Opposition Brief — Upsher v. Grosse Pointe Public School System

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} Supreme Coart. Dy,

{ FILED

No. 02-35 AUG 2 2002

| _OFFICE OF THE GLEE

In The ae | —

Supreme Court of the United States

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JESSE UPSHER; ANNIE ABRAHAM;

EDWARD BRODZIK; JEANETTE BRODZIK;

HENRY HUCZEK; AURELIA HUCZEK; STEPHEN

KALMUS; CATHERINE KALMUS; KAREN KOHL;

TRACY THACKER; JOHN O’LOUGHLIN,

Petitioners,

3

GROSSE POINTE PUBLIC SCHOOL SYSTEM;

‘GROSSE POINTE BOARD OF EDUCATION; SUZANNE

KLEIN; CHRISTINA FENTON; TIMOTHY HOWLETT;

| “PAUL PAGEL; CARL ANDERSON; JACK RYAN;

- JOHN MILLS; CYNTHIA PANGBORN: SEARS TAYLOR;

es MARY BETH HERMAN: JAY JEFFRIES; STEVE ;

ee ge derbi ED SHINE; LARRY YANKAUSKAS,

tage 8 _ individually and in their respective capacities,

Respondents.

STATEMENT PURSUANT TO RULE 29.6

Petitioners are individual residents of the State of

Michigan. Petitioner Steven Kalmus is deceased, having

died of causes unrelated to this litigation during the

pendency of this appeal. The record below, including the

complaint filed in the District Court, refers to the first

named Petitioner as “Jesse Upshur.” However, the Court

of Appeals published opinion and this Petition refer to that

individual as “Jesse Upsher.”

Individual Respondents are residents of the State of

Michigan. The Grosse Pointe Public School System is a

general powers public school district organized under the

laws of the State of Michigan, and is engaged in the

operation of public schools in a geographic area in south-

eastern Michigan. It has neither parent nor subsidiary

corporations and its board members are elected by the

public. The Grosse Pointe Board of Education is not a

corporate entity and the reference thereto presumably

refers to the board members of the Grosse Pointe Public

School System or to the Grosse Pointe Public School

System itself.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

STATEMENT PURSUANT TO RULE 29.6............... i

TAR hls CP CIC a Be ivcisininssnsicinvnseengnieciencntvetuns il

TAD OF AU EEIMeE EBIRO <ishccnsnnssrcviconemocceteereseseies ili

COUNTER-STATEMENT OF THE CASE ................ 1

REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT..................... 5

I. THE COURT OF APPEALS’ OPINION DOES

NOT CONFLICT WITH DECISIONS OF THIS

COURT OR DECISIONS OF OTHER CIR-

II. THE COURT OF APPEALS’ OPINION DOES

NOT CONFLICT WITH DECISIONS OF THE

MICHIGAN SUPREME COURT .................000088 7

III. THE COURT OF APPEALS’ OPINION IS IN

ACCORDANCE WITH THE LAW ESTAB-

LISHED BY THIS- COURT AND BY THE

SIXTH CIRCUIT, AND IS NOT “PLAIN ER-

ili

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

CASES

Bazinau v. Mackinac Carriage Tours, 233 Mich.

App. 743, 593 N.W. 2d 219 (1998).................00ssscccccsserees 8

Beauchamp v. Dow Chemical Company, 427 Mich.

I, I © oo csscsennossinesdcnsssanvvosextodenseninens 7

Collins v. City of Harker Heights, Texas, 503 U.S.

115, 112 S. Ct. 1061, 117 L. Ed. 2d 261 (1992)....6, 10, 11

Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 106 S. Ct. 662,

Be Bes Be NO OE CL) on echnssinssecssccconssncsessinscossseveveoverenes 11

Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509

U.S. 579, 118 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469

ENE SSUES ECE Soper Pee ee a oe 1

DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social Ser-

vices, 489 U.S. 189, 109 S. Ct. 998, 103 L. Ed. 2d

ao oa aticcanahheadundbianniminoeeeebinanteeseesion 11

Gazette v. City of Pontiac, 41 F. 3d 1061 (6th Cir.

he ta eiiesianaieleninsonadoinaneakebineeseevinnant 6, 10

Golec v. Metal Exchange Corporation, 453 Mich.

By Te Bees Oe Be CRO cecesescncedenssencscseessesscesnseneses 7,8

LaBounty v. Coughlin, 137 F. 3d 68 (2nd Cir. 1998)....... 5, 6

Lewellen v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville

and Davidson County, Tennessee, 34 F. 3d 345

es Ee aE eee ene 5, 6, 10, 11

Palazzola v. Karmazin Products, 223 Mich. App.

A EE, EE EEE GRIPES secsseesenseoncsvencossversnsvenessecsnses 9

Travis v. Dreis & Krump Manufacturing Company,

453 Mich. 149, 551 N.W. 2d 132 (1996) ........ ees 7,8

Upsher, et al. v. Grosse Pointe Public School System,

et al., 285 F. 3d 448 (6th Cir. 2002)....................066 6, 7, 10

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES -— Continued

STATUTES

COUNTER-STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Petitioners’ statement of the case contains factual

allegations not supported by the record before the lower

Court and in many instances contrary to such record.

Significant examples of these discrepancies are set forth

below, and are not meant to be exhaustive.

1. Petitioners rely on deposition testimony of two

experts’ to the effect that Petitioners suffered injury as a

result of actions of Respondents, stating that such testi-

mony is unrebutted.

a. In spite of the fact that the medical literature is

replete with epidemiologic studies relating to as-

bestos exposure, Mr. Wabeke testified that he did

not review any such studies in connection with

his work on this case (Court of Appeals Joint Ap-

pendix (C. A. App.) at 675). Mr. Wabeke correctly

testified (C. A. App. at 679) that the maximum

acceptable time weighted average concentration

for occupational exposure to asbestos was one-

tenth of a fiber per cubic centimeter of air over

an eight-hour period. However, he was unable to

provide any testimony as to the amount of asbes-

tos fibers released at Grosse Pointe South High

School during the incident in question. He testi-

fied as follows (C. A. App. at 681):

* Respondents argued in the Court of Appeals that Petitioners’ two

proffered experts, by their own admissions, were not qualified to give

opinions as their testimony did not meet the requirements of Daubert v.

Merrill Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 125

L. Ed. 2d 469 (1993).

2

Q You would have to speculate in order to — to set a

figure as to the amount of asbestos fibers re-

leased at the Grosse Pointe Schools in 1995; isn’t

that correct?

A I-— yeah, I suppose. One is too many if it’s con-

trollable.

Mr. Wabeke further admits that he does not have

experience with regard to asbestos remediation

involving vinyl asbestos tile (C. A. App. at 683).

Mr. Wabeke candidly admits that in order to ex-

trapolate from other fact situations and reach a

conclusion about asbestos release in the case at

bar would be a “quantum leap” and “speculation.”

(C. A. App. at 684). Concerning total exposure (as

opposed to time weighted average concentration)’

Mr. Wabeke testifies (C. A. App. at 690) that the

maximum total exposure which plaintiffs could

have encountered was 14/10,000 of a fiber year.

This is a negligible amount compared with the 10

and 20 fiber year exposure of employees that

normally occurs in the insulation trade, pipe fit-

ting trade, or other occupations where epidemi-

ologic studies have been undertaken.

b. Dr. Chiodo’s opinion was based on epidemiologic

studies unrelated to the situation in the case at

bar. Dr. Chiodo relied on studies involving asbes-

tos exposure of construction ironworkers and

* Time weighted average concentration is the measure of the

amount of asbestos fibers in the air at any given time. Total exposure is

the amount of asbestos to which a person is exposed during a given

period of time.

3

Swedish insulation workers, which he readily

admitted were not applicable to the case at bar

(C. A. App. at 508). Significantly, Dr. Chiodo testi-

fied that he had no knowledge and was unable to

provide any evidence as to the level of asbestos

exposure, if any, encountered by Petitioners. Dr.

Chiodo testified (C. A. App. at 504-06) that he did

not know the time weighted average concentra-

tion to which any of the Petitioners were ex-

posed, nor the total exposure in fiber years of any

of the Petitioners.

2. Petitioners state that the carpet removal project

lasted ten days. The record reflects that the project lasted

no more than four days (C. A. App. at 466, 576, 599-607).

3. Petitioners state that New York Carpet World

walked off the project when it discovered that the tiles

contained twenty-five percent asbestos. The record estab-

lishes that New York Carpet World advised Respondent

Pagel that the method they used for removing old carpet

was to use a mechanical scraper, and if there were asbes-

tos tiles under the carpeting, that process might disturb

the tiles (C. A. App. at 650). This is the reason that the

decision was made to remove the carpet by hand, so that

the tiles under the carpet would not be disturbed.°

* It is unrebutted that no one anticipated that in connection with

removal of the carpet, the underlying tiles would be disturbed or would

come loose. Petitioners were instructed to remove carpet, not tiles (C. A.

App. at 660).

+

4. Petitioners state that Respondents were aware

that tiles would become detached from the floor and would

release asbestos fibers. The record reflects that Respon-

dents’ only knowledge was that the tiles could contain

asbestos. Such knowledge is not equivalent to knowledge

that tiles would become detached from the floor or would

release asbestos fibers. Only Respondent Jeffries, who was

working on the carpet project as the “foreman” was aware

that tiles were coming detached from the floor. The record

is clear that he was unaware of any danger as a result of

such condition and continued working. None of the other

Respondents were aware that tiles were becoming de-

tached from the floor until after the project was completed.

5. Petitioners refer to violations received by the

Grosse Pointe Public School System in connection with

this project. The only two violations received were for

failure to conduct air monitoring during the project and

failure to instruct employees as to asbestos-related facts.

Respondents received no violations in connection with the

actual physical removal of the carpet. Provided air moni-

toring was conducted and proper asbestos instruction was

given, the carpet removal project ordered by Respondents

and conducted by Petitioners would not have been a

violation of any law and would have been permitted to

proceed.‘ The particular regulations for which Respon-

dents were cited did not themselves cause any injury to

Petitioners.

* Carrying Petitioners’ argument to its logical extension leads to

the conclusion that under the facts of this case, and assuming air

monitoring and proper instruction, Petitioners would have no claim

even though their exposure would have been the same.

5

REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT

Petitioners argue that the writ should be granted for

three reasons (Petition at 18-19):

1. The decision of the United States Court of Appeals

for the Sixth Circuit conflicts with holdings of this Court

and other circuits.

2. The decision of the United States Court of Appeals

for the Sixth Circuit conflicts with decisions of the Michi-

gan Supreme Court on Petitioners’ state law claims.

3. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth

Circuit committed plain error.

I. THE COURT OF APPEALS’ OPINION DOES

NOT CONFLICT WITH DECISIONS OF THIS

COURT OR DECISIONS OF OTHER CIR-

CUITS

The only Court of Appeals’ opinion cited by Petitioners

to support their argument that there is a conflict among

the circuits relating to the proper test to be applied in

determining a violation of 42 U.S.C. 1983 is LaBounty v.

Coughlin, 137 F. 3d 68 (2nd Cir. 1998). The Sixth Circuit

opinion in this case clarified that different principles

would apply in a custodial case, such as LaBounty, supra.

Eighth Amendment considerations alone may very well

dictate a different test being applied in a custodial setting.

The Sixth Circuit cites and relies on Lewellen v Metropoli-

tan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, Ten-

nessee, 34 F. 3d 345 (6th Cir. 1994) in its holding below

that in a non-custodial setting, “plaintiff must prove that

the governmental actor either intentionally injured the

6

plaintiff or acted arbitrarily in the constitutional sense.”

Upsher, et al. v. Grosse Pointe Public School System, et al.,

285 F. 3d 448, 453 (6th Cir. 2002), citing Lewellen, supra,

at 350-51 and Gazette v. City of Pontiac, 41 F. 3d 1061,

1067 (6th Cir. 1994). LaBounty, supra, is not in conflict

with these decisions, as courts have recognized a key

distinction between custodial and non-custodial cases. The

Sixth Circuit opinion in this case is entirely consistent

with previous appellate decisions, including LaBounty,

supra, and complies with this Court’s pronouncement in

Collins v. City of Harker Heights, Texas, 503 U.S. 115, 112

S. Ct. 1061, 117 L. Ed. 2d 261 (1992).

Having determined that the law requires evidence of

conduct “intentionally designed to punish someone” or

“conscious shocking” behavior, the Sixth Circuit examines

the record and finds no such evidence. An examination of

the record below establishes that this conclusion is correct.

None of the Respondents (with the exception of Respon-

dent Jeffries) were aware that carpet tiles were becoming

detached from the floor. In addition, none of the Respon-

dents (including Respondent Jeffries) were aware of any

danger to which Petitioners were exposed. As the Sixth

Circuit correctly stated,

“We cannot find, nor was our attention invited to,

any evidence in the record which suggests that

any of the defendants made a deliberate decision

to inflict pain or bodily injury on any of the

plaintiffs. Neither is there proof that the defen-

dants engaged in arbitrary conduct intentionally

designed to punish the plaintiffs — conduct which

we have recognized may result in the deprivation

of a constitutionally-protected interest. Id. With-

out more, we conclude that the plaintiffs’ evi-

dence establishes, at best, a case sounding in

7

negligence and not a constitutional tort under

Section 1983.” (Upsher, supra, at 453-54).

Inasmuch as Petitioners have not cited any Court of

Appeals’ authority in conflict with the Sixth Circuit

opinion in this tase, the writ should be not be granted.

II. THE COURT OF APPEALS’ OPINION DOES

NOT CONFLICT WITH DECISIONS OF THE

MICHIGAN SUPREME COURT

Petitioners’ state law claim rests upon the intentional

tort exception to the Michigan Worker’s Disability

Compensation Act (MWDCA), M.C.L.A. 418.131(1). The

law relating to the intentional tort exception has been

evolving in Michigan since the 1986 decision of the

Michigan Supreme Court in Beauchamp v. Dow Chemical

Company, 427 Mich. 1, 398 N.W. 2d 882 (1986). The law

has now been set to rest by the Michigan Supreme Court’s

dual decisions in Travis v. Dreis & Krump Manufacturing

Company, and Golec v. Metal Exchange Corporation, 453

Mich. 149, 551 N.W. 2d 132 (1996). To establish an-“inten-

tional tort” Michigan law requires either:

1. An injury to an employee as a result of a deliber-

ate-act of the employer where the employer spe-

cifically intended an injury, or

2. An injury to an employee where the employer had

actual knowledge that an injury was certain to oc-

cur and willfully disregarded that knowledge.

Michigan law also provides that the question of whether or

not the facts in a case constitute an intentional tort is a

question of law for the court.

The Sixth Circuit, in its analysis of Petitioners’ Sec-

tion 1983 claim, found that the record did not reflect an

intentional act as required by 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Court

then applied the same rationale to hold that there was no

intentional tort. The lack of knowledge of Respondents as

to the progress of the carpet project and the failure of

Respondents to adequately comprehend any danger (if any

such danger existed), requires the conclusion that no

intentional tort has been proven, nor can such an inten-

tional tort be established from the state of the record

below.

In Golec, supra, the employer had knowledge that the

condition in the plant which caused injury to the plaintiff

had in fact caused a similar injury in the past. In spite of

this knowledge and in spite of the history of the respective

condition to cause injury, the employee was ordered to

continue working. Here, Petitioners were not ordered to

remove tile, just carpet, and there was no indication that

the tile would become detached with the carpet.

Other Michigan cases decided since Travis and Golec,

supra, hold the same. Bazinau v. Mackinac Carriage

Tours, 233 Mich. App. 743, 593 N.W. 2d 219 (1999), in-

volved an employee traveling across the ice between

Mackinac Island and the mainland in connection with

delivering horse feed to Mackinac Island. Plaintiff argued

that the intentional tort exception should apply when the

vehicle broke through the ice. The Michigan Court of

Appeals indicated that evidence of increased risk of injury

or increased probability of injury is not admissible, as the

injury must be certain to occur. The court held that the

intentional tort exception did not apply.

9

Palazzola v. Karmazin Products, 223 Mich. App. 141,

565 N.W. 2d 868 (1997), involved injuries to an employee

cleaning sludge from a tank and being overcome with

trichloroethyline fumes. The employee’s supervisor was

not aware of, nor did he appreciate, the risk. The Michigan

Court of Appeals stated that in order to establish an intent

to injure, the evidence must show a deliberate act or

omission specifically intended to cause an injury by a

particular employee. Disconnected testimony by various

employees is not sufficient. In Palazzola, supra, a case

with strikingly similar facts to the case as bar, the super-

visor instructed the employees to drain and fill the tank,

not to clean the sludge from the tank. In the case at bar,

Petitioners were instructed to remove the carpet, not the

tile. Also, the foreman in Palazzola, supra, was not aware

of the danger of the trichloroethyline fumes, and actually

was in the tank himself doing work. In the case at bar,

Respondent Jeffries, the foreman on the job, was also

removing carpet and did not appreciate any danger in-

volved. Holding that the facts did not establish an inten-

tional tort exception to the MWDCA, the Michigan Court

of Appeals affirmed the trial Court’s dismissal of plain-

tiff’s claim. —

Further substantiating the lack of liability of Respon-

dents is the fact that at most, Petitioners were exposed to

14/10,000 of a fiber year, an extremely negligible amount.

Also, none of the Petitioners suffer from any medical

consequences of asbestos exposure.

The Sixth Circuit opinion below is in accord with

applicable Michigan authority, and consequently the writ

should not be granted.

10

III. THE COURT OF APPEALS’ OPINION IS IN

ACCORDANCE WITH THE LAW ESTAB-

LISHED BY THIS COURT AND BY THE

SIXTH CIRCUIT, AND IS NOT “PLAIN ER-

ROR”

Petitioners state that the Sixth Circuit opinion affirm-

ing the trial court’s dismissal of their 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim

was “plain error.” However, the Sixth Circuit relies on its

previous opinion in Lewellen, supra, a case which itself

relies on Collins v. City of Harker Heights, Texas, supra.

Petitioners cite no authority in support of their proposition

that the Sixth Circuit committed “plain error” and the

Petition does not even address the opinion in Lewellen,

supra. The Sixth Circuit analysis of Lewellen, supra, and

its reference to Collins, supra, and Gazette, supra, (Upsher,

supra, at 452-53, provide the best argument as to why the

Sixth Circuit opinion is in accord with prior law and not

“plain error.”

The law establishes that gross negligence is not the

type of governmental action needed to support a 42 U.S.C.

1983 claim. Gross negligence is not actionable under 42

U.S.C. 1983 because it is not “arbitrary in the constitu-

tional sense.” Gazette, supra, at 1067, Lewellen, supra, at

350-351. Reckless or grossly negligent conduct (assuming

that Petitioners could establish such conduct) is not

enough to support a 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim. In Lewellen,

supra, plaintiff was a construction worker severely injured

when his construction materials came into contact with a

power line. Plaintiff argued that defendants City and

School District should be liable under 42 U.S.C. 1983

because they chose to build a school directly beneath a

high voltage line, delayed removal of the line, violated

applicable safety and electrical code standards, and willfully

pron a

11

disregarded the high risk of injury. The Sixth Circuit

disagreed with the plaintiff’s argument in Lewellen,

supra, stating (34 F. 3d at 348):

... [T]he defendants obviously did not make a

deliberate decision to inflict pain or bodily injury

on the plaintiff. The defendants may have been

negligent, but it is now firmly settled that injury

caused by negligence does not constitute a ‘depri-

vation’ of any constitutionally protected interest.

[Emphasis added]

citing Collins, supra; DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept.

of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189, 109 S.Ct. 998, 103

L. Ed. 2d 249 (1989); and Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S.

327, 106 S. Ct. 662, 88 L. Ed. 2d 662 (1986).

In the instant case Petitioners describe, at best,

negligent conduct. Viewing Petitioners’ best attempt to

paint a grim picture of Respondents’ actions in the most

favorable light, this Court cannot conclude that Respon-

dents made a deliberate decision to inflict pain upon

Petitioners. Petitioners have failed to establish “plain

error” and as such the writ should not be granted.

¢

12

CONCLUSION

For all of the foregoing reasons, Respondents respect-

fully request that this Honorable Court deny the Petition.

Respectfully submitted,

TIMOTHY D. WITTLINGER

Counsel of Record

EVELYN L. SULLEN

CLARK HILL PLC

500 Woodward Avenue,

Suite 3500

Detroit, MI 48226-3435

(313) 965-8300

Attorneys for Respondents

Dated: August 2, 2002

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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