Opposition Brief — Upsher v. Grosse Pointe Public School System
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} Supreme Coart. Dy,
{ FILED
No. 02-35 AUG 2 2002
| _OFFICE OF THE GLEE
In The ae | —
Supreme Court of the United States
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JESSE UPSHER; ANNIE ABRAHAM;
EDWARD BRODZIK; JEANETTE BRODZIK;
HENRY HUCZEK; AURELIA HUCZEK; STEPHEN
KALMUS; CATHERINE KALMUS; KAREN KOHL;
TRACY THACKER; JOHN O’LOUGHLIN,
Petitioners,
3
GROSSE POINTE PUBLIC SCHOOL SYSTEM;
‘GROSSE POINTE BOARD OF EDUCATION; SUZANNE
KLEIN; CHRISTINA FENTON; TIMOTHY HOWLETT;
| “PAUL PAGEL; CARL ANDERSON; JACK RYAN;
- JOHN MILLS; CYNTHIA PANGBORN: SEARS TAYLOR;
es MARY BETH HERMAN: JAY JEFFRIES; STEVE ;
ee ge derbi ED SHINE; LARRY YANKAUSKAS,
tage 8 _ individually and in their respective capacities,
Respondents.
STATEMENT PURSUANT TO RULE 29.6
Petitioners are individual residents of the State of
Michigan. Petitioner Steven Kalmus is deceased, having
died of causes unrelated to this litigation during the
pendency of this appeal. The record below, including the
complaint filed in the District Court, refers to the first
named Petitioner as “Jesse Upshur.” However, the Court
of Appeals published opinion and this Petition refer to that
individual as “Jesse Upsher.”
Individual Respondents are residents of the State of
Michigan. The Grosse Pointe Public School System is a
general powers public school district organized under the
laws of the State of Michigan, and is engaged in the
operation of public schools in a geographic area in south-
eastern Michigan. It has neither parent nor subsidiary
corporations and its board members are elected by the
public. The Grosse Pointe Board of Education is not a
corporate entity and the reference thereto presumably
refers to the board members of the Grosse Pointe Public
School System or to the Grosse Pointe Public School
System itself.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
STATEMENT PURSUANT TO RULE 29.6............... i
TAR hls CP CIC a Be ivcisininssnsicinvnseengnieciencntvetuns il
TAD OF AU EEIMeE EBIRO <ishccnsnnssrcviconemocceteereseseies ili
COUNTER-STATEMENT OF THE CASE ................ 1
REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT..................... 5
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS’ OPINION DOES
NOT CONFLICT WITH DECISIONS OF THIS
COURT OR DECISIONS OF OTHER CIR-
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS’ OPINION DOES
NOT CONFLICT WITH DECISIONS OF THE
MICHIGAN SUPREME COURT .................000088 7
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS’ OPINION IS IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THE LAW ESTAB-
LISHED BY THIS- COURT AND BY THE
SIXTH CIRCUIT, AND IS NOT “PLAIN ER-
ili
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
CASES
Bazinau v. Mackinac Carriage Tours, 233 Mich.
App. 743, 593 N.W. 2d 219 (1998).................00ssscccccsserees 8
Beauchamp v. Dow Chemical Company, 427 Mich.
I, I © oo csscsennossinesdcnsssanvvosextodenseninens 7
Collins v. City of Harker Heights, Texas, 503 U.S.
115, 112 S. Ct. 1061, 117 L. Ed. 2d 261 (1992)....6, 10, 11
Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 106 S. Ct. 662,
Be Bes Be NO OE CL) on echnssinssecssccconssncsessinscossseveveoverenes 11
Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509
U.S. 579, 118 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469
ENE SSUES ECE Soper Pee ee a oe 1
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social Ser-
vices, 489 U.S. 189, 109 S. Ct. 998, 103 L. Ed. 2d
ao oa aticcanahheadundbianniminoeeeebinanteeseesion 11
Gazette v. City of Pontiac, 41 F. 3d 1061 (6th Cir.
he ta eiiesianaieleninsonadoinaneakebineeseevinnant 6, 10
Golec v. Metal Exchange Corporation, 453 Mich.
By Te Bees Oe Be CRO cecesescncedenssencscseessesscesnseneses 7,8
LaBounty v. Coughlin, 137 F. 3d 68 (2nd Cir. 1998)....... 5, 6
Lewellen v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville
and Davidson County, Tennessee, 34 F. 3d 345
es Ee aE eee ene 5, 6, 10, 11
Palazzola v. Karmazin Products, 223 Mich. App.
A EE, EE EEE GRIPES secsseesenseoncsvencossversnsvenessecsnses 9
Travis v. Dreis & Krump Manufacturing Company,
453 Mich. 149, 551 N.W. 2d 132 (1996) ........ ees 7,8
Upsher, et al. v. Grosse Pointe Public School System,
et al., 285 F. 3d 448 (6th Cir. 2002)....................066 6, 7, 10
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES -— Continued
STATUTES
COUNTER-STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Petitioners’ statement of the case contains factual
allegations not supported by the record before the lower
Court and in many instances contrary to such record.
Significant examples of these discrepancies are set forth
below, and are not meant to be exhaustive.
1. Petitioners rely on deposition testimony of two
experts’ to the effect that Petitioners suffered injury as a
result of actions of Respondents, stating that such testi-
mony is unrebutted.
a. In spite of the fact that the medical literature is
replete with epidemiologic studies relating to as-
bestos exposure, Mr. Wabeke testified that he did
not review any such studies in connection with
his work on this case (Court of Appeals Joint Ap-
pendix (C. A. App.) at 675). Mr. Wabeke correctly
testified (C. A. App. at 679) that the maximum
acceptable time weighted average concentration
for occupational exposure to asbestos was one-
tenth of a fiber per cubic centimeter of air over
an eight-hour period. However, he was unable to
provide any testimony as to the amount of asbes-
tos fibers released at Grosse Pointe South High
School during the incident in question. He testi-
fied as follows (C. A. App. at 681):
* Respondents argued in the Court of Appeals that Petitioners’ two
proffered experts, by their own admissions, were not qualified to give
opinions as their testimony did not meet the requirements of Daubert v.
Merrill Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 125
L. Ed. 2d 469 (1993).
2
Q You would have to speculate in order to — to set a
figure as to the amount of asbestos fibers re-
leased at the Grosse Pointe Schools in 1995; isn’t
that correct?
A I-— yeah, I suppose. One is too many if it’s con-
trollable.
Mr. Wabeke further admits that he does not have
experience with regard to asbestos remediation
involving vinyl asbestos tile (C. A. App. at 683).
Mr. Wabeke candidly admits that in order to ex-
trapolate from other fact situations and reach a
conclusion about asbestos release in the case at
bar would be a “quantum leap” and “speculation.”
(C. A. App. at 684). Concerning total exposure (as
opposed to time weighted average concentration)’
Mr. Wabeke testifies (C. A. App. at 690) that the
maximum total exposure which plaintiffs could
have encountered was 14/10,000 of a fiber year.
This is a negligible amount compared with the 10
and 20 fiber year exposure of employees that
normally occurs in the insulation trade, pipe fit-
ting trade, or other occupations where epidemi-
ologic studies have been undertaken.
b. Dr. Chiodo’s opinion was based on epidemiologic
studies unrelated to the situation in the case at
bar. Dr. Chiodo relied on studies involving asbes-
tos exposure of construction ironworkers and
* Time weighted average concentration is the measure of the
amount of asbestos fibers in the air at any given time. Total exposure is
the amount of asbestos to which a person is exposed during a given
period of time.
3
Swedish insulation workers, which he readily
admitted were not applicable to the case at bar
(C. A. App. at 508). Significantly, Dr. Chiodo testi-
fied that he had no knowledge and was unable to
provide any evidence as to the level of asbestos
exposure, if any, encountered by Petitioners. Dr.
Chiodo testified (C. A. App. at 504-06) that he did
not know the time weighted average concentra-
tion to which any of the Petitioners were ex-
posed, nor the total exposure in fiber years of any
of the Petitioners.
2. Petitioners state that the carpet removal project
lasted ten days. The record reflects that the project lasted
no more than four days (C. A. App. at 466, 576, 599-607).
3. Petitioners state that New York Carpet World
walked off the project when it discovered that the tiles
contained twenty-five percent asbestos. The record estab-
lishes that New York Carpet World advised Respondent
Pagel that the method they used for removing old carpet
was to use a mechanical scraper, and if there were asbes-
tos tiles under the carpeting, that process might disturb
the tiles (C. A. App. at 650). This is the reason that the
decision was made to remove the carpet by hand, so that
the tiles under the carpet would not be disturbed.°
* It is unrebutted that no one anticipated that in connection with
removal of the carpet, the underlying tiles would be disturbed or would
come loose. Petitioners were instructed to remove carpet, not tiles (C. A.
App. at 660).
+
4. Petitioners state that Respondents were aware
that tiles would become detached from the floor and would
release asbestos fibers. The record reflects that Respon-
dents’ only knowledge was that the tiles could contain
asbestos. Such knowledge is not equivalent to knowledge
that tiles would become detached from the floor or would
release asbestos fibers. Only Respondent Jeffries, who was
working on the carpet project as the “foreman” was aware
that tiles were coming detached from the floor. The record
is clear that he was unaware of any danger as a result of
such condition and continued working. None of the other
Respondents were aware that tiles were becoming de-
tached from the floor until after the project was completed.
5. Petitioners refer to violations received by the
Grosse Pointe Public School System in connection with
this project. The only two violations received were for
failure to conduct air monitoring during the project and
failure to instruct employees as to asbestos-related facts.
Respondents received no violations in connection with the
actual physical removal of the carpet. Provided air moni-
toring was conducted and proper asbestos instruction was
given, the carpet removal project ordered by Respondents
and conducted by Petitioners would not have been a
violation of any law and would have been permitted to
proceed.‘ The particular regulations for which Respon-
dents were cited did not themselves cause any injury to
Petitioners.
* Carrying Petitioners’ argument to its logical extension leads to
the conclusion that under the facts of this case, and assuming air
monitoring and proper instruction, Petitioners would have no claim
even though their exposure would have been the same.
5
REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT
Petitioners argue that the writ should be granted for
three reasons (Petition at 18-19):
1. The decision of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit conflicts with holdings of this Court
and other circuits.
2. The decision of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit conflicts with decisions of the Michi-
gan Supreme Court on Petitioners’ state law claims.
3. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit committed plain error.
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS’ OPINION DOES
NOT CONFLICT WITH DECISIONS OF THIS
COURT OR DECISIONS OF OTHER CIR-
CUITS
The only Court of Appeals’ opinion cited by Petitioners
to support their argument that there is a conflict among
the circuits relating to the proper test to be applied in
determining a violation of 42 U.S.C. 1983 is LaBounty v.
Coughlin, 137 F. 3d 68 (2nd Cir. 1998). The Sixth Circuit
opinion in this case clarified that different principles
would apply in a custodial case, such as LaBounty, supra.
Eighth Amendment considerations alone may very well
dictate a different test being applied in a custodial setting.
The Sixth Circuit cites and relies on Lewellen v Metropoli-
tan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, Ten-
nessee, 34 F. 3d 345 (6th Cir. 1994) in its holding below
that in a non-custodial setting, “plaintiff must prove that
the governmental actor either intentionally injured the
6
plaintiff or acted arbitrarily in the constitutional sense.”
Upsher, et al. v. Grosse Pointe Public School System, et al.,
285 F. 3d 448, 453 (6th Cir. 2002), citing Lewellen, supra,
at 350-51 and Gazette v. City of Pontiac, 41 F. 3d 1061,
1067 (6th Cir. 1994). LaBounty, supra, is not in conflict
with these decisions, as courts have recognized a key
distinction between custodial and non-custodial cases. The
Sixth Circuit opinion in this case is entirely consistent
with previous appellate decisions, including LaBounty,
supra, and complies with this Court’s pronouncement in
Collins v. City of Harker Heights, Texas, 503 U.S. 115, 112
S. Ct. 1061, 117 L. Ed. 2d 261 (1992).
Having determined that the law requires evidence of
conduct “intentionally designed to punish someone” or
“conscious shocking” behavior, the Sixth Circuit examines
the record and finds no such evidence. An examination of
the record below establishes that this conclusion is correct.
None of the Respondents (with the exception of Respon-
dent Jeffries) were aware that carpet tiles were becoming
detached from the floor. In addition, none of the Respon-
dents (including Respondent Jeffries) were aware of any
danger to which Petitioners were exposed. As the Sixth
Circuit correctly stated,
“We cannot find, nor was our attention invited to,
any evidence in the record which suggests that
any of the defendants made a deliberate decision
to inflict pain or bodily injury on any of the
plaintiffs. Neither is there proof that the defen-
dants engaged in arbitrary conduct intentionally
designed to punish the plaintiffs — conduct which
we have recognized may result in the deprivation
of a constitutionally-protected interest. Id. With-
out more, we conclude that the plaintiffs’ evi-
dence establishes, at best, a case sounding in
7
negligence and not a constitutional tort under
Section 1983.” (Upsher, supra, at 453-54).
Inasmuch as Petitioners have not cited any Court of
Appeals’ authority in conflict with the Sixth Circuit
opinion in this tase, the writ should be not be granted.
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS’ OPINION DOES
NOT CONFLICT WITH DECISIONS OF THE
MICHIGAN SUPREME COURT
Petitioners’ state law claim rests upon the intentional
tort exception to the Michigan Worker’s Disability
Compensation Act (MWDCA), M.C.L.A. 418.131(1). The
law relating to the intentional tort exception has been
evolving in Michigan since the 1986 decision of the
Michigan Supreme Court in Beauchamp v. Dow Chemical
Company, 427 Mich. 1, 398 N.W. 2d 882 (1986). The law
has now been set to rest by the Michigan Supreme Court’s
dual decisions in Travis v. Dreis & Krump Manufacturing
Company, and Golec v. Metal Exchange Corporation, 453
Mich. 149, 551 N.W. 2d 132 (1996). To establish an-“inten-
tional tort” Michigan law requires either:
1. An injury to an employee as a result of a deliber-
ate-act of the employer where the employer spe-
cifically intended an injury, or
2. An injury to an employee where the employer had
actual knowledge that an injury was certain to oc-
cur and willfully disregarded that knowledge.
Michigan law also provides that the question of whether or
not the facts in a case constitute an intentional tort is a
question of law for the court.
The Sixth Circuit, in its analysis of Petitioners’ Sec-
tion 1983 claim, found that the record did not reflect an
intentional act as required by 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Court
then applied the same rationale to hold that there was no
intentional tort. The lack of knowledge of Respondents as
to the progress of the carpet project and the failure of
Respondents to adequately comprehend any danger (if any
such danger existed), requires the conclusion that no
intentional tort has been proven, nor can such an inten-
tional tort be established from the state of the record
below.
In Golec, supra, the employer had knowledge that the
condition in the plant which caused injury to the plaintiff
had in fact caused a similar injury in the past. In spite of
this knowledge and in spite of the history of the respective
condition to cause injury, the employee was ordered to
continue working. Here, Petitioners were not ordered to
remove tile, just carpet, and there was no indication that
the tile would become detached with the carpet.
Other Michigan cases decided since Travis and Golec,
supra, hold the same. Bazinau v. Mackinac Carriage
Tours, 233 Mich. App. 743, 593 N.W. 2d 219 (1999), in-
volved an employee traveling across the ice between
Mackinac Island and the mainland in connection with
delivering horse feed to Mackinac Island. Plaintiff argued
that the intentional tort exception should apply when the
vehicle broke through the ice. The Michigan Court of
Appeals indicated that evidence of increased risk of injury
or increased probability of injury is not admissible, as the
injury must be certain to occur. The court held that the
intentional tort exception did not apply.
9
Palazzola v. Karmazin Products, 223 Mich. App. 141,
565 N.W. 2d 868 (1997), involved injuries to an employee
cleaning sludge from a tank and being overcome with
trichloroethyline fumes. The employee’s supervisor was
not aware of, nor did he appreciate, the risk. The Michigan
Court of Appeals stated that in order to establish an intent
to injure, the evidence must show a deliberate act or
omission specifically intended to cause an injury by a
particular employee. Disconnected testimony by various
employees is not sufficient. In Palazzola, supra, a case
with strikingly similar facts to the case as bar, the super-
visor instructed the employees to drain and fill the tank,
not to clean the sludge from the tank. In the case at bar,
Petitioners were instructed to remove the carpet, not the
tile. Also, the foreman in Palazzola, supra, was not aware
of the danger of the trichloroethyline fumes, and actually
was in the tank himself doing work. In the case at bar,
Respondent Jeffries, the foreman on the job, was also
removing carpet and did not appreciate any danger in-
volved. Holding that the facts did not establish an inten-
tional tort exception to the MWDCA, the Michigan Court
of Appeals affirmed the trial Court’s dismissal of plain-
tiff’s claim. —
Further substantiating the lack of liability of Respon-
dents is the fact that at most, Petitioners were exposed to
14/10,000 of a fiber year, an extremely negligible amount.
Also, none of the Petitioners suffer from any medical
consequences of asbestos exposure.
The Sixth Circuit opinion below is in accord with
applicable Michigan authority, and consequently the writ
should not be granted.
10
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS’ OPINION IS IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THE LAW ESTAB-
LISHED BY THIS COURT AND BY THE
SIXTH CIRCUIT, AND IS NOT “PLAIN ER-
ROR”
Petitioners state that the Sixth Circuit opinion affirm-
ing the trial court’s dismissal of their 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim
was “plain error.” However, the Sixth Circuit relies on its
previous opinion in Lewellen, supra, a case which itself
relies on Collins v. City of Harker Heights, Texas, supra.
Petitioners cite no authority in support of their proposition
that the Sixth Circuit committed “plain error” and the
Petition does not even address the opinion in Lewellen,
supra. The Sixth Circuit analysis of Lewellen, supra, and
its reference to Collins, supra, and Gazette, supra, (Upsher,
supra, at 452-53, provide the best argument as to why the
Sixth Circuit opinion is in accord with prior law and not
“plain error.”
The law establishes that gross negligence is not the
type of governmental action needed to support a 42 U.S.C.
1983 claim. Gross negligence is not actionable under 42
U.S.C. 1983 because it is not “arbitrary in the constitu-
tional sense.” Gazette, supra, at 1067, Lewellen, supra, at
350-351. Reckless or grossly negligent conduct (assuming
that Petitioners could establish such conduct) is not
enough to support a 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim. In Lewellen,
supra, plaintiff was a construction worker severely injured
when his construction materials came into contact with a
power line. Plaintiff argued that defendants City and
School District should be liable under 42 U.S.C. 1983
because they chose to build a school directly beneath a
high voltage line, delayed removal of the line, violated
applicable safety and electrical code standards, and willfully
pron a
11
disregarded the high risk of injury. The Sixth Circuit
disagreed with the plaintiff’s argument in Lewellen,
supra, stating (34 F. 3d at 348):
... [T]he defendants obviously did not make a
deliberate decision to inflict pain or bodily injury
on the plaintiff. The defendants may have been
negligent, but it is now firmly settled that injury
caused by negligence does not constitute a ‘depri-
vation’ of any constitutionally protected interest.
[Emphasis added]
citing Collins, supra; DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept.
of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189, 109 S.Ct. 998, 103
L. Ed. 2d 249 (1989); and Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S.
327, 106 S. Ct. 662, 88 L. Ed. 2d 662 (1986).
In the instant case Petitioners describe, at best,
negligent conduct. Viewing Petitioners’ best attempt to
paint a grim picture of Respondents’ actions in the most
favorable light, this Court cannot conclude that Respon-
dents made a deliberate decision to inflict pain upon
Petitioners. Petitioners have failed to establish “plain
error” and as such the writ should not be granted.
¢
12
CONCLUSION
For all of the foregoing reasons, Respondents respect-
fully request that this Honorable Court deny the Petition.
Respectfully submitted,
TIMOTHY D. WITTLINGER
Counsel of Record
EVELYN L. SULLEN
CLARK HILL PLC
500 Woodward Avenue,
Suite 3500
Detroit, MI 48226-3435
(313) 965-8300
Attorneys for Respondents
Dated: August 2, 2002
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