Reply Brief — Krilich v. United States

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— Ceut,US. |

(5) FILED |

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| WAR 25 2003

No. 02-915 CLERK

Jn the Supreme Court of the Anited States

ROBERT R. KRILICH, KRILICH COMPANIES, INC.,

RIVERWOODS DEVELOPMENT CoRP., ET AL., PETITIONERS,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, RESPONDENT.

On Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari

To The United States Court Of Appeals

For The Seventh Circuit

REPLY BRIEF FOR THE PETITIONERS

JAVIER H. RUBINSTEIN

_ Counsel of Record

SUSAN E. BRICE

MICHAEL A. SCODRO

Mayer, Brown, Rowe & Maw

190 South LaSalle Street

Chicago, Illinois 60603

(312) 782-0600

Counsel for Petitioner

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REPLY BRIEF FOR THE PETITIONERS

I.

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CONCLUSION

i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S DECISION

CONFLICTS WITH THIS COURT’S RULING

IN SWANCC AND IMPLICATES A

RECOGNIZED SPLIT IN THE LOWER

CRED 6s cps cuh beer et sina vow asewe ses

THE CONSENT DECREE WAS VOID AB

INITIO BECAUSE FEDERAL REGULATORS

LACK STATUTORY OR CONSTITUTIONAL

AUTHORITY OVER PETITIONERS’ NON-

NAVIGABLE, ISOLATED WETLANDS ....

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ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases: Page

Augusta Aviation, Inc. v. United States, 671 F.2d 445

CE OU Cae, Does ese os os ee keen sas 8

FD & P Enterprises v. United States Army Corps of

Eng’rs, 239 F. Supp. 2d 509 (D.N.J. 2003) ....... 4

Federal Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380 (1947) .. 8

Headwaters, Inc. v. Talent Irrigation Dist., 243 F.3d

Ree CG, BE 6 es tab ea vet ree senses: 4,5

Hoffman Homes, Inc. v. Administrator, United

States EPA, 961 F.2d 1310, vacated,

973 FAG 1599 CORE, TPE) oa cnc v eee cisev es 2

New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742 (2001) ......... 8

Rice v. Harken Exploration Co., 250 F.3d 264

CG Pee 8 kh eS caw cane eerar te rekes 4,5

Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S.

Re OE ia Ware a be kA Se KOS 2

Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. United

States Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159

< | Peereerrer ee vey er eee eee passim

United States v. Lamplight Equestrian Ctr., Inc.,

2002 WL 360652 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 8, 2002) ........ 5

ill

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES-continued

Statute, Regulation, and Rule: Page

OR ee reer passim

os 8 OR BX 6 eee eae »

. 8 ee ef) ee i, 2, 7,9

Miscellaneous:

Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on the

Clean Water Act Regulatory Definition

of “Waters of the United States,” 68 Fed.

Reg. 1991 (Jan. 15, 2005) ...... news eccnecs 3, 6

Virginia Albrecht & Stephen Nickelsburg, Could

SWANCC Be Right? A New Look at the

Legislative History of the Clean Water Act,

SH018 ALI-ABA 249 (2002) ..............265- 5

Lawrence Liebesman & Stuart Turner, Summary of

Federal Court Decisions Interpreting the

Supreme Court’s 2001 Decision of Solid Waste

Agency of Northern Cook County v. Corps,

SG096 ALI-ABA 207 (2002)...............4.. 5

REPLY BRIEF FOR THE PETITIONERS

The petition for certiorari raises two issues arising from

petitioners’ 1992 Consent Decree settlement with federal

environmental regulators. First, the Seventh Circuit refused to

vacate the decree only by taking an exceptionally narrow view

of this Court’s decision in Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook

County v. United States Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159

(2001) (“SWANCC”). The court of appeals read SWANCC to

give federal regulators authority over even “non-navigable,

isolated wetlands”—like petitioners’—that have “no surface

connection to the nearest stream or nearest navigable body of

water.” Pet. App. 10a. This reading is at odds with SWANCC

and implicates a recognized split of authority in the lower

courts. Second, the Seventh Circuit held petitioners to their

stipulation that federal authorities could regulate petitioners’

isolated wetlands. On this score, the court of appeals blatantly

ignored jurisprudence from this and other courts refusing to

enforce consent decrees or other contracts' that purport to

expand the scope of federal regulatory power beyond its

statutory and constitutional limits.

Remarkably, the government’s response pays only scant

attention to these important issues. The bulk of the

government’s argument (at 11-13) is devoted instead to the

claim that petitioners do not qualify for relief under Fed. R.

Civ. P. 60(b)(5}—an issue that has no bearing on either

question presented.’ While petitioners strongly disagree, their

position before this Court—like their argument before the

' As the petition for certiorari explains (at 22 n.6), this Court has repeatedly

held that consent decrees are construed basically as contracts for

enforcement purposes.

2 Rule 60(b)(5) provides, in pertinent part, that a “court may relieve a party

or a party’s legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding”

if “it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective

application.”

2

district court and Seventh Circuit—does not rely on the change

in law that Rule 60(b)(5) requires.’ The Consent Decree itself

gives the district court ongoing jurisdiction “to interpret,

enforce, or modify [the] Decree,” Pet. App. 35a, and the

contract is void ab initio, regardless of whether SWANCC

changed Seventh Circuit law, because it purports to give federal

regulators authority beyond statutory and constitutional limits.

Accordingly, the government’s protracted argument that

SWANCC did not change Seventh Circuit law has no bearing on

petitioners’ claim.‘

The government ultimately spends only three paragraphs on

the two issues that are raised in the petition. In a single

paragraph, the government claims that the recognized split of

authority over the meaning of SWANCC does not exist. In the

final two paragraphs of its brief, the government simply asserts,

without authority, that private parties can consent to federal

regulatory jurisdiction beyond regulators’ statutory and

> This Court held in Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367,

384 (1992), that a party seeking relief under Rule 60(b)(S) “may meet its

initial burden by showing * * * a significant change either in factual

conditions or in law.”

‘ In fact, SWANCC’s definition of “isolated” waters is far more extensive

than the definition recognized in Hoffman Homes, Inc. v. Administrator,

United States EPA, 961 F.2d 1310 (Hoffman Homes I), vacated, 975 F.2d

1554 (7th Cir. 1992), the governing Seventh Circuit case when the parties

negotiated the Consent Decree. Under Hoffman Homes I, “isolated”

wetlands have “no hydrological connection to any body of water * * * no

relationship or interdependence with any other body of water * * * are not

part of an aquatic ecosystem and do not control floods or pollution in other

bodies of water.” Jd. at 1314. SWANCC’s definition is far broader. Unlike

Hoffman Homes I, SWANCC does not limit “isolated” waters to areas

without any hydrological connection to another body of water. Likewise,

whereas Hoffman Homes I defines “isolated” waters as those without any

relationship or interdependence with another water, “isolated” waters under

SWANCC include areas that are tenuously but not “significantly” tied to

navigable waters.

3

constitutional authority. See Br. in Opp. 15-16. Neither of

these points withstands even superficial scrutiny.

I. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S DECISION

CONFLICTS WITH THIS COURT’S RULING IN

SWANCC AND IMPLICATES A RECOGNIZED

. SPLIT IN THE LOWER COURTS.

The government boldly asserts that the courts of appeals

are not “‘deeply divided’ over the scope of federal regulatory

authority under Section 404 of the CWA.” Br. in Opp. 14. In

fact, this split has been recognized again and again not only by

lower courts and legal scholars, see Pet. 14-15, but by the

government itself. On January 15, 2003, the Army Corps of

Engineers and the Environmental Protection Agency, the very

regulators involved in this case, issued an “Advance Notice of

Proposed Rulemaking on the Clean Water Act Regulatory

Definition of ‘Waters of the United States.”” 68 Fed. Reg.

1991 (“Notice”). The Notice expressly recognizes the divide

among the courts of appeals over the meaning of SWANCC:

“While a majority of cases hold that SWANCC applies only to

waters that are isolated, intrastate and nonnavigable, several

courts have interpreted SWANCC’s reasoning to apply to waters

other than the isolated waters at issue in that case.” Jd. at 1996.

As a result, the Notice recognizes that a number of

“uncertainties” exist following SWANCC and proposes that

field staff seek formal approval from headquarters before

asserting jurisdiction over certain isolated waters. Jd. at 1996,

1997.

The Notice proceeds to discuss the circuit split at length.

As to the specific issue of tributaries, for example, it concedes

that while a number of courts have held that “SWANCC does

not change the principle that CWA jurisdiction extends to

tributaries of navigable waters[,] * * * some courts have

interpreted the reasoning in SWANCC to _ potentially

circumscribe CWA jurisdiction over tributaries by finding

CWA jurisdiction attaches only where navigable waters and

4

waters immediately adjacent to navigable waters are involved.”

68 Fed. Reg. at 1997 (citing both Headwaters, Inc. v. Talent

Irrigation Dist., 243 F.3d 526 (9th Cir. 2001), and the Seventh

Circuit’s decision in this case as examples of the former and

Rice v. Harken Exploration Co., 250 F.3d 264, 265, 268-271

(Sth Cir. 2001), as an example of the latter). This Notice was

issued nearly two months before the government filed its brief

in this Court—a brief that incredibly tries to disavow the split.

The government’s position before this Court is at best gross

error and at worst disingenuous.

Indeed, the government (Br. in Opp. 14-15) even takes

issue with the very divide discussed in the Notice—the split

between the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Rice and the Ninth

Circuit’s opinion in Headwaters. The government argues that

these decisions “are not inconsistent with each other, and

neither decision in any way conflicts with the Seventh Circuit’s

ruling in the instant case.” Br. in Opp. 15. This remarkable

statement not only flies in the face of the government’s public

Notice, but also is patently untrue. In Rice, 250 F.3d at 269, the

Fifth Circuit fashioned a bright-line jurisdictional rule: “[u]nder

[SWANCC], it appears that a body of water is subject to

regulation under the CWA if the body of water is actually

navigable or is adjacent to an open body of navigable water.”

By contrast, the Ninth Circuit adopted an “effects test” in

Headwaters. This standard asks whether the waters in question

have a significant connection to, or effect upon, a navigable

body of water.

The stark difference between these two interpretations has

been the subject of several judicial opinions and scholarly

articles. See FD & P Enterprises v. United States Army Corps

> The government tries to sidestep this issue by briefly recounting the facts

of Rice and Headwaters before its conclusory claim that “[t}he holdings of

those decisions are not inconsistent with each other.” Br. in Opp. 14-15.

This bald statement ignores the well-recognized, irreconcilable difference

between the Fifth and Ninth Circuit interpretations of SWANCC.

5

of Eng’rs, 239 F. Supp. 2d 509, 513-515, 516-517 (D.N.J.

2003) (recognizing circuit split, specifically the divide between

Fifth and Ninth Circuits, and reading SWANCC to require a

look at “whether there is a substantial nexus—beyond a mere

hydrological connection—between the FD & P Property” and

the navigable water at issue); United States v. Lamplight

Equestrian Ctr., Inc., 2002 WL 360652, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 8,

2002) (finding that Rice and Headwaters reached “opposite”

conclusions); Lawrence Liebesman & Stuart Turner, Summary

of Federal Court Decisions Interpreting the Supreme Court's

2001 Decision of Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County

v. Corps, SG096 ALI-ABA 207, 215 (2002) (“The split in

interpretation among the courts wrestling with the SWANCC

decision was deep and instantaneous”; “the 5th and the 9th

[Circuits] split over this issue”); Virginia Albrecht & Stephen

Nickelsburg, Could SWANCC Be Right? A New Look at the

Legislative History of the Clean Water Act, SHO18 ALI-ABA

249, 285 n.128-131 (2002) (highlighting split between Rice and

Headwaters); see also Pet. 14-15.

It is likewise unquestionable that Rice and Headwaters are

irreconcilable with the Seventh Circuit’s finding in this case

that the Migratory Bird Rule was the only casualty of

SWANCC. Under the Seventh Circuit’s ruling, SWANCC

permits federal authorities to regulate isolated waters so long as

the Migratory Bird Rule is not the express predicate for federal

jurisdiction.® Thus, while the Fifth and Ninth Circuits (albeit

6

Even the Notice disagrees with the Seventh Circuit’s interpretation,

reading SWANCC to reject more than just the Migratory Bird Rule: “[I]jn

light of SWANCC, it is uncertain whether there remains any basis for

jurisdiction under the other rationales of § 328.3(a)(3)(i)-(iii) over isolated,

non-navigable, intrastate waters (i.e., use of the water by interstate or foreign

travelers for recreational or other purposes; the presence of fish or shellfish

that could be taken and sold in interstate commerce; use of the water for

industrial purposes by industries in interstate commerce).” As a result, the

Notice requests comments on whether and under what circumstances the -

factors listed in § 328.3(a)(3 (i)-(iii) or any other factors “provide a basis for

6

for different reasons) would prohibit federal regulation of

petitioners’ wetlands—isolated areas with no significant nexus

to a navigable water—the Seventh Circuit allows it.

In an apparent effort to distract from this obvious conflict,

the government mischaracterizes the Seventh Circuit’s decision

below:

The court of appeals did not construe the term “waters

of the United States” to encompass isolated wetlands

lacking a surface connection to navigable-in-fact

waters, and it did not suggest that the federal

government could exercise regulatory authority over

such wetlands in the face of a timely challenge to the

assertion of federal power. Ratl..i, the court simply

held that petitioners had identified no relevant change

in fact or law since entry of the Consent Decree, and

that petitioners were therefore bound by their prior

stipulation that the wetlands at issue here are “waters

of the United States” within the meaning of the CWA.

Br. in Opp. 14. This reading disregards large sections of the

Seventh Circuit’s opinion. The court of appeals

held—notwithstanding its express assumption “that all waters

at issue were nonnavigable, isolated wetlands with no surface

connection to the nearest stream or nearest navigable body of

water”’—that SWANCC “does [not] establish that the

Government exceeded its authority in entering into the Consent

Decree.” Pet. App. 10a, 16a. The government ignores this

language, which reads SWANCC to permit federal regulation of

isolated waters with “no surface connection to the nearest

stream or nearest navigable body of water.”

In fact, the Seventh Circuit expressly rejected petitioners’

claim that SWANCC “removed from the [Army Corps of

determining CWA jurisdiction over isolated, intrastate, non-navigable

waters.” 68 Fed. Reg. at 1994, 1996.

7

Engineers’ ] regulatory authority all waters that are not adjacent

to bodies of open water”—i.e., waters that are neither navigable

themselves nor adjacent to a navigable waterway. Pet. App.

13a. In the Seventh Circuit’s view, “the precise holding of

SWANCC was not so broad”; “in SWANCC, the Supreme Court

merely held that the definition of ‘waters of the United States’

under 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3), as clarified by the Migratory

Bird Rule, ‘exceeds the authority granted to [the Corps] under

§ 404(a) of the CWA.’” Jbid. (quoting SWANCC, 531 U.S. at

174).

From the foregoing, it is plain that the Seventh Circuit’s

ruling is much broader than the government describes. The

decision below narrowly interprets SWANCC and expressly

applies this narrow reading to the instant case, holding that

SWANCC does not preclude federal regulation of isolated

wetlands like petitioners’. This holding is entirely independent

of the court’s ruling on the application of Rule 60(b)(5) and the

attendant question whether there had been a “relevant change

in fact or law.” See Pet. App. 16a (discussing points

separately).

II. THE CONSENT DECREE WAS VOID AB INITIO

BECAUSE FEDERAL REGULATORS LACK

STATUTORY OR CONSTITUTIONAL

AUTHORITY OVER PETITIONERS’ NON-

NAVIGABLE, ISOLATED WETLANDS.

The government fails to address any of the numerous

decisions petitioners cite from this Court and other courts for

the rule that parties cannot contractually expand the scope of

federal authority. See Pet. 20-26. The crux of the

government’s response on this issue is a single sentence:

“Petitioners do not and could not plausibly contend * * * that

the federal government lacks authority to negotiate voluntary

settlements of CWA enforcement actions.” Br. in Opp. 15.

This is a red herring. Of course petitioners do not assail the

government’s right to settle cases. Petitioners challenge its

8

asserted right to enter into settlements that give federal

regulators ongoing authority over wetlands that are beyond the

regulators’ statutory or constitutional jurisdiction. The

government can settle cases, but it cannot use settlements to

breach the legal limits on its regulatory power.

A decision the government cites in passing earlier in its

brief is thus wholly irrelevant. The government invokes New

Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742 (2001), for the

unremarkable proposition that a party can be “judicially

estopped from asserting a position in a subsequent proceeding

contrary to the position it agreed to in a consent decree entered

by the court in the same case.” Br. in Opp. 12. The position |

that bound the State of New Hampshire in that case involved

the location of its boundary with Maine; the case had nothing

to do with federal regulatory authority, let alone the ability to

expand this power by contract. .

The government also misses the mark with its passing

claim that this case is “readily distinguishable from cases in

which the invalidity of the relevant government contract is

apparent on the face of the agreement.” Br. in Opp. 15-16. The

government complains that petitioners’ theory would force the

district court “to conduct a potentially time-consuming inquiry

into the physical characteristics of the relevant waters.” Jd. at

16. In fact, decisions cited in the petition struck down contracts

because underlying facts made them unenforceable. For

example, the insurance contract in Federal Crop Ins. Corp. v.

Merrill was not deficient on its face. The Court held that it was

void ab initio in light of a fact—that most of the insured acres

had been reseeded with spring wheat—that was not disclosed |

in the insurance application. 332 U.S. 380, 382 (1947) (“The

formal application itself did not disclose that any part of the |

insured crop was reseeded”). Likewise, the government agent

in Augusta Aviation, Inc. v. United States acted without

authority when it promised veteran education funds in an

amount in excess of what the former soldier had earned. 671

F.2d 445, 448-450 (11th Cir. 1982). Once again, an underlying

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fact—there the veteran’s period of military service—deprived

the government agent of contracting authority. Accordingly,

the fact that petitioners’ claim depends on underlying

facts—i.e., the characteristics of the wetlands—is of no

moment.

Finally, the government argues as a matter of policy that

petitioners’ position “would, if accepted, substantially

complicate efforts to achieve consensual resolution of federal

enforcement actions.” Br. in Opp. 16. If the government’s

point is that petitioners would undermine the permanency of

consent decrees, these contracts are already vulnerable to

mox ‘fication under Rule 60(b)(5) when relevant legal or factual

changes occur. The well-recognized limits on federal authority

on which petitioners rely merely encourage federal regulators

to ensure that they have jurisdiction under existing law before

executing a contract that gives them ongoing regulatory power.

This is hardly an undesirable “complicat[ion]” of the settlement

process. It is a rule that discourages agencies from exceeding

statutory and constitutional limits on their authority by

threatening litigation and coercing a settlement that concedes

unlawful agency jurisdiction.

CONCLUSION

The petition for certiorari should be granted.

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Respectfully submitted.

JAVIER H. RUBINSTEIN

Counsel of Record

SUSAN E. BRICE

MICHAEL A. SCODRO

Mayer, Brown, Rowe & Maw

190 South LaSalle Street

Chicago, Illinois 60603

(312) 782-0600

MARCH 2003

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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