Opposition Brief — Zaman v. Atlantic Richfield Co.
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i n\ Supreme Court, US.
~ FILED
No. 02-93 AUG 19 2002
OFFICE OF THE CLERK
In the
Supreme Court of the Anited States
JAMSHID ZAMAN, an individual; MAHVASH ZAMAN, an individual;
BEHROUZ ZAMAN, an individual; ZAMAN, INc., a California
corporation, d/b/a BEverLY Hits Motorworks;
and AFFORDABLE Cars, INc., a California corporation,
Petitioners,
ie
ATLANTIC RICHFIELD CoMPANY, a Delaware corporation;
Fox & Fieps, a general partnership; Ropert J. Fox, an
individual; JERRY FieLps, an individual; LAWRENCE R. ANSLEY, SR.,
an individual; and MARGARET ANSLEY, an individual,
Respondents.
On Petition For Writ OF CERTIORARI
To Tue UNitrep States Court Or APPEALS
For Tue Nintu Circuit
- RESPONDENT ATLANTIC RICHFIELD
COMPANY'S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION
Louis E. KEMPINSKY
Counsel of Record
PEITZMAN, GLASSMAN, WEG & KEemPINSKY LLP
1801 AVENUE OF THE STARS
Surre 1225
Los ANGELES, CA 90067
(310) 552-3100
Counsel for Respondent Atlantic Richfield Company
BECKER GALLAGHER LEGAL PUBLISHING, INC.,
CINCINNATI, OHIO 800-890-5001
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
l. Where the undisputed evidence established, as
both lower courts found, that Respondent Atlantic Richfield
Company (“Atlantic Richfield”) had a direct pecuniary and
personal stake in the underlying litigation, did Atlantic
Richfield have Article III standing to maintain suit under 42
U.S.C. § 6972, the citizen-suit provision of the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act (“RCRA”’), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901
et seq.?
2. Does the attorneys’ fee provision of RCRA
unfairly advantage the plaintiff in a RCRA lawsuit when the
defendant may, if it is an aggrieved party, assert its own claim
under RCRA (either as a counterclaim, cross-claim, or
otherwise) and, if it prevails, recover attorneys’ fees under the
same standard applicable to a prevailing plaintiff?’
t Although this is an issue raised in the body of the Petition for
Writ of Certiorari, it was not an issue raised before either of the
lower courts, nor was it designated as a question presented for
review. It should therefore not be considered by the Court in
deciding whether to grant the writ. This is just one of several
procedural and substantive infirmities in Petitioners’ submission.
Additional examples are provided infra, any one of which constitutes
a basis for denial of review. See Sup. Ct. R. 14(4).
i
CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
Pursuant to Rule 29.6 of the Supreme Court Rules,
Atlantic Richfield hereby identifies all of its parent
corporations and any publicly held company that owns 10
percent or more of its stock: (1) BP America, Inc.; and (2) BP
p.t.c.
ll
TABLE OF CONTENTS
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW ...........
CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT .......... il
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I. NO COMPELLING REASON EXISTS TO GRANT
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Il. THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S FINDING THAT ATLANTIC
RICHFIELD HAD STANDING COMPORTS WITH
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A. Atlantic Richfield Proved Injury In
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B. The Undisputed Evidence
Demonstrated That Atlantic Richfield’s
Injury In Fact Was Caused By
Petitioners’ Failure To Remediate The
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* Injunctive Relief is Likely to Redress
the Injuries in Fact Identified by
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III. CERTIORARI SHOULD NOT BE GRANTED BASED
UPON PETITIONERS’ ARGUMENT THAT RCRA
MORE READILY AUTHORIZES AN AWARD OF
ATTORNEYS’ FEES TO A PLAINTIFF THAN TO A
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Allen v. Wright,
468 U.S. 737, 752, 104 S. Ct. 3315, 3325,
Oe LB. BRO CLIO oon cla csdbvsdeventes 13
W
Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat’] Union.
442 U.S. 289, 298, 99 S. Ct. 2301,
2308-09, 60 L. Ed. 2d 895 (1979) ............. 1]
Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 117 S. Ct. 1154,
cg Et rrr eee ne 8
Bland v. Fessler,
88 F.3d 729, 736 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
519 U.S. 1009, 117 S. Ct. 513,
em. & | tt. a 1]
Brem-Air Disposal v. Cohen,
156 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 1998) .......... 7,8
Central Arizona Water Conservation Dist. v.
United States Envtl. Protection Agency,
990 F.2d 1531, 1537 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
510 U.S. 828, 114 S. Ct. 94,
120 L.. BG. ZE G1 (1993)... ce ccccccccscsuceun 9
Citizens for a Better Environment v. Caterpillar,
30 F. Supp. 2d 1053, 1072 n.5 (C.D. Ill. 1998) .... 8
Davis v. Sun Oil Co.,
148 F.3d 606, 610-13 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
525 U.S. 1018, 119 S. Ct. 543,
PGE Kn: BOs PO EEE bon kok kno Cecadeabens 14
Family & Children’s Center, Inc. v.
School City of Mishawaka, 13 F.3d 1052,
1058 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 961,
115 S. Ct. 420, 130 L. Ed. 2d 335 (1994) ...
Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood,
441 U.S. 91, 100, 99 S. Ct. 1601, 1608,
Pee fi, eee ee ee eee
Graham y. Federal Emergency Mgmt. Agency,
149 F.3d 997, 1003 (9th Cir. 1998) ........
Heckler v. Mathews,
465 U.S. 728, 738, 104 S. Ct. 1387, 1394,
FF Len Gile Ae ORO CESS oi vs cee eces bb eees
Kemper Prime Indus. Partners v.
Montgomery Watson Americas, Inc.,
2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11450
{aoe BP ee rrr roe ee
Northeastern Florida Chapter of Assoc. General
Contractors of America v.
City of Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 663,
113 S. Ct. 2297, 2302, 124 L. Ed. 2d
WMA .... cc
Oregon Envtl. Council v. Kunzman,
817 F.2d 484, 491-92 (9th Cir. 1987) ......
Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization,
426 US. 26, 41-42, 96 S. Ct. 1917, 1926,
ee es eer rs ee
vl
Steel Co. v. C ‘itizens for a Better Environment,
523 U.S. 83, 102-04, 118 S. Ct. 1003.
1016-17, 140 L. Ed. 2d 210 (1998) ............. s)
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501, 95 S. Ct. 2197,
BD Ee. THB. BE DES CASTS) 25 vc cn ccccccccccvcas 7
Statutes
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42 U.S.C. § 6972(ay1)(B) .... 2... eee ee eee. 3
Te ee MEI 0s 5s 2s So oo Polka wr bcwce incu. 15
Rules
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ee eG re OUD cc Su obo pio bbe oGh owe lce ket. 4
ECE ahs wens bee vaknaec ceca eeececen es 6, 7
Ee EE a wk cn och bose ecaoubaveueeenenis 6, 7
eee rr re een! 6
Us ae Os ED 5 nv odbc cue cwsee beceeecetecace l
I eR noo bv ce bs ve bw been tdbwieciaeeu. l
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ee ams Wy WUE nn cans dace card bec ewe oe rukekk l
WU CE. CGE ke ced cicccicecccceces l
Se Fic Chis ov ko oo Weedee des we vetee mec l
Miscellaneous
ey CANS TI xine oes wa Gea Une cbabaeers 1, 4,6, 7,8
15 J. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice.
§101.40[S][a] (3d ed. 2002) .... 2.200000... )
17 C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper,
Federal Practice & Procedure: Jurisdiction 2d.
§4036 (1988 & supp. 2002) .........0002.0... 15
V1i
OPINIONS BELOW
Atlantic Richfield objects to Petitioners’ incomplete
citation of opinions and orders entered in the case by the lower
courts. Both the “Opinions Below” section and the Appendix
in the Petition for Writ of Certiorari (“Petition’’) omit the Order
Denying Defendants’ Motions Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59
(“Order”), entered by the United States District Court for the
Central District of California (“District Court’) on August 8,
2000. The Order addresses the precise issue as to which
Petitioners seek review. It sets forth the District Court’s
findings and conclusions regarding the existence of Atlantic
Richfield’s Article III standing to bring the RCRA action, the
challenge of which Petitioners did not initiate until after the
District Court’s entry of judgment in favor of Atlantic
Richfield.
The Order is set forth in the Appendix to this
Opposition at pages 1b through 9b. Pursuant to Sup. Ct. R.
14(1)(d) and 14(1)(i) (specifically, Rules 14(1)(1)(1),
14(1)(i)(ii), and/or 14(1)(i)(vi)), Petitioners were specifically
required to cite the Order and to include it in the Appendix to
the Petition. Petitioners’ failure to do so is, in and of itself, a
sufficient reason for the Court to deny the Petition. See Sup.
Ct. R. 14(4).
The District Court’s Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law, entered on May 4, 2000, is set forth at pages 5a-53a of
the Appendix to the Petition.? The District Court's Final
Judgment and Permanent Injunction, entered on May 23, 2000,
is set forth at pages 56a-61a of the Appendix to the Petition.
: To distinguish between the two appendices, all references to
“RA: _” are to the Appendix to the Opposition. All references to
“PA: _” are to the Appendix to the Petition.
l
The Memorandum Opinion of the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (“Ninth Circuit”) affirming the
District Court’s entry of judgment in favor of Atlantic
Richfield and against Petitioners, filed on January 16, 2002, is
set forth at pages la-4a of the Appendix to the Petition. The
Ninth Circuit’s Order denying Petitioners’ petition for
rehearing and rehearing en banc, filed on March 12, 2002, is
set forth at pages 54a-55a of the Appendix to the Petition.
No prior orders or opinions have been reported.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In 1979, two of the petitioners, Jamshid Zaman and
Mahvash Zaman, acquired the real property commonly known
as 8800 Burton Way in Beverly Hills, California (“Property’’).
See PA: 9a. Following their acquisition of the Property,
Jamshid Zaman operated a gasoline service station on the site.
See PA: 9a-10a. Later, petitioner Behrouz Zaman operated a
car repair and mechanic shop on the site. See PA: lla. In
recent years, petitioner Affordable Cars, Inc. has operated a car
rental business at the Property. See PA: 15a.
By the mid-1980s, Petitioners had allowed the Property
to become contaminated with thousands of gallons of gasoline
and waste oil. See PA: 1la-12a. Petitioners did nothing to
clean up the Property, allowing the unremediated
contamination to begin to migrate off site. See PA: 16a-17a,
19a. Instead, Petitioners sought to shift the blame for the
contamination to Atlantic Richfield. Petitioners accused
Atlantic Richfield, which had owned the Property for anumber
of years prior to selling it in 1979, of contaminating the
Property and demanded that Atlantic Richfield undertake at its
own expense the clean-up. See PA: 7a, 9a, 15a-17a; RA: 6b.
Upon learning of the existence of the contamination,
Atlantic Richfield engaged in extensive good-faith negotiations
with Jamshid Zaman and his representatives concerning a
potential agreement to remediate the Property. See PA: 16a.
Atlantic Richfield also took steps to assess the site, as well as
to remove the most dangerous contaminants. See id. Atlantic
Richfield spent in excess of $200,000 in connection with these
site assessment and remediation activities, much of which was
done in response to agency orders directed to Jamshid Zaman.
See id
Efforts by Atlantic Richfield over seven years to reach
an agreement with Petitioners regarding the clean-up of the
Property were unsuccessful, as Petitioners persisted in their
refusal to take appropriate steps to remediate the Property.
Confronting this intransigence, the threat of agency action
directed against Atlantic Richfield, and the possibility of
litigation from adjoining landowners, Atlantic Richfield
initiated in October 1994 the process (by giving the 90 days’
required notice) preparatory to filing a suit for injunctive relief
under RCRA.’ See PA: 17a.; RA: 5b-7b.
Following a lengthy trial that began in March 2000, the
District Court found Petitioners to be responsible for 100% of
the gasoline and waste oil contamination at the Property. See
PA: 20a-34a. The District Court concluded that the evidence
justified the issuance of an injunction pursuant to RCRA to
ensure the Property would be remediated. See PA: 35a, 40a-
3 Under RCRA, “any person may commence a civil action on
his own behalf. . . against any person . . . who has contributed or is
contributing to the past or present handling, storage, treatment,
transportation, or disposal of any solid or hazardous waste which
may present an imminent and substantial endangerment to health or
the environment.” 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B).
3
41a. The District Court thereafter on May 23, 2000 entered its
Final Judgment and Permanent Injunction. See PA: 56a. Only
at this point did Petitioners raise for the first time the issue of
Atlantic Richfield’s Article III standing, asserting it as a
ground for their motion to vacate the judgment under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 59. See RA: 4b. The District Court denied the motion,
and, in so doing, it augmented its findings, based on the
testimony adduced at trial, to address the standing issue. See
RA: 5b-7b.
The Petition is premised on a persistent and
fundamental misstatement of the factual record before the
District Court and the Ninth Circuit. Petitioners are flatly
wrong in asserting that: (1) the Ninth Circuit “has decided
Atlantic Richfield’s Article III standing in reliance on evidence
not in record”; and (2) “[p]rior to this lawsuit, the Petitioners
did not contend that Atlantic Richfield was responsible for the
contamination and did not demand that the company help cover
remediation costs.” Petition at 3-4. In point of fact, Jamshid
Zaman’s representative Ali Ebrahimi testified at trial through
a videotaped deposition that Jamshid Zaman approached
Atlantic Richfield in the mid-1980s because he maintained that
Atlantic Richfield had caused the contamination and should
bear the clean-up costs.* See PA: 16a-17a.
Furthermore, while Petitioners acknowledge that the
District Court denied their motion to vacate the judgment based
upon Atlantic Richfield’s alleged lack of standing, see Petition
2 The District Court’s Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law indicated that “[t]he Court received the testimony of Eli [sic]
Ebrahimi by way of videotaped excerpts of deposition testimony.”
Appendix to Petition at 6a, 46a n. 3. Excerpts from the transcript of
Mr. Ebrahimi’s deposition testimony were included as pages 590-600
of the Supplemental Excerpts of Record filed by Atlantic Richfield
with the Ninth Circuit.
4
EEE EE
at 2, they fail to set forth the District Court’s findings on the
standing issue either in the body of their Petition or in the
Appendix thereto. In denying Petitioners’ motion to vacate the
judgment, the District Court stated that its Findings of Fact
“did not expressly address the issue of standing because
(1) standing had never been challenged until the filing of the
Rule 59(e) motion, and (2) because the record so clearly
showed that [Atlantic Richfield] had standing.” RA: 5b
In its Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law and in
its Order denying the motion to vacate the judgment, the
District Court found that the contamination, unless remediated,
would continue to migrate off-site and cause off-site
contamination. See PA: 19a; RA: 5b-6b. In holding that
Atlantic Richfield had standing to pursue its RCRA claim, the
District Court found that the contamination implicated Atlantic
Richfield as a prior owner of the Property because: (1) “i]t is
possible that owners of adjacent property might sue [Atlantic
Richfield] if contamination emanating from the Property
contaminated their Property”; (2) “[Petitioners] claimed that
[Atlantic Richfield] was responsible for the contamination at
the Property and sought to have [Atlantic Richfield] pay for the
costs of remediating the Property”; and (3) a public agency, the
Regional Water Quality Control Board (the “RWQCB”), was
seeking to have the Property remediated and could have issued
an enforcement order naming all potentially responsible narties
including Atlantic Richfield, but “did not do so, in part,
because it believed that [Petitioners] were proceeding with
remediation.” RA: 5b-6b.
The District Court then found that, if Petitioners had
remediated the Property, “[Atlantic Richfield] would not be
subject to suit from adjacent neighbors and would not be
subject to an RWQCB enforcement action,” and “Atlantic
Richfield’s] potential liability to [Petitioners] would have been
5
lower.” RA: 6b-7b. Accordingly, the District Court found
that: (1) “[rJemediation of the Property decreases the likelihood
of lawsuits from adjacent neighbors and decreases [Atlantic
Richfield’s] financial exposure”; and (2) “[r]emediation of the
Property removes the threat of an RWQCB enforcement
action.” RA: 7b. The District Court therefore concluded that
“(Atlantic Richfield] had standing under Article III of the
Constitution and under 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a).” RA: 7b.
The Ninth Circuit found that there was a real
controversy giving Atlantic Richfield standing to sue because
“(Petitioners], through their representative Ebrahimi,
contended that Atlantic Richfield was responsible for the
contamination and demanded that the company help cover
remediation costs.” PA: 3a. Having found this to be a
sufficient basis to confer Article III standing, the Ninth Circuit
did not need to address whether the other two controversies
identified by the District Court also constituted injuries in fact
giving Atlantic Richfield the requisite standing to sue. See id.
ARGUMENT
I. No COMPELLING REASON EXISTS TO GRANT
CERTIORARI.
Under Rule 10 of the Supreme Court Rules, a petition
for a writ of certiorari “will be granted only for compelling
reasons” in the Court’s discretion. Sup. Ct. R. 10. Petitioners
cannot show that the Ninth Circuit’s unpublished Memorandum
Opinion decided an important federal question in a way that
conflicts with decisions from this Court or other federal
appellate courts. See Sup. Ct. R. 10(a), (c). Nor can
Petitioners show that the Ninth Circuit “has so far departed
from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings, or
sanctioned such a departure by a lower court, as to call for an
exercise of this Court’s supervisory power.” Sup. Ct. R. 10(a).
At most, Petitioners contend that the District Court and
the Ninth Circuit committed a factual error in finding that
Atlantic Richfield suffered injury in fact giving it standing to
sue. “A petition for a wmit of certiorari is rarely granted when
the asserted error consists of erroneous factual findings or the
misapplication of a properly stated rule of law.” Sup. Ct. R. 10.
Neither error, in any event occurred in this case. The
application of well-settled constitutional principles to the
undisputed evidence compelled the Ninth Circuit to affirm the
District Court’s finding that Atlantic Richfield possessed the
requisite standing to pursue its RCRA claim.
Il. THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S FINDING THAT ATLANTIC
RICHFIELD HAD STANDING COMPORTS WITH THIS
COURT’S OPINIONS.
The determination of whether a plaintiff has standing to
bring suit under a statute begins with an examination of the
legislative intent. It is axiomatic that “Congress may, by
legislation, expand standing to the full extent permitted by Art.
III, thus permitting litigation by one ‘who otherwise would be
barred by prudential standing rules.’” Gladstone, Realtors v.
Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 100, 99S. Ct. 1601, 1608, 60
L. Ed. 2d 66 (1979) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490,
501, 95 S. Ct. 2197, 45 L. Ed. 2d 343 (1975)). This is what
Congress has done in 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a), the citizen-suit
provision of RCRA under which Atlantic Richfield proceeded,
which broadly confers standing upon “any person.” As one
court explained:
.. The text [of Section 6972(a)] could not be
more clear as to the statute’s scope: “any
7
person,” including [the plaintiff], can sue “‘any
person,” including the United States and its
officers, for any violation of “any of [RCRA’s]
... requirements.” [42 U.S.C. § 6972(a).] In
light of the extraordinary breadth of this
statutory language, [the plaintiff] most certainly
could have filed a citizen-suit.
A recent Supreme Court case makes this
very point. As the Court explained in Bennett
v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 117 S. Ct. 1154, 137 L.
Ed. 2d 281 (1997), with regard to the citizen-
suit provision of the Endangered Species Act, a
conferral of standing upon “any person”’ is “an
authorization of remarkable breadth.” Jd. at
1162. It applies to “al/ the causes of action”
created by the statute, and “there is no textual
basis for saying that its expansion of standing
requirements applies to environmentalists
alone.” Jd. at 1163 (emphasis added). . . .
Brem-Air Disposal v. Cohen, 156 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir.
1998) (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted). See Citizens
for a Better Environment v. Caterpillar, 30 F. Supp. 2d 1053,
1072 n.5 (C.D. Ill. 1998) (because RCRA authorizes “any
person” to commence a suit, a RCRA plaintiff's standing may
not be challenged under the prudential “zone of interest”
requirement).
Apparently recognizing this authority, Petitioners do
not dispute that RCRA confers standing upon Atlantic
Richfield or challenge Atlantic Richfield’s standing as a
prudential matter. Instead, Petitioners premise their challenge
upon the baseline standing requirements imposed by Article
Ill, Section 2 of the United States Constitution. See Petition at
6-7.
For purposes of Article III standing, three requirements
must be met: (1) “there must be alleged (and ultimately proven)
an ‘injury in fact’ - a harm suffered by the plaintiff that is
‘concrete’ and ‘actual or imminent, not “conjectural” or
“hypothetical’”; (2) “there must be causation - a fairly
traceable connection between the plaintiff's injury and the
complained-of conduct of the defendant”: and (3) “there must
be redressability - a likelihood that the requested relief will
redress the alleged injury.” Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better
Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 102-04, 118 S. Ct. 1003, 1016-17.
140 L. Ed. 2d 210 (1998) (citation omitted).
A. Atlantic Richfield Proved Injury In Fact.
Atlantic Richfield brought suit to protect its own
financial interest in ensuring that the Property was remediated
as expeditiously as possible. “Pecuniary injury is clearly ‘a
sufficient basis for standing.” Central Arizona Water
Conservation Dist. v. United States Envtl. Protection Agency,
990 F.2d 1531, 1537 (9th Cir.) (citation omitted), cert. denied,
510 U.S. 828, 114 S. Ct. 94, 126 L. Ed. 2d 61 (1993). See
generally 15 J. Moore, Moores Federal Practice,
§ 101.40[S][a] (3d ed. 2002) (“{p]ecuniary interest clearly
provides a sufficient basis for standing”) (footnote omitted).
Furthermore, where the plaintiff has Aan actual stake in the
outcome that goes beyond ‘intellectual or academic curiosity,’
. even a minor or non-economic injury will satisfy the
strictures of Article III.” Family & Children’s Center, Inc. v.
School City of Mishawaka, 13 F.3d 1052, 1058 (7th Cir.)
(citation omitted), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 961, 115 S. Ct. 420,
130 L. Ed. 2d 335 (1994).
The evidence introduced at trial showed that the
standing requirements were met for at least three different
injuries suffered by Atlantic Richfield. Each of these injuries
9
resulted directly from Petitioners’ continuing failure to
remediate the Property. Any one of these three injuries, taken
alone, would be sufficient to create Article III standing.
First, Atlantic Richfield had standing because
Petitioners claimed that Atlantic Richfield was responsible for
the contamination, and Petitioners’ continued failure to
commence remediation was increasing the amount of damages
that might have been assessed against Atlantic Richfield.
Second, Atlantic Richfield had standing because the
contamination at the Property, unless remediated, would
continue to migrate off-site, creating the potential that nearby
property owners would sue Atlantic Richfield for
contamination of their property. Third, Atlantic Richfield had
standing because the RWQCB would, as a matter of policy,
have issued an order requiring Atlantic Richfield to clean up
the Property if it were not otherwise remediated.
Threat of Suit by Petitioners. As both the District
Court and the Ninth Circuit held, Petitioners’ own claims that
Atlantic Richfield was responsible for the contamination at the
Property constituted an injury in fact giving Atlantic Richfield
standing. This contention gave Atlantic Richfield a strong
pecuniary interest in ensuring that the contamination was
remediated as expeditiously and inexpensively as possible.
See Kemper Prime Indus. Partners v. Montgomery Watson
Americas, Inc., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11450 at *2, 6, 18
(N.D. Ill. June 26, 2000) (holding that a defendant alleged to
have financial responsibility for contamination at a property
had suffered an injury in fact that was “concrete and
particularized and actual or imminent” and therefore supported
a RCRA claim).
Threat of Suit by Adjacent Landowners. Atlantic
Richfield also established injury in fact through evidence
10
wast
demonstrating a likelihood that the owners of down-gradient
property might sue Atlantic Richfield if their property were
contaminated by gasoline or waste oil emanating from the
Property. Ralph Moran of Atlantic Richfield testified to the
existence and significance of this likelihood. Indeed, counsel
for Atlantic Richfield received a letter dated September 15,
1997 from counsel for the owner of the land directly to the
south of the Property, who threatened to sue Atlantic Richfield
if any contamination from the Property migrated to its parcel.°
The fact that no adjacent landowner has yet sued
Atlantic Richfield does not mean there was no injury in fact.
“Injury sufficient to meet the standing requirement may be
actual or threatened, . . . and may involve a contingent risk of
injury.” Oregon Envtl. Council v. Kunzman, 817 F.2d 484,
491-92 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S.
728, 738, 104 S. Ct. 1387, 1394, 79 L. Ed. 2d 646 (1984)).
“**(OJne does not have to await the consummation of threatened
injury to obtain preventive relief”; ““‘[i]f the injury is certainly
impending that is enough.’” Bland v. Fessler, 88 F.3d 729, 736
(9th Cir.) (quoting Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat'l
Union, 442 U.S. 289, 298, 99 S. Ct. 2301, 2308-09, 60 L. Ed.
2d 895 (1979)), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1009, 117 S. Ct. 513,
136 L. Ed. 2d 403 (1996).
Threat of Agency Enforcement Action. Atlantic
Richfield suffered an injury in fact as a result of the actions of
the RWQCB. As the District Court found: (1) the RWQCB was
seeking to have the Property remediated; (2) “(t]he RWQCB
could have issued an enforcement order requiring remediation
3 Mr. Moran's testimony and the letter from counsel may be
found at pages 690-91 and page 686, respectively, of the
Supplemental Excerpts of Record filed with the Ninth Circuit by
Atlantic Richfield.
11
but did not do so, in part, because it believed that [Petitioners]
were proceeding with remediation”; and (3) “(t]he enforcement
order would have named all potentially responsible parties
including [Atlantic Richfield].” RA: 6b. This finding was
supported by the testimony of former RWQCB official James
Ross that the RWQCB would, as a matter of “standard
operating procedure,” have named all potentially responsible
parties - including Atlantic Richfield - in an enforcement
order.°
B. The Undisputed Evidence Demonstrated
That Atlantic Richfield’s Injury In Fact Was
Caused By Petitioners’ Failure To
Remediate The Property.
The requirement of “‘a causal relationship between the
injury and the challenged conduct” means “that the injury
‘fairly can be traced to the challenged action of the defendant,’
and has not resulted ‘from the independent action of some third
party not before the court.”” Northeastern Florida Chapter of
Assoc. General Contractors of America v. City of Jacksonville,
508 U.S. 656, 663, 113 S. Ct. 2297, 2302, 124 L. Ed. 2d 586
(1993) (quoting Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights
Organization, 426 U.S. 26, 41-42, 96 S. Ct. 1917, 1926, 48 L.
Ed. 2d 450 (1976)).
The causation prong of the standing test is met in this
case. Atlantic Richfield’s RCRA claim was based upon
Petitioners’ continuing failure to undertake the remedial efforts
necessary to abate the imminent and substantial threat to health
or the environment caused by the contamination at the
° Mr. Ross’ testimony may be found at pages 750-51 of the
Supplemental Excerpts of Record filed with the Ninth Circuit by
Atlantic Richfield.
12
Property. Petitioners’ failure to remediate the Property directly
caused each of the three injuries in fact identified by Atlantic
Richfield. As the District Court found, if Petitioners had
remediated the Property as appropriate: (1) it would have
“decrease[d] the likelihood of lawsuits from adjacent neighbors
and decrease[d] [Atlantic Richfield’s] financial exposure”;
(2) “Atlantic Richfield’s potential liability to [Petitioners]
would have been lower’; and (3) it would have “remove[d] the
threat of an RWQCB enforcement action.” RA: 6b-7b.
C. Injunctive Relief is Likely to Redress the
Injuries in Fact Identified by Atlantic
Richfield.
The requirement of “a likelihood that the injury will be
redressed by a favorable decision” means “that the ‘prospect of
obtaining relief from the injury as a result of a favorable ruling’
is not ‘too speculative.’” Northeastern Florida Chapter of
Assoc. General Contractors of America, 508 U.S. at 663-64,
113 S. Ct. 2297, 2302, 124 L. Ed. 2d 586 (quoting Allen v.
Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752, 1048S. Ct. 3315, 3325, 82 L. Ed. 2d
556 (1984)). “[P]laintiffs ‘must show only that a favorable
decision is likely to redress (their injuries], not that a favorable
decision will inevitably redress [their injuries].”” Graham v.
Federal Emergency Mgmt. Agency, 149 F.3d 997, 1003 (9th
Cir. 1998) (citation omitted).
As the District Court found, see RA: 6b-7b, the
injunctive relief it ordered does much to redress the injuries in
fact identified by Atlantic Richfield. Requiring Petitioners to
take the steps necessary to prevent any imminent or substantial
threat to health or the environment will make it considerably
less likely that other property owners will sue Atlantic
Richfield for contamination of their property. See id. In the
event that the District Court had found that Atlantic Richfield
13
was responsible for any contamination at the Property - which
it ultimately did not - the injunctive relief sought by Atlantic
Richfield would have decreased the cost of remediation and
thereby would have decreased the amount of damages that
could be imposed on Atlantic Richfield. See RA: 7b. See
also Kemper Prime Indus. Partners, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
11450 at *2, 6, 18 (holding that a defendant alleged to have
financial responsibility for contamination at a property had
shown redressability with regard to its RCRA claim by
asserting that its “exposure for the clean-up will be greatly
reduced, if not eliminated,” if the court ordered remediation of
the property). Similarly, the injunctive relief ordered by the
District Court made it unnecessary for the RWQCB to issue an
enforcement order requiring Atlantic Richfield to remediate the
Property. See RA: 6b-7b.
In Davis v. Sun Oil Co., 148 F.3d 606, 610-13 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1018, 119 S. Ct. 543, 142 L. Ed. 2d
451 (1998), defendants argued that res judicata barred plaintiffs
from pursuing a federal claim for injunctive relief under RCRA
because they had already obtained injunctive relief in a state
court action. See id. The Sixth Circuit noted that “[i]t would
be possible to reformulate [the defendant’s] theory as a
challenge to the [plaintiffs’] standing to bring their RCRA
action - specifically, as an assertion that the [plaintiffs] fail to
meet the ‘remedial benefit’ requirement of standing.” Jd. at 610
n.4. The Sixth Circuit found that defendants could not have
prevailed on such a theory “because the [plaintiffs] may benefit
from the pressure placed on [the defendant] to remedy the
pollution by the daily-accruing penalties.” Jd. The likelihood
that Atlantic Richfield would benefit from an injunction
entered by the district court is considerably greater than the
likelihood that the Davis plaintiffs would have benefitted from
the relief sought in the federal lawsuit.
14
CERTIORARI SHOULD NOT BE GRANTED BASED
UPON PETITIONERS’ ARGUMENT THAT RCRA MORE
READILY AUTHORIZES AN AWARD OF ATTORNEYS’
FEES TO A PLAINTIFF THAN TO A DEFENDANT.
Without including the issue as a question presented for
review, Petitioners suggest that certiorari should be granted
because a RCRA plaintiff may more readily recover attorneys’
fees than a RCRA defendant, thereby giving a party an
incentive to initiate a RCRA suit. See Petition at 13-15.
However, Petitioners did not raise this issue before the Ninth
Circuit. Accordingly, the Court should decline to consider the
issue for the first time through a writ of certiorari. See
generally 17 C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, Federal
Practice & Procedure: Jurisdiction 2d, § 4036, at 35 & nn. 67-
68 (1988 & supp. 2002) (noting “the general rule that new
questions may not be raised for the first time on Supreme Court
review ’).
In any event, Petitioners’ argument fails on the merits.
RCRA authorizes a court “to award costs of litigation
(including reasonable attorney and expert witness fees) to the
prevailing or substantially prevailing party, whenever the court
determines such an award is appropriate.” 42 U.S.C. § 6972(e).
If a defendant in a RCRA lawsuit believes that a plaintiff or
other party is responsible for the contamination at a site, the
defendant may file a RCRA counterclaim, cross-claim, etc.
against the culpable party.’ Should the defendant prevail on its
RCRA claim by proving that another party is responsible for
the contamination, it will have the benefit of RCRA’s more
2 Indeed, Petitioners filed an amended counterclaim asserting
a RCRA claim against Atlantic Richfield, but the District Court
ultimately dismissed the RCRA claim as barred by the statute of
limitations.
15
lenient standard for recovering attorneys’ fees even though it
asserted its RCRA claim in a capacity other than as plaintiff.
The RCRA attorneys’ fee provision gives no advantage to the
first to bring suit. The same standard applies to whomever is
successful in obtaining relief against a party responsible for
creating the risk sought to be remedied by the statute.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, Atlantic Richfield
respectfully asks the Court to deny the Petition.
DATED: August 19, 2002
Respectfully submitted,
LoulIs E. KEMPINSKY
PEITZMAN, GLASSMAN, WEG &
KEMPINSKY LLP
1801 AVENUE OF THE STARS
SUITE 1225
Los ANGELES, CA 90067
(310) 552-3100
Counsel for Respondent Atlantic
Richfield Company
16
APPENDIX 1 .
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CV-95-566-ABC (AJWx)
[Filed August 4, 2002]
[Entered August 8, 2002}
Atlantic Richfield Company,
Plaintiff,
V.
Defendants.
)
)
)
)
)
)
Jamshid Zaman, et al., )
)
)
)
)
And Related Cross-Actions. )
)
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS
PURSUANT TO FED. R. CIV. P. 59
After reviewing the materials submitted by the parties
and the case file, the Court DENIES Defendants’ Motions
Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(b) and 59(e).
ae
Order Denying Defendants’ Motions
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59
I. Procedural Background
This matter was tried to the Court March 7 through
April 19, 2000. The court issued Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law on May 3, 2000. The court filed a Final
Judgment and Permanent Injunction on May 22, 2000.
Defendants Jamshid Zaman, Mahvash Zaman,
Behrouz Zaman, and Affordable Cars, Inc. (the “Zaman
Parties”) filed the instant motions on June 7, 2000. The first
motion is a motion to vacate, alter, or amend the judgment
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). The Zaman Parties’ Rule
59(e) motion is based on the grounds that (1) the Court lacks
subject matter jurisdiction and (2) there was insubstantial
evidence to hold the separate Zaman Parties liable. The
second motion is a motion for new trial pursuant to Rule
59(b). The Rule 59(b) motion is based on the grounds that (1)
the Court erred in its evidentiary ruling concerning the belated
discovery of the 55-gallon drum and (2) there was a lack of
substantial evidence. Plaintiff Atlantic Richfield Company
(“ARCO”) and Counter-Defendants Lawrence and Margaret
Ansley oppose.
II. Discussion
A. Rule 59 Standard
A motion under 59(e) “should not be granted, absent
highly unusual circumstances, unless the district court is
presented with newly discovered evidence, committed clear
error, or if there is an intervening change in the controlling
law.” 389 Orange Street Partners v. Arnold, 179 F. 3d 656,
/-
Order Denying Defendants’ Motions
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59 _
665 (9th Cir. 1999). “Reconsideration of a judgment after its
entry is an extraordinary remedy which should be used
sparingly.” McDowell v. Calderon, 197 F. 3d 1253, 1255 n.
1 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting 11 Charles Alan Wright, et al.,
Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d § 2810.1 (1995)).
Pursuant to Rule 59(b), a district court may grant a
new trial upon a timely motion. General grounds for a new
trial include: (1) that the verdict is against the weight of the
evidence, (2) that the damages are excessive, or (3) that the
trial was unfair, either in light of the substantial errors in the
admission or exclusion of evidence, or erroneous instruction
of the jury. See 11 Charles Alan Wright, et al., Federal
Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d § 2805 et. seq. (1995).
When evaluating a motion for a new trial based on error, the
Court’s inquiry is twofold: (1) whether an error was in fact
committed and (2) whether that error was so prejudicial that
denial of a new trial would be “inconsistent with substantial
justice.” Fed R. Civ. P. 61. Thus, before granting a new
trial, the district court must be convinced that the error
adversely affected or tainted the verdict.
The burden of proof on a new trial motion rests on the
moving party. Anglo-American Gen. Agents v. Jackson Nat.
Life Ins. Co,. 83 F.R.D. 41, 43 (N.D. Cal. 1979). A motion
under Rule 59 is committed to the district court’s sound
discretion. See Allied Chemical Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc., 449
U.S. 33 (1980); 389 Orange Street Partners, 179 F. 3d at
665; Metromedia Co. v. Fugazy, 983 F. 2d 350 (2d Cir.
1992).
Order Denying Defendants’ Motions
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59
Finally, a Rule 59 motion “may not be used. . . to
raise arguments which could have been raised prior to the
issuance of the judgment, nor may they be used to argue a
case under a novel legal theory that the party had the ability
to address in the first instance.” Pacific Ins. Co. v. American
Nat. Fire Ins. Co., 148 F. 3d 396, 403 (4th Cir. 1998)
(describing Rule 59(e) standard); accord 389 Orange Street
Partners, 179 F. 3d at 665; 11 Wright, supra, § 2805
(describing Rule 59(b) standard).
B. The Court has jurisdiction.
For the first time in this litigation, the Zaman Parties
argue that this Court has no subject-matter jurisdiction over
this case. Specifically, they argue that ARCO has no standing
to sue as required by Article III of the United States
Constitution.
Although the Zaman Parties bring up this argument for
the first time after trial, the prohibition against raising
arguments for the first time does not generally apply to
jurisdictional questions because subject matter jurisdiction
goes to the heart of whether this Court has power to issue a
judgment in the first place. If the Court has no subject matter
jurisdiction, any judgment issued by the Court would be void.
Of course, where there is an honest concern about
jurisdiction, it is incumbent on the party to challenge that
jurisdiction as early as possible. As the parties are aware, this
case, which spanned five years, placed a substantial burden on
the resources of this Court and of the parties. But even if the
Court were to assume that Zaman Parties had permitted the
4b
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PAREN ne
ES!
LR rs a yt
Order Denying Defendants’ Motions
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59
Court to waste its resources on a matter that they suspected all
along was not properly before this Court, the Court would
have to vacate the judgment if it determined that subject
matter jurisdiction was lacking. '
The Court, however, finds that the Zaman Parties’
contention lacks merit. The Court’s finding that it had subject
matter jurisdiction, (Conclusions of Law { 1), is fully
supported by the record. The Zaman Parties argue that
because the Court did not make express findings of fact and
conclusions of law about ARCO’s standing that the judgment
must be vacated. In all honesty, the Court did not expressly
address the issue of standing, because (1) standing had never
been challenged until the filing of the Rule 59(e) motion, and
(2) because the record so clearly showed that ARCO had
standing. To clarify any doubts, the Court makes the
following additional findings:
‘ ARCO is a person for purposes of 42 U.S.C.
§ 6972 of the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act (“RCRA”).
Bs The gasoline and waste oil contamination on
the Property is a continuing threat to human
health and the environment. The unremediated
contamination has moved off-site and will
continue to move off-site unless action is
At the same time, if it was just a matter of a trial
record that lacked evidence to support the issue of standing, the
Court would first grant Plaintiff the opportunity to meet its burden
of showing that it had standing.
Sb
Order Denying Defendants’ Motions
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59
taken. If the Property is not remediated, the
groundwater will continually’ be
recontaminated with seasonal cyclic rise and
fall of the water table. (Findings of Fact ¢ 56.)
It is possible that owners of adjacent property
might sue ARCO if contamination emanating
from the Property contaminated their property.
(Moran Testimony.)
The Zaman Parties claimed that ARCO was
responsible for the contamination at the
property and sought to have ARCO pay for the
costs of remediating the Property.
The Regional Water Quality Control Board
(“RWQCB”) was seeking to have the water
remediated. (Ross Testimony.)
The RWQCB could have issued an
enforcement order requiring remediation but
did not do so, in part, because it believed that
the Zaman Parties were proceeding with
remediation. (Ross Testimony; Findings of
Fact ¢ 57.)
The enforcement order would have named all
potentially responsible parties including
ARCO. (Ross Testimony.)
If the Zaman Parties had remediated the
Property, ARCO would not be subject to suit
6b
Order Denying Defendants’ Motions
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59
from adjacent neighbors and would not be
subject to an RWQCB enforcement action.
9. If the Zaman Parties had remediated the
Property, ARCO’s potential liability to the
Zaman Parties would have been lower.
10. Remediation of the Property decreases the
likelihood of lawsuits from adjacent neighbors,
and decreases ARCO’s financial exposure.
11. Remediation of the Property removes the
threat of an RWQCB enforcement action.
Based on these findings, the Court finds that ARCO had
standing under Article III of the Constitution and under 42
U.S.C. § 6972(a).
at There is sufficient evidence to support the
judgment.
Both of the Zaman Parties’ motions argue that there is
insufficient evidence to hold Behrouz Zaman on the gasoline
contamination, Jamshid Zaman on the waste oil
contamination, Mahvash Zaman on any contamination, and
Affordable Cars on any contamination. The Court disagrees.
The Court finds that there is sufficient evidence to support
judgment against each of the Zaman Parties.
The Court also notes that for the first time in their
reply on the Rule 59(e) motion, the Zaman parties argue that
the Court should apportion the amount of contamination
7b
Order Denying Defendants’ Motions
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59
among each of the Zaman Parties. The Zaman Parties could
have brought this argument at trial or earlier. Accordingly,
the Court refuses to consider the argument. See 389 Orange
Street Partners, 179 F. 3d. at 665. The Court’s holding that
the Zaman Parties are jointly and severally liable for the full
amount of the contamination on the site stands.
D. The Court did not err in sanctioning the
Zaman Parties for spoliation of evidence.
Finally, the Zaman Parties argue that the Court erred
in sanctioning them for their handling of the 55-gallon drum
that they discovered during the pendency of this litigation.
The Court finds that no error was committed. Furthermore,
the Court makes the following observations:
:. There was no_ procedural impediment
‘preventing Plaintiff from making its motion
when it did. Moreover, the Zaman Parties
challenged the “timeliness” of the motion
when it was first made and the Court found
that the spoliation motion was proper.
ya The Court’s ruling and sanction was limited
and targeted at the specific violation at issue.
Moreover, even without the presumption,” the
2 The Court notes that the sanction consisted solely of a
“rebuttable presumption that the sampling, had it been done by
Arco’s expert, would have been positive for Arco and would have
been detrimental to the Zamans.” (RT 1414-15.)
8b
Order Denying Defendants’ Motions
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59
Court would) have reached the same
conclusion. (See Findings of Fact ¢ 97.)
Ili. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES the
Zaman Parties’ Rule 59 motions.
SO ORDERED,
DATED: August 4, 2000
/s/
AUDREY B. COLLINS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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