Appendix — In Re Perry
Supreme Court brief2002
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(2) supreme Cour, U.S.
QO2 104 WN 1 7 2002
No. clens*
OFFICE OF THE
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
In re LLOYD G. PERRY
Petitioner
V.
INDIANA SUPREME COURT et al
Respondants
On Petition For
Writ of Mandamus and Prohibition
SEPARATE APPENDIX TO
PETITION FOR WRIT
OF MANDAMUS AND PROHIBITION
Lloyd G. Perry
Pro se on record
P.O. Box 11041.
Ft Wayne Ind 46855
[Oo |
TABLE OF CONTENTS
FOR SEPARATE APPENDIX TO
EXTRA ORDINARY WRIT
SUBJECT: PAGE USED:
“ ***¥NOTICE***
The contents of this appendix consists of parts of the record
as filed in the Indiana Court of Appeals and petitioned to be
transfered to the Indiana Supreme Court.
Most of the documents contain a full table of contents and
table of authorities. Please do not confuse this table of contents
with those for the individual tables as said, or with the
additional appendix that is entitled “Lodgings” that
accompanies this set of documents related to the petition for
extraordinary writ, but which contains record parts of some of
the other cases related to but not part of Perry v. Curtis.
1. Brief of Appellant I. thru 37
Original page numbers are in brackets |
. Petition for Rehearing 38 - 51
2
3. Attached Opinion to rehearing 52 - 56
4. Certification to lower Court of judgment 57 - 59
5. Petition to transfer to Indiana Supreme Ct. 60 - 63
6. Table of Contents of the record 64 - 90
- This "Catalog" is required by appellate
Rules and is intended identify each
documents and tell what it represents.
“1. ~
IN THE
INDIANA COURT OF APPEALS
CAUSE NO. 57A04-0009-CV-404
LLOYD G. PERRY, ) APPEAL FROM THE
Appellant/ Defendant/ ) NOBLE SUPERIOR COURT
C. Pitf. (Below) ) Cause No. 57D01-CT-000018
v. ) )
MARVIN R. CURTIS, et al., ) The Honorable
Appellee/ Plaintiff/ ) J. Scott VanDerbeck, S. Judge
C. Deft. (Below) )
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
TABLE OF CONTENTS
SECTION: SUBJECT: PAGE NO:
I. Jurisdiction of Court of Appeals questioned. 1
I. Jurisdiction Of Indiana Supreme Court 1-6
1. Statement of Statutes assigning exclusive jurisdiction 1
2. Injunction, encroachment on Supreme Court jurisdiction 1
3. Case of Curtis v. Perry in wrong court voids jurisdiction 2
4. Discrimination against Perry pro se 2
5. State Supreme Court, failure to discipline, failure to 3
protect, is direct cause of Curtis case.
Long term pattern(History)of State policy discrimination 3-4
Intentional tort by Curtis in aid of getting a StateCourt 5
injunction against Perry as twin to Federal Injunction
Case “arises under" U.S. Constitution Article II. § 2.cl.1. 5
Judge Spindler disqualified to hear case but goes forward 6
Statement of Issues Presented For Review
No jurisdiction
Fraud by opposing counsels
Threats and intimidation to witnesses and Perry
Deprived Due Process
. Deprived equal protection of the law
REFERENCE TO THE RECORD WITH ISSUES 8
Specific fact noted in paragraph 6.1 9-10
IV. Statement of The Case;(History leading up to appeal) 10-18
HISTORY EXHIBITS ARE IN SEPERATE APPENDIX
wa wre Foe Dae
eS sNews
1. ee se 10
-L-
TABLE OF CONTENTS :
SECTION: SUBJECT: PAGE NO.
2. Details of Perry v. Gresk issue that impacts 11-12
this case
3. Indiana Supreme Court Failure To Disciplme 13
is direct cause of Curtis case
4. State and Federal injunctions placed on Perry 13
for evil purpose.
5. Federal Question Challenge to State Statutes 13
Constitutional
n..
6. Comparing dates of Allen Circuit Court case
of Perry v. Fox to Curtis v. Perry to show
case of Fox still pending when Curtis case
was filed. See Allen Circuit Docket S. Appdx.
7. Fraud in National Labor relations Board and
Indiana Civil Rights Commission, by attorneys
Groth and Lerch serving in all capacities on
issues Perry had before the said Agencies.
SUMMARY STATEMENT OF THE CASE 15-16
Order Reproduced, setting up this appeal
V. STATEMENT OF FACTS RELATED TO ISSUES: 16-18
1. Facts of fraud 20
2. Facts showing pattern of extortion 21- 22.
3. Facts of no jurisdiction 23- 24.
VI. SUMMARY ARGUMENT 24
Standards of review stated in paragraph 5. 24
Vil. Arguments: A. Jurisdiction 24
1. No jurisdiction is shown by court or law cited 25- 27
2. Verbatim citations of controlling laws 27- 28
B. Argument (Discrimination) 28- 29
1. Verbatim citations of controlling laws 29- 30
RELIEF DESIRED 30
(ai. -]
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
AUTHORITY: PAGE USED:
1. Boczar v. Reuben 742 N.E.2d 1010 (Ind.App. 2001) 25
2. Brazosport Towing Co. V. 3,838 Tons of Sorghum 27
607 F. Supp 11; Affd. op 790 F.2d 891
3. Couchman v. Restoration Contractors Inc. 9
743 N.E.2d 346 (Ind. App. 2001)
4. Doe v. Sullivan County Tenn. 956 F.2d 545 30
113 S. Ct. 187 (Tenn 1992)
5. Foor v. Town of Hebron 742 N.E.2d 545 26,28,30
6. Georgetown Bd. of Zoning Appeals v. Keele 25,26
743 N.E.2d 301 (Ind. App. 2001)
7. Hauck v. City of Prairie Village, Kansas, 30
912 F. Supp. 1428, Reconsidered 950 F. Supp. 312
: 2
8. Hogue v. MQS Inspection Inc. 875 F. Supp 714 30
9. Hoult v. Hoult 57 F.3d 1 (1995 CA1 Mass) 28
10. Hughs v. City of Gary 741 N.E.2d 1168 25
(Ind. App. 2001)
11. In re Guardianship of K.T. 743 25,26,27,28,30
N.E.2d 348 (Ind. App. 2001)
12. Jones v. State 449 N.E.2d 1060 (Ind. App. 1983) 9,29
13. Lynn v. Windridge Co-Owners Ass'n Inc. 9,10
743 N.E.2d 305 (Ind. App. 2001)
14. Mickens v. State 742 N.E.2d 927 (Ind. App. 2001) 25
15. Perry v. Bamard 745 F. Supp. 1394 @ 1408 4
16. Schwartz v. U.S. 976 F.2d 213 at 28
217 col. 1. 1 [2] (1992 CA4Md)
17. Scothorn v. State of Kansas, 29
772 F.Supp 556 (Kan. 1991)
18. Scott v. Crussen, 741 N.E.2d 743 (Ind. App. 2000) 9
19. Shenvar v. Johnson, 741 N.E.2d 1275 25
(Ind. App. 2001)
20. Sivard v. Pulaski County, 995 F.2d 662; 29
17 F.3d 185 (Ind. App. 1992)
[ -txi.-]
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
AUTHORITY: PAGE USED:
21. Smith v. Miller Builders Inc., 9
741 N.E.2d 731 (INd. App. 2000)
22. United States v. Zima 28
766 F.2d 1153 (1985 CA7 Ind.)
INDIANA CONSTITUTION
1. Article L, § 12 3,8,12
2. Article IIL, § 1. 1,3,6,26
3. Article VIL, § 4. 1,3,6,26,28
INDIANA RULES OF COURT
1. Appellate Rule 4(B)(1) 5
2. Appellate Rule 8.3 1
3. Original Action Rule 1(B) 6
4. Trial Rule 12 6,26
-IV.-
5. Trial Rule 52(A)(1), (2) & (3) 9
6. Trial Rule 60(B) 24
7. Trial Rule 75(A) 2,6,23
8. Trial Rule 75(8) 2,6,23,26
INDIANA STATUTES
1. Indiana Code § 33-2-3-1 1,2,3,6,7,12,26
28,29
2. Indiana Code § 34-5-2-1 1,2,3,6,7,12,26,29
3. Indiana Code § 34-47-2-3 26,28
4. Indiana Code § 35-44-3-4 26,28
5. Indiana Code § 35-45-2-1 26
[- iv. -]
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
AUTHORITY: PAGE USED:
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
‘1. Article III. § 2. clause 1 & 2 3,5
2. Amendment V. 3
3. Amendment VL , 26
4. Amendment XIV. 3,8,12
UNITED STATES FEDERAL PROCEDURE
1. 21A Federal Procedure L Ed 27
§ 51:166 (1999 Ed.) pp. 438,439
2. 21A Federal Procedure L Ed § 51:167 (1999 Ed.) 27
pp. 439, 441 at 440 Last 5 lines on 441
UNITED STATES STATUTES
1. 28 USCS § 144 12
2. 28 USCS § 455 12
3. 28 USCS § 1346(a)(2)(b) 27
4. 42USCS § 1983 27,29,30
5. 42 USCS § 1985 27
[-v.-]
IN THE -
INDIANA COURT OF APPEALS
CAUSE NO. 57A04-0009-CV-404
LLOYD G. PERRY, ) APPEAL FROM THE
Appint. Defnt./ C. Pitf. (Below) ) NOBLE SUPERIOR COURT
v. ) No57D01 9007-CT-000018
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Comes now the appellant, defendant / cross plaintiff below,
Lloyd G. Perry, in person and pro se and files his brief on appeal,
pursuant to Appellate Rule 8.3 of the Ind. Rules of Court, 2000.
I. JURISDICTION:
Jurisdiction of this Indiana Court Of Appeals to hear this case
is im question, by reason that the issues involve lack of
jurisdiction of the Noble Superior Court, over the person, the
eee grove wlybar per grt german yr rib * apr
I JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT:
Jurisdiction of this case, in Perry's opinion, should be im the
Indiana Supreme Court on the bases of the following facts: (early
in the appeal Perry tried to transfer but was denied)
1. That the subject matter of this appeal relates to Indiana
*
and extra judicial acts that took place during the proceedings in
the said, Allen Circuit Court case of Fox et al., forced Perry to
dismiss that case. Pursuant to Indiana Rules of Court, Trial Rule
12, Perry was obligated to file his cross-complaint to preserve his
right to sue for damages for the obstruction of justice in the Fox
case. Pursuant to Trial Rule 75(A) & (B), Judge Stephen Spindler
was obligated to transferr the case to the Indiana Supreme Court
pursuant to the request in the last paragraph of Perry's complaint.
(see C. Complt. record Vol. III. pp 578-589 at 589)
(disreguarding the right to represent yourself under the color of
that same set of Indiana laws) see Indiana Code § 33-2-3-1 and
LC. § 34-5-2-1.
.2 The discrimination policy raises the question as to what
constitutes the un-authoritzed practice of law? This question and
from incompetent and attorneys
by State Statutes, Indiana Code § 33-2-3-1 and LC. 34-5-2-1,
a long documented history of this stated fact, etched in the pages
of legal history in both the State and Federal Judicial Systems, as
of the Indiana isions of access to the Courts
to Article L, § 12 and a complete avoidance of their
duties to Indiana i Article III. § 1. and
precedented first in the Indiana Court Of Appeals, back in the
Spencer County Farm Bureau Co-op v.-Lloyd G. Perry case;
which grew in time and occurances to the case of Perry v. Gresk
and manifested in the case of Perry v. Barnard et al. The Baranrd
case being Perry against the Indiana Supreme Court for refusing
to discipline Gresk and others for their various criminal activities
both inside and outside the Courts, with emphasis on Gresk's part
in the theft of his own clients money while retained to sue the
same parties he assisted to steal Perry's money.
-2 The Federal injunction was then issued in the Barnard
case to block Perry's right to recover his stolen money and other
damages from Gresk and those he criminally associated with.
The mjunction was a streight forward usurping of all laws and
constitutional rights of Perry to due process and recovery of
damages and personal property losses and at the same time put in
place a shield so that the criminal activities could continue in the
Courts. They did continue, and they form the bases of this post-
judgment appeal for relief from judgment, with the issues of the
judgment and injunction not appealed because of threats,
intimidation and attempts on Perry's life, threatened by attorney
Stephen Lerch in the post-judgment settings in 1992 and by
many others as time passed.
-3 The real reason for the Curtis v. Perry case was attommey
Theadore Lockyear’s interest in having an injunction in both
State and Federal Courts to block Perry's use of the Courts.
Lockyear was the attorney for the Indiana Bar Association in the
Perry v. Barnard case and was soundly defeated in oral argument
in that case. However he went on to write the opinion published
in the Federal Reporter Perry v. Barnard, 745 F. Supp. 1394 @
1408; which if you examine the case laws and the facts of the
case, you will find that that opinion is a published lie, published
to conceal what truely took place.
4 For the State injunction to be effective, it was important
for those same conditons that occured in relation to Gresk and
Barnard to be replicated and brought forward into this instance
case of Curtis v. Perry and was accomplished by means of an
ee ee
al.
The issues of attorney and judge procedure fraud and criminal
practices in procedure were then instigated in Fox and brought
into this instance case of Curtis as a vehicle to be used to place
0
Indiana Code § 33-2-3-1 and LC. § 34-5-2-1, Indiana
Constitution Article VII, § 4 and Article II. § 1, all of which
gives exclusive jurisdiction of such subject matter to the Indiana
Supreme Court. This raises the Federal Question Challenge to the
Perry where it has a legal duty to do so and Perry i
deprived access to both the Federal and State Courts
his remedies and collect his losses and damages.
2 Perry, in this instance case of Curtis, was obligated by
‘i
the loss of right to plead and waive his right to damage awards.
Judge Spindler was obligated under Trial Rule 75(A)&(B) to
transfer the case but would not do so. The obstructions to the
justice to be forth comming, obstructed by the oppossing parties
and their counsel should not and would not have been allowed
severity of the issues, there would be no help and no transfer and
as the record shows no protection to Perry or his witnesses.
3 Additionally, Judge Spindler was disqualified from
setting in judgment over any part of the case, which included the
same time period in which he issued his judgments and placed
the injunctions on Perry. (see Letter from Ind. Supreme Court
ordering to resume jurisdiction Vol. Il. pp 639-641 dated
2/28/92; see also hearing date of July 15, 1991, record Vol. IL, p
466, Ls 12-24. (transcript is distorted here but point is made by
comparing the dates) See Rules of Procedure For Original
Actions, Rule 1(B) p. 359 of Indiana Rules of Court 2000. See
also Appellant Perry's Motion For Relief From Judgment Before
Filing of Brief on Appeal, filed in this instance appeal with
attachments. [6.]
IIL STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW:
1. The Noble Superior Court lacked subject miatier
jurisdiction; personal jurisdiction over the issues of Curtis v.
Perry case with the case having filed in the wrong court and
the same subject matter pending in the Allen Circuit Court under
of the Curtis case at the time in which he made his
j against Perry and in favor of Curtis and the others.
3. That Judge Stephen Spindler placed a permanent
injunction on Perry's use of the State Judicial System of the type
exclusive to the Indiana Supreme Court; in conjunction with the
Federal Injunction from the cases of Gresk and Barnard and
outside jurisdiction or basis in law.
4. That Judge Stephen Spindler Ordered the drafting of
evidence of a joint effort between State and Federal Government
to discriminate against Perry, marked 1 ly in the record of
this case by the reference to; and the drafting of a twin set of
injunctions designed to deprive Perry of the use of the judicial
of the State Law of Indiana Code § 33-2-3-1 and LC. § 34-5-2-1
requireing a person to be a licensed attomey to practice law in
the Courts within the State of Indiana. (No consideration under
that distorted color of State Law for the right of a person to
appear pro se.) Post-judgment motion for relief from judgment
should have been immediate.
8. Add then the killing of Perry's two friends that were to be
‘witnesses; the attempted killing of Perry by the Noble County
Sheriff Deputies ordered by Judge Spindler; the fear that all of
records of the case by the Clerk. [7.]
REFERENCE TO RECORD OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED
FOR REVIEW:
1. The primary issue on appeal is the lack of jurisdiciton of
any kind by first, Judge Stephen Spindler and second by Special
Judge J. Scott VanDerbeck.
The record is very altered and distorted in relation to the issue
of jurisdiction and motion to dismiss, with the first document
filed by Perry, which was an objection to the case being filed in
Noble County instead of Allen County, and that document was
totally removed from the record. The second document filed by
Perry was his response to the complaint of Curtis, wherein his
motion to dismiss stated lack of jurisdiction, record p. 590 1 1.
also p. 593 first paragraph, also hearings p. 443, 454 Ls 14,20;
see cross-complaint record, p. 579 first paragraph. and p. 589.
With the issues of no jurisdiction omitted from the
there are still references to that issue see pp. 253,254, (333 here
shows Judge knew he was outside his jurisdiction) 373, 443,
526.
2. But in addition to the above paragraph 1., neither Judge
Spindler nor Special Judge VanDerbeck nor the Indiana
Supreme Court would rule on the issues of jurisdiction, with
Perry making the point very clear in his post-judgment motion
for relief from judgment, record pp. 133-142, at 137 and again in
his post judgment motion to correct errors, pp. 231-238, at 231 1
2., and 232 third paragraph, before Special Judge J. Scott
issue the injunction of the type Judge Spindler placed on Perry,
oe
eee poe ‘,
record pp. 144-148, patterned after the injunction placed on
Perry by the U.S. District Court Judge John Daniel Tinder. See
record, verified application for permanent injunction pp. 614-
642 at 628-642, (see also docket, record p. 23 I third on page
See record, motion to correct errors, p. 232 {1 3. Both injunctions
are constructed contrary to the purpose setforth by law for
injunctions; are unconstitutional to the United States Constitution
Amendment XIV and the Indiana Constitution, Article L § 12;
and both injunctions are intended for an evil and illegal purpose
that disrupts the exercise of due process in both the Federal and
State judicial systems. Both should be struct down as being un-
constitutional and issued outside the jurisdiction of each
respective court's jurisdiction. The Injunction of this imstance
case, failed to be placed based on any stated laws or tried facts.
:
:
:
e
?
i
’
by the Clerk.
6. Notice that reference to the case of Perry v. Gresk is part
of the Court's order to draft an injunction im a like fashion to the
injunction related to Gresk. See docket entry, record Vol. I, p. 23,
3rd i; also verified application for permanent injunction, record
Vol. IIL, pp. 614-634, at 628-631. This is the history that
establishes the State practiced policy of discrimination against
layman Perry as pro se in a demonstrated calloused disregard for
Perry's civil rights. (E.g. Jones v. State, 449 N.E.2d 1060 (Ind.
1983) it goes all the way back to the appeal of Spencer County
Coop vs. Lloyd G. Perry and Judge Paul Buchanon's statement
that layment pro se will get nowhere in the Indiana Court Of
Appeals and then the Clerk of Lawrence County refused to
produce the record and no order could be had to cause the record
to be sent to the Court of Appeals.(S. Apdx.)
-1 FACT; the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Judgment (record VolLIIL, pp. 642,643) This document is
completely void of any tried fact, cites no statutes or case law at
all, gives no cited legal support of any action the Court was
taking in it's judgment or placement of the injunction. The Noble
Superior Court and Judge Stephen Spindler Ordered a proposed
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment (record Vol.
Il. p. 468 Ls 9 thru 20) which now serves as Prima Facie
Evidence of lack of any bases in law; lack of due process of law;
lack of jurisdiction to place the injunction and lack of subject
matter jurisdiction and lack of personal jurisdiction. See e.g.
Trial Procedure Rule 52(A)(1), (2) & (3) and Smith v. Miller
Builders, Inc., 741 N.E.2d 731 (Ind. App. 2000) and Scott v.
Crussen, 741 N.E.2d 743 (Ind. App. 2000) also Couchman v.
Restoration Contractors, Inc. 743 N.E.2d 346 (Ind. App. 2001)
also Lynn v. Windridge Co-Owners [9.] Ass'n Inc. 743 N.E.2d
305 (Ind. App. 2001)
2 The question of fact as to self defense was never tried
by court or jury, only mis-stated by attorney Stephen Lerch in
relation to Perry's affirmative defense (see defense, record Vol.III
pp 591 last paragraph and 592 paragraph numbered 4.; there
were no laws or statutes cited in support of any findings; nor
were there any laws or statutes cited in support of placing the
injunction nor bond required against objections by Perry;
therefore as a matter of law the judgment and injunction must be
reversed on the bases of totally erronous; lacking foundation in
- 10. -
a Pee eT eS ee
law and fact; was arbitrary and capricious with anger, malice,
prejudice and discrimination all present. (Id.)
caught the Co-op officers and their attorneys in a series of false
statement. The case was attempted to be appealed and in the pre-
appeal hearing Judge Paul Buchanon stated to Perry that he did
not care what any atlorney did or what crime they have
committed if the issue is brought by a non licensed attorney
(layman pro se) and that a pro se litigant will get nowhere in the
Indiana Court of Appeals. This started the State practiced policy
of discrimination against pro se litigants as relates to Perry and
his cases. Without consideration of the fact that Perry was unable
that involved the embezzlement of Perry's money and the cover-
up of that embezzlement by Perry's own retained attorney, Paul
State Court Systems to protect Gresk and others from recourse
by Perry, as a shield to either civil or criminal actions.
3. To make it work, the subject matter had to be consistent
through out. That ment that the subject matter of the Gresk
(Bamard) imjunction had to be duplicated in the State Court of
the same offenses of altered records; tampering with witnesses;
using false and fabricated documents; theft of documents;
perjured testimony; altered transcripts of hearings and/or
depositions; extra-judicial contact with the judge, all had to be
duplicated to get the issues into a State Court Injunction, (that
was accomplished in this case of Curtis v. Perry) so as to prevent
Perry's use of those defenses or assertions in the litigation
process. With those conditions stated in the injunctions the
opposing counsels had free will to use any and all parts of those
illegal methods to defeat Perry because Perry could not use any
of those issues without breach of the injunction, if that attorney
was on the injunction. As a result, false claims were filed by
many of those named attorneys; the stated methods were and are
used to gain judgments and Perry is powerless to defend against
the prejudice it invokes or the effect those fraud uses have on
the merits of a case.
2. In the case of Perry v. Tell City National Bank and
George Astrike, Perry retained either 12 or 13 attorneys at fees
from $500. to $1500. each to bring the Tort Business
Interference With A Business Relationship case against the said
bank and it's president, and others. Each time the attorneys
would either do nothing or sell out to the bank side, leaving Perry
without representation and the loss of the retainer. (History
exhibits are in Seperate Appendix)
3. Paul D. Gresk was one of those attorneys that was paid
$1500. retainer to sue said bank and it's president, Kelco Inc.,
Kelco of Indiana Inc., Roger West and several bonding
companies for the said business interference and breach of
contract. (see for yourself the conflicts in the documents within
the separate appendix) (see also Buchanon statements)
4. After nearly a year of waiting on Gresk to file, Perry in
disgust, filed his own suite against the said bank and it's president
only to find in the discovery process that Gresk had been to the
bank, had given that bank and the others he was to have sued,
assignments of interests of an amount in total of $600,000.00, a
part of which ($125,000.00) the bank president, George Astrike
- 12, -
cause Gresk to make restitution to Perry for the theft of Perry's
money, and likewise for the others involved and named in the
Gresk case, to make restitution. Tinder will preside over subject
of justice, altered court records, perjured testimony, false sworn
its and
likewise the public at large and therefore raises the challenge to
the constitutionality of the State Statutes of Indiana Code § 33-2-
3-1 and Indiana Code § 34-5-2-1. Because the Indiana Supreme
Court has not protected Perry nor the public at large and have
taken affirmative steps to insure that an attorney or judge is
protected and shielded from disciplinary action; civil liability;
criminal prosecution, even when the actions of that attorney or
serie aiadhnn ths tome of 4:Chaab Ac tbban; otis Gapmiadla ten
eee are brought by a layman pro se.
The State Injunction (record Vol. L. pp. 143, 149) the
- 14,-
judicial processes, 10 Perry's detriment and that of the public at
large, contrary to the legal duty of the Indiana Supreme Court to
protect Perry and likewise the pulbic at large as a furtherance of
it's legal duty under the United States Constitution Article IIL,
Section 2., clauses 1 & 2. Herein lies the liability of the State of
6. From the case of Perry v. Barnard came the attorney
Theadore Lockyear, counsel for the then current and immediate
trouble for Perry through the Intemational Union Of Operating
Engineers, Local #103 by starting a rumor that was both
slanderous and libles to Perry. This lead to the case .
Fox Contractors Inc. filed in the Allen Circuit Court, which
injunction to prevent further damage to Perry and his reputation.
First the injunction was granted then withdrawn under the
- 15. -
(see separate appndx. Docket)
8. The evidence that Perry had, which included the letters
from the National Labor Relations Board, signed affidavits from
some witnesses were stripped from the Perry files imtrusted to
serves as the approximate cause of the fight between Perry and
Curtis. Under a series of abuses of power by the use of sanctions
as threats, the attorney mis-conduct was a factor in Perry's not
case, evidenced by the deliberate filing of the Curtis complaint in
the wrong Court in Noble County, while the Fox complaint was
still active in the Allen Circuit Court.
11. In additon to this is the fact that the attomey William
file. Lerch is the common thread in each and every instance of
wrong doing in both the Curtis and the Fox cases, and with each
2001) and asked if Mr. Groth represented just the said Union.
The answer was no. That he serves [15.] all sides at various
-17.-
capacity for the agency. Then the question was asked, what
about the issue of conflict of interest. She said, there is none.
.1 I believe this to be a determinative, meritorious fact
(record Vol. IL, p 314 Ls 14 to 21;
start on p. 312 L 6 on thru p. 315) that justice was obstructed by
Lerch and Groth and the records of Mr. Groth's appearance will
Perry because of their conflict of interests and that obstruction
was present in the issues Perry took to the various agencies
before suite was filed in the Fox case; and which then brought in
even more conflict of interest and undue influence when attoney
Stephen Lerch came im, as said above; which was the
approximate cause for the distruction of the records m those
agencies and the reversal of the positions those agencies had first
taken, as reflected by the history of Mr. Lerch's unethical and
Appeals, in this case, has reflected. This includes the Indiana
Civil Rights Commission. (see cross-complaint Vol. IL pp 581 1
#2 thru all 582).
13. The final poit to be made is that in the document
entitled Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law and Judgment
(Vol. III, pp. 642,643) there is no statement of true facts or any
issue tried by the court or presented to a jury, in a jury requested
case. More importantly, there is no law cited in this document at
all; nothing in the form of law supports the Court's actions;
nothing supports or even gives grounds for the issueing of the
imjunction against Perry or for the judgment im a case of pleaded
self-defense. (a question of fact to be determmed by a jury.) The
judgment, the injunction and the document entitled Findings of
Facts and Conclusions of Law and Judgment are totally void of
any law or fact that supports the action of the Court. This
supports Perry's clearly stated fact that the decisions were made
arbitrarily, capriciously, with malice and anger, motivated by the
State practiced policy of discrimination against layman pro se
litigants and conclusively shows the Court had no jurisdiction to
act at all, and no jurisdiction to act as it did.
- 18. -
SUMMARY STATEMENT OF THE CASE:
1. The statement of facts deals more specifically with the
merits of this case but this case of Curtis v. Perry grew out of a
case pending in Allen Circuit Court of Perry v. Fox Contracting
Inc. et al. It was an issue of slander and lible and a petition for
preliminary and permanent injunctive relief. The injunction was
denied. The slander conditions grew worse and lead to a fight on
a Union Job site in Delaware County, between Perry and Curtis.
Curtis sued. [16.]
2. Asa form of self-defense, Perry struck Curtis to stop the
slander and the risks that the slander presented to Perry's welfare.
Curtis sued for damages from the hit.
3. The opposing counsels in the case of Perry v. Fox, while
the case was active at the same time as the Curtis case, used
various forms of criminal methods to cause Perry to dismiss his
case or be sanctioned. The sanctions were to be imposed for non
production of documents; documents that the same attorneys
together with my own attomey Karen Walker stripped from my
files in the short time in which she represented Perry in the Fox
case.
4. The attorney misconduct carried over from the Fox case
to the Curtis case. Two of Perry's friends, as witnesses, got killed
to prevent their testifying. Threats and intimidation toward other
co-workers caused fear for their lives and Perry feared for their
lives and also his own. The result was that Perry could not
conduct discovery because of the risks and of the fear of more
harm.
5. Judge Spindler would not do a thing to help Perry to get
protection for his witnesses nor would he sanction the attorneys
(Lerch in particular) for their criminal conduct im the
proceedings, nor grant an injunction. In stead he had extra
judicial contact with Lerch and others and knowingly proceeded
outside his jurisdiction and refused to dismiss the Curtis case or
to transfer the case to Allen County or elsewhere. To add to all of
this, the Noble Superior Court Clerk kept altering and tampering
with the records of the case making presentment of the issues
almost impossible because of the absence of the information
missing from the record.
6. Summary Judgment was granted to each and all of the
int defendants and to the plaintiff on August 2,
1991, citing no facts that had been tried by the court or by jury in
a case requesting trial by jury; nor were there any case laws or
- 19, -
statutes cited in the findings of facts and conclusion of law.
7. The injunction was placed by reference to an junction
against Perry from a U.S. District Court set of cases of Perry v.
Gresk and Perry v. Bamard. (see statement of facts section) The
injunction restricted, regulated and barred Perry's access to the
U.S. District Court on the bases that Perry could not sue any of
the parties named in the injunction; Perry could not sue anyone
for the same subject matter at issue in the Gresk or Barnard cases.
.1 Both cases of Gresk and Barnard were dealing with the
issues of criminal methods being used in the judicial processes to
gain a judgment against Perry.
.2 One of the main issues in both Gresk and Barnard was
attorney Paul D. Gresk's aiding in the embezzlement and cover
up of that embezzlement of $125,000. of Perry's money, while
retamed by Perry and during the same time period Gresk was to
bring suit against the same bank and president that had
embezzled the money. Gresk proceeded, without Perry's
knowledge [17.] or consent, to assign away Perry's money
earned under contracts, to this same bank and others Gresk was
to sue for Perry. The total theft was right at $600,000.00. Perry's
many Federal and State cases have been filed in an effort to get
that money and other losses and damages back.
.3 However, this post-judgment motion for relief from
judgment has been brought on by the endless set of law suits
against Perry; which make bogus claims, then they present one or
the other of the injunctions and the judgment goes to the false
claim because of the prejudice the injunction has caused. There is
no justice with the shield the injunction puts up, that will not
allow Perry to show with any effect the facts that the claims are
false and the evidence used to support the claims are false and
fabricated. In addition to the law suits are the issues of the
constant stalking of Perry to disrupt his businesses and any
income. They just will not leave Perry alone.
4 The case of Perry v. Bamard, is a suit against the
Nominating Study Commission for refusing to discipline Gresk
and others in a like position, and refusal to order restitution to
Perry. Corrupt influence by Senator Richard Lugar was the bases
of the non discipline, non public protection, no protection to
Perry, on the basis that Gresk was Lugar's chief staff attorney at
the time.
- 20. -
8. The post-judgment, order reads as follows: (record Vol.
L. pp. 220,221)
ORDER
The Court, having taken under advisement all pending issues
and after review of the pleadings, now finds:
1. There is no substantial evidence presented by which the
official court records should be amended beyond the Court Order
of February 25, 2000.
2. The Court further finds that an Order Enjoining Defendant
and Cross-Plaintiff Perry was entered by this Court on August 2,
1991.
3. That no appeal was taken of the 1991 Order.
4. That a Petition of Permanent Writ of Mandamus and
Prohibition and a Petition for Emergency Writ was filed by
Defendant, Perry, with the Indiana Supreme Court and was
dismissed on February 25, 2000.
5. That Defendant, Perry, has not carried his burden to show
the Court any mistake, excusable neglect, newly discovered
evidence or fraud as required by T.R. 60(b). Accordingly, his
Motion for Relief from Judgment filed December 12, 1999 is
hereby denied.
6. The Defendant is further advised of his right to appeal this
decision as provided by T.R. 60(C).
7. All further petitions and motions contained withm the
record, if any may exist, are hereby denied.
SO ORDERED THIS 28th day of June, 2000
Perry [18.]
- 21. -
V. STATEMENT OF FACTS RELATED TO THE ISSUES:
1. In each of the previous four sections of this brief are
stated facts that form the basis of the Jurisdiction; the Statement
Of
The Issues; the Statement Of The Case and by reference to
each and all four sections of L, I, IL, and IV., Perry now
Mcorporates those sections into this section V. in their full and
2. In view of the importance of this Appellant's Motion For
Relief From Lower Court Judgment, filed in this Indiana Court of
Appeals on March 27, 2001 and the said Court of Appeals
denied the immediate relief, Perry by reference to that said
Motion For Relief From Lower Court Judgment with it's
with attached affidavit in support of motion to correct the record:
now by reference to that said Relief Motion, incorporates into this
section of this brief as if fully written herein, with full force and
effect, with all of it's cited and documented facts.
3. The total of all the facts in all five sections combines into
two main issues; (A) the toatal lack of jurisdiction of Noble
Superior Court over any part of the case and any issue therein:
(B) that justice has long been denied Perry because of the long
standing State practiced policy of discrimination against layman
pro se Perry under color of State Law and is the direct cause of
long suffering, deprived civil and human rights, which includes
deprived due process and deprived equal protection of the law to
name a couple. These are established facts gleaned from the long
history of suit filings in the United States District Courts and also
in the Indiana State Courts as cited and stated within this brief.
This fact is then amplified by first the Federal imjunction
presented m ihe State Court hearing July 15, 1991, record Vol. IL.
p. 427 and miroduced under motion for sanctions by attomey
Leonard Eilbacher who had been im the case and had been
using criminal methods in procedure. See p. 439 also pp.
468,469, 470. See also verified application for permanent
injunction by Eilbacher with attachments of Federal Order of
myunction, Federal Injunction, Seventh Circuit Order, see record
es
OE ee ee ee ee eee
Vol. IIL. pp 614 thru 634.
4. Judge Spindler granted the injunction and with a broad
brush, would include anyone in that injunction that requested to
be there. Clear evidence of the said discrimination, abuse of
power and intended denial of due process in cases that might be
forth comming. See record, Vol. IL., pp 469, Ls 19-25. [19.]
FACTS OF FRAUD:
1. Objection to Curtis case being filed in Noble Superior
Court was removed from the record of the case but was also the
subject matter in Perry Motion to Dismiss as a response. See
record, M. To Dismiss, Vol. IIL., p. 590 {| 1. and p. 593 {i 1st)
2. Evidence that attorney Lerch and Judge Spindler knew
the case was in the wrong Court when Lerch tried to dismiss the
Allen Circuit Court Case by motion in the Noble Superior Court
case. Record, Vol. IL, pp 433-435, at 433 Ls 13-24 and p. 434
Ls 1-25 thru p. 436. See also April 17, 1991 hearing, record Vol.
IL pp. 312 thru 316, Ls 23-25 also pp. 339-341 Court mes to bail
Lerch out and at the same time knows the case is m the wrong
Court.
3. Attorney Stephen Lerch had conflict of interests that
disrupted both the Labor Board and the Indiana Civil Rights
Commissions freedom to conduct a fair process. Record, hearmg
April 17, 1991, Vol. IL p. 314 Ls 15-21 also all of p. 312 thru
315 with procedure error on p. 316.
4. Attorney Stephen Lerch failed to notify Perry of the
hearing date of November 4, 1992, in Lerch's efforts to extort a
signed agreed judgment from Perry over a year after the final
judgment was entered on Augusi 2, 1991. See sequence of
events as follows:
A. Perry was afraid for his life, from all of the kiling and
of Vol. IL but with emphasis on the threat by Lerch cited by
Perry, stating that Lerch would make Perry disappear. see record
Vol. IL, p. 281 Ls 12,13.
B. That the hearing of paragraph A above was an
Emergency hearing held April 17, 1991 whereby Perry was
rumning out of time and needed the information from the
discovery imterrogatories to Curtis, which was the names
addresses and phone numbers of certain Union members. Curtis
and attorney Stephen Lerch and Local #103 refused to cooperate
«ft. .
in the discovery and produce that information so that suimpoenas
could be issued. Judge Spimdler found every way but the night
way to let Perry have that information and to sanction Curtis and
Lerch for the non cooperation. Many of the statements made by
Perry are omitted and altered. See record Vol. IL, p. 261, Ls 8
thru 19. No sanctions for Lerch but plenty for Perry.
Employment disruption was a factor then as it is now and
prevented vaniations of discovery that would otherwise be
available io Perry. Also the problem of fear was the subject of
the majority of that same hearing. Obstructions by means of fear
from two killings, non cooperation in discovery and extortion
ee ee ee
FACTS SHOW PATTERN OF EXTORTION:
Perry tells Special Judge J. Scott VanDerbeck that the reason
he did not appeal the case of Curtis after final judgment was
because of fear. Record Hearing Feb. 25, 2000, Vol. IIL. p. 523
all. The same was true cf the Allen Circuit Court case of Perry v.
Fox, dismissed under duress. ( record Vol. I, p 461 L 4) The
followig events shows the pattern of extortion to gain the agreed
judgment in Curtis and a like set of circumstances im the Perry v.
Fox case in Allen County:
1. Vol IL, p 433 LS 13 thru Ls 25 of p. 437, shows that
Allen County Circuit Court still had jurisdiction and attomey
Stephen Lerch (plaintiff counsel) was asking Noble County
Superior to dismiss the Allen County Circuit Court case. Implied
acknowledgement that the jurisdiction of the matters was in Allen
County,by Lerch.
2. Vol. IL p. 264, Ls 2 thru Ls 24 p. 275. Perry has
requested an Emergency Hearing, and was requesting an
injunction. The statements specifically saying anything about an
myunction on Perry's behalf have been omitted. Further Perry is
also asking for sanctions for the non co-operation by Lerch and
others. The statements as to request for sanctions have also been
omitted. Nothing that Perry presents to the Court is bad enough
to have the Court take appropriate action on Perry's behalf.
Action is always taken for the opposing side only and always.
Perry repeatedly states and implies, the Allen Circuit Court case
was dismissed under duress. Perry is denied relief.
In Fox and im Curtis, sanctions requested by Lerch was lever
is
ee
eel oo
used for dismissal. In Fox after Perry's documents and evidence
had been stolen and Perry could not produce pursuant to the
Court's Order, Lerch ask for and received an Order for sanctions
if the documents he aided in stealing from Perry, joimt with
Karen Walker, were not produced. see cross-complt. record Vol.
Ill p. 584 all. Perry was denied an injunction. Vol. Il. pp
379,380.
3. Lerch and the other cross-defendants filed for sanctions
and motion for summary judgment, received in the hearing July
15, 1991, Vol. IL pp. 453 thru 462. No consideration was given
to Perry and his conditions of threats, intimidation and killing of
4. In the hearing of November 4, 1992, Lerch has asked for
a second sei of sanctions, again the sanctions are requested and
this time notice of the hearing was not served. See record Vol. I,
pp 473 thru 477 see also letters Vol. I, pp 61; 62; 79; 80; 83; 85.
In these many letters you see Lerch communicate with Judge
Spindler and making note of the fact that settlement was in
progress, but the sanctions are held over Perry's head by an
Order from a hearing Perry was not properly serviced on. The
Order on pages 80,81 of Vol IL. grants the sanctions. Perry
received the information from the Court giving the sanctions
dated November 12, 1992, record Vol. L. pp 82 thru 89. [21.]
On Nov. 24, 1992, Perry files a response to that Court Order
of November 12, asking for an extension of time to respond:
Moves to set aside the judgment dated 11/12/92; see record
docket Vol. L p. 27 entry 11/24/92, moves for a protective
order; affidavit in support of protective order. Perry's pattern of
service, unless disrupted for some reason, is to file and
personally serve the same day as the filing took place.
On Nov. 25, 1992, Lerch again files for his third set of
sanctions against Perry and requests a continuance. record Vol. I.
pp. 90,91. A second request for continuance by Lerch is filed
March 1, 1993 stating a settlement agreement has been reached,
record Vol. L p 92. But there was no agreement signed untill
July 15, 1993 as reflected in the Order of Judgment on page 94
of Vol L But the agreement or consent to judgment was the
agreement at issue in the motion to set aside the judgment filed
on November 24, 1992 as being one and the same but reqritten
to reflect the earlier date of February 24, 1993 but note Lerch
told the Court March 20, 1992, that the agreement had been
; Perry's motion to set aside
reached. Vol. L. p 92 but the Order of Judgment submitted by
Lerch is submitted on July 15, 1993 Vol. L. p 94; consent to
Judgment on p. 95 is also submitted on July 15, 1993 but post
dated as being February 24, 1993, p. 95. Perry clearly wasbemg
forced and Perry was not cooperating in the extortion efforts of
Lerch against Perry.
5. The pattern here is clearly to get im the position of
sanctions and then through the threats of further sanctions and
bodily harm, force Perry to go against his will.
It clearly was Perry's intent to appeal these matters. record
Vol. IL. p 280 Ls 12 thru p. 281.
It was also clear that Lerch had threatened Perry (threat is
omitted from transcript) but Perry repeats the threat to the Court.
record hearing April 17, 1991, Vol. IL. p. 281 Ls 12,13
6. The further threats made by Lerch outside the Court was
of the nature of what he could do im the courts because it should
pp 635 thru 637 and compare to pari statement (though altered
and appearing out of sequence to the truth compare to statements
made m record hearing July 15, 1991, Vol. I, ll 463 Ls 19 thru
p. 467 L 25. [22]
FACTS OF NO JURISDICTION:
co Perry's response as motion to dismiss and the missing
matter. See cross-complaint, Vol. II. p. 579 all. also Motion to
dismiss Vol. IIL. p. 590 | 1. and 593 all.
-.
2. Perry, under Trial Rule 12 was obligated to file his cross-
complaint which requested a disciplinary setting, See C.Complt.
record. Vol. IIL p. 589. Judge Spindler was obligated to transfer
the mandatory cross-complaint to the Indiana Supreme Court
under Trial Rule 75(A) & (B) or at least back to Allen Circuit but
he made no transfer at all and would not cooperate in the transfer
of the Allen Circuit Court case to Noble county. see record
hearing April 17, 1991, Vol. I. p. 254 all, p. 265 all, pp. 268,269
all. Record docket Vol. I. p. 19 date 3/16/91.
3. That on July 15, 1991 Judge Spindler granted summary
judgment and imyunctive relief for the plaintiff and cross-
defendants. see record, hearing July 15, 1991, Vol. IL pp
426,427
which means Judge Spindler passed judgment on the disciplinary
issues, which are reserved for the Indiana Supreme Court and it is
an area in which he has no jurisdiction what so ever.
4. Long before the July 15, 1991 hearing, Perry had served
a disqualification affidavit on Judge Spindler but like all
pertment evidence im this case, the filing and service of the
disqualification affidavit is not shown anywhere except im the
July 15, 1991 hearing, which is long after the Judge had received
the disqualification. (No entry shows on the docket) The
transcript of that hearing is not accurate and is altered. Judge
Spindlers jurisdiction was not restored untill 2/28/92 See record
VoL IL p. 427 Ls 10-20; p. 426, Ls 17-25; p. 427 Ls 1-7. The
Indiana Supreme Court did not order Judge Spindler to resum
jurisdiction untill February 28, 1992. See Letter, record Vol. II.
pp 639-641. Therefore Judge Spindler was acting as Judge and
making his decisions while under disqualification. This includes
Judge Spindlers orders to search Perry (record hearing July 15,
1991, pp 463 thru 471; and to have the Noble County Sheriff
Deputies kill Perry by pushing him down the strairs. Record,
Letter to Commissioners Vol. IIL. pp 635-637.
Compare the statements made in the hearing to the Letter to
the Commissioners and know that the transcript has been altered.
When all of the facts are tallied, the results are clear, that the
case was filed m the wrong court and that Judge Spindler had no
jurisdiction of any kind to make his judgments and place the
myunction.
5. When you look at the Ordered findings of fact and
conclusions of law. See open court order for drafting, hearing
- 27.-
July 15, 1991, Vol. I. pp 468 Ls 6-19 and all of p. 469 See
[23.] document finding: of facts and conclusions of law and
judgment signed by Judge Spindler. record Vol.IIL p. 642,643,
you find that there are no facts that were tried by the court or by
Jury in a case demanding trial by jury. You also find there is no
ciation of any law of any kind showing a bases for the judgment.
The only thing that is there is mis-stated facts from Perry's
affirmative defenses that raises a question of fact as relates to self
defense, which was never tried. See record. Perry's motion to
dismiss as response to Curtis Complaint, Vol. IIL pp. 591 2.
under answers to specific paragraphs, and all of the top half of
page 592. This also serves as evidence of denial of equal
protection that results in self help and more damages to Perry
because of the said State practiced policy of discrimination
against Perry as a layman pro se litigant. Where is the equal
protsction and where is justice in these circumstances? More
importantly, where is the Indiana Supreme Courts protection as
their legal duty as forthsaid above?
VL SUMMARY ARGUMENT:
1. In the Order by Special Judge J. Scott VanDerbeck, of
Noble Superior Court on page 18 above, is stated that
"Defendant, Perry has not carried his burden to show the Court
Court.
5. In summary, collective facts and statements contained
withm this appellant's brief give rise to two issues: (A.)
Jurisdiction; and (B.) State practiced policy of discrimination
agamst Perry as layman pro se litigant. Standard of review,
"Totally Erroneous" and “Obstructed Justice”.
Vi. ARGUMENTS:
A. JURISDICTION
1. To determine if the Noble Superior Court had jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the case of Curtis v. Perry and the
cross-complaint of Perry v. Curtis et al., we look first to the [24.]
document entitled finding of facts and conclusions of law.
(record Vol. Ill. p. 642,643) see Georgetown Bd. of Zoning
Appeals v. Keele 743 N.E.2d 301 (Ind. App. 2001) Then we
look at the Injunction (record Vol. L pp 144 thru 148) And then
at the cross-complaint (record Vol. Il. pp 578 thru 589) also In
re Guardianship of K.T., ( Infra) Jurisdiction as applies to types
and subject matter. This Court of Appeals will have to determine
the law, if any is to be applied because the injunction; the finding
of facts and conclusions of law contain no law of any type or
form. This is the first indication of no jurisdiction because they
have no legal basis as reference for any action.
2. From page 642 under finding of fact, paragraph 2. states
the occurance took place in Delaware County on a job site
(Union Job Site) paragraph 3. and 4. states that Perry struck
Curtis but without cause and with malice and it was willful. This
is contrary to Perry's affirmative Csfenses which states Perry
acted in a form of self defense. (record Vol. IIL.,pp 591 {1 2. and
top half of 592. This raises a triable issue of fact on materail
pomts at issue. Was it self defense? see Mickens (infra) Burden
of proof shifts. This issue was never tried; But then how could
they try it without a legal base in which to form an opinion?
3. Under conslusions of law page 643, paragraphs 1. and 2.
see Mickens v. State, 742 N.E. 2d 927 (Ind.App. 2001) self
defense shifts proof to State to prove, but State is not party.
4 and 5 make reference to the documents and
Paragraphs
specific designated parts gets no summary judgment.
4. Under Judgment. Paragraph 1. Court grants Curtis
Summary Judgment. Paragraph 2. find that Perry is liable to
Curtis for imtentional tort and intentional battery. Paragraph
states that the only remaining issue is the amount of damages due
and owing from defendant to plaintiff. see Hughs v. City of
Gary, 741 N.E.2d 1168 (Ind. App. 2001) also Shenvar v.
Johnson, 741 N.E. 2d 1275 (Ind. App. 2001) Findings of facts
are clearly erroneous and mistake has been made.
5. No where in there document of conclusions of law, is
there stated or cited any basis in law. The facts, which they fail
to specifically, references, are mis-construed statements from
Perry's affirmative defenses. see Boczar v. Reuben 742 N.E.2d
1010 (ind. App. 2001) designations of evidence must be specific
and specifically referenced for summary judgment. This was not
done. Without the law, where is the jurisdiction? see In re
Edition,
United States ‘Constitution Amendment VI. Black's Law
Dictionary 6th Edition p. 1646, requires that the person be
processed in the State and District where the offense occured and
a compulsary process for witnesses to his favor be made
hearing April 17,1991, Vol. I pp 250-
ing for those witnesses but that help
T.R. 75(B) required the case to be
the Allen Circuit Court case of Perry v. Fox but
do .
judgments and injunction are void.
7. When we examine the cross-complaint, Vol. II, pp 578-
589 we see on page 589 a specific request for a disciplinary
setting. Under T.R. 12, Perry was obligated to file the cross-
complaint but Judge Stephen Spindler was obligated under T.R.
75(B) to transfer the case to the Indiana Supreme Court because
the issues were criminal in nature and would be actionable under
Indiana Code § 34-47-2-3, Assulting, influencing or intimidating
witnesses: LC. § 35-44-3-4, Obstruction of Justice; and LC. § 35-
45-2-1, Intimidation. See statement of facts section of this brief
for all the offenses that took place in the Curtis case and see
record, cross-complaint, Vol. II, pp. 578-589 for all offenses
committed in the Perry v. Fox case. These all fall under the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Indiana Supreme Court and it's night
to discipline, dis-barr, restrict and regulate attorneys and judges
licensed to practice law in this State. See Indiana Code § 33-2-3-
1: Burns Ind. Statutes,1997 replmnt. pp. 113,114; LC. § 34-
5-2-1: Indiana Constitution Article IL. § 1. Burns Ind. Statutes,
Const. 1997 repimnt. p. 204 and Article VII. § 4. Burns Indiana
Statutes, Const. 1997 replmnt p. 30 Accordingly, the judgments
and imjunction should be dismissed for lack of subject matier
jurisdiction. See record, motion to dismiss,Vol. IIL., pp 590 1.,
hearing went. see record, hearing July 15, 1991 VoL IL. pp 421 L
25 and p. 422 see also p. 413 Ls 13-14 there Judge Spindler
admitts he has no authority to make the needed corrections or
give the needed help. Then, later in the same hearing he granted
-31.-
the plaintiff and cross-defendants summary judgment and placed
the injunction on Perry. Record Vol. II. pp 426,427.
9. There can be no jurisdiction found for Judge Spindler
and the Noble Superior Court in these circumstances. Without
jurisdiction for Judge Spindler, the change of judge to Special
Judge J. Scott VanDerbeck, made no difference because that
Noble Superior Court could not get jurisdiction. When Perry filed
his motion for relief from judgment in the lower court, the relief,
21A Fed Proc. L Ed § 51:166 (1999 Ed)
Void Judgment, general, pp 438, 439
[T]he right to relief from a void judgment is absolute and
not a matter within the Court's discretion, Nor do the time
limitations applicable generally to FRCP 60(b) ordinarily
apply to motions seeking relief from voidness, and the
moving party need not show diligence in seeking to
Overturn the judgment or a meritorious defense. (citing
from 5th Circuit e.g. Brazosport Towing co. v. 3,838 Tons
of Sorghum (1984, SD Texas) 607 F. Supp 11, affid
without op (CA5 Tex) 790 F2d 891 State Law e.g. In re
Guardianship of K.T. 743 N.E. 2d 348 (Ind. App 2001)
21A Fed Proc. L Ed § 51:167 (1999 Ed)
What Judgments are void pp. 439, 441 at 440 Jast 5 lines
on 44]
[RJather, judgments are void only if the court lacked
- 32. -
jurisdiciton of either the parties or the subject matter,
entered a decree not within the powers granted to it by law,
or if the judgment was entered in violation of due process
of law; or as is [27 sometime stated, if the court's action in
rendering judgment beyond its scope of authority amounts
to a plain usurpation of power (citing United States v. Zima
(1985 CA7 Ind.) 766 F.2d 1153, also citing Hoult v. Hoult
(1995 CA1 Mass) 57 F.3d 1. also citing Schwartz v. U.S.
(1992) (CA4 Md) 976 F.2d 213 at 217 col. 1.1 [2] State
Law e.g. In re Guardianship of K.T. 743 N.E.2d 348 (Ind.
App. 2001) also Foor v. Town of Hebron, 742 N.E.2d 545
(Ind. App 2001)
Jurisdiction of Indiana Supreme Court as relates to
arguments A and B in this Brief
Exclusive Jurisdiction Of Indiana Supreme Court, citing
Indiana Code § 33-2-3-1 (1997 Ed.) pp. 113, 114 Sec. 1
Sec. 1. The Supreme Court of this state shall have
exclusive jurisdiction to admit attorneys to practice law in
all courts of the state and exclusive jurisdiction to issue
restraining orders and injunctions in all cases involving the
unauthorized practice of the law under such rules and
regulations as it may prescribe.
Indiana Constitution Article VII. § 4. Burns Ind. Statutes,
Const. (1997 Ed) p. 30
Article VIL., § 4, Jurisdiciton of Supreme Court
The Supreme Court shall have no original jurisdiction
except in admission to the practice of law; discipline or
disbarment of those admitted; the unauthorized practice of
law; discipline, removal and retirement of justices and
judges; supervision of the exercise of jurisdiction by the
other courts of the State; and issuance of writs necessary or
appropriate in aid of its jurisdiction. the Supreme Court
shall exercise appellate jurisdiction under such terms and
conditions as spedified by rules except that appeals from a
Judgment imposing a sentence of death, life imprisonment
or immprisonment for a term greater than fifty years shall
be taken directly to the Supreme Court. The Supreme
Court shall have, in all criminal cases, the power to review
- 33. -
all questions of law and to review and revise the sentence
imposed. - - As amended - -
As the above cited and quoted State and Federal Laws and
Indiana and United States Constitutional provisions require; the
judgments and injunction must be voided for lack of jurisdiction.
B. ARGUMENT
Through out this brief, in the statement of the case; the
Statement of the issues; the statement of facts and within the
selected parts of the record on appeal setforth in the Table Of
Contents under the title of Catalog, are clear and documented
Statements of attomey and judge fraud, criminal conduct of both
intrinsic and extrinsic forms; tampering with witnesses; tampering
with the record by the Clerk and Court Reporters, all falling
under the heading of obstruction of justice. see Indiana Code §
35-44-3-4, 1999 Ed. pg. 45,46, LC. § 34-47-2-3, 1999 Ed. pp
624,625 all of which are disciplinary issues, but without
corrective measures barred by Court non action.
y At this point, Perry incorporates each and all of those parts
of the record cited in the table of contents notations; and each of
the five sections of this brief, by reference, into this [28.] part of
this brief as if fully written herein with full force and effect to
stand as evidence of a long history of permitted corruption and
criminal activities within the judicial systems of this State Of
Indiana. Such conditions make it next to impossible for Perry's
to present his issues each time.
3. As this compile of evidence shows by document and by
reference; the history of the various types of misconduct by
Court officers and Clerks goes back to the precident established
by two factors; (A) Judge Buchanon's statement that he didn't
care what an attorney did if the issue was brought to the court by
a non licensed attorney (layman pro se); (B) The Indiana
Supreme Court, indirectly supporting this State practiced policy
of discrimination, when in the issues of discipline of Perry's
attorney, Paul D. Gresk and others, the Indiana Supreme Court
refused to discipline or cause restitution to be made to Perry, a
layman pro se litigant. (Jones, infra) .
4. As the history shows by reference to the many Federal and
State cases, no crime is serious enough for the Indiana Supreme
Court or any State Court judge to taken action against the
—.
Sit ak dis ba en ae Oe] ee
l—
attorney or clerk or other judge for their misconduct. Instead, the
Federal District Court in Indianapolis, Indiana and the Noble
Superior Court in Albion, Indiana, placed an injunction on Perry,
barring him from his right to access the Federal and State Courts
for the recovery of the stolen money, loss of personal and real
property and businesses and personal reputations. (Id.) ,
5. This State practiced policy of discrimination is the exact
cause of this Curtis v. Perry case on the basis that the Indiana
Supreme Court set the precedent in both cases of Gresk and
Bamard, that gave the green light to the said corruption in the
judicial systems and resulted in no protection as required by the
Indiana Supreme Court in these conditions; started an un-
throttled usurping of all State and Federal Laws and Rules of
Court and further denied Perry equal protection of the law and
denied Perry due process of law by use of the said State and
Federal Injunctions,which were placed for an illegal (evil)
purpose. Therefore, as a matter of law cited above, (supra p.
28) the judgments and injunctions must be struck down as being
un-constitutional,along with the cited Indiana Code § 33-2-3-1
and I.C. 34-5-2-1 (see Federal Question supra p. 13) see
citations below.
To prove violation of due process clause based on
| discrimination, it must be shown that the discrimination
exists and is a deliberate policy of the State. Jones v. State,
449 N.E.2d 1060 (Ind. App. 1983) see 698 N.E.2d 735
Federal Laws as applies to this case and conditions:
Section 1983 civil rights claim must be based on deliberate
indifference, not on mere inadvertence. Sivard v. Pulaski
County, 995 F.2d 662, 17 F.3d 185 (Ind. 1992) see also
rs v. State of Kansas, 772 F. Supp. 556 (Kansas
1991
Improper motivation is key element to § 1983 action
alleging violation of plaintiff's right to equal protection of
the laws. Houck v. City of Prairie Village, [29] Kansas
912 F. Supp 1428 recons. 950 F.Supp 312; see also Hogue
v. MQS Inspection Inc. 875 F.Supp 714
Where procedural due process is alleged, constitutional
violation actionable under § 1983 is not complete when
- 35. -
deprivation occurs; it is not complete unless and until state
fails to provide due process. Doe v. Sullivan County,
Tenn., 956 F. 2d 545; 113 S,Ct, 187
In relation to this Doe case (Id.), this is consistent with the
opinion of the United States Supreme Court as these issues relate
to Perry's petitions for Writ of Certiorari to the said
Court in the cases of Lloyd G. Perry v. United States Of America
et al., Docket No. 99-310; and Lloyd G. Perry v. Linda K.
Barnard et al., Docket No. 00-241. Perry was told that the issues
had to be presented to the Indiana Supreme Court and/or Indiana
Court Of Appeals, where ever the jurisdiction lays, and if these
high State Courts do not correct the problems, bring the matters
back to the U.S. Supreme Court and they will take care of it.
As it sets right now, the issues of jurisdiction have been
before both the Indiana Supreme Court under an Original Action
February 25, 2000 , (see order supra p. 18 1 4.) and before this
Indiana Court of Appeals March 27, 2001 under Motion For
Relief From Lower Court Judgment; and have been before the
lower Court February 25, 2000 (record Hearing 2/25/00, Vol. III.
pp 507 thru 534. Each and every one of the above mentioned
courts have refused to address the issue of jurisdiction. This is
something that must take place immediately, see all citations
verbatum above that supports this fact, with emphasis on e.g.
Gardianship (supra) and Foor, supra) pp. 27,28.
RELIEF DESIRED:
Defendant, Lloyd G. Perry, respectfully requests an Order
reversing the judgments and injunction of the Curtis case and
cross-complaint. With that Order declaring both the Federal and
State injunctions un-constitutional,(both are in the record) on the
basis of evil intent.
That Perry has submitted to this Court in his motion for relief
complaint in the Curtis v. Perry case are subject to liability for
those damages for an injunction placed for an evil purpose, with
the bulk of the damages to be the obligation of the State Of
Indiana, toward the Three Billion dollars.
That positive and immediate steps will be ordered to protect
the public and Perry, in response to the Federal Question. So
requested with all other just and proper relief in the premises.
é.
Respectfully submi ;
Lloyd Ket <hne ig se
10025 W. 400 S.
Dunkirk, Indiana 47336
Phone (765) 768-9915 [30.]
TABLE OF CONTENTS
SUBJECT PAGE USED:
1. I. Jurisdictional Statement 1.
2. II. StatementOf Issues 2.
a III. Statement Of Cases 2-3
4. IV. Statement Of Facts 3-4
1 V. Summary of Argument 5-6
6. VI. Standard of Review 7
7. HOW 8
8. Second Federal Question +
9. Certificate of word compliance 10
10. Certificate of service 11
11. Order of Indiana Court of Appeals 12-18
NOTICE: Original page numbers are in bold brackets.
[+-]
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
AUTHORITY: PAGE USED:
& Foor v. Town of Hebron, 4,6,7,8
742 N.E. 2d 545 (Ind. App. 2001)
r a G.B. v. State, 715 NE. 2d 951,953 Fe
a Houck v. City of Prairie Village, 4,7
912 F. Supp 1428 Rec. 950 F. Supp 312
4. Huber v. Franklin County Comty School Corp. 3,7
507 N.E. 2d 233,238 (Ind. 1987)
5. In re Guardianship of K.T. 4,6,7,8
743 N.E. 2d 348 (Ind. App. 2001)
6. Jones v. State, 449 N_E. 2d 1060 2.
(Ind. App. 1983) 698 N.E. 2d 735
st Levin v. Levin, 645 N.E. 2d 601, r
604 (Ind. 1994)
8. Mercantile Nat'l Bank Of Ind. v. Teamsters ms
Union Local #142 Pension Fund
668 N.E. 2d 1269,1271 (Ind. App. 1996)
9. Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc. C_A.N.Y. 8.
719 F. 2d 5,17
-38. -
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
AUTHORITY: PAGE USED:
10. Scothorn v. State of Kansas 772 F. Supp. 556 4.
(Kansas 1991)
11. Sivard v. Pulaski County, 995 F. 2d 662, 2,4.
17 F. 3d 185 (Ind. 1992)
12. State v. Lake Superior Court Room 4, B
335 N.E. 2d 199,203
13. United States v. Zima 766 F2d 1153 7.
(1985 CA 7 Ind.)
FEDERAL STATUTES:
1. RICO ACT 18 US.C.A. § 1961 8.
2. RICO ACT 18 U.S.C.A. § 1962 8.
INDIANA STATUTES:
i. Indiana Code § 33-2-3-1 Let
2. Indiana Code § 34-5-2-1 1,3,7
3. Indiana Code § 34-4-17-1 thru § 34-4-17-8 6.
INDIANA CONSTITUTION
> PP
(1997 Replcmt. p. 30)
Article IIL § 1 Burns Statutes, Constitutions 1,7.
(1997 Replicmt. p. 204)
Article VII. § 4. Burns Statutes, Constitutions 1,7
(1997 Replicmt. p. 277)
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
Article III., Sec. 2., Clause 1, 1,4,5,7,8
Black's Law Dict. 6th Ed. p. 1644
Article V1. Sec. 2. Black's Law Dict. 3,5,6
6th Ed. p. 1645
Amendment VIL., Black's Law Dict. 2,3,4,5,8
6th Ed. p. 1646
Amendment XIV., Black's Law Dict. 3,4,,5,6,7,9
6th Ed. p. 1647
INDIANA RULES OF COURT
Trial Rules 7 thru 15 point of reference, 6,8
2000 Ed, pp. 11-18
[- a. -]
-39, -
IN THE INDIANA COURT OF APPEALS
CAUSE NO. 57A04-0009-CV-404
LLOYD G. PERRY, ) APPEAL FROM THE
Appint/Deft/ C. Pitf (Below) ) NOBLE CO. SUPIR. COURT
v. ) No. 57D01-9007-CT-000018
MARVIN R. CURTIS, et al., ) The Honorable
Apple/Pitf. C. Deft. (Below) ) J. SCOTT VANDERBECK, S.J.
APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR REHEARING
Comes now the appellant, Lloyd G. Perry, in person and
pro se and moves this Indiana Court Of Appeals by Petition For
Rehearing and/or Motion To Reconsider it's judgment of August
3, 2001 im the above entitled case of Perry v. Curtis and files this
petition pursuant to Appellante Rules 54, 43, 44, 46.
L JURISDICTION:
The jurisdiction of this appeal has been established in
appellant's brief, un-opposed and places the jurisdiction in the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Indiana Supreme Court pursuant to
the terms and conditions of the "Arising under" clause of Article
IIL, Section 2, clause 1. of the United States Constitution,
charged with supervisory powers and consistent with the Indiana
Constitution Article II., § 1 and Article VII., § 4 and supported
by Indiana Code § 33-2-3-1.
1. The underlymg condition of State practiced
policy of discrimination agaist layman pro se litigants, is in
violation of the United States Constitution, has deprived this
appellant, Lloyd G. Perry of his equal privilages and immunities,
equal protection of the law; deprived due process of law and has
caused Perry to suffered heavily, physically, financially,
emotionally for a period of years because of this said
discrimination. It has put at risk, his life, property, family,
income, freedom and the right to recover for the said losses and
damages. The absence of the Indiana Supreme Court's
Supervision of equally applied law, consistent with the United
States Constitution's rule of law, has brought on a run-away
judicial deteriation as relates to discipline of attorneys and judges
relating to the said discrimination; bad legislation related to the
Courts and bad case laws by the Courts themselves, under
negative, agressive, anti-Constitutional supervision, intended for
discrimimation, contrary to the Supervisory duties directed under
Article III, Sec. 2. Cl. 1. at a cost to the public in the form of
saienciicitiieae iia”
II. STATEMENTOF THE ISSUES:
My The State of Indiana has engaged in the practice
of a policy of discrimination against layman pro se litigants in the
courts. To rid the courts of cases filed by a layman, the Indiana
Supreme Court in concert with the Indiana Legislature made
legislation and made case law specifically imtended to be used in
this discrimination practice. The laws and methods are
accomplished under the violations of the United States
Constitution; dismissing a case as frivolous or im some cases
under Summary Judgment, either instance takes the issues of
determining facts from a jury in a case demanding mal by jury
on facts pleaded as required by the Rules of Court.
y 4 To prove a case of discrimination by the State, it
must be shown that the State intended to discriminate and was the
policy of the State. With this petition that history and proof is
now provided m it's full form, between this petition and
appellant's brief on appeal. (e.g. Jones v. State, 449 N.E. 2d 1060
(Ind. App. 1983) see 698 N.E. 2d 735. (A reversible error)
> To accomplish the discrimination, the State
Supreme Court deliberately, willfully, maliciously and with the
imtent to deprive the citizens of this State of their United States
Constitutional rights, did cause legislation and did draft law,
contrary to the United States Constitution for the expressed
purpose of depriving the citizens of the State of Indiana
(Specifically Lloyd G. Perry) of his right to use the courts of the
state as setforth inthe Indiana Constitution Article L § 12 (e.g.
Sivard v. Pulaski County, 995 F.2d 662, 17 F.3d 185 (Ind. 1992)
4. That this case on appeal has set forth the facts as
they are and have shown the fraud and abuse of discreations
along the way. The abuse of discreation is accomplished by the
respective court making the determmation that the case is
frivolous, thus taking the questions of facts away from the jury in
a jury demanded case. This is reversable error and a US.
Constitutional violation on the part of the Court and the State.
(see U.S. Constitution Amendment VII. infra)
Ii. STATEMENT OF THE CASE:
1. Petition For Relief From Judgment was filed
based on lack of jurisdiction and defective judgment by reason of
personal interest in outcome of case by judge joimt with parties.
2. - As the approximate cause; the State Of Indiana
Supreme Court has failed and refused to uphold it's legal duty to
-41.-
protect Perry from the fraud, corruption and racketeering
activities in the judicial systems in this State Of Indiana, resulting
in damage to Perry and effecting his litigation for relief, recovery,
protection and justice. The State has a legal duty to discipline
attorneys and judges and it has failed, but it has also violated the
Untied States Constitution to aid it's discrimination policy against
layman pro se litigants. A policy that has [2] made clear that an
attorney or judge can do whatever they desire to do to a layman
pro se, his documents, witnesses, his property, his privacy and
know that because of the policy of the State, there will be no
disciplinary action and no risk of lost of the case to the layman.
This condition has the judicial system operating as a racketeering
operation, with clear evidence of no supervision by the State
Supreme Court over discipline or law making or protecting the
public.
IV. STATEMENT OF FACTS:
FIRST, I want to thank this Court for making the
of Appeals August 3, 2001. (e.g. Huber v. Franklin County
Cmty. Sch. Corp. 507 N.E. 2d 233,238 (ind. 1987) and others
1. Nowhere in this Court's Order of August 3, 2001
is the Federal Question Challenge to the constitutionality of
§ 33-2-3-1 and LC. § 34-5-2-1 and their
relationship to the required discipline of attorneys and judges, as
a legal duty of the Indiana Supreme Court, to protection the
this
than Perry could have hoped to make it,
points must be part of your decision making process in this
appeal, which presently are not reflected. You have failed to
consider that your laws and legislation is contrary to U.S.
Constitutional law. You also failed to consider all listed abuses of
discreation including taking the questions of fact from the jury
and depriving trial by jury.
A. You say there has been no evidence
references to the record in Perry's brief in relation to several types
of fraud, from the administrative agency of the labor boards, to
the court room, to the sheriff, to the Indiana Supreme Court. [3]
B. You say that Perry did not timely file his
appeal in the original process. But you have overlooked the
proof of the threats and mtimidations that are so clearly
documented in the record, in Perry's brief, which includes Judge
Spindlers comment as Perry being deserving of an injunction
and you have mistated the facts as you did for paragraph A.
above. Perry explained why he did not file; Perry made clear by
reference to the record that threats, intimidation, killings,
distruction of records have all been part of the methods used by
the opposing sides to cause Perry to loose the case and obstruct
all his processes. This fact extends back into the Perry v. Fox
case and the issues filed in Curtis were new issues that developed
during the pendency of the said Fox case, and go all the way
back to Spencer County, as referenced by Perry in Perry's brief
with a separate appendix with evidence with it that shows the
basis for all the attempted killings and killings of witnesses. (see
e.g. Sivard v. Pulaski County, 995 F.2d 662, , 17 F.3d 185 (Ind.
1992) see also Scothom v. State Of Kansas, 772 F. Supp. 556
(Kansas 1991) also Houck v. City of Prairie Village, 912 F. Supp
1428 trvond. 950 F. Supp 312
C. Nowhere in this said August 3, 2001
Order was addressed the matters of State practiced policy of
discrimimation against layman pro se litigants, which is at the
heart of this appeal and the conditions leading up to this appeal
over a period of years. It is only addressed as being a right that a
-43. -
court has in relation to frivolous law suites. But you can't violate
the United States Constitution by inacting legislation t create the
right for the Court. Nor can you pass case law consistent with
that legislation to support that right when the whole of i amounts
to more U.S. Constitutional violations that just are not allowed.
As you well know, two wrongs don't make a right. This is a fact
that you must consider but have not and it is an abuse of
descreation by each level of Court involved here. (E.g. In re
Guardianship of K. T. 743 N.E. 2d 348 (Ind. App. 2001) also
e.g. Foor v. Town of Hebron, 742 N.E. 2d 545 (Ind. App. 2001)
D. Like all of the other issues stated in the
Order, the mistating of the facts of this case and the other related
cases are at the heart of the discrimination and under the laws
cited by this Court in it's Order of August 3, 2001 we can see
with absolute certainty the intent of the Judicial and Legislative
bodies of this State in concert to take away the rights of the
citizens by passing both legislation and case law to circumvent
the terms and conditions guaranteed to those citizens by the
United States Constitution Amendment VIL, right to trial by jury
and Amendment XIV. § 1 due process. There is no law or
legislation that can justify the issueing of an mjunction by any
Court to protect a party from civil or criminal prosecution for the
civil and criminal wrongs that person has committed that gives
rise to the filing of a complaint and requests for justice and relief.
Nor can Indiana block that relief pursuant to Indiana Constitution
Article L § 12 [4]
V. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT:
i. This Indiana Court Of Appeals states that the
issues brought by Perry to the Courts of this State are frivolous
and are therefore dismissed and for repeated filings the injunction
is placed to protect the parties from further litigation. That is a
prejudical mis-statement.
2. Here is where this Indiana Court Of Appeals, the
lower Courts, the Indiana Supreme Court and the Federal District
Court and Seventh Circuit Court Of Appeals have all made their
biggest and most costly mistakes, anchoring the charge by Perry
they carry the liability of consequential damages from the effects
of the injunctions and the prejudice m the many court
ings which deny due process, in whole or in part due to
-44, -
against laymen pro se litigants. Go back and look at your United
States Constitutional Law. You are m error.
From Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition
(Constitutions pp. 1645-1646)
Article VI. [2]
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof;
and all Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under the Authority of the United States, shall be
the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in
every State shall be bound thereby, any thing in
the Constitution or Laws of any State to the
Contrary notwithstanding.
Amendment VIL.
In Suite at common law, where the value in
controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the nght
of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact
tried by jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in
any Court of the United States, than according to
the rules of the common law.
Article III, Section 2, caluse [1]
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in
Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution,
the Laws of the United Staes, and Treaties made,
or which shall be made, under their Authority, - -
to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public
Ministers and Consuls; - - to all Cases of
admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction; - - to
Controversies to which the United States shall be
a Party; - - to Controversies between two or more
States; - - between State and Citizens of another
State; - - Lands under the Grants of different
States, and between a State, or the Citizens
thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.
3. It appears that the basis for issueing an injunction
-45. -
a
is on grounds of preventing frivolous litigation and a repeat
filmg of the same; however to issue such an injunction is [5]
contrary to United States Constitutional Law and therefore the
State Courts have abused it's power and acted m abuse of
case law and third placing the injunctions in an effort to
circumvent the U.S. Constitution Amendment XIV. This is
evidence of willful and malicious obstructions of justice when
preformed by knowledgable people of the legal profession. this
point supports Perry's contension of recketeering activities.
4, Above, you find the verbatim quote of the United
States Constitution, Amendment VII, which states that civil trial
by jury on questions of facts are guaranteed. Then in Article VI.
that no State Constitution or State law can void the effects of the
United States Constitution. Indiana Constitution Article I. § 12 is
the States verson of the due process - open door court.
3 In this Indiana Court Of Appeals own words and
citations of case law, you make two strong points for me: :
(1.) There has been several willful, State actor
violations of United States Constitutional Provisions in an effort
to stop some types of State litigation.
(a.) | Huber v. Franklin County (supra) reflects a joint
effort by the courts (judicial) and the legislature in relation to LC.
34-4-17-1 thru 34-4-17-8 and it's repeal as it applies to dismissels
and injunctions and sets the limits as to what constitutes
frivolous. (This is abuse of discreation. There is no jurisdiction
for either body to alter the U.S. Constitutions terms.)
(b.) For the court of any level to set in place rules of
civil and criminal procedure, with specific pleading requirements
(T.R. 7-15), then disqualify a case based on being frivolous, does
not fly. Once the pleadings are filed the position the court is in is
one of taking the issues to a jury in a case that has demanded trial
by jury. The statements made by the pleader, pursuant to the said
rules are verified as true and as fact as is any evidence that may
be attached. Therefore for any court to make a determination as
to what is true or false or determative is for the jury (trier of fact)
to determine. For the Court to make that judgment is substituting
the Courts powers for the jury right to decide. The Constitutional
law as cited makes clear that can not be done and it is abuse of
comes from trying to make a decision that by law belongs to the
46. -
jury and by depriving the party of his right to a jury trial is a
denial of due process of law. (E.g. Foor and e.g. K.T. supra) [6]
VI. STANDARDS OF REVIEW:
The problems that face this Indiana Court Of Appeal and
the Indiana Supreme Court is one of lack of jurisdiction and
where there may be jurisdiction, there is a clear lack of
supervision. This appeal stands as a mark of those stated facts.
The Indiana Supreme Court knew or should have known that the
legislation and case laws were both in violation of the United
States Constitution. The Indiana Court of Appeals is equally
responsible as being pros in law. Therefore a standard for
negligence in supervision should be one level; with the abuse of
power, abuse of discreation and wrong motive as a second level
of review; and totally erroneous, a third level ap lied to this
rehearing. (United States v. Zima, 766 F.2d 1155 (1985 CA7
Ind.) also Hoult v. Hoult, 57 F.3d 1.
Vo. ARGUMENT:
1. In Perry's brief, he made clear that jurisdiction of
this appeal was clearly within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Indiana Supreme Court and requested that it be transfered. Even
now the issue of jurisdiction and lack of jurisdiction remains un-
answered by the lower court or by this Indiana Court Of Appeals. —
My request, you ignored and failed to accurately state the facts of
the case and failed to answer all questions, including the Federal
Question and failed to grant relief where the laws are very clear
on the subject matter. Instead you cite case law that a non
schooled person can recognize as violating the U.S. Constitution,
and expect it to get you off the hook for the practiced
discrimination. It has set the hook deeper and sharpened the
point. You can not find jurisdiction for any of the courts herein
mentioned, to justify what has been done contrary to the United
States Constitution Article III., Sec. 2., Clause 1., Amendment
VII. and Amendment XIV and the Indiana Constitution Article I.
§ 12 and Article III. § 1 and Article VII. § 4. (see e.g. K.T. and
Foor, supra) Lack of jurisdiction is your un-solvable problem.
ae In this said Order of August 3, 2001 we find the
Court stating that the complaints were frivolous and dismissed
with injunctions placed to prevent further frivolous litigation.
Then this Court cites the case laws of Huber v. Franklin County
Cmty Sch. Corp. 507 N.E. 2d 233,238(Ind. 1987); State v. Lake
Suuperior Court Room 4, 335 N.E. 2d 199,203 along with
-47, -
Mercantile Nat"! Bank of Ind. v. Teamsters Union Local #142
Pension Fund, 668 N.E. 2d 1269,1271 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) G.B.
v. State, 715 N.E. 2d 951,953; Levin v. Levin 645 N.E. 2d
601,604 (Ind. 1994) These cases, as they apply to Perry and this
case of Perry vy. Curtis and in general of all the other Perry related
cases, makes the pot of the State practiced policy of
discrimination against layman pro se litigants citing first one
the rights of the people. The people, including this appellant,
can't afford anymore of this imcompetent supervisory court
practice. This gross [7] incompetency is reflected back in the
middle of the Curtis case, when Perry filed for disqualification of
Judge Spindler. Justice Shephard put Spindler back on the bench
with no consideration of Spindlers hostilities toward Perry and
Spindlers criminal actions against Perry and Perry's due process.
(see record, Vol. II, p. 466, L 12-24) This condition reflects the
unwillingness to discipline; (Record Vol. IIL. pp. 639,641) poor
to no ision (with interest in the outcome of the case since it
is related to Gresk and the placement of Justice Shephard came
as the result of Gresk) mis-application of law and failed basic
legal duty to protect the public; the above cited case laws and
Perry's cases documents the State's practiced policy of
discrimination even when the conditions involves murder and
———
HOW?
entry Docket, Record. p. 11 Date 9/20/90) (and in many cases
denied appointment of legal counsel with emphasis on Gresk
case) which as we can see is clearly a violation of U.S.
Constitution Amendment VII. Then to avoid having to deal with
consistent with the requirements of the rules of court. With
emphasis on Trial Rule 7 and 9 but including rules 7 thru 15.
-48. -
Averment of facts pleaded under Trial Rule 9 is a question of
fact for the jury and not the court. But where is the supervision as
required by Article III. Section 2., clause 1.of U.S. Constitution?
The supervision is now clearly the problem because as the
referenced case law of the August 3, 2001 order shows, the
Indiana Supreme Court and specifically Chief Justice Randal T.
Shephard worked hard at getting the legislation and case laws
into place so as to cause the denial of the due process by
dismissing any case they didn't want, on the basis of frivolous.
This really does go beyond the limits of discrimination and into
the area of racketeering, which when examined in both civil and
criminal cases has caused people to be imprisioned that should
not be locked up and has caused people to loose their property or
other rights because there was no true due process and equal
protection of the law. Who then benifited? The attorneys and the
crook. Look then at the RICO Act 18 U.S.C.A. § 1961; and 18
U.S.C.A. 1962; Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc. C.A. N.Y. 719
F.2d 5,17 and see how it applies to this condition and know that
this condition must end because it is corrupting our judicial
system. See also K.T. and Foor supra) [8]
4. ‘Then add the lack of equal protection of the law,
whens Desey atthe ter an ebentiien te: Allen Circuit end in Noble
Superior but was refused and then the opposing side is granted
the type of injunction that should never be granted. This case
came after the Curtis v. Perry fight brought litigation from Perry's
self help after denial of protection in Allen Circuit. This violates
U.S. Constitution Amendment XIV. (see separtate appendix p. 30
entry 8-31-89)
5. The intent of the Indiana Supreme Court and the
Indiana Legislature could not be clearer stated, than is stated m
those laws cited in that August 3, 2001 order with emphasis on
Huber (supra) , but remember the Governor had to sign that
legislation also, so it is total State government discrimination and
as the laws show, it was intended to be that way no matter how
wrong it was. (see e.g. Houck, supra)
FEDERAL QUESTION #2.
As a second Federal Question, can the State, it's
legislators or judicial branches or any other branch of the State
make rules and regulations that deprive the Citizens of ther _
guaranteed, United States Constitutional Provisions so that that
new rule or regulation eases or makes more convenient the
- 49. -
operation of the State and any of it's various branches,at the loss
of citizens rights?
Therefore, are any laws providing for the dismissel of a
case on the bases of frivolous or summary judgment, where the
trial by jury has been demanded or the placement of an
injunction barring futher litigation, constitutional under the terms
and conditions of this case?
Therefore, as a matter of law, and in consideration of the
facts and circumstances supported by law, as set forth in this
Petition and in appellant's Brief, as the rule of law the lower court
judgment should be reversed and all cases tried under these same
conditions should also be reversed with full payment of damages
to Perry for the physical suffering, mental anguish, loss of
income, loss of property and damage to his reputation and credit,
in the amount as earlier stated of $3.3 billion, with all other just
and proper relief in the premises.
Respectfully submitted by;
s/
Lloyd G. Perry, Appint. pro se
10025 West, 400 South
Dunkirk, Indiana 47336
Phone
Word count certificate omitted. [10]
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
i, Lloyd G. Perry do verify that true and exact copies of
s Petition For Rehearing was served on each of the
following counsels of record by deposit in the U.S. Postal
Service, postage pre-paid at the following addresses on or before
September 3, 2001.
Indiana Attomey General, William Groth,
Assistant, Janice E. Kruescher 1213 North Arlington
Ind. Gov. Center, S., 5th Floor Indianapolis, Ind. 46204
402 West Washington Street Phone (317) 353-9363
i lis, Ind. 46204
Phone (317) 232-6316
- 50. -
HALLER & Colvin
Stephen Lewis
444 East Main Street
Fort Wayne, Ind. 46802
Phone (219) 436-8549
803 South Calhoun
Fort Wayne, Ind. 46802
Phone (219) 422-1515
Stephen Lerch
Suite 500
919 South Harrison
Ft. Wayne, Ind. 46802
Phone (219) 423-6655
Burt, Blee, Dixon & Sutton
Mr. Burt
200 East Main Street
Ft. Wayne, Ind. 46802
Phone (219) 426-1300
- 51. -
Lebamoff Law Offices,
918 South Calhoun,
Fort Wayne, Ind. 46802
Phone (219) 423-2581
Hunt, Suedhoff,
803 South Calhoun Street
Fort Wayne, Ind. 46802
Phone (219) 423-1311
Rothberg & Logan
2100 Ft. Wayne Nat'l Bank
110 West Berry
Fort Wayne, Ind. 46802
Phone (219)422-9454
Eilbacher, Scott
Lee Eilbacher
Suite 2200, Ft Wayne Nat'l
Bank Bidg.
Ft. Wayne, Ind. 46802
Phone (219) 423-9551
Barrett & McNagny
Thomas Kimbrough
Electron Bidg.
215 East Berry
Ft. Wayne, Ind. 46802
Phone (219) 423-9551
Respectfully submitted by;
"s/ "
Lloyd G. Perry, Applt. pro se
10025 West, 400 South
Dunkirk, Ind. 47336
Phone [11]
SEAL OF STATE OF INDIANA
1816
Brian Bishop
Clerk
CLERK
SUPREME COURT, COURT OF APPEALS, AND TAX COURT
STATE OF INDIANA
217 STATE HOUSE, INDIANAPOLIS, IN 46204
317-232-1930 FAX 317-232-8365
PERRY, LLOYD G. Cause No. :
10025 West, 400 South 57A04-0009-CV-0040
Lower Court Number:
DUNKIRK, IN 47336 57D019007CT18
PERRY, LLOYD G. -v- CURTIS, MARVIN R.
You are hereby notified that
COURT OF APPEALS has on this day 8/03/01
ISSUED THE ENCLOSED OPINION: RS
WITNESS My name and the seal of said Court,
3RD AUGUST, 2001
this day of
" Ss /
Brian Bishop
Clerk Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and Tax Court
[12] (Notice Cover Page of Order)
- 52. -
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 15(A)( FILED
this Memorandum Decision shall not be |} AUG 3 2001
regarded as precedent or cited before Brian Bishop
any Court except for the purpose of CLERK
establishing the defense of res judicata, INDIANA
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case] SUPREME COURT
COURT OF APPEALS
AND TAX COURT
LLOYD G. PERRY
Dunkirk, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
LLOYD G. PERRY, )
Appellant-Plaintiff, )
vs. ) No. 57A04-0009-CV-404
MARVIN R. CURTIS, et al., )
Appellees-Defendants. )
APPEAL FROM THE NOBLE SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable J. Scott VanDerbeck, Special Judge
Cause No. 57D019007-CT-189
August 3, 2001
MEMORANDUM DECISION-NOT FOR PUBLICATION
BAKER, JUDGE [1] (of order)
Appellant-plaintiff, Lloyd G. Perry appeals the dismissal
of his Motion for Relief from Judgment pursuant to Ind. Trial
Rule 60(B). Specifically, he contends that the trial court lacked
jurisdiction in permanently enjoining him from instituting a cause
of action, in any court in the State of Indiana, on matters already
litigated regarding a battery claim and in a separate case for
slander and libel. Perry also maintains that his motion should
have been granted because he demonstrated that the defendants
in those actions committed fraud.
FACTS
The facts most favorable to the judgment are that on
February 22, 1991, Perry was enjoined, by the Noble Superior
- 53. -
Court, from instituting any further causes of action that arose
from, or related to, issues in Perry v. Fox Contractors, Inc., et. al.
No. 02C01-9808-CT-93, or Perry v. Curtis, No. 57D01-90006-
CT-018, in any court within the State of Indiana, without leave of
the Noble Superior Court. Record at 146. The claims brought by
Perry in those action were based upon battery and defamation.
When the order was issued, the trial judge commented as follows
"I believe that if anyone is subject to sanctions under Rule
11 and if anyone has behave themselves in a fashion
which causes justice to cry out for an injunction to curb the
abuse of the legal system which you have perpetrated in
the past and the future, it is you. And, for that purpose, I
am going to grant all of the Motions and Applications for
Permanent Injunctions.” R. at 461-62. "This action, as I
tried to explain to you earlier, is so patently, obviously,
and tansparently frivolous and brought in bad faith that it
is frivolous, transparently and patently frivolous, with
regards to everyone you named." [2] (of order)
R. at 472. The trial court noted that the injunction did not affect
Perry's right to appeal the decision, to defend himself in any
criminal action, or to deny his access to the Court of Appeals or
the Supreme Court of Indiana for any purpose. R. at 147-48.
Perry did not appeal this injunction, but instead filed a T.R. 60
(B) Motion for Relief From Judgment or Order on December 12,
1999. In that motion, Perry claimed that the trial court was
without jurisdiction to issue the permanent injunction regarding
those cases. He also argued that the opposing parties acted
Prior to the Noble Superior Court's issuance of the injunction,
the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Indiana, in 1989, enjoined Perry from filing in any federal court,
without leave of that court, any lawsuit arising out of or related to
any issues in Perry v. Gresk, No. EV84-174-C, slip op. (S.D Ind.
Feb 21, 1986, or Perry v. Barnard, No. EV88-24-C, slip op.
(S.D.Ind. Sept. 26, 1989). R. at 628-32 (7th Cir. Nov. 21, 1986)
These actions involved conspiracy and defamation claims against
various state officials and government agencies. That injunction
was affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the
a.
aan" Circuit, Perry v. Bamard, No. 89-3575. R. at 633-34
1986
In response to the Noble Superior Court's order, Perry filed a
Petition of Permanent Writ of Mandamus and Prohibition and a
Petition for Emergency Writ with the Indiana Supreme Court on
February 25, 2000. Perry alleged that only the Indiana Supreme
Court had the jurisdiction to issue an injunction to prevent pro se
representation and that the injunction placed a hardship on Perry.
Thereafter, our Supreme Court dismissed the petitions on
February 25, 2000, determining that Perry sought an
unquestionably inappropriate remedy and that Perry failed to
show that the trial court [3] exceeded its jurisdiction in granting
the injunction. the trial court denied Perry's Motion for Relief
from Judgment on June 28, 2000, determining that Perry had not
carried his burden to show any mistake, newly discovered
evidence or fraud as required by T.R. 60(B). He now appeals the
denial of that motion
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
L Standard of Review
In resolving Perry's claim that the trial court erred in denying
his Motion for Relief from Judgment, we note that the grant or
denial of a Motion for Relief from Judgment is left to the
equitable discretion of the trial court. We will reverse only for an
abuse of that discretion. Mercantile Natl Bank of-Ind._v.
sters cal #142 F d. 668 N.E.2d 1269,
1271 (ind. Ct. App. 1996). ta tun ft Gatien eines en
the trial court's denial is clearly against the logic and effect of the
facts and inferences supporting the judgment. G.B. v. State, 715
N.E.2d 951,953 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999). On a Motion for Relief
from Judgment, the burden is on the movant to demonstrate that
relief is both necessary and just. Levin v. Levin.645 N.E.2d
601,604 (Ind. 1994)
In resolving Perry's claim that the trial court was without
jurisdiction to issue the permanent injunction, we note that
imjunctive relief may be granted, under the court's equity powers,
when the plaintiff's production of litigation amounts to an abuse
of process. Huber v. Franklin County Comty Sch. Com.. 507
N.E.2d 233,238 (Ind. 1987). Likewise, the equity powers may
be mvoked to prevent a multiplicity of suits or to suppress
- 55. -
litigation when otherwise there would be actions at law
unnecessarily or [4] burdensomely numerous.
Superior Court Room 4, 335 N.E.2d 199,203 (Ind. 1975)
Turning to the circumstances in the instant case, it is apparent
that Perry has a history of bringing frivolous lawsuits. Perry was
sanctioned by the federal court for instituting spurious claims in a
decision that was upheld by the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit. R. at 628-34. In those cases, Perry brought suit against
fifty-three defendants including the Indiana Department of
Natural Resources, the Insurance Company of North America,
the Indiana Attorney General, the German American Bank, and
the Chief Justice of the Indiana Supreme Court. R. at 628-29.
Perry claimed that the various defendants were jomed in a
conspiracy to defraud him and harm his reputation. The federal
courtfound these claims to be without evidentiary support,
wholly frivolous, and without merit.
Perry has also not been a stranger to our state courts. In the
Perry's Motion for [5] Relief fromJudgment. Finally, we note that
the trial court was well within its equitable powers to issue the
me ‘ake fanatics ©
injunction
N.E.2d at 605.
Judgment affirmed.
FRIEDLANDER, J., and ROBB, J., concur.
1 Many of these same individuals and allegations were alleged in
separate complaint Perry filed in Allen County that was dismissed
with prejudice. [6]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
CERTIFICATION
Brian Bishop
Clerk, Supreme Court
57
CERTIFICATION
STATE OF INDIANA ‘
SS:
Court Of Appeals )
I, Brian Bishop, Clerk of the Supreme Court of the State Of
Indiana, Certify the above and foregoing to be a true and
complete copy of ___THE OPINION __ OF SAID COurt in the
above entitled case. .
IN WITNESS HEREOF, I set my hand and affix the seal of
____THE CLERK OF THE __said Court, at the City of
Indianapolis, this 19 day of __MARCH 2002 _
"s/_ Brian Bish "Cleri
se ee eee a
ee ee
SEAL OF THE STATE OF INDIANA
CLERK
Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and Tax Court
STATE OF INDIANA
217 State Hous, Indianapolis, In 46204
Brian Bishop
Clerk 317-232-1930 FAX 317-232-8365
Cause Number
PERRY, LLOYD G. 57A04-0009-CV-00404
10025 West, 400 South Lower Court Number:
Dunkirk, In 47336 57D019007CT18
PERRY, LLOYD G. -V. - CURTIS, MARVIN R.
You are hereby notified that the Supreme Court, has on this
day 3/19/02.
This Matter has come before the Indiana Supreme Court on
a Petition to Transfer Jurisdiction following the issuance of a
decision by the court of appeals. The petition was filed pursuant
to Appellate Rule 57. The Court has reviewed the Decision of
the Court Of Appeals. Any record on appeal that was submitted
has been made available to the Court for review, along with any
and all briefs that may have been filed in the court of appeals
and all the materials filed in connection with the request to
transfer jurisdiction. Each Participating member of the Court
has voted on the Petition. Each participating member has had
the opportunity to voice that Justice's views on the case in
Being duly advised, the Court now denies the Appellant's
Petition To Transfer of Jurisdiction.
Randall T. Shepard, Chief Judge
All Justices concur AA
Witness my name and the seal of said Court,
19TH March, 2002
"s/ "
Clerk Supreme Court, Court of
Appeals, and Tax Court.
- 59. -
IN THE
INDIANA COURT OF APPEALS
CAUSE NO. 57A04-0009-CV-404
LLOYD G. PERRY, ) APPEAL FROM THE
Appellant/ Defendant/ C. ) NOBLE COUNTY SUPERIOR
Plaintiff, ) COURT
)
v. ) CAUSE NO.
) 57D01 9007-CT-000018
- )
MARVIN R. CURTIS, _) The Honorable
Appellee/ Plaintiff/ C. ) J. Scott VanDerbeck, Special Judge
Defendant et al )
PETITION TO TRANSFER
TO THE INDIANA SUPREME COURT
Comes now the appellant, defendant below, Lloyd G. Perry
in person and pro se and petitions this Indiana Court Of
Appeals and the Indiana Supreme Court for the transfer of this
case to the Indiana Supreme Court.
IL JURISDICTION:
Jurisdiction of these issues is and should have always been
in this State of Indiana Supreme Court concurrent with the
United States Supreme Court pursuant to the terms and
conditions of the United States Constitution Article I, § 2
clauses 1 & 2 as to exclusive jurisdiction over matters of
discipline of judges and attorneys; and supervisory jurisdiction
over the inferior courts to insure equal justice to all.
iti is the Indiana Constitution provisions under
Article IIL, § 1. and Article VIL, § 4, jomt with Indiana Code §
34-5-2-1 and LC. § 33-2-3-1, jomt with the terms and
conditions setforth in Article I, § 12 of the said Indiana
Constitution.
IL STATEMENT OF CASE WITH FACTS:
As this Indiana Supreme Court examines this case, it will
find that at no time has the case of Curtis v. Perry and cross
claim of Perry v. Curtis ever been under the jurisdiction of the
Noble Superior Court; but they don't want to admitt it, nor does
this Indiana Supreme Court as is evidenced by Perry's original
_ *
action to the Indiana Supreme Court January 25, 2000; nor
does this Indiana Court Of Appeals in it's memorandum ruling
issued against this appellant Perry on August 3, 2001 with
rehearing denied October 29, 2001.
Appellant states the following history of the case:
1. That the Indiana Court Of Appeals decided the case by
written opinion in a not for publish Order August 3, 2001,
against this appellant, Lloyd G. Perry (this party seeking
transfer)
2. That this appellant, Perry, timely filed a petition for
rehearing setting for the errors of the Indiana Court Of Appeals
and pointing out clearly the questions of law, including the
Federal Questions in the case that were never addressed. Issues
that for the most part were of the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Indiana Supreme Court. Such as, jurisdiction of subject matter;
Supreme Court supervision over inferior lower courts; the
subject matter of discipline of attorneys and judges; the
constitutionality of the Indiana Code § 34-5-2-1- and § 33-2-3-
1.
3. The primary error listed in appellants petition for
rehearing was the lack of jurisdiction on the part of all the
Indiana State Courts and the Federal District Court and
Seventh Circuit Court Of Appeals over a very long period of
time and throughout a great many cases involving Perry.
In the final analysis, we can clearly see a pattern of
unwillingness on part of the said Indiana Supreme Court to
discipline attorneys and judges for criminal practices in
litigation processes and at the same time a willingness, by this
same Supreme Court to violate the United States Constitution
and the Indiana State Constitution in concert with the Indiana
Legislature in an effort to avoid the effects of their failed duty
to protect the public. In a concerted effort by both the Indiana
Supreme Court and the Indiana Legislature and in violation of
the seperation of powers doctrine, did draft and did legislate
and did cause case law to be made in an open and clearly
intended effort to allow for discrimination by the Courts of this
State against Laymen Pro Se Litigants; and to provide a means
by which to avoid the legal duty of the Indiana Supreme Court
to protect the public. Thus we have legislation that gives the
Courts the right to dismiss a case that they deem as frivolous or
dismiss it under summary judgment, even when the case has
- 61. -
demanded trial by jury; and all of which is constructed contrary
to Constitutional law. But this is the lead that the Indiana Court
Of Appeals has followed, though it is flawed. Therefore it is
the duty and liability of the State Supreme Court to correct it's
own errors.
4. In addition to this is then the misuse of the injunction and
mandate as applied by both the Noble Superior Court, U.S.
District Court and the Seventh Circuit Court Of Appeals. They
have been placed for evil purposes and not as a protection to
the public at large: but they operate entirely contrary to the
principals of law. By their placement, damages to Perry has
increased to the sum of $3.3 Billion and if you count this last
denial as another offense it grows by another triple multipal.
IN SUMMARY:
The Legislative intent of the Indiana Supreme Court, the
Indiana Legislature and the Governor Of Indiana was to void
the guarantees of the U.S. Constitution and deprive the citizens.
Article IIL § 2, clauses 1 & 2 the supervisors of the other
Courts within the State Of Indiana and you have errored and
- 62. -
Court ) asking their supervision over you in an original Action
in the U.S. Supreme Court, which I have been directed to do in
time.
As Perry has outlined in his Petition For Rehearing, the State
of Indiana Supreme Court can not do what they have done in
their bold efforts to discriminate against laymen pro se litigants.
The United States Constitution clearly forbids the State to
legislate law or incorporate provisions in it's constitution that
void the effects and guarantees of the United States
Constitution. Under Article I, Section 2, clause 1 & 2, the
Indiana Supreme Court has a legal duty to supervise.
Therefore this appellant, Lloyd G. Perry petitions this
Indiana Court Of Appeals for the transfer of this case to the
Indiana Supreme Court so as to satisfy the jurisdictional defects;
corrected the flawed laws; and repair that which can be repaired
in the way of damage to Perry as well as to the judicial system
of this State Of Indiana; so requested to be complete pursuant to
law within the next 10 days, with all other just and proper relief
in the premises.
VERIFIED PLEADINGS AS TRUE AND FACTUAL, UNDER
PENALTY OF PERJURY BY;
"s/ *
Lloyd G. Perry, Appint. Pro Se
10025 West, 400 South
-3.- Dunkirk, Indiana 47336
- 63. -
TABLE OF CONTENTS
RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
VOLUME I. OF IV.
PAGES 1. THRU 248.
DOCUMENT: PAGE NO.:
1. Defendant Perry's Praecipe of the Record(first copy) 1.- 5 *
Shows check list of Noble County Superior Court Clerk,
omitting parts of requested record.
2. Defendant Perry's Praecipe of the Record 6.- 10
(second, copy) Certified Copy of requested record parts.
3. Certified Docket Sheets of record 11.- 31
of proceedings
4. Perry's Opposing Affidavit and 32.- 39
Exhibits To Cross-Defendants Motion For Summary Judgment
Statements of obstructions of justice, death certificates of —
witness friends, case in Allen County dismissed under duress.
5. Motion For Summary Judgment and Motion 40.-46
For Sanctions For Instituting Frivolous Litigation (by Lerch)
Contains affidavits of defendant attorneys Lerch and
Groth.
6. Motion For Summary Judgment and 47.- 49
Motion For Sanctions (by Leonard LEilbacher, defendant
attorney) Contains affidavit of Wayne Leon Pancake
7. Motion For Summary Judgment 50.- 54
(by defendant firm Haller & Colvin) Contains affidavit of
Dallas Day.
8. Defendant Lloyd G. Perry's First Set Of 55.- 57
Interrogatories Contains question pretaining to injuries, claims. ~
9. Motion For Production Of Documents 58.
(by Defendant Perry) 58. Requested medical records.
-64.-
10. Motion For Default Judgment 59.- 60 -
(by Defendant Perry) Failure of respond to complaint
11. Letter dated March 18, 1992 to Judge 61.
Spindler from Lerch _Notice of settlement agreement.
12. Letter dated July 23, 1992, to Judge Spindler 62.
from Lerch Noting agreement to settle not completed; asking
for trial.
* The Complaint, Cross Complaint, Motion To Dismiss,
Verified Application For Permanent Injunction, Letter from
Supreme Court Ordering Resumption Of Jurisdiction (also
others) are located in Evidence Volume II. Of IV. pages
535 thru 672. [i]
TABLE OF CONTENTS
RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
VOLUME 1. OF IV.
PAGES 1. THRU 248.
DOCUMENT: PAGE NO.:
13. Plaintiff's First Set Of Interrogatories To 63.- 66
Defendant Lloyd G. Perry Requesting asset informtion
14. Notice of Filing Of; Plaintiff's First Set Of 67.
Interrogatories To Defendant, Lloyd G. Perry (by Lerch)
15. Notice Of Filing Of; Plaintiff's request For 68.
Production Of Documents to Party (by Lerch)
16. Motion To Compel and Motion For Sanctions 69.- 70
(by Lerch) Second Set Of Sanctions and requested after
judgment.
17. Notice Of Filing Of; Plaintiff's Request For 71.
65.-
Production of Documents To Party (duplicate of page 68
above)
18. Request For Production Of Documents To 72.- 73
Party (by Lerch) Requesting privileged information
19. Notice of Filing Of; Plaintiff's First Set Of 74.
Interrogatories To Defendant Lloyd G. Perry (same as pages
68, 71 above)
20. Plaintiff's First set Of Interrogatories to 75.- 78
Defendant, Lloyd G. Perry by Lerch (requesting asset
information)
21. Letter dated September 30, 1992 from Lerch 79.
to Perry Requesting production of late documents
20. Order; Production of Documents and 80.- 81
Sanctions if not done. Order states Perry did not show for
hearing
21. Motion For extension Of Time In Which To 82.
Answer Order Dated 11/12/92 (by Perry) States improper
service on hearing to compel and sanctions.
22. Motion to Set Aside Order dated 11/12/92 83.- 85
(by Perry) Perry cites faulty service, improper procedure,
disrupted employment as factors.
23. Motion For Protective Order (by Perry) ; 86.
Perry seeks protection for privileged information
24. Affidavit In Support Of Motion ForProtective 87.- 89
Order (by Perry) Cites illegal procedure, discovery closed as
[- ii. -]
TABLE OF CONTENTS
RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
VOLUME 1. OF IV.
_
PAGES 1. THRU 248.
DOCUMENT: PAGE NO:
25. Verified Motion For Continuance and Request 90.- 91
For Further Sanctions (by Lerch)
26. Motion For Continuance (by Lerch) 92.- 93
Settlement pending
27. ORDER OF JUDGMENT (offered by Lerch 94,
28. CONSENT TO JUDGMENT 95.- 96
(offered by Lerch)
29. Request For Emergency Hearing (by Perry 4/9/97) 97- 98
Emergency based on abuse in court proceedings Allen Co.
30. In complaince with Courts Orders; 99.-110
Second Title, Defendant,Cross-Plaintiff's Request To remove
Permanent Injunction, For Good Cause Shown (affidavit
attached) Perry spells out fraud and corruption related to
tt
31. Proposed Order (by Perry) 111.-113
32. In Complaince with this Court's Order, 114,-116
Request For Leave To File and Waiver Of Filing Requirements
(by Perry) Perry spells out more fraud
33. Proposed Order (by Perry) 117
34. Response To Filings Of Lloyd G. Perry 118.-119
(by defendant and counsel of record, Leonard Eilbacher)
wants injunction on
35. Defendant Lloyd G. Perry's Objection 120.-122
to Defendant Leonard Eilbachers Letter and Response. Perry
36. Letter from Eilbacher to Clerk Of Noble 123.
Superior, directed at Judge Spindler asking to be excused from
- 67. -
hearings.
37. Duplicate Documents of pages 118 thru 122.
‘ 124 thru 131
38. Post Judgment Docket excerpt Dated 132.
Jan. 31, 2001, p.3 Shows Perry filing Motion For Relief From
Judgment; Judge Spindlers disqualification and Judge
VanDerbeck replacing Spindler,and Perry's Objection.
[- iii. -]
TABLE OF CONTENTS
RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
VOLUME 1. OF V.
PAGES 1. THRU 248.
DOCUMENT: - PAGE NO:
39. Motion For Relief From Judgment Of 133.-136
August 2, 1991 Pursuant To Trial Rule 60(b) of LR.CP.,
Expidited Proceedings Requested To Prevent Further Damage.
(by Perry, Dec. 20, 1999) Perry cites lack of jurisdiction;
abuse of power depriving due process and equal protection of
the law; injunction bemg Un-Constitutional
40. Brief In Support Of Motion For Relief 137.-142
From Judgment (above) Cites jurisdiction never had by Noble
Superior Court; injunction issued by encroachment upon
exclusive jurisdiction of Indiana Supreme Court.
41. EXHIBIT "A" to the above brief in support 143.-148
of Motion For Relief From Judgment, ORDER ENJOINING
DEFENDANT AND CROSS-PLAINTIFF PERRY
The injunction restricts, regulates and obstructs Perry's
access to the Indiana Court System; Such action amounts to a
determination related to the issues of legal malpractice, decided
in favor of the defendant attomeys on subject matter reserved
exclusively for the Indiana Supreme Court. Therefore the Court
i.
had no jurisdiction to issue any injunction of this type.
42. Motion To Shorten Response Time To 149.-151
Motion For Relief From Judgment, To Be Filed on or Before
December 30, 1999. As a matter of law cited in Perry's motion
for relief, it required immediate relief, Perry was asking for that
immediate action.
43. Notice of Action For Relief From Judgment 152.
44. Certificate of service to Motion For Relief 153
From Judgment
45. Proposed Order in relation to relief from 154.-155
judgment.
46. Duplicate Certificate Of Service of page 153. 157
47. Duplicate Docket Sheet to page 132. 158
48. Notice of Acceptance by J. Scott 159
VanDerbeck Special Judge
49. Perry's MotionTo Correct The Record 160.-161
Stating missing documents and unfiled documents.
[- iv. -]
TABLE OF CONTENTS
RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
VOLUME 1. OF IV.
PAGES 1. THRU 248.
DOCUMENT: PAGE NO.::
50. Letter Dated 1/ 14/00, to Clerk by Perry 162.-164
Amending his Request for certified record parts for use in the
Supreme Court
51. Letter Dated January 14, 2000, by Perry to 165-167
- 69. -
Court Reporter Ms. Yates requesting transcripts of hearings for
use in Supreme Court.
52. Objection to The Appointment Of Any 168-174
Special Judge Including The Honorable J. Scott VanDerbeck
with Supportive Brief. Based on procedural error and lack of
+ . li hi
53. Notice Of Non-Participation of Leonard 175-176
E. Eilbacher ©
54. Excerpts of Docket Sheet of Jan 31, 2000, 177-178
page 3 & 4. Shows hearing set for February 25, 2000 to
Perry's
Objection (above page 168,174)
Notice Clerk's Certificate for copies prepared is not
available note
is appended to page 178 and is also noted on Praecipe
(page 4,V.1)
55. Response To Motion For Relief From Judgment 179-181
States no law or fact bases.
56. Request To Participate Telphonically 182.- 183.
57. Notice of Non-Participation of Scott L. 184-185
Bunnell and Hunt Suedhoff
58. Response of Stephen E. Lewis and 186-187
Haller & Colvin Oppose said motion; not legally or factually
appropriate
59. Notice Of Non-Participation of David 188-190
Hawk and Hawk, Hynie & Gallmeyer. By David Hawk
opposed by Hawk
60. Order from Indiana Supreme Court 191-192
Denying Petition For Emergency Writ. Denied on bases of
substitute for appeal not allowed.
61. Petition For Emergency Writ 193-200
- 70. -
(Copy filed with Clerk) Raises three issues of jurisdiction or
lack of jurisdiction. Citing racketeering supported by the
injunctions from two cases
62. Petition ForPermanent Writ Of Mandamus 201-204
and Prohibition Raises issues of no jurisdiction and
encroachment as above.
63. Duplicates of pages 191,192 above. 205.- 207.
[- v. -]
TABLE OF CONTENTS
RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
VOLUME 1. Of IV.
PAGES 1. THRU 248.
DOCUMENT: PAGE NO.:
64. Order Dated February 25, 2000. Noting 208
no hearing on Jan. 13, 1992
65. Letter from Judge VanDerbeck, Dated 209-211
2/25/00 from Perry Letter expanded testimony that Court of
Appeals and Supreme Court in Indiana was closed to Perry —
66. Defendant Perry's Response To 212-216
Judge vanderbeck's Statement That The Rules Require an
Affidavit To Be Filed To Correct The Record.
This response is in affidavit form and cites the areas
needed to be corrected.
67. Order, dated March 9, 2000. 217.
; _ Directs Clerk to check file, directs parties to supply
missing parts.
68. Objection To This Court's Finding on or 21-219
About May 15, 2000. by Perry. Argues the facts of tampering.
- 71. -
69. Order, dated June 28, 2000 stating 220-221
Judge VanDerbecks opinion of the status of the case.
Denied relief from judgment on bases of not appealing at
time of judgment August 2, 1991.
Objection To This Court's Order Of 228-230
June 28, 2000, Dismissing Defendant's Motion For Relief From
Judgment Without Consideration Of The Extrinsic Facts and
Constitutional Rights Consolidated with the First Objection To
This Court's Finding On Or About May 15, 2000. The issue
of jurisdiction was never addressed by the Noble Superior
Court nor the Indiana Supreme Court.
71. Motion To Correct Errors Pursuant To Trial 231-238
Rule 59(A) and Rule 59(H) of the Indiana Rules Of Court
- 2000.
[- vi. -]
TABLE OF CONTENTS
RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
VOLUME 1. OF IV.
PAGES 1. THRU 248.
DOCUMENT: PAGE NO:
72. Supportive Affidavit to Motion To 235-238
Correct Errors The issue of not addressing jurisdiction when
the motion for Relief From Judgment was based on no
ordered Perry killed
73. Notice of Address Change for Perry 239.
74. Duplicate of Address change Notice 240.
- 72. -
Oe a .
75. Order Denying Motion To Correct Errors, 241-242
dated 8/16/00
76. Defendant Perry's Praecipe of the Record 243.- 247.
77. Clerk's Certificate 248.
[vii]
- 73. -
TABLE OF CONTENTS
EVIDENCE
TRANSCRIPTS OF PROCEEDINGS
VOLUME Il. OF IV.
PAGES 249. THRU 499.
DOCUMENT: PAGE NO..:
1. Hearing on Various Motions, April 17, 250-417
1991, Judge Spindler
2. Hearing on Various Motions, July 15, 1991, 418-472
Judge Spindler
3. Hearing on Motion to Compel and Motion 473-477
For Sanctions by Learch before Judge Spindler, November 4,
1992. There is no certificate by Court Reporter or Judge
4. Hearing on pending motions, April 30, 1997, 478-576
Judge Spindler
5. Hearing on Various Motion, February 25, Vol. Ill 507-534
2000, before Judge J. Scott VanDerbeck, Special Judge
CURTIS v. PERRY, Curtis represented by Stephen Lerch,
Lloyd G. Perry, pro se
1. April 17, 1991 Defendant Perry's Motion 253
For Emergency Hearing On Petition For Order To Transfer. V.
Il, p. 253, Ls 14-16.
2. Court states he realizes the effort to get 254
the Allen County Case into Noble County, (V. IL,p. 254, Ls
5,7) Stated after Eilbacher voiced his concern to the Transfer.
(p.253, Ls 24,25, p.254,1s 1,4 253.
Jurisdiction is at issue throughout the entire hearing.
- 74, -
3. Perry cites Indiana Code 33-5-9-8 on jurisdiction. 256.
p. 256, Ls 10 and 15-25 to p. 257, Ls 1,3. on thru p.258.
4. Perry raises the issue of non co-operation 261-263
on the part of Lerch, Lerch withholding production and
answers to interrogatories,
witnesses fear for their lives, giving examples of Alford and
Croomis (Crummer) deaths in the Allen County case.
5. Court expresses concem about setting an 264
emergency hearing to protect Perry and prevent further
damage. p. 264, Ls 2-16 but misses the point that the issue is
j for not cooperating and openly obstructing the
process
6. Issues narrow to between Perry and 274
Lerch as stated by Court p.274, Ls 3-23.
7. Hearing on Emergency Relief turns to 278
evidence hearing p.278 Ls 1-3,
-L-
TABLE OF CONTENTS
EVIDENCE
TRANSCRIPTS OF PROCEEDINGS
VOLUME IL. OF IV.
PAGE 249. THRU 499
DOCUMENT: PAGE NO.:
8. Plaintiff's Exhibit 1. admitted without 278
objection p. 278,L 11 Letter dated 1/29/91 from Lerch to
Perry telling Perry to be specific as to what interrogatories were
not fully answered
9. Plaintiff's Exhibit 2. admitted without 283
objection p. 283, 15 Lerch is asking for extension of time to
produce X-rays.
- 75. -
10. Plaintiff's Exhibit 3. admitted without 291
objection. p. 291, Ls 16,17 Letter dated 2/21/91 from Lerch to
Perry stating he did not see the point in supplying Perry with
copies of Perry's own documents. Perry narrowing the
evasiveness by causing the production of the document being
evaded.
11. Plaintiff's Exhibit 4. admitted over 295
objection. p.295, Ls 1,2 Perry's objection is that he never
received the letter dated 2/21/91
12.Plaintiff's Exhibit 5. admitted over 297
objection. p.297, L 20 Perry's objection to the letter dated
2/25/91 that it is misleading by not stating the terms of the
viewing.
13. Plaintiff's Exhibit 6 asked by Lerch if 299
Perry received to letter p. 299, Ls 5-7.
Defendant Perry's response was "after a third request- -
finally". p.299,Ls 8,9. "I got some other indication that you had
sent the Judge a letter on that date. p.299, Ls 19,20 This was
the onset forming the bases of the disqualification.
The letter to the Judge was never produced with Exhibit
6.
14. Plaintiff's Exhibit 6. admitted, p.301, L 5 301
Letter dated March 19, 1991 from Lerch to Perry giving
Perry yet another set of instructions as to the limits of his
office, contrary to statements made on pp. 275,276.
15. Plaintiff's Exhibit 7. admitted p.305 L12, 304-305
but Perry objected p.304,L 10 . Clearly Lerch would not mail
the production item.
16. Lerch raises the issue that Perry has not 312-315
exhausted his administrative remedies. p.312, L20-24 on thru
p.314, L 22. Lerch admits issues are in wrong forum. p.312, L
13
TABLE OF CONTENTS
EVIDENCE
TRANSCRIPTS OFPROCEEDINGS
VOLUME Il. OF IV.
PAGE 249. THRU 499
DOCUMENT: PAGE NO.:
Perry makes the point that he filed on two 314
different occasions but withdrew the last filing p. 314Es 7 &
14. Perry points out to the Court the lie p.315, L. 14-22
Important to note that Lerch was associated 314
with the (Ls 15-21) Labor board and that the first complaint
was processed and became and issue in Perry's cross-
complaint. V. III, pp. 581, 1 2(A) thru p. 582. (second
disqualifying act)
17. Judge Spindler knew he was proceeding 316
against the rules. p.316,Ls 23-25
18. Plaintiff's Exhibit 8. admitted p.317, Ls 20,21 317.
Exhibit 8 is Defendant Perry's First Set of Interrogatories
Propounded to Plaintiff Marvin R. Curtis
19. Plaintiff's Exhibit 9 admitted without 321
objection p.321, Ls 10-12 Perry's Motion For Production Of
Documents
20. Plaintiff's Exhibit 10 admitted without 323
objection p. 323, » Ls 17,18 Plamtiff's answers to interrogatories. _
21. Plaintiff's Exhibit 11 admitted without a
objection p.328, Ls 16,17 Plaintiff's supplemental Response to
interrogatories.
22. Defendant Perry demonstrates great 332
delay in receiving production p.332,Ls 5,6 & 9.
a
23. Lerch raised the issue of location of the 333.
fight as being on May 5 in Delaware County Indiana p.333, Ls
9,10
Judge Spindler questions the location p.333, Ls 11,12
Perry recalls responding on the issue of jurisdiction but
that statement, which would have followed Spindlers question
is not in the transcript. _ (third disqualification point)
24. Lerch and his client Curtis willfully 334-337
withhold information requested by Defendant Perry needed
for Perry's discovery. p. 334, Ls 18-23
25. Court attempts to bail Lerch out of the 339-341
point that Lerch has been associated with the Labor Relations
Board, the Union and represented the Union and it's labor
board attorney Groth starting with p.339, L 3 thru 341.
[- iti. -]
TABLE OF CONTENTS
EVIDENCE
TRANSCRIPTS OF PROCEEDINGS
VOLUME IL. OF IV.
PAGE 249. THRU 499.
DOCUMENT: PAGE NO.:
26. Defendant Perry wants to place into 341-347
evidence two affidavits p.341, Ls 21 thru all of p.347 -
Judge Spindler wants to immediately go 342
back to the emergency motion purpose of the hearing and not
let Perry make the placement p.342, Ls 14-18. Judge does
admitt Defendants compile of Exhibit 1.
into evidence p.347, Ls 18-20
27. Defendant Perry's Exhibit 1. consists of a 348-382
total of 35 pages of attached to Perry's Affidavit Showing
Deliberate Delay
A. Defendant Perry's Affidavit Showing Delay 348-351
- 78. -
B. Affidavit of Abbie Bryan, documents slander 352-353
C. Letter from Crider & Crider Excavatingto 354.
Perry di ing.
D. Letter date 6/8/90 citing Lerch for setting up 355-356
theft of documents
E. Letter date 8/14/90 , Lerch to Perry, Lerch 357-359
don't like response
F. Letter date 2/21/91, Lerch to Judge Spindler 360
requesting hearing on Motion For Summary Judgment.
G. Letter date 3/11/91 Lerch to Clerk, requesting 361
H.
continuance
i Letter 3/19/91 Lerch to Judge Spindler 362
i requesting hearing on Defendant Perry's Motion To
- I. Letter 3/25/91, Lerch to Judge Spindler 363
clearifying letter above
J. Letter 3/27/91, Lerch to Judge Spindler, 363
requesting hearing date
K. Letter 3/27/91, Lerch to Judge Spindler, 365
emergency hearing
L. Letter 3/27/91, Lerch to Perry response 366
to incomplete answers
M. Letter 8/14/90, Lerch to Perry response 367
to production
N. Letter 8/14/90, Lerch to Perry faulting 368-369
Perry but not truth
QO. Letter 9/25/90, Lerch to Perry, no 371
service for anyone else
P. Letter 11/6/90, Lerch to Perry, denies filings 372.
Q. Letter 11/14/90, Lerch to Perry, issue of 373-375
wrong court.
R. Letter 1/29/91. Lerch to Perry, answersto § 376
interrogatories by Curtis no sufficient.
S. Letter 2/21/91, Lerch to Perry, stating he 377-378
produced the answers
T. Letter 5/7/90, Perry to Judge Ryan, asking 379-380
why no injunction why no other protection has been
given under Perry requests.
U. Letter 2/15/91, Perry to Lerch, narrowing 381
evasiveness of Lerch
- 79, -
V. Letter 2/7/91, Attorney Groth to Perry 382
confirms two filings of unfair labor practices with the
labor board.
W. Letter 2/28/91, Perry to Dan Smart Union 383
Local 103 requesting a review of dispatches.
[- iv. -]
TABLE OF CONTENTS
EVIDENCE
TRANSCRIPTS OFPROCEEDINGS
VOLUME I. OF IV.
PAGE 249. THRU 499.
DOCUMENT: PAGE NO.:
28. The remainder of the hearing is dedicated 398-417
to the obstruction of justice through intimidation preventing
Perry from discovery p. 398, Ls 11-20 also p.400, Ls 1-11 also
p. 401, Ls 9 thru p.414,
With emphasis p. 415-416. This summerizes the need
for the Emergency Motion.
JULY 15, 1991 Hearing On Various Motions Page 417
1. Judge Spindler proceeds on to issue 426-427
summary judgment against Perry and placed an injunction on
Perry air he hed deen cureed-mcadiiieat Gt eeaatiieaaen.
p. 427, Ls 10-20, 426, Ls 17-25, p.427, Ls 1-7. Jurisdiction was
re-instated by Indiana Supreme Court by letter dated February
28, 1992,V. Il, p.639-641.
2. Judge Spindler brings in by reference 427
Federal Judges John Tinder and Brooks. p. 427, Ls 13-25.
3. Court mades references to two deaths 428
of witnesses p.428, Ls 18,19
4. Discussion that summary judgment and 431-432
- 80. -
motion for sanctions and Perry's Motion to Dismiss are yet
undecided and Perry wants the evidence he holds withheld
beyond the hearings for discovery reasons, p. 431, Ls 1- thru L
25 of p. 32. Perry wants to shield the evidence and conduct an
evidence hearing with the witnesses physically before the
Court.
5. Court points out to Lerch that he does no 433-435t
represent Fox Contractors p.433, Ls 13-24. Lerch tries to
dismiss the Perry vs. Fox case in Allen County, by motion
before Judge Spindler in Noble County. p.434, Ls 1-25, thru
p.436.
6. Objection stated against granting Plaintiff 438-439
Curtis's Motion To Dismiss, p.438,Ls 5 thru 25 all p.439.
7. Injunction is suggested by attorney Eilbacher, 439
against Perry p.439,Ls 11thru 20.
8. Attorney General, assistant Ms. Rodeheffer 439
states she has a Motion To Dismiss Pending. p.439, Ls 23-25
[- v. -]
TABLE OF CONTENTS
EVIDENCE
TRANSCRIPTS OF PROCEEDINGS
VOLUME I. OF IV.
PAGE 249. THRU 499.
DOCUMENT: © PAGE NO:
9. Rodeheffer, states Perry did not 440
exhaust his administrative remedies stating Perry did not follow
procedure with agency. p.440, Ls 3-17.
10. Perry states constitutional violations 440-441
based upon mis-applied law by Civil Rights Commission.
p.440, Ls 19-25, thru L 16, p.441.
- 81. -
11. Perry states objection to dismissal of 441
Civil Rights Commission p.441, Ls 18-20.
12. Court grants Civil Rights Commion and 441-442
members motion to dismiss p.441, Ls 21-25 thru L 2, p.442
13. Court grants various parties motions for 443
summary judgment, starting p.442, Ls 22-25 thru L 2, p. 443;
__ Perry objects to all summary judgments. p. 443,Ls 7-12
and re-enters his motion to dismiss for no jurisdiction. p.443,Ls
9-12
14. Court continues to grant summary 443
judgments to individual motions. Granted p.443, L 13; Perry
objection L 21.
15. Court grants Hawk summary judgment 444
and sanctions, p. 444, Ls 2,3,7 Perry objects. L 6.
16. Court grants Eilbacher motion for 444
summary judgment p.444 L 21, Perry's Objection L 16, part of
Perry's statement is omitted because the persons are named that
have not answered Perry's complaint
17. Attorney Walker motion for summary 445
Judgment p.445, L 11 Perry's objection L 10
18. Attorney Lerch and clients granted 445
summary judgment p.445, L 16. Perry Objects L 15
19. Dallas Day motion for summary 445
judgment granted p.445, L 23 Perry objects L 22
20. Attomey Rockwell motion for summary 446
Judgment granted p.446, L 8. Perry objects iL 5 Part of Perry's
TABLE OF CONTENTS
EVIDENCE
TRANSCRIPTS OF PROCEEDINGS
VOLUME U. OF IV.
PAGE 249. THRU 499,
DOCUMENT: PAGE NO.:
oh Crider & Crider motion for summary 446
judgment granted p.446, L 17. Perry objects L 16
22. Musser requested Motion To Dismiss 447
and requested that is be treated as Motion For
Judgment p.446, L 20 thru L 20 on p. 447. Perry states it
depends on which rule it's under. p.446, L 25 thru L 8 p.447
23. Perry motion to dismiss, motion for 450
sanctions motion for summary judgment considered p.450, L
17-21, Court denies all motions p.451 L 14,
24. Perry asked for his evidence hearing 451
p.450 L 22-24 thru L 4,p.451 Court denied hearing p.451, Ls
1-3.
25. Perry shows the Court they have not 453
addressed the first motion to dismiss p.453, Ls 14 - thru 454
all.
Again part of Perry's statements have been omitted by
reason that L 16 by Lerch is to a presentation by Perry not
shown in print.
The presentation would have been the jurisdictional issue.
26. Court denies Perry first motion to dismiss 454
with sanctions p.454, L 23
27. Consideration of hearing motion 458-460
for injunction against Perry
28. Court's opinion of Perry's case 461-462
p.461, L 5 thru L 7 p. 462 Perry states objection p.462, L 11
and tells the court it is wrong p.462, Ls 14,15
- 83. -
29. Court references Court Of Appeals 463
p.463, Ls 5-18
X
30. This part of the transcript is clearly not 463
part of this particular hearing and it appears to be a
combination of two or more hearings. The statement made
starting on p. 463, L 19 and running thru L 25, p. 464 took
place when no other party or attorney was present, only sheriff
deputies and court reporter.
It was part but not all that was said to Judge Spindler after
the asult and attempted murder of Perry by said deputies
consistent with the letter to county commissioner in V. III,
p.635-637.
[- vii. -]
TABLE OF CONTENTS
EVIDENCE
TRANSCRIPTS OF PROCEEDINGS
VOLUME IL. OF IV.
PAGE 249. THRU 499.
DOCUMENT: PAGE NO.:
31. The issue of Judge Spindlers recusal 466-468
is stated again on p.466, L 14 thru L 20 p.468
32. Clear and un-questioned reference to 470-472
Federal District Court Judge Tinder and his broad brush
any wrong doing. p. 470, L 2 thru p.472.
Hearing on Motion to Compe! and Motion for Sanctions
November 4, 1992 Page 473
1. Curtis v. Perry, Curtis represented by 474
Lerch requested the hearing Perry never showed. p.474,Ls 4-8
Oks
2. Lerch states he sent interrogatories to Perry 475
but Perry never responded p.475, Ls 2-8
3. Lerch seeks order to compel and 475
sanctions for travel. p.475,Ls 19-24
4. No conclusion of the hearing and no Judges certificate to the
hearing
Perry was not advised of.
Hearing on Pending Motions
April 30, 1997 Page 478
1. Perry makes clear that he wants the injunction 480
totally and permanently off. p.480, L 5-14. Reason prejudice
to cases when the injunction is needlessly filed such as
Eilbacher did. p.481, Ls 2,3
2. State Court Injunction prejudices any 480-505
case that Perry is brought into by any plaintiff for any reason
in any State Court case. That is Perry's argument through out
attached to a document is no evidence of prejudice.p.496, Ls
24 thru 7, p.497
[- viii. -
TABLE OF CONTENTS
EVIDENCE
TRANSCRIPTS OF PROCEEDINGS
VOLUME IL. OF IV.
PAGE 249. THRU 499.
DOCUMENT: PAGE NO.:
Hearing on Various Motions
February 25, 2000 Page 507
1. Hearing on Perry's Post Judgment 508
Motion For Relief From Judgment. Response by Attorney
- 85. -
General assistant Janice Kruesher requesting communication
telephonically. p.508, Ls 11-16.
2. Others who responded by request for non 508
participation were Hawk, Haynie and Gallmeyer p.508, Ls22-
24 Stephen Lewis of Haller & Colvin. p.509, Ls 3-4 Leon
Eilbacher. p.510, L 1.
3. Court acknowledges receipt of filing 511
of Petition For Mandamus, Prohibition. p. 511,Ls 9-14.
4. Perry's objection to the appointment 514
of Special Judge J. Scott VanDerbeck to replace Judge
Spindler is dismissed without comment. 514, Ls 2-7
5. Perry states conditions in Clerk's office 515-516
citing listings on the docket that were not in the file and
documents in the file that were not on the docket and the first
document Perry had filed, an objection, was not in the file. p.
515, L 3, thru L 20 p.516. Jurisdiction of Allen Circuit Court
was the issue.
6. Continued discussion on record parts 516-520
letnal , abe
7. Judge tells Perry that a concent to 522
judgment cured a lot of potential problems. p.522, Ls 11-24
8. Perry states that except when concent ; 523-524
to judgment is forced. p.523, Ls 1 thru 4, p.524.
9. Judge states basic objection is to the 524
injunction. p.524, Ls 17-18
10 Perry, "I indicated to you uh, the agreed 524
entry was signed under duress" p. 524, Ls 19-21 Perry states
the judgment was already awarded by the Judge before he
signed the agreed judgment. p.524, Ls 19-25
[- ix. -]
. 2
TABLE OF CONTENTS
EVIDENCE
TRANSCRIPTS OF PROCEEDINGS
VOLUME II. OF IV.
PAGE 249. THRU 499.
DOCUMENT: PAGE NO.:
11. Perry states that the Judge made a ruling 525
on questions of fact which is reserved for the jury. p.525, Ls 5-
25
12. Perry states that cross-claim was granted 526
before agreed entry was signed. p.526, Ls 5-7
13. Perry states case was in wrong Court and 526
the missing objection states that fact. p.526, Ls 11-21
14. Perry states Allen County case was forced 526-527
to be dismissed because of threats of contempt charges. p.526,
Ls 21 thru 13 p.527
15. Judge questions why no appeal on the 527
judgments or the injunction p. 527, Ls 14-19
Perry's response is that you don't do those things when
people are trying to kill you. p. 527, Ls 20-25
16. Perry states his willingness to walk away 528-529
ss so ry Sallam
disrupting everything. p. 528, ALL
Further stated thru 529 to L 20 p.530
17. Judge gives oath to Perry with opening 530
statement deemed truth and is evidence. p.530, Ls 21-25. Oath
given p.531, Ls 8-15.
[-x. -]
TABLE OF CONTENTS
EVIDENCE
VOLUME Ill. OF IV.
PAGE 534. THRU 672.
CONTAINS RECORD PARTS AS EVIDENCE OF
TAMPERING
OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE AND ATTEMPTED MURDER
DOCUMENT: PAGE NO.:
1. Letter to Clerk, dated January 14, 2000 535.- 537
Clerk did not include in praecipe as requested.
Letter came with other documents packaged in an
envelope all of which are water damaged. Parts are those to
Supreme Court for Petition For Writ but she never produced
them.
2. Docket sheet of this case record also damaged, 538.- 575
and in a like condition and purpose as above.
3. Curtis Complaint. 576.- 577
Claim for intentional tort. (water damaged)
4. Defendant Perry's Cross-Complaint 578.- 589
R . . of . * li . in fi I
579
" Request for disciplinary proceedings in last paragraph
589.
Complains of obstruction of justice in each count.
579.- 589.
Cites Indiana Civil Rights Commission with 581 - 582
alteration of their findings after review. (water damaged)
5. Defendant Perry's Motion To Dismiss pursuant 590.- 611
to Trial Rule 12(B) .
Raises issue of no jurisdiction in parg. 1. page 590
Doctrine of latches as bar paragraph 2. page 591
Affirmative Defenses, self defense, paragraphs 592
4. & 5. page :
- 88. -
Perry vs. Fox et al., complaint is attached as 594.-611
an exhibit (all are water damaged)
6. Demand For Trail By Jury, by Perry (water damaged) 612
7. Motion To Dismiss of Defendant Moellering 613
Construction Co., Inc. Bases for motion, Lack Of Subject
Matter Jurisdiction
8. Verified Application For Permanent Injunction 614.- 634
by Ejilbacher
Federal Order of the injunction attached 620.- 627
Federal Injunction attached 628.- 632
Seventh Circuit Order attached (water damaged) 633-634
9. Letter to Noble County Commissioners stating 635.-637
attempted murder by the Noble County Sheriff Deputies
ordered by Judge Spindler
10. Certificate of service to above letter. 638.
[- i. -]
TABLE OF CONTENTS
EVIDENCE
VOLUME Ill. OF IV.
PAGE 534. THRU 672.
CONTAINS RECORD PARTS AS EVIDENCE OF
TAMPERING
OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE AND ATTEMPTED MURDER
DOCUMENT: PAGE NO.:
11. Order from Supreme Court Of Indiana to 639.- 641
Resume Jurisdiction, dated February 28, 1992 and filed March
3, 1992
Perry moved to disqualify 466. Vol. II, Ls 12-24
Judge Spindler for extra judicial contact, cited in July 15,
1991 hearing.
-89. -
Letter to commissioners (above), Hearing date and Order
dates don't match.
12. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 642.-643
Law and Judgment No laws were cited; no facts decided
by a jury.
13. Defendant Perry's Request For 644.-663
Emergency Hearing April 9, 1997
The injunctions were being used to influence other Courts
to gain judgments on bogus claims. Caused Perry a loss of
about $22 million over 4 years and put him on the street.
14. Proposed Order to Emergency Hearing above 664.
15. Response To Filings of Lloyd G. Perry 665.-666
by Eilbacher, April 10, 1997 He states his objection and
desire to keep the injunction on.
16. Defendant Lloyd G. Perry's Objection 667.-672
To C- Defendant Leonard Eilbacher's Letter and Response.
17. Original certificate of the Noble Superior Court Clerk. also
at 248.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
EVANSVILLE DIVISION |
LLOYD G. PERRY,
Plaintiff. ’
)
vs. ) EV 88-24C
)
LINDA K. BARNARD, et al., )
Defendants.
P PERRY
Lloyd G. Perry is hereby permanently ENJOINED from
filing (or having filed on his behalf) in any federal district court
without leave of that court, any lawsuit arising out of or related to
Perry v. Gresk, No. EV 84-174-C (S.D. Ind. February 21, 1986)
(unreported), aff'd, No. 86 1765 (7th Cir. November 21, 1986)
(unreported), as well as this cause of action.
Specifically, Perry is permanently ENJOINED from filing
(or having filed on his behalf) in any federal district court without
leave of that court, any lawsuit against one or more of the
following parties who were named as defendants in either Perry
v. Gresk or Perry v. Barnard:
US. DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
CERTIFIED:
A TRUE COPY
91.
William C. Welborn
Georgia Surety Company
C. Lawrence Jewett
Phillip C. Moulthorop
American Druggists' Insurancy Company
Insurance Company of North America
Lamar Street
Roger H. West
Kelco of Indiana, Inc.
Kelco Inc.
Tri-State Reclamation, Inc.
Roger S. Curry
Lee Ringman
Jasper State Bank
German American Bank
James DeMotte
David Hubster
Jasper Engine & Transmission, Inc.,
James J. Hartz
State of Indiana, Division of Reclamation of the Indiana
Department of Natural Resources
James McDonald, Jr.James Puckett
Wesley W. Ratliff, Jr.
Itsia Rivera
Sarah B. Davies
92.
eh gn ietat is 8 3 i 22 ’
LEA IDES ANI OLA IG PAE TE HI
2s PP Saeed
Bruce Kotzan
Hansford Mann
James T. Neal
C. Corydon Randall
Randal T. Shepard
Thomas H. Singer
Howard S. Young, Jr.
Rabb Emison
Russ Hart
Perry is also permanently ENJOINED from filing (or
having filed on his behalf) in any federal district court without
leave of that court, any lawsuit arising out of or related to any
issue of issues in Perry v. gresk, which was a complaint under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 and § 1985 with pendent state claims against
various attorneys, parties and witnesses who were involved in
previous lawsuits with Perry; and any lawsuit arising out of or
related to any issue or issues in Perry v. Barnard, which was a
complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against those defendants for
failing to act on his requests for disciplinary action against
various attomeys and judges who were also involved in previous
lawsuits with Perry. |
The following procedures are to be followed in order to
comply with this injunction. In seeking leave to file a complaint
concerning the above--stated matters, in this or any other federal
district court, Perry (or anyone else acting in his behalf) must file
with the complaint a motion captioned "Motion pursuant to
Court Order Seeking Leave to File." The following documents
must be attached to that motion: 1) a copy of this order and the
accompanying entry and judgment; 2) a swom affidavit
certifying that the claims that he wishes to present are new claims
never before raised by him in any state or federal court; 3) a list
of the full captions of each and every suit previously filed by him
or on his behalf against each and every defendant; 4) a copy of
each such complaint and a certified record of its disposition. A
copy of this order must be served on each defendant when and if
leave to file the new case is granted. Any such action that Perry,
or anyone acting on his behalf, seeks to file in any federal district
court will not be file marked until the judge of that court grants
Perry or anyone acting on his behalf leave to file.
Upon failure to comply with any of the terms of this
injunction, Perry may be found in contempt of this court and
93.
punished accordingly. Any defendant in any federal court suit
who believes that Perry has failed to comply with the terms of
this injunction may file an affidavit to that effect with the Clerk of
the court, Southern District of Indiana, Evansville Division, under
the EV 88-24-C docket number.
Nothing in this order shall be construed as affecting
Perry's ability to defend himself in any criminal action. Nothing
in this order shall be construed to deny Perry access to the federal
courts through the filing of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus
or other extraordinary writ. Nothing im this order shall be
construed as denying Perry access to the United States Court of
Appeals. |
IT IS SO ORDERED this 26th day of September 1989.
John Daniel Tinder, Judge
United States District Court
copies to;
Lloyd G. Perry
7999 Meadow Lane
Newburgh, IN. 47630
Robert Spear
Deputy Attorney General
Office of the Attorney General
Room 219, State House
Indianapolis, IN 46204
Ted Lockyear
Lockyear & Lockyear
555 Sycamore Street
P.O. Box 3515
Evansville, IN 47734-3515
94.
State Of Indiana ) IN THE NOBLE SUPERIOR COURT
) SS:
-County Of Noble )
)
)
Marvin R. Curtis )
Plaintiff )
)
vs. ) CAUSE NO. 57D01-9006-CT-018
)
Lloyd G. Perry, )
Defendant )
& Cross-Plaintiff, )
)
)
VS. ) FILED
) Aug 02 1991
Marvin R. Curtis ) "s/ .
CLERK NOBLE SUPERIOR COURT
together with all other herein listed )
defendants of the original case of _)
Perry v. Fox, et al., of the Allen )
Circuit Court under Cause No. )
02C01-8908-CT-93 and as follows: )
FOX CONTRACTORS, INC.,
DALLAS DAY, BOB BAKER,
RON CUMMER,
ALVEY LARAMEN, CLIFFORD
LYNN, RANDY BECKTEL,
DALE KIRKENDAU,
MOELLERING CONSTRUCTION,
Inc., SCOTT HEIL, CHARLES
ACHESON, NED SCHULTZ,
MILLER BROTHERS
CONSTRUCTION, Inc.,
BERNIE , of
Miller Bros., DENNEY .
of Miller Bros., Inc.,
JOHNSON of Miller Bros., Inc.
CHARLES CHRISTMAN Jr.,
) oe te ee ee
95.
CRIDER & CRIDER
EXCAVATING AND PAVING,
WAYNE PANCAKE, PAUL
GRIMM, DICK YEARLING,
S.E. JOHNSON COMPANIES,
Inc., HERB WIEDNER, DAVE
DAY, INTERNATIONAL UNION
OF OPERATING ENGS. LOCAL
#103, DAN SMART, KENNETH
JOHNSON, MIKE WALL, &
New Defendants Under The
Conspiracy Theory:
STEPHEN J. LERCH and LEVINE
& LERCH FIRM, STEPHEN J.
LEWIS and HALLER and COLVIN
FIRM, KAREN WALKER and
LEBAMOFF FIRM, DAVID K.
HAWK and HAWK, HAYNIE,
GALLMEYER FIRM,
DENNERLINE, GROTH & BAIRD
FIRM, SCOTT NIEMANN, and
ROTHBERG, GALLMEYER,
FRUECHTENICHT & LOGAN
FIRM, LEONARD E. EILBACHER ,
also SCOTT L. BUNNELL, and
HUNT, SUEDHOFF, BORROR &
EILBACHER, BOBBY POTTERS
of 1.C.R.C., and KAREN
FREEMAN of LC.R.C.
ee ee it ee he ee ee ee ee eee ee
The defendants, J.E. Crider & Sons, denominated "Crider
& Crider Excavating and Paving," and other cross-defendants,
having filed herein their verified application for permanent
injunction and, to the extent that any cross-defendant has not
joined im such application, the Court sua sponte now deems each
of said parties as applicants, and orders, as follows:
96.
1. Lloyd G. Perry ("Perry") is hereby permanently
enjoined from filing in any court in the State of Indiana any
lawsuit arising out of or related to Perry vs. Fox Contractors, Inc.,
et al., Allen Circuit Court, Cause No. 02C01-8908-CT-93, and to
this action.
2. Perry is permanently enjoined from filing, or
having filed on his behalf, in any court of the State of Indiana
without leave of that court, any lawsuit against any one or more
of the following serait who were named as defendants 3 in either
Thomas L. Ryan, Judge of the Allen Circuit Court;
Fox Contractors Inc., its officers, directors, or agents;
Dallas Day;
Bob Baker;
Miller Brothers Construction, Inc., its officers, directors, or
agents;
Bernard Nartker;
Denny Warner;
Charles Christman, Jr.,;
Crider & Crider Excavating & Paving, its officers, directors
or agents;
Wayne Pancake;
Paul Grimm;
Richard Yearling;
S.E. Johnson Companies, Inc., its officers, directors or agents;
Herbert Widener :
David Day;
Local Union No. 103, International Union of Operating
97.
Engineers ("Local 103"), its officers, directors or agents;
Stanley A. Levine;
Levine & Lerch, Attorneys at Law;
Stephen E. Lewis;
Cynthia Rockwell;
Haller & Colvin, Attorneys at Law;
Karen S. Walker;
Thomas P. Boyer;
Lebamoff Law Offices;
David K. Hawk;
Hawk, Haynie & Gallmeyer, Attorneys at Law;
William R. Groth;
Fillenwarth, Dennerline, Groth & Baird, Attorneys at Law;
Scott T. Niemann; E
Rothberg, Gallmeyer, Fruechtenicht & Logan, Attorneys at
Law;
Leonard E. Eilbacher;
Haller and Colvin Firm;
Karen Walker and Lebamoff firm;
David K. Hawk and Hawk , Haynie, Gallmeyer Firm;
William T. Groth and Fillenwarth, Dennerline, Groth &
Baird Firm, Scott Niemann and Rothberg Gallmeyer,
Fruechtenicht & Logan Firm,
Leonard E. Eilbacher;
Scott L. Bunnell;
Hunt, Suedhoff, Borror & Eilbacher, Attorneys at Law;
Daniel Leininger;
J. Philip Burt;
Burt, Blee, Dixon & Sutton, Attorneys at Law;
Bobby Potters;
Charles Johnson;
Karen Freeman; and
Kirk Knoll, Deputy Attorney General.
3. Perry is permanently enjoined from filing, or
having filed on his behalf in any court of the State of Indiana
without leave of that court, any lawsuit arising out of or related to
any issue or issues in Perry vs. Fox Contractors, Inc.., et al., or the
purported cross-claim of Perry in this legal action.
4. Perry is permanently enjoined from causing any
subpoena to issue by any clerk of a court of the State of Indiana
against any of the aforesaid organizations, their officers and
directors, or any aforesaid persons, judicial officers, or members
of any law firm, without following the procedures set forth
below, which are necessary to comply with this injunction.
5. The following procedures are to be followed in
order to comply with this injunction. In seeking leave to file a
complaint concerning the above-stated matters, in this or any
other court of the State of Indiana, Perry (or anyone else acting
in his behalf) must file with the complaint a motion captioned
"Motion Pursuant to Court Order Seeking Leave to File." The
following documents must be attached to that motion: (1) a copy
of this order and the accompanying findings of fact, conclusions
of law, and judgment; (2) a sworn affidavit certifying that the
claims that he wishes to present are new claims never before
raised by him in any state or federal court; (3) a list of the full
captions of each and every suit previously filed by him or on his
behalf against each and every proposed defendant; (4) a copy of
each such complaint and a certified record of its disposition. A
copy of this order must be served on each defendant when and if
leave to file the new case is granted. Any such action that Perry
or anyone acting on his behalf seeks to file in any court of the
State of Indiana will-not be file marked until the judge of that
court grants Perry or anyone acting on his behalf leave to file.
6. Similarly, Perry shall not cause a subpoena to be
issued for any of the organizations or persons listed in paragraph
2 above, without express leave of the presiding judge of that
court, and only after filing with such court a copy of this order
and bringing the same to the attention of the presiding judge.
99.
7. Upon failure to comply with any of the terms of
this injunction, Perry may be found in contempt of this court and
punished accordingly. Any defendant in any court of the State of
Indiana who believes that Perry has failed to comply with the
terms of this injunction may file an affidavit to that effect with the
Clerk of the Noble Superior Court, in Cause No. 57D01-9006-
CT-018.
8. Nothing in this order shall be construed as affecting
Perry's right of appeal herein, his ability to defend himself in any
criminal action, or to deny his access to the Court of Appeal or
the Supreme Court of Indiana for any purpose.
IT IS SO ORDERED this__6 day of August, 1991.
Stephen Spindler, Judge
Noble Superior Court
STATE OF INDIANA
SEAL
NOBLE COUNTY COURTS
I, Diann Bortner,Clerk of Noble County Courts
hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and
correct copy of the original on file in this office.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I hereunto subscribe
my name and affix the seal of the Noble Cournt
Court.
~~ tenon decree geared
Diann Bortner, Clerk, Noble County Courts
By: "s/ ", Deputy
100.
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