Opposition Brief — Zaman v. Atlantic Richfield Co.

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i n\ Supreme Court, US.

~ FILED

No. 02-93 AUG 19 2002

OFFICE OF THE CLERK

In the

Supreme Court of the Anited States

JAMSHID ZAMAN, an individual; MAHVASH ZAMAN, an individual;

BEHROUZ ZAMAN, an individual; ZAMAN, INc., a California

corporation, d/b/a BEverLY Hits Motorworks;

and AFFORDABLE Cars, INc., a California corporation,

Petitioners,

ie

ATLANTIC RICHFIELD CoMPANY, a Delaware corporation;

Fox & Fieps, a general partnership; Ropert J. Fox, an

individual; JERRY FieLps, an individual; LAWRENCE R. ANSLEY, SR.,

an individual; and MARGARET ANSLEY, an individual,

Respondents.

On Petition For Writ OF CERTIORARI

To Tue UNitrep States Court Or APPEALS

For Tue Nintu Circuit

- RESPONDENT ATLANTIC RICHFIELD

COMPANY'S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

Louis E. KEMPINSKY

Counsel of Record

PEITZMAN, GLASSMAN, WEG & KEemPINSKY LLP

1801 AVENUE OF THE STARS

Surre 1225

Los ANGELES, CA 90067

(310) 552-3100

Counsel for Respondent Atlantic Richfield Company

BECKER GALLAGHER LEGAL PUBLISHING, INC.,

CINCINNATI, OHIO 800-890-5001

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

l. Where the undisputed evidence established, as

both lower courts found, that Respondent Atlantic Richfield

Company (“Atlantic Richfield”) had a direct pecuniary and

personal stake in the underlying litigation, did Atlantic

Richfield have Article III standing to maintain suit under 42

U.S.C. § 6972, the citizen-suit provision of the Resource

Conservation and Recovery Act (“RCRA”’), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901

et seq.?

2. Does the attorneys’ fee provision of RCRA

unfairly advantage the plaintiff in a RCRA lawsuit when the

defendant may, if it is an aggrieved party, assert its own claim

under RCRA (either as a counterclaim, cross-claim, or

otherwise) and, if it prevails, recover attorneys’ fees under the

same standard applicable to a prevailing plaintiff?’

t Although this is an issue raised in the body of the Petition for

Writ of Certiorari, it was not an issue raised before either of the

lower courts, nor was it designated as a question presented for

review. It should therefore not be considered by the Court in

deciding whether to grant the writ. This is just one of several

procedural and substantive infirmities in Petitioners’ submission.

Additional examples are provided infra, any one of which constitutes

a basis for denial of review. See Sup. Ct. R. 14(4).

i

CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

Pursuant to Rule 29.6 of the Supreme Court Rules,

Atlantic Richfield hereby identifies all of its parent

corporations and any publicly held company that owns 10

percent or more of its stock: (1) BP America, Inc.; and (2) BP

p.t.c.

ll

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW ...........

CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT .......... il

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I. NO COMPELLING REASON EXISTS TO GRANT

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Il. THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S FINDING THAT ATLANTIC

RICHFIELD HAD STANDING COMPORTS WITH

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A. Atlantic Richfield Proved Injury In

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B. The Undisputed Evidence

Demonstrated That Atlantic Richfield’s

Injury In Fact Was Caused By

Petitioners’ Failure To Remediate The

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* Injunctive Relief is Likely to Redress

the Injuries in Fact Identified by

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III. CERTIORARI SHOULD NOT BE GRANTED BASED

UPON PETITIONERS’ ARGUMENT THAT RCRA

MORE READILY AUTHORIZES AN AWARD OF

ATTORNEYS’ FEES TO A PLAINTIFF THAN TO A

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Allen v. Wright,

468 U.S. 737, 752, 104 S. Ct. 3315, 3325,

Oe LB. BRO CLIO oon cla csdbvsdeventes 13

W

Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat’] Union.

442 U.S. 289, 298, 99 S. Ct. 2301,

2308-09, 60 L. Ed. 2d 895 (1979) ............. 1]

Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 117 S. Ct. 1154,

cg Et rrr eee ne 8

Bland v. Fessler,

88 F.3d 729, 736 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,

519 U.S. 1009, 117 S. Ct. 513,

em. & | tt. a 1]

Brem-Air Disposal v. Cohen,

156 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 1998) .......... 7,8

Central Arizona Water Conservation Dist. v.

United States Envtl. Protection Agency,

990 F.2d 1531, 1537 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,

510 U.S. 828, 114 S. Ct. 94,

120 L.. BG. ZE G1 (1993)... ce ccccccccscsuceun 9

Citizens for a Better Environment v. Caterpillar,

30 F. Supp. 2d 1053, 1072 n.5 (C.D. Ill. 1998) .... 8

Davis v. Sun Oil Co.,

148 F.3d 606, 610-13 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,

525 U.S. 1018, 119 S. Ct. 543,

PGE Kn: BOs PO EEE bon kok kno Cecadeabens 14

Family & Children’s Center, Inc. v.

School City of Mishawaka, 13 F.3d 1052,

1058 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 961,

115 S. Ct. 420, 130 L. Ed. 2d 335 (1994) ...

Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood,

441 U.S. 91, 100, 99 S. Ct. 1601, 1608,

Pee fi, eee ee ee eee

Graham y. Federal Emergency Mgmt. Agency,

149 F.3d 997, 1003 (9th Cir. 1998) ........

Heckler v. Mathews,

465 U.S. 728, 738, 104 S. Ct. 1387, 1394,

FF Len Gile Ae ORO CESS oi vs cee eces bb eees

Kemper Prime Indus. Partners v.

Montgomery Watson Americas, Inc.,

2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11450

{aoe BP ee rrr roe ee

Northeastern Florida Chapter of Assoc. General

Contractors of America v.

City of Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 663,

113 S. Ct. 2297, 2302, 124 L. Ed. 2d

WMA .... cc

Oregon Envtl. Council v. Kunzman,

817 F.2d 484, 491-92 (9th Cir. 1987) ......

Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization,

426 US. 26, 41-42, 96 S. Ct. 1917, 1926,

ee es eer rs ee

vl

Steel Co. v. C ‘itizens for a Better Environment,

523 U.S. 83, 102-04, 118 S. Ct. 1003.

1016-17, 140 L. Ed. 2d 210 (1998) ............. s)

Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501, 95 S. Ct. 2197,

BD Ee. THB. BE DES CASTS) 25 vc cn ccccccccccvcas 7

Statutes

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42 U.S.C. § 6972(ay1)(B) .... 2... eee ee eee. 3

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Rules

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ee eG re OUD cc Su obo pio bbe oGh owe lce ket. 4

ECE ahs wens bee vaknaec ceca eeececen es 6, 7

Ee EE a wk cn och bose ecaoubaveueeenenis 6, 7

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WU CE. CGE ke ced cicccicecccceces l

Se Fic Chis ov ko oo Weedee des we vetee mec l

Miscellaneous

ey CANS TI xine oes wa Gea Une cbabaeers 1, 4,6, 7,8

15 J. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice.

§101.40[S][a] (3d ed. 2002) .... 2.200000... )

17 C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper,

Federal Practice & Procedure: Jurisdiction 2d.

§4036 (1988 & supp. 2002) .........0002.0... 15

V1i

OPINIONS BELOW

Atlantic Richfield objects to Petitioners’ incomplete

citation of opinions and orders entered in the case by the lower

courts. Both the “Opinions Below” section and the Appendix

in the Petition for Writ of Certiorari (“Petition’’) omit the Order

Denying Defendants’ Motions Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59

(“Order”), entered by the United States District Court for the

Central District of California (“District Court’) on August 8,

2000. The Order addresses the precise issue as to which

Petitioners seek review. It sets forth the District Court’s

findings and conclusions regarding the existence of Atlantic

Richfield’s Article III standing to bring the RCRA action, the

challenge of which Petitioners did not initiate until after the

District Court’s entry of judgment in favor of Atlantic

Richfield.

The Order is set forth in the Appendix to this

Opposition at pages 1b through 9b. Pursuant to Sup. Ct. R.

14(1)(d) and 14(1)(i) (specifically, Rules 14(1)(1)(1),

14(1)(i)(ii), and/or 14(1)(i)(vi)), Petitioners were specifically

required to cite the Order and to include it in the Appendix to

the Petition. Petitioners’ failure to do so is, in and of itself, a

sufficient reason for the Court to deny the Petition. See Sup.

Ct. R. 14(4).

The District Court’s Findings of Fact and Conclusions

of Law, entered on May 4, 2000, is set forth at pages 5a-53a of

the Appendix to the Petition.? The District Court's Final

Judgment and Permanent Injunction, entered on May 23, 2000,

is set forth at pages 56a-61a of the Appendix to the Petition.

: To distinguish between the two appendices, all references to

“RA: _” are to the Appendix to the Opposition. All references to

“PA: _” are to the Appendix to the Petition.

l

The Memorandum Opinion of the United States Court

of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (“Ninth Circuit”) affirming the

District Court’s entry of judgment in favor of Atlantic

Richfield and against Petitioners, filed on January 16, 2002, is

set forth at pages la-4a of the Appendix to the Petition. The

Ninth Circuit’s Order denying Petitioners’ petition for

rehearing and rehearing en banc, filed on March 12, 2002, is

set forth at pages 54a-55a of the Appendix to the Petition.

No prior orders or opinions have been reported.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

In 1979, two of the petitioners, Jamshid Zaman and

Mahvash Zaman, acquired the real property commonly known

as 8800 Burton Way in Beverly Hills, California (“Property’’).

See PA: 9a. Following their acquisition of the Property,

Jamshid Zaman operated a gasoline service station on the site.

See PA: 9a-10a. Later, petitioner Behrouz Zaman operated a

car repair and mechanic shop on the site. See PA: lla. In

recent years, petitioner Affordable Cars, Inc. has operated a car

rental business at the Property. See PA: 15a.

By the mid-1980s, Petitioners had allowed the Property

to become contaminated with thousands of gallons of gasoline

and waste oil. See PA: 1la-12a. Petitioners did nothing to

clean up the Property, allowing the unremediated

contamination to begin to migrate off site. See PA: 16a-17a,

19a. Instead, Petitioners sought to shift the blame for the

contamination to Atlantic Richfield. Petitioners accused

Atlantic Richfield, which had owned the Property for anumber

of years prior to selling it in 1979, of contaminating the

Property and demanded that Atlantic Richfield undertake at its

own expense the clean-up. See PA: 7a, 9a, 15a-17a; RA: 6b.

Upon learning of the existence of the contamination,

Atlantic Richfield engaged in extensive good-faith negotiations

with Jamshid Zaman and his representatives concerning a

potential agreement to remediate the Property. See PA: 16a.

Atlantic Richfield also took steps to assess the site, as well as

to remove the most dangerous contaminants. See id. Atlantic

Richfield spent in excess of $200,000 in connection with these

site assessment and remediation activities, much of which was

done in response to agency orders directed to Jamshid Zaman.

See id

Efforts by Atlantic Richfield over seven years to reach

an agreement with Petitioners regarding the clean-up of the

Property were unsuccessful, as Petitioners persisted in their

refusal to take appropriate steps to remediate the Property.

Confronting this intransigence, the threat of agency action

directed against Atlantic Richfield, and the possibility of

litigation from adjoining landowners, Atlantic Richfield

initiated in October 1994 the process (by giving the 90 days’

required notice) preparatory to filing a suit for injunctive relief

under RCRA.’ See PA: 17a.; RA: 5b-7b.

Following a lengthy trial that began in March 2000, the

District Court found Petitioners to be responsible for 100% of

the gasoline and waste oil contamination at the Property. See

PA: 20a-34a. The District Court concluded that the evidence

justified the issuance of an injunction pursuant to RCRA to

ensure the Property would be remediated. See PA: 35a, 40a-

3 Under RCRA, “any person may commence a civil action on

his own behalf. . . against any person . . . who has contributed or is

contributing to the past or present handling, storage, treatment,

transportation, or disposal of any solid or hazardous waste which

may present an imminent and substantial endangerment to health or

the environment.” 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B).

3

41a. The District Court thereafter on May 23, 2000 entered its

Final Judgment and Permanent Injunction. See PA: 56a. Only

at this point did Petitioners raise for the first time the issue of

Atlantic Richfield’s Article III standing, asserting it as a

ground for their motion to vacate the judgment under Fed. R.

Civ. P. 59. See RA: 4b. The District Court denied the motion,

and, in so doing, it augmented its findings, based on the

testimony adduced at trial, to address the standing issue. See

RA: 5b-7b.

The Petition is premised on a persistent and

fundamental misstatement of the factual record before the

District Court and the Ninth Circuit. Petitioners are flatly

wrong in asserting that: (1) the Ninth Circuit “has decided

Atlantic Richfield’s Article III standing in reliance on evidence

not in record”; and (2) “[p]rior to this lawsuit, the Petitioners

did not contend that Atlantic Richfield was responsible for the

contamination and did not demand that the company help cover

remediation costs.” Petition at 3-4. In point of fact, Jamshid

Zaman’s representative Ali Ebrahimi testified at trial through

a videotaped deposition that Jamshid Zaman approached

Atlantic Richfield in the mid-1980s because he maintained that

Atlantic Richfield had caused the contamination and should

bear the clean-up costs.* See PA: 16a-17a.

Furthermore, while Petitioners acknowledge that the

District Court denied their motion to vacate the judgment based

upon Atlantic Richfield’s alleged lack of standing, see Petition

2 The District Court’s Findings of Fact and Conclusions of

Law indicated that “[t]he Court received the testimony of Eli [sic]

Ebrahimi by way of videotaped excerpts of deposition testimony.”

Appendix to Petition at 6a, 46a n. 3. Excerpts from the transcript of

Mr. Ebrahimi’s deposition testimony were included as pages 590-600

of the Supplemental Excerpts of Record filed by Atlantic Richfield

with the Ninth Circuit.

4

EEE EE

at 2, they fail to set forth the District Court’s findings on the

standing issue either in the body of their Petition or in the

Appendix thereto. In denying Petitioners’ motion to vacate the

judgment, the District Court stated that its Findings of Fact

“did not expressly address the issue of standing because

(1) standing had never been challenged until the filing of the

Rule 59(e) motion, and (2) because the record so clearly

showed that [Atlantic Richfield] had standing.” RA: 5b

In its Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law and in

its Order denying the motion to vacate the judgment, the

District Court found that the contamination, unless remediated,

would continue to migrate off-site and cause off-site

contamination. See PA: 19a; RA: 5b-6b. In holding that

Atlantic Richfield had standing to pursue its RCRA claim, the

District Court found that the contamination implicated Atlantic

Richfield as a prior owner of the Property because: (1) “i]t is

possible that owners of adjacent property might sue [Atlantic

Richfield] if contamination emanating from the Property

contaminated their Property”; (2) “[Petitioners] claimed that

[Atlantic Richfield] was responsible for the contamination at

the Property and sought to have [Atlantic Richfield] pay for the

costs of remediating the Property”; and (3) a public agency, the

Regional Water Quality Control Board (the “RWQCB”), was

seeking to have the Property remediated and could have issued

an enforcement order naming all potentially responsible narties

including Atlantic Richfield, but “did not do so, in part,

because it believed that [Petitioners] were proceeding with

remediation.” RA: 5b-6b.

The District Court then found that, if Petitioners had

remediated the Property, “[Atlantic Richfield] would not be

subject to suit from adjacent neighbors and would not be

subject to an RWQCB enforcement action,” and “Atlantic

Richfield’s] potential liability to [Petitioners] would have been

5

lower.” RA: 6b-7b. Accordingly, the District Court found

that: (1) “[rJemediation of the Property decreases the likelihood

of lawsuits from adjacent neighbors and decreases [Atlantic

Richfield’s] financial exposure”; and (2) “[r]emediation of the

Property removes the threat of an RWQCB enforcement

action.” RA: 7b. The District Court therefore concluded that

“(Atlantic Richfield] had standing under Article III of the

Constitution and under 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a).” RA: 7b.

The Ninth Circuit found that there was a real

controversy giving Atlantic Richfield standing to sue because

“(Petitioners], through their representative Ebrahimi,

contended that Atlantic Richfield was responsible for the

contamination and demanded that the company help cover

remediation costs.” PA: 3a. Having found this to be a

sufficient basis to confer Article III standing, the Ninth Circuit

did not need to address whether the other two controversies

identified by the District Court also constituted injuries in fact

giving Atlantic Richfield the requisite standing to sue. See id.

ARGUMENT

I. No COMPELLING REASON EXISTS TO GRANT

CERTIORARI.

Under Rule 10 of the Supreme Court Rules, a petition

for a writ of certiorari “will be granted only for compelling

reasons” in the Court’s discretion. Sup. Ct. R. 10. Petitioners

cannot show that the Ninth Circuit’s unpublished Memorandum

Opinion decided an important federal question in a way that

conflicts with decisions from this Court or other federal

appellate courts. See Sup. Ct. R. 10(a), (c). Nor can

Petitioners show that the Ninth Circuit “has so far departed

from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings, or

sanctioned such a departure by a lower court, as to call for an

exercise of this Court’s supervisory power.” Sup. Ct. R. 10(a).

At most, Petitioners contend that the District Court and

the Ninth Circuit committed a factual error in finding that

Atlantic Richfield suffered injury in fact giving it standing to

sue. “A petition for a wmit of certiorari is rarely granted when

the asserted error consists of erroneous factual findings or the

misapplication of a properly stated rule of law.” Sup. Ct. R. 10.

Neither error, in any event occurred in this case. The

application of well-settled constitutional principles to the

undisputed evidence compelled the Ninth Circuit to affirm the

District Court’s finding that Atlantic Richfield possessed the

requisite standing to pursue its RCRA claim.

Il. THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S FINDING THAT ATLANTIC

RICHFIELD HAD STANDING COMPORTS WITH THIS

COURT’S OPINIONS.

The determination of whether a plaintiff has standing to

bring suit under a statute begins with an examination of the

legislative intent. It is axiomatic that “Congress may, by

legislation, expand standing to the full extent permitted by Art.

III, thus permitting litigation by one ‘who otherwise would be

barred by prudential standing rules.’” Gladstone, Realtors v.

Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 100, 99S. Ct. 1601, 1608, 60

L. Ed. 2d 66 (1979) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490,

501, 95 S. Ct. 2197, 45 L. Ed. 2d 343 (1975)). This is what

Congress has done in 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a), the citizen-suit

provision of RCRA under which Atlantic Richfield proceeded,

which broadly confers standing upon “any person.” As one

court explained:

.. The text [of Section 6972(a)] could not be

more clear as to the statute’s scope: “any

7

person,” including [the plaintiff], can sue “‘any

person,” including the United States and its

officers, for any violation of “any of [RCRA’s]

... requirements.” [42 U.S.C. § 6972(a).] In

light of the extraordinary breadth of this

statutory language, [the plaintiff] most certainly

could have filed a citizen-suit.

A recent Supreme Court case makes this

very point. As the Court explained in Bennett

v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 117 S. Ct. 1154, 137 L.

Ed. 2d 281 (1997), with regard to the citizen-

suit provision of the Endangered Species Act, a

conferral of standing upon “any person”’ is “an

authorization of remarkable breadth.” Jd. at

1162. It applies to “al/ the causes of action”

created by the statute, and “there is no textual

basis for saying that its expansion of standing

requirements applies to environmentalists

alone.” Jd. at 1163 (emphasis added). . . .

Brem-Air Disposal v. Cohen, 156 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir.

1998) (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted). See Citizens

for a Better Environment v. Caterpillar, 30 F. Supp. 2d 1053,

1072 n.5 (C.D. Ill. 1998) (because RCRA authorizes “any

person” to commence a suit, a RCRA plaintiff's standing may

not be challenged under the prudential “zone of interest”

requirement).

Apparently recognizing this authority, Petitioners do

not dispute that RCRA confers standing upon Atlantic

Richfield or challenge Atlantic Richfield’s standing as a

prudential matter. Instead, Petitioners premise their challenge

upon the baseline standing requirements imposed by Article

Ill, Section 2 of the United States Constitution. See Petition at

6-7.

For purposes of Article III standing, three requirements

must be met: (1) “there must be alleged (and ultimately proven)

an ‘injury in fact’ - a harm suffered by the plaintiff that is

‘concrete’ and ‘actual or imminent, not “conjectural” or

“hypothetical’”; (2) “there must be causation - a fairly

traceable connection between the plaintiff's injury and the

complained-of conduct of the defendant”: and (3) “there must

be redressability - a likelihood that the requested relief will

redress the alleged injury.” Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better

Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 102-04, 118 S. Ct. 1003, 1016-17.

140 L. Ed. 2d 210 (1998) (citation omitted).

A. Atlantic Richfield Proved Injury In Fact.

Atlantic Richfield brought suit to protect its own

financial interest in ensuring that the Property was remediated

as expeditiously as possible. “Pecuniary injury is clearly ‘a

sufficient basis for standing.” Central Arizona Water

Conservation Dist. v. United States Envtl. Protection Agency,

990 F.2d 1531, 1537 (9th Cir.) (citation omitted), cert. denied,

510 U.S. 828, 114 S. Ct. 94, 126 L. Ed. 2d 61 (1993). See

generally 15 J. Moore, Moores Federal Practice,

§ 101.40[S][a] (3d ed. 2002) (“{p]ecuniary interest clearly

provides a sufficient basis for standing”) (footnote omitted).

Furthermore, where the plaintiff has Aan actual stake in the

outcome that goes beyond ‘intellectual or academic curiosity,’

. even a minor or non-economic injury will satisfy the

strictures of Article III.” Family & Children’s Center, Inc. v.

School City of Mishawaka, 13 F.3d 1052, 1058 (7th Cir.)

(citation omitted), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 961, 115 S. Ct. 420,

130 L. Ed. 2d 335 (1994).

The evidence introduced at trial showed that the

standing requirements were met for at least three different

injuries suffered by Atlantic Richfield. Each of these injuries

9

resulted directly from Petitioners’ continuing failure to

remediate the Property. Any one of these three injuries, taken

alone, would be sufficient to create Article III standing.

First, Atlantic Richfield had standing because

Petitioners claimed that Atlantic Richfield was responsible for

the contamination, and Petitioners’ continued failure to

commence remediation was increasing the amount of damages

that might have been assessed against Atlantic Richfield.

Second, Atlantic Richfield had standing because the

contamination at the Property, unless remediated, would

continue to migrate off-site, creating the potential that nearby

property owners would sue Atlantic Richfield for

contamination of their property. Third, Atlantic Richfield had

standing because the RWQCB would, as a matter of policy,

have issued an order requiring Atlantic Richfield to clean up

the Property if it were not otherwise remediated.

Threat of Suit by Petitioners. As both the District

Court and the Ninth Circuit held, Petitioners’ own claims that

Atlantic Richfield was responsible for the contamination at the

Property constituted an injury in fact giving Atlantic Richfield

standing. This contention gave Atlantic Richfield a strong

pecuniary interest in ensuring that the contamination was

remediated as expeditiously and inexpensively as possible.

See Kemper Prime Indus. Partners v. Montgomery Watson

Americas, Inc., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11450 at *2, 6, 18

(N.D. Ill. June 26, 2000) (holding that a defendant alleged to

have financial responsibility for contamination at a property

had suffered an injury in fact that was “concrete and

particularized and actual or imminent” and therefore supported

a RCRA claim).

Threat of Suit by Adjacent Landowners. Atlantic

Richfield also established injury in fact through evidence

10

wast

demonstrating a likelihood that the owners of down-gradient

property might sue Atlantic Richfield if their property were

contaminated by gasoline or waste oil emanating from the

Property. Ralph Moran of Atlantic Richfield testified to the

existence and significance of this likelihood. Indeed, counsel

for Atlantic Richfield received a letter dated September 15,

1997 from counsel for the owner of the land directly to the

south of the Property, who threatened to sue Atlantic Richfield

if any contamination from the Property migrated to its parcel.°

The fact that no adjacent landowner has yet sued

Atlantic Richfield does not mean there was no injury in fact.

“Injury sufficient to meet the standing requirement may be

actual or threatened, . . . and may involve a contingent risk of

injury.” Oregon Envtl. Council v. Kunzman, 817 F.2d 484,

491-92 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S.

728, 738, 104 S. Ct. 1387, 1394, 79 L. Ed. 2d 646 (1984)).

“**(OJne does not have to await the consummation of threatened

injury to obtain preventive relief”; ““‘[i]f the injury is certainly

impending that is enough.’” Bland v. Fessler, 88 F.3d 729, 736

(9th Cir.) (quoting Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat'l

Union, 442 U.S. 289, 298, 99 S. Ct. 2301, 2308-09, 60 L. Ed.

2d 895 (1979)), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1009, 117 S. Ct. 513,

136 L. Ed. 2d 403 (1996).

Threat of Agency Enforcement Action. Atlantic

Richfield suffered an injury in fact as a result of the actions of

the RWQCB. As the District Court found: (1) the RWQCB was

seeking to have the Property remediated; (2) “(t]he RWQCB

could have issued an enforcement order requiring remediation

3 Mr. Moran's testimony and the letter from counsel may be

found at pages 690-91 and page 686, respectively, of the

Supplemental Excerpts of Record filed with the Ninth Circuit by

Atlantic Richfield.

11

but did not do so, in part, because it believed that [Petitioners]

were proceeding with remediation”; and (3) “(t]he enforcement

order would have named all potentially responsible parties

including [Atlantic Richfield].” RA: 6b. This finding was

supported by the testimony of former RWQCB official James

Ross that the RWQCB would, as a matter of “standard

operating procedure,” have named all potentially responsible

parties - including Atlantic Richfield - in an enforcement

order.°

B. The Undisputed Evidence Demonstrated

That Atlantic Richfield’s Injury In Fact Was

Caused By Petitioners’ Failure To

Remediate The Property.

The requirement of “‘a causal relationship between the

injury and the challenged conduct” means “that the injury

‘fairly can be traced to the challenged action of the defendant,’

and has not resulted ‘from the independent action of some third

party not before the court.”” Northeastern Florida Chapter of

Assoc. General Contractors of America v. City of Jacksonville,

508 U.S. 656, 663, 113 S. Ct. 2297, 2302, 124 L. Ed. 2d 586

(1993) (quoting Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights

Organization, 426 U.S. 26, 41-42, 96 S. Ct. 1917, 1926, 48 L.

Ed. 2d 450 (1976)).

The causation prong of the standing test is met in this

case. Atlantic Richfield’s RCRA claim was based upon

Petitioners’ continuing failure to undertake the remedial efforts

necessary to abate the imminent and substantial threat to health

or the environment caused by the contamination at the

° Mr. Ross’ testimony may be found at pages 750-51 of the

Supplemental Excerpts of Record filed with the Ninth Circuit by

Atlantic Richfield.

12

Property. Petitioners’ failure to remediate the Property directly

caused each of the three injuries in fact identified by Atlantic

Richfield. As the District Court found, if Petitioners had

remediated the Property as appropriate: (1) it would have

“decrease[d] the likelihood of lawsuits from adjacent neighbors

and decrease[d] [Atlantic Richfield’s] financial exposure”;

(2) “Atlantic Richfield’s potential liability to [Petitioners]

would have been lower’; and (3) it would have “remove[d] the

threat of an RWQCB enforcement action.” RA: 6b-7b.

C. Injunctive Relief is Likely to Redress the

Injuries in Fact Identified by Atlantic

Richfield.

The requirement of “a likelihood that the injury will be

redressed by a favorable decision” means “that the ‘prospect of

obtaining relief from the injury as a result of a favorable ruling’

is not ‘too speculative.’” Northeastern Florida Chapter of

Assoc. General Contractors of America, 508 U.S. at 663-64,

113 S. Ct. 2297, 2302, 124 L. Ed. 2d 586 (quoting Allen v.

Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752, 1048S. Ct. 3315, 3325, 82 L. Ed. 2d

556 (1984)). “[P]laintiffs ‘must show only that a favorable

decision is likely to redress (their injuries], not that a favorable

decision will inevitably redress [their injuries].”” Graham v.

Federal Emergency Mgmt. Agency, 149 F.3d 997, 1003 (9th

Cir. 1998) (citation omitted).

As the District Court found, see RA: 6b-7b, the

injunctive relief it ordered does much to redress the injuries in

fact identified by Atlantic Richfield. Requiring Petitioners to

take the steps necessary to prevent any imminent or substantial

threat to health or the environment will make it considerably

less likely that other property owners will sue Atlantic

Richfield for contamination of their property. See id. In the

event that the District Court had found that Atlantic Richfield

13

was responsible for any contamination at the Property - which

it ultimately did not - the injunctive relief sought by Atlantic

Richfield would have decreased the cost of remediation and

thereby would have decreased the amount of damages that

could be imposed on Atlantic Richfield. See RA: 7b. See

also Kemper Prime Indus. Partners, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

11450 at *2, 6, 18 (holding that a defendant alleged to have

financial responsibility for contamination at a property had

shown redressability with regard to its RCRA claim by

asserting that its “exposure for the clean-up will be greatly

reduced, if not eliminated,” if the court ordered remediation of

the property). Similarly, the injunctive relief ordered by the

District Court made it unnecessary for the RWQCB to issue an

enforcement order requiring Atlantic Richfield to remediate the

Property. See RA: 6b-7b.

In Davis v. Sun Oil Co., 148 F.3d 606, 610-13 (6th

Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1018, 119 S. Ct. 543, 142 L. Ed. 2d

451 (1998), defendants argued that res judicata barred plaintiffs

from pursuing a federal claim for injunctive relief under RCRA

because they had already obtained injunctive relief in a state

court action. See id. The Sixth Circuit noted that “[i]t would

be possible to reformulate [the defendant’s] theory as a

challenge to the [plaintiffs’] standing to bring their RCRA

action - specifically, as an assertion that the [plaintiffs] fail to

meet the ‘remedial benefit’ requirement of standing.” Jd. at 610

n.4. The Sixth Circuit found that defendants could not have

prevailed on such a theory “because the [plaintiffs] may benefit

from the pressure placed on [the defendant] to remedy the

pollution by the daily-accruing penalties.” Jd. The likelihood

that Atlantic Richfield would benefit from an injunction

entered by the district court is considerably greater than the

likelihood that the Davis plaintiffs would have benefitted from

the relief sought in the federal lawsuit.

14

CERTIORARI SHOULD NOT BE GRANTED BASED

UPON PETITIONERS’ ARGUMENT THAT RCRA MORE

READILY AUTHORIZES AN AWARD OF ATTORNEYS’

FEES TO A PLAINTIFF THAN TO A DEFENDANT.

Without including the issue as a question presented for

review, Petitioners suggest that certiorari should be granted

because a RCRA plaintiff may more readily recover attorneys’

fees than a RCRA defendant, thereby giving a party an

incentive to initiate a RCRA suit. See Petition at 13-15.

However, Petitioners did not raise this issue before the Ninth

Circuit. Accordingly, the Court should decline to consider the

issue for the first time through a writ of certiorari. See

generally 17 C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, Federal

Practice & Procedure: Jurisdiction 2d, § 4036, at 35 & nn. 67-

68 (1988 & supp. 2002) (noting “the general rule that new

questions may not be raised for the first time on Supreme Court

review ’).

In any event, Petitioners’ argument fails on the merits.

RCRA authorizes a court “to award costs of litigation

(including reasonable attorney and expert witness fees) to the

prevailing or substantially prevailing party, whenever the court

determines such an award is appropriate.” 42 U.S.C. § 6972(e).

If a defendant in a RCRA lawsuit believes that a plaintiff or

other party is responsible for the contamination at a site, the

defendant may file a RCRA counterclaim, cross-claim, etc.

against the culpable party.’ Should the defendant prevail on its

RCRA claim by proving that another party is responsible for

the contamination, it will have the benefit of RCRA’s more

2 Indeed, Petitioners filed an amended counterclaim asserting

a RCRA claim against Atlantic Richfield, but the District Court

ultimately dismissed the RCRA claim as barred by the statute of

limitations.

15

lenient standard for recovering attorneys’ fees even though it

asserted its RCRA claim in a capacity other than as plaintiff.

The RCRA attorneys’ fee provision gives no advantage to the

first to bring suit. The same standard applies to whomever is

successful in obtaining relief against a party responsible for

creating the risk sought to be remedied by the statute.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, Atlantic Richfield

respectfully asks the Court to deny the Petition.

DATED: August 19, 2002

Respectfully submitted,

LoulIs E. KEMPINSKY

PEITZMAN, GLASSMAN, WEG &

KEMPINSKY LLP

1801 AVENUE OF THE STARS

SUITE 1225

Los ANGELES, CA 90067

(310) 552-3100

Counsel for Respondent Atlantic

Richfield Company

16

APPENDIX 1 .

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CV-95-566-ABC (AJWx)

[Filed August 4, 2002]

[Entered August 8, 2002}

Atlantic Richfield Company,

Plaintiff,

V.

Defendants.

)

)

)

)

)

)

Jamshid Zaman, et al., )

)

)

)

)

And Related Cross-Actions. )

)

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS

PURSUANT TO FED. R. CIV. P. 59

After reviewing the materials submitted by the parties

and the case file, the Court DENIES Defendants’ Motions

Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(b) and 59(e).

ae

Order Denying Defendants’ Motions

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59

I. Procedural Background

This matter was tried to the Court March 7 through

April 19, 2000. The court issued Findings of Fact and

Conclusions of Law on May 3, 2000. The court filed a Final

Judgment and Permanent Injunction on May 22, 2000.

Defendants Jamshid Zaman, Mahvash Zaman,

Behrouz Zaman, and Affordable Cars, Inc. (the “Zaman

Parties”) filed the instant motions on June 7, 2000. The first

motion is a motion to vacate, alter, or amend the judgment

pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). The Zaman Parties’ Rule

59(e) motion is based on the grounds that (1) the Court lacks

subject matter jurisdiction and (2) there was insubstantial

evidence to hold the separate Zaman Parties liable. The

second motion is a motion for new trial pursuant to Rule

59(b). The Rule 59(b) motion is based on the grounds that (1)

the Court erred in its evidentiary ruling concerning the belated

discovery of the 55-gallon drum and (2) there was a lack of

substantial evidence. Plaintiff Atlantic Richfield Company

(“ARCO”) and Counter-Defendants Lawrence and Margaret

Ansley oppose.

II. Discussion

A. Rule 59 Standard

A motion under 59(e) “should not be granted, absent

highly unusual circumstances, unless the district court is

presented with newly discovered evidence, committed clear

error, or if there is an intervening change in the controlling

law.” 389 Orange Street Partners v. Arnold, 179 F. 3d 656,

/-

Order Denying Defendants’ Motions

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59 _

665 (9th Cir. 1999). “Reconsideration of a judgment after its

entry is an extraordinary remedy which should be used

sparingly.” McDowell v. Calderon, 197 F. 3d 1253, 1255 n.

1 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting 11 Charles Alan Wright, et al.,

Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d § 2810.1 (1995)).

Pursuant to Rule 59(b), a district court may grant a

new trial upon a timely motion. General grounds for a new

trial include: (1) that the verdict is against the weight of the

evidence, (2) that the damages are excessive, or (3) that the

trial was unfair, either in light of the substantial errors in the

admission or exclusion of evidence, or erroneous instruction

of the jury. See 11 Charles Alan Wright, et al., Federal

Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d § 2805 et. seq. (1995).

When evaluating a motion for a new trial based on error, the

Court’s inquiry is twofold: (1) whether an error was in fact

committed and (2) whether that error was so prejudicial that

denial of a new trial would be “inconsistent with substantial

justice.” Fed R. Civ. P. 61. Thus, before granting a new

trial, the district court must be convinced that the error

adversely affected or tainted the verdict.

The burden of proof on a new trial motion rests on the

moving party. Anglo-American Gen. Agents v. Jackson Nat.

Life Ins. Co,. 83 F.R.D. 41, 43 (N.D. Cal. 1979). A motion

under Rule 59 is committed to the district court’s sound

discretion. See Allied Chemical Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc., 449

U.S. 33 (1980); 389 Orange Street Partners, 179 F. 3d at

665; Metromedia Co. v. Fugazy, 983 F. 2d 350 (2d Cir.

1992).

Order Denying Defendants’ Motions

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59

Finally, a Rule 59 motion “may not be used. . . to

raise arguments which could have been raised prior to the

issuance of the judgment, nor may they be used to argue a

case under a novel legal theory that the party had the ability

to address in the first instance.” Pacific Ins. Co. v. American

Nat. Fire Ins. Co., 148 F. 3d 396, 403 (4th Cir. 1998)

(describing Rule 59(e) standard); accord 389 Orange Street

Partners, 179 F. 3d at 665; 11 Wright, supra, § 2805

(describing Rule 59(b) standard).

B. The Court has jurisdiction.

For the first time in this litigation, the Zaman Parties

argue that this Court has no subject-matter jurisdiction over

this case. Specifically, they argue that ARCO has no standing

to sue as required by Article III of the United States

Constitution.

Although the Zaman Parties bring up this argument for

the first time after trial, the prohibition against raising

arguments for the first time does not generally apply to

jurisdictional questions because subject matter jurisdiction

goes to the heart of whether this Court has power to issue a

judgment in the first place. If the Court has no subject matter

jurisdiction, any judgment issued by the Court would be void.

Of course, where there is an honest concern about

jurisdiction, it is incumbent on the party to challenge that

jurisdiction as early as possible. As the parties are aware, this

case, which spanned five years, placed a substantial burden on

the resources of this Court and of the parties. But even if the

Court were to assume that Zaman Parties had permitted the

4b

Fain tn hia etn nl 5h 86? Salaun a ai aaep ee Nie ail

PAREN ne

ES!

LR rs a yt

Order Denying Defendants’ Motions

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59

Court to waste its resources on a matter that they suspected all

along was not properly before this Court, the Court would

have to vacate the judgment if it determined that subject

matter jurisdiction was lacking. '

The Court, however, finds that the Zaman Parties’

contention lacks merit. The Court’s finding that it had subject

matter jurisdiction, (Conclusions of Law { 1), is fully

supported by the record. The Zaman Parties argue that

because the Court did not make express findings of fact and

conclusions of law about ARCO’s standing that the judgment

must be vacated. In all honesty, the Court did not expressly

address the issue of standing, because (1) standing had never

been challenged until the filing of the Rule 59(e) motion, and

(2) because the record so clearly showed that ARCO had

standing. To clarify any doubts, the Court makes the

following additional findings:

‘ ARCO is a person for purposes of 42 U.S.C.

§ 6972 of the Resource Conservation and

Recovery Act (“RCRA”).

Bs The gasoline and waste oil contamination on

the Property is a continuing threat to human

health and the environment. The unremediated

contamination has moved off-site and will

continue to move off-site unless action is

At the same time, if it was just a matter of a trial

record that lacked evidence to support the issue of standing, the

Court would first grant Plaintiff the opportunity to meet its burden

of showing that it had standing.

Sb

Order Denying Defendants’ Motions

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59

taken. If the Property is not remediated, the

groundwater will continually’ be

recontaminated with seasonal cyclic rise and

fall of the water table. (Findings of Fact ¢ 56.)

It is possible that owners of adjacent property

might sue ARCO if contamination emanating

from the Property contaminated their property.

(Moran Testimony.)

The Zaman Parties claimed that ARCO was

responsible for the contamination at the

property and sought to have ARCO pay for the

costs of remediating the Property.

The Regional Water Quality Control Board

(“RWQCB”) was seeking to have the water

remediated. (Ross Testimony.)

The RWQCB could have issued an

enforcement order requiring remediation but

did not do so, in part, because it believed that

the Zaman Parties were proceeding with

remediation. (Ross Testimony; Findings of

Fact ¢ 57.)

The enforcement order would have named all

potentially responsible parties including

ARCO. (Ross Testimony.)

If the Zaman Parties had remediated the

Property, ARCO would not be subject to suit

6b

Order Denying Defendants’ Motions

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59

from adjacent neighbors and would not be

subject to an RWQCB enforcement action.

9. If the Zaman Parties had remediated the

Property, ARCO’s potential liability to the

Zaman Parties would have been lower.

10. Remediation of the Property decreases the

likelihood of lawsuits from adjacent neighbors,

and decreases ARCO’s financial exposure.

11. Remediation of the Property removes the

threat of an RWQCB enforcement action.

Based on these findings, the Court finds that ARCO had

standing under Article III of the Constitution and under 42

U.S.C. § 6972(a).

at There is sufficient evidence to support the

judgment.

Both of the Zaman Parties’ motions argue that there is

insufficient evidence to hold Behrouz Zaman on the gasoline

contamination, Jamshid Zaman on the waste oil

contamination, Mahvash Zaman on any contamination, and

Affordable Cars on any contamination. The Court disagrees.

The Court finds that there is sufficient evidence to support

judgment against each of the Zaman Parties.

The Court also notes that for the first time in their

reply on the Rule 59(e) motion, the Zaman parties argue that

the Court should apportion the amount of contamination

7b

Order Denying Defendants’ Motions

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59

among each of the Zaman Parties. The Zaman Parties could

have brought this argument at trial or earlier. Accordingly,

the Court refuses to consider the argument. See 389 Orange

Street Partners, 179 F. 3d. at 665. The Court’s holding that

the Zaman Parties are jointly and severally liable for the full

amount of the contamination on the site stands.

D. The Court did not err in sanctioning the

Zaman Parties for spoliation of evidence.

Finally, the Zaman Parties argue that the Court erred

in sanctioning them for their handling of the 55-gallon drum

that they discovered during the pendency of this litigation.

The Court finds that no error was committed. Furthermore,

the Court makes the following observations:

:. There was no_ procedural impediment

‘preventing Plaintiff from making its motion

when it did. Moreover, the Zaman Parties

challenged the “timeliness” of the motion

when it was first made and the Court found

that the spoliation motion was proper.

ya The Court’s ruling and sanction was limited

and targeted at the specific violation at issue.

Moreover, even without the presumption,” the

2 The Court notes that the sanction consisted solely of a

“rebuttable presumption that the sampling, had it been done by

Arco’s expert, would have been positive for Arco and would have

been detrimental to the Zamans.” (RT 1414-15.)

8b

Order Denying Defendants’ Motions

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59

Court would) have reached the same

conclusion. (See Findings of Fact ¢ 97.)

Ili. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES the

Zaman Parties’ Rule 59 motions.

SO ORDERED,

DATED: August 4, 2000

/s/

AUDREY B. COLLINS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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