Opposition Brief — Logiodice v. Trustees of Maine Central Institute

No. 02-632 | ort

In The

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

ZACHARIAH LOGIODICE,

Petitioner,

ia Vv. _—

TRUSTEES OF MAINE CENTRAL INSTITUTE (MCD,

DOUGLAS C. CUMMINGS, JOHN MARQUIS,

TERRANCE C. McCANNELL, and MAINE SCHOOL

ADMINISTRATIVE DISTRICT NO. 53,

Respondents,

ON PEITITION FOR A WRIT OF CENTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

RESPONDENT MCI’S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

Brent A. Singer

Counsel of Record

Bruce C. Mallonee

Edmond J. Bearor

Of Counsel

RUDMAN & WINCHELL

Attomeys for MCI

84 Harlow Street

Bangor, Maine 04402-1401

(207)947-4501

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IDENTIFICATION OF PARTIES

AND

RULE 29.6 CORPORATE DISCLOSURE

STATEMENT

This brief is submitted on behalf of Respondents

Douglas C. Cummings, John Marquis, and the Trustees of

Maine Central Institute (referred to collectively as MCI).

Maine Central Institute has issued to the public shares of its

capital stock, which are traded on the American Stock

Exchange. No parent, subsidiary, or affiliated corporation

has issued shares of stock to the public.

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QUESTION PRESENTED

Do this court’s rulings in Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn.

Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288 (2001), and

West v. Atkins, 482 U.S. 42 (1988), compel a finding that an

independent school is a state actor when, by contract with a

public school district containing no other high school, it

provides a high school education to students living in the

district?

]

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Maine School Administrative District 53 (M.S.A.D.

53) comprises three towns. The only high school within the

district is Maine Central Institute, an independent school

continuously operated since 1866. By contract, MCI

provides a high school education to students living in

M.S.A.D. 53. Eighty percent of MCI’s students come from

M.S.A.D. 53, while fifty-one percent of MCI’s revenue is

received pursuant to the contract. Under the terms of the

contract, student discipline is delegated to MCI.

M.S.A.D. 53 is governed by a board elected by the

public. MCI is governed by a private Board of Trustees.

At the time of the incident giving rise to Petitioner’s

complaint, two members of the MCI Board of Trustees

were also members of the M.S.A.D. 53 Board. The dual

board participation of these two members was coincidental.

There is no contractual provision requiring cross

membership between the boards of M.S.A.D. 53 and MCI.

One term of the contract between MCI and M.S.A.D.

53 provides for a Joint Committee composed of

representatives of each entity. This joint board exerts no

authority over MCI’s operations.

Petitioner Logiodice was suspended for 10 days

following a confrontation with school personnel. Because

the circumstances of the confrontation suggested Petitioner

might be dangerous to himself or others, the suspension was

extended until Petitioner could submit himself to a safety

evaluation by a psychological professional. The actual

suspension totaled 17 school days, during which Petitioner

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was not afforded a hearing. M.S.A.D. 53 objected to MCI’s

handling of Petitioner’s suspension but was without

authority and unable to coerce, direct, or persuade MCI to

adopt a different course of action.

The United States District Court for the District of

Maine granted MCI’s motion for summary judgment on

Petitioner’s Fourteenth Amendment due process claims.

On appeal a divided First Circuit ruled, inter alia, that MCI

was not a State actor pursuant to Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn.

Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288 (2001), and

West v. Atkins, 482 U.S. 42 (1988).

REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT

The First Circuit’s decision in this case presents no

conflict with the decision of any other United States court

of appeals. It does not address any important question of

federal law needing to be settled by this court. Instead, it

legally resolves a dispute over a single disciplinary decision

governed by an idiosyncratic institutional contract. Further

constitutional analysis is unlikely to provide guidance with

respect to any widespread educational practice or recurrent

circumstance affecting other schools and students.

As this court noted in Brentwood Academy:

[S]tate action may be found if, though only if,

there is such a “close nexus between the State

and the challenged action” that seemingly private

behavior “may be fairly treated as that of the

State itself.”

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What is fairly attributable is a matter of

normative judgment, and the criteria lack rigid

simplicity.

Brentwood Academy, 531 U.S. at 295 (citation omitted).

The record in this case demonstrates that MCI’s private

behavior cannot fairly be treated as that of the State itself.

The separation of MCI’s authority from that of the

State is of fundamental importance. The disciplinary

decision against Petitioner was undertaken against the

wishes of the State and despite strenuous objections by

public school board officials.

Beyond that, a factual comparison between the

Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association and MCI

confirms that MCI, unlike the Athletic Association, is not a

state actor. The Athletic Association was a statewide entity

without any parallel public organization; MCT is a single

high school serving three towns within a state. Each public

school member of the Athletic Association was afforded a

vote in the election of members to the Association’s

governing boards; M.S.A.D. 53 members have no right to

determine members of MCI’s Board of Trustees. Public

school officials controlled and actually performed Athletic

Association functions; public school officials perform no

MCI functions and indeed found they were unable to

influence MCI’s actions when they disagreed with them.

The only real point of similarity between the Athletic

Association and MCI has to do with percentage of

participation: eighty four percent of the Athletic

Association’s member schools were public, while 80

percent of MCI’s students come from M.S.A.D. 53.

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Comparison of MCI’s actions to those at issue in

West v. Atkins reveals similar divergences. The defendant

in West was a prison, an institution traditionally and

historically operated by the exercise of sovereignty. The

plaintiff's claim arose out of the State’s constitutional

obligation to provide medical treatment to prisoners. The

prisoner had no choice in the medical care provided. In

contrast, as the District Court in this case noted, providing

an education is not traditionally the exclusive prerogative of

the State. The right in question—a free public education—

is statutory rather than constitutional, and students have a

choice whether to accept the free education offered by the

State or pay tuition to attend school elsewhere.

Finally, this case presents no question of widespread

public importance. Were this court to apply Brentwood and

West to the singular contractual circumstances presented by

petitioner, Maine School Administrative District 53, and

MCL, the resulting decision would provide little guidance to

public school systems, independent schools, parents, or

students in other places.

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CONCLUSION

Because no constitutional issue of consequence is

presented, Mr. Logiodice’s petition for writ of certiorari

should be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

Brent A. Singer

Counsel of Record

Bruce C. Mallonee

Edmond J. Bearor

Of Counsel

RUDMAN & WINCHELL

Attorneys for MCI

84 Harlow Street

Bangor, Maine 04402-1401

(207)947-4501