Reply Brief — Krilich v. United States
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| WAR 25 2003
No. 02-915 CLERK
Jn the Supreme Court of the Anited States
ROBERT R. KRILICH, KRILICH COMPANIES, INC.,
RIVERWOODS DEVELOPMENT CoRP., ET AL., PETITIONERS,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, RESPONDENT.
On Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari
To The United States Court Of Appeals
For The Seventh Circuit
REPLY BRIEF FOR THE PETITIONERS
JAVIER H. RUBINSTEIN
_ Counsel of Record
SUSAN E. BRICE
MICHAEL A. SCODRO
Mayer, Brown, Rowe & Maw
190 South LaSalle Street
Chicago, Illinois 60603
(312) 782-0600
Counsel for Petitioner
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REPLY BRIEF FOR THE PETITIONERS
I.
Il.
CONCLUSION
i
TABLE OF CONTENTS
THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S DECISION
CONFLICTS WITH THIS COURT’S RULING
IN SWANCC AND IMPLICATES A
RECOGNIZED SPLIT IN THE LOWER
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THE CONSENT DECREE WAS VOID AB
INITIO BECAUSE FEDERAL REGULATORS
LACK STATUTORY OR CONSTITUTIONAL
AUTHORITY OVER PETITIONERS’ NON-
NAVIGABLE, ISOLATED WETLANDS ....
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ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases: Page
Augusta Aviation, Inc. v. United States, 671 F.2d 445
CE OU Cae, Does ese os os ee keen sas 8
FD & P Enterprises v. United States Army Corps of
Eng’rs, 239 F. Supp. 2d 509 (D.N.J. 2003) ....... 4
Federal Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380 (1947) .. 8
Headwaters, Inc. v. Talent Irrigation Dist., 243 F.3d
Ree CG, BE 6 es tab ea vet ree senses: 4,5
Hoffman Homes, Inc. v. Administrator, United
States EPA, 961 F.2d 1310, vacated,
973 FAG 1599 CORE, TPE) oa cnc v eee cisev es 2
New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742 (2001) ......... 8
Rice v. Harken Exploration Co., 250 F.3d 264
CG Pee 8 kh eS caw cane eerar te rekes 4,5
Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S.
Re OE ia Ware a be kA Se KOS 2
Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. United
States Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159
< | Peereerrer ee vey er eee eee passim
United States v. Lamplight Equestrian Ctr., Inc.,
2002 WL 360652 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 8, 2002) ........ 5
ill
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES-continued
Statute, Regulation, and Rule: Page
OR ee reer passim
os 8 OR BX 6 eee eae »
. 8 ee ef) ee i, 2, 7,9
Miscellaneous:
Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on the
Clean Water Act Regulatory Definition
of “Waters of the United States,” 68 Fed.
Reg. 1991 (Jan. 15, 2005) ...... news eccnecs 3, 6
Virginia Albrecht & Stephen Nickelsburg, Could
SWANCC Be Right? A New Look at the
Legislative History of the Clean Water Act,
SH018 ALI-ABA 249 (2002) ..............265- 5
Lawrence Liebesman & Stuart Turner, Summary of
Federal Court Decisions Interpreting the
Supreme Court’s 2001 Decision of Solid Waste
Agency of Northern Cook County v. Corps,
SG096 ALI-ABA 207 (2002)...............4.. 5
REPLY BRIEF FOR THE PETITIONERS
The petition for certiorari raises two issues arising from
petitioners’ 1992 Consent Decree settlement with federal
environmental regulators. First, the Seventh Circuit refused to
vacate the decree only by taking an exceptionally narrow view
of this Court’s decision in Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook
County v. United States Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159
(2001) (“SWANCC”). The court of appeals read SWANCC to
give federal regulators authority over even “non-navigable,
isolated wetlands”—like petitioners’—that have “no surface
connection to the nearest stream or nearest navigable body of
water.” Pet. App. 10a. This reading is at odds with SWANCC
and implicates a recognized split of authority in the lower
courts. Second, the Seventh Circuit held petitioners to their
stipulation that federal authorities could regulate petitioners’
isolated wetlands. On this score, the court of appeals blatantly
ignored jurisprudence from this and other courts refusing to
enforce consent decrees or other contracts' that purport to
expand the scope of federal regulatory power beyond its
statutory and constitutional limits.
Remarkably, the government’s response pays only scant
attention to these important issues. The bulk of the
government’s argument (at 11-13) is devoted instead to the
claim that petitioners do not qualify for relief under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 60(b)(5}—an issue that has no bearing on either
question presented.’ While petitioners strongly disagree, their
position before this Court—like their argument before the
' As the petition for certiorari explains (at 22 n.6), this Court has repeatedly
held that consent decrees are construed basically as contracts for
enforcement purposes.
2 Rule 60(b)(5) provides, in pertinent part, that a “court may relieve a party
or a party’s legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding”
if “it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective
application.”
2
district court and Seventh Circuit—does not rely on the change
in law that Rule 60(b)(5) requires.’ The Consent Decree itself
gives the district court ongoing jurisdiction “to interpret,
enforce, or modify [the] Decree,” Pet. App. 35a, and the
contract is void ab initio, regardless of whether SWANCC
changed Seventh Circuit law, because it purports to give federal
regulators authority beyond statutory and constitutional limits.
Accordingly, the government’s protracted argument that
SWANCC did not change Seventh Circuit law has no bearing on
petitioners’ claim.‘
The government ultimately spends only three paragraphs on
the two issues that are raised in the petition. In a single
paragraph, the government claims that the recognized split of
authority over the meaning of SWANCC does not exist. In the
final two paragraphs of its brief, the government simply asserts,
without authority, that private parties can consent to federal
regulatory jurisdiction beyond regulators’ statutory and
> This Court held in Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367,
384 (1992), that a party seeking relief under Rule 60(b)(S) “may meet its
initial burden by showing * * * a significant change either in factual
conditions or in law.”
‘ In fact, SWANCC’s definition of “isolated” waters is far more extensive
than the definition recognized in Hoffman Homes, Inc. v. Administrator,
United States EPA, 961 F.2d 1310 (Hoffman Homes I), vacated, 975 F.2d
1554 (7th Cir. 1992), the governing Seventh Circuit case when the parties
negotiated the Consent Decree. Under Hoffman Homes I, “isolated”
wetlands have “no hydrological connection to any body of water * * * no
relationship or interdependence with any other body of water * * * are not
part of an aquatic ecosystem and do not control floods or pollution in other
bodies of water.” Jd. at 1314. SWANCC’s definition is far broader. Unlike
Hoffman Homes I, SWANCC does not limit “isolated” waters to areas
without any hydrological connection to another body of water. Likewise,
whereas Hoffman Homes I defines “isolated” waters as those without any
relationship or interdependence with another water, “isolated” waters under
SWANCC include areas that are tenuously but not “significantly” tied to
navigable waters.
3
constitutional authority. See Br. in Opp. 15-16. Neither of
these points withstands even superficial scrutiny.
I. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S DECISION
CONFLICTS WITH THIS COURT’S RULING IN
SWANCC AND IMPLICATES A RECOGNIZED
. SPLIT IN THE LOWER COURTS.
The government boldly asserts that the courts of appeals
are not “‘deeply divided’ over the scope of federal regulatory
authority under Section 404 of the CWA.” Br. in Opp. 14. In
fact, this split has been recognized again and again not only by
lower courts and legal scholars, see Pet. 14-15, but by the
government itself. On January 15, 2003, the Army Corps of
Engineers and the Environmental Protection Agency, the very
regulators involved in this case, issued an “Advance Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking on the Clean Water Act Regulatory
Definition of ‘Waters of the United States.”” 68 Fed. Reg.
1991 (“Notice”). The Notice expressly recognizes the divide
among the courts of appeals over the meaning of SWANCC:
“While a majority of cases hold that SWANCC applies only to
waters that are isolated, intrastate and nonnavigable, several
courts have interpreted SWANCC’s reasoning to apply to waters
other than the isolated waters at issue in that case.” Jd. at 1996.
As a result, the Notice recognizes that a number of
“uncertainties” exist following SWANCC and proposes that
field staff seek formal approval from headquarters before
asserting jurisdiction over certain isolated waters. Jd. at 1996,
1997.
The Notice proceeds to discuss the circuit split at length.
As to the specific issue of tributaries, for example, it concedes
that while a number of courts have held that “SWANCC does
not change the principle that CWA jurisdiction extends to
tributaries of navigable waters[,] * * * some courts have
interpreted the reasoning in SWANCC to _ potentially
circumscribe CWA jurisdiction over tributaries by finding
CWA jurisdiction attaches only where navigable waters and
4
waters immediately adjacent to navigable waters are involved.”
68 Fed. Reg. at 1997 (citing both Headwaters, Inc. v. Talent
Irrigation Dist., 243 F.3d 526 (9th Cir. 2001), and the Seventh
Circuit’s decision in this case as examples of the former and
Rice v. Harken Exploration Co., 250 F.3d 264, 265, 268-271
(Sth Cir. 2001), as an example of the latter). This Notice was
issued nearly two months before the government filed its brief
in this Court—a brief that incredibly tries to disavow the split.
The government’s position before this Court is at best gross
error and at worst disingenuous.
Indeed, the government (Br. in Opp. 14-15) even takes
issue with the very divide discussed in the Notice—the split
between the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Rice and the Ninth
Circuit’s opinion in Headwaters. The government argues that
these decisions “are not inconsistent with each other, and
neither decision in any way conflicts with the Seventh Circuit’s
ruling in the instant case.” Br. in Opp. 15. This remarkable
statement not only flies in the face of the government’s public
Notice, but also is patently untrue. In Rice, 250 F.3d at 269, the
Fifth Circuit fashioned a bright-line jurisdictional rule: “[u]nder
[SWANCC], it appears that a body of water is subject to
regulation under the CWA if the body of water is actually
navigable or is adjacent to an open body of navigable water.”
By contrast, the Ninth Circuit adopted an “effects test” in
Headwaters. This standard asks whether the waters in question
have a significant connection to, or effect upon, a navigable
body of water.
The stark difference between these two interpretations has
been the subject of several judicial opinions and scholarly
articles. See FD & P Enterprises v. United States Army Corps
> The government tries to sidestep this issue by briefly recounting the facts
of Rice and Headwaters before its conclusory claim that “[t}he holdings of
those decisions are not inconsistent with each other.” Br. in Opp. 14-15.
This bald statement ignores the well-recognized, irreconcilable difference
between the Fifth and Ninth Circuit interpretations of SWANCC.
5
of Eng’rs, 239 F. Supp. 2d 509, 513-515, 516-517 (D.N.J.
2003) (recognizing circuit split, specifically the divide between
Fifth and Ninth Circuits, and reading SWANCC to require a
look at “whether there is a substantial nexus—beyond a mere
hydrological connection—between the FD & P Property” and
the navigable water at issue); United States v. Lamplight
Equestrian Ctr., Inc., 2002 WL 360652, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 8,
2002) (finding that Rice and Headwaters reached “opposite”
conclusions); Lawrence Liebesman & Stuart Turner, Summary
of Federal Court Decisions Interpreting the Supreme Court's
2001 Decision of Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County
v. Corps, SG096 ALI-ABA 207, 215 (2002) (“The split in
interpretation among the courts wrestling with the SWANCC
decision was deep and instantaneous”; “the 5th and the 9th
[Circuits] split over this issue”); Virginia Albrecht & Stephen
Nickelsburg, Could SWANCC Be Right? A New Look at the
Legislative History of the Clean Water Act, SHO18 ALI-ABA
249, 285 n.128-131 (2002) (highlighting split between Rice and
Headwaters); see also Pet. 14-15.
It is likewise unquestionable that Rice and Headwaters are
irreconcilable with the Seventh Circuit’s finding in this case
that the Migratory Bird Rule was the only casualty of
SWANCC. Under the Seventh Circuit’s ruling, SWANCC
permits federal authorities to regulate isolated waters so long as
the Migratory Bird Rule is not the express predicate for federal
jurisdiction.® Thus, while the Fifth and Ninth Circuits (albeit
6
Even the Notice disagrees with the Seventh Circuit’s interpretation,
reading SWANCC to reject more than just the Migratory Bird Rule: “[I]jn
light of SWANCC, it is uncertain whether there remains any basis for
jurisdiction under the other rationales of § 328.3(a)(3)(i)-(iii) over isolated,
non-navigable, intrastate waters (i.e., use of the water by interstate or foreign
travelers for recreational or other purposes; the presence of fish or shellfish
that could be taken and sold in interstate commerce; use of the water for
industrial purposes by industries in interstate commerce).” As a result, the
Notice requests comments on whether and under what circumstances the -
factors listed in § 328.3(a)(3 (i)-(iii) or any other factors “provide a basis for
6
for different reasons) would prohibit federal regulation of
petitioners’ wetlands—isolated areas with no significant nexus
to a navigable water—the Seventh Circuit allows it.
In an apparent effort to distract from this obvious conflict,
the government mischaracterizes the Seventh Circuit’s decision
below:
The court of appeals did not construe the term “waters
of the United States” to encompass isolated wetlands
lacking a surface connection to navigable-in-fact
waters, and it did not suggest that the federal
government could exercise regulatory authority over
such wetlands in the face of a timely challenge to the
assertion of federal power. Ratl..i, the court simply
held that petitioners had identified no relevant change
in fact or law since entry of the Consent Decree, and
that petitioners were therefore bound by their prior
stipulation that the wetlands at issue here are “waters
of the United States” within the meaning of the CWA.
Br. in Opp. 14. This reading disregards large sections of the
Seventh Circuit’s opinion. The court of appeals
held—notwithstanding its express assumption “that all waters
at issue were nonnavigable, isolated wetlands with no surface
connection to the nearest stream or nearest navigable body of
water”’—that SWANCC “does [not] establish that the
Government exceeded its authority in entering into the Consent
Decree.” Pet. App. 10a, 16a. The government ignores this
language, which reads SWANCC to permit federal regulation of
isolated waters with “no surface connection to the nearest
stream or nearest navigable body of water.”
In fact, the Seventh Circuit expressly rejected petitioners’
claim that SWANCC “removed from the [Army Corps of
determining CWA jurisdiction over isolated, intrastate, non-navigable
waters.” 68 Fed. Reg. at 1994, 1996.
7
Engineers’ ] regulatory authority all waters that are not adjacent
to bodies of open water”—i.e., waters that are neither navigable
themselves nor adjacent to a navigable waterway. Pet. App.
13a. In the Seventh Circuit’s view, “the precise holding of
SWANCC was not so broad”; “in SWANCC, the Supreme Court
merely held that the definition of ‘waters of the United States’
under 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3), as clarified by the Migratory
Bird Rule, ‘exceeds the authority granted to [the Corps] under
§ 404(a) of the CWA.’” Jbid. (quoting SWANCC, 531 U.S. at
174).
From the foregoing, it is plain that the Seventh Circuit’s
ruling is much broader than the government describes. The
decision below narrowly interprets SWANCC and expressly
applies this narrow reading to the instant case, holding that
SWANCC does not preclude federal regulation of isolated
wetlands like petitioners’. This holding is entirely independent
of the court’s ruling on the application of Rule 60(b)(5) and the
attendant question whether there had been a “relevant change
in fact or law.” See Pet. App. 16a (discussing points
separately).
II. THE CONSENT DECREE WAS VOID AB INITIO
BECAUSE FEDERAL REGULATORS LACK
STATUTORY OR CONSTITUTIONAL
AUTHORITY OVER PETITIONERS’ NON-
NAVIGABLE, ISOLATED WETLANDS.
The government fails to address any of the numerous
decisions petitioners cite from this Court and other courts for
the rule that parties cannot contractually expand the scope of
federal authority. See Pet. 20-26. The crux of the
government’s response on this issue is a single sentence:
“Petitioners do not and could not plausibly contend * * * that
the federal government lacks authority to negotiate voluntary
settlements of CWA enforcement actions.” Br. in Opp. 15.
This is a red herring. Of course petitioners do not assail the
government’s right to settle cases. Petitioners challenge its
8
asserted right to enter into settlements that give federal
regulators ongoing authority over wetlands that are beyond the
regulators’ statutory or constitutional jurisdiction. The
government can settle cases, but it cannot use settlements to
breach the legal limits on its regulatory power.
A decision the government cites in passing earlier in its
brief is thus wholly irrelevant. The government invokes New
Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742 (2001), for the
unremarkable proposition that a party can be “judicially
estopped from asserting a position in a subsequent proceeding
contrary to the position it agreed to in a consent decree entered
by the court in the same case.” Br. in Opp. 12. The position |
that bound the State of New Hampshire in that case involved
the location of its boundary with Maine; the case had nothing
to do with federal regulatory authority, let alone the ability to
expand this power by contract. .
The government also misses the mark with its passing
claim that this case is “readily distinguishable from cases in
which the invalidity of the relevant government contract is
apparent on the face of the agreement.” Br. in Opp. 15-16. The
government complains that petitioners’ theory would force the
district court “to conduct a potentially time-consuming inquiry
into the physical characteristics of the relevant waters.” Jd. at
16. In fact, decisions cited in the petition struck down contracts
because underlying facts made them unenforceable. For
example, the insurance contract in Federal Crop Ins. Corp. v.
Merrill was not deficient on its face. The Court held that it was
void ab initio in light of a fact—that most of the insured acres
had been reseeded with spring wheat—that was not disclosed |
in the insurance application. 332 U.S. 380, 382 (1947) (“The
formal application itself did not disclose that any part of the |
insured crop was reseeded”). Likewise, the government agent
in Augusta Aviation, Inc. v. United States acted without
authority when it promised veteran education funds in an
amount in excess of what the former soldier had earned. 671
F.2d 445, 448-450 (11th Cir. 1982). Once again, an underlying
9
fact—there the veteran’s period of military service—deprived
the government agent of contracting authority. Accordingly,
the fact that petitioners’ claim depends on underlying
facts—i.e., the characteristics of the wetlands—is of no
moment.
Finally, the government argues as a matter of policy that
petitioners’ position “would, if accepted, substantially
complicate efforts to achieve consensual resolution of federal
enforcement actions.” Br. in Opp. 16. If the government’s
point is that petitioners would undermine the permanency of
consent decrees, these contracts are already vulnerable to
mox ‘fication under Rule 60(b)(5) when relevant legal or factual
changes occur. The well-recognized limits on federal authority
on which petitioners rely merely encourage federal regulators
to ensure that they have jurisdiction under existing law before
executing a contract that gives them ongoing regulatory power.
This is hardly an undesirable “complicat[ion]” of the settlement
process. It is a rule that discourages agencies from exceeding
statutory and constitutional limits on their authority by
threatening litigation and coercing a settlement that concedes
unlawful agency jurisdiction.
CONCLUSION
The petition for certiorari should be granted.
10
Respectfully submitted.
JAVIER H. RUBINSTEIN
Counsel of Record
SUSAN E. BRICE
MICHAEL A. SCODRO
Mayer, Brown, Rowe & Maw
190 South LaSalle Street
Chicago, Illinois 60603
(312) 782-0600
MARCH 2003
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.