Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Krilich v. United States
Supreme Court brief2003
Ask Donna
What actually matters in this document.
Text
Dall Alt et l M ld el iene MB
x Supreme Court, U.S.
/ f FILE D
02 915DEC9 2002
No OFFICE OF THE CLERK
In the Supreme Court of the Gnited States
ROBERT R. KRILICH, KRILICH COMPANIES, INC..,
RIVERWOODS DEVELOPMENT CoORP., ET AL., PETITIONERS,
V.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, RESPONDENT.
On Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari
To The United States Court Of Appeals
For The Seventh Circuit
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
JAVIER H. RUBINSTEIN
Counsel of Record
SUSAN E. BRICE
MICHAEL A. SCODRO
Mayer, Brown, Rowe & Maw
190 South LaSalle Street
Chicago, Illinois 60603
(312) 782-0600
Counsel for Petitioner
i
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. Whether the court of appeals erred in holding, contrary
to decisions of other courts of appeals and this Court’s decision
in Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. United States Army
Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159 (2001), that the federal govern-
ment has the statutory and constitutional authority to regulate
“non-navigable, isolated wetlands that have no surface connec-
tion to the nearest stream or nearest navigable body of water.”
2. Whether a consent decree between private citizens and
an agency of the federal government is subject to rescission as
void ab initio where the federal government never had statutory
or constitutional authority to regulate the subject matter of the
decree.
ee
il
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
QUESTIONS PRESENTED ...-.--0scceeerecseoress i
OPINIONS BELOW ....-----ssrrrr |
FURIGEMGTION «0. coco vascevenrrensserererrrr ee. 1
STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL
PROVISIONS INVOLVED ....------ssssr rr 1
CT ATRREIINT ac onc ccs wena nes epee eee tse res 1
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION ....----: 5
|. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S MISCONSTRUCTION
OF SWANCC CONFLICTS WITH DECISIONS OF
OTHER COURTS OF APPEALS THAT THERE IS
NO FEDERAL AUTHORITY TO REGULATE
ISOLATED, INTRASTATE WATERS HAVING NO
SIGNIFICANT CONNECTION TO NAVIGABLE
WANN Coc cccesenec een eeneernreeT 6
A. CWA § 404 And The Court’s Decision In
ne 5. ETE os oi esha 7
B. The Federal Courts Are Deadlocked As To
Whether Isolated, Non-navigable, Intrastate
Waters Axe Subject To Federal Regulation
Under CWA § 404. ..---e scree rrr 9
C. The Seventh Circuit’s Holding Is Inconsistent |
With This Court’s Decision In SWANCC. ...---: 15
ill
TABLE OF CONTENTS-Continued
Page
Il. THESEVENTH CIRCUIT ERRED IN REFUSING TO
RESCIND THE CONSENT DECREE AS VOID AB
INITIO DUE TO THE GOVERNMENT’S LACK OF
REGULATORY AUTHORITY. .............000. 19
A. Private Citizens Cannot Contractually Expand
A Federal Agency’s Statutory And Constitu-
ane a e weeks bw Cee ewes 20
B. This Court’s Decisions And Those Of Other
Courts Of Appeals Confirm That Consent
Decrees Are Void Ab Initio And Subject To
Rescission Where The Government Had No
Authority To Execute Them. ................. 22
SE a ee ee 26
iV
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases: Page
Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 638 (1990) ....... 21
Augusta Aviation, Inc. v. United States, 671 F.2d 445
(11th Cir. 1982) ........ee cece cere cere ee cecees 25
Bennett v. Hedglin, 995 P.2d 668 (Alaska 2000) .....-- 26
Bergstrom v. Estate of DeVoe, 854 P.2d 860
(Nev. 1993)... 2. c cee cserccecercvccccncrceces 26
Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204
HOU 5 oo vis ccdncccsesteaveneseasdaersets es 20
Brace v. United States, 51 Fed. Cl. 649 (2002) .......-- 13
Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281 (1979) ......--- 20
FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,
529 U.S. 120 (2000) ......-- eee reer reece ree 20
Federal Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380
(IDET)... wc ccnsecnssececssenerseaneosenees 22, 23
The Floyd Acceptances, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 666
TDD vinns cvegnsrav evar nndyae Ress sasintreses 23
Headwaters, Inc. v. Talent Irrigation Dist.,
243 F.3d 526 (9th Cir. 2001) ....---------+ee 12, 13
Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp.,
513 U.S. 30 (1994) .... 2. e eee eee eee eters 18
Hughes v. United States, 342 U.S. 353 (1952) .....---- 22
Vv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES-Continued
Idaho Rural Council v. Bosma, 143 F. Supp. 2d
eo Perr rere
Keith v. Volpe, 118 F.3d 1386 (9th Cir. 1997) ....
Kelley v. Town of Milan, 127 U.S. 139 (1888) ....
Klopp v. Keystone Ins. Cos., 595 A.2d 1 (Pa. 1991)
League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Clements,
999 F.26 G31 (Sia Clr. 1993) 2... cc nccccvess
Local Number 93, Int’l Ass'n of Firefighters v.
City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501 (1986) .......
National Revenue Corp. v. Violet, 807 F.2d 285
GREG WEEE obo se ce ese eereeeee
Needham, In re, 279 B.R. 515 (Bankr. W.D. La.
WD ka bia ooo a ek ea
Orange v. District of Columbia, 59 F.3d 1267
ee er err re Peer Eres
Rapanos v. United States, 533 U.S. 913 (2001) ...
REW Enters. v. Premier Bank, N.A., 49 F.3d 163
CRG Be ok.bb eek cous
Rice v. Harken Exploration Co., 250 F.3d 264
CE. DED cad anckoncenunenena ean
wees 21
vi
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES-Continued
Page
Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. United
States Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159
¢ 111) } oe passim
Schism v. United States, _ F.3d __, 2002 WL
31549178 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 18, 2002) (en banc) ...... 24
Total Med. Mgmt., Inc. v. United States,
104 F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 1997) .......----+ esses 25
Tuxedo Cheverly Volunteer Fire Co. v. Prince
George's County, 385 A.2d 819 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 1978) ......-- seers e eee e errr tenes 26
United States v. Amdahl Corp., 786 F.2d 387
(Fed. Cir. 1986) ........ cece eee cece eee e ee eeee 24
United States v. Armour & Co., 402 U.S. 673
(LL) EEE ok 22
United States v. Beebe, 180 U.S. 343 (1901) .....--- 23, 24
United States v. Buday, 138 F. Supp. 2d 1282
(D. Mont. 2001) . 6. eee eee cere reer eee eens 13
United States v. Interstate General Co., 2002 WL
1421411 (4th Cir. July 2, 2002) .....--- eee e eres 10
United States v. Interstate General Co., 152 F. Supp. 2d
843 (D. Md. 2001), aff'd, 2002 WL 1421411
(4th Cir. July 2, 2002) ......--- sees eee ees 15, 19
Vii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES-Continued
Page
United States v. ITT Cont’! Baking Co.,
ey ee Ne I 5 £6 6b 686545050000 baw ens 22
United States v. Lamplight Equestrian Center,
2002 WL 360652 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 8, 2002) ....... 13,14
United States v. Newdunn Assocs., 195 F. Supp. 2d
ee ee rr 1]
United States v. Ownbey Enters., Inc., 789 F. Supp.
Ree EE io as 6.0 604.04 Due obec beeen 19
United States v. Rapanos, 190 F. Supp. 2d 1011
err ere yee ree 11,17
United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc.,
ee Shy Se CE ac ¥ bone ca ueb eines oxies 5, 7,17
United States v. RMG Corp., 222 F. Supp. 2d
eo SS er | rere per 11
United States v. Rueth Dev., 189 F. Supp. 2d
Pe I a dkk eo 660k cee ibe baetas 13, 19
Williams v. Metzler, 132 F.3d 937 (3d Cir. 1997) ....... 21
Statutes, Regulations, and Rule:
pe a 3 ee ey re ree rere 2,7
LT oe | eee ar ee passim
vill
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES-Continued
Page
33 UBL. § IDAGE) on crc ccnccccccccscosccsssescess 7
33 UBC. 6 IDGRT) ..w cv ccccccccccvccccncscceceses 7
33 UB.C. § ISGRID) .. wn ccccsccveccccccsccesecesess 7
SD CER. 6 IACI)... 2... ccccceccccceeseces 4,7, 10
Pod. BR. Civ. P. GRR) oc ccccccccccscccccesescccecs 3
Miscellaneous:
2 FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 5.1 (2d ed. 1998) ..... 25
51 Fed. Reg. 41,206 (Nov. 13, 1986) ............-5555- 7
Michael Gerhardt, On Revolution and Wetland
Regulations, 90 GEO. L.J. 2143 (2002) ..........-- 11
Protecting Wetlands, WASH. POST,
Sept. 27, 2002, at A22 ... 1. cece eee e cece eens 14
Trip Van Nippon, Current Developments in Clean
Water Act Litigation, SG101 ALI-ABA 104
COED on cone cinceseccececeseusceiesssaseces 15
12 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 35:63 (4th ed. 1999) ... 25
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Robert R. Krilich et al. respectfully petition for a writ of |
certiorari to review the judgment of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in this case.
OPINIONS BELOW
The decision of the court of appeals (App., infra, 1a-16a) is
reported at 303 F.3d 784. The judgment of the district court
(App., infra, 17a-33a) is reported at 152 F. Supp. 2d 983.
JURISDICTION
The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on
September 9, 2002. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked
under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1). .
STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL
PROVISIONS INVOLVED
The relevant provisions of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C.
§§ 1311, 1344, 1362 are reproduced at App., infra, 75a-76a.
Article 1, § 8, cl. 3 of the United States Constitution provides,
in pertinent part, that “[t]he Congress shail have Power * * * To
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the
several States, and with the Indian Tribes.”
STATEMENT
1. This case arises out of a Consent Decree entered by the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois
on October 29, 1992. The Decree resolved an enforcement
action by the EPA regarding petitioners’ alleged improper
filling of 4.5 acres of wetlands on their property (“petitioners’
Waters” or “Waters”.
The Waters are located entirely within the State of Illinois,
are non-navigable and isolated. The nearest non-navigable
water body, Salt Creek, is located 1.9 stream miles away from
the property, and the nearest navigable water, the Des Plaines
River at Hoffman Dam, is located 19.1 stream miles away.
App., infra, 71a-72a. In order for any runoff from the property
to reach the Des Plaines River at Hoffman Dam, it must travel
into a manhole with an open grate, which connects to a
“manmade, underground, concrete storm sewer system,” which
runs 2000 feet east and then flows into a small ditch that joins
non-navigable Salt Creek about 1.5 miles further east. /d. at
71a. Salt Creek then joins the Des Plaines River approximately
16.5 stream miles to the Southeast. /bid. The government
alleges that petitioners filled these Waters without a permit in
violation of Sections 404 and 301(a) of the Clean Water Act, 33
U.S.C. §§ 1344, 1311(a).
In the Consent Decree, the parties stipulated that certain of
the Waters are “waters of the United States,” and that the EPA
thus had jurisdiction to regulate them. App., infra, 38a-39a. The
Decree obligated petitioners to conduct restoration and
mitigation activities. It remains in force to this day, and its use
restrictions continue. In the Decree, the district court also
“retain[ed] jurisdiction in order to enable any party to apply to
the Court at any time for such further relief as may be necessary
to interpret, enforce, or modify this Decree.” Jd. at 35a.
When petitioners were unable to meet the deadlines in the
Decree, the government moved to enforce its penalty
provisions. On May 31, 1996, the district court entered an order
imposing a substantial fine on petitioners. 948 F. Supp. 719
(N.D. Ill. 1996). The court of appeals affirmed the penalty in
part but remanded for recalculation of the amount. 126 F.3d
1035 (7th Cir. 1997). The district court entered a modified
judgment in the amount of $1,257,500 on December 1, 1997.
These fines and penalties remain on deposit in a judicially
supervised escrow account.
2. On January 9, 2001, this Court announced its decision
in Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. United States Army
Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 167-168, 171-172 (2001)
(“SWANCC’”), that § 404 of the Clean Water Act (“CWA”)
does not extend “to ponds that are not adjacent to open water,”
————~=E—
and instead extends to waters that “actually abu[t] on a
navigable waterway.” Based on SWANCC, petitioners promptly
moved to vacate the Consent Decree, invoking the district
court’s powers under the Decree’s reservation-of-jurisdiction
clause and, alternatively, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5).
In support of their motion, petitioners submitted the Report
of an environmental expert who testified, among other things,
that petitioners’ Waters: (1) have “no natural connection to any
navigable waterway”; (2) are located 19.1 stream miles away
from the nearest navigable body of water; and (3) “would have
no measurable effect” on the nearest navigable or non-
navigable water “in terms of wildlife habitat, stormwater
retention, flood flow attenuation and water purification” even
if they were completely filled. App., infra, 71a, 74a.
The government did not challenge any of these factual
findings, despite the district court’s invitation to do so. The
district court thus assumed for purposes of its decision that “the
waters at issue actually are nonnavigable, isolated wetlands that
have no surface connection to the nearest stream or nearest
navigable body of water.” App., infra, 22a. Nonetheless, the
district court denied petitioners’ motion to vacate, holding that
the court was powerless to vacate or modify the Consent
_ Decree, and that petitioner was bound by the Decree, even if
the Waters were “isolated” under SWANCC, because petitioner
had stipulated to the government’s regulatory jurisdiction in the
Decree.
The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Like the district court, the
court of appeals assumed “that all waters at issue were
nonnavigable, isolated wetlands with no surface connection to
the nearest stream or nearest navigable body of water.” App.,
infra, 10a. The court rejected petitioners’ contention, however,
that SWANCC “removed from the [Army Corps of Engineers’ ]
regulatory authority all waters that are not adjacent to bodies of
open water.” /d. at 13a. In the court’s view, “the precise
holding of SWANCC was not so broad.” Jbid. Instead, the
4
Seventh Circuit concluded that “in SWANCC, the Supreme
Court merely held that the definition of ‘waters of the United
States’ under 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3), as clarified by the
Migratory Bird Rule, ‘exceeds the authority granted to [the
Corps] under § 404(a) of the CWA.’” App., infra, 13a (quoting
SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 174).
According to the Seventh Circuit, SWANCC shed no light
on the question of whether the CWA extends to isolated waters
not adjacent to navigable waters because “SWANCC in no way
altered the other regulations interpreting ‘waters of the United
States.”” App., infra, 14a. Because “[t]here is nothing in the
Consent Decree establishing that the Migratory Bird Rule was
the sole basis for the. EPA’s assertion of authority over
[petitioners’} property,” the court of appeals concluded that
“(t]he SWANCC decision does not establish that the
Government exceeded its authority in entering into the Consent
Decree, so [petitioners’] claim that the Decree was void ab
initio fails as well.” Id. at 13a-14a, 16a.
Finally, the Seventh Circuit held that “even assuming that
the wetlands were isolated, Krilich is nonetheless bound by the
Consent Decree” because “he already agreed that the waters
were ‘waters of the United States.’” App., infra, 10a, 13a. As
the court of appeals explained:
If a party believes that the waters at issue on his own
property are not properly subject to the EPA’s authority
* * * he should not stipulate otherwise. But that is
exactly what Krilich did, to his continued dismay. He
expressly agreed that certain waters on his property
constituted “waters of the United States,” subject to
regulation by the EPA.
App., infra, 14a-15a. Thus, according to the Seventh Circuit,
petitioners would be bound by the Consent Decree, and their
property thus subject to continued federal regulation, even if the
5
federal government never had any statutory or constitutional
authority to regulate petitioners’ Waters.
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION
This case presents the important and recurring question of
whether the United States government has the statutory and
constitutional authority to regulate isolated, intrastate waters
that are not directly adjacent to any navigable body of water,
and have no significant connection to any navigable waters.
This Court has addressed this issue twice, once in United States
v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. T2T (1985), and
again, more recently, in SWANCC.
Nevertheless, the courts of appeals and district courts are
hopelessly split over the meaning of SWANCC and Riverside
Bayview and the extent to which the federal government has
jurisdiction to regulate the nation’s intrastate waters. This case
presents the ideal opportunity to resolve this split. Both the
district court and the Seventh Circuit found, for purposes of
their decisions, that the Waters in this case were “nonnavigable,
isolated wetlands that have no surface connection to the nearest
stream or nearest navigable body of water.” This-casetherefore
squarely presents the naked legal question of whether the
federal government has the statutory and constitutional power
to regulate intrastate waters that have no significant connection
to any navigable body of water, irrespective of the Migratory
Bird Rule. As the cases cited herein confirm, the federal courts
repeatedly have confronted this question in the 2 years since
SWANCC was decided, but have not been able to reach a
consensus. Only this Court can break the deadlock.
This case also presents the separate and far-reaching
question of whether a Consent Decree between the federal
government and a private citizen is subject to rescission where
the federal government never had jurisdiction to regulate the
subject matter of the Decree. In this case, the Seventh Circuit
held that even if the EPA never had authority to regulate the
6
Waters in question, petitioners are nevertheless bound by the
Decree because they stipulated to the EPA’s regulatory
authority, thus allowing the EPA to bootstrap itself into
jurisdiction that neither Congress nor the Constitution has
conferred upon it. That holding not only flies in the face of this
Court’s administrative law decisions that private citizens cannot
contractually expand the regulatory jurisdiction of federal
agencies, but the multiple holdings of this Court and lower
federal courts that repeatedly have rescinded consent decrees as
void ab initio where it was found that the federal agency had no
authority to execute them in the first place.
I. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S MISCONSTRUCTION
OF SWANCC CONFLICTS WITH DECISIONS OF
OTHER COURTS OF APPEALS THAT THERE IS
NO FEDERAL AUTHORITY TO REGULATE
ISOLATED, INTRASTATE WATERS HAVING NO
SIGNIFICANT CONNECTION TO NAVIGABLE
WATERS.
The Seventh Circuit below held that despite this Court’s
holding in SWANCC, the federal government continues to have
the statutory and constitutional authority to regulate isolated,
non-navigable, intrastate waters. Indeed, here the Waters have
“no natural connection to any navigable waterway,” are located
19.1 stream miles away from the nearest navigable body of
water, and “would have no measurable effect” on any navigable
body of water. This decision squarely raises the very issue that
this Court confronted in SWANCC, i.e., whether the federal
government, as opposed to the states, has the power to regulate
intrastate waters that are neither adjacent to nor have any
significant effect upon any navigable waters. As SWANCC
itself confirmed, this fundamental question implicates not only
far-reaching issues of land use development and ecology, but
also “significant constitutional and federalism questions.” 531
U.S. at 174.
7
A. CWA § 404 And The Court’s Decision In SWANCC.
The CWA prohibits “any person” from discharging “any
pollutant,” including “dredged or fill material,” into “the
navigable waters” without obtaining a permit from the Army
Corps of Engineers (the “Corps”). 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a),
1344(a), 1362(12). “Navigable waters” are defined in the CWA
to mean “the waters of the United States, including the
territorial seas.” Jd. § 1362(7). The Corps, in turn, has defined
the term “waters of the United States” in § 404 of the CWA, 33
U.S.C. § 1344, to include not only traditional “navigable
waters,” but also
waters such as intrastate lakes, rivers, streams
(including intermittent streams), mudflats, sandflats,
wetlands, sloughs, prairie potholes, wet meadows, playa
lakes, or natural ponds, the use, degradation or
destruction of which could affect interstate or foreign
commerce.
33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a).
In 1986, the Corps further expanded the reach of its
jurisdiction by defining “other” waters pursuant to what is
known as the “Migratory Bird Rule”:
EPA has clarified that waters of the United States at
[33] CFR 328.3(a)(3) also include the following waters:
a. Which are or would be used as habitat by birds
protected by Migratory Bird Treaties; or
b. Which are or would be used as habitat by other
migratory birds which cross state lines * * * .
51 Fed. Reg. 41,206, 41,217 (Nov. 13, 1986).
In United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc.,474 U.S.
121 (1985), this Court held that § 404 gives the government
jurisdiction over non-navigable wetlands immediately adjacent
8
to open bodies of navigable water. The Court reaffirmed that
holding in SWANCC but made clear that federal authority to
regulate adjacent wetlands must be strictly circumscribed,
particularly in light of Commerce Clause concerns:
It was the significant nexus between the wetlands and
“navigable waters” that informed our reading of the
CWA in Riverside Bayview Homes. Indeed, we did not
“express any opinion” on the “question of the authority
of the Corps to regulate discharges of fill material into
wetlands that are not adjacent to bodies of open water.”
SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 167. The Court thus confirmed that
Riverside Bayview permits federal regulation only of wetlands
immediately adjacent to navigable waters, such as waters that
“actually abutted on a navigable waterway”:
In order to rule for respondents here, we would have to
hold that the jurisdiction of the Corps extends to ponds
that are not adjacent to open water. But we conclude
that the text of the statute will not allow this.
Id. at 168.
By using the term “navigable waters” in the CWA, the
Court explained, Congress intended only to “exert * * * its
commerce power over navigation”:
The term “navigable” has at least the import of showing
us what Congress had in mind as its authority for
enacting the CWA: its traditional jurisdiction over
waters that were or had been navigable in fact or which
could reasonably be so made.
SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 168 n.3, 172. The Court accordingly
rejected the claim that
isolated ponds, some only seasonal, wholly located
within two Illinois counties, fall under § 404(a)’s
definition of “navigable waters” because they serve as
9
habitat for migratory birds. As counsel for respondents
conceded at oral argument, such a ruling would assume
that “the use of the word navigable in the
statute * * * does not have any independent
significance.”
Id. at 171-172 (omission in original). While acknowledging its
statement in Riverside Bayview that “the word ‘navigable’ in
the statute was of ‘limited effect,’” the Court cautioned that “it
is one thing to give a word limited effect and quite another to
give it no effect whatever.” /d. at 172.
Finally, the SWANCC Court emphasized that its holding on
the scope of § 404 jurisdiction was meant “to avoid the
significant constitutional and federalism questions raised by”
expansion of federal jurisdiction to cover purely local, intrastate
waters. /d. at 174. Those very concerns are raised again by the
court of appeals’ holding below.
B. The Federal Courts Are Deadlocked As To Whether
Isolated, Non-navigable, Intrastate Waters Are
Subject To Federal Regulation Under CWA § 404.
The federal courts are deeply divided over the scope and
meaning of CWA § 404 following this Court’s decision in
SWANCC, particularly over the extent to which federal
agencies can regulate intrastate waters that are neither
immediately adjacent to navigable waters nor have any
significant effect on any navigable waters. In fact, the federal
courts have divided into at least three distinct and irreconcilable
camps.
1. The Seventh Circuit’s decision below reflects the first
of these approaches, holding that SWANCC was limited to its
facts, and that “non-navigable, isolated wetlands that have no
surface connection to the nearest stream or nearest navigable
body of water” are subject to federal regulation so long as
regulators do not rely solely on the now-overturned Migratory
Bird Rule. Put another way, in the view of the Seventh Circuit,
10
the federal government can continue to assert federal
Jurisdiction over isolated, intrastate waters so long as it does not
explicitly rely on the Migratory Bird Rule as the jurisdictional
predicate. According to this view, if the government in
SWANCC had asserted any additional basis for jurisdiction
(e.g., 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3), (a)(5) or (a)(7)), the court of
appeals’ decision in that case would have been affirmed.
The Seventh Circuit’s decision follows a similar ruling by
the Fourth Circuit in United States v. Interstate General Co.,
2002 WL 1421411 (July 2, 2002), which likewise held that
SWANCC addressed only the validity of 33 C.F.R.
§ 328.3(a)(3), “as clarified and applied to petitioner’s balefill
site pursuant to the ‘Migratory Bird Rule,’” and did not
generally address the extent to which federal agencies may
regulate isolated, intrastate waters.
2. The Fifth Circuit, agreeing with Justice Stevens’
interpretation of the majority opinion in SWANCC, has adopted
a different approach, interpreting SWANCC to articulate a
bright line test for § 404 jurisdiction. In his dissent, Justice
Stevens observed that “[i]n its decision today, the Court draws
a new jurisdictional line, one that invalidates the 1986
migratory bird regulation as well as the Corps’ assertion of
jurisdiction over all waters except for actually navigable waters,
their tributaries, and wetlands adjacent to each.” 531 U.S. at
176-177 (dissenting opinion). Justice Stevens also noted that
SWANCC had the effect of excluding from federal regulation
tributaries and wetlands that are neither contiguous nor adjacent
to navigable waters from the scope of Section 404. Jd. at 189
n.14 (dissenting opinion). Accordingly, he concluded that
SWANCC extended § 404 jurisdiction only to navigable-in-fact
7"
waters, primary tributaries to navigable-in-fact waters, and
adjacent wetlands. '
The Fifth Circuit and a growing number of district courts
agree with this broader reading of the majority opinion in
SWANCC and thus have fashioned a bright-line jurisdictional
rule in which “a body of water is subject to regulation under the
CWA if the body of water is actually navigable or is adjacent
to an open body of navigable water.” Rice v. Harken
Exploration Co., 250 F.3d 264, 265, 268-71 (5th Cir. 2001);?
see also Jn re Needham, 279 B.R. 515, 518 (Bankr. W.D. La.
2001) (same); United States v. Rapanos, 190 F. Supp. 2d 1011,
1012 (E.D. Mich. 2002) (holding that wetlands that “were not
directly adjacent to navigable waters” were beyond
government’s reach); United States v. Newdunn Assocs., 195 F.
Supp. 2d 751, 767-768 (E.D. Va. 2002) (agreeing with dissent’s
characterization of SWANCC as excluding “wetlands and
tributaries that are not contiguous or adjacent to navigable
waters” from Corps’s grasp and finding that wetlands at issue
were not “adjacent to navigable waters by any reasonable
definition of adjacency”); United States v. RMG Corp., 222 F.
Supp. 2d 780, 788-789 (E.D. Va. 2002) (holding that wetlands
not adjacent to closest navigable waterway were outside federal
jurisdiction); Michael Gerhardt, On Revolution and Wetland
Regulations, 90 GEO. L.J. 2143, 2154 (2002) (interpreting
' Justice Stevens stated that SWANCC “excised” “Phase 3” waters (described
as all waters other than navigable-in-fact waters, their primary tributaries and
wetlands adjacent/contiguous to each) from the scope of the CWA.
SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 189 n.14 (dissenting opinion); see also United States
v. Newdunn Assocs., 195 F. Supp. 2d 751, 763 (E.D. Va. 2002).
* The actual holding in Rice reads SWANCC even more ambitiously. The
Fifth Circuit held that Big Creek did not qualify as a “navigable water”
within the meaning of the CWA, despite the fact that “Big Creek runs across
the ranch to the Canadian River,” a navigable-in-fact water. 250 F.3d at 265.
The Rice court thus found that even a primary tributary is not a “navigable
water” subject to CWA jurisdiction.
12
SWANCC as holding that “waters that are neither navigable
waters nor adjacent to navigable waters are simply not within
the Corps’s jurisdiction”).
This second approach—that all waters not immediately
adjacent to a navigable water (or at least not abutting onto a
primary tributary of a navigable water) are beyond the limits of
federal regulatory authority—squarely conflicts with the
Seventh Circuit’s position that “non-navigable, isolated
wetlands that have no surface connection to the nearest stream
or nearest navigable body of water” are still within the reach of
federal regulators even after SWANCC.
3. Ccher federal courts have rejected the view of the
Seventh Circuit and the bright-line test adopted by the Fifth
Circuit in favor of an “effects” tests that asks whether the
waters in question have a significant connection to, or effect
upon, a navigable body of water. This view, endorsed by the
Ninth Circuit and various district courts, is equally at odds with
the Seventh Circuit’s holding below.
For instance, in Headwaters, Inc. v. Talent Irrigation Dist.,
243 F.3d 526 (9th Cir. 2001), the Ninth Circuit held that certain
irrigation canals were “waters of the United States” within the
meaning of the CWA. In reaching its decision, the Ninth Circuit
found that the canals were not “isolated” within the meaning of
SWANCC because the introduction of pollutants into the canals
had a deleterious effect on waters of the United States. /d. at
533-534. The Ninth Circuit found that
[b]ecause the canals receive water from natural streams
and lakes, and divert water to streams and creeks, they
are connected as tributaries to other “waters of the
United States.” * * * The Clean Water Act is concerned
with the pollution of tributaries as well as with the
“io
pollution of navigable streams, and “it is incontestable
that substantial pollution of one not only may but very
probably will affect the other.”
Ibid?
Other lower courts have endorsed this same approach. See,
e.g., United States vy. Lamplight Equestrian Ctr., 2002 WL
360652, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 8, 2002) (after SWANCC, “the
critical issue is whether there is a ‘significant nexus’ between
the Property’s wetlands and the Fox River [the navigable
water]”); United States v. Rueth Dev., 189 F. Supp. 2d 874,
877-878 (N.D. Ind. 2002) (finding that relationship between
wetlands and navigable water was “direct” and that property
“has the ‘significant nexus’ to a navigable waterway necessary
to trigger Army Corps of Engineers jurisdiction under CWA
§ 404(a)”); Brace v. United States, 51 Fed. Cl. 649 (2002)
(focusing on whether “nexus” exists between wetlands and
navigable water); Idaho Rural Council v. Bosma, 143 F. Supp.
2d 1169, 1179 (D. Idaho 2001) (waters were “sufficiently
connected” via surface water to navigable water to be subject
to federal jurisdiction); United States v. Buday, 138 F. Supp. 2d
1282, 1290 n.14 (D. Mont. 2001) (since no one disputed
adjacency, court analyzed effect tributary had on navigable
water and found that it was “significant” and that its water
quality was vital to that of navigable water).
Under this “effects” approach, a court assessing the limits
of § 404 jurisdiction must determine whether the waters in
dispute have a “significant nexus” with a navigable water body.
While obviously distinct from the bright-line test endorsed by
* Headwaters involved neither the Migratory Bird Rule nor § 404 of the
CWA. It concerned § 402 of the CWA and an irrigation district’s alleged
discharge of herbicides without an NPDES permit. The mere fact that the
Ninth Circuit addressed SWANCC in a non-section 404 case thus confirms
its disagreement with the Seventh Circuit’s narrow reading of that decision.
14
the Fifth Circuit in Rice, this approach stands equally and
irreconcilably in conflict with the Seventh Circuit’s narrow
reading of SWANCC below.
The Seventh Circuit held that petitioners’ Waters are
subject to continuing federal control under SWANCC even
though they are not adjacent to any navigable body of water
and lack a significant nexus to any navigable waters. In the
Seventh Circuit’s view, both of these facts are irrelevant simply
because the federal government did not rely exclusively on the
Migratory Bird Rule. Whichever approach one favors, the
circuit split over this important issue is both significant and
undeniable.
Indeed, the pervasive confusion over where to draw the
jurisdictional limits of § 404 has been widely recognized. A
recent editorial in the Washington Post highlighted this
confusion and the mounting problems that the circuit split is
causing:
Last year the Supreme Court narrowed the reach of the
Clean Water Act, holding that it doesn’t apply to
“isolated” wetlands because it refers to navigable
waters. The result has been confusion, and potential
danger to natural habitats. Federal officials in different
areas of the country have put the court’s ruling into
practice differently. States haven’t made much progress
in filling the gap. Two U.S. courts have reached
opposite conclusions about how much connection to
navigable water is enough to bring a wetland within the
Clean Water Act’s reach.
Protecting Wetlands, WASH. POST, Sept. 27, 2002, at A22.
Many district courts also have acknowledged the confusion
that now exists over the meaning of SWANCC and the
compelling need for Supreme Court guidance as to whether
§ 404 extends to isolated wetlands not immediately adjacent to
navigable waters. See, e.g., Lamplight Equestrian Ctr., 2002
LA ee Pee er ae a eee
15
WL 360652, at *5 (“Courts interpreting SWANCC have reached
varying results, the primary rift being whether the Migratory
Bird Rule was the decision’s only casualty, or whether the
holding limited the Corps’ jurisdiction even further”); United
States v. Interstate General Co., 152 F. Supp. 2d 843, 848 (D.
Md. 2001) (“[t]he Court is aware that there is a difference of
opinion with regards to the application of SWANCC as applied
to the CWA”), aff'd, 2002 WL 1421411 (4th Cir. July 2, 2002).
Whatever the answer to this important question, the
- prejudice to petitioners and others resulting from this split of
authority is plain. If petitioners’ Waters had been located in the
Fifth or Ninth Circuits, those Waters would today be free from
federal control, subject instead to the proper regulation of state
and local authorities. But because they happen to be located
within the Seventh Circuit, petitioners are precluded from
developing their property as they wish, even though the subject
Waters are located 19.1 stream miles away from the nearest
navigable water, and the filling of those Waters would have no
effect upon any navigable water body.
Absent Supreme Court review, this question will
undoubtedly continue to plague the courts. Since this Court’s
decision in SWANCC, numerous federal decisions have been
issued that attempt to discern its meaning, many of which have
come to opposite conclusions. Trip Van Noppen, Current
Developments in Clean Water Act Litigation, SG101 ALI-ABA
1041, 1043 (2002) (the SWANCC decision “has spawned
decisions on CWA jurisdictional issues in a dizzying variety of
fact situations with conflicting results”). There is no reason to
believe that the lower courts can resolve this disagreement
without Supreme Court guidance.
C. The Seventh Circuit’s Holding Is Inconsistent With
This Court’s Decision In SWANCC.
The Seventh Circuit’s holding that federal agencies possess
the power to regulate “nonnavigable, isolated wetlands that
16
have no surface connection to the nearest stream or nearest
navigable body of water” cannot be reconciled with this Court’s
decision in SWANCC.
As set forth above, SWANCC plainly did more than merely
strike down the Migratory Bird Rule. At the very least,
SWANCC limited § 404 jurisdiction to: (1) navigable-in-fact
waters; (2) primary tributaries of navigable-in-fact waters; and
(3) wetlands “immediately adjacent” to each. Indeed, the
majority opinion suggests an even broader holding, one that
limits the jurisdiction of federal regulators to two categories of
waters: (1) navigable-in-fact waters and (2) wetlands
immediately adjacent thereto. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 168
(Section 404 does not extend “to ponds that are not adjacent to
open water”); id. at 172 (“[t]he term ‘navigable’ has at least the
import of showing us what Congress had in mind as its
authority for enacting the CWA: its traditional jurisdiction over
waters that were or had been navigable in fact or which could
reasonably be so made”).
This Court was presented with a petition for certiorari
relying on this reading of SWANCC shortly after that case was
decided. John Rapanos, who had been convicted of illegally
filling wetlands that were “at least 20 miles from the nearest
navigable waterway,”™ asked the Court to decide whether, under
SWANCC, federal regulators have § 404 “jurisdiction over
isolated wetiands not adjacent to any navigable or open
waters.” See Rapanos v. United States, Petition for Certiorari
at i, 7 (No. 00-1428). This Court granted the petition, vacated
the judgment below and remanded for further consideration in
light of SWANCC. See Rapanos v. United States, 533 U.S. 913
(2001).
* The hydrological connection in Rapanos was described as follows: “any
water flowing from Mr. Rapanos’ property would flow into the Lobodzinski
Drain, then into the Hoppler Drain and from there into the Kawkawlin River,
ultimately reaching the Saginaw Bay [a navigable body of water], some
twenty (20) miles away.” Rapanos Pet. 8.
stents
17
Following the remand, the district court vacated the
defendant’s 1995 criminal conviction, holding “as a matter of
law that the wetlands on Defendant’s property were not directly
adjacent to navigable waters, and therefore, the government
cannot regulate Defendant’s property.” United States v.
Rapanos, 190 F. Supp. 2d 1011, 1017 (E.D. Mich. 2002).
The district court in Rapanos thus applied the “immediately
adjacent” test adopted by the Fifth Circuit. And as in Rapanos,
petitioners’ Waters here are beyond the federal regulators’ —
reach under this standard. Petitioners’ Waters are clearly non-
navigable and isolated, as established by the uncontradicted
expert testimony presented below. The nearest non-navigable
water body, Salt Creek, is located 1.9 stream miles away from
the property, and the nearest navigable water, the Des Plaines
River at Hoffman Dam, is located 19.1 stream miles away.
App., infra, 71a-72a. In order for any runoff from the property
to reach the Des Plaines River at Hoffman Dam, it must travel
into a manhole with an open grate, which connects to a
“manmade, underground, concrete storm sewer system”’ that
runs 2000 feet east and then flows into a small ditch that joins :
non-navigable Salt Creek about 1.5 miles further east. Id at
71a. Salt Creek then joins the Des Plaines River approximately
16.5 stream miles to the Southeast. Jbid At these distances,
petitioners’ Waters can hardly be described as “immediately
adjacent” to or abutting ona navigable water or even a primary
tributary to a navigable water.
Petitioners’ Waters also lie beyond the limits of federal
regulation if one were to apply the “effects” approach adopted
by the Ninth Circuit and other courts. Petitioners’ Waters have
no “significant nexus” with, nor are they — in the words of
Riverside Bayview—“inseparably bound up” with any
navigable waters. See 474 U.S. at 133. Indeed, petitioners
presented uncontradicted expert testimony that even the filling
of all of petitioners’ Waters—not just the 4.5 acres allegedly
filled—“would have no measurable effect on the Des Plaines
18
River or Salt Creek in terms of wildlife habitat, stormwater
retention, flood flow attenuation and water purification.” App.,
infra, 74a. In fact, the “Site’s drainage is often times
hydrologically isolated.” /d. at 72a.
Given these uncontradicted facts, to extend § 404 to cover
the Waters in this case would not only run contrary to the
statute, but also would clearly violate the Commerce
Clause—raising the same “significant constitutional and
federalism questions” that this Court highlighted in SWANCC.
531 U.S. at 174; see also ibid. (“Regulation of land use [is] a
function traditionally performed by local governments”)
(quoting Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30,
44 (1994)). Indeed, federal agencies are seeking to regulate the
use of waters and private property that have no conceivable
connection to any federal interest in commerce or navigation.
Congress clearly did not allow regulators to meddle in such
intrinsically local issues:
Rather than expressing a desire to readjust the federal-
state balance in this manner, Congress chose to
“recognize, preserve, and protect the primary
responsibilities and rights of States * * * to plan the
development and use * * * of land and water resources
* * * >
Ibid. (omissions in original). These concerns lead to the
inexorable conclusion that the federal government has no
jurisdiction to regulate the sort of private, intrastate and non-
navigable waters at issue in this case. After all, “[w]here an
administrative interpretation of a statute invokes the outer
limits of Congress’ power, we expect a clear indication that
Congress intended that result.” Jd. at 172. No such indication
appears in this case.
In short, SWANCC confirms that federal regulators never
had jurisdiction over petitioners’ Waters. The Seventh Circuit’s
holding to the contrary must be reversed.
19
II. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT ERRED IN REFUSING TO
RESCIND THE CONSENT DECREE AS VOID AB
INITIO DUE TO THE GOVERNMENT’S LACK OF
REGULATORY AUTHORITY.
Petitioners moved to vacate the consent decree in this case
on the ground that federal agencies never had authority to
regulate petitioners’ Waters, that its execution of the consent
decree was thus an ultra vires act, and that the government
should not be allowed to continue regulating petitioners’
Waters when it never possessed regulatory authority over them
in the first place. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of the
motion t. vacate, holding that even if the federal government
never had regulatory authority over petitioners’ Waters,
petitioners are nevertheless bound by the Consent Decree
because they “expressly agreed that certain waters on [the]
property constituted ‘waters of the United States,’ subject to
regulation by the EPA.” App., infra, 15a. In the Seventh
Circuit’s view, even if the federal government never had
authority to regulate petitioners’ Waters, the government
nevertheless can continue to regulate them pursuant to
petitioners’ stipulation to federal regulatory jurisdiction.°
The Seventh Circuit’s holding clearly conflicts not only
with this Court’s decisions, but with those of other multiple
courts of appeals, which have held that consent decrees and
other contracts are subject to rescission where the government
—
* Citing previous decisions in this case, at least two district courts have
bound private parties by their stipulations to EPA jurisdiction. See United
States v. Rueth Dev. Co., 189 F. Supp. 2d 874, 890 (N.D. Ind. 2002) (“By
assenting to settlement in this action, Defendants waived, for example, the
right to contest the EPA’s regulatory jurisdiction”); Interstate General, 152
F. Supp. 2d at 848-849 (barring defendant from challenging federal CWA
jurisdiction after pleading guilty to environmental crime); see also United
States v. Ownbey Enters., Inc., 789 F. Supp. 1145, 1150 (N.D. Ga. 1992)
(defendant’s “admission as to EPA’s jurisdiction acts as an acceptance by
[defendant] that all necessary conditions precedent to the issuance of this
Order have been fulfilled”).
20
lacked authority to enter into them. Indeed, to hold otherwise
would be to allow the federal government to retain the spoils of
illegal regulation and to continue its improper intrusion upon
the rights of state and local governments to regulate the use of
intrastate waters that have no conceivable connection to any
navigable waters.
A. Private Citizens Cannot Contractually Expand A
Federal Agency’s Statutory And Constitutional
Authority.
The Consent Decree in this case permits federal agencies to
regulate petitioners’ Waters on an ongoing basis. Despite a lack
of statutory authority, it authorizes the government to gain
access to the Royce property, requires petitioners to sell or
convey the property only subject to certain restrictive covenants
that run with the land, entitles the government to over $1.5
million in penalties currently in escrow and further fines if
petitioners violate the decree, empowers the government to
enforce the decree and all of its prohibitions, and forbids
petitioners from discharging dredged or fill material into the
waters without a permit. App., infra, 35a, 40a-41a, 48a-49a,
52a-57a.
As demonstrated above, however, petitioners’ isolated
wetlands were never within the regulatory jurisdiction of the
EPA. If that is so, it makes no difference that petitioners
stipulated to federal regulatory jurisdiction in the Decree. This
Court has clearly held that federal agencies may not act beyond
their congressionally delegated authority. “[N]o matter how
‘important, conspicuous, and controversial’ the issue * * * an
administrative agency’s power to regulate in the public interest
must always be grounded in a valid grant of authority from
Congress.” FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529
U.S. 120, 161 (2000); see also Bowen v. Georgetown Univ.
Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988) (“It is axiomatic that an
administrative agency’s power * * * is limited to the authority
delegated by Congress”); Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S.
21
281, 302 (1979) (“The legislative power of the United States is
vested in the Congress, and the exercise of quasi-legislative
authority by governmental departments and agencies must be
rooted in a grant of such power by the Congress and subject to
limitations which that body imposes”).
The constitutional limits on federal power, and the statutory
limits on agency authority, are fundamental to the American
conception of a federal government of limited powers.
Consistent with this principle, courts have long recognized that
private citizens may not confer authority upon a government
actor that the actor does not otherwise enjoy under law. See,
e.g., Local Number 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of
Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 526 (1986) (“[T]he parties may [not]
agree to take action that conflicts with or violates the statute
upon which the complaint was based”); Williams v. Metzler,
132 F.3d 937, 942, 943 (3d Cir. 1997) (“[T]he parties are
attempting to vest consensual jurisdiction in the Secretary to
perform a function that Congress has explicitly placed in the
district court. * * * If the Secretary’s decision serves to block
full consideration of the merits in the district court, then the
Secretary has done indirectly what is ultra vires if done
directly”); see also Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 638,
650 (1990) (“it is fundamental ‘that an agency may not
bootstrap itself into an area in which it has no jurisdiction”).
Federal regulators attempt to do here precisely what this
Court has forbidden—to expand their regulatory jurisdiction by
contract. The fundamental restrictions on federal agency power,
however, apply to all forms of regulation, including
enforcement through consent decrees. As the Fifth Circuit has
noted, “[c]ourts must be especially cautious when parties seek
to achieve by consent decree what they cannot achieve by their
own authority. Consent is not enough when litigants seek to
grant themselves powers they do not hold outside of court.”
League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Clements, 999 F.2d 831,
846 (Sth Cir. 1993) (en banc); see also Keith v. Volpe, 118 F.3d
22
1386, 1393 (9th Cir. 1997) (“To the extent the parties to the
Consent Decree intended to ban advertising displays next to
I-105, they could not agree to terms which would exceed their
authority and supplant state law”); National Revenue Corp. v.
Violet, 807 F.2d 285, 288 (1st Cir. 1986) (“For an attorney
general to stipulate that an act of the legislature is
unconstitutional is a clear confusion of the three branches of
government * * * . An attorney general can have no authority
to be the binding determiner that legislation is unconstitutional.
The agreed judgment was void on its face”).
Thus, if the federal government never had statutory or
constitutional authority to regulate petitioners’ Waters, it was
necessarily without authority to enter into any consent decree
that regulates wetlands beyond the statutory and constitutional
reaches of federal power.
B. This Court’s Decisions And Those Of Other Courts
Of Appeals Confirm That Consent Decrees Are Void
Ab Initio And Subject To Rescission Where The
Government Had No Authority To Execute Them.
Consent decrees are governed by principles of contract
law,® and it is black-letter contract law that where a
government’s execution of a contract constitutes an ultra vires
act, the contract itself is void ab initio and has no legal effect.
Indeed, this Court has adopted this prevailing view as federal
common law. In Federal Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S.
380 (1947), for instance, the Court held that an ultra vires
contract with a federal agency was void and unenforceable. In
° This Court has held many times that “a consent decree or order is to be
construed for enforcement purposes basically as a contract.” United States
v. ITT Cont’! Baking Co., 420 U.S. 223, 238 (1975); see also, e.g., United
States v. Armour & Co., 402 U.S. 673, 682 (1971); Hughes v. United States,
342 U.S. 353, 356 (1952). Consent decrees are governed by contract law
because “‘it is the parties’ agreement that serves as the source of the court’s
authority to enter any judgment at all.” Local Number 93, 478 U.S. at 522.
23
that case, the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation—an agency
created by Congress as part of the Department of
Agriculture—accepted an application for crop insurance. Later
that year, drought destroyed the insured crop. The Corporation
refused to pay the loss because it learned that the crop was
planted on re-seeded land, and federal regulations prohibited
the Corporation from issuing insurance policies to crops on
such lands. /d. at 381-382. Despite the equities of the situation,
the Court held that the insurance policy was void ab initio
because the Corporation lacked authority to issue the policy in
the first place. Jd. at 385; see also The Floyd Acceptances, 74
U.S. (7 Wall.) 666, 671, 681 (1869) (contract between
Secretary of War and supply company was null and void
because “the secretary was acting wholly beyond the scope of
his authority”).
This Court has reached the same conclusion with respect to
consent decrees in particular. A century ago, for instance, the
Court voided an ultra vires consent decree between the United
States and two defendants in United States v. Beebe, 180 U.S.
343 (1901). The defendants in that case were sureties on a
federal tax collector’s bond; when the collector failed to
account for public monies that had come into his hands, the
United States moved to collect from the defendants. /d. at 344-
345. The government commenced actions against the
defendants seeking over $28,000, but the attorney for the
government eventually agreed to a consent judgment—due to
the defendants’ claimed poverty—by which the government
would dismiss the actions in exchange for a $100 payment from
each defendant. /d. at 344-346.
Four years after the district court approved the consent
judgment, the government petitioned to void it on the ground
that the prosecutor had lacked authority to enter into it; federal
regulations at the time provided that “no district attorney shall
agree to take a judgment or decree for a less amount than is
claimed by the United States, without express instructions from
24
the Solicitor of the Treasury.” Beebe, 180 U.S. at 351. The
Court held that “(a] judgment entered upon such a compromise
is subject to be set aside on the ground of the lack of authority
in the attorney to make the compromise upon which the
judgment rests,” and “the judgment will be vacated on that
ground.” /d. at 352. The Court ordered the parties returned to
the status quo ante—after a new trial or settlement, the
defendants’ $100 payments would be either returned to them or
credited against the judgment. /d. at 354-355.’
Lower federal courts consistently have applied this rule. In
United States v. Amdahl Corp., 786 F.2d 387 (Fed. Cir. 1986),
for example, the court held that a contract by the Treasury
Department to acquire computer equipment exceeded the
agency’s authority. Such an ultra vires contract, the court held,
was void ab initio and was therefore rescinded. Jd. at 393. The
court stated that “[a]dministrative actions taken in violation of
statutory authorization or requirement are of no effect. * * *
The courts are bound to strike down illegal contracts.” Jd. at
392-393; see also Schism v. United States, __ F.3d __, 2002
WL 31549178, at *13-*23 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 18, 2002) (en banc)
(holding that military lacked authority to promise lifetime
healthcare to certain servicemen); Orange v. District of
Columbia, 59 F.3d 1267, 1271 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (holding that
university’s employment contracts with plaintiff-professors
’ The Court took a similar path in Kelley v. Town of Milan, 127 U.S. 139
(1888). Investors there sued a municipality to collect on railroad bonds
issued by the local government. Under state law, the municipality lacked the
authority to issue the bonds, id. at 150, and it attempted to avoid payment on
that basis. To rebut that assertion, the investors pointed to a consent decree
between the municipality and the relevant railroad company that declared the
bonds valid; the municipality argued that, as with the bonds themselves, its
agents lacked authority to enter the consent decree. /d. at 158-160. The Court
held that “(t]he act of the mayor, in signing that [consent] agreement, could
give no validity to the bonds, if they had none at the time the agreement was
made. The want of authority to issue them extended to a want of authority
to declare them vaiid. The mayor had no such authority.” /d. at 159.
25
were “invalid as written” and therefore void and unenforceable
because the contracts were not approved by the university’s
Board of Trustees, as required by D.C. law); Total Med. Megmt.,
Inc. v. United States, 104 F.3d 1314, 1320-1321 (Fed. Cir.
1997) (“Neither the Secretary of Defense nor any of his
designated representatives had the authority to obligate
CHAMPUS beyond these base rates set by regulation”);
Augusta Aviation, Inc. v. United States, 671 F.2d 445, 448-449
(11th Cir. 1982) (holding that contract between V.A. and school
was “void for lack of authorization” because “[t]he
Administrator does not have the power to grant a veteran any
more money than the amount permitted by the ratio in the
statute”).® |
In this case, if this Court were to hold that federal regulators
never had authority over petitioners’ Waters, it follows that the
Consent Decree must be rescinded as an ultra vires contract,
notwithstanding petitioners’ stipulation to EPA jurisdiction. To
hold otherwise would permit the federal government to expand
its jurisdiction by contract beyond the limits specified by
Congress and the Constitution, thus improperly altering the
very balance between state and federal power that this Court
sought to protect in SWANCC.
If, as petitioners contend, the government lacked
jurisdiction over their Waters, the Consent Decree must be
declared void ab initio, and the appropriate remedy is
rescission, putting the parties back in the positions they held
before the government’s illegal exercise of regulatory authority.
See REW Enters. v. Premier Bank, N.A., 49 F.3d 163, 171 (5th
Cir. 1995) (voiding federal land bank’s ultra vires acceptance
of letter of credit and returning all parties to status quo ante:
* See also 12 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 35:63 (4th ed. 1999)
(summarizing general rule that ultra vires contracts by governments are
void); 2 FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 5.1 (2d ed. 1998) (summarizing
general rule that illegal contracts are void ab initio).
26
“Because an ultra vires contract is null and void, the remedy for
rescission of that contract is to put the parties in the position
they would have occupied had the unlawful agreement not been
made”); Tuxedo Cheverly Volunteer Fire Co. v. Prince
George's County, 385 A.2d 819 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1978)
(holding that municipal corporation’s ultra vires contract was
void ab initio and therefore required returning parties to status
quo ante); Bennett v. Hedglin, 995 P.2d 668 (Alaska 2000)
(rescission is proper remedy for contracts that are void ab
initio); Bergstrom v. Estate of DeVoe, 854 P.2d 860 (Nev.
1993) (same); Klopp v. Keystone Ins. Cos., 595 A.2d 1 (Pa.
1991) (same).
In short, the Seventh Circuit’s holding that petitioners are
bound by their consent to EPA regulatory jurisdiction
contravenes this Court’s established jurisprudence and the
holdings of other courts of appeals, and must be reversed.
CONCLUSION
The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.
Respectfully submitted.
JAVIER H. RUBINSTEIN
Counsel of Record
SUSAN E. BRICE
MICHAEL A. SCODRO
Mayer, Brown, Rowe & Maw
190 South LaSalle Street
Chicago, Illinois 60603
(312) 782-0600
APPENDIX
la
APPENDIX A
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,
Vv.
ROBERT R. KRILICH, KRILICH COMPANIES, INC.,
RIVERWOODS DEVELOPMENT CORP., ET AL.,
Defendants-Appellants.
No. 01-2746.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 92 C 5354—William T. Hart, Judge.
Argued May 14, 2002—Decided Sept. 9, 2002.
Before COFFEY, MANION, and EVANS, Circuit Judges.
MANION, Circuit Judge.
In 1992, the EPA sued Robert Krilich and several
corporations he controlled, alleging violations of the Clean
Water Act. The parties entered into a Consent Decree resolving
the case. However, after the Supreme Court held that the Army
Corps of Engineers exceeded its authority in extending the
definition of “navigable waters” under the Clean Water Act to
include intrastate waters used by migratory birds, Krilich
moved the district court to vacate the Consent Decree. The
district court refused to do so. Krilich appeals, and we affirm.
2a
I. Factual and Legal Background
On August 7, 1992, the United States Environmental
Protection Agency (“EPA”) filed a civil complaint against the
defendants,' alleging that they violated the Clean Water Act, 33
U.S.C. § 1251 et seq. (“CWA”). The government alleged that
Krilich violated Section 301 of the CWA by discharging fill
material without a permit into wetlands on two Illinois sites that
he was developing: the Royce Renaissance site in Oakbrook,
Illinois and the Sullivan Lake site in Lakemoor, Illinois.
Section 301(a) prohibits the “discharge of any pollutant,”
except as otherwise authorized by the CWA. 33 U.S.C. §
1311(a). Section 404 of the CWA authorizes the Secretary to
issue a permit approving “the discharge of dredged or fill
material into the navigable waters.” 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a).
“Navigable waters” are defined as “waters of the United
States.” 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7). “Waters of the United States” are
further defined by regulations promulgated under the CWA. 33
C.F.R. § 323.2(a). See generally 33 C.F.R. Pt. 328. Section
328.3(a)(3) further defines “waters of the United States” to
include “{a]ll other waters such as intrastate lakes, rivers,
streams (including intermittent streams), mudflats, sandflats,
wetlands, sloughs, prairie potholes, wet meadows, playa lakes,
or natural ponds, the use, degradation or destruction of which
could affect interstate or foreign commerce.” 33 C.F.R. §
328.3(a)(3).
While the suit was pending and the parties were negotiating,
this court issued a decision holding that the EPA’s construction
of “waters of the United States” as including intrastate,
nonadjacent or “isolated” wetlands under 40 C.F.R.
' The government filed suit against Robert Krilich individually and several
corporations which he controlled. Throughout this anaes we simply refer
to “Krilich” or the “defendants”.
3a
§ 230.3(s)(3)’ exceeded its authority under the CWA. See
Hoffman Homes, Inc. v. Adm’r, United States Envtl. Prot.
Agency, 961 F.2d 1310, 1316 (7th Cir. 1992) (“Hoffman Homes
I”), vacated by 975 F.2d 1554 (7th Cir. 1992). In Hoffman
Homes I, this court further held that, even if the regulation was
reasonable under the CWA, Congress lacked authority under
the Commerce Clause to regulate such waters based simply on
the actual or potential use of such waters by migratory birds.’
Id. at 1321. Following Hoffman Homes I, Krilich and the EPA
drafted a Consent Decree to settle their dispute. The Consent
Decree acknowledged the potential impact of the Hoffman
Homes I decision by incorporating the following provisions:
IV. DEFINITIONS
10. Except as specifically modified herein, the terms
“waters of the United States”; “wetlands”: “dredged
material”; “fill material”; “discharge of dredged
material”; and “discharge of fill material” shall have the
meanings assigned them at 40 C.F.R. § 230.3 or 33 C.F.R.
§ 323.2. “EPA” means the United States Environmental
Protection Agency, and “Corps” means the United States
Army Corps of Engineers.
* * *
? 40 C.F.R. § 230.3(s\(3), the EPA regulation that defines “waters of the
United States,” is identical to the Army Corps of Engineers regulation, 33
C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3), also defining the phrase. As noted, infra, both are
referenced in Paragraph 10 ofthe Consent Decree. =|
* The Migratory Bird Rule was intended to clarify the scope of 33 C.F.R.
328.3(a)(3), and provided that “waters of the United States . . . also include
the following waters: a. Which are or would be used as habitat by birds
protected by Migratory Bird Treaties; or b. Which are or would be used as
habitat by other migratory birds which cross state lines . . . .” 51 Fed. Reg.
41217 (1986).
4a
V. WATERS OF THE UNITED STATES
17. For purposes of this Consent Decree, the parties shall
treat wetland and open water areas depicted on Exhibit 1,
together with the new wetland and open water area
created pursuant to Part VII (injunctive relief) and
depicted on Exhibit 2, as waters of the United States
located on the Royce Renaissance Property.
** *
0A. The Defendants shall continue to treat wetland and
open water areas depicted on Exhibit 1 as waters of the
United States until the mandate issues in Hoffman Homes,
Inc. v. EPA, No. 90-3810 (7th Cir. April 20, 1992) and
until proceedings related to any appeal, petition for
certiorari, or remand are completed. Following
completion of these proceedings, unless pertinent portions
of the Seventh Circuit’s April 20, 1992 decision are
reversed, Exhibit 1 areas W2A, W2B, W3, W5B, and W9
shall be excluded from the obligations imposed in
Paragraph 17.
Thus, the parties expressly excluded some waters on the
defendant’s property and agreed to treat the rest of the waters
as “waters of the United States.”
Before the parties approved the final Consent Decree,
Hoffman Homes I was vacated “on September 4, 1992, before
the birds had reason to migrate south.” United States v. Krilich,
209 F.3d 968, 970 (7th Cir. 2000) (“Krilich IV”). Thereafter,
the parties signed the Consent Decree, incorporating the
Hoffman Homes I language, notwithstanding the fact that it had
been vacated. The Consent Decree required the defendants to
undertake certain remediation and mitigation activities and to
pay fines for filling wetlands. On October 29, 1992, the district
Sa
court entered final judgment under the Consent Decree, and
under the terms of the Decree, retained jurisdiction.‘
Nine months after the Consent Decree was agreed upon and
final judgment entered, this court issued Hoffman Homes II,
wherein we held that the EPA lacked jurisdiction over the
wetlands at issue because the government had failed to present
substantial evidence (under the “Migratory Bird Rule’) that
migratory birds actually used the wetlands as a habitat. See
Hoffman Homes, Inc. v. Adm’r, United States Envt’l Prot.
Agency, 999 F.2d 256, 261-62 (7th Cir. 1993) (“Hoffman Homes
IT’). Unlike Hoffman Homes I, we did not reach the question of
whether the Migratory Bird Rule was within the limits of
Congress’ power under the Commerce Clause.
On September 27, 1995, the government moved to enforce
the Consent Decree, alleging that Krilich had failed to construct
the replacement wetland by the date specified in the Consent
Decree and that Krilich had violated the Decree by discharging
fill material into an area known as W9, which the government
contended was a “water of the United States.” The district court
agreed with the government regarding Krilich’s failure to
perform remediation and imposed civil penalties of $1,307,500.
See United States v. Krilich, 948 F. Supp. 719, 728 (N.D. Ill.
1996) (“‘Krilich [’). With respect to the allegation that Krilich
had improperly discharged fill material into W9, the district
court concluded that “pertinent portions” of Hoffman Homes I
had not been “reversed” by Hoffman Homes II within the
meaning of Paragraph 20A of the Consent Decree. /d. at 725.
Therefore, the district court concluded that, under the Decree,
W9 was not a “water of the United States” and accordingly
denied the government’s motion to impose a penalty for filling
* Paragraph 2 of the Consent Decree provides: “The Court shall! retain
jurisdiction in order to enable any party to apply to the Court at any time for
such further relief as may be necessary to interpret, enforce, or modify this
Decree.”
6a
that area. Krilich appealed the district court’s decision to
impose penalties for his failure to perform remediation, id., and
this court affirmed, but remanded the case to the district court
to correct an error made in calculating that penalty. See United
States v. Krilich, 126 F.3d 1035, 1037-38 (7th Cir. 1997)
(“Krilich IT’). On remand, in November 1998, Krilich moved
pursuant to Rule 60(b)(4) to vacate the district court's original
judgment entering the Consent Decree, arguing that the court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the EPA’s complaint.
Specifically, Krilich argued that
the land he allegedly filled was an “isolated intrastate
wetland” which was beyond the federal government's
commerce power to regulate. Because Congress lacked
authority to regulate his property, Krilich contend[ed] that
the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over
the EPA’s complaint. And even though he agreed to the
terms of the consent decree, which included a provision
that the wetlands filled were “waters of the United
States,” Krilich [argued] that this does not change the
result because you can never consent to subject matter
jurisdiction, and lack of jurisdiction can be raised at any
time.
Krilich IV, 209 F.3d at 971. The district court rejected Krilich’s
argument, United States v. Krilich, 1999 WL 182333 (N.D. Ill.
March 25, 1999) (‘‘Krilich IIT”), and on appeal this court held
that “the district court had subject matter jurisdiction over the
EPA’s case against Krilich because the suit civilly charged a
violation of a federal statute which is within the federal courts’
federal question jurisdiction.” Krilich IV, 209 F.3d at 973.
Additionally, we held that Krilich’s argument failed “because
he entered into a consent decree stipulating that the waters
involved were ‘waters of the United States.”” Id. Finally, we
stated that, because the district court had subject matter
jurisdiction based on the terms of the Consent Decree, we did
not need to reach the question of whether the regulation of
Ta
isolated intrastate wetlands exceeded Congress’ power under
the Commerce Clause. /d. at 973, n. 5.
Last year, nine months after we issued Krilich IV, the
Supreme Court rendered a decision holding that 33 C.F.R.
§ 328.3(a)(3), as clarified by the Migratory Bird Rule, “exceeds
the authority granted to [the Army Corps of Engineers] under
§ 404(a) of the CWA.” Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook
Co. v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, 531 U.S. 159,
174 (2001) (““SWANCC’”). In interpreting Section 404(a), the
Court concluded that nothing in the text of the CWA indicated
that Congress intended to allow the jurisdiction of the Corps of
Engineers to extend to “ponds tha: are not adjacent to open
water.” Jd. at 168. The Supreme Court did not reach the
question of whether Congress could exercise such authority
consistent with its power to legislate under the Commerce
Clause. Jd. at 162, 174.
After SWANCC was issued by the Supreme Court, Krilich
brought the present motion in federal district court, arguing
that, under SWANCC, the waters affected by the Consent
Decree are not subject to the EPA’s authority under the CWA.
Therefore, Krilich reasoned, the execution and enforcement of
the Consent Decree by the EPA is an ultra vires act and the
Consent Decree was void ab initio. Krilich identified three
bases for the district court’s authority to vacate or modify the
Decree: the express reservation-of-jurisdiction clause contained
in Paragraph 2 of the Consent Decree, the court’s inherent
power to modify its judgments, and Rule 60(b)(5) in light of a
change in the law, namely, the SVANCC decision.’
* Even though Krilich brought the action under the Consent Decree’s express
reservation-of-jurisdiction clause and under the court’s inherent authority,
and only alternatively under Rule 60(b)(5), the court treated his motion as
one under Rule 60(b). United States v. Krilich, 152 F. Supp. 2d 983, 990
(N.D. Ill. 2001) (“Krilich V’). The district court noted that its inherent
authority to modify its judgments was not more expansive than the authority
provided in Rule 60(b). /d. Additionally, the district court concluded that its
8a
In considering Krilich’s motion, the district court assumed
that all of the waters at issue were nonnavigable, isolated
wetlands that had no surface connection to the nearest stream
or nearest navigable body of water. Krilich V, 152 F. Supp. 2d
at 989. Even so, the district court denied the defendants’
motion, holding that even if the Consent Decree were ultra
vires, it did not have the authority to vacate or modify it. The
court reached this conclusion for several reasons,’ but only one
is challenged on appeal: whether the Decree should be
modified under Rule 60(b)(5) due to a change in the law.® The
powers under Paragraph 2 were not broader than its authority under Rule
60(b). /d. Krilich abandons his reliance upon the court’s inherent authority
on appeal, but as explained below, continues to argue that both Rule 60(b)(5)
and Paragraph 2 of the Consent Decree serve as independent bases for
modification.
© The defendants submitted an expert report of Gary C. Schaefer, P.E. in
support of their motion, contending, that all the waters at issue under the
Consent Decree were isolated.
7 The court analyzed Krilich’s motion under Rule 60(b)(4), which provides
for relief if the judgment is void, and determined that the fact that a party to
a consent judgment lacked authority to consent does not void the judgment
itself. Krilich V, 152 F. Supp. 2d at 991. Next, the court analyzed Krilich’s
motion under Rule 60(b)(1) for mistake of law and rejected this ground as
untimely. /d. at 992. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b) (Rule 60(b)(1) motion must be
brought within one year of entry of judgment). Third, the district court
analyzed Krilich’s motion under the catch-all provision of Rule 60(b)(6) and
concluded that because Krilich had stipulated that the property in question
constituted “waters of the United States” it was bound by that stipulation.
152 F. Supp. 2d at 992. Cf Krilich IV, 209 F.3d at 972 (Krilich could not
“assail the district court’s subject matter jurisdiction because he entered into
a consent decree in which he agreed that the waters involved were “waters
of the United States.’”). Krilich does not appeal these determinations and,
therefore, we need not review them.
8 Rule 60(b)(5) provides, in part, that a judgment may be modified if “it is
no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(5).
9a
district court first noted that in Hoffman Homes I this court held
that “isolated wetlands” were not subject to CWA regulation.
Id. at 994. The court then noted that the parties took this
decision into account by referencing it in Paragraph 20A of the
Consent Decree and expressly excluding specified wetlands
that Krilich contended were isolated. /d. The court also noted
the Supreme Court’s decision in SWANCC holding that the
Migratory Bird Rule exceeded the agencies’ authority under the
CWA. /d. The district court determined that the Supreme
Court's decision in SWANCC was no more narrow than
Hoffman Homes I, and since Paragraph 20A of the Consent
Decree was crafted with that decision in mind, the district court
concluded that the Decree was drafted in light of controlling
precedent that was no less favorable to Krilich than SWANCC.
Id. at 994-95. The court also noted that “[e]quity does not
require that the Decree be reopened so that defendants may now
litigate whether the wetlands on the property are actually
isolated. Defendants chose not to do so more than eight years
ago and the legal framework has not changed in a manner that
would justify doing it today.” /d. at 995.
Krilich appeals, claiming that the district court should have
vacated or modified the Consent Decree under either Rule
60(b)(5) or the Consent Decree's reservation-of-jurisdiction
clause in Paragraph 2.
II. Analysis -
A. Standard of Review
We review a denial of Rule 60(b)(5) relief for an abuse of
discretion. See Protectoseal Co. v. Barancik, 23 F.3d 1184,
1186 (7th Cir. 1994). We review a district court's interpretation
of a consent decree de novo. See Alliance to End Repression v.
City of Chicago, 119 F.3d 472, 474 (7th Cir. 1997).
Although the defendants submitted a professional engineer's
expert report attempting to establish that all the wetlands
subject to the Consent Decree are isolated, the district court did
10a
not conduct a hearing on that issue, nor did it reach a
conclusion. Rather, it assumed that all waters at issue were
nonnavigable, isolated wetlands with no surface connection to
the nearest stream or nearest navigable body of water.
Krilich V, 152 F. Supp. 2d at 989. We proceed under the same
assumption because, as discussed below, even assuming that
the wetlands were isolated, Krilich is nonetheless bound by the
Consent Decree.
B. Grounds for Relief under Rule 60(b)(5)
A consent decree, while contractual in nature, is enforceable
as “a judicial decree that is subject to the rules generally
applicable to other judgments and decrees.” Rufo v. Inmates of
Suffolk Co. Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 378 (1992). Accordingly, parties
wishing to modify or vacate a consent decree may do so by
resorting to Rule 60(b). In moving to modify or vacate the
Consent Decree, Krilich relies upon the third clause of Section
(b)(5) of Rule 60, which provides that a judgment may be
modified if “it is no longer equitable that the judgment should
have prospective application.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(5). In
interpreting this clause of Rule 60(b)(5), the Supreme Court has
set forth a two-part test to determine whether modification is
warranted. See Rufo, 502 U.S. at 383. Under that test, a party
seeking to modify a Consent Decree “bears the burden of
establishing that a significant change in circumstances warrants
revision of the decree.” /d. A party may meet the initial burden
of establishing a significant change in circumstances “by
showing a significant change either in factual conditions or in
law.” Id. at 384. Krilich does not contend that there has been a
change in factual conditions, only that the Supreme Court’s
decision in SWANCC is a significant change in the law. If the
moving party meets this initial burden, “the court should
consider whether the proposed modification is suitably tailored
to the changed circumstance.” /d. at 383.
In Rufo, the Supreme Court identified instances in which a
significant change in law may have occurred. For example, the
lla
Court stated, a “consent decree must of course be modified if,
as it later turns out, one or more of the obligations placed upon
the parties has become impermissible under federal law. But
modification of a consent decree may be warranted when the
statutory or decisional law has changed to make legal what the
decree was designed to prevent.” /d. at 388. See also Agostini
v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 215 (1997) (granting a Rule 60(b)(5)
modification of a permanent injunction based on intervening
law). The Rufo Court also noted that “[w]hile a decision that
clarifies the law will not, in and of itself, provide a basis for
modifying a decree, it could constitute a change in
circumstances that would support modification if the parties
had based their agreement on a misunderstanding of the
governing law.” /d. at 390.
Krilich argues that Rule 60(b)(5) provides a basis to modify
the Decree, and that the district court abused its discretion by
denying him relief thereunder. Specifically, he contends that
SWANCC represents a significant change in the law under the
third clause of Rule 60(b)(5), thereby requiring the Consent
Decree to be vacated, or at a minimum, modified prospectively.
He argues that SWANCC establishes that the government never
had authority to regulate the waters at issue and that “it is
difficult to imagine a more relevant change in the law.”
Accordingly, he reasons that SWANCC makes clear that the
entry and continued enforcement of the Consent Decree are
ultra vires acts by the EPA, requiring the Decree to be vacated.
See, e.g., Federal Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380
(1947) (where agency granted crop insurance, and later found
out that crop was planted on re-seeded land for which agency
could not issue insurance policies, court found insurance policy
void ab initio). See also Dunn v. Carey, 808 F.2d 555, 559-60
(7th Cir. 1986) (“Because a consent decree’s force comes from
agreement rather than positive law, the decree depends on the
parties’ authority to give assent.”).
12a
Initially, Krilich argues that the district court improperly
applied the Rufo test by reasoning that the parties were not
operating under a misunderstanding of law and therefore that
Krilich was not entitled to vacate the Consent Decree. He
argues that the district court should instead have asked whether
SWANCC changed the law. However, the district court did not
improperly apply the Rufo test. The district court concluded that
SWANCC was not a significant change in the law by reasoning
that the Consent Decree was drafted in light of a law (as
enunciated in Hoffman Homes !) that was as favorable to
Krilich as was the later SWANCC decision. In essence, the
district court was determining whether “the statutory or
decisional law has changed to make legal what the decree was
designed to prevent.” Rufo, 502 U.S. at 388. To the extent that
the district court did question whether the parties
misunderstood the law, Rufo specifically identifies the parties’
misunderstanding of law, as later clarified by another decision,
as a circumstance where modification might be warranted.
Rufo, 502 U.S. at 390.
Krilich also contends that the district court erred in relying
upon the fact that the Consent Decree was drafted in light of
Hoffman Homes I, because it had been vacated and was no
longer the governing law of this circuit by the time the Decree
was entered. Therefore, he claims that we should analyze
whether SWANCC represents a significant change in the law
from the law pre-Hoffman Homes I, wherein we had merely
held “that Congress intended the Clean Water Act to regulate
all the ‘navigable waters’ within its constitutional reach under
the Commerce Clause.” See Hoffman Homes I, 961 F.2d at
1316-17 (citation omitted). However, this argument ignores the
fact that notwithstanding the vacation of Hoffman Homes I, the
parties agreed to incorporate its interpretation of the law into
the Consent Decree and Krilich benefitted from that decision.
Under these circumstances, it would not be equitable to
compare a change in the law pre-Hoffman Homes I to
SWANCC. Rather, under Rule 60(b)(5), we must determine
l3a
whether the law has changed significantly enough such that it
would be equitable to modify this Consent Decree that itself
incorporated the legal standards set out in Hoffman Homes I.
That brings us to the heart of Krilich’s argument: that
SWANCC eliminated the EPA’s authority to regulate the
wetlands at issue because they are nonnavigable, isolated,
intrastate waters. Unfortunately for him, he already agreed that
the waters were “waters of the United States.” To get around
his stipulation, he contends that the holding in Hoffman Homes
I is narrower than SWANCC, and therefore SWANCC does
constitute a significant change in law under Rufo justifying
modification of the Decree. He argues that, in SWANCC, the
Supreme Court removed from the Corps’ regulatory authority
all waters that are not adjacent to bodies of open water,
SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 168, whereas in Hoffman Homes I, the
court defined isolated wetlands as those that “have no
hydrological connection to any body of water.” 961 F.2d at
1314. But the precise holding of SWANCC was not so broad.
While reaffirming its prior holding that Section 404
encompassed non-navigable wetlands adjacent to navigable
waters, 531 U.S. at 167-68 (citing United States v. Riverside
Bayview Homes Inc., 474 U.S. 121 (1985)), the Court explicitly
declined to further determine the exact meaning of “navigable
waters.” SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 171. And, it declined to reach
any constitutional question. /d. at 174. Rather, in SWANCC, the
Supreme Court merely held that the definition of “waters of the
United States” under 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3), as clarified by the
Migratory Bird Rule, “exceeds the authority granted to [the
Corps] under § 404(a) of the CWA.” /d. This limited holding
does not represent a significant change in the law such that it
would be equitable to modify or vacate the Consent Decree.
Moreover, even if SWANCC is a significant change in the
law from Hoffman Homes J—it is not a significant change that
is relevant to this Consent Decree. There is nothing in the
Consent Decree establishing that the Migratory Bird Rule was
l4a
the sole basis for the EPA’s assertion of authority over Krilich’s
property, and therefore SWANCC is not a relevant change in the
law such that this Consent Decree should be modified. The
defendants’ own “Motion to Bar Enforcement of Penalty,” filed
with the district court in 1998 on remand to the district court
from our decision in Krilich II, acknowledged that “Paragraph
1 of the Consent Decree recites that jurisdiction is based upon
the Clean Water Act and other statutes. Paragraph 10 adopts the
regulatory definition of wetlands. The Consent Decree does not
rely upon the wetlands as a migratory bird habitat as a basis for
Commerce Clause jurisdiction.” Instead, as the defendants
argued in that motion, the government merely relied “upon its
authority to define wetlands under the regulations.” As the
district court noted when the defendants first attempted to
challenge subject matter jurisdiction, “there is nothing in the
Decree...that makes it apparent that the mitigation plan may
have been based solely on the filling of isolated wetlands.
Neither was there any information indicating that those
wetlands’ only possible connection to interstate commerce was
their occasional use by migratory birds.” Krilich III, 1999 WL
182333 at * 2. Thus, SWANCC has no appreciable impact on
this Consent Decree.
As the Consent Decree demonstrates, the parties were
already operating on the premise that the Migratory Bird Rule
did not authorize the EPA to regulate otherwise isolated
wetlands, as that was our conclusion in Hoffman Homes I,
which the parties expressly incorporated into Paragraph 20A of
their agreement. In fact, Paragraph 20A carved out certain
wetlands as beyond the EPA’s authority and exempted them
from the reach of the Consent Decree’s requirements. But the
parties also agreed that the EPA had authority to regulate
Krilich’s other wetlands. SWANCC in no way altered the other
regulations interpreting “waters of the United States.”
If a party believes that the waters at issue on his own
property are not properly subject to the EPA’s authority,
15a
whether under the rationale of Hoffman Homes I, SWANCC or
under some other theory, he should not stipulate otherwise. But
that is exactly what Krilich did, to his continued dismay. He
expressly agreed that certain waters on his property constituted
“waters of the United States,” subject to regulation by the EPA.
Like most parties that enter into a settlement or plea agreement,
he presumably made a tactical decision that the terms of the
Consent Decree were more favorable than the costs or risks of
continued litigation. Accordingly, we conclude that SWANCC
effected no relevant change in decisional law such that the
district court should have modified the Consent Decree. Nor
does SWANCC establish that the EPA’s entry into and
continued enforcement of the Consent Decree are ultra vires
acts. “To hold that a clarification in the law automatically opens
the door for relitigation of the merits of every affected consent
decree would undermine the finality of such agreements and
could serve as a disincentive to negotiation of settlements in...
litigation.” Rufo, 502 U.S. at 389.°
C. Grounds for Relief under Reservation-of-Jurisdiction
Clause
Krilich also argues that the district court had authority to
vacate or modify the Decree under Paragraph 2, its
reservation-of-jurisdiction clause. As previously noted, the
reservation clause expressly provided: “The Court shall retain
jurisdiction in order to enable any party to apply to the Court at
any time for such further relief as may be necessary to interpret,
enforce, or modify this Decree.” In analyzing Krilich’s
argument, the district court concluded that it could not interpret
this clause outside the bounds of Rule 60(b). Krilich V, 152 F.
Supp. 2d at 990. Krilich argues that such an interpretation
” Because we conclude that Krilich did not meet his burden of establishing
a change in law warranting modification of the Consent Decree, we need not
reach the question whether the proposed modification is Suitably tailored to
the changed circumstance. Rufo, 502 U.S. at 383.
l6a
makes the clause meaningless. We note, however, that while
relying on the reservation-of-jurisdiction clause as an additional
basis for modifying the Consent Decree, Krilich does not
identify any standard or test broader than the Supreme Court’s
test in Rufo that would result in a different outcome. We need
not decide, however, whether this reservation-of-jurisdiction
clause provided the district court with authority beyond Rule
60(b) for vacating the Consent Decree because the reasons
Krilich presented for vacating the Consent Decree are
misplaced. As discussed above, the Supreme Court’s decision
in SWANCC was not more favorable to Krilich than Hoffman
Homes I, which was the basis for the Consent Decree. Nor does
SWANCC establish that the Government exceeded its authority
in entering into the Consent Decree. Therefore, whether
Krilich’s motion was considered under Rule 60(b)(5) or under
the reservation-of-jurisdiction clause is immaterial because his
claim fails in either case.
Ill. Conclusion
Krilich voluntarily entered into the Consent Decree with the
government, agreeing to resolve their dispute without recourse
to further litigation. At that time, the parties were operating
under the Hoffman Homes I view of the law. The Supreme
Court’s later decision in SWANCC did not alter the parties’
reliance on Hoffman Homes I that the EPA could not regulate
isolated intrastate wetlands. Therefore, the subsequent release
of the SWANCC decision does not justify vacating the Consent
Decree. The SWANCC decision does not establish that the
Government exceeded its authority in entering into the Consent
Decree, so Krilich’s claim that the Decree was void ab initio
fails as well. For these and the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM.
17a
APPENDIX B
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS,
EASTERN DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff,
Vv.
ROBERT R. KRILICH, ET AL., Defendants.
No. 92 C 5354.
June 21, 2001
Hart, District Judge.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
In 1992, the parties to this case entered into a consent decree
regarding Clean Water Act (“CWA”) violations involving
wetlands in an area being developed by defendants.' Following
consideration by the court, the proposed decree, as modified,
was entered on October 29, 1992 (the “Decree”). The United
States subsequently contended that defendants had violated
certain provisions of the Decree concerning the Royce
Renaissance Property (the “Royce Property”).2 The issue was
' For present purposes, it is unnecessary to make any distinction among the
defendants.
? The present dispute, as well as the prior disputes that resulted in court
rulings, all concern the Royce Property. The existing dispute does not
directly concern the Sullivan Lake Property that was also a subject of the
Decree. .
18a
presented on stipulated and asserted facts and briefed by the
parties. It was held that none of the facts claimed to be in
dispute were material and a ruling was issued on the basis of
the documents that had been presented. Defendants were held
to have violated deadlines for a mitigation plan that were
contained in the Decree and therefore were subject to a
substantial penalty under the terms of the Decree. See United
States v. Krilich, 948 F. Supp. 719 (N.D. Ill. 1996)
(“Krilich I’). In an opinion dated October 15, 1997, this
holding was upheld on appeal, except that the government
conceded that there had been a miscalculation of the penalty.
See United States v. Krilich, 126 F.3d 1035 (7th Cir. 1997)
(“Krilich IT’). On December 15, 1997, a modified judgment in
the amount of $1,257,500 was entered on the docket.
In November 1998, defendants moved to bar enforcement of
the penalty. That motion was construed as being pursuant to
Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b). See United States v. Krilich, 1999 WL
182333 *1 (N.D. Ill. March 25, 1999) (“Krilich III’). The
primary argument raised by ‘defendants was that this court
lacked jurisdiction to enforce the mitigation plan deadlines.
Defendants contended that subject matter jurisdiction was
lacking because the Royce Property wetlands that allegedly
were improperly filled were not “navigable waters” covered by
the CWA nor did they have a sufficient connection with
interstate commerce to invoke federal jurisdiction. It was
assumed that these issues went to the court’s subject matter
jurisdiction, but Rule 60(b)(4) relief was denied on the ground
that the judgment was not void for lack of subject matter
3 The CWA regulates the discharge of dredged or fill material into
“navigable waters.” 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a). The CWA defines navigable
waters as “the waters of the United States, including the territorial seas.” /d.
§ 1362(7). The Army Corps of Engineers and the Environmental Protection
Agency, both of which enforce the CWA, have promulgated regulations
defining waters of the United States. See 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a); 40 C.F.R.
§ 230.3(s).
19a
jurisdiction because, even if jurisdictional, a colorable basis
existed for finding the wetlands to be navigable waters and
within the federal government’s interstate commerce powers.
Id. at *2. Defendants also contended that the penalty should not
be enforced because the Decree should be modified in light of
a more recent precedent from another circuit supporting that the
filled lands did not fall within the purview of the CWA. The
merits of this Rule 60(b)(5) contention were not addressed
because defendants only sought retrospective relief (vacating
the prior monetary judgment), whereas modifying the Decree
in 1999 could only affect possible prospective relief. Jd. at *3.
Defendants appealed Krilich III, raising only the Rule
60(b)(4) contentions discussed above. The Seventh Circuit held
that the questions of whether the wetlands at issue were
navigable waters or had a sufficient nexus to interstate
commerce did not go to the court’s subject matter jurisdiction.
United States v. Krilich, 209 F.3d 968, 971-72 (7th Cir. 2000)
(“Krilich IV’). The court further stated: “Moreover, just as a
guilty plea (in which the criminal defendant admits—at least
implicitly—the connection between his conduct and interstate
commerce) forecloses an appellate attack on subject matter
jurisdiction, [defendants] cannot now assail the district court’s
subject matter jurisdiction because [they] entered into a consent
decree in which [they] agreed that the waters involved were
‘waters of the United States.’” Jd. at 972. The Seventh Circuit
concluded: “In sum, the district court had subject matter
jurisdiction over the EPA’s case against [defendants] because
the suit civilly charged a violation of a federal statute which is
within the federal courts’ federal question jurisdiction. And
[defendants’] attempt to now assail the court’s subject matter
jurisdiction fails because [they] entered into a consent decree
stipulating that the waters involved were ‘waters of the United
States,’ and that is merely an element of the offense and not the
basis for federal subject matter jurisdiction.” /d. at 973. On
November 13, 2000, the Supreme Court denied certiorari.
Krilich v. United States, 121 S. Ct. 482 (2000).
20a
On January 9, 2001, the Supreme Court issued Solid Waste
Agency of Northern Cook County v. United States Army Corps
of Engineers, 121 S. Ct. 675 (2001) (*SWANCC”). In that case,
the Supreme Court held that the Army Corps’ “Migratory Bird
Rule” was unenforceable because it exceeded the authority
granted to the Corps under the CWA. Id. at 684.* Under the
Migratory Bird Rule, waters of the United States were defined
as including isolated wetlands which are or could be used by
migratory birds or endangered species. See id. at 678. SWANCC
holds that the CWA definition of navigable waters/waters of the
United States does not extend to the full limits of Congress’s
powers under the Commerce Clause. Jd. at 683-84. SWANCC
does not reach the question of whether, on a basis other than
being visited by migratory birds, isolated wetlands may fall
under the definition of navigable waters/waters of the United
States. United States v. Interstate General Co., 152 F. Supp. 2d
843 (D. Md. 2001). It makes clear that it is still the rule that a
nonnavigable (in the traditional sense) wetland directly adjacent
to a navigable body of water falls within the purview of the
CWA, SWANCC, 121 S. Ct. at 682-83 (citing United States v.
Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121 (1985)), and that
an isolated wetland being visited by migratory birds is not
enough to bring the wetland within the purview of the CWA.
SWANCC does not clarify at what points between those two
extremes a nonnavigable body of water falls within the CWA
definition of navigable waters. SWANCC does indicate, though,
that wetlands likely need to have a substantial connection to
interstate commerce or a connection to navigable waters (in the
traditional sense) in order to be waters of the United States that
fall within the CWA term navigable waters. See id. at 682-83.°
* The majority of circuits, including the Seventh Circuit in SWANCC, had
held otherwise.
5 No final or proposed regulation has been found which revises the
regulatory definitions in light of SWANCC. Possible revisions, however,
apparently are presently being considered. See Further Revisions to the
2la
In February 2001, defendants brought their present motion
arguing that the Decree, at least as regards the Royce Property,
should be vacated in light of SWANCC, which defendants
contend makes clear that none of the waters on the Royce
Property were navigable waters subject to regulation under the
CWA. They contend that, because the waters do not fall within
the purview of the CWA, the United States had no authority to
regulate the waters and thus no authority to enter into a consent
decree, making the Decree an ultra vires act. According to
defendants, under this theory, the Decree is void ab initio and
should be rescinded, which would include refunding the
penalties already paid and compensating defendants for the
expense of the required Royce Property mitigation work.
Defendants contend the Decree may be vacated or modified
either under the express reservation-of-jurisdiction clause of the
Decree or pursuant to the court's inherent powers to modify its
judgments. Alternatively, defendants contend that, pursuant to
Rule 60(b)(5), the Decree should be modified in light of the
change of law. Defendants contend that such a modification
would have a prospective effect because its use of the property
continues to be affected by the Decree and because the payment
for the penalties is presently being held by the court and has not
yet been turned over to the government.°
At the time defendants presented their motion, the court
advised the parties that there were certain issues they should
make sure to address. The government was advised that it
Clean Water Act Regulatory Definition of “Discharge of Dredged
Material,” 66 Fed. Reg. 4550, 4569 (Jan. 17, 2001).
© Under the terms of the Decree, it was to “terminate on August 31, 1998 if
all of the on-site and off-site mitigation and enhancement projects meet the
final performance standards set forth in the pertinent exhibits for those
projects. If the final performance standards are not met on that date, then this
Decree will continue in effect until the standards are met.” Decree { 86.
Apparently, the standards have not yet been met, at least as regards the
Royce Property.
22a
would not be required to provide evidentiary proof along with
its answer to the motion, but it was expected that the
government would at least outline its factual basis for
contending the waters on the property still fall within the
purview of the CWA, even in light of SWANCC. The
government apparently misunderstood. The government
contends that, even in light of SWANCC, the pertinent Royce
Property waters still fall within the purview of SWANCC. The
government’s apparent position is that the wetlands at issue are
not isolated. In any event, for present purposes, it will be
assumed that the waters at issue actually are nonnavigable,
isolated wetlands that have no surface connection to the nearest
stream or nearest navigable body of water.’ If it is held that,
under that factual assumption, defendants would be entitled to
modification of the Decree or other relief, further proceedings
would be necessary to resolve any genuine and material factual
disputes regarding the nature of the wetlands.
The Decree contains the following provisions that are
particularly pertinent to the present dispute:
2. The Court shall retain jurisdiction in order to
enable any party to apply to the Court at any time for such
further relief as may be necessary to interpret, enforce, or
modify this Decree.
* * *¢ &* *& *
” Defendants represent that all the bodies of water at issue are located 1.5 to
2 linear miles from nonnavigable Salt Creek and 7 to 7.5 linear miles from
the nearest navigable body of water, the Des Plaines River. In their reply,
defendants further represent that Salt Creek is 1.9 or more stream miles from
each body of water and that the Des Plaines River is 19.1 or more stream
miles from each body of water. According to the report of defendants’
expert, all of the Royce Property’s drainage “appears” to flow into a
manhole that “appears” to connect to an underground storm sewage system
which runs for 2000 feet before flowing into a small ditch that goes for 1.5
miles before joining Salt Creek. Schaefer Report ff 22-24. The expert states
that this manhole has existed since at least 1986.
23a
10. Except as specifically modified herein, the terms
“waters of the United States”; . . . shall have the meanings
assigned them at 40 C.F.R. § 230.3 or 33 C.F.R.
Es &
* * &¢ © & &
V. WATERS OF THE UNITED STATES
17. For purposes of this Consent Decree, the parties
shall treat wetland and open water areas depicted on
Exhibit 1, together with the new wetland and open water
area created pursuant to Part VII (injunctive relief) and
depicted on Exhibit 2, as waters of the United States
located on the Royce Renaissance Property.
* * *&£ *&* & *
19. The Defendants hereby elect delineation for the
Royce Renaissance Property pursuant to the Federal
Manual for Identifying and Delineating Jurisdictional
Wetlands (1989). Further, the Parties agree that the
boundaries of the alleged waters of the United States
referenced in Paragraph 17 and depicted on Exhibit 1
would not differ if the delineation had been conducted
pursuant to the Corps of Engineers Wetland Delineation
Manual (1987).
20. The boundaries depicted in Exhibits 1 and 3°
shall bind the parties for the life of this Consent Decree
unless and until a new Corps or EPA delineation is made
pursuant to the final version of a revised wetland
delineation manual. The Defendants shall not request a
new jurisdictional determination from either the Corps or
EPA for the Royce Renaissance Property or the Sullivan
Lake Property during the life of this Consent Decree
§ Exhibit 3 pertains to the Sullivan Lake Property.
24a
unless and until the government issues the final version of
a revised wetland delineation manual.
20A. The Defendants shall continue to treat wetland
and open water areas depicted on Exhibit | as waters of
the United States until the mandate issues in Hoffman
Homes, Inc. v. EPA, No. 90-3810 (7th Cir. April 20,
1992) and until proceedings related to any appeal, petition
for certiorari, or remand are completed. Following
completion of these proceedings, unless pertinent portions
of the Seventh Circuit’s April 20, 1992 decision are
reversed, Exhibit 1 areas W2A, W2B, W3, WSB, and W9
shall be excluded from the obligations imposed in
Paragraph 17.
Courts have always had the inherent power to reconsider or
modify their judgments within a reasonable period of time. See
In re Met-L-Wood Corp., 861 F.2d 1012, 1018 (7th Cir. 1988),
cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1006 (1989). That power, however, has
been merged into Rule 60 of the Federal Rules of Civil
procedure. There are no separate inherent powers that are more
expansive than those provided for in Rule 60(b). See id.; In re
Wyciskalla, 156 B.R. 579, 580 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 1993); Blair v.
Delta Air Lines, Inc., 344 F. Supp. 367, 368 (S.D. Fla. 1972),
aff'd, 477 F.2d 564 (Sth Cir. 1973) (adopting district court
opinion); Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, & Mary Kay
Kane, Federal Practice & Procedure §§ 2851-52 (2d ed. 1995).
See also Glass, Molders, Pottery, Plastics & Allied Workers
International Union, AFL-CIO, CLC, Local 182B v. Excelsior
Foundry Co., 56 F.3d 844, 847 (7th Cir. 1995). Additionally,
pursuant to Rule 60(b), this court would have the power to
modify the Decree even without the express provision
contained in § 2 of the Decree. See Picon v. Morris, 933 F.2d
660, 662 (8th Cir. 1991). The language of ¥ 2 does not provide
any additional or greater powers of modification that this court
25a
did not already have under Rule 60(b).’ Defendants’ present
motion must be considered as a Rule 60(b) motion. The
arguments as to the judgment being void as an ultra vires
agreement will be considered under various subsections of Rule
60(b) and the argument as to modification in light of a change
of law will be considered as a Rule 60(b)(5) motion.
Defendants contend the Decree is a contract and that it
should be treated as such in ruling on the pending motion. It is
true that, “[f]rom the standpoint of interpretation, a consent
decree is a contract.” Cook v. City of Chicago, 192 F.3d 693,
695 (7th Cir. 1999). A consent decree, however, is contractual
in nature in only “some respects.” Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk
County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 378 (1992). “[I]t is an agreement
that the parties desire and expect will be reflected in, and be
enforceable as, a judicial decree that is subject to the rules
generally applicable to other judgments and decrees.” /d.
“[F]rom the standpoint of remedy it is an equitable decree,”
subject to equitable remedies. Cook, 192 F.3d at 695.
The government does not dispute defendants’ contention
that, where the requisite consent is lacking, a contract is void ab
initio. However, it is not a mere contract that is before this
court, it is a consent decree that has been entered as a judgment.
If the judgment is void, Rule 60(b)(4) provides that the
judgment is to be vacated. The parties’ contract being void is
not the same as the judgment itself being void. A judgment is
void if it is without subject matter jurisdiction, there was no
personal jurisdiction over a party, or the judgment was entered
? Paragraph 2 states that motions to modify the Decree may be brought “at
any time.” Arguably, that provision could be construed as permitting Rule
60(b) motions to be brought at any time. However, no order of the court can
extend the time limits contained in Rule 60(b). See Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(b); United
States v. Deutsch, 981 F.2d 299, 302 (7th Cir. 1992). Paragraph 2 should not
be construed as having an effect that is inconsistent with the governing law.
Even if it were to be so construed, it would have no effect because Rule 6(b)
provides that no court order can extend the time limits of Rule 60(b).
26a
without due process of law. Federal Election Commission v. Al
Salvi for Senate Committee, 205 F.3d 1015, 1019 (7th Cir.
2000); Wright, Miller, & Kane § 2862 at 326-69; United States
v. Beebe, 180 U.S. 343, 350-51 (1901). The fact that a party to
a consent judgment lacked authority to consent (as defendants
contend is true of the United States in light of SWANCC) does
not void the judgment itself. Beebe, 180 U.S. at 350-51
(judgment not void where district attorney lacked authority to
compromise absent express approval of Solicitor of the
Treasury); Phelan v. Bradbury Building Corp., 7 F.R.D. 429,
432 (S.D.N.Y. 1947) (judgment not void even if parties lacked
authority to settle because, subsequent to entry of judgment
based on settlement of FLSA overtime claim, Supreme Court
held that statute prohibited settlement of such claims for less
than full damages). Contra National Revenue Corp. v. Violet,
807 F.2d 285, 288 (1st Cir. 1986) (consent decree void under
Rule 60(b)(4) because Rhode Island Attorney General did not
have authority to stipulate state statute violated the federal
Constitution).!° As was previously held in this litigation,
defendants’ contentions as to the wetlands not being United
States waters and there being an insufficient interstate
commerce nexus do not go to the court’s subject matter
jurisdiction and therefore do not state a basis for voiding the
judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b)(4). Krilich IV, 209 F.3d at
971-72:'' Interstate General, 152 F. Supp. 2d at 848. Even
assuming that, in light of SWANCC, none of the wetlands that
are a subject of the Decree are actually waters of the United
10 This holding in Violet is inconsistent with the Supreme Court holding in
Beebe and the well-established case law as to the limited grounds for finding
a judgment to be void under Rule 60(b)(4).
ey The Seventh Circuit considered whether the wetlands not being waters of
the United States or not having a sufficient nexus to interstate commerce
went to this court's subject matter jurisdiction and held that it did not. At that
time, defendants did not explicitly argue that the government engaged in an
ultra vires act by consenting to the Decree.
27a
States subject to regulation under the CWA, no basis is stated
for vacating the Decree as void pursuant to Rule 60(b)(4).
Interstate General, 152 F. Supp. 2d at 848; cf Phelan, 7 F.R.D.
at 432.
Though not stating a basis for relief pursuant to Rule
60(b)(4), the government’s alleged lack of authority to enter
into the Decree may state a basis for relief under another
subsection of Rule 60(b). Before the existence of Rule 60(b),
the Supreme Court held in Beebe that an attorney’s lack of
authority could state a basis for vacating a judgment even if that
basis was not that the judgment itself was void. See Beebe,
180 U.S. at 351-53. Such grounds, though, must be timely
raised and are subject to the possibility that the principal
ratified the attorney’s action either expressly or through
conduct. See id. Modern cases denominate a motion to vacate
based on an attorney lacking authority to enter into a settlement
agreement as a Rule 60(b)(1) motion based on mistake or
inadvertence. See Bradford Exchange v. Trein’s Exchange, 600
F.2d 99, 102 (7th Cir. 1979). A Rule 60(b)(1) motion must be
brought within one year of the entry of judgment. Of course,
defendants are not contending that the government’s attorneys
lacked authority from their principal as in Beebe and Bradford
Exchange, but they are contending that the parties were
mistaken as to the government’s authority to regulate the
wetlands at issue. Defendants’ ultra vires contentions,
therefore, may properly be classified as being a claim of
mistake of law under Rule 60(b)(1). Cf Webb v. James, 147
F.3d 617, 622 (7th Cir. 1998). Since it is more than a year since
the entry of judgment, the motion is untimely when classified
as a Rule 60(b)(1) motion.
But even assuming the ultra vires contention instead falls
within the catch-all provision of Rule 60(b)(6)'? and was
'2 Rule 60(b)(6) provides for relief based on “any other reason justifying
relief from the operation of the judgment.” Such relief, however, is limited
28a
brought within a reasonable period of time, it would fail on its
merits. In the Decree, the parties agreed that the pertinent
Royce Property wetlands currently at issue were waters of the
United States. Defendants are bound by that stipulation. See
Krilich IV, 209 F.3d at 972. Compare also Hugi v. United
States, 164 F.3d 378, 380-81 (7th Cir. 1999), That these facts
go to the federal government's authority to regulate the
wetlands does not prevent defendants from being bound by the
stipulations. See, e.g., Krilich IV, supra; Hugi, supra; Interstate
General, 152 F. Supp. 2d at 848. Moreover, this is a
post-judgment attack on the government’s authority that comes
more than eight years after entry into the Decree. Just as a
colorable basis for subject matter jurisdiction is enough to
defeat an attack on a judgment being void for subject-matter
jurisdiction, see Krilich III, 1999 WL 182333 at *1- 2, a
colorable basis for the wetlands being subject to CWA
regulation should be enough to defeat the present ultra vires
contention. At the time the parties entered into the Decree, a
colorable basis existed for finding the wetlands subject to CWA
regulation.'® See id. at*2.
to circumstances that are not otherwise covered by the other subsections of
Rule 60(b). See Webb, 147 F.3d at 622; Helm v. Resolution Trust Corp., 84
F.3d 874, 878-79 (7th Cir. 1996); Met-L-Wood, 861 F.2d at 1018.
'? To the extent there is a basis for the government to contend that the
wetlands are not isolated, a colorable basis for CWA regulation continues to
exist. Cases subsequent to SWANCC have not limited the definition of
waters of the United States to those immediately adjacent to navigable (in
the traditional sense) waters. See Headwaters, Inc. v. Talent Irrigation
District, 243 F.3d 526, 533 (9th Cir. 2001) (irrigation ditches that connect
to streams that flow to navigable waters are waters of the United States);
Interstate General, 152 F. Supp. 2d at 844, 846 (wetlands that are adjacent
to nonnavigable creeks that connect to a navigable river via at least six miles
of intermittent streams and drainage ditches are waters of the United States);
Idaho Rural Council v. Bosma, 143 F. Supp. 2d 1169, 1172-74, 1177-79 &
n. 4 (D. Idaho 2001) (spring that runs into pond that drains across a pasture
into a canal that flows to a creek, that is either navigable or flows into a
navigable river, is a water of the United States); United States v. Buday, 138
29a
But even if defendants are not bound by the stipulation,
another ground still exists for denying relief on the ultra vires
contention. There is no contention that the Sullivan Lake
property does not contain wetlands subject to CWA regulation,
even in light of SWANCC. Therefore, the government was not
without authority to enter into the Decree. It would not matter
that the Decree also has provisions imposing obligations as to
wetlands that are not subject to CWA regulation. Under a
consent decree, a party can agree to greater obligations than
could be achieved if the suit were to go to trial. Rufo, 502 U.S.
at 389; Komyati v. Bayh, 96 F.3d 955, 959 (7th Cir. 1996);
Kasper v. Board of Election Commissioners of Chicago, 814
F.2d 332, 342-43 (7th Cir. 1987). A consent decree, however,
cannot oblige a party to perform illegal conduct. Rufo, supra;
Kasper, supra. It is not illegal to preserve isolated,
nonregulated wetlands or to create new wetlands to replace
ones that have been destroyed. The provisions of the Decree
were lawful and based on a substantive, colorable claim even
if Sullivan Lake was the only property that had wetlands
subject to CWA regulation. Even applying SWANCC
retrospectively and assuming the Royce Property wetlands are
not waters of the United States, the government was not
without authority to enter into the Decree.
In sum, the ultra vires argument fails for four different
reasons, each of which is sufficient by itself to deny the
presently requested relief. First, even if the government went
beyond its authority, that does not void the judgment even if it
would void a contract. Second, defendants are bound by the
stipulation that the wetlands are waters of the United States.
F. Supp. 2d 1282 (D. Mont. 2001) (wetlands adjacent a creek that flowed
into a creek that flowed into a river that was navigable a further 190 miles
downstream are waters of the United States); Aiello v. Town of Brookhaven,
136 F. Supp. 2d 81, 119 & n. 30 (E.D.N.Y. 2001) (pond and creek that
emptied into lake that flows into navigable bay are waters of the United
States).
30a
Third, it is too late to now contend that the parties were
mistaken as to the wetlands being waters of the United States.
Fourth, the government’s agreement to enter into the Decree
was not ultra vires because the Sullivan Lake property contains
wetlands subject to CWA regulation.
Still to be considered is whether the Decree should be
modified in light of the change of law represented by
SWANCC. While the parties were negotiating, the Seventh
Circuit decided Hoffman Homes, Inc. v. Administrator, United
States EPA, 961 F.2d 1310 (7th Cir. 1992) (“Hoffman I’).
Hoffman I holds that “isolated wetlands” are not subject to
CWA regulation. The government provides correspondence"
showing that the parties were aware of Hoffman I and that, as
a result, the decree in negotiation was modified to exclude
specified wetlands that defendants contended were isolated.
The parties also took into account the possibility that Hoffman |
would be reversed. These provisions are incorporated in J 20A
of the Decree. After the case was filed, but before the Decree
was approved and entered as a judgment, Hoffman I was
vacated for rehearing. Almost nine months after the Decree was
entered, the Seventh Circuit decided Hoffman Homes, Inc. v.
Administrator, United States EPA, 999 F.2d 256 (7th Cir. 1993)
(“Hoffman IT’). Hoffman IT holds that the wetlands at issue did
not meet the regulatory definitions of waters of the United
States and therefore found it unnecessary to consider whether
an isolated wetland could qualify as a water of the United
'4 This correspondence is being considered in determining whether the
history of this case supports modification in light of a change of law. The
correspondence is not being used to construe the meaning of the Decree and
no opinion is expressed regarding whether it would have been appropriate
to consider the correspondence as extrinsic evidence pertinent to interpreting
420A.
3la
States.'° Later in 1993, the Seventh Circuit issued an opinion
supporting that isolated wetlands were properly subject to
regulation under the CWA. See Rueth v. United States EPA, 13
F.3d 227, 231 (7th Cir. 1993).
In November 1998, defendants moved to vacate the penalties
that had been imposed for violation of the Decree. See Krilich
I; Krilich II. For the first time, defendants raised the contention
that the Royce Property wetlands that were the subject of the
Decree were not subject to CWA regulation because they were
isolated wetlands. This court held that “[t]here was and
continues to be a colorable basis for exercising jurisdiction over
the Decree’s subject matter and it cannot be held that
jurisdiction in this case was totally wanting.” Krilich IJ], 1999
WL 182333 at *2. Since defendants sought only retrospective
relief (vacating a money judgment), the merits of modifying the
Decree in light of a claimed change of law was not considered.
See id. at *3.'° The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the
issue did not go to this court’s subject matter jurisdiction and
therefore could not be a basis for vacating the judgment as void.
See Krilich IV.
Between Krilich III and Krilich IV, the Seventh Circuit
issued its opinion in SWANCC, which upheld the Migratory
Bird Rule as constitutional and within the agencies’ authority
under the CWA. 191 F.3d 845 (7th Cir. 1999). That decision
was reversed by the Supreme Court’s decision in SWANCC
holding that the Migratory Bird Rule exceeded the agencies’
authority under the statute. Defendants contend the Decree
'S Krilich I, 948 F. Supp. at 721-25, construes the meaning of § 20A and
rejected the government's contention that Hoffman I] was a “reversal” of
Hoffman I such that the isolated wetlands that had been expressly excluded
from the Decree should be considered waters of the United States.
'© The claimed change of law was a Fourth Circuit case holding that the
Migratory Bird Rule exceeded the Army Corps’ statutory authority under the
CWA. See United States v. Wilson, 133 F.3d 251, 257 (4th Cir. 1997).
32a
should be modified in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in
_ SWANCC.
Rule 60(b)(5) provides in part that a judgment may be
modified or vacated if “a prior judgment upon which it is based
has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer
equitable that the judgment should have prospective
application.” Although defendants contend the prior clause is
satisfied, that provision is clearly inapplicable to this case. That
provision is limited to judgments that were the basis of issue or
claim preclusion; it does not apply to reversals of cases that
were relied upon as precedent. Wright, Miller, & Kane § 2863
at 335. Therefore, defendants’ only possible relief is
prospective relief under the last clause. Agostini v. Felton, 521
U.S. 203, 239 (1997); Krilich II, 1999 WL 182333 at *3.
Under the last clause of Rule 60(b)(5), modification of a
consent decree can only be appropriate if the parties based their
agreement on a misunderstanding of the law. Rufo, 502 U.S. at
390. At the time defendants originally agreed to the relevant
portions of the Decree, Seventh Circuit case law (Hoffman 1)
held that isolated wetlands were not subject to CWA regulation.
SWANCC did not narrow the application of the CWA any more
than did Hoffman I. Paragraph 20A of the Decree was drafted
in light of Hoffman I. When Hoffman I was vacated for
rehearing prior to actual entry of the Decree, the Decree was
not modified to take that into account. Therefore, the Decree,
as it now stands, was drafted in light of controlling precedent
that was no less favorable to defendants than SWANCC. It was
not drafted in light of subsequent Seventh Circuit precedent
that, unlike Hoffman I, was overruled by the Supreme Court’s
decision in SWANCC. Also, the Decree does not oblige
defendants to perform any act that is now unlawful in light of
current law. Equity does not require that the Decree be
reopened so that defendants may now litigate whether the
wetlands on the property are actually isolated. Defendants
chose not to do so more than eight years ago and the legal
33a
framework has not changed in a manner that would justify
doing it today. Cf Interstate General, 152 F. Supp. 2d at
847-48.
For the foregoing reasons, defendants’ motion to vacate the
consent decree will be denied.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendants’ motion to
vacate the consent decree [141-1] is denied.
34a
APPENDIX C
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
Vv.
ROBERT R. KRILICH,
KRILICH COMPANIES, INC.
RIVERWOODS DEVELOPMENT
CORP., LAKEMOOR COUNTRY
CLUB, INC., AUSTIN STATE
BANK, not individually, but as
Trustee under the Trust Agreement
dated December 18, 1968 and
known as Trust No. 4580,
and
MANUFACTURERS’
AFFILIATED TRUST CO.
f/k/a AFFILIATED BANK
FRANKLIN PARK f//k/a/ FIRST
STATE BANK & TRUST OF
FRANKLIN PARK, not
individually, but as Trustee under
the Trust Agreements dated July 30,
1982 and known as Trust Nos. 866
and 867,
Defendants.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
No. 92 C 5354
J. Hart
[Filed Aug. 10, 1992]
35a
CONSENT DECREE
WHEREAS, the United States brought this case on behalf of
the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) to restrain
alleged violations of Clean Water Act (“CWA”) sections 301(a)
and 404, 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) and 1344, at two separate
Chicago areas construction sites;
WHEREAS, the United States seeks both permanent
injunctive relief (including restoration of certain wetland and
open water areas and on-site and off-site mitigation) and an
appropriate civil penalty; and
WHEREAS, the parties agree that a settlement is in their
mutual interest and in the public interest;
NOW, THEREFORE before taking any testimony, and
without admission of fact, law, or liability by either party,
(except as provided in Paragraph 1), it is hereby ORDERED,
ADJUDGED, and DECREED:
I. JURISDICTION
1. This Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this
action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1345, and pursuant to
Clean Water Act sections 309(b) and 404(s), 33 U.S.C. §§
1319(b), 1344(s). This Court has obtained jurisdiction over the
parties consenting to entry of this Decree, and venue is proper
pursuant to 33 U.S.C. §§ 1319(b), 1344(s).
2. The Court shall retain jurisdiction in order to enable any
party to apply to the Court at any time for such further relief as
may be necessary to interpret, enforce, or modify this Decree.
Il. PARTIES
3. The Plaintiff is the United States of America. The
Department of Justice is authorized to bring this suit pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. §§ 516 and 519, and CWA § 306, 33 U.S.C.
§ 1366.
36a
4. Defendant Robert R. Krilich is an individual engaged in
the business of developing real estate in the Chicago area.
5. Defendants Krilich Companies, Inc., and Riverwoods
Development Corporation are corporations organized under the
laws of the State of Illinois, and are engaged in the business of
developing real estate in this District. Robert R. Krilich is the
sole stockholder, and President of Krilich Companies, Inc., and
Riverwoods Development Corporation.
6. Lakemoor Country Club, Inc., is a corporation organized
under the laws of the State of Illinois, and engaged in the
business of developing real estate in this District. Robert R.
Krilich owns one hundred percent (100%) of the stock in that
corporation.
7. Defendants Manufacturers’ Affiliated Trust Co. f/k/a
Affiliated Bank/Franklin Park f/k/a First State Bank & Trust of
Franklin Park, and Austin State Bank are the Trustees of certain
Illinois Land Trusts formed pursuant to Illinois law for the sole
benefit of Defendant Robert R. Krilich.
lll. SUBJECT PROPERTY
8. The property owned and controlled by Defendant Robert
Krilich as beneficiary of Manufacturers’ Affiliated Trust Co.
f/k/a Affiliated Bank/Franklin Park f/k/a First State Bank &
Trust of Franklin Park Trust Nos. 866 and 867 in Oukbrook
Terrace, and subject to remediation under this Decree (the
“Royce Renaissance Property”), is located near the
intersections of Butterfield Road and Royce Boulevard, and is
legally described as follows:
The Southeast quarter of Section 21 ,Township 39N,
Range 11E, Village of Oakbrook Terrace, DuPage
County, Illinois.
37a
9. The property owned and controlled by Defendant Robert
Krilich as beneficiary of Austin State Bank Trust No. 4580 in
McHenry and Lake Counties, and subject to remediation under
this Decree (the “Sullivan Lake Property”), is located between
Illinois Route 60 and Sullivan Lake Road, West of the Village
of Volo, Illinois, and is legally described as follows:
The Southeast Quarter of Section 29, Township 45 North,
Range 9 East, McHenry County, Illinois.
- and -
The Southwest Quarter of Section 28, Township 45
North, Range 9 East, Lake County, Illinois.
IV. DEFINITIONS
10. Except as specifically modified herein, the terms “waters
of the United States”; “wetlands”; “dredged material”; “fill
material”; “discharge of dredged material”; and “discharge of
fill material” shall have the meanings assigned them at 40
C.F.R. § 230.3 or 33 C.F.R. § 323.2. “EPA” means the United
States Environmental Protection Agency, and “Corps” means
the United States Army Corps of Engineers.
11. As used in this Consent Decree, the terms “restore” and
“restoration” refer to removal of dredged or fill material from
the waters of the United States, together with replanting and
other measures intended to reinstate the natural conditions
allegedly prevailing prior to activities giving rise to this action.
12. As used in this Consent Decree, the terms “mitigate” and
“mitigation” refer to creation of new wetland and open water
areas as compensation for alleged temporal loss of waters of the
United States the Defendant will restore pursuant to the terms
of this Consent Decree, and for alleged permanent loss of
waters of the United States that will not be restored. As used in
this Consent Decree, the term “on-site mitigation” refers to the
3.10 acre area located on the Royce Renaissance Property and
38a
depicted on Exhibit 2 and to the 1.5 acre area located on the
Sullivan Lake Property and depicted on Exhibit 3. As used in
this Consent Decree, the term “off-site mitigation” refers to the
2.08 acre area to be constructed as additional mitigation for the
alleged loss of wetland on the Royce Renaissance Property, as
provided in Paragraph 31 of this Decree.
13. The “Royce Renaissance Plan” is the Wetland
Restoration and Mitigation Summary Document attached as
Exhibit 4, and is incorporated herein by reference. In case of
ambiguity or conflict between the Royce Renaissance Plan and
this Consent Decree, the provisions of this Decree shall control.
14. The “Royce Renaissance Defendants” are Robert R.
Krilich, Krilich Companies, Inc., and Riverwoods Development
Corp., together with associated persons or entities described in
Paragraph 81 of this Decree.
15. The “Sullivan Lake Defendants” are Robert R. Krilich,
Krilich Companies, Inc., and Lakemoor Country Club, Inc.,
together with associated persons or entities described in
Paragraph 81 of this Decree.
16. The “Trust Defendants” are Manufacturers’ Affiliated
Trust Co. f/k/a Affiliated Bank/Franklin Park f/k/a First State
Bank & Trust of Franklin Park, not individually, but as Trustee
under the Trust Agreements dated July 30, 1982 and known as
Trust Nos. 866 and 867, and Austin State Bank, not
individually, but as Trustee under the Trust Agreement dated
December 18, 1968 and known as Trust No. 4580.
V. WATERS OF THE UNITED STATES
17. For purposes of this Consent Decree, the parties shall
treat wetland and open water areas depicted on Exhibit 1,
together with the new wetland and open water area created
pursuant to Part VII (injunctive relief) and depicted on Exhibit
2, as waters of the United States located on the Royce
Renaissance Property.
39a
18. For purposes of this Consent Decree, the parties shall
similarly treat wetland and open water areas depicted on
Exhibit 3, together with the 1.02 acre wetland mitigation area
already created by the Sullivan Lake Defendants and depicted
on Exhibit 3, as waters of the United States located on the
Sullivan Lake Property.
19. The Defendants hereby elect delineation for the Royce
Renaissance Property pursuant to the Federal Manual for
Identifying and Delineating Jurisdictional Wetlands (1989).
Further, the Parties agree that the boundaries of the alleged
waters of the United States referenced in Paragraph 17 and
depicted on Exhibit 1 would not differ if the delineation had
been conducted pursuant to the Corps of Engineers Wetland
Delineation Manual (1987).
20. The boundaries depicted in Exhibits 1 and 3 shall bind
the parties for the life of this Consent Decree unless and until
a new Corps or EPA delineation is made pursuant to the final
version of a revised wetland delineation manual. The
Defendants shall not request a new jurisdictional determination
from either the Corps or EPA for the Royce Renaissance
Property or the Sullivan Lake Property during the life of this
Consent Decree unless and until the government issues the final
version of a revised wetland delineation manual.
20A. The Defendanis shall continue to treat wetland and
open water areas depicted on Exhibit | as waters of the United
States until the mandate issues in Hoffman Homes, Inc. v. EPA,
No. 90-3810 (7th Cir. April 20, 1992) and until proceedings
related to any appeal, petition for certiorari, or remand are
completed. Following completion of these proceedings, unless
pertinent portions of the Seventh Circuit’s April 20, 1992
decision are reversed, Exhibit 1 areas W2A, W2B, W3, WSB,
and W9 shall be excluded from the obligations imposed in
Paragraph 17.
40a
VI. DESIGNATED PROJECT COORDINATORS
21. All reports, plans, approvals, disapprovals, and other
written communication required or permitted by this Consent
Decree shall be sent to each party’s designated Project
Coordinator. The project coordinators are:
For EPA:
Douglas A. Ehorn
Chief, Wetlands and Watersheds Section
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
77 West Jackson Boulevard - WQW-16J
Chicago, IL 60604
For Royce Renaissance Defendants:
Kerry Plencner
Vice President
Krilich Companies Inc.
1000 Royce Boulevard
Oak Brook Terrace
Oak Brook, IL 60181
For Sullivan Lake Defendants:
Kerry Plencner
Vice President
Krilich Companies Inc.
1000 Royce Boulevard
Oak Brook Terrace
Oak Brook, IL 60181
VII. INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
22. Each Defendant is permanently enjoined from
discharging dredged or fill material in violation of Clean Water
Act § 301, 33 U.S.C. § 1311.
23. The Royce Renaissance Defendants shall not discharge
dredged or fill material into the areas depicted as waters of the
4la
United States on Exhibits | and 2 without obtaining and fully
complying with the terms of a permit issued by the United
States Army Corps of Engineers pursuant to Clean Water Act
§ 404, 33 U.S.C. § 1344, and shall take all reasonable measures
to prevent others from doing so.
24. The Sullivan Lake Defendants shall not discharge
dredged or fill material into the areas depicted as waters of the
United States on Exhibit 3 without obtaining and fully
complying with the terms of a permit issued by the Corps
pursuant to Clean Water Act § 404, 33 U.S.C. § 1344, and shall
take all reasonable measures to prevent others from doing so.
a. Wetland Identification
25. The Royce Renaissance Defendants and the Sullivan
Lake Defendants, respectively, shall mark the boundaries of the
alleged waters of the United States depicted on Exhibits 1 and
3 using surveying stakes with appropriate flagging under the
on-scene supervision of an EPA representative, not later than
30 days after the entry of this Consent Decree. The same
Defendants shall not disturb those markers for any reason, shall
take all reasonable measures to prevent others from disturbing
those markers, and shall promptly replace markers disturbed by
others in accordance with the survey provided for in Paragraph
28.
26. The Royce Renaissance Defendants shall mark the
boundaries of the on-site mitigation area at the Royce
Renaissance Property, as depicted on Exhibit 2, using surveying
stakes with appropriate flagging under the on-scene supervision
of an EPA representative not later than 30 days after
completion of initial excavation and grading in accordance with
Paragraph 30. The same Defendants shall not disturb those
markers for any reason, shall take all reasonable measures to
prevent others from disturbing those markers, and shall
promptly replace markers disturbed by others in accordance
with the survey provided for in Paragraph 28.
42a
27. The Sullivan Lake Defendants shall mark the boundaries
of the on-site mitigation area, as depicted on Exhibit 3, using
surveying stakes with appropriate flagging under the on-scene
supervision of the EPA representative, not later than 30 days
after entry of this Consent Decree. The same Defendants shall
not disturb those markers for any reason, shall take reasonable
measurers to prevent others from disturbing those markers, and
shall promptly replace markers disturbed by others in
accordance with the survey provided for in Paragraph 28.
28. The Defendants shall arrange for a professional survey
of the boundary markers placed pursuant to Paragraphs 25
through 27, and shall provide EPA’s project coordinator with
a copy of each survey no later than 60 days after entry of this
Consent Decree for Paragraphs 25 and 27 and 30 days after
placement of the markers in accordance with Paragraph 26.
b. Restoration/Mitigation—Royce Renaissance
29. The Royce Renaissance Defendants shall restore the
alleged loss of the waters of the United States on the Royce
Renaissance Property in accordance with the Royce
Renaissance Plan, and in accordance with the following
schedule:
Deadline: Task:
August 31, 1992 Complete removal of spoil piles in areas
labelled Wla and Wld on Exhibit 1,
complete construction of berm in area
Wid, and complete regarding of
existing man-made channel in area W la.
September 30, 1992 Complete planting of the berm in area
Wid.
30. The Royce Renaissance Defendants shall create wetlands
on-site (as depicted in Exhibits 1 and 2) to mitigate for alleged
wetland and open water losses on the Royce Renaissance
43a
Property in accordance with the Royce Renaissance Plan and
the foilowing schedule:
Deadline: Task:
March 1, 1993 Commence initial excavation and
grading.
March 31, 1993 Complete initial excavation and grading,
and complete installation of flow control
structures.
May 15, 1993 Complete planting in the mitigation
area.
31. The Royce Renaissance Defendants shall further create
at least 2.08 acres of off-site wetlands in accordance with the
Royce Renaissance Plan and the following schedule:
Deadline: Task:
September 30, 1992 Submit proposed site to EPA’s
project coordinator for approval.
November 30, 1992 Submit proposed wetland
creation, maintenance and
monitoring plan to EPA’s
project coordinator for approval.
March 1, 1993 Commence initial excavation
and grading.
March 31, 1993 Complete initial excavation and
grading.
May 15, 1993 Complete planting in the new
wetland erea.
32. The Royce Renaissance Defendants shall mark the
boundaries of the off-site wetland created pursuant to Paragraph
31 using surveying stakes with appropriate flagging under the
44a
on-scene supervision of an EPA representative, not later than
30 days after planting in the new wetland is complete. The
same Defendants shall not disturb those markers for any reason,
shall take all reasonable measures to prevent other from
disturbing those markers, and shall promptly replace markers
disturbed by others in accordance with the survey provided for
in Paragraph 33. 7
33. The Royce Renaissance Defendants shall arrange for a
professional survey of the boundary markers placed pursuant to
Paragraph 32, and shall provide EPA’s project coordinator with
a coy of the survey no later than 60 days after placement of
those markers.
34. This Paragraph has been deliberately left blank.
35. Upon completion of the off-site mitigation work required
in accordance with the Royce Renaissance Plan and Paragraph
31, subject to the approval of EPA, the Royce Renaissance
Defendants may convey the off-site mitigation area to a public
entity or other suitable body subject to the restrictive covenants
described in Paragraph 49 and Exhibit 6. Subject to the
approval of EPA, the Defendants also may convey the on-site
mitigation areas at the Sullivan Lake and Royce Renaissance
Properties to a homeowners’ association, public entity, or other
suitable body subject to the covenants undertaken pursuant to
Paragraph 49 and Exhibits 5 and 7.
c. Additional Off-Site Enhancement - Carol Stream.
36. The Royce Renaissance Defendants and Sullivan Lake
Defendants shall provide additional off-site enhancement of
certain existing wetlands on property owned by Parkway Bank
and Trust Co. as Trustee for Trust No. 8429, for the sole benefit
of Robert R. Krilich, and legally described as follows (“the
Carol Stream Site’’):
45a
The Northeast and Southeast Quarters of Section a
Township 40N, Range 9E, Village of Carol Stream,
DuPage County, Illinois.
37. The Royce Renaissance Defendants and the Sullivan
Lake Defendants shall conduct the wetland enhancement
required pursuant to this subpart c within one of the prospective
enhancement areas depicted on Exhibit 8 (marked “wetlands”),
or within whatever on-site mitigation area is specified pursuant
to any permit the Corps may issue for the discharge of dredged
or fill material on the subject parcel.
38. The enhancement work required by this subpart c shall
be in addition to, and consistent with, work required pursuant
to any permit the Corps may issue in connection with
development of the Carol Stream Site. Nothing in this Consent
Decree shall be construed as a warranty or other guarantee by
the United States that any such permit will issue.
39. The Royce Renaissance Defendants and Sullivan Lake
Defendants shall conduct the enhancement required by this
subpart c in accordance with an appropriate wetland
enhancement plan approved by EPA (the “Carol Stream Plan”),
which shall be incorporated by reference in this Consent Decree
upon approval by EPA. At a minimum, the plan shall include
the following:
a. Unless the site selected differs from the sites depicted on
Exhibit 8, increasing the depth of water in the subject
area in order to enhance the non-game fish habitat;
b. Creating islands in central portions of the wetlands area
in order to enhance waterfowl habitat;
c. Planting suitable high-density wetland plants in the
shrub/scrub and emergent zones in order to control
erosion and thereby improve water quality;
46a
d. Provision for the expenditure of not less than $16,000.00
on grading and construction, together with procurement
and planting of vegetation; and
e. Should the Corps not issue a permit, specification of
suitable two-year interim performance standards, and
final performance standards, and provision for suitable
semi-annual reporting, pursuant to Paragraph 52A.
40. The Royce Renaissance Defendants and the Sullivan
Lake Defendants shall conduct the enhancement work in
accordance with the following schedule, measured from the
date of a decision by the Corps upon pending permit application
number 9359111, or from the first anniversary of entry of this
Consent Decree, whichever date is sooner.
Deadline: Task:
60 days Submit proposed
enhancement, maintenance
_ and monitoring plan to
EPA’s project coordinator
for approval.
180 days Commence initial excavation
and grading.
240 days Complete initial excavation
and grading.
270 days Complete planting in the
enhanced wetland area.
41. The Royce Renaissance Defendants and the Sullivan
Lake Defendants, collectively, shall notify EPA’s project
coordinator within 3 business days after each of the tasks listed
in Paragraph 40 is complete and available for inspection. EPA
shall notify these Defendants’ project coordinators in writing
within 45 days should any aspect of the work not comply with
47a
the Carol Stream Plan, and these Defendants shall correct any
such condition within a reasonable time allowed by EPA and
notify EPA within 3 business days after completion that the
condition is corrected and available for inspection.
d. Contractor/Restoration Standards
42. Defendants shall arrange for the performance of all
wetlands restoration, mitigation, and enhancement work
pursuant to this Consent Decree by or under the direct
supervision of a contractor with qualifications and experience
suitable to conduct wetlands creation, restoration, and
enhancement work. Defendants shall provide EPA’s project
coordinator in writing with the name of the contractor, and the
title, qualifications, and experience of the proposed contract
personnel no less than 15 working days before commencing
any restoration, enhancement or mitigation work. Selection and
replacement of the contractor shall each be subject to written
approval by EPA on reasonable grounds.
43. The Royce Renaissance Defendants shall notify EPA’s
project coordinator within 3 business days after each of the
tasks listed in Paragraphs 25 through 31 are complete and
available for inspection. EPA shall notify Defendants respective
project coordinators in writing within 45 days thereafter should
any aspect of the work not comply with the Royce Renaissance
Plan and Defendants shall correct any such condition within the
reasonable time allowed by EPA and notify EPA within 3
business days after completion that the condition is corrected
and available for inspection.
44. Should restored wetlands on the Royce Renaissance
Property, wetlands created there as on-site mitigation, or
wetlands created pursuant to Paragraph 31 as off-site
mitigation, respectively, fail to achieve the interim performance
standards specified in the applicable restoration or mitigation
plans by the date of second anniversary of planting, the Royce
Renaissance Defendants shall include proposed corrective
48a
measures, together with a schedule for their implementation, in
the next semi-annual report to EPA pursuant to Subpart VII g.
EPA shall notify the Royce Renaissance Defendants’ project
coordinator in writing within 45 days thereafter should any
aspect of the proposed corrective measures be inadequate. The
Royce Renaissance Defendants shall thereafter make any
reasonable changes suggested by EPA, and shall implement the
corrective measures plan.
45. Should performance standards be required for wetlands
enhanced pursuant to Paragraphs 36 through 41, and if
enhancements fail to achieve the interim performance standards
by the date of second anniversary of planting, the Royce
Renaissance Defendants and the Sullivan Lake Defendants
shall include proposed corrective measures, together with a
schedule for their implementation, in the next semi-annual
report submitted by the Royce Renaissance Defendants
pursuant to Paragraph 52A. EPA shall notify the Royce
Renaissance Defendants’ project coordinator in writing within
45 days thereafter should any aspect of the proposed corrective
measures be inadequate. The Royce Renaissance Defendants
shall thereafter make any reasonable changes suggested by
EPA, and shall implement the corrective measures plan.
e. Site Access
46. The Trust Defendants, Royce Renaissance Defendants,
and Sullivan Lake Defendar.ts shall allow any authorized
representative of EPA or the Corps, upon presentation of
appropriate credentials and telephone notice to the project
coordinator, any of the designated alternative persons, or other
representative of the Defendants, to enter any site that is the
subject of this action, including the site of the off-site
mitigation required by Paragraph 31 and the wetlands enhanced
at the Carol Stream Site, to monitor compliance with this
Consent Decree.
49a
47. This Decree does not limit the authority of the United
States to enter, conduct inspections, have access to records, or
monitor compliance pursuant to any statute or court order.
f. Mitigation Guarantee/Restrictive Covenants
48. The Trust Defendants, Royce Renaissance Defendants
and Sullivan Lake Defendants, respectively, shall maintain
those areas provided as mitigation (as depicted on Exhibits 2
and 3) as vegetated wetlands for so long as they own the
mitigation portions of the Royce Renaissance Property, the
Sullivan Lake Property, or the off-site mitigation property
referenced in Paragraph 31, and shall take all reasonable
measures to prevent damage by discharge of dredged or fill
material, trespass, or other disturbance by others.
49. The Trust Defendants, Royce Renaissance Defendants,
and Sullivan Lake Defendants hereby declare that whatever
interest they, or any of them, may have in the Royce
Renaissance or Sullivan Lake Properties, together with any
interest they, or any of them, may acquire in the off-site
mitigation property, whether legal, equitable, or otherwise,
shall be held, sold, distributed, or conveyed only subject to, and
in accordance with, covenants in the form attached to this
Consent Decree as Exhibits 5, 6, and 7.
50. The parties to this Consent Decree hereby express their
mutual intention that the covenants undertaken pursuant to
Paragraph 49 and Exhibits 5, 6, and 7 bind the parties, their
heirs, successors, assigns, and any subsequent purchaser of any
interest in any portion of the Royce Renaissance or Sullivan
Lake Properties or the off-site mitigation property required by
Paragraph 31.
51. Within 30 days after the boundaries of each mitigation
area are surveyed, as provided for in Paragraphs __and __, the
Royce Renaissance and Sullivan Lake Defendants shall execute
and record their respective covenants by filing a copy in the
appropriate local property records, and shall attach a copy of
50a
the same covenants to any instrument of conveyance prepared
in connection with the mitigation portions of the Royce
Renaissance and Sullivan Lake Properties or the off-site
mitigation area, and shall similarly attach a copy of the same
covenants to any development plan or plat submitted to any
municipal or other authority, or otherwise made public, in
connection with the mitigation portions of the Royce
Renaissance or Sullivan Lake properties or areas adjacent to or
encompassing such mitigation areas.
52. The 3.10 acre on-site mitigation area on the Royce
Renaissance Property, the 1.0 acre on-site mitigation area on
the Sullivan Lake Property, and the off-site mitigation area
created pursuant to Paragraph 31, are provided to mitigate for
the alleged loss of wetland and open water areas on the Royce
Renaissance and Sullivan Lake Properties, and shall not be
available to provide mitigation for other projects, including but
not limited to any application for a Section 404 permit.
g. Reporting
52A. The Royce Renaissance Defendants shall provide
EPA’s project coordinator with semi-annual progress reports
beginning September 30, 1993, and continuing thereafter not
later than March 31 and September 30 for the life of their
Consent Decree. Such semi-annual report shall include, at a
minimum:
1. A description of the specific actions taken by the Royce
Renaissance Defendants during the preceding semi-
annual period to comply with the terms of the Consent
Decree, and a projection of action to be taken for the
following semi-annual period;
2. A complete monitoring and management report
describing the condition and re-growth of restored
wetlands, on-site mitigation areas, off-site mitigation
areas, and, if required pursuant to Paragraph 39e, the
Sla
Carol Stream enhancement project, together with the
Royce Renaissance Defendants’ activities in those areas;
3. A statement of compliance or noncompliance with the
requirements of this Consent Decree; and
4. In the event of any noncompliance, a specific statement
of the reason(s) for that noncompliance, together with a
plan for preventing such noncompliance in the future.
52B. Semi-annual reports submitted pursuant to this subpart
g shall be signed by an officer of Krilich Companies, Inc., at
the time of the submission, under the following certification:
“I certify under penalty of law that this document and
any attachments were prepared under my direction or
supervision in accordance with a system designed to
assure qualified personnel properly gather and
evaluate the information submitted. Based on my
directions and my inquiry of the person(s) who
manage the system, or the person(s) directly
responsible for gathering the information, the
information submitted is, to the best of my knowledge
and belief, true, accurate and complete.”
52C. Defendants shall not object to the admissibility of any
semi-annual report in any proceeding to enforce this Consent
Decree. Compliance with the reporting requirements imposed
by this Consent Decree shall not relieve Defendants of any
other requirements imposed by Federal or State laws and
regulations.
VIN. CIVIL PENALTY
53. Within 30 days after entry of this Consent Decree, the
Royce Renaissance and Sullivan Lake Defendants shall pay a
civil penalty, without admission of liability, in the amount of
the one hundred and eighty-five thousand dollars ($185,000) to
the United States of America. Payment shall be made by
52a
certified or cashier check, payable to ‘‘Treasurer, United States
of America” and delivered to the United States Department of
Justice, Attention: Michael D. Rowe, Environment and Natural
Resources Division, P.O. Box 23986, Washington, DC 20026-
3986. Defendants shall simultaneously send a copy of the check
to EPA’s project coordinator.
54. In consideration of the actions that will be performed and
the penalties that will be paid by the Royce Renaissance
Defendants and the Sullivan Lake Defendants pursuant to this
Consent Decree, the United States covenants not to take action
to assess an administrative penalty against the same Defendants
pursuant to Clean Water Act § 309(g), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g), for
violations of Clean Water Act § 301(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a),
based on a discharge of dredged or fili material without the
required section 404 permit {33 U.S.C. § 1344) at the Royce
Renaissance Property (in the case of the Royce Renaissance
Defendants) and the Sullivan Lake Property (in the case of the
Sullivan Lake Defendants) prior to the date of lodging of this
Consent Decree. This covenant not to take action to assess an
administrative penalty is conditioned upon satisfactory
performance by the Royce Renaissance Defendants and the
Sullivan Lake Defendants of their respective obligations under
this Consent Decree. The covenant extends only to the Royce
Renaissance Defendants and the Sullivan Lake Defendants, and
not to any other person or entity.
IX. STIPULATED PENALTIES
55. The Royce Renaissance Defendants collectively shall
pay, and shall be jointly and severally liable for, a Stipulated
Penalty of two thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500.00) per
day for each of the following violations of this Decree:
a. failure to timely mark wetland boundaries in accordance
with Paragraphs 25, 26, and 32;
53a
b. failure to complete initial planting and restoration of
restoration and mitigation areas in accordance with
Paragraphs 29 through 31 and Exhibit 4;
c. movement by the Royce Renaissance Defendants of the
surveying stakes after placement approval by EPA in
violation of Paragraphs 25, 26, and 32;
d. failure to correct any conditions noted by EPA as being
inconsistent with the Royce Renaissance Plan in a timely
fashion as required by Paragraph 43;
e. violation of the mitigation guarantee/restrictive covenant
provisions found in the applicable portions of Paragraphs
49 through 51.
56. The Royce Renaissance Defendants collectively shall
pay, and shall be jointly and severally liable for, a Stipulated
Penalty of a thousand dollars ($1,000.00) per day for each of
the following violations of this Decree:
a. failure to timely deliver a survey of those wetland
boundaries in accordance with Paragraph 28 and 33;
b. failure to timely deliver information regarding contractor
identification and qualifications in accordance with
Paragraph 42;
c. failure to timely submit semi-annual reports in
accordance with subpart VII g;
d. failure to timely notify EPA’s project coordinator when
each of the tasks listed in Paragraphs 25-31 is complete
and available for inspection as required by Paragraph 43.
e. failure to timely notify EPA’s project coordinator when
conditions have been corrected and are ready for
inspection as required by Paragraph 43.
57. The Sullivan Lake Defendants collectively shall pay, and
shall be jointly and severally liable for, a Stipulated Penalty of
54a
two thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500.00) per day for each
of the following violations of this Decree:
a. failure to timely mark wetland boundaries in accordance
with Paragraph 27;
b. movement by the Sullivan Lake Defendants of the
surveying stakes after placement approval by EPA as
prohibited in Paragraph 27.
c. violation of the mitigation guarantee/restrictive covenant
provision found in the applicable portions of Paragraphs
49 through 51.
58. The Sullivan Lake Defendants collectively shall pay, and
shall be jointly and severally liable for, a Stipulated Penalty of
one thousand dollars ($1,000.00) per day for each of the
following violations of this Decree:
a. failure to timely deliver a survey of those boundaries in
accordance with Paragraph 28.
59. The Royce Renaissance Defendants and the Sullivan
Lake Defendants, collectively, shall pay, and shall be jointly
and severally liable for, a Stipulated Penalty of two thousand
five hundred dollars ($2,500.00) per day for each of the
following violations of this Decree:
a. failure to timely submit a proposed enhancement,
maintenance, and monitoring plan to EPA’s project
coordinator in accordance with Paragraph 40;
b. failure to complete initial excavation and grading in
accordance with Paragraph 40;
c. failure to complete planting the enhanced wetland area
in accordance with Paragraph 40;
60. The Royce Renaissance Defendants and the Sullivan
Lake Defendants collectively shall pay, and shall be jointly and
severally liable for, a Stipulated Penalty of one thousand dollars
ee...
55a
($1,000.00) per day for each of the following violations of this
Decree:
a. failure to timely notify EPA’s project coordinator when
each of the tasks listed in Paragraph 40 is complete and
available for inspection, as required by Paragraph 41.
b. failure to timely notify EPA’s project coordinator when
conditions have been corrected and are ready for
inspection as required by Paragraph 41.
c. failure to conduct monitoring and inspections and
provide semi-annual reports, if required pursuant to
Paragraph 39(e).
61. The Royce Renaissance Defendants collectively shall
pay, and shall be jointly and severally liable for, a Stipulated
Penalty for each day unpermitted dredged or fill material is
discharged, placed, or remains thereafter, in areas depicted as
waters of the United States on Exhibit 1 (that is, for each
violation of Paragraph 23) in the following amounts:
a. Five thousand dollars ($5,000.00) per day for the first 5
business days of violation;
b. Twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000) per day for each
calendar day of violation thereafter.
c. For purposes of this Consent Decree, a “business day”
shall include any nonbusiness day during which
construction or other crews are conducting earthmoving,
construction or other similar operations of the Royce
Renaissance Property.
62. The Sullivan Lake Defendants collectively shall pay, and
shall be jointly and severally liable for, a Stipulated Penalty for
each day unpermitted dredged or fill material is discharged,
placed, or remains thereafter, in areas depicted as alleged
waters of the United States on Exhibit 3 (that is, for each
violation of Paragraph 24) in the following amounts:
56a
a. Five thousand dollars ($5,000.00) per day for the first 5
business days of violation;
b. Twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000) per day for each
calendar day of violation thereafter.
c. For purposes of this Consent Decree, a “business day”
shall include any nonbusiness day during which
construction or other crews are conducting earthmoving,
construction or other similar operations on the Sullivan
Lake Property.
63. Any Defendant who denies an EPA or Corps employee
access to either the Royce Renaissance Property or the Sullivan
Lake Property, in vio
This text is long and has been trimmed here. Open the source document for the complete record.
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.