

Plan under the Civil Justice Reform Act and Rule 72, Fed.R. Cir.

P. See Consent (Entry #16)

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District Court Memorandum and Order - 10/24/01

Inc., 477 U.S. at 248. Facts may be gleaned from reviewing

the pleadings, answers to interrogatories, admissions and

affidavits on File. See Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d

1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994)(en banc). In deciding whether a

fact issue has been created, the facts and any inferences to be

drawn from them, must be viewed in the light most favorable

to the nonmoving party, and questions of law are reviewed de

novo. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods. Inc., 530

U.S. 133,, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 2110 (2000); Merritt-Carnpbell,

Inc. v. RxP Prods. Inc., 164 F.3d 957,961 (Sth Cir. 1999);

Horton v. City of Houston, 179 F.3d 188, 191 (Sth Cir.

1999). If the summary judgment motion is properly

supported, the nonmovant may not rest on mere allegations or

denials, but must set forth specific and supported material

facts, of significant probative value, establishing that there

exists a genuine issue of material fact. See Matsushita Elec.

Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,586 (1986);

Hamilton v. Seque Software Inc., 232 F.3d 473, 477 (Sth Cir.

2000); Union Planters National Leasing Inc. v. Woods, 687

F.2d 117, 119 (Sth Cir. 1992).

DISCUSSION

I. The Fair Labor Standards Claim

Miller does not dispute SWBT’s claim that he has

failed to state a viable claim in alleging that SWBT has

violated the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) by

terminating his employment with the company. Despite

Miller’s allegation that SWBT is culpable for FLSA

violations, Miller now contends that he is not asserting such

claims. See First Amended Complaint, para. 1.3 (Entry #17);

but contra. Plaintiff's Response to Motion for Summary

28a

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ARERR ATO

DRESS OL IE LE ANIC ert

District Court Memorandum and Order - 10/24/01

Judgment (Entry #25) at p. 1. Miller has failed to satisfy his

burden of proving the FLSA violations, as plead. Samson v.

Apollo Resources, Inc., 242 F.3d 629, 636 (Sth Cir. 2001).

It is, therefore, determined that there is no genuine dispute as

to any material fact with respect to Miller’s allegation of

FLSA violations and, accordingly, summary judgment as to

this claim is proper.

II. The Discriminatiou Claims :

A. Alleged Violations of the Americans With Disabilities Act

(ADA)

The Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”)

prohibits discrimination to ensure that individuals are not

denied jobs or other benefits because of the prejudiced

attitudes or the ignorance of others toward individuals

perceived to be disabled. See Deas v. River West, L.P., 152

F.3d 471,482 (5th Cir. 1998), quoting School Bd. of Nassau

County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 107 S.Ct. 1123, 1129

(1987). Miller maintains that he was terminated by SWBT,

despite the fact that SWBT regarded him as disabled and that

SWBT’s conduct was in violation of the Americans with

Disabilities Act. See Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint

(Entry #17). SWBT seeks summary judgment, contending that

Miller had no disability, was not terminated because of any

disability and, accordingly, can make no prima facie case of

discrimination under the ADA. Further, SWBT maintains that

its belief that Miller falsified time reports, in violation of its

Code of Business- Conduct, applicable to all SWBT

employees, provided SWBT with a_ legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason for firing Miller, for which Miller

is unable to establish pretext. See Defendant’s Motion for

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District Court Memorandum and Order - 10/24/01

Summary Judgment (Entry #24) and Reply to Plaintiff’ s

Response to Motion for Summary Judgment (Entry #30); see

also affidavit of Milliken at paras. 2-3, Exhibit E,

Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Entry #24).

(i) The Prima Facie Case

To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under

the ADA, Miller must demonstrate that 1) he is disabled or is

regarded as disabled; 2) that he is qualified for the job; 3) that

he was subjected to an adverse employment action on account

of his disability or perceived disability; and 4) that he was

replaced by or treateded less favorably than non-disabled

employees. See McInnis v. Alamo Community College Dist.,

207 F.3d 276, 279-280 (Sth Cir. 2000); Burch v. Coca-Cola

Co., 119 F.3d 305, 320 (Sth Cir. 1997), cert. denied 522

U.S. 1084 (1998). If Miller is able to establish a prima facie

case, the burden shifts to SWBT to articulate a legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action;

and, if successful, the burden then shifts back to Miller to

establish by sufficient evidence that the articulated reason was

merely a pretext for unlawful discrimination. See id., citing

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).

Miller must first establish that he is disabled or, was regarded

by SWBT as being disabled. See McInnis v. Aiamo

Community College Dist., id at 280; Sherrod v. American

Airlines, Inc., 132 F.3d 1112, 1119 (Sth Cir. 1998), quoting

Bridges v. City of Bossier, 92 F.3d 329, 332 (Sth cir. 1996),

cert. denied, _ U.S. _, 117 S.Ct. 770 (1997).

The ADA defines the term “qualified individual with

a disability” as someone who has a disability, but who, “with

or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the

30a

6 LPL EIN I RR oy ape

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RARE edad icra

District Court Memorandum and Order - 10/24/01

essential functions of the employment position that such

individual holds or desires.” 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8); Giles v.

General Elec. Co., 245 F.3d 474,483 (Sth Cir. 2001). SWBT

does not dispute that Miller was qualified for his position or

that he suffered a negative employment action when

terminated. See Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment

(Entry #24). SWBT, however, denies that Miller was disabled

or regarded as disabled, and that if Miller were to be found

disabled, that the disability in anyway was a factor in his

termination. Jd. The ADA definition of “disability,” with

respect to an individual, means

(A) a physical or mental impairment that

substantially limits one or more of the major

life activities of such individual;

(B) a record of such an impairment, or

(C) being regarded as having such an

impairment.

42 U.S.C. § 12102(2); see also Albertsons, Inc. v.

Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. _, 119 S.Ct. 2162, 2167 (1999).

SWBT does not dispute that Miller’s back condition

(spondylolisthesis), arthritis of the knees and heart condition

constituted physical impairments, i.e., “a condition affecting

one or more of the ... body systems...” See Albertsons, Inc.

v. Kirkingburg, id.; 29 C.F.R § 1630.2(h)(1). SWBT

maintains, however, that Miller’s impairments do not

substantially limit one or more of his major life activities and,

accordingly, fail to rise to the level of “disabilities.”

Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Entry #24).

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District Court Memorandum and Order - I 0/24/01

SWBT points out that Miller returned from his heart surgery,

in September of 1998, with no restrictions on his physical

abilities to perform work, but merely with some limitations as

to the overtime his physician recommended he perform. See

id, deposition of Miller at pp. 136-140, 169, Exhibit B.

Furthermore, SWBT argues that Miller concedes that his

physical impairments did not limit his ability to perform his

job, see id. at pp. 138-140, 146-47; and, that in seeking a

transfer to a technician’s position in February of 1998, Miller

indicated on the Job Vacancy Request, that he was not

disabled and required no accommodations. See Job Vacancy

Request, Exhibit F-3, Defendant’s Motion for Summary

Judgment (Entry #24). Miller maintains, in rebuttal, that

although he had no physical impairment that substantially

limited one or more of his major life activities, he was

regarded by SWBT as having such an impairment, and that

this is evidenced by Dugas’ acknowledgment that Miller

returned from ‘disability leave’ in September of 1998, and

that Dugas noticed Miller would tire when putting in overtime

hours. See Plaintiff's Response to Motion for Summary

Judgment at at pp. 7-9 (Entry #25); see also affidavit of Dale

Dugas at paras. 3-4, Exhibit C, Defendant’s Motion for

Summary Judgment (Entry #24).

“A major life activity” includes “caring for oneself,

performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking,

breathing, learning, and working.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2. The

regulation further provides that an individual is “substantially

limited” in a major life activity if he is:

(i) [uJnable to perform a major life

activity that the average person in the

general population can perform; or

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District Court Memorandum and Order - 10/24/01

(ii) — [s]ignificantly restricted as to the

condition, manner, or duration under

which an individual can perform a

particular major life activity as

compared to the condition, manner, or

duration under which the average

person in the general population can

perform that same major life activity.

29 C.F.R. § 1630.2

Miller is not arguing that he was actually disabled but, merely

regarded as disabled by SWBT. See Plaintiff's Response to

Motion for Summary Judgment at pp. 7-9 (Entry #25). To

determine, in this instance, whether Miller was regarded as

having a disability by SWBT, Miller has the burden of

establishing that he 1) has a physical or mental impairment

that does not substantially limit major life activities, but was

treated as such by SWBT; 2) has a physical or mental

impairment that substantially limits one or more major life

activities, but only because of the attitudes of others toward

the impairment; or 3) has no actual impairment at all, but be

treated by an employer as having a substantially limiting

impairment. See McGinnis v. Alamo Community College

Dist., 207 F.3d at 281. Further, Miller must demonstrate that

his impairments, if they existed as perceived, would be

substantially limiting. See id.; Deas v. River West, L.P., 152

F.3d at 476 (Sth Cir. 1998).

Miller has adduced evidence indicating that he was off

of work from July thru September, 1998, following an alcohol

septal reduction surgical procedure to correct a physical

impairment of his heart. See Exhibit A-3, Plaintiff's Response

to Motion for Summary Judgment (Entry #25). Further, the

33a

District Court Memorandum and Order - 10/24/01

deposition testimony of Dale Dugas indicates that as his direct

supervisor she was aware of Miller’s heart impairment and

that he had some difficulty with his knees and back. See id.,

pp. 12-14, deposition of Dugas, Exhibit B. Miller, however,

has not offered sufficient evidence to raise any inference that

SWBT believed that Miller, because of his impairments,

either singly or cumulatively, was either unable to perform a

major life activity expected of the average person, or that he

was significantly restricted as to the manner in which he could

perform a major life activity. In other words, Miller has failed

to demonstrate that his impairments, as perceived by SWBT,

would be substantially limiting. Miller, himself, has testified

that his physical impairments did not limit his ability to

perform his job. See deposition of Miller at pp. 138, 14647,

Exhibit B, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Entry

#24). Further, Miller indicates that his physician’s only

limitation as to the manner he performed his job, was to limit

the amount of time in excess of the average work week, to ten

hours and to allow two consecutive days off. See id. at pp.

136-40, 169; see also affidavit of Miller at para. 4 (Entry

#27). Miller offers nothing indicating that he was limited by

his physician or by his impairments in any major life activity.

More importantly, Miller fails to demonstrate that SWBT

believed that he was substantially limited in the manner he

could perform his job or any other major life activity. Dugas

testified that it was her understanding that Miller had

difficulty with his knees if he squatted for too long, and his

back hurt if he sat for long periods of time. Dugas also

indicated, however, that these were not unusual complaints

from individuals on her crew, and she did not testify that she

viewed these physical ailments as significantly limiting. See

deposition of Dugas at p. 14, Exhibit B, Plaintiff's Response

to Motion for Summary Judgment (Entry #25). The evidence

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District Court Memorandum and Order - 10/24/01

indicates that Dugas, in fact, felt that Miller could and would,

despite his physician’s directions, exceed the work time

allotted Miller. See id. at paras. 3 and 4, affidavit of Dugas,

- Exhibit C. SWBT’s absence of a belief that Miller was

substantially limited in a major life activity is further

bolstered by his indicating, on a job transfer request, that he

was not disabled and requested no accommodations. See id.,

Exhibit F-3. Miller’s argument that Dugas perceived him to

be disabled because she referred to his leave for surgery and

recuperation as, “disability” leave, is specious at best, when

at most Dugas’ statement merely indicates that she was

mistaken as to the type of leave he was on, as is evinced by

Miller’s use of both the terms, “medical” and “disability,”

when describing his leave. See affidavit of Miller at para. 3

(Entry #27). Dugas’ use of the phrase disability leave, without

more, does not infer that she believed Miller to be disabled.

Miller’s failure to establish that his impairments were

believed by SWBT to be significantly limiting, does not

demonstrate that SWBT regarded him as disabled. See

McGinnis v. Alamo Community College Dist., 207 F.3d at

281; Deas v. River West, L.P., 152 F.3d at 476, n. 10. Miller

has, therefore, failed to make a prima facie showing that he

was discriminated against by SWBT because he was regarded

as disabled and, accordingly, summary judgment as to this

issue is merited.

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District Court Memorandum and Order - 10/24/01

(ii) Defendant’s Articulation of a Legitimate,

Non-Discriminatory Reason For its

Employment Action

If Miller had established a prima facie case, he would

have created a presumption that SWBT discriminated against

him in violation of the ADA. See St. Mary’s Honor Center v.

Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 525 (1993); Texas Dept. of Community

Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981); Bauer v.

Albemarle, 169 F.3d 962,966 (Sth Cir. 1999). SWBT, in

facing the prima facie case, would then have the burden of

rebutting the presumption by articulating a legitimate

nondiscriminatory reason that motivated its decision to

terminate Miller. See id.; Haynes v. Pennzoil Co., 207 F.3d

296, 300 (Sth Cir. 2000). The Defendant’s burden, however,

is one of production only and not of persuasion. See Texas

Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 25556;

Evans v. City of Bishop, 238 F.3d 586, 590 (5th Cir. 2000).

SWBT contends that it terminated Méiller’s

employment because Miller falsely reported on a time report

that he performed work on a customer account that he did not

perform. Further, SWBT maintains that the false report of

work performed is in violation of the employer’s internal

regulations for all employees. See affidavits of Dugas,

Mehaffey and Milliken, Exhibits C, D and E, Defendant’s

Motion for Summary Judgment (Entry #25). SWBT’s

explanation for terminating Miller’s employment, satisfies

SWBT’s burden to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory

reason for its actions. See id.; Meinecke v. H & R Block, 66

F.3d 77, 83 (Sth Cir. 1995).

District Court Memorandum and Order - 10/24/01

(iii) Plaintiff's Claim that Defendant’s Reasons are a

Mere Pretext for Discriminatory Motives

A prima facie showing by Miller, would have allowed

him to establish that SWBT’s articulated reasons for his

termination, are a mere pretext for discriminatory conduct.

See Russell v. McKinney Hospital Venture, 235 F.3d 219,

222-23 (Sth Cir. 2000). Miller contends that he did not falsify

any reports and that, with respect to the September 21, 1998

incident that generated his termination, he merely charged his

travel time and the time needed to clean and gas his vehicle to

the disputed account.’ See affidavit of Miller at paras. 8-11

(Entry #27. Miller maintains that such time reporting is

customary with SWBT csts. /d. at para. 9-10. Miller,

however, was not terminated by SWBT for charging his travel

and gas time to the customer account, but was fired for

claiming that he performed work (i.e., drop cut - 2 pair) that

he did not perform. See Time Report at Exhibit E, bate stamp

number 135; see also affidavits of Dugas, Mehaffey and

Milliken at Exhibits C, D and E, Defendant’s Motion for

Summary Judgment (Entry #25). In light of previous similar

infractions by Miller, SWBT’s belief that he made false

reports on the September, 1998 time record, would not prove

unreasonable. Miller’s claim that SWBT’s advanced reason

for terminating him, i.e., the falsifying of the job performed

on a time report, is a mere pretext for discrimination would

not, therefore, be persuasive if Miller had established a prima

facie case.

° The time charged by Miller to the customer account is

not utilized as a billing item, but is merely a time report, utilized by

SWBT to account for the time of its csts. See Miller affidavit at

para. 8 (Entry #27).

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B. Alleged Violations of the Age Discrimination in

Employment Act (ADEA)

The same burden-shifting framework advanced by

McDonnell Douglas, as discussed with respect to Miller's

ADA claim, is utilized to demonstrate his claims of violations

of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”) at

29 U.S.C. § 621, et seq. Miller must first establish a prima

facie case of age discrimination. SWBT must then respond by

producing a legitimate, non-discriminatory rationale for its

decision. Once SWBT offers a legitimate, non-discriminatory

reason for Miller’s termination, the burden shifts back to

Miller to “raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether

the employer’s proffered reason was merely a pretext for age

discrimination.” Medina v. Ramsey Steel Co., Inc., 238 F.3d

674, 680 (Sth Cir. 2001). “[A] plaintiff's prima facie case,

combined with sufficient evidence to find that the employer’s

asserted justification is false, may permit the trier of fact to

conclude that the employer unlawfully discriminated.” Reeves

v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 148

(2000). If Miller is able to show that SBWT’s justification for

its employment decision is mere pretext for discriminatory

conduct, that showing, together with Miller’s prima facie

demonstration, will be sufficient to survive summary

judgment as to the claim of age discrimination. /d. at 142-43;

see also Auguster v. Vermilion Parish School Bd, 249 F.3d

400, 402 (Sth Cir. 2001); Russell v. McKinney Hospital

Venture, 235 F.3d at 222-23.

(i) The Prima Facie Case

In order to establish a prima facie case for age

discrimination, Miller must show that 1) he was in the

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District Court Memorandum and Order - 10/24/01

protected class, i.e., over 40 years of age; 2) he was qualified

for the position; 3) that he suffered an adverse employment

action; and, 4) that his replacement was under forty years of

age. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prod., Inc., 530 U.S. at

142; Holtzclaw v, DSC Communications Corp., 255 F.3d

254, 260 (Sth Cir. 2001); Evans v. City of Bishop, 238 F.3d

at 590. SWBT concedes that Miller was over the age of forty,

that he was qualified for his position, and that he was fired,

thereby, suffering an adverse employment action. See

Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Entry #24).

SWBT maintains, however, that Miller is unable to establish

that he was replaced by a younger individual. Jd.

Miller admits that he does not actually know who

replaced him. See id., Miller deposition at p. 141, Exhibit B.

SWBT contends that it replaced Miller with Jim Osteen. See

id., affidavit of Dugas at para. 11, Exhibit C. Miller does not

dispute that he was replaced by Jim Osteen. See Miller

deposition, Jd. SWBT maintains that when Osteen replaced

Miller, Osteen was fifty-six (56) years old and Miller does not

refute this. See id., Miller deposition at p. 141. Miller is,

therefore, unable to establish that he was replaced by a

younger individual and, accordingly, is unable to demonstrate

a prima facie case of age discrimination. Evans v. City of

Bishop, id.

(ti) Defendant’s Legitimate, Non-Discriminatory

Reason and Lack of Pretext

If Miller were able to establish a prima facie case of

discriminatory conduct violative of the ADEA, his allegations

would fail for the same reasons advanced in the discussion of

SWBT’s articulation of a legitimate and non-discriminatory

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reason for its actions and Miller’s failure to establish pretext

as to his claims of disability discrimination. Méiller’s

allegation of age discrimination is, therefore, as susceptible to

summary judgment as is his ADA discrimination claim.

Ill. The Retaliation Claim

Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to retaliate

against an employee for opposing an unlawful employment

practice. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a); see also Mato v.

Baldauf, C.A. 00-50522, slip op. 91, 96 (Sth Cir. October 9,

2001). In order for Miller to prevail on his retaliation claim,

he must establish that he engaged in activity protected by Title

VII, that SWBT took adverse employment against him, and

that a causal connection exists between the protected activity

and the adverse action, /d.; Holtzclaw v. DSC

Communications Corp., 255 F.3d at 259. Miller maintains

that the protected activity he engaged in was seeking an

accommodation from SWBT as to his claimed disability, and

that SWBT fired him for seeking the accommodation. See

para. 1.2 and 6.6, Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint (Entry --

#17); Plaintiff's Response to Motion for Summary Judgment

(Entry #25). SWBT does not dispute that seeking an

accommodation for disability is protected activity.° Further,

SWBT’s termination of Miller’s employment is the adverse

consequence contemplated by Title VII. See Walker v.

Thompson, 214 F.3d 615,628-29 (Sth Cir. 2000); Mattern v.

Eastman Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 702, 707 (Sth Cir. 1997).

6 SWBT also claims that Miller failed to exhaust his

administrative remedies because he did not claim retaliation when

filing his EEOC Charge. See Defendant’s Reply to Plaintiff's

Response to Motion for Summary Judgment (Entry #30).

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Miller, however, has failed to establish a causal nexus

between his seeking an accommodation for his physical

condition and SWBT’s termination of his employment. As has

been discussed, SWBT has articulated a legitimate, non-

discriminatory motive for dismissing Miller that would have

successfully rebutted the presumption of a prima facie case of

discrimination, had Miller established such a case. Further,

each relevant decision maker has averred that Miller’s

dismissal was not the result of seeking an accommodation, but

his employment was terminated due to misconduct. See

affidavits of Dugas, Mehaffey and Milliken, Exhibits C, D

and E, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Entry

#24). Additionally, Miller testified that the only post-surgical

accommodation Miller’s physician sought was that Miller be

given two consecutive days per work week off, and SWBT

accommodated that request. See deposition of Miller at pp.

139-140, Exhibit B, Defendant’s Motion for Summary

Judgment (Entry #24). Miller, not his doctor, requested that

one of his day’s off not include a Sunday and, accordingly,

being allowed to work on a Sunday was not an

accommodation that would have assisted Miller, in light of his

physical condition, to perform his job. As the probative

evidence does not establish that Miller suffered an adverse

employment action causally connected to a protected activity,

Miller’s claim of retaliation is unable to survive summary

dismissal. See McKenon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co.,

513 U.S. 352, 359-60 (1995); Chaney v. New Orleans Public

Facility Management, 179 F.3d 164, 168 (Sth Cir. 1999).

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IV. The Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

Claim

Miller seeks damages for SWBT’s alleged tortious

intentional infliction of emotional distress. See First Amended

Complaint at paras. 6.7-6.9 (Entry #17). In Texas, an

employee must prove the following elements to establish

intentional infliction of emotional distress, that 1) the

employer acted intentionally or recklessly; 2) the conduct was

extreme and outrageous; 3) the employer’s actions caused the

plaintiff emotional distress; and, 4) the emotional distress that

the plaintiff suffered was severe. Hughes Training Inc. v.

Cook, 254 F.3d 588, 594 (Sth Cir. 2001); Wornick Co. v.

Casas, 856 S.W.2d 732, 734 (Tex. 1993). In order for

SWBT’s conduct to be considered extreme and outrageous it

must be behavior “so outrageous in character and so extreme

in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency,

and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a

civilized community.” Hughes Training Inc. v. Cook, id.

Generally, ordinary employment disputes will not support a

claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, Jd.

Miller’s claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress in

this “discrimination in employment context” is only viable if

he is able to establish that SWBT knew that he was peculiarly

susceptidle to emotional distress, by reason of some physical

or mental condition or peculiarity. [d. at 595.

Miller, himself, indicates that SWBT fully

accommodated his post-surgical requests. See deposition of

Miller at pp. 139-140, Exhibit B, Defendant’s Motion for

Summary Judgment (Entry #24). Miller does not allege that

SWBT harassed him with respect to his request for post-

surgical assistance, but appears to contend that his firing,

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alone, constituted SWBT’s intentional infliction of emotional

distress. See Plaintiff's Response to Motion for Summary

Judgment (Entry #25). Miller’s termination or SWBT’s

investigation of the matters underlying the termination,

without more, is not enough to constitute the intentional

infliction of emotional distress. Hughes Training Inc. v. Cook, —

254 F.3d at 594-95; see also Shaboon v. Duncan, 252 F.3d

722, 734 (Sth Cir. 2001). Miller’s failure to adduce evidence

raising an inference that SWBT’s conduct was extreme and

outrageous or that he suffered extreme emotional distress will

not defeat summary judgment as to his claim of intentional

infliction of emotional distress.

CONCLUSION

Miller’s failure to demonstrate prima facie cases of age

or disability discrimination, retaliation or to adduce evidence

of extreme and outrageous conduct constituting the intentional

infliction of emotional distress or FLSA violations, does not

raise a genuine issue as to material fact asserted by his

lawsuit. Miller’s claims of age and disability discrimination,

retaliation, FLSA violations and the intentional infliction of

emotional distress must, therefore, be sumarily dismissed. See

Haas v. Advo Systems, Inc., 169 F.3d 732, 733 (Sth Cir.

1999); see also Chaney v. New Orleans Public Facility

Management, 179 F.3d at 167. It is, therefore,

ORDERED that Southwestern Bell Telephone

Company’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Entry #24) is

GRANTED. Further, it is

ORDERED that this matter is DISMISSED with

prejudice from the dockets of this Court.

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The Clerk of Court shall file this Memorandum and

Order and provide the parties with a true copy.

SIGNED at Houston, Texas, on this the 22nd day of

October, 2001.

/s/

Calvin Botley

United States Magistrate Judge

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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