Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Krilich v. United States

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Dall Alt et l M ld el iene MB

x Supreme Court, U.S.

/ f FILE D

02 915DEC9 2002

No OFFICE OF THE CLERK

In the Supreme Court of the Gnited States

ROBERT R. KRILICH, KRILICH COMPANIES, INC..,

RIVERWOODS DEVELOPMENT CoORP., ET AL., PETITIONERS,

V.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, RESPONDENT.

On Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari

To The United States Court Of Appeals

For The Seventh Circuit

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

JAVIER H. RUBINSTEIN

Counsel of Record

SUSAN E. BRICE

MICHAEL A. SCODRO

Mayer, Brown, Rowe & Maw

190 South LaSalle Street

Chicago, Illinois 60603

(312) 782-0600

Counsel for Petitioner

i

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether the court of appeals erred in holding, contrary

to decisions of other courts of appeals and this Court’s decision

in Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. United States Army

Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159 (2001), that the federal govern-

ment has the statutory and constitutional authority to regulate

“non-navigable, isolated wetlands that have no surface connec-

tion to the nearest stream or nearest navigable body of water.”

2. Whether a consent decree between private citizens and

an agency of the federal government is subject to rescission as

void ab initio where the federal government never had statutory

or constitutional authority to regulate the subject matter of the

decree.

ee

il

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

QUESTIONS PRESENTED ...-.--0scceeerecseoress i

OPINIONS BELOW ....-----ssrrrr |

FURIGEMGTION «0. coco vascevenrrensserererrrr ee. 1

STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL

PROVISIONS INVOLVED ....------ssssr rr 1

CT ATRREIINT ac onc ccs wena nes epee eee tse res 1

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION ....----: 5

|. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S MISCONSTRUCTION

OF SWANCC CONFLICTS WITH DECISIONS OF

OTHER COURTS OF APPEALS THAT THERE IS

NO FEDERAL AUTHORITY TO REGULATE

ISOLATED, INTRASTATE WATERS HAVING NO

SIGNIFICANT CONNECTION TO NAVIGABLE

WANN Coc cccesenec een eeneernreeT 6

A. CWA § 404 And The Court’s Decision In

ne 5. ETE os oi esha 7

B. The Federal Courts Are Deadlocked As To

Whether Isolated, Non-navigable, Intrastate

Waters Axe Subject To Federal Regulation

Under CWA § 404. ..---e scree rrr 9

C. The Seventh Circuit’s Holding Is Inconsistent |

With This Court’s Decision In SWANCC. ...---: 15

ill

TABLE OF CONTENTS-Continued

Page

Il. THESEVENTH CIRCUIT ERRED IN REFUSING TO

RESCIND THE CONSENT DECREE AS VOID AB

INITIO DUE TO THE GOVERNMENT’S LACK OF

REGULATORY AUTHORITY. .............000. 19

A. Private Citizens Cannot Contractually Expand

A Federal Agency’s Statutory And Constitu-

ane a e weeks bw Cee ewes 20

B. This Court’s Decisions And Those Of Other

Courts Of Appeals Confirm That Consent

Decrees Are Void Ab Initio And Subject To

Rescission Where The Government Had No

Authority To Execute Them. ................. 22

SE a ee ee 26

iV

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases: Page

Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 638 (1990) ....... 21

Augusta Aviation, Inc. v. United States, 671 F.2d 445

(11th Cir. 1982) ........ee cece cere cere ee cecees 25

Bennett v. Hedglin, 995 P.2d 668 (Alaska 2000) .....-- 26

Bergstrom v. Estate of DeVoe, 854 P.2d 860

(Nev. 1993)... 2. c cee cserccecercvccccncrceces 26

Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204

HOU 5 oo vis ccdncccsesteaveneseasdaersets es 20

Brace v. United States, 51 Fed. Cl. 649 (2002) .......-- 13

Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281 (1979) ......--- 20

FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,

529 U.S. 120 (2000) ......-- eee reer reece ree 20

Federal Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380

(IDET)... wc ccnsecnssececssenerseaneosenees 22, 23

The Floyd Acceptances, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 666

TDD vinns cvegnsrav evar nndyae Ress sasintreses 23

Headwaters, Inc. v. Talent Irrigation Dist.,

243 F.3d 526 (9th Cir. 2001) ....---------+ee 12, 13

Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp.,

513 U.S. 30 (1994) .... 2. e eee eee eee eters 18

Hughes v. United States, 342 U.S. 353 (1952) .....---- 22

Vv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES-Continued

Idaho Rural Council v. Bosma, 143 F. Supp. 2d

eo Perr rere

Keith v. Volpe, 118 F.3d 1386 (9th Cir. 1997) ....

Kelley v. Town of Milan, 127 U.S. 139 (1888) ....

Klopp v. Keystone Ins. Cos., 595 A.2d 1 (Pa. 1991)

League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Clements,

999 F.26 G31 (Sia Clr. 1993) 2... cc nccccvess

Local Number 93, Int’l Ass'n of Firefighters v.

City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501 (1986) .......

National Revenue Corp. v. Violet, 807 F.2d 285

GREG WEEE obo se ce ese eereeeee

Needham, In re, 279 B.R. 515 (Bankr. W.D. La.

WD ka bia ooo a ek ea

Orange v. District of Columbia, 59 F.3d 1267

ee er err re Peer Eres

Rapanos v. United States, 533 U.S. 913 (2001) ...

REW Enters. v. Premier Bank, N.A., 49 F.3d 163

CRG Be ok.bb eek cous

Rice v. Harken Exploration Co., 250 F.3d 264

CE. DED cad anckoncenunenena ean

wees 21

vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES-Continued

Page

Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. United

States Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159

¢ 111) } oe passim

Schism v. United States, _ F.3d __, 2002 WL

31549178 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 18, 2002) (en banc) ...... 24

Total Med. Mgmt., Inc. v. United States,

104 F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 1997) .......----+ esses 25

Tuxedo Cheverly Volunteer Fire Co. v. Prince

George's County, 385 A.2d 819 (Md. Ct.

Spec. App. 1978) ......-- seers e eee e errr tenes 26

United States v. Amdahl Corp., 786 F.2d 387

(Fed. Cir. 1986) ........ cece eee cece eee e ee eeee 24

United States v. Armour & Co., 402 U.S. 673

(LL) EEE ok 22

United States v. Beebe, 180 U.S. 343 (1901) .....--- 23, 24

United States v. Buday, 138 F. Supp. 2d 1282

(D. Mont. 2001) . 6. eee eee cere reer eee eens 13

United States v. Interstate General Co., 2002 WL

1421411 (4th Cir. July 2, 2002) .....--- eee e eres 10

United States v. Interstate General Co., 152 F. Supp. 2d

843 (D. Md. 2001), aff'd, 2002 WL 1421411

(4th Cir. July 2, 2002) ......--- sees eee ees 15, 19

Vii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES-Continued

Page

United States v. ITT Cont’! Baking Co.,

ey ee Ne I 5 £6 6b 686545050000 baw ens 22

United States v. Lamplight Equestrian Center,

2002 WL 360652 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 8, 2002) ....... 13,14

United States v. Newdunn Assocs., 195 F. Supp. 2d

ee ee rr 1]

United States v. Ownbey Enters., Inc., 789 F. Supp.

Ree EE io as 6.0 604.04 Due obec beeen 19

United States v. Rapanos, 190 F. Supp. 2d 1011

err ere yee ree 11,17

United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc.,

ee Shy Se CE ac ¥ bone ca ueb eines oxies 5, 7,17

United States v. RMG Corp., 222 F. Supp. 2d

eo SS er | rere per 11

United States v. Rueth Dev., 189 F. Supp. 2d

Pe I a dkk eo 660k cee ibe baetas 13, 19

Williams v. Metzler, 132 F.3d 937 (3d Cir. 1997) ....... 21

Statutes, Regulations, and Rule:

pe a 3 ee ey re ree rere 2,7

LT oe | eee ar ee passim

vill

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES-Continued

Page

33 UBL. § IDAGE) on crc ccnccccccccscosccsssescess 7

33 UBC. 6 IDGRT) ..w cv ccccccccccvccccncscceceses 7

33 UB.C. § ISGRID) .. wn ccccsccveccccccsccesecesess 7

SD CER. 6 IACI)... 2... ccccceccccceeseces 4,7, 10

Pod. BR. Civ. P. GRR) oc ccccccccccscccccesescccecs 3

Miscellaneous:

2 FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 5.1 (2d ed. 1998) ..... 25

51 Fed. Reg. 41,206 (Nov. 13, 1986) ............-5555- 7

Michael Gerhardt, On Revolution and Wetland

Regulations, 90 GEO. L.J. 2143 (2002) ..........-- 11

Protecting Wetlands, WASH. POST,

Sept. 27, 2002, at A22 ... 1. cece eee e cece eens 14

Trip Van Nippon, Current Developments in Clean

Water Act Litigation, SG101 ALI-ABA 104

COED on cone cinceseccececeseusceiesssaseces 15

12 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 35:63 (4th ed. 1999) ... 25

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Robert R. Krilich et al. respectfully petition for a writ of |

certiorari to review the judgment of the United States Court of

Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in this case.

OPINIONS BELOW

The decision of the court of appeals (App., infra, 1a-16a) is

reported at 303 F.3d 784. The judgment of the district court

(App., infra, 17a-33a) is reported at 152 F. Supp. 2d 983.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on

September 9, 2002. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked

under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1). .

STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL

PROVISIONS INVOLVED

The relevant provisions of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C.

§§ 1311, 1344, 1362 are reproduced at App., infra, 75a-76a.

Article 1, § 8, cl. 3 of the United States Constitution provides,

in pertinent part, that “[t]he Congress shail have Power * * * To

regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the

several States, and with the Indian Tribes.”

STATEMENT

1. This case arises out of a Consent Decree entered by the

United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois

on October 29, 1992. The Decree resolved an enforcement

action by the EPA regarding petitioners’ alleged improper

filling of 4.5 acres of wetlands on their property (“petitioners’

Waters” or “Waters”.

The Waters are located entirely within the State of Illinois,

are non-navigable and isolated. The nearest non-navigable

water body, Salt Creek, is located 1.9 stream miles away from

the property, and the nearest navigable water, the Des Plaines

River at Hoffman Dam, is located 19.1 stream miles away.

App., infra, 71a-72a. In order for any runoff from the property

to reach the Des Plaines River at Hoffman Dam, it must travel

into a manhole with an open grate, which connects to a

“manmade, underground, concrete storm sewer system,” which

runs 2000 feet east and then flows into a small ditch that joins

non-navigable Salt Creek about 1.5 miles further east. /d. at

71a. Salt Creek then joins the Des Plaines River approximately

16.5 stream miles to the Southeast. /bid. The government

alleges that petitioners filled these Waters without a permit in

violation of Sections 404 and 301(a) of the Clean Water Act, 33

U.S.C. §§ 1344, 1311(a).

In the Consent Decree, the parties stipulated that certain of

the Waters are “waters of the United States,” and that the EPA

thus had jurisdiction to regulate them. App., infra, 38a-39a. The

Decree obligated petitioners to conduct restoration and

mitigation activities. It remains in force to this day, and its use

restrictions continue. In the Decree, the district court also

“retain[ed] jurisdiction in order to enable any party to apply to

the Court at any time for such further relief as may be necessary

to interpret, enforce, or modify this Decree.” Jd. at 35a.

When petitioners were unable to meet the deadlines in the

Decree, the government moved to enforce its penalty

provisions. On May 31, 1996, the district court entered an order

imposing a substantial fine on petitioners. 948 F. Supp. 719

(N.D. Ill. 1996). The court of appeals affirmed the penalty in

part but remanded for recalculation of the amount. 126 F.3d

1035 (7th Cir. 1997). The district court entered a modified

judgment in the amount of $1,257,500 on December 1, 1997.

These fines and penalties remain on deposit in a judicially

supervised escrow account.

2. On January 9, 2001, this Court announced its decision

in Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. United States Army

Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 167-168, 171-172 (2001)

(“SWANCC’”), that § 404 of the Clean Water Act (“CWA”)

does not extend “to ponds that are not adjacent to open water,”

————~=E—

and instead extends to waters that “actually abu[t] on a

navigable waterway.” Based on SWANCC, petitioners promptly

moved to vacate the Consent Decree, invoking the district

court’s powers under the Decree’s reservation-of-jurisdiction

clause and, alternatively, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5).

In support of their motion, petitioners submitted the Report

of an environmental expert who testified, among other things,

that petitioners’ Waters: (1) have “no natural connection to any

navigable waterway”; (2) are located 19.1 stream miles away

from the nearest navigable body of water; and (3) “would have

no measurable effect” on the nearest navigable or non-

navigable water “in terms of wildlife habitat, stormwater

retention, flood flow attenuation and water purification” even

if they were completely filled. App., infra, 71a, 74a.

The government did not challenge any of these factual

findings, despite the district court’s invitation to do so. The

district court thus assumed for purposes of its decision that “the

waters at issue actually are nonnavigable, isolated wetlands that

have no surface connection to the nearest stream or nearest

navigable body of water.” App., infra, 22a. Nonetheless, the

district court denied petitioners’ motion to vacate, holding that

the court was powerless to vacate or modify the Consent

_ Decree, and that petitioner was bound by the Decree, even if

the Waters were “isolated” under SWANCC, because petitioner

had stipulated to the government’s regulatory jurisdiction in the

Decree.

The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Like the district court, the

court of appeals assumed “that all waters at issue were

nonnavigable, isolated wetlands with no surface connection to

the nearest stream or nearest navigable body of water.” App.,

infra, 10a. The court rejected petitioners’ contention, however,

that SWANCC “removed from the [Army Corps of Engineers’ ]

regulatory authority all waters that are not adjacent to bodies of

open water.” /d. at 13a. In the court’s view, “the precise

holding of SWANCC was not so broad.” Jbid. Instead, the

4

Seventh Circuit concluded that “in SWANCC, the Supreme

Court merely held that the definition of ‘waters of the United

States’ under 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3), as clarified by the

Migratory Bird Rule, ‘exceeds the authority granted to [the

Corps] under § 404(a) of the CWA.’” App., infra, 13a (quoting

SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 174).

According to the Seventh Circuit, SWANCC shed no light

on the question of whether the CWA extends to isolated waters

not adjacent to navigable waters because “SWANCC in no way

altered the other regulations interpreting ‘waters of the United

States.”” App., infra, 14a. Because “[t]here is nothing in the

Consent Decree establishing that the Migratory Bird Rule was

the sole basis for the. EPA’s assertion of authority over

[petitioners’} property,” the court of appeals concluded that

“(t]he SWANCC decision does not establish that the

Government exceeded its authority in entering into the Consent

Decree, so [petitioners’] claim that the Decree was void ab

initio fails as well.” Id. at 13a-14a, 16a.

Finally, the Seventh Circuit held that “even assuming that

the wetlands were isolated, Krilich is nonetheless bound by the

Consent Decree” because “he already agreed that the waters

were ‘waters of the United States.’” App., infra, 10a, 13a. As

the court of appeals explained:

If a party believes that the waters at issue on his own

property are not properly subject to the EPA’s authority

* * * he should not stipulate otherwise. But that is

exactly what Krilich did, to his continued dismay. He

expressly agreed that certain waters on his property

constituted “waters of the United States,” subject to

regulation by the EPA.

App., infra, 14a-15a. Thus, according to the Seventh Circuit,

petitioners would be bound by the Consent Decree, and their

property thus subject to continued federal regulation, even if the

5

federal government never had any statutory or constitutional

authority to regulate petitioners’ Waters.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

This case presents the important and recurring question of

whether the United States government has the statutory and

constitutional authority to regulate isolated, intrastate waters

that are not directly adjacent to any navigable body of water,

and have no significant connection to any navigable waters.

This Court has addressed this issue twice, once in United States

v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. T2T (1985), and

again, more recently, in SWANCC.

Nevertheless, the courts of appeals and district courts are

hopelessly split over the meaning of SWANCC and Riverside

Bayview and the extent to which the federal government has

jurisdiction to regulate the nation’s intrastate waters. This case

presents the ideal opportunity to resolve this split. Both the

district court and the Seventh Circuit found, for purposes of

their decisions, that the Waters in this case were “nonnavigable,

isolated wetlands that have no surface connection to the nearest

stream or nearest navigable body of water.” This-casetherefore

squarely presents the naked legal question of whether the

federal government has the statutory and constitutional power

to regulate intrastate waters that have no significant connection

to any navigable body of water, irrespective of the Migratory

Bird Rule. As the cases cited herein confirm, the federal courts

repeatedly have confronted this question in the 2 years since

SWANCC was decided, but have not been able to reach a

consensus. Only this Court can break the deadlock.

This case also presents the separate and far-reaching

question of whether a Consent Decree between the federal

government and a private citizen is subject to rescission where

the federal government never had jurisdiction to regulate the

subject matter of the Decree. In this case, the Seventh Circuit

held that even if the EPA never had authority to regulate the

6

Waters in question, petitioners are nevertheless bound by the

Decree because they stipulated to the EPA’s regulatory

authority, thus allowing the EPA to bootstrap itself into

jurisdiction that neither Congress nor the Constitution has

conferred upon it. That holding not only flies in the face of this

Court’s administrative law decisions that private citizens cannot

contractually expand the regulatory jurisdiction of federal

agencies, but the multiple holdings of this Court and lower

federal courts that repeatedly have rescinded consent decrees as

void ab initio where it was found that the federal agency had no

authority to execute them in the first place.

I. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S MISCONSTRUCTION

OF SWANCC CONFLICTS WITH DECISIONS OF

OTHER COURTS OF APPEALS THAT THERE IS

NO FEDERAL AUTHORITY TO REGULATE

ISOLATED, INTRASTATE WATERS HAVING NO

SIGNIFICANT CONNECTION TO NAVIGABLE

WATERS.

The Seventh Circuit below held that despite this Court’s

holding in SWANCC, the federal government continues to have

the statutory and constitutional authority to regulate isolated,

non-navigable, intrastate waters. Indeed, here the Waters have

“no natural connection to any navigable waterway,” are located

19.1 stream miles away from the nearest navigable body of

water, and “would have no measurable effect” on any navigable

body of water. This decision squarely raises the very issue that

this Court confronted in SWANCC, i.e., whether the federal

government, as opposed to the states, has the power to regulate

intrastate waters that are neither adjacent to nor have any

significant effect upon any navigable waters. As SWANCC

itself confirmed, this fundamental question implicates not only

far-reaching issues of land use development and ecology, but

also “significant constitutional and federalism questions.” 531

U.S. at 174.

7

A. CWA § 404 And The Court’s Decision In SWANCC.

The CWA prohibits “any person” from discharging “any

pollutant,” including “dredged or fill material,” into “the

navigable waters” without obtaining a permit from the Army

Corps of Engineers (the “Corps”). 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a),

1344(a), 1362(12). “Navigable waters” are defined in the CWA

to mean “the waters of the United States, including the

territorial seas.” Jd. § 1362(7). The Corps, in turn, has defined

the term “waters of the United States” in § 404 of the CWA, 33

U.S.C. § 1344, to include not only traditional “navigable

waters,” but also

waters such as intrastate lakes, rivers, streams

(including intermittent streams), mudflats, sandflats,

wetlands, sloughs, prairie potholes, wet meadows, playa

lakes, or natural ponds, the use, degradation or

destruction of which could affect interstate or foreign

commerce.

33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a).

In 1986, the Corps further expanded the reach of its

jurisdiction by defining “other” waters pursuant to what is

known as the “Migratory Bird Rule”:

EPA has clarified that waters of the United States at

[33] CFR 328.3(a)(3) also include the following waters:

a. Which are or would be used as habitat by birds

protected by Migratory Bird Treaties; or

b. Which are or would be used as habitat by other

migratory birds which cross state lines * * * .

51 Fed. Reg. 41,206, 41,217 (Nov. 13, 1986).

In United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc.,474 U.S.

121 (1985), this Court held that § 404 gives the government

jurisdiction over non-navigable wetlands immediately adjacent

8

to open bodies of navigable water. The Court reaffirmed that

holding in SWANCC but made clear that federal authority to

regulate adjacent wetlands must be strictly circumscribed,

particularly in light of Commerce Clause concerns:

It was the significant nexus between the wetlands and

“navigable waters” that informed our reading of the

CWA in Riverside Bayview Homes. Indeed, we did not

“express any opinion” on the “question of the authority

of the Corps to regulate discharges of fill material into

wetlands that are not adjacent to bodies of open water.”

SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 167. The Court thus confirmed that

Riverside Bayview permits federal regulation only of wetlands

immediately adjacent to navigable waters, such as waters that

“actually abutted on a navigable waterway”:

In order to rule for respondents here, we would have to

hold that the jurisdiction of the Corps extends to ponds

that are not adjacent to open water. But we conclude

that the text of the statute will not allow this.

Id. at 168.

By using the term “navigable waters” in the CWA, the

Court explained, Congress intended only to “exert * * * its

commerce power over navigation”:

The term “navigable” has at least the import of showing

us what Congress had in mind as its authority for

enacting the CWA: its traditional jurisdiction over

waters that were or had been navigable in fact or which

could reasonably be so made.

SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 168 n.3, 172. The Court accordingly

rejected the claim that

isolated ponds, some only seasonal, wholly located

within two Illinois counties, fall under § 404(a)’s

definition of “navigable waters” because they serve as

9

habitat for migratory birds. As counsel for respondents

conceded at oral argument, such a ruling would assume

that “the use of the word navigable in the

statute * * * does not have any independent

significance.”

Id. at 171-172 (omission in original). While acknowledging its

statement in Riverside Bayview that “the word ‘navigable’ in

the statute was of ‘limited effect,’” the Court cautioned that “it

is one thing to give a word limited effect and quite another to

give it no effect whatever.” /d. at 172.

Finally, the SWANCC Court emphasized that its holding on

the scope of § 404 jurisdiction was meant “to avoid the

significant constitutional and federalism questions raised by”

expansion of federal jurisdiction to cover purely local, intrastate

waters. /d. at 174. Those very concerns are raised again by the

court of appeals’ holding below.

B. The Federal Courts Are Deadlocked As To Whether

Isolated, Non-navigable, Intrastate Waters Are

Subject To Federal Regulation Under CWA § 404.

The federal courts are deeply divided over the scope and

meaning of CWA § 404 following this Court’s decision in

SWANCC, particularly over the extent to which federal

agencies can regulate intrastate waters that are neither

immediately adjacent to navigable waters nor have any

significant effect on any navigable waters. In fact, the federal

courts have divided into at least three distinct and irreconcilable

camps.

1. The Seventh Circuit’s decision below reflects the first

of these approaches, holding that SWANCC was limited to its

facts, and that “non-navigable, isolated wetlands that have no

surface connection to the nearest stream or nearest navigable

body of water” are subject to federal regulation so long as

regulators do not rely solely on the now-overturned Migratory

Bird Rule. Put another way, in the view of the Seventh Circuit,

10

the federal government can continue to assert federal

Jurisdiction over isolated, intrastate waters so long as it does not

explicitly rely on the Migratory Bird Rule as the jurisdictional

predicate. According to this view, if the government in

SWANCC had asserted any additional basis for jurisdiction

(e.g., 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3), (a)(5) or (a)(7)), the court of

appeals’ decision in that case would have been affirmed.

The Seventh Circuit’s decision follows a similar ruling by

the Fourth Circuit in United States v. Interstate General Co.,

2002 WL 1421411 (July 2, 2002), which likewise held that

SWANCC addressed only the validity of 33 C.F.R.

§ 328.3(a)(3), “as clarified and applied to petitioner’s balefill

site pursuant to the ‘Migratory Bird Rule,’” and did not

generally address the extent to which federal agencies may

regulate isolated, intrastate waters.

2. The Fifth Circuit, agreeing with Justice Stevens’

interpretation of the majority opinion in SWANCC, has adopted

a different approach, interpreting SWANCC to articulate a

bright line test for § 404 jurisdiction. In his dissent, Justice

Stevens observed that “[i]n its decision today, the Court draws

a new jurisdictional line, one that invalidates the 1986

migratory bird regulation as well as the Corps’ assertion of

jurisdiction over all waters except for actually navigable waters,

their tributaries, and wetlands adjacent to each.” 531 U.S. at

176-177 (dissenting opinion). Justice Stevens also noted that

SWANCC had the effect of excluding from federal regulation

tributaries and wetlands that are neither contiguous nor adjacent

to navigable waters from the scope of Section 404. Jd. at 189

n.14 (dissenting opinion). Accordingly, he concluded that

SWANCC extended § 404 jurisdiction only to navigable-in-fact

7"

waters, primary tributaries to navigable-in-fact waters, and

adjacent wetlands. '

The Fifth Circuit and a growing number of district courts

agree with this broader reading of the majority opinion in

SWANCC and thus have fashioned a bright-line jurisdictional

rule in which “a body of water is subject to regulation under the

CWA if the body of water is actually navigable or is adjacent

to an open body of navigable water.” Rice v. Harken

Exploration Co., 250 F.3d 264, 265, 268-71 (5th Cir. 2001);?

see also Jn re Needham, 279 B.R. 515, 518 (Bankr. W.D. La.

2001) (same); United States v. Rapanos, 190 F. Supp. 2d 1011,

1012 (E.D. Mich. 2002) (holding that wetlands that “were not

directly adjacent to navigable waters” were beyond

government’s reach); United States v. Newdunn Assocs., 195 F.

Supp. 2d 751, 767-768 (E.D. Va. 2002) (agreeing with dissent’s

characterization of SWANCC as excluding “wetlands and

tributaries that are not contiguous or adjacent to navigable

waters” from Corps’s grasp and finding that wetlands at issue

were not “adjacent to navigable waters by any reasonable

definition of adjacency”); United States v. RMG Corp., 222 F.

Supp. 2d 780, 788-789 (E.D. Va. 2002) (holding that wetlands

not adjacent to closest navigable waterway were outside federal

jurisdiction); Michael Gerhardt, On Revolution and Wetland

Regulations, 90 GEO. L.J. 2143, 2154 (2002) (interpreting

' Justice Stevens stated that SWANCC “excised” “Phase 3” waters (described

as all waters other than navigable-in-fact waters, their primary tributaries and

wetlands adjacent/contiguous to each) from the scope of the CWA.

SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 189 n.14 (dissenting opinion); see also United States

v. Newdunn Assocs., 195 F. Supp. 2d 751, 763 (E.D. Va. 2002).

* The actual holding in Rice reads SWANCC even more ambitiously. The

Fifth Circuit held that Big Creek did not qualify as a “navigable water”

within the meaning of the CWA, despite the fact that “Big Creek runs across

the ranch to the Canadian River,” a navigable-in-fact water. 250 F.3d at 265.

The Rice court thus found that even a primary tributary is not a “navigable

water” subject to CWA jurisdiction.

12

SWANCC as holding that “waters that are neither navigable

waters nor adjacent to navigable waters are simply not within

the Corps’s jurisdiction”).

This second approach—that all waters not immediately

adjacent to a navigable water (or at least not abutting onto a

primary tributary of a navigable water) are beyond the limits of

federal regulatory authority—squarely conflicts with the

Seventh Circuit’s position that “non-navigable, isolated

wetlands that have no surface connection to the nearest stream

or nearest navigable body of water” are still within the reach of

federal regulators even after SWANCC.

3. Ccher federal courts have rejected the view of the

Seventh Circuit and the bright-line test adopted by the Fifth

Circuit in favor of an “effects” tests that asks whether the

waters in question have a significant connection to, or effect

upon, a navigable body of water. This view, endorsed by the

Ninth Circuit and various district courts, is equally at odds with

the Seventh Circuit’s holding below.

For instance, in Headwaters, Inc. v. Talent Irrigation Dist.,

243 F.3d 526 (9th Cir. 2001), the Ninth Circuit held that certain

irrigation canals were “waters of the United States” within the

meaning of the CWA. In reaching its decision, the Ninth Circuit

found that the canals were not “isolated” within the meaning of

SWANCC because the introduction of pollutants into the canals

had a deleterious effect on waters of the United States. /d. at

533-534. The Ninth Circuit found that

[b]ecause the canals receive water from natural streams

and lakes, and divert water to streams and creeks, they

are connected as tributaries to other “waters of the

United States.” * * * The Clean Water Act is concerned

with the pollution of tributaries as well as with the

“io

pollution of navigable streams, and “it is incontestable

that substantial pollution of one not only may but very

probably will affect the other.”

Ibid?

Other lower courts have endorsed this same approach. See,

e.g., United States vy. Lamplight Equestrian Ctr., 2002 WL

360652, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 8, 2002) (after SWANCC, “the

critical issue is whether there is a ‘significant nexus’ between

the Property’s wetlands and the Fox River [the navigable

water]”); United States v. Rueth Dev., 189 F. Supp. 2d 874,

877-878 (N.D. Ind. 2002) (finding that relationship between

wetlands and navigable water was “direct” and that property

“has the ‘significant nexus’ to a navigable waterway necessary

to trigger Army Corps of Engineers jurisdiction under CWA

§ 404(a)”); Brace v. United States, 51 Fed. Cl. 649 (2002)

(focusing on whether “nexus” exists between wetlands and

navigable water); Idaho Rural Council v. Bosma, 143 F. Supp.

2d 1169, 1179 (D. Idaho 2001) (waters were “sufficiently

connected” via surface water to navigable water to be subject

to federal jurisdiction); United States v. Buday, 138 F. Supp. 2d

1282, 1290 n.14 (D. Mont. 2001) (since no one disputed

adjacency, court analyzed effect tributary had on navigable

water and found that it was “significant” and that its water

quality was vital to that of navigable water).

Under this “effects” approach, a court assessing the limits

of § 404 jurisdiction must determine whether the waters in

dispute have a “significant nexus” with a navigable water body.

While obviously distinct from the bright-line test endorsed by

* Headwaters involved neither the Migratory Bird Rule nor § 404 of the

CWA. It concerned § 402 of the CWA and an irrigation district’s alleged

discharge of herbicides without an NPDES permit. The mere fact that the

Ninth Circuit addressed SWANCC in a non-section 404 case thus confirms

its disagreement with the Seventh Circuit’s narrow reading of that decision.

14

the Fifth Circuit in Rice, this approach stands equally and

irreconcilably in conflict with the Seventh Circuit’s narrow

reading of SWANCC below.

The Seventh Circuit held that petitioners’ Waters are

subject to continuing federal control under SWANCC even

though they are not adjacent to any navigable body of water

and lack a significant nexus to any navigable waters. In the

Seventh Circuit’s view, both of these facts are irrelevant simply

because the federal government did not rely exclusively on the

Migratory Bird Rule. Whichever approach one favors, the

circuit split over this important issue is both significant and

undeniable.

Indeed, the pervasive confusion over where to draw the

jurisdictional limits of § 404 has been widely recognized. A

recent editorial in the Washington Post highlighted this

confusion and the mounting problems that the circuit split is

causing:

Last year the Supreme Court narrowed the reach of the

Clean Water Act, holding that it doesn’t apply to

“isolated” wetlands because it refers to navigable

waters. The result has been confusion, and potential

danger to natural habitats. Federal officials in different

areas of the country have put the court’s ruling into

practice differently. States haven’t made much progress

in filling the gap. Two U.S. courts have reached

opposite conclusions about how much connection to

navigable water is enough to bring a wetland within the

Clean Water Act’s reach.

Protecting Wetlands, WASH. POST, Sept. 27, 2002, at A22.

Many district courts also have acknowledged the confusion

that now exists over the meaning of SWANCC and the

compelling need for Supreme Court guidance as to whether

§ 404 extends to isolated wetlands not immediately adjacent to

navigable waters. See, e.g., Lamplight Equestrian Ctr., 2002

LA ee Pee er ae a eee

15

WL 360652, at *5 (“Courts interpreting SWANCC have reached

varying results, the primary rift being whether the Migratory

Bird Rule was the decision’s only casualty, or whether the

holding limited the Corps’ jurisdiction even further”); United

States v. Interstate General Co., 152 F. Supp. 2d 843, 848 (D.

Md. 2001) (“[t]he Court is aware that there is a difference of

opinion with regards to the application of SWANCC as applied

to the CWA”), aff'd, 2002 WL 1421411 (4th Cir. July 2, 2002).

Whatever the answer to this important question, the

- prejudice to petitioners and others resulting from this split of

authority is plain. If petitioners’ Waters had been located in the

Fifth or Ninth Circuits, those Waters would today be free from

federal control, subject instead to the proper regulation of state

and local authorities. But because they happen to be located

within the Seventh Circuit, petitioners are precluded from

developing their property as they wish, even though the subject

Waters are located 19.1 stream miles away from the nearest

navigable water, and the filling of those Waters would have no

effect upon any navigable water body.

Absent Supreme Court review, this question will

undoubtedly continue to plague the courts. Since this Court’s

decision in SWANCC, numerous federal decisions have been

issued that attempt to discern its meaning, many of which have

come to opposite conclusions. Trip Van Noppen, Current

Developments in Clean Water Act Litigation, SG101 ALI-ABA

1041, 1043 (2002) (the SWANCC decision “has spawned

decisions on CWA jurisdictional issues in a dizzying variety of

fact situations with conflicting results”). There is no reason to

believe that the lower courts can resolve this disagreement

without Supreme Court guidance.

C. The Seventh Circuit’s Holding Is Inconsistent With

This Court’s Decision In SWANCC.

The Seventh Circuit’s holding that federal agencies possess

the power to regulate “nonnavigable, isolated wetlands that

16

have no surface connection to the nearest stream or nearest

navigable body of water” cannot be reconciled with this Court’s

decision in SWANCC.

As set forth above, SWANCC plainly did more than merely

strike down the Migratory Bird Rule. At the very least,

SWANCC limited § 404 jurisdiction to: (1) navigable-in-fact

waters; (2) primary tributaries of navigable-in-fact waters; and

(3) wetlands “immediately adjacent” to each. Indeed, the

majority opinion suggests an even broader holding, one that

limits the jurisdiction of federal regulators to two categories of

waters: (1) navigable-in-fact waters and (2) wetlands

immediately adjacent thereto. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 168

(Section 404 does not extend “to ponds that are not adjacent to

open water”); id. at 172 (“[t]he term ‘navigable’ has at least the

import of showing us what Congress had in mind as its

authority for enacting the CWA: its traditional jurisdiction over

waters that were or had been navigable in fact or which could

reasonably be so made”).

This Court was presented with a petition for certiorari

relying on this reading of SWANCC shortly after that case was

decided. John Rapanos, who had been convicted of illegally

filling wetlands that were “at least 20 miles from the nearest

navigable waterway,”™ asked the Court to decide whether, under

SWANCC, federal regulators have § 404 “jurisdiction over

isolated wetiands not adjacent to any navigable or open

waters.” See Rapanos v. United States, Petition for Certiorari

at i, 7 (No. 00-1428). This Court granted the petition, vacated

the judgment below and remanded for further consideration in

light of SWANCC. See Rapanos v. United States, 533 U.S. 913

(2001).

* The hydrological connection in Rapanos was described as follows: “any

water flowing from Mr. Rapanos’ property would flow into the Lobodzinski

Drain, then into the Hoppler Drain and from there into the Kawkawlin River,

ultimately reaching the Saginaw Bay [a navigable body of water], some

twenty (20) miles away.” Rapanos Pet. 8.

stents

17

Following the remand, the district court vacated the

defendant’s 1995 criminal conviction, holding “as a matter of

law that the wetlands on Defendant’s property were not directly

adjacent to navigable waters, and therefore, the government

cannot regulate Defendant’s property.” United States v.

Rapanos, 190 F. Supp. 2d 1011, 1017 (E.D. Mich. 2002).

The district court in Rapanos thus applied the “immediately

adjacent” test adopted by the Fifth Circuit. And as in Rapanos,

petitioners’ Waters here are beyond the federal regulators’ —

reach under this standard. Petitioners’ Waters are clearly non-

navigable and isolated, as established by the uncontradicted

expert testimony presented below. The nearest non-navigable

water body, Salt Creek, is located 1.9 stream miles away from

the property, and the nearest navigable water, the Des Plaines

River at Hoffman Dam, is located 19.1 stream miles away.

App., infra, 71a-72a. In order for any runoff from the property

to reach the Des Plaines River at Hoffman Dam, it must travel

into a manhole with an open grate, which connects to a

“manmade, underground, concrete storm sewer system”’ that

runs 2000 feet east and then flows into a small ditch that joins :

non-navigable Salt Creek about 1.5 miles further east. Id at

71a. Salt Creek then joins the Des Plaines River approximately

16.5 stream miles to the Southeast. Jbid At these distances,

petitioners’ Waters can hardly be described as “immediately

adjacent” to or abutting ona navigable water or even a primary

tributary to a navigable water.

Petitioners’ Waters also lie beyond the limits of federal

regulation if one were to apply the “effects” approach adopted

by the Ninth Circuit and other courts. Petitioners’ Waters have

no “significant nexus” with, nor are they — in the words of

Riverside Bayview—“inseparably bound up” with any

navigable waters. See 474 U.S. at 133. Indeed, petitioners

presented uncontradicted expert testimony that even the filling

of all of petitioners’ Waters—not just the 4.5 acres allegedly

filled—“would have no measurable effect on the Des Plaines

18

River or Salt Creek in terms of wildlife habitat, stormwater

retention, flood flow attenuation and water purification.” App.,

infra, 74a. In fact, the “Site’s drainage is often times

hydrologically isolated.” /d. at 72a.

Given these uncontradicted facts, to extend § 404 to cover

the Waters in this case would not only run contrary to the

statute, but also would clearly violate the Commerce

Clause—raising the same “significant constitutional and

federalism questions” that this Court highlighted in SWANCC.

531 U.S. at 174; see also ibid. (“Regulation of land use [is] a

function traditionally performed by local governments”)

(quoting Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30,

44 (1994)). Indeed, federal agencies are seeking to regulate the

use of waters and private property that have no conceivable

connection to any federal interest in commerce or navigation.

Congress clearly did not allow regulators to meddle in such

intrinsically local issues:

Rather than expressing a desire to readjust the federal-

state balance in this manner, Congress chose to

“recognize, preserve, and protect the primary

responsibilities and rights of States * * * to plan the

development and use * * * of land and water resources

* * * >

Ibid. (omissions in original). These concerns lead to the

inexorable conclusion that the federal government has no

jurisdiction to regulate the sort of private, intrastate and non-

navigable waters at issue in this case. After all, “[w]here an

administrative interpretation of a statute invokes the outer

limits of Congress’ power, we expect a clear indication that

Congress intended that result.” Jd. at 172. No such indication

appears in this case.

In short, SWANCC confirms that federal regulators never

had jurisdiction over petitioners’ Waters. The Seventh Circuit’s

holding to the contrary must be reversed.

19

II. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT ERRED IN REFUSING TO

RESCIND THE CONSENT DECREE AS VOID AB

INITIO DUE TO THE GOVERNMENT’S LACK OF

REGULATORY AUTHORITY.

Petitioners moved to vacate the consent decree in this case

on the ground that federal agencies never had authority to

regulate petitioners’ Waters, that its execution of the consent

decree was thus an ultra vires act, and that the government

should not be allowed to continue regulating petitioners’

Waters when it never possessed regulatory authority over them

in the first place. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of the

motion t. vacate, holding that even if the federal government

never had regulatory authority over petitioners’ Waters,

petitioners are nevertheless bound by the Consent Decree

because they “expressly agreed that certain waters on [the]

property constituted ‘waters of the United States,’ subject to

regulation by the EPA.” App., infra, 15a. In the Seventh

Circuit’s view, even if the federal government never had

authority to regulate petitioners’ Waters, the government

nevertheless can continue to regulate them pursuant to

petitioners’ stipulation to federal regulatory jurisdiction.°

The Seventh Circuit’s holding clearly conflicts not only

with this Court’s decisions, but with those of other multiple

courts of appeals, which have held that consent decrees and

other contracts are subject to rescission where the government

—

* Citing previous decisions in this case, at least two district courts have

bound private parties by their stipulations to EPA jurisdiction. See United

States v. Rueth Dev. Co., 189 F. Supp. 2d 874, 890 (N.D. Ind. 2002) (“By

assenting to settlement in this action, Defendants waived, for example, the

right to contest the EPA’s regulatory jurisdiction”); Interstate General, 152

F. Supp. 2d at 848-849 (barring defendant from challenging federal CWA

jurisdiction after pleading guilty to environmental crime); see also United

States v. Ownbey Enters., Inc., 789 F. Supp. 1145, 1150 (N.D. Ga. 1992)

(defendant’s “admission as to EPA’s jurisdiction acts as an acceptance by

[defendant] that all necessary conditions precedent to the issuance of this

Order have been fulfilled”).

20

lacked authority to enter into them. Indeed, to hold otherwise

would be to allow the federal government to retain the spoils of

illegal regulation and to continue its improper intrusion upon

the rights of state and local governments to regulate the use of

intrastate waters that have no conceivable connection to any

navigable waters.

A. Private Citizens Cannot Contractually Expand A

Federal Agency’s Statutory And Constitutional

Authority.

The Consent Decree in this case permits federal agencies to

regulate petitioners’ Waters on an ongoing basis. Despite a lack

of statutory authority, it authorizes the government to gain

access to the Royce property, requires petitioners to sell or

convey the property only subject to certain restrictive covenants

that run with the land, entitles the government to over $1.5

million in penalties currently in escrow and further fines if

petitioners violate the decree, empowers the government to

enforce the decree and all of its prohibitions, and forbids

petitioners from discharging dredged or fill material into the

waters without a permit. App., infra, 35a, 40a-41a, 48a-49a,

52a-57a.

As demonstrated above, however, petitioners’ isolated

wetlands were never within the regulatory jurisdiction of the

EPA. If that is so, it makes no difference that petitioners

stipulated to federal regulatory jurisdiction in the Decree. This

Court has clearly held that federal agencies may not act beyond

their congressionally delegated authority. “[N]o matter how

‘important, conspicuous, and controversial’ the issue * * * an

administrative agency’s power to regulate in the public interest

must always be grounded in a valid grant of authority from

Congress.” FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529

U.S. 120, 161 (2000); see also Bowen v. Georgetown Univ.

Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988) (“It is axiomatic that an

administrative agency’s power * * * is limited to the authority

delegated by Congress”); Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S.

21

281, 302 (1979) (“The legislative power of the United States is

vested in the Congress, and the exercise of quasi-legislative

authority by governmental departments and agencies must be

rooted in a grant of such power by the Congress and subject to

limitations which that body imposes”).

The constitutional limits on federal power, and the statutory

limits on agency authority, are fundamental to the American

conception of a federal government of limited powers.

Consistent with this principle, courts have long recognized that

private citizens may not confer authority upon a government

actor that the actor does not otherwise enjoy under law. See,

e.g., Local Number 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of

Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 526 (1986) (“[T]he parties may [not]

agree to take action that conflicts with or violates the statute

upon which the complaint was based”); Williams v. Metzler,

132 F.3d 937, 942, 943 (3d Cir. 1997) (“[T]he parties are

attempting to vest consensual jurisdiction in the Secretary to

perform a function that Congress has explicitly placed in the

district court. * * * If the Secretary’s decision serves to block

full consideration of the merits in the district court, then the

Secretary has done indirectly what is ultra vires if done

directly”); see also Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 638,

650 (1990) (“it is fundamental ‘that an agency may not

bootstrap itself into an area in which it has no jurisdiction”).

Federal regulators attempt to do here precisely what this

Court has forbidden—to expand their regulatory jurisdiction by

contract. The fundamental restrictions on federal agency power,

however, apply to all forms of regulation, including

enforcement through consent decrees. As the Fifth Circuit has

noted, “[c]ourts must be especially cautious when parties seek

to achieve by consent decree what they cannot achieve by their

own authority. Consent is not enough when litigants seek to

grant themselves powers they do not hold outside of court.”

League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Clements, 999 F.2d 831,

846 (Sth Cir. 1993) (en banc); see also Keith v. Volpe, 118 F.3d

22

1386, 1393 (9th Cir. 1997) (“To the extent the parties to the

Consent Decree intended to ban advertising displays next to

I-105, they could not agree to terms which would exceed their

authority and supplant state law”); National Revenue Corp. v.

Violet, 807 F.2d 285, 288 (1st Cir. 1986) (“For an attorney

general to stipulate that an act of the legislature is

unconstitutional is a clear confusion of the three branches of

government * * * . An attorney general can have no authority

to be the binding determiner that legislation is unconstitutional.

The agreed judgment was void on its face”).

Thus, if the federal government never had statutory or

constitutional authority to regulate petitioners’ Waters, it was

necessarily without authority to enter into any consent decree

that regulates wetlands beyond the statutory and constitutional

reaches of federal power.

B. This Court’s Decisions And Those Of Other Courts

Of Appeals Confirm That Consent Decrees Are Void

Ab Initio And Subject To Rescission Where The

Government Had No Authority To Execute Them.

Consent decrees are governed by principles of contract

law,® and it is black-letter contract law that where a

government’s execution of a contract constitutes an ultra vires

act, the contract itself is void ab initio and has no legal effect.

Indeed, this Court has adopted this prevailing view as federal

common law. In Federal Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S.

380 (1947), for instance, the Court held that an ultra vires

contract with a federal agency was void and unenforceable. In

° This Court has held many times that “a consent decree or order is to be

construed for enforcement purposes basically as a contract.” United States

v. ITT Cont’! Baking Co., 420 U.S. 223, 238 (1975); see also, e.g., United

States v. Armour & Co., 402 U.S. 673, 682 (1971); Hughes v. United States,

342 U.S. 353, 356 (1952). Consent decrees are governed by contract law

because “‘it is the parties’ agreement that serves as the source of the court’s

authority to enter any judgment at all.” Local Number 93, 478 U.S. at 522.

23

that case, the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation—an agency

created by Congress as part of the Department of

Agriculture—accepted an application for crop insurance. Later

that year, drought destroyed the insured crop. The Corporation

refused to pay the loss because it learned that the crop was

planted on re-seeded land, and federal regulations prohibited

the Corporation from issuing insurance policies to crops on

such lands. /d. at 381-382. Despite the equities of the situation,

the Court held that the insurance policy was void ab initio

because the Corporation lacked authority to issue the policy in

the first place. Jd. at 385; see also The Floyd Acceptances, 74

U.S. (7 Wall.) 666, 671, 681 (1869) (contract between

Secretary of War and supply company was null and void

because “the secretary was acting wholly beyond the scope of

his authority”).

This Court has reached the same conclusion with respect to

consent decrees in particular. A century ago, for instance, the

Court voided an ultra vires consent decree between the United

States and two defendants in United States v. Beebe, 180 U.S.

343 (1901). The defendants in that case were sureties on a

federal tax collector’s bond; when the collector failed to

account for public monies that had come into his hands, the

United States moved to collect from the defendants. /d. at 344-

345. The government commenced actions against the

defendants seeking over $28,000, but the attorney for the

government eventually agreed to a consent judgment—due to

the defendants’ claimed poverty—by which the government

would dismiss the actions in exchange for a $100 payment from

each defendant. /d. at 344-346.

Four years after the district court approved the consent

judgment, the government petitioned to void it on the ground

that the prosecutor had lacked authority to enter into it; federal

regulations at the time provided that “no district attorney shall

agree to take a judgment or decree for a less amount than is

claimed by the United States, without express instructions from

24

the Solicitor of the Treasury.” Beebe, 180 U.S. at 351. The

Court held that “(a] judgment entered upon such a compromise

is subject to be set aside on the ground of the lack of authority

in the attorney to make the compromise upon which the

judgment rests,” and “the judgment will be vacated on that

ground.” /d. at 352. The Court ordered the parties returned to

the status quo ante—after a new trial or settlement, the

defendants’ $100 payments would be either returned to them or

credited against the judgment. /d. at 354-355.’

Lower federal courts consistently have applied this rule. In

United States v. Amdahl Corp., 786 F.2d 387 (Fed. Cir. 1986),

for example, the court held that a contract by the Treasury

Department to acquire computer equipment exceeded the

agency’s authority. Such an ultra vires contract, the court held,

was void ab initio and was therefore rescinded. Jd. at 393. The

court stated that “[a]dministrative actions taken in violation of

statutory authorization or requirement are of no effect. * * *

The courts are bound to strike down illegal contracts.” Jd. at

392-393; see also Schism v. United States, __ F.3d __, 2002

WL 31549178, at *13-*23 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 18, 2002) (en banc)

(holding that military lacked authority to promise lifetime

healthcare to certain servicemen); Orange v. District of

Columbia, 59 F.3d 1267, 1271 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (holding that

university’s employment contracts with plaintiff-professors

’ The Court took a similar path in Kelley v. Town of Milan, 127 U.S. 139

(1888). Investors there sued a municipality to collect on railroad bonds

issued by the local government. Under state law, the municipality lacked the

authority to issue the bonds, id. at 150, and it attempted to avoid payment on

that basis. To rebut that assertion, the investors pointed to a consent decree

between the municipality and the relevant railroad company that declared the

bonds valid; the municipality argued that, as with the bonds themselves, its

agents lacked authority to enter the consent decree. /d. at 158-160. The Court

held that “(t]he act of the mayor, in signing that [consent] agreement, could

give no validity to the bonds, if they had none at the time the agreement was

made. The want of authority to issue them extended to a want of authority

to declare them vaiid. The mayor had no such authority.” /d. at 159.

25

were “invalid as written” and therefore void and unenforceable

because the contracts were not approved by the university’s

Board of Trustees, as required by D.C. law); Total Med. Megmt.,

Inc. v. United States, 104 F.3d 1314, 1320-1321 (Fed. Cir.

1997) (“Neither the Secretary of Defense nor any of his

designated representatives had the authority to obligate

CHAMPUS beyond these base rates set by regulation”);

Augusta Aviation, Inc. v. United States, 671 F.2d 445, 448-449

(11th Cir. 1982) (holding that contract between V.A. and school

was “void for lack of authorization” because “[t]he

Administrator does not have the power to grant a veteran any

more money than the amount permitted by the ratio in the

statute”).® |

In this case, if this Court were to hold that federal regulators

never had authority over petitioners’ Waters, it follows that the

Consent Decree must be rescinded as an ultra vires contract,

notwithstanding petitioners’ stipulation to EPA jurisdiction. To

hold otherwise would permit the federal government to expand

its jurisdiction by contract beyond the limits specified by

Congress and the Constitution, thus improperly altering the

very balance between state and federal power that this Court

sought to protect in SWANCC.

If, as petitioners contend, the government lacked

jurisdiction over their Waters, the Consent Decree must be

declared void ab initio, and the appropriate remedy is

rescission, putting the parties back in the positions they held

before the government’s illegal exercise of regulatory authority.

See REW Enters. v. Premier Bank, N.A., 49 F.3d 163, 171 (5th

Cir. 1995) (voiding federal land bank’s ultra vires acceptance

of letter of credit and returning all parties to status quo ante:

* See also 12 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 35:63 (4th ed. 1999)

(summarizing general rule that ultra vires contracts by governments are

void); 2 FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 5.1 (2d ed. 1998) (summarizing

general rule that illegal contracts are void ab initio).

26

“Because an ultra vires contract is null and void, the remedy for

rescission of that contract is to put the parties in the position

they would have occupied had the unlawful agreement not been

made”); Tuxedo Cheverly Volunteer Fire Co. v. Prince

George's County, 385 A.2d 819 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1978)

(holding that municipal corporation’s ultra vires contract was

void ab initio and therefore required returning parties to status

quo ante); Bennett v. Hedglin, 995 P.2d 668 (Alaska 2000)

(rescission is proper remedy for contracts that are void ab

initio); Bergstrom v. Estate of DeVoe, 854 P.2d 860 (Nev.

1993) (same); Klopp v. Keystone Ins. Cos., 595 A.2d 1 (Pa.

1991) (same).

In short, the Seventh Circuit’s holding that petitioners are

bound by their consent to EPA regulatory jurisdiction

contravenes this Court’s established jurisprudence and the

holdings of other courts of appeals, and must be reversed.

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted.

JAVIER H. RUBINSTEIN

Counsel of Record

SUSAN E. BRICE

MICHAEL A. SCODRO

Mayer, Brown, Rowe & Maw

190 South LaSalle Street

Chicago, Illinois 60603

(312) 782-0600

APPENDIX

la

APPENDIX A

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

Vv.

ROBERT R. KRILICH, KRILICH COMPANIES, INC.,

RIVERWOODS DEVELOPMENT CORP., ET AL.,

Defendants-Appellants.

No. 01-2746.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 92 C 5354—William T. Hart, Judge.

Argued May 14, 2002—Decided Sept. 9, 2002.

Before COFFEY, MANION, and EVANS, Circuit Judges.

MANION, Circuit Judge.

In 1992, the EPA sued Robert Krilich and several

corporations he controlled, alleging violations of the Clean

Water Act. The parties entered into a Consent Decree resolving

the case. However, after the Supreme Court held that the Army

Corps of Engineers exceeded its authority in extending the

definition of “navigable waters” under the Clean Water Act to

include intrastate waters used by migratory birds, Krilich

moved the district court to vacate the Consent Decree. The

district court refused to do so. Krilich appeals, and we affirm.

2a

I. Factual and Legal Background

On August 7, 1992, the United States Environmental

Protection Agency (“EPA”) filed a civil complaint against the

defendants,' alleging that they violated the Clean Water Act, 33

U.S.C. § 1251 et seq. (“CWA”). The government alleged that

Krilich violated Section 301 of the CWA by discharging fill

material without a permit into wetlands on two Illinois sites that

he was developing: the Royce Renaissance site in Oakbrook,

Illinois and the Sullivan Lake site in Lakemoor, Illinois.

Section 301(a) prohibits the “discharge of any pollutant,”

except as otherwise authorized by the CWA. 33 U.S.C. §

1311(a). Section 404 of the CWA authorizes the Secretary to

issue a permit approving “the discharge of dredged or fill

material into the navigable waters.” 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a).

“Navigable waters” are defined as “waters of the United

States.” 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7). “Waters of the United States” are

further defined by regulations promulgated under the CWA. 33

C.F.R. § 323.2(a). See generally 33 C.F.R. Pt. 328. Section

328.3(a)(3) further defines “waters of the United States” to

include “{a]ll other waters such as intrastate lakes, rivers,

streams (including intermittent streams), mudflats, sandflats,

wetlands, sloughs, prairie potholes, wet meadows, playa lakes,

or natural ponds, the use, degradation or destruction of which

could affect interstate or foreign commerce.” 33 C.F.R. §

328.3(a)(3).

While the suit was pending and the parties were negotiating,

this court issued a decision holding that the EPA’s construction

of “waters of the United States” as including intrastate,

nonadjacent or “isolated” wetlands under 40 C.F.R.

' The government filed suit against Robert Krilich individually and several

corporations which he controlled. Throughout this anaes we simply refer

to “Krilich” or the “defendants”.

3a

§ 230.3(s)(3)’ exceeded its authority under the CWA. See

Hoffman Homes, Inc. v. Adm’r, United States Envtl. Prot.

Agency, 961 F.2d 1310, 1316 (7th Cir. 1992) (“Hoffman Homes

I”), vacated by 975 F.2d 1554 (7th Cir. 1992). In Hoffman

Homes I, this court further held that, even if the regulation was

reasonable under the CWA, Congress lacked authority under

the Commerce Clause to regulate such waters based simply on

the actual or potential use of such waters by migratory birds.’

Id. at 1321. Following Hoffman Homes I, Krilich and the EPA

drafted a Consent Decree to settle their dispute. The Consent

Decree acknowledged the potential impact of the Hoffman

Homes I decision by incorporating the following provisions:

IV. DEFINITIONS

10. Except as specifically modified herein, the terms

“waters of the United States”; “wetlands”: “dredged

material”; “fill material”; “discharge of dredged

material”; and “discharge of fill material” shall have the

meanings assigned them at 40 C.F.R. § 230.3 or 33 C.F.R.

§ 323.2. “EPA” means the United States Environmental

Protection Agency, and “Corps” means the United States

Army Corps of Engineers.

* * *

? 40 C.F.R. § 230.3(s\(3), the EPA regulation that defines “waters of the

United States,” is identical to the Army Corps of Engineers regulation, 33

C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3), also defining the phrase. As noted, infra, both are

referenced in Paragraph 10 ofthe Consent Decree. =|

* The Migratory Bird Rule was intended to clarify the scope of 33 C.F.R.

328.3(a)(3), and provided that “waters of the United States . . . also include

the following waters: a. Which are or would be used as habitat by birds

protected by Migratory Bird Treaties; or b. Which are or would be used as

habitat by other migratory birds which cross state lines . . . .” 51 Fed. Reg.

41217 (1986).

4a

V. WATERS OF THE UNITED STATES

17. For purposes of this Consent Decree, the parties shall

treat wetland and open water areas depicted on Exhibit 1,

together with the new wetland and open water area

created pursuant to Part VII (injunctive relief) and

depicted on Exhibit 2, as waters of the United States

located on the Royce Renaissance Property.

** *

0A. The Defendants shall continue to treat wetland and

open water areas depicted on Exhibit 1 as waters of the

United States until the mandate issues in Hoffman Homes,

Inc. v. EPA, No. 90-3810 (7th Cir. April 20, 1992) and

until proceedings related to any appeal, petition for

certiorari, or remand are completed. Following

completion of these proceedings, unless pertinent portions

of the Seventh Circuit’s April 20, 1992 decision are

reversed, Exhibit 1 areas W2A, W2B, W3, W5B, and W9

shall be excluded from the obligations imposed in

Paragraph 17.

Thus, the parties expressly excluded some waters on the

defendant’s property and agreed to treat the rest of the waters

as “waters of the United States.”

Before the parties approved the final Consent Decree,

Hoffman Homes I was vacated “on September 4, 1992, before

the birds had reason to migrate south.” United States v. Krilich,

209 F.3d 968, 970 (7th Cir. 2000) (“Krilich IV”). Thereafter,

the parties signed the Consent Decree, incorporating the

Hoffman Homes I language, notwithstanding the fact that it had

been vacated. The Consent Decree required the defendants to

undertake certain remediation and mitigation activities and to

pay fines for filling wetlands. On October 29, 1992, the district

Sa

court entered final judgment under the Consent Decree, and

under the terms of the Decree, retained jurisdiction.‘

Nine months after the Consent Decree was agreed upon and

final judgment entered, this court issued Hoffman Homes II,

wherein we held that the EPA lacked jurisdiction over the

wetlands at issue because the government had failed to present

substantial evidence (under the “Migratory Bird Rule’) that

migratory birds actually used the wetlands as a habitat. See

Hoffman Homes, Inc. v. Adm’r, United States Envt’l Prot.

Agency, 999 F.2d 256, 261-62 (7th Cir. 1993) (“Hoffman Homes

IT’). Unlike Hoffman Homes I, we did not reach the question of

whether the Migratory Bird Rule was within the limits of

Congress’ power under the Commerce Clause.

On September 27, 1995, the government moved to enforce

the Consent Decree, alleging that Krilich had failed to construct

the replacement wetland by the date specified in the Consent

Decree and that Krilich had violated the Decree by discharging

fill material into an area known as W9, which the government

contended was a “water of the United States.” The district court

agreed with the government regarding Krilich’s failure to

perform remediation and imposed civil penalties of $1,307,500.

See United States v. Krilich, 948 F. Supp. 719, 728 (N.D. Ill.

1996) (“‘Krilich [’). With respect to the allegation that Krilich

had improperly discharged fill material into W9, the district

court concluded that “pertinent portions” of Hoffman Homes I

had not been “reversed” by Hoffman Homes II within the

meaning of Paragraph 20A of the Consent Decree. /d. at 725.

Therefore, the district court concluded that, under the Decree,

W9 was not a “water of the United States” and accordingly

denied the government’s motion to impose a penalty for filling

* Paragraph 2 of the Consent Decree provides: “The Court shall! retain

jurisdiction in order to enable any party to apply to the Court at any time for

such further relief as may be necessary to interpret, enforce, or modify this

Decree.”

6a

that area. Krilich appealed the district court’s decision to

impose penalties for his failure to perform remediation, id., and

this court affirmed, but remanded the case to the district court

to correct an error made in calculating that penalty. See United

States v. Krilich, 126 F.3d 1035, 1037-38 (7th Cir. 1997)

(“Krilich IT’). On remand, in November 1998, Krilich moved

pursuant to Rule 60(b)(4) to vacate the district court's original

judgment entering the Consent Decree, arguing that the court

lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the EPA’s complaint.

Specifically, Krilich argued that

the land he allegedly filled was an “isolated intrastate

wetland” which was beyond the federal government's

commerce power to regulate. Because Congress lacked

authority to regulate his property, Krilich contend[ed] that

the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over

the EPA’s complaint. And even though he agreed to the

terms of the consent decree, which included a provision

that the wetlands filled were “waters of the United

States,” Krilich [argued] that this does not change the

result because you can never consent to subject matter

jurisdiction, and lack of jurisdiction can be raised at any

time.

Krilich IV, 209 F.3d at 971. The district court rejected Krilich’s

argument, United States v. Krilich, 1999 WL 182333 (N.D. Ill.

March 25, 1999) (‘‘Krilich IIT”), and on appeal this court held

that “the district court had subject matter jurisdiction over the

EPA’s case against Krilich because the suit civilly charged a

violation of a federal statute which is within the federal courts’

federal question jurisdiction.” Krilich IV, 209 F.3d at 973.

Additionally, we held that Krilich’s argument failed “because

he entered into a consent decree stipulating that the waters

involved were ‘waters of the United States.”” Id. Finally, we

stated that, because the district court had subject matter

jurisdiction based on the terms of the Consent Decree, we did

not need to reach the question of whether the regulation of

Ta

isolated intrastate wetlands exceeded Congress’ power under

the Commerce Clause. /d. at 973, n. 5.

Last year, nine months after we issued Krilich IV, the

Supreme Court rendered a decision holding that 33 C.F.R.

§ 328.3(a)(3), as clarified by the Migratory Bird Rule, “exceeds

the authority granted to [the Army Corps of Engineers] under

§ 404(a) of the CWA.” Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook

Co. v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, 531 U.S. 159,

174 (2001) (““SWANCC’”). In interpreting Section 404(a), the

Court concluded that nothing in the text of the CWA indicated

that Congress intended to allow the jurisdiction of the Corps of

Engineers to extend to “ponds tha: are not adjacent to open

water.” Jd. at 168. The Supreme Court did not reach the

question of whether Congress could exercise such authority

consistent with its power to legislate under the Commerce

Clause. Jd. at 162, 174.

After SWANCC was issued by the Supreme Court, Krilich

brought the present motion in federal district court, arguing

that, under SWANCC, the waters affected by the Consent

Decree are not subject to the EPA’s authority under the CWA.

Therefore, Krilich reasoned, the execution and enforcement of

the Consent Decree by the EPA is an ultra vires act and the

Consent Decree was void ab initio. Krilich identified three

bases for the district court’s authority to vacate or modify the

Decree: the express reservation-of-jurisdiction clause contained

in Paragraph 2 of the Consent Decree, the court’s inherent

power to modify its judgments, and Rule 60(b)(5) in light of a

change in the law, namely, the SVANCC decision.’

* Even though Krilich brought the action under the Consent Decree’s express

reservation-of-jurisdiction clause and under the court’s inherent authority,

and only alternatively under Rule 60(b)(5), the court treated his motion as

one under Rule 60(b). United States v. Krilich, 152 F. Supp. 2d 983, 990

(N.D. Ill. 2001) (“Krilich V’). The district court noted that its inherent

authority to modify its judgments was not more expansive than the authority

provided in Rule 60(b). /d. Additionally, the district court concluded that its

8a

In considering Krilich’s motion, the district court assumed

that all of the waters at issue were nonnavigable, isolated

wetlands that had no surface connection to the nearest stream

or nearest navigable body of water. Krilich V, 152 F. Supp. 2d

at 989. Even so, the district court denied the defendants’

motion, holding that even if the Consent Decree were ultra

vires, it did not have the authority to vacate or modify it. The

court reached this conclusion for several reasons,’ but only one

is challenged on appeal: whether the Decree should be

modified under Rule 60(b)(5) due to a change in the law.® The

powers under Paragraph 2 were not broader than its authority under Rule

60(b). /d. Krilich abandons his reliance upon the court’s inherent authority

on appeal, but as explained below, continues to argue that both Rule 60(b)(5)

and Paragraph 2 of the Consent Decree serve as independent bases for

modification.

© The defendants submitted an expert report of Gary C. Schaefer, P.E. in

support of their motion, contending, that all the waters at issue under the

Consent Decree were isolated.

7 The court analyzed Krilich’s motion under Rule 60(b)(4), which provides

for relief if the judgment is void, and determined that the fact that a party to

a consent judgment lacked authority to consent does not void the judgment

itself. Krilich V, 152 F. Supp. 2d at 991. Next, the court analyzed Krilich’s

motion under Rule 60(b)(1) for mistake of law and rejected this ground as

untimely. /d. at 992. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b) (Rule 60(b)(1) motion must be

brought within one year of entry of judgment). Third, the district court

analyzed Krilich’s motion under the catch-all provision of Rule 60(b)(6) and

concluded that because Krilich had stipulated that the property in question

constituted “waters of the United States” it was bound by that stipulation.

152 F. Supp. 2d at 992. Cf Krilich IV, 209 F.3d at 972 (Krilich could not

“assail the district court’s subject matter jurisdiction because he entered into

a consent decree in which he agreed that the waters involved were “waters

of the United States.’”). Krilich does not appeal these determinations and,

therefore, we need not review them.

8 Rule 60(b)(5) provides, in part, that a judgment may be modified if “it is

no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application.”

Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(5).

9a

district court first noted that in Hoffman Homes I this court held

that “isolated wetlands” were not subject to CWA regulation.

Id. at 994. The court then noted that the parties took this

decision into account by referencing it in Paragraph 20A of the

Consent Decree and expressly excluding specified wetlands

that Krilich contended were isolated. /d. The court also noted

the Supreme Court’s decision in SWANCC holding that the

Migratory Bird Rule exceeded the agencies’ authority under the

CWA. /d. The district court determined that the Supreme

Court's decision in SWANCC was no more narrow than

Hoffman Homes I, and since Paragraph 20A of the Consent

Decree was crafted with that decision in mind, the district court

concluded that the Decree was drafted in light of controlling

precedent that was no less favorable to Krilich than SWANCC.

Id. at 994-95. The court also noted that “[e]quity does not

require that the Decree be reopened so that defendants may now

litigate whether the wetlands on the property are actually

isolated. Defendants chose not to do so more than eight years

ago and the legal framework has not changed in a manner that

would justify doing it today.” /d. at 995.

Krilich appeals, claiming that the district court should have

vacated or modified the Consent Decree under either Rule

60(b)(5) or the Consent Decree's reservation-of-jurisdiction

clause in Paragraph 2.

II. Analysis -

A. Standard of Review

We review a denial of Rule 60(b)(5) relief for an abuse of

discretion. See Protectoseal Co. v. Barancik, 23 F.3d 1184,

1186 (7th Cir. 1994). We review a district court's interpretation

of a consent decree de novo. See Alliance to End Repression v.

City of Chicago, 119 F.3d 472, 474 (7th Cir. 1997).

Although the defendants submitted a professional engineer's

expert report attempting to establish that all the wetlands

subject to the Consent Decree are isolated, the district court did

10a

not conduct a hearing on that issue, nor did it reach a

conclusion. Rather, it assumed that all waters at issue were

nonnavigable, isolated wetlands with no surface connection to

the nearest stream or nearest navigable body of water.

Krilich V, 152 F. Supp. 2d at 989. We proceed under the same

assumption because, as discussed below, even assuming that

the wetlands were isolated, Krilich is nonetheless bound by the

Consent Decree.

B. Grounds for Relief under Rule 60(b)(5)

A consent decree, while contractual in nature, is enforceable

as “a judicial decree that is subject to the rules generally

applicable to other judgments and decrees.” Rufo v. Inmates of

Suffolk Co. Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 378 (1992). Accordingly, parties

wishing to modify or vacate a consent decree may do so by

resorting to Rule 60(b). In moving to modify or vacate the

Consent Decree, Krilich relies upon the third clause of Section

(b)(5) of Rule 60, which provides that a judgment may be

modified if “it is no longer equitable that the judgment should

have prospective application.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(5). In

interpreting this clause of Rule 60(b)(5), the Supreme Court has

set forth a two-part test to determine whether modification is

warranted. See Rufo, 502 U.S. at 383. Under that test, a party

seeking to modify a Consent Decree “bears the burden of

establishing that a significant change in circumstances warrants

revision of the decree.” /d. A party may meet the initial burden

of establishing a significant change in circumstances “by

showing a significant change either in factual conditions or in

law.” Id. at 384. Krilich does not contend that there has been a

change in factual conditions, only that the Supreme Court’s

decision in SWANCC is a significant change in the law. If the

moving party meets this initial burden, “the court should

consider whether the proposed modification is suitably tailored

to the changed circumstance.” /d. at 383.

In Rufo, the Supreme Court identified instances in which a

significant change in law may have occurred. For example, the

lla

Court stated, a “consent decree must of course be modified if,

as it later turns out, one or more of the obligations placed upon

the parties has become impermissible under federal law. But

modification of a consent decree may be warranted when the

statutory or decisional law has changed to make legal what the

decree was designed to prevent.” /d. at 388. See also Agostini

v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 215 (1997) (granting a Rule 60(b)(5)

modification of a permanent injunction based on intervening

law). The Rufo Court also noted that “[w]hile a decision that

clarifies the law will not, in and of itself, provide a basis for

modifying a decree, it could constitute a change in

circumstances that would support modification if the parties

had based their agreement on a misunderstanding of the

governing law.” /d. at 390.

Krilich argues that Rule 60(b)(5) provides a basis to modify

the Decree, and that the district court abused its discretion by

denying him relief thereunder. Specifically, he contends that

SWANCC represents a significant change in the law under the

third clause of Rule 60(b)(5), thereby requiring the Consent

Decree to be vacated, or at a minimum, modified prospectively.

He argues that SWANCC establishes that the government never

had authority to regulate the waters at issue and that “it is

difficult to imagine a more relevant change in the law.”

Accordingly, he reasons that SWANCC makes clear that the

entry and continued enforcement of the Consent Decree are

ultra vires acts by the EPA, requiring the Decree to be vacated.

See, e.g., Federal Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380

(1947) (where agency granted crop insurance, and later found

out that crop was planted on re-seeded land for which agency

could not issue insurance policies, court found insurance policy

void ab initio). See also Dunn v. Carey, 808 F.2d 555, 559-60

(7th Cir. 1986) (“Because a consent decree’s force comes from

agreement rather than positive law, the decree depends on the

parties’ authority to give assent.”).

12a

Initially, Krilich argues that the district court improperly

applied the Rufo test by reasoning that the parties were not

operating under a misunderstanding of law and therefore that

Krilich was not entitled to vacate the Consent Decree. He

argues that the district court should instead have asked whether

SWANCC changed the law. However, the district court did not

improperly apply the Rufo test. The district court concluded that

SWANCC was not a significant change in the law by reasoning

that the Consent Decree was drafted in light of a law (as

enunciated in Hoffman Homes !) that was as favorable to

Krilich as was the later SWANCC decision. In essence, the

district court was determining whether “the statutory or

decisional law has changed to make legal what the decree was

designed to prevent.” Rufo, 502 U.S. at 388. To the extent that

the district court did question whether the parties

misunderstood the law, Rufo specifically identifies the parties’

misunderstanding of law, as later clarified by another decision,

as a circumstance where modification might be warranted.

Rufo, 502 U.S. at 390.

Krilich also contends that the district court erred in relying

upon the fact that the Consent Decree was drafted in light of

Hoffman Homes I, because it had been vacated and was no

longer the governing law of this circuit by the time the Decree

was entered. Therefore, he claims that we should analyze

whether SWANCC represents a significant change in the law

from the law pre-Hoffman Homes I, wherein we had merely

held “that Congress intended the Clean Water Act to regulate

all the ‘navigable waters’ within its constitutional reach under

the Commerce Clause.” See Hoffman Homes I, 961 F.2d at

1316-17 (citation omitted). However, this argument ignores the

fact that notwithstanding the vacation of Hoffman Homes I, the

parties agreed to incorporate its interpretation of the law into

the Consent Decree and Krilich benefitted from that decision.

Under these circumstances, it would not be equitable to

compare a change in the law pre-Hoffman Homes I to

SWANCC. Rather, under Rule 60(b)(5), we must determine

l3a

whether the law has changed significantly enough such that it

would be equitable to modify this Consent Decree that itself

incorporated the legal standards set out in Hoffman Homes I.

That brings us to the heart of Krilich’s argument: that

SWANCC eliminated the EPA’s authority to regulate the

wetlands at issue because they are nonnavigable, isolated,

intrastate waters. Unfortunately for him, he already agreed that

the waters were “waters of the United States.” To get around

his stipulation, he contends that the holding in Hoffman Homes

I is narrower than SWANCC, and therefore SWANCC does

constitute a significant change in law under Rufo justifying

modification of the Decree. He argues that, in SWANCC, the

Supreme Court removed from the Corps’ regulatory authority

all waters that are not adjacent to bodies of open water,

SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 168, whereas in Hoffman Homes I, the

court defined isolated wetlands as those that “have no

hydrological connection to any body of water.” 961 F.2d at

1314. But the precise holding of SWANCC was not so broad.

While reaffirming its prior holding that Section 404

encompassed non-navigable wetlands adjacent to navigable

waters, 531 U.S. at 167-68 (citing United States v. Riverside

Bayview Homes Inc., 474 U.S. 121 (1985)), the Court explicitly

declined to further determine the exact meaning of “navigable

waters.” SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 171. And, it declined to reach

any constitutional question. /d. at 174. Rather, in SWANCC, the

Supreme Court merely held that the definition of “waters of the

United States” under 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3), as clarified by the

Migratory Bird Rule, “exceeds the authority granted to [the

Corps] under § 404(a) of the CWA.” /d. This limited holding

does not represent a significant change in the law such that it

would be equitable to modify or vacate the Consent Decree.

Moreover, even if SWANCC is a significant change in the

law from Hoffman Homes J—it is not a significant change that

is relevant to this Consent Decree. There is nothing in the

Consent Decree establishing that the Migratory Bird Rule was

l4a

the sole basis for the EPA’s assertion of authority over Krilich’s

property, and therefore SWANCC is not a relevant change in the

law such that this Consent Decree should be modified. The

defendants’ own “Motion to Bar Enforcement of Penalty,” filed

with the district court in 1998 on remand to the district court

from our decision in Krilich II, acknowledged that “Paragraph

1 of the Consent Decree recites that jurisdiction is based upon

the Clean Water Act and other statutes. Paragraph 10 adopts the

regulatory definition of wetlands. The Consent Decree does not

rely upon the wetlands as a migratory bird habitat as a basis for

Commerce Clause jurisdiction.” Instead, as the defendants

argued in that motion, the government merely relied “upon its

authority to define wetlands under the regulations.” As the

district court noted when the defendants first attempted to

challenge subject matter jurisdiction, “there is nothing in the

Decree...that makes it apparent that the mitigation plan may

have been based solely on the filling of isolated wetlands.

Neither was there any information indicating that those

wetlands’ only possible connection to interstate commerce was

their occasional use by migratory birds.” Krilich III, 1999 WL

182333 at * 2. Thus, SWANCC has no appreciable impact on

this Consent Decree.

As the Consent Decree demonstrates, the parties were

already operating on the premise that the Migratory Bird Rule

did not authorize the EPA to regulate otherwise isolated

wetlands, as that was our conclusion in Hoffman Homes I,

which the parties expressly incorporated into Paragraph 20A of

their agreement. In fact, Paragraph 20A carved out certain

wetlands as beyond the EPA’s authority and exempted them

from the reach of the Consent Decree’s requirements. But the

parties also agreed that the EPA had authority to regulate

Krilich’s other wetlands. SWANCC in no way altered the other

regulations interpreting “waters of the United States.”

If a party believes that the waters at issue on his own

property are not properly subject to the EPA’s authority,

15a

whether under the rationale of Hoffman Homes I, SWANCC or

under some other theory, he should not stipulate otherwise. But

that is exactly what Krilich did, to his continued dismay. He

expressly agreed that certain waters on his property constituted

“waters of the United States,” subject to regulation by the EPA.

Like most parties that enter into a settlement or plea agreement,

he presumably made a tactical decision that the terms of the

Consent Decree were more favorable than the costs or risks of

continued litigation. Accordingly, we conclude that SWANCC

effected no relevant change in decisional law such that the

district court should have modified the Consent Decree. Nor

does SWANCC establish that the EPA’s entry into and

continued enforcement of the Consent Decree are ultra vires

acts. “To hold that a clarification in the law automatically opens

the door for relitigation of the merits of every affected consent

decree would undermine the finality of such agreements and

could serve as a disincentive to negotiation of settlements in...

litigation.” Rufo, 502 U.S. at 389.°

C. Grounds for Relief under Reservation-of-Jurisdiction

Clause

Krilich also argues that the district court had authority to

vacate or modify the Decree under Paragraph 2, its

reservation-of-jurisdiction clause. As previously noted, the

reservation clause expressly provided: “The Court shall retain

jurisdiction in order to enable any party to apply to the Court at

any time for such further relief as may be necessary to interpret,

enforce, or modify this Decree.” In analyzing Krilich’s

argument, the district court concluded that it could not interpret

this clause outside the bounds of Rule 60(b). Krilich V, 152 F.

Supp. 2d at 990. Krilich argues that such an interpretation

” Because we conclude that Krilich did not meet his burden of establishing

a change in law warranting modification of the Consent Decree, we need not

reach the question whether the proposed modification is Suitably tailored to

the changed circumstance. Rufo, 502 U.S. at 383.

l6a

makes the clause meaningless. We note, however, that while

relying on the reservation-of-jurisdiction clause as an additional

basis for modifying the Consent Decree, Krilich does not

identify any standard or test broader than the Supreme Court’s

test in Rufo that would result in a different outcome. We need

not decide, however, whether this reservation-of-jurisdiction

clause provided the district court with authority beyond Rule

60(b) for vacating the Consent Decree because the reasons

Krilich presented for vacating the Consent Decree are

misplaced. As discussed above, the Supreme Court’s decision

in SWANCC was not more favorable to Krilich than Hoffman

Homes I, which was the basis for the Consent Decree. Nor does

SWANCC establish that the Government exceeded its authority

in entering into the Consent Decree. Therefore, whether

Krilich’s motion was considered under Rule 60(b)(5) or under

the reservation-of-jurisdiction clause is immaterial because his

claim fails in either case.

Ill. Conclusion

Krilich voluntarily entered into the Consent Decree with the

government, agreeing to resolve their dispute without recourse

to further litigation. At that time, the parties were operating

under the Hoffman Homes I view of the law. The Supreme

Court’s later decision in SWANCC did not alter the parties’

reliance on Hoffman Homes I that the EPA could not regulate

isolated intrastate wetlands. Therefore, the subsequent release

of the SWANCC decision does not justify vacating the Consent

Decree. The SWANCC decision does not establish that the

Government exceeded its authority in entering into the Consent

Decree, so Krilich’s claim that the Decree was void ab initio

fails as well. For these and the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM.

17a

APPENDIX B

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS,

EASTERN DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff,

Vv.

ROBERT R. KRILICH, ET AL., Defendants.

No. 92 C 5354.

June 21, 2001

Hart, District Judge.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

In 1992, the parties to this case entered into a consent decree

regarding Clean Water Act (“CWA”) violations involving

wetlands in an area being developed by defendants.' Following

consideration by the court, the proposed decree, as modified,

was entered on October 29, 1992 (the “Decree”). The United

States subsequently contended that defendants had violated

certain provisions of the Decree concerning the Royce

Renaissance Property (the “Royce Property”).2 The issue was

' For present purposes, it is unnecessary to make any distinction among the

defendants.

? The present dispute, as well as the prior disputes that resulted in court

rulings, all concern the Royce Property. The existing dispute does not

directly concern the Sullivan Lake Property that was also a subject of the

Decree. .

18a

presented on stipulated and asserted facts and briefed by the

parties. It was held that none of the facts claimed to be in

dispute were material and a ruling was issued on the basis of

the documents that had been presented. Defendants were held

to have violated deadlines for a mitigation plan that were

contained in the Decree and therefore were subject to a

substantial penalty under the terms of the Decree. See United

States v. Krilich, 948 F. Supp. 719 (N.D. Ill. 1996)

(“Krilich I’). In an opinion dated October 15, 1997, this

holding was upheld on appeal, except that the government

conceded that there had been a miscalculation of the penalty.

See United States v. Krilich, 126 F.3d 1035 (7th Cir. 1997)

(“Krilich IT’). On December 15, 1997, a modified judgment in

the amount of $1,257,500 was entered on the docket.

In November 1998, defendants moved to bar enforcement of

the penalty. That motion was construed as being pursuant to

Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b). See United States v. Krilich, 1999 WL

182333 *1 (N.D. Ill. March 25, 1999) (“Krilich III’). The

primary argument raised by ‘defendants was that this court

lacked jurisdiction to enforce the mitigation plan deadlines.

Defendants contended that subject matter jurisdiction was

lacking because the Royce Property wetlands that allegedly

were improperly filled were not “navigable waters” covered by

the CWA nor did they have a sufficient connection with

interstate commerce to invoke federal jurisdiction. It was

assumed that these issues went to the court’s subject matter

jurisdiction, but Rule 60(b)(4) relief was denied on the ground

that the judgment was not void for lack of subject matter

3 The CWA regulates the discharge of dredged or fill material into

“navigable waters.” 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a). The CWA defines navigable

waters as “the waters of the United States, including the territorial seas.” /d.

§ 1362(7). The Army Corps of Engineers and the Environmental Protection

Agency, both of which enforce the CWA, have promulgated regulations

defining waters of the United States. See 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a); 40 C.F.R.

§ 230.3(s).

19a

jurisdiction because, even if jurisdictional, a colorable basis

existed for finding the wetlands to be navigable waters and

within the federal government’s interstate commerce powers.

Id. at *2. Defendants also contended that the penalty should not

be enforced because the Decree should be modified in light of

a more recent precedent from another circuit supporting that the

filled lands did not fall within the purview of the CWA. The

merits of this Rule 60(b)(5) contention were not addressed

because defendants only sought retrospective relief (vacating

the prior monetary judgment), whereas modifying the Decree

in 1999 could only affect possible prospective relief. Jd. at *3.

Defendants appealed Krilich III, raising only the Rule

60(b)(4) contentions discussed above. The Seventh Circuit held

that the questions of whether the wetlands at issue were

navigable waters or had a sufficient nexus to interstate

commerce did not go to the court’s subject matter jurisdiction.

United States v. Krilich, 209 F.3d 968, 971-72 (7th Cir. 2000)

(“Krilich IV’). The court further stated: “Moreover, just as a

guilty plea (in which the criminal defendant admits—at least

implicitly—the connection between his conduct and interstate

commerce) forecloses an appellate attack on subject matter

jurisdiction, [defendants] cannot now assail the district court’s

subject matter jurisdiction because [they] entered into a consent

decree in which [they] agreed that the waters involved were

‘waters of the United States.’” Jd. at 972. The Seventh Circuit

concluded: “In sum, the district court had subject matter

jurisdiction over the EPA’s case against [defendants] because

the suit civilly charged a violation of a federal statute which is

within the federal courts’ federal question jurisdiction. And

[defendants’] attempt to now assail the court’s subject matter

jurisdiction fails because [they] entered into a consent decree

stipulating that the waters involved were ‘waters of the United

States,’ and that is merely an element of the offense and not the

basis for federal subject matter jurisdiction.” /d. at 973. On

November 13, 2000, the Supreme Court denied certiorari.

Krilich v. United States, 121 S. Ct. 482 (2000).

20a

On January 9, 2001, the Supreme Court issued Solid Waste

Agency of Northern Cook County v. United States Army Corps

of Engineers, 121 S. Ct. 675 (2001) (*SWANCC”). In that case,

the Supreme Court held that the Army Corps’ “Migratory Bird

Rule” was unenforceable because it exceeded the authority

granted to the Corps under the CWA. Id. at 684.* Under the

Migratory Bird Rule, waters of the United States were defined

as including isolated wetlands which are or could be used by

migratory birds or endangered species. See id. at 678. SWANCC

holds that the CWA definition of navigable waters/waters of the

United States does not extend to the full limits of Congress’s

powers under the Commerce Clause. Jd. at 683-84. SWANCC

does not reach the question of whether, on a basis other than

being visited by migratory birds, isolated wetlands may fall

under the definition of navigable waters/waters of the United

States. United States v. Interstate General Co., 152 F. Supp. 2d

843 (D. Md. 2001). It makes clear that it is still the rule that a

nonnavigable (in the traditional sense) wetland directly adjacent

to a navigable body of water falls within the purview of the

CWA, SWANCC, 121 S. Ct. at 682-83 (citing United States v.

Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121 (1985)), and that

an isolated wetland being visited by migratory birds is not

enough to bring the wetland within the purview of the CWA.

SWANCC does not clarify at what points between those two

extremes a nonnavigable body of water falls within the CWA

definition of navigable waters. SWANCC does indicate, though,

that wetlands likely need to have a substantial connection to

interstate commerce or a connection to navigable waters (in the

traditional sense) in order to be waters of the United States that

fall within the CWA term navigable waters. See id. at 682-83.°

* The majority of circuits, including the Seventh Circuit in SWANCC, had

held otherwise.

5 No final or proposed regulation has been found which revises the

regulatory definitions in light of SWANCC. Possible revisions, however,

apparently are presently being considered. See Further Revisions to the

2la

In February 2001, defendants brought their present motion

arguing that the Decree, at least as regards the Royce Property,

should be vacated in light of SWANCC, which defendants

contend makes clear that none of the waters on the Royce

Property were navigable waters subject to regulation under the

CWA. They contend that, because the waters do not fall within

the purview of the CWA, the United States had no authority to

regulate the waters and thus no authority to enter into a consent

decree, making the Decree an ultra vires act. According to

defendants, under this theory, the Decree is void ab initio and

should be rescinded, which would include refunding the

penalties already paid and compensating defendants for the

expense of the required Royce Property mitigation work.

Defendants contend the Decree may be vacated or modified

either under the express reservation-of-jurisdiction clause of the

Decree or pursuant to the court's inherent powers to modify its

judgments. Alternatively, defendants contend that, pursuant to

Rule 60(b)(5), the Decree should be modified in light of the

change of law. Defendants contend that such a modification

would have a prospective effect because its use of the property

continues to be affected by the Decree and because the payment

for the penalties is presently being held by the court and has not

yet been turned over to the government.°

At the time defendants presented their motion, the court

advised the parties that there were certain issues they should

make sure to address. The government was advised that it

Clean Water Act Regulatory Definition of “Discharge of Dredged

Material,” 66 Fed. Reg. 4550, 4569 (Jan. 17, 2001).

© Under the terms of the Decree, it was to “terminate on August 31, 1998 if

all of the on-site and off-site mitigation and enhancement projects meet the

final performance standards set forth in the pertinent exhibits for those

projects. If the final performance standards are not met on that date, then this

Decree will continue in effect until the standards are met.” Decree { 86.

Apparently, the standards have not yet been met, at least as regards the

Royce Property.

22a

would not be required to provide evidentiary proof along with

its answer to the motion, but it was expected that the

government would at least outline its factual basis for

contending the waters on the property still fall within the

purview of the CWA, even in light of SWANCC. The

government apparently misunderstood. The government

contends that, even in light of SWANCC, the pertinent Royce

Property waters still fall within the purview of SWANCC. The

government’s apparent position is that the wetlands at issue are

not isolated. In any event, for present purposes, it will be

assumed that the waters at issue actually are nonnavigable,

isolated wetlands that have no surface connection to the nearest

stream or nearest navigable body of water.’ If it is held that,

under that factual assumption, defendants would be entitled to

modification of the Decree or other relief, further proceedings

would be necessary to resolve any genuine and material factual

disputes regarding the nature of the wetlands.

The Decree contains the following provisions that are

particularly pertinent to the present dispute:

2. The Court shall retain jurisdiction in order to

enable any party to apply to the Court at any time for such

further relief as may be necessary to interpret, enforce, or

modify this Decree.

* * *¢ &* *& *

” Defendants represent that all the bodies of water at issue are located 1.5 to

2 linear miles from nonnavigable Salt Creek and 7 to 7.5 linear miles from

the nearest navigable body of water, the Des Plaines River. In their reply,

defendants further represent that Salt Creek is 1.9 or more stream miles from

each body of water and that the Des Plaines River is 19.1 or more stream

miles from each body of water. According to the report of defendants’

expert, all of the Royce Property’s drainage “appears” to flow into a

manhole that “appears” to connect to an underground storm sewage system

which runs for 2000 feet before flowing into a small ditch that goes for 1.5

miles before joining Salt Creek. Schaefer Report ff 22-24. The expert states

that this manhole has existed since at least 1986.

23a

10. Except as specifically modified herein, the terms

“waters of the United States”; . . . shall have the meanings

assigned them at 40 C.F.R. § 230.3 or 33 C.F.R.

Es &

* * &¢ © & &

V. WATERS OF THE UNITED STATES

17. For purposes of this Consent Decree, the parties

shall treat wetland and open water areas depicted on

Exhibit 1, together with the new wetland and open water

area created pursuant to Part VII (injunctive relief) and

depicted on Exhibit 2, as waters of the United States

located on the Royce Renaissance Property.

* * *&£ *&* & *

19. The Defendants hereby elect delineation for the

Royce Renaissance Property pursuant to the Federal

Manual for Identifying and Delineating Jurisdictional

Wetlands (1989). Further, the Parties agree that the

boundaries of the alleged waters of the United States

referenced in Paragraph 17 and depicted on Exhibit 1

would not differ if the delineation had been conducted

pursuant to the Corps of Engineers Wetland Delineation

Manual (1987).

20. The boundaries depicted in Exhibits 1 and 3°

shall bind the parties for the life of this Consent Decree

unless and until a new Corps or EPA delineation is made

pursuant to the final version of a revised wetland

delineation manual. The Defendants shall not request a

new jurisdictional determination from either the Corps or

EPA for the Royce Renaissance Property or the Sullivan

Lake Property during the life of this Consent Decree

§ Exhibit 3 pertains to the Sullivan Lake Property.

24a

unless and until the government issues the final version of

a revised wetland delineation manual.

20A. The Defendants shall continue to treat wetland

and open water areas depicted on Exhibit | as waters of

the United States until the mandate issues in Hoffman

Homes, Inc. v. EPA, No. 90-3810 (7th Cir. April 20,

1992) and until proceedings related to any appeal, petition

for certiorari, or remand are completed. Following

completion of these proceedings, unless pertinent portions

of the Seventh Circuit’s April 20, 1992 decision are

reversed, Exhibit 1 areas W2A, W2B, W3, WSB, and W9

shall be excluded from the obligations imposed in

Paragraph 17.

Courts have always had the inherent power to reconsider or

modify their judgments within a reasonable period of time. See

In re Met-L-Wood Corp., 861 F.2d 1012, 1018 (7th Cir. 1988),

cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1006 (1989). That power, however, has

been merged into Rule 60 of the Federal Rules of Civil

procedure. There are no separate inherent powers that are more

expansive than those provided for in Rule 60(b). See id.; In re

Wyciskalla, 156 B.R. 579, 580 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 1993); Blair v.

Delta Air Lines, Inc., 344 F. Supp. 367, 368 (S.D. Fla. 1972),

aff'd, 477 F.2d 564 (Sth Cir. 1973) (adopting district court

opinion); Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, & Mary Kay

Kane, Federal Practice & Procedure §§ 2851-52 (2d ed. 1995).

See also Glass, Molders, Pottery, Plastics & Allied Workers

International Union, AFL-CIO, CLC, Local 182B v. Excelsior

Foundry Co., 56 F.3d 844, 847 (7th Cir. 1995). Additionally,

pursuant to Rule 60(b), this court would have the power to

modify the Decree even without the express provision

contained in § 2 of the Decree. See Picon v. Morris, 933 F.2d

660, 662 (8th Cir. 1991). The language of ¥ 2 does not provide

any additional or greater powers of modification that this court

25a

did not already have under Rule 60(b).’ Defendants’ present

motion must be considered as a Rule 60(b) motion. The

arguments as to the judgment being void as an ultra vires

agreement will be considered under various subsections of Rule

60(b) and the argument as to modification in light of a change

of law will be considered as a Rule 60(b)(5) motion.

Defendants contend the Decree is a contract and that it

should be treated as such in ruling on the pending motion. It is

true that, “[f]rom the standpoint of interpretation, a consent

decree is a contract.” Cook v. City of Chicago, 192 F.3d 693,

695 (7th Cir. 1999). A consent decree, however, is contractual

in nature in only “some respects.” Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk

County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 378 (1992). “[I]t is an agreement

that the parties desire and expect will be reflected in, and be

enforceable as, a judicial decree that is subject to the rules

generally applicable to other judgments and decrees.” /d.

“[F]rom the standpoint of remedy it is an equitable decree,”

subject to equitable remedies. Cook, 192 F.3d at 695.

The government does not dispute defendants’ contention

that, where the requisite consent is lacking, a contract is void ab

initio. However, it is not a mere contract that is before this

court, it is a consent decree that has been entered as a judgment.

If the judgment is void, Rule 60(b)(4) provides that the

judgment is to be vacated. The parties’ contract being void is

not the same as the judgment itself being void. A judgment is

void if it is without subject matter jurisdiction, there was no

personal jurisdiction over a party, or the judgment was entered

? Paragraph 2 states that motions to modify the Decree may be brought “at

any time.” Arguably, that provision could be construed as permitting Rule

60(b) motions to be brought at any time. However, no order of the court can

extend the time limits contained in Rule 60(b). See Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(b); United

States v. Deutsch, 981 F.2d 299, 302 (7th Cir. 1992). Paragraph 2 should not

be construed as having an effect that is inconsistent with the governing law.

Even if it were to be so construed, it would have no effect because Rule 6(b)

provides that no court order can extend the time limits of Rule 60(b).

26a

without due process of law. Federal Election Commission v. Al

Salvi for Senate Committee, 205 F.3d 1015, 1019 (7th Cir.

2000); Wright, Miller, & Kane § 2862 at 326-69; United States

v. Beebe, 180 U.S. 343, 350-51 (1901). The fact that a party to

a consent judgment lacked authority to consent (as defendants

contend is true of the United States in light of SWANCC) does

not void the judgment itself. Beebe, 180 U.S. at 350-51

(judgment not void where district attorney lacked authority to

compromise absent express approval of Solicitor of the

Treasury); Phelan v. Bradbury Building Corp., 7 F.R.D. 429,

432 (S.D.N.Y. 1947) (judgment not void even if parties lacked

authority to settle because, subsequent to entry of judgment

based on settlement of FLSA overtime claim, Supreme Court

held that statute prohibited settlement of such claims for less

than full damages). Contra National Revenue Corp. v. Violet,

807 F.2d 285, 288 (1st Cir. 1986) (consent decree void under

Rule 60(b)(4) because Rhode Island Attorney General did not

have authority to stipulate state statute violated the federal

Constitution).!° As was previously held in this litigation,

defendants’ contentions as to the wetlands not being United

States waters and there being an insufficient interstate

commerce nexus do not go to the court’s subject matter

jurisdiction and therefore do not state a basis for voiding the

judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b)(4). Krilich IV, 209 F.3d at

971-72:'' Interstate General, 152 F. Supp. 2d at 848. Even

assuming that, in light of SWANCC, none of the wetlands that

are a subject of the Decree are actually waters of the United

10 This holding in Violet is inconsistent with the Supreme Court holding in

Beebe and the well-established case law as to the limited grounds for finding

a judgment to be void under Rule 60(b)(4).

ey The Seventh Circuit considered whether the wetlands not being waters of

the United States or not having a sufficient nexus to interstate commerce

went to this court's subject matter jurisdiction and held that it did not. At that

time, defendants did not explicitly argue that the government engaged in an

ultra vires act by consenting to the Decree.

27a

States subject to regulation under the CWA, no basis is stated

for vacating the Decree as void pursuant to Rule 60(b)(4).

Interstate General, 152 F. Supp. 2d at 848; cf Phelan, 7 F.R.D.

at 432.

Though not stating a basis for relief pursuant to Rule

60(b)(4), the government’s alleged lack of authority to enter

into the Decree may state a basis for relief under another

subsection of Rule 60(b). Before the existence of Rule 60(b),

the Supreme Court held in Beebe that an attorney’s lack of

authority could state a basis for vacating a judgment even if that

basis was not that the judgment itself was void. See Beebe,

180 U.S. at 351-53. Such grounds, though, must be timely

raised and are subject to the possibility that the principal

ratified the attorney’s action either expressly or through

conduct. See id. Modern cases denominate a motion to vacate

based on an attorney lacking authority to enter into a settlement

agreement as a Rule 60(b)(1) motion based on mistake or

inadvertence. See Bradford Exchange v. Trein’s Exchange, 600

F.2d 99, 102 (7th Cir. 1979). A Rule 60(b)(1) motion must be

brought within one year of the entry of judgment. Of course,

defendants are not contending that the government’s attorneys

lacked authority from their principal as in Beebe and Bradford

Exchange, but they are contending that the parties were

mistaken as to the government’s authority to regulate the

wetlands at issue. Defendants’ ultra vires contentions,

therefore, may properly be classified as being a claim of

mistake of law under Rule 60(b)(1). Cf Webb v. James, 147

F.3d 617, 622 (7th Cir. 1998). Since it is more than a year since

the entry of judgment, the motion is untimely when classified

as a Rule 60(b)(1) motion.

But even assuming the ultra vires contention instead falls

within the catch-all provision of Rule 60(b)(6)'? and was

'2 Rule 60(b)(6) provides for relief based on “any other reason justifying

relief from the operation of the judgment.” Such relief, however, is limited

28a

brought within a reasonable period of time, it would fail on its

merits. In the Decree, the parties agreed that the pertinent

Royce Property wetlands currently at issue were waters of the

United States. Defendants are bound by that stipulation. See

Krilich IV, 209 F.3d at 972. Compare also Hugi v. United

States, 164 F.3d 378, 380-81 (7th Cir. 1999), That these facts

go to the federal government's authority to regulate the

wetlands does not prevent defendants from being bound by the

stipulations. See, e.g., Krilich IV, supra; Hugi, supra; Interstate

General, 152 F. Supp. 2d at 848. Moreover, this is a

post-judgment attack on the government’s authority that comes

more than eight years after entry into the Decree. Just as a

colorable basis for subject matter jurisdiction is enough to

defeat an attack on a judgment being void for subject-matter

jurisdiction, see Krilich III, 1999 WL 182333 at *1- 2, a

colorable basis for the wetlands being subject to CWA

regulation should be enough to defeat the present ultra vires

contention. At the time the parties entered into the Decree, a

colorable basis existed for finding the wetlands subject to CWA

regulation.'® See id. at*2.

to circumstances that are not otherwise covered by the other subsections of

Rule 60(b). See Webb, 147 F.3d at 622; Helm v. Resolution Trust Corp., 84

F.3d 874, 878-79 (7th Cir. 1996); Met-L-Wood, 861 F.2d at 1018.

'? To the extent there is a basis for the government to contend that the

wetlands are not isolated, a colorable basis for CWA regulation continues to

exist. Cases subsequent to SWANCC have not limited the definition of

waters of the United States to those immediately adjacent to navigable (in

the traditional sense) waters. See Headwaters, Inc. v. Talent Irrigation

District, 243 F.3d 526, 533 (9th Cir. 2001) (irrigation ditches that connect

to streams that flow to navigable waters are waters of the United States);

Interstate General, 152 F. Supp. 2d at 844, 846 (wetlands that are adjacent

to nonnavigable creeks that connect to a navigable river via at least six miles

of intermittent streams and drainage ditches are waters of the United States);

Idaho Rural Council v. Bosma, 143 F. Supp. 2d 1169, 1172-74, 1177-79 &

n. 4 (D. Idaho 2001) (spring that runs into pond that drains across a pasture

into a canal that flows to a creek, that is either navigable or flows into a

navigable river, is a water of the United States); United States v. Buday, 138

29a

But even if defendants are not bound by the stipulation,

another ground still exists for denying relief on the ultra vires

contention. There is no contention that the Sullivan Lake

property does not contain wetlands subject to CWA regulation,

even in light of SWANCC. Therefore, the government was not

without authority to enter into the Decree. It would not matter

that the Decree also has provisions imposing obligations as to

wetlands that are not subject to CWA regulation. Under a

consent decree, a party can agree to greater obligations than

could be achieved if the suit were to go to trial. Rufo, 502 U.S.

at 389; Komyati v. Bayh, 96 F.3d 955, 959 (7th Cir. 1996);

Kasper v. Board of Election Commissioners of Chicago, 814

F.2d 332, 342-43 (7th Cir. 1987). A consent decree, however,

cannot oblige a party to perform illegal conduct. Rufo, supra;

Kasper, supra. It is not illegal to preserve isolated,

nonregulated wetlands or to create new wetlands to replace

ones that have been destroyed. The provisions of the Decree

were lawful and based on a substantive, colorable claim even

if Sullivan Lake was the only property that had wetlands

subject to CWA regulation. Even applying SWANCC

retrospectively and assuming the Royce Property wetlands are

not waters of the United States, the government was not

without authority to enter into the Decree.

In sum, the ultra vires argument fails for four different

reasons, each of which is sufficient by itself to deny the

presently requested relief. First, even if the government went

beyond its authority, that does not void the judgment even if it

would void a contract. Second, defendants are bound by the

stipulation that the wetlands are waters of the United States.

F. Supp. 2d 1282 (D. Mont. 2001) (wetlands adjacent a creek that flowed

into a creek that flowed into a river that was navigable a further 190 miles

downstream are waters of the United States); Aiello v. Town of Brookhaven,

136 F. Supp. 2d 81, 119 & n. 30 (E.D.N.Y. 2001) (pond and creek that

emptied into lake that flows into navigable bay are waters of the United

States).

30a

Third, it is too late to now contend that the parties were

mistaken as to the wetlands being waters of the United States.

Fourth, the government’s agreement to enter into the Decree

was not ultra vires because the Sullivan Lake property contains

wetlands subject to CWA regulation.

Still to be considered is whether the Decree should be

modified in light of the change of law represented by

SWANCC. While the parties were negotiating, the Seventh

Circuit decided Hoffman Homes, Inc. v. Administrator, United

States EPA, 961 F.2d 1310 (7th Cir. 1992) (“Hoffman I’).

Hoffman I holds that “isolated wetlands” are not subject to

CWA regulation. The government provides correspondence"

showing that the parties were aware of Hoffman I and that, as

a result, the decree in negotiation was modified to exclude

specified wetlands that defendants contended were isolated.

The parties also took into account the possibility that Hoffman |

would be reversed. These provisions are incorporated in J 20A

of the Decree. After the case was filed, but before the Decree

was approved and entered as a judgment, Hoffman I was

vacated for rehearing. Almost nine months after the Decree was

entered, the Seventh Circuit decided Hoffman Homes, Inc. v.

Administrator, United States EPA, 999 F.2d 256 (7th Cir. 1993)

(“Hoffman IT’). Hoffman IT holds that the wetlands at issue did

not meet the regulatory definitions of waters of the United

States and therefore found it unnecessary to consider whether

an isolated wetland could qualify as a water of the United

'4 This correspondence is being considered in determining whether the

history of this case supports modification in light of a change of law. The

correspondence is not being used to construe the meaning of the Decree and

no opinion is expressed regarding whether it would have been appropriate

to consider the correspondence as extrinsic evidence pertinent to interpreting

420A.

3la

States.'° Later in 1993, the Seventh Circuit issued an opinion

supporting that isolated wetlands were properly subject to

regulation under the CWA. See Rueth v. United States EPA, 13

F.3d 227, 231 (7th Cir. 1993).

In November 1998, defendants moved to vacate the penalties

that had been imposed for violation of the Decree. See Krilich

I; Krilich II. For the first time, defendants raised the contention

that the Royce Property wetlands that were the subject of the

Decree were not subject to CWA regulation because they were

isolated wetlands. This court held that “[t]here was and

continues to be a colorable basis for exercising jurisdiction over

the Decree’s subject matter and it cannot be held that

jurisdiction in this case was totally wanting.” Krilich IJ], 1999

WL 182333 at *2. Since defendants sought only retrospective

relief (vacating a money judgment), the merits of modifying the

Decree in light of a claimed change of law was not considered.

See id. at *3.'° The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the

issue did not go to this court’s subject matter jurisdiction and

therefore could not be a basis for vacating the judgment as void.

See Krilich IV.

Between Krilich III and Krilich IV, the Seventh Circuit

issued its opinion in SWANCC, which upheld the Migratory

Bird Rule as constitutional and within the agencies’ authority

under the CWA. 191 F.3d 845 (7th Cir. 1999). That decision

was reversed by the Supreme Court’s decision in SWANCC

holding that the Migratory Bird Rule exceeded the agencies’

authority under the statute. Defendants contend the Decree

'S Krilich I, 948 F. Supp. at 721-25, construes the meaning of § 20A and

rejected the government's contention that Hoffman I] was a “reversal” of

Hoffman I such that the isolated wetlands that had been expressly excluded

from the Decree should be considered waters of the United States.

'© The claimed change of law was a Fourth Circuit case holding that the

Migratory Bird Rule exceeded the Army Corps’ statutory authority under the

CWA. See United States v. Wilson, 133 F.3d 251, 257 (4th Cir. 1997).

32a

should be modified in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in

_ SWANCC.

Rule 60(b)(5) provides in part that a judgment may be

modified or vacated if “a prior judgment upon which it is based

has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer

equitable that the judgment should have prospective

application.” Although defendants contend the prior clause is

satisfied, that provision is clearly inapplicable to this case. That

provision is limited to judgments that were the basis of issue or

claim preclusion; it does not apply to reversals of cases that

were relied upon as precedent. Wright, Miller, & Kane § 2863

at 335. Therefore, defendants’ only possible relief is

prospective relief under the last clause. Agostini v. Felton, 521

U.S. 203, 239 (1997); Krilich II, 1999 WL 182333 at *3.

Under the last clause of Rule 60(b)(5), modification of a

consent decree can only be appropriate if the parties based their

agreement on a misunderstanding of the law. Rufo, 502 U.S. at

390. At the time defendants originally agreed to the relevant

portions of the Decree, Seventh Circuit case law (Hoffman 1)

held that isolated wetlands were not subject to CWA regulation.

SWANCC did not narrow the application of the CWA any more

than did Hoffman I. Paragraph 20A of the Decree was drafted

in light of Hoffman I. When Hoffman I was vacated for

rehearing prior to actual entry of the Decree, the Decree was

not modified to take that into account. Therefore, the Decree,

as it now stands, was drafted in light of controlling precedent

that was no less favorable to defendants than SWANCC. It was

not drafted in light of subsequent Seventh Circuit precedent

that, unlike Hoffman I, was overruled by the Supreme Court’s

decision in SWANCC. Also, the Decree does not oblige

defendants to perform any act that is now unlawful in light of

current law. Equity does not require that the Decree be

reopened so that defendants may now litigate whether the

wetlands on the property are actually isolated. Defendants

chose not to do so more than eight years ago and the legal

33a

framework has not changed in a manner that would justify

doing it today. Cf Interstate General, 152 F. Supp. 2d at

847-48.

For the foregoing reasons, defendants’ motion to vacate the

consent decree will be denied.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendants’ motion to

vacate the consent decree [141-1] is denied.

34a

APPENDIX C

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

Vv.

ROBERT R. KRILICH,

KRILICH COMPANIES, INC.

RIVERWOODS DEVELOPMENT

CORP., LAKEMOOR COUNTRY

CLUB, INC., AUSTIN STATE

BANK, not individually, but as

Trustee under the Trust Agreement

dated December 18, 1968 and

known as Trust No. 4580,

and

MANUFACTURERS’

AFFILIATED TRUST CO.

f/k/a AFFILIATED BANK

FRANKLIN PARK f//k/a/ FIRST

STATE BANK & TRUST OF

FRANKLIN PARK, not

individually, but as Trustee under

the Trust Agreements dated July 30,

1982 and known as Trust Nos. 866

and 867,

Defendants.

)

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No. 92 C 5354

J. Hart

[Filed Aug. 10, 1992]

35a

CONSENT DECREE

WHEREAS, the United States brought this case on behalf of

the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) to restrain

alleged violations of Clean Water Act (“CWA”) sections 301(a)

and 404, 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) and 1344, at two separate

Chicago areas construction sites;

WHEREAS, the United States seeks both permanent

injunctive relief (including restoration of certain wetland and

open water areas and on-site and off-site mitigation) and an

appropriate civil penalty; and

WHEREAS, the parties agree that a settlement is in their

mutual interest and in the public interest;

NOW, THEREFORE before taking any testimony, and

without admission of fact, law, or liability by either party,

(except as provided in Paragraph 1), it is hereby ORDERED,

ADJUDGED, and DECREED:

I. JURISDICTION

1. This Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this

action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1345, and pursuant to

Clean Water Act sections 309(b) and 404(s), 33 U.S.C. §§

1319(b), 1344(s). This Court has obtained jurisdiction over the

parties consenting to entry of this Decree, and venue is proper

pursuant to 33 U.S.C. §§ 1319(b), 1344(s).

2. The Court shall retain jurisdiction in order to enable any

party to apply to the Court at any time for such further relief as

may be necessary to interpret, enforce, or modify this Decree.

Il. PARTIES

3. The Plaintiff is the United States of America. The

Department of Justice is authorized to bring this suit pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. §§ 516 and 519, and CWA § 306, 33 U.S.C.

§ 1366.

36a

4. Defendant Robert R. Krilich is an individual engaged in

the business of developing real estate in the Chicago area.

5. Defendants Krilich Companies, Inc., and Riverwoods

Development Corporation are corporations organized under the

laws of the State of Illinois, and are engaged in the business of

developing real estate in this District. Robert R. Krilich is the

sole stockholder, and President of Krilich Companies, Inc., and

Riverwoods Development Corporation.

6. Lakemoor Country Club, Inc., is a corporation organized

under the laws of the State of Illinois, and engaged in the

business of developing real estate in this District. Robert R.

Krilich owns one hundred percent (100%) of the stock in that

corporation.

7. Defendants Manufacturers’ Affiliated Trust Co. f/k/a

Affiliated Bank/Franklin Park f/k/a First State Bank & Trust of

Franklin Park, and Austin State Bank are the Trustees of certain

Illinois Land Trusts formed pursuant to Illinois law for the sole

benefit of Defendant Robert R. Krilich.

lll. SUBJECT PROPERTY

8. The property owned and controlled by Defendant Robert

Krilich as beneficiary of Manufacturers’ Affiliated Trust Co.

f/k/a Affiliated Bank/Franklin Park f/k/a First State Bank &

Trust of Franklin Park Trust Nos. 866 and 867 in Oukbrook

Terrace, and subject to remediation under this Decree (the

“Royce Renaissance Property”), is located near the

intersections of Butterfield Road and Royce Boulevard, and is

legally described as follows:

The Southeast quarter of Section 21 ,Township 39N,

Range 11E, Village of Oakbrook Terrace, DuPage

County, Illinois.

37a

9. The property owned and controlled by Defendant Robert

Krilich as beneficiary of Austin State Bank Trust No. 4580 in

McHenry and Lake Counties, and subject to remediation under

this Decree (the “Sullivan Lake Property”), is located between

Illinois Route 60 and Sullivan Lake Road, West of the Village

of Volo, Illinois, and is legally described as follows:

The Southeast Quarter of Section 29, Township 45 North,

Range 9 East, McHenry County, Illinois.

- and -

The Southwest Quarter of Section 28, Township 45

North, Range 9 East, Lake County, Illinois.

IV. DEFINITIONS

10. Except as specifically modified herein, the terms “waters

of the United States”; “wetlands”; “dredged material”; “fill

material”; “discharge of dredged material”; and “discharge of

fill material” shall have the meanings assigned them at 40

C.F.R. § 230.3 or 33 C.F.R. § 323.2. “EPA” means the United

States Environmental Protection Agency, and “Corps” means

the United States Army Corps of Engineers.

11. As used in this Consent Decree, the terms “restore” and

“restoration” refer to removal of dredged or fill material from

the waters of the United States, together with replanting and

other measures intended to reinstate the natural conditions

allegedly prevailing prior to activities giving rise to this action.

12. As used in this Consent Decree, the terms “mitigate” and

“mitigation” refer to creation of new wetland and open water

areas as compensation for alleged temporal loss of waters of the

United States the Defendant will restore pursuant to the terms

of this Consent Decree, and for alleged permanent loss of

waters of the United States that will not be restored. As used in

this Consent Decree, the term “on-site mitigation” refers to the

3.10 acre area located on the Royce Renaissance Property and

38a

depicted on Exhibit 2 and to the 1.5 acre area located on the

Sullivan Lake Property and depicted on Exhibit 3. As used in

this Consent Decree, the term “off-site mitigation” refers to the

2.08 acre area to be constructed as additional mitigation for the

alleged loss of wetland on the Royce Renaissance Property, as

provided in Paragraph 31 of this Decree.

13. The “Royce Renaissance Plan” is the Wetland

Restoration and Mitigation Summary Document attached as

Exhibit 4, and is incorporated herein by reference. In case of

ambiguity or conflict between the Royce Renaissance Plan and

this Consent Decree, the provisions of this Decree shall control.

14. The “Royce Renaissance Defendants” are Robert R.

Krilich, Krilich Companies, Inc., and Riverwoods Development

Corp., together with associated persons or entities described in

Paragraph 81 of this Decree.

15. The “Sullivan Lake Defendants” are Robert R. Krilich,

Krilich Companies, Inc., and Lakemoor Country Club, Inc.,

together with associated persons or entities described in

Paragraph 81 of this Decree.

16. The “Trust Defendants” are Manufacturers’ Affiliated

Trust Co. f/k/a Affiliated Bank/Franklin Park f/k/a First State

Bank & Trust of Franklin Park, not individually, but as Trustee

under the Trust Agreements dated July 30, 1982 and known as

Trust Nos. 866 and 867, and Austin State Bank, not

individually, but as Trustee under the Trust Agreement dated

December 18, 1968 and known as Trust No. 4580.

V. WATERS OF THE UNITED STATES

17. For purposes of this Consent Decree, the parties shall

treat wetland and open water areas depicted on Exhibit 1,

together with the new wetland and open water area created

pursuant to Part VII (injunctive relief) and depicted on Exhibit

2, as waters of the United States located on the Royce

Renaissance Property.

39a

18. For purposes of this Consent Decree, the parties shall

similarly treat wetland and open water areas depicted on

Exhibit 3, together with the 1.02 acre wetland mitigation area

already created by the Sullivan Lake Defendants and depicted

on Exhibit 3, as waters of the United States located on the

Sullivan Lake Property.

19. The Defendants hereby elect delineation for the Royce

Renaissance Property pursuant to the Federal Manual for

Identifying and Delineating Jurisdictional Wetlands (1989).

Further, the Parties agree that the boundaries of the alleged

waters of the United States referenced in Paragraph 17 and

depicted on Exhibit 1 would not differ if the delineation had

been conducted pursuant to the Corps of Engineers Wetland

Delineation Manual (1987).

20. The boundaries depicted in Exhibits 1 and 3 shall bind

the parties for the life of this Consent Decree unless and until

a new Corps or EPA delineation is made pursuant to the final

version of a revised wetland delineation manual. The

Defendants shall not request a new jurisdictional determination

from either the Corps or EPA for the Royce Renaissance

Property or the Sullivan Lake Property during the life of this

Consent Decree unless and until the government issues the final

version of a revised wetland delineation manual.

20A. The Defendanis shall continue to treat wetland and

open water areas depicted on Exhibit | as waters of the United

States until the mandate issues in Hoffman Homes, Inc. v. EPA,

No. 90-3810 (7th Cir. April 20, 1992) and until proceedings

related to any appeal, petition for certiorari, or remand are

completed. Following completion of these proceedings, unless

pertinent portions of the Seventh Circuit’s April 20, 1992

decision are reversed, Exhibit 1 areas W2A, W2B, W3, WSB,

and W9 shall be excluded from the obligations imposed in

Paragraph 17.

40a

VI. DESIGNATED PROJECT COORDINATORS

21. All reports, plans, approvals, disapprovals, and other

written communication required or permitted by this Consent

Decree shall be sent to each party’s designated Project

Coordinator. The project coordinators are:

For EPA:

Douglas A. Ehorn

Chief, Wetlands and Watersheds Section

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

77 West Jackson Boulevard - WQW-16J

Chicago, IL 60604

For Royce Renaissance Defendants:

Kerry Plencner

Vice President

Krilich Companies Inc.

1000 Royce Boulevard

Oak Brook Terrace

Oak Brook, IL 60181

For Sullivan Lake Defendants:

Kerry Plencner

Vice President

Krilich Companies Inc.

1000 Royce Boulevard

Oak Brook Terrace

Oak Brook, IL 60181

VII. INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

22. Each Defendant is permanently enjoined from

discharging dredged or fill material in violation of Clean Water

Act § 301, 33 U.S.C. § 1311.

23. The Royce Renaissance Defendants shall not discharge

dredged or fill material into the areas depicted as waters of the

4la

United States on Exhibits | and 2 without obtaining and fully

complying with the terms of a permit issued by the United

States Army Corps of Engineers pursuant to Clean Water Act

§ 404, 33 U.S.C. § 1344, and shall take all reasonable measures

to prevent others from doing so.

24. The Sullivan Lake Defendants shall not discharge

dredged or fill material into the areas depicted as waters of the

United States on Exhibit 3 without obtaining and fully

complying with the terms of a permit issued by the Corps

pursuant to Clean Water Act § 404, 33 U.S.C. § 1344, and shall

take all reasonable measures to prevent others from doing so.

a. Wetland Identification

25. The Royce Renaissance Defendants and the Sullivan

Lake Defendants, respectively, shall mark the boundaries of the

alleged waters of the United States depicted on Exhibits 1 and

3 using surveying stakes with appropriate flagging under the

on-scene supervision of an EPA representative, not later than

30 days after the entry of this Consent Decree. The same

Defendants shall not disturb those markers for any reason, shall

take all reasonable measures to prevent others from disturbing

those markers, and shall promptly replace markers disturbed by

others in accordance with the survey provided for in Paragraph

28.

26. The Royce Renaissance Defendants shall mark the

boundaries of the on-site mitigation area at the Royce

Renaissance Property, as depicted on Exhibit 2, using surveying

stakes with appropriate flagging under the on-scene supervision

of an EPA representative not later than 30 days after

completion of initial excavation and grading in accordance with

Paragraph 30. The same Defendants shall not disturb those

markers for any reason, shall take all reasonable measures to

prevent others from disturbing those markers, and shall

promptly replace markers disturbed by others in accordance

with the survey provided for in Paragraph 28.

42a

27. The Sullivan Lake Defendants shall mark the boundaries

of the on-site mitigation area, as depicted on Exhibit 3, using

surveying stakes with appropriate flagging under the on-scene

supervision of the EPA representative, not later than 30 days

after entry of this Consent Decree. The same Defendants shall

not disturb those markers for any reason, shall take reasonable

measurers to prevent others from disturbing those markers, and

shall promptly replace markers disturbed by others in

accordance with the survey provided for in Paragraph 28.

28. The Defendants shall arrange for a professional survey

of the boundary markers placed pursuant to Paragraphs 25

through 27, and shall provide EPA’s project coordinator with

a copy of each survey no later than 60 days after entry of this

Consent Decree for Paragraphs 25 and 27 and 30 days after

placement of the markers in accordance with Paragraph 26.

b. Restoration/Mitigation—Royce Renaissance

29. The Royce Renaissance Defendants shall restore the

alleged loss of the waters of the United States on the Royce

Renaissance Property in accordance with the Royce

Renaissance Plan, and in accordance with the following

schedule:

Deadline: Task:

August 31, 1992 Complete removal of spoil piles in areas

labelled Wla and Wld on Exhibit 1,

complete construction of berm in area

Wid, and complete regarding of

existing man-made channel in area W la.

September 30, 1992 Complete planting of the berm in area

Wid.

30. The Royce Renaissance Defendants shall create wetlands

on-site (as depicted in Exhibits 1 and 2) to mitigate for alleged

wetland and open water losses on the Royce Renaissance

43a

Property in accordance with the Royce Renaissance Plan and

the foilowing schedule:

Deadline: Task:

March 1, 1993 Commence initial excavation and

grading.

March 31, 1993 Complete initial excavation and grading,

and complete installation of flow control

structures.

May 15, 1993 Complete planting in the mitigation

area.

31. The Royce Renaissance Defendants shall further create

at least 2.08 acres of off-site wetlands in accordance with the

Royce Renaissance Plan and the following schedule:

Deadline: Task:

September 30, 1992 Submit proposed site to EPA’s

project coordinator for approval.

November 30, 1992 Submit proposed wetland

creation, maintenance and

monitoring plan to EPA’s

project coordinator for approval.

March 1, 1993 Commence initial excavation

and grading.

March 31, 1993 Complete initial excavation and

grading.

May 15, 1993 Complete planting in the new

wetland erea.

32. The Royce Renaissance Defendants shall mark the

boundaries of the off-site wetland created pursuant to Paragraph

31 using surveying stakes with appropriate flagging under the

44a

on-scene supervision of an EPA representative, not later than

30 days after planting in the new wetland is complete. The

same Defendants shall not disturb those markers for any reason,

shall take all reasonable measures to prevent other from

disturbing those markers, and shall promptly replace markers

disturbed by others in accordance with the survey provided for

in Paragraph 33. 7

33. The Royce Renaissance Defendants shall arrange for a

professional survey of the boundary markers placed pursuant to

Paragraph 32, and shall provide EPA’s project coordinator with

a coy of the survey no later than 60 days after placement of

those markers.

34. This Paragraph has been deliberately left blank.

35. Upon completion of the off-site mitigation work required

in accordance with the Royce Renaissance Plan and Paragraph

31, subject to the approval of EPA, the Royce Renaissance

Defendants may convey the off-site mitigation area to a public

entity or other suitable body subject to the restrictive covenants

described in Paragraph 49 and Exhibit 6. Subject to the

approval of EPA, the Defendants also may convey the on-site

mitigation areas at the Sullivan Lake and Royce Renaissance

Properties to a homeowners’ association, public entity, or other

suitable body subject to the covenants undertaken pursuant to

Paragraph 49 and Exhibits 5 and 7.

c. Additional Off-Site Enhancement - Carol Stream.

36. The Royce Renaissance Defendants and Sullivan Lake

Defendants shall provide additional off-site enhancement of

certain existing wetlands on property owned by Parkway Bank

and Trust Co. as Trustee for Trust No. 8429, for the sole benefit

of Robert R. Krilich, and legally described as follows (“the

Carol Stream Site’’):

45a

The Northeast and Southeast Quarters of Section a

Township 40N, Range 9E, Village of Carol Stream,

DuPage County, Illinois.

37. The Royce Renaissance Defendants and the Sullivan

Lake Defendants shall conduct the wetland enhancement

required pursuant to this subpart c within one of the prospective

enhancement areas depicted on Exhibit 8 (marked “wetlands”),

or within whatever on-site mitigation area is specified pursuant

to any permit the Corps may issue for the discharge of dredged

or fill material on the subject parcel.

38. The enhancement work required by this subpart c shall

be in addition to, and consistent with, work required pursuant

to any permit the Corps may issue in connection with

development of the Carol Stream Site. Nothing in this Consent

Decree shall be construed as a warranty or other guarantee by

the United States that any such permit will issue.

39. The Royce Renaissance Defendants and Sullivan Lake

Defendants shall conduct the enhancement required by this

subpart c in accordance with an appropriate wetland

enhancement plan approved by EPA (the “Carol Stream Plan”),

which shall be incorporated by reference in this Consent Decree

upon approval by EPA. At a minimum, the plan shall include

the following:

a. Unless the site selected differs from the sites depicted on

Exhibit 8, increasing the depth of water in the subject

area in order to enhance the non-game fish habitat;

b. Creating islands in central portions of the wetlands area

in order to enhance waterfowl habitat;

c. Planting suitable high-density wetland plants in the

shrub/scrub and emergent zones in order to control

erosion and thereby improve water quality;

46a

d. Provision for the expenditure of not less than $16,000.00

on grading and construction, together with procurement

and planting of vegetation; and

e. Should the Corps not issue a permit, specification of

suitable two-year interim performance standards, and

final performance standards, and provision for suitable

semi-annual reporting, pursuant to Paragraph 52A.

40. The Royce Renaissance Defendants and the Sullivan

Lake Defendants shall conduct the enhancement work in

accordance with the following schedule, measured from the

date of a decision by the Corps upon pending permit application

number 9359111, or from the first anniversary of entry of this

Consent Decree, whichever date is sooner.

Deadline: Task:

60 days Submit proposed

enhancement, maintenance

_ and monitoring plan to

EPA’s project coordinator

for approval.

180 days Commence initial excavation

and grading.

240 days Complete initial excavation

and grading.

270 days Complete planting in the

enhanced wetland area.

41. The Royce Renaissance Defendants and the Sullivan

Lake Defendants, collectively, shall notify EPA’s project

coordinator within 3 business days after each of the tasks listed

in Paragraph 40 is complete and available for inspection. EPA

shall notify these Defendants’ project coordinators in writing

within 45 days should any aspect of the work not comply with

47a

the Carol Stream Plan, and these Defendants shall correct any

such condition within a reasonable time allowed by EPA and

notify EPA within 3 business days after completion that the

condition is corrected and available for inspection.

d. Contractor/Restoration Standards

42. Defendants shall arrange for the performance of all

wetlands restoration, mitigation, and enhancement work

pursuant to this Consent Decree by or under the direct

supervision of a contractor with qualifications and experience

suitable to conduct wetlands creation, restoration, and

enhancement work. Defendants shall provide EPA’s project

coordinator in writing with the name of the contractor, and the

title, qualifications, and experience of the proposed contract

personnel no less than 15 working days before commencing

any restoration, enhancement or mitigation work. Selection and

replacement of the contractor shall each be subject to written

approval by EPA on reasonable grounds.

43. The Royce Renaissance Defendants shall notify EPA’s

project coordinator within 3 business days after each of the

tasks listed in Paragraphs 25 through 31 are complete and

available for inspection. EPA shall notify Defendants respective

project coordinators in writing within 45 days thereafter should

any aspect of the work not comply with the Royce Renaissance

Plan and Defendants shall correct any such condition within the

reasonable time allowed by EPA and notify EPA within 3

business days after completion that the condition is corrected

and available for inspection.

44. Should restored wetlands on the Royce Renaissance

Property, wetlands created there as on-site mitigation, or

wetlands created pursuant to Paragraph 31 as off-site

mitigation, respectively, fail to achieve the interim performance

standards specified in the applicable restoration or mitigation

plans by the date of second anniversary of planting, the Royce

Renaissance Defendants shall include proposed corrective

48a

measures, together with a schedule for their implementation, in

the next semi-annual report to EPA pursuant to Subpart VII g.

EPA shall notify the Royce Renaissance Defendants’ project

coordinator in writing within 45 days thereafter should any

aspect of the proposed corrective measures be inadequate. The

Royce Renaissance Defendants shall thereafter make any

reasonable changes suggested by EPA, and shall implement the

corrective measures plan.

45. Should performance standards be required for wetlands

enhanced pursuant to Paragraphs 36 through 41, and if

enhancements fail to achieve the interim performance standards

by the date of second anniversary of planting, the Royce

Renaissance Defendants and the Sullivan Lake Defendants

shall include proposed corrective measures, together with a

schedule for their implementation, in the next semi-annual

report submitted by the Royce Renaissance Defendants

pursuant to Paragraph 52A. EPA shall notify the Royce

Renaissance Defendants’ project coordinator in writing within

45 days thereafter should any aspect of the proposed corrective

measures be inadequate. The Royce Renaissance Defendants

shall thereafter make any reasonable changes suggested by

EPA, and shall implement the corrective measures plan.

e. Site Access

46. The Trust Defendants, Royce Renaissance Defendants,

and Sullivan Lake Defendar.ts shall allow any authorized

representative of EPA or the Corps, upon presentation of

appropriate credentials and telephone notice to the project

coordinator, any of the designated alternative persons, or other

representative of the Defendants, to enter any site that is the

subject of this action, including the site of the off-site

mitigation required by Paragraph 31 and the wetlands enhanced

at the Carol Stream Site, to monitor compliance with this

Consent Decree.

49a

47. This Decree does not limit the authority of the United

States to enter, conduct inspections, have access to records, or

monitor compliance pursuant to any statute or court order.

f. Mitigation Guarantee/Restrictive Covenants

48. The Trust Defendants, Royce Renaissance Defendants

and Sullivan Lake Defendants, respectively, shall maintain

those areas provided as mitigation (as depicted on Exhibits 2

and 3) as vegetated wetlands for so long as they own the

mitigation portions of the Royce Renaissance Property, the

Sullivan Lake Property, or the off-site mitigation property

referenced in Paragraph 31, and shall take all reasonable

measures to prevent damage by discharge of dredged or fill

material, trespass, or other disturbance by others.

49. The Trust Defendants, Royce Renaissance Defendants,

and Sullivan Lake Defendants hereby declare that whatever

interest they, or any of them, may have in the Royce

Renaissance or Sullivan Lake Properties, together with any

interest they, or any of them, may acquire in the off-site

mitigation property, whether legal, equitable, or otherwise,

shall be held, sold, distributed, or conveyed only subject to, and

in accordance with, covenants in the form attached to this

Consent Decree as Exhibits 5, 6, and 7.

50. The parties to this Consent Decree hereby express their

mutual intention that the covenants undertaken pursuant to

Paragraph 49 and Exhibits 5, 6, and 7 bind the parties, their

heirs, successors, assigns, and any subsequent purchaser of any

interest in any portion of the Royce Renaissance or Sullivan

Lake Properties or the off-site mitigation property required by

Paragraph 31.

51. Within 30 days after the boundaries of each mitigation

area are surveyed, as provided for in Paragraphs __and __, the

Royce Renaissance and Sullivan Lake Defendants shall execute

and record their respective covenants by filing a copy in the

appropriate local property records, and shall attach a copy of

50a

the same covenants to any instrument of conveyance prepared

in connection with the mitigation portions of the Royce

Renaissance and Sullivan Lake Properties or the off-site

mitigation area, and shall similarly attach a copy of the same

covenants to any development plan or plat submitted to any

municipal or other authority, or otherwise made public, in

connection with the mitigation portions of the Royce

Renaissance or Sullivan Lake properties or areas adjacent to or

encompassing such mitigation areas.

52. The 3.10 acre on-site mitigation area on the Royce

Renaissance Property, the 1.0 acre on-site mitigation area on

the Sullivan Lake Property, and the off-site mitigation area

created pursuant to Paragraph 31, are provided to mitigate for

the alleged loss of wetland and open water areas on the Royce

Renaissance and Sullivan Lake Properties, and shall not be

available to provide mitigation for other projects, including but

not limited to any application for a Section 404 permit.

g. Reporting

52A. The Royce Renaissance Defendants shall provide

EPA’s project coordinator with semi-annual progress reports

beginning September 30, 1993, and continuing thereafter not

later than March 31 and September 30 for the life of their

Consent Decree. Such semi-annual report shall include, at a

minimum:

1. A description of the specific actions taken by the Royce

Renaissance Defendants during the preceding semi-

annual period to comply with the terms of the Consent

Decree, and a projection of action to be taken for the

following semi-annual period;

2. A complete monitoring and management report

describing the condition and re-growth of restored

wetlands, on-site mitigation areas, off-site mitigation

areas, and, if required pursuant to Paragraph 39e, the

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Carol Stream enhancement project, together with the

Royce Renaissance Defendants’ activities in those areas;

3. A statement of compliance or noncompliance with the

requirements of this Consent Decree; and

4. In the event of any noncompliance, a specific statement

of the reason(s) for that noncompliance, together with a

plan for preventing such noncompliance in the future.

52B. Semi-annual reports submitted pursuant to this subpart

g shall be signed by an officer of Krilich Companies, Inc., at

the time of the submission, under the following certification:

“I certify under penalty of law that this document and

any attachments were prepared under my direction or

supervision in accordance with a system designed to

assure qualified personnel properly gather and

evaluate the information submitted. Based on my

directions and my inquiry of the person(s) who

manage the system, or the person(s) directly

responsible for gathering the information, the

information submitted is, to the best of my knowledge

and belief, true, accurate and complete.”

52C. Defendants shall not object to the admissibility of any

semi-annual report in any proceeding to enforce this Consent

Decree. Compliance with the reporting requirements imposed

by this Consent Decree shall not relieve Defendants of any

other requirements imposed by Federal or State laws and

regulations.

VIN. CIVIL PENALTY

53. Within 30 days after entry of this Consent Decree, the

Royce Renaissance and Sullivan Lake Defendants shall pay a

civil penalty, without admission of liability, in the amount of

the one hundred and eighty-five thousand dollars ($185,000) to

the United States of America. Payment shall be made by

52a

certified or cashier check, payable to ‘‘Treasurer, United States

of America” and delivered to the United States Department of

Justice, Attention: Michael D. Rowe, Environment and Natural

Resources Division, P.O. Box 23986, Washington, DC 20026-

3986. Defendants shall simultaneously send a copy of the check

to EPA’s project coordinator.

54. In consideration of the actions that will be performed and

the penalties that will be paid by the Royce Renaissance

Defendants and the Sullivan Lake Defendants pursuant to this

Consent Decree, the United States covenants not to take action

to assess an administrative penalty against the same Defendants

pursuant to Clean Water Act § 309(g), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g), for

violations of Clean Water Act § 301(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a),

based on a discharge of dredged or fili material without the

required section 404 permit {33 U.S.C. § 1344) at the Royce

Renaissance Property (in the case of the Royce Renaissance

Defendants) and the Sullivan Lake Property (in the case of the

Sullivan Lake Defendants) prior to the date of lodging of this

Consent Decree. This covenant not to take action to assess an

administrative penalty is conditioned upon satisfactory

performance by the Royce Renaissance Defendants and the

Sullivan Lake Defendants of their respective obligations under

this Consent Decree. The covenant extends only to the Royce

Renaissance Defendants and the Sullivan Lake Defendants, and

not to any other person or entity.

IX. STIPULATED PENALTIES

55. The Royce Renaissance Defendants collectively shall

pay, and shall be jointly and severally liable for, a Stipulated

Penalty of two thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500.00) per

day for each of the following violations of this Decree:

a. failure to timely mark wetland boundaries in accordance

with Paragraphs 25, 26, and 32;

53a

b. failure to complete initial planting and restoration of

restoration and mitigation areas in accordance with

Paragraphs 29 through 31 and Exhibit 4;

c. movement by the Royce Renaissance Defendants of the

surveying stakes after placement approval by EPA in

violation of Paragraphs 25, 26, and 32;

d. failure to correct any conditions noted by EPA as being

inconsistent with the Royce Renaissance Plan in a timely

fashion as required by Paragraph 43;

e. violation of the mitigation guarantee/restrictive covenant

provisions found in the applicable portions of Paragraphs

49 through 51.

56. The Royce Renaissance Defendants collectively shall

pay, and shall be jointly and severally liable for, a Stipulated

Penalty of a thousand dollars ($1,000.00) per day for each of

the following violations of this Decree:

a. failure to timely deliver a survey of those wetland

boundaries in accordance with Paragraph 28 and 33;

b. failure to timely deliver information regarding contractor

identification and qualifications in accordance with

Paragraph 42;

c. failure to timely submit semi-annual reports in

accordance with subpart VII g;

d. failure to timely notify EPA’s project coordinator when

each of the tasks listed in Paragraphs 25-31 is complete

and available for inspection as required by Paragraph 43.

e. failure to timely notify EPA’s project coordinator when

conditions have been corrected and are ready for

inspection as required by Paragraph 43.

57. The Sullivan Lake Defendants collectively shall pay, and

shall be jointly and severally liable for, a Stipulated Penalty of

54a

two thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500.00) per day for each

of the following violations of this Decree:

a. failure to timely mark wetland boundaries in accordance

with Paragraph 27;

b. movement by the Sullivan Lake Defendants of the

surveying stakes after placement approval by EPA as

prohibited in Paragraph 27.

c. violation of the mitigation guarantee/restrictive covenant

provision found in the applicable portions of Paragraphs

49 through 51.

58. The Sullivan Lake Defendants collectively shall pay, and

shall be jointly and severally liable for, a Stipulated Penalty of

one thousand dollars ($1,000.00) per day for each of the

following violations of this Decree:

a. failure to timely deliver a survey of those boundaries in

accordance with Paragraph 28.

59. The Royce Renaissance Defendants and the Sullivan

Lake Defendants, collectively, shall pay, and shall be jointly

and severally liable for, a Stipulated Penalty of two thousand

five hundred dollars ($2,500.00) per day for each of the

following violations of this Decree:

a. failure to timely submit a proposed enhancement,

maintenance, and monitoring plan to EPA’s project

coordinator in accordance with Paragraph 40;

b. failure to complete initial excavation and grading in

accordance with Paragraph 40;

c. failure to complete planting the enhanced wetland area

in accordance with Paragraph 40;

60. The Royce Renaissance Defendants and the Sullivan

Lake Defendants collectively shall pay, and shall be jointly and

severally liable for, a Stipulated Penalty of one thousand dollars

ee...

55a

($1,000.00) per day for each of the following violations of this

Decree:

a. failure to timely notify EPA’s project coordinator when

each of the tasks listed in Paragraph 40 is complete and

available for inspection, as required by Paragraph 41.

b. failure to timely notify EPA’s project coordinator when

conditions have been corrected and are ready for

inspection as required by Paragraph 41.

c. failure to conduct monitoring and inspections and

provide semi-annual reports, if required pursuant to

Paragraph 39(e).

61. The Royce Renaissance Defendants collectively shall

pay, and shall be jointly and severally liable for, a Stipulated

Penalty for each day unpermitted dredged or fill material is

discharged, placed, or remains thereafter, in areas depicted as

waters of the United States on Exhibit 1 (that is, for each

violation of Paragraph 23) in the following amounts:

a. Five thousand dollars ($5,000.00) per day for the first 5

business days of violation;

b. Twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000) per day for each

calendar day of violation thereafter.

c. For purposes of this Consent Decree, a “business day”

shall include any nonbusiness day during which

construction or other crews are conducting earthmoving,

construction or other similar operations of the Royce

Renaissance Property.

62. The Sullivan Lake Defendants collectively shall pay, and

shall be jointly and severally liable for, a Stipulated Penalty for

each day unpermitted dredged or fill material is discharged,

placed, or remains thereafter, in areas depicted as alleged

waters of the United States on Exhibit 3 (that is, for each

violation of Paragraph 24) in the following amounts:

56a

a. Five thousand dollars ($5,000.00) per day for the first 5

business days of violation;

b. Twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000) per day for each

calendar day of violation thereafter.

c. For purposes of this Consent Decree, a “business day”

shall include any nonbusiness day during which

construction or other crews are conducting earthmoving,

construction or other similar operations on the Sullivan

Lake Property.

63. Any Defendant who denies an EPA or Corps employee

access to either the Royce Renaissance Property or the Sullivan

Lake Property, in vio

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Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Krilich v. United States · 538 U.S. 977 | Frix