Appendix — Langdon v. Swain

Supreme Court brief2002

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‘

No.

In The

Supreme Court of the Gnited States

Christopher Langdon, Petitioner,

v.

Lyndo Tippett, Roy Cooper et al.

consolidated with:

Christopher Langdon, Petititoner,

v.

J.J. Swain, Jack Murdock, F.D. Martin et al.

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari

To The United States Court of Appeals

For the Fourth Circuit

APPENDIX, PART II, FOR

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Christopher Langdon

Pro Se

1835 Edwin Blvd.

Winter Park, Fla. 32789

407-647-7539

38

[EXHBIT #1]

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

ASHEVILLE DIVISION

CASE NO:1:01-CV-107

FILED: 2001 MAY 21

P.M. 2:09

U.S DIST. COURT

W. DIST. OF N.C.

CHRISTOPHER LANGDON,

PLAINTIFF,

v.

LYNDO TIPPETT, SECRETARY OF TRANSP.

OF THE STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA; THE

NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF

TRANSPORTATION (NCDOT); ROY COOPER,

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NORTH CARO-

LINA, THE STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA;

THE NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF

JUSTICE & THE OFFICE OF ATTORNEY

GENERAL,

DEFENDANTS

CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT CHALLENGING

THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF NORTH

CAROLINA STATUTES & FOR DECLAR-

ATORY JUDGEMENT AND_INJUNCTIVE

RELIEF & INCORPORATED MEMORANDUM

OF LAW

39

(1) The plaintiff hereby seeks to have North

Carolina General Statutes 136-103 through

136- 112, NCGS-40A-1, NCGS-1-51, NCGS

1-53 and NCGS -1-35 declared unconstitu- ©

tional and that an injunction be issued

barring the defendants from utilizing those

statutes as defenses, or otherwise. The

aforesaid statutes deny equal protection

under the law, due process of lay anda

proper procedure for a redress of grievances

against the government. Therefore, the

aforesaid statutes are in violation of USCA’s

I, V, & XIV. More specifically:

a. 4

(2) NCGS 136-111 is unconstitutional

because it does away with prior notice be-

fore the taking of property and an opportun-

ity to be heard. The only exception to the

right to notice and an opportunity to be

heard prior to a taking is in emergency

situations. See: Boddie v. Connecticutt,

401 US 371 at 379 ; Davis v. Scherer, 468

US 183 at 200-201 (1984); Wisconsin v.

Constantineau, 400 US 433, 91 S. Ct. 507

at 510; Windsor v. Mc Veigh, 93 US 274

(1876).

Particularly enlightening is the Court’s

ruling in Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 US 67 at

83, 92 S.Ct. 1983 at 1995 (1972). The

Court has repeatedly held that “constructive

notice” is not sufficient: Mullane v. Central a

Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 US 306,

40

314, 70 S.Ct. 652, 657 (1950); Schroeder v.

New York City, 371 US 208, 83 S.Ct. 279;

Mennonite Board of Missions v. Adams, 462

US 791,103 S.Ct. 2706 (1983). The low-

er courts agree: Miles v. District of Colum-

bia, 354 F. Supp. 577 (1973), 510 F. 2d 188

(1975). See also: Caveness V. Raleigh C. &

S. R. Co., 90 Se 244 at 246(N.C.S.Ct.-1916)

The right to prior notice and opportunity to

be heard before the taking of one’s property

is extended to all members of society, even

the most downtrodden.

For example, prisoners are allowed prior

notice and a hearing before their good time

credits are taken away Wolff v. McDonnell,

418 US 539, 557 -558 (1974). Mental

patients are allowed hearings before being

deprived of their civil rights: Zinermon v.

Burch, 494 US 113, 110 S.Ct. 975 (1990). ;

Those aliens who are charged with being in

this country illegally are entitled to notice

and a hearing prior to being deported:

Kwang Hai Chew v. Colding, 73 S. Ct. 472,

344 US 590.

States have always recognized the right to

prior notice and opportunity to be heard

when one’s property is taken by a govern-

mental entity: See: Bernard v. Brewer,

Virginia Reports, Volume II, {77}, pages 99-

100 (1795) ( this case was argued by John

Marshall as a practicing attorney); Case of

Neeld’s Road, 1 Pa 353 at 355; Stuart v.

41

Palmer, 74 NY-29 Sickels (183) at(190)

(New York-1878). North Carolina cases are

in agreement: Phelps v. Chesson, 34 NC

(197), page 189 (1851); Marshall v. Love-

lass, 1 NC 412; McMillan v. Robeson

County, 262 NC 413, 137 Se 2d 105 at 108

[4] (1964); Mc Donald’s Corp. v. Dwyer, 338

NC 445, 450 Se 2d 888 at 891 [6] (1994);

Bowie v. Town of West Jefferson, 57 Se 2d

369 at 371 [1] (1950); Beaufort County v.

Mayo, 176 Se 753 at 755 (NC S.Ct.-1934).

Board of Commissioners of Roxboro v.

Bumpass, 233 N.C. 190, 63 Se 2d 144 at

147 [9-12] (1951). Because there is no

requirement of prior notice and opportunity

to be heard in NCGS 136-111 when the

NCDOT takes property, it is in violation of

USCA’s I, V, & XIV.

(3) Federal law prohibits any federal

employee from intentionally making it

necessary for a property owner to institute

legal proceedings to prove that a taking has

occurred. See: 27 Am Jur 2d, EMINENT

DOMAIN, Sections 826, 1108; 42 USCS

4651 (8); UEDC Section 213; Many states

have the same prohibition: Alabama Codes-

18-1A-33. The reason for this prohibition is

that any government employee must inform

a citizen of the taking of that citizen’s

property if they are aware of the taking.

However, NCGS 136-111 has no such

Pa ew

42

requirement. NCGS 136-111 as written,

and as interpreted in the NC courts, allows

the NCDOT to simply take a citizen’s

property and say “sue us.” This has

happened on numerous occasions in N.C.

Therefore, NCGS 136-111 violates USCA’s I,

V, & XIV.

(4) The Supreme Court of the State of North

Carolina has repeatedly held that a statute

which allows the taking of property without

PRIOR notice and opportunity to be heard is

unconstitutional: Mc Donald’s Corp. v.

Dwyer, 338 NC 445, 450 Se 2d 888 at 891

(N.C.S.Ct.- 1994); Bowie v. Town of West

Jefferson, supra. For NC to make an excep-

tion to this rule for the NCDOT is not equal

protection under the law and due process of

law.

There are other state’s which agree that

statutes which allow the taking of property

without prior notice and opportunity to be

heard are unconstitutional: Violet’s Heirs

et al. v. City Council of Alexandria, 53 Am

St. Rep. 825, 23 Se 909 (Supreme Court of

Virginia- 1896); Savannah F. & W. Ry. Co. Vv.

Mayor of Savannah, 96 Ga. 680 at 680

(Ga.S.Ct.-1895); Dodd v. Hart, 68 A. 397 at

397 [1] (Court of Chancery of Deleware-

1900); Janes v. West Puerto De Luna

Community Ditch,169 P. 309 at 310

(Supreme Court of New Mexico-1917); Re

Dace

43

Opinion of Justices, 313 Ne 2d 561 (Mass.)

(5) NCGS 136-111 and NCGS 136-112

do not, as far as I am aware, appear in the

Index to the N.C. General Statutes. I have

checked under “Dept. of Transp.,” “Transp.

Dept.,” “N.C. Dept. of Transp.,” “ Just

Compensation,” “Taking,” “Inverse Condem-

nation,” “Condemnation” and “Eminent Do-

main.” If NCGS 136-111 is an exclusive

remedy, as the courts in NC have ruled,

notice that the statute exists must be given.

The government can’t hide the existence of

a statute, expect a citizen to be aware that

it exists and then punish them if they don’t

comply with it. Notice that a statute exists

is particularly important for pro se party,

particularly if they live in a remote county

with no law library. From 1980 to 1998 I

lived in Polk county N.C. which has no law

library. However, a copy of the NC General

Statutes was available.

The failure to include NCGS’s 136-111

and 112 in the Index is particularly harmful

to pro se parties who can’t afford legal

representation, thus, it is an economic,

class based discrimination. This type of

discrimination is unconstitutional: Harper

v. Va. Board of Elections, 383 US 663

(1966).

The failure to give proper notice to the

general public that NCGS 136-111 and 136-

Me

44

112 exist is a denial of due process of law

and equal protection under the law in

violation of USCA’s I, V and XIV.

(6) NCGS 136-111 states that a

property owner may file a complaint within

two years of the taking. However, it does

not specify what happens when a taking is

caused by a series of events over a period of

time, rather than by a single event. The US

Supreme Court addressed this question in

US v. Dickinson, 331 US 745, 67 S.Ct. 1382

at 1384-1385 (1947). In that case the

Court ruled that when a taking occurs over

a period of time, a statute of limitations, if

any, does not begin to run until the taking

is complete.

The reason for this rule is to avoid

premature and multipie lawsuits. See also

Gregorio P.Castro v. U.S., 500 F. 2d 436 at

440 (1974); Barbaccia v. County of Santa

Clara, 451 F. Supp. 260 at 266 (1978);

Juda v. U.S., 6 Cl. Ct. 441 (1984); Silver-

berg v. U.S., 155 Ct. Cl. 436 (1961); Avery v.

U.S., 300 F. 2d 640 (1964); Terteling v.

U.S., 334 F. 2d 250 (1964); Pierpont Inn v.

California, 449 P. 2d 737 (1969).

Rather than running any statute of

limitations from the time that the taking is

complete, the courts in N.C. have been

known to run a statute of limitations for a

taking from the first injury, no matter how

48

small it might be, regardless of whether or

not the taking is complete: Robertson v.

City of High Point, 497 Se 2d 300 (N.C.

App.-1998). NCGS 136-111, as written and

as interpreted, does not ensure that the

suggested statute of limitations, if applic-

able, runs from the last event in the taking,

rather than the first, therefore, NCGS 136-

111 is in violation of USCA’s I, V, & XIV.

(7) NCGS 136-112 states that interest

should run from the date of the taking.

However, when a taking occurs by a series

of events over a period of time, rather than

by a single event, the federal courts have

ruled that interest should run from the mid-

point of the taking: Drakes B.L. Co. v. U.S.,

459 F. 2d 504 at 511-512, 198 Ct. Cl. 598

at 608 (1965); Fonnaledes v. U.S., 107 F.

Supp. 1019, 1022, 1023, 123 Ct. Cl. 483,

503-504 (1952); Gregorio Castro v. U.S.,

SOOF. 2d 436 at 443 (1974). Therefore,

NCGS 136-112 is not constitutional and is

in violation of USCA’s I, V & XIV.

(8) NCGS 136-111 is unconstitutional

because it is too vague. A “taking” has been

recognized as substantial damage to a

citizen’s property which creates a servitude

or easement on the property: U.S. v. Dick-

inson, 67 S. Ct. 1382 at 1383 (1947); Wade

v. Car. Tel. & Tel. Co.,147 N.C. 219, 60 Se

ee Ot ilo as le ae tee Fal

46

987 at 988 (S.Ct. of N.C.-1908); Geer v.

Durham Water Co., 37 Se 474 At 475.

The question is “What amount of damage

must be reached to create a taking?”

Historically, if the damage to the citizen’s

property was not substantial enough to be a

taking, it was considered a tort and no com-

pensation was available, unless the

government had waved its sovereign

immunity with regards to tort claims. ~

“ The distinction is made between a

‘taking’ and ‘damage.’ Compensation to the

owner required as to the former, but not as

to the latter.” Kirkpatrick v. City of

487 at 4

“ Continuing trespass or nuisance may

ripen into a taking.” City of Jacksonville v.

Schumann, 167 So. 2d 95 at 95 [3] (Fl.-

1964).

“ Property is not ‘taken’ within meaning

of takings clause of State Constitution if it

is simply damaged.” Hawkins v. City of La

Grande, 843 P. 2d 400 (Oregon)

See also: Sanguinetti v. U.S., 264 US 148

at 149 (1924).

Because of the confusion as to what level

of damage was necessary to reach the level

of a taking, most states now have constitu-

tional amendments which require just

compensation for the ‘taking’ and

‘damaging’ of property by the government.

47

The first to do so was Illinois in the 1870’s.

North Carolina is not one of those states.

Therefore, a plaintiff must wait until the

damage reaches the level of a taking before

his cause of action accrues. Unfortunately,

North Carolina has at least three different

definitions as to what minimum level of

damage constitutes a taking:

“ And ‘taking’ under the power of eminent

domain may be defined as.. ‘informally

appropriating or injuriously affecting it

[property] in such a way as substantially to

oust the owner and deprive him of a//

beneficial enjoyment thereof.” Penn v.

Coastal, 231 NC 481lat 484 (1950).

Is a taking a complete destruction of

value, or is it substantial damage? The

quote above contains two different defi-

nitions of a taking because it gives two

different levels of damage necessary to

constitute a taking. Substantial damage

can be less than a complete destruction of

value, perhaps much iess, depending

on a particular judge’s, or jury’s interpre-

tation of the word “substantial.”

“Substantial” is a subjective term.

Some may consider a 10 % diminution in

value substantial, others 25%, 50%, or

75%. Is $500 worth of damage substan-

tial? Is $1,000 worth of damage sub-

stantial? Is $5,000 worth of damage

substantial? The above definition of a

48

‘taking’ appears in several NC cases and is

cited in the case notes of the NC General

Statutes. Another definition of a taking is:

“ In inverse condemnation action, prima

facie showing of substantial physical

damage measurable in monetary terms is

required.” Lea v. N.C. Board of Transp.,

291 Se 2d 844 at 845 [12] (N.C. App.-1982

304 Se 2d 164 at 166 [14] (N.C.S.Ct.-1983

The NC Court of Appeals has

further confused the matter by stating in

Robertson v. City of High Point, 497 Se 2d

300 (1998) that any statute of limitations

for inverse condemnation runs from the

first injury. One can draw two conclusions

from that: (A) The court believes that a

‘taking’ is a any injury, no matter how

small, or; (B) The statute of limitations for

a taking can begin running before a cause

of action accrues.

For example, if a NCDOT road/dam

malfunctions and destroys Mr. Abercrom-

bie’s barn, doing $20, 000 worth of damage,

the damage would probably be considered

substantial enough to be a taking. The

statute of limitations, according to

Robertson, would begin to run when

Abercrombie’s cause of action accrued.

However, if the same road/dam caused

$200 damage to Barnaby’s property, the

purported statute of limitations would,

according to Robertson, begin running,

49

although the damage was not substantial

enough to be a taking.

If Barnaby’s property was injured again

a year later by the same structure in the

amount of $400, Barnaby still couldn’t sue

for a taking. If Barnaby’s property was

injured again in the amount of $25,000, 26

months after the first injury, Barnaby

couldn’t sue because, according to Robert-

son, the statute of limitations began to run

from the first injury and had expired

before his cause of action had accrued.

Under Robertson, plaintiffs have different

time periods, or none at all, for filing.

In states which have constitutional bars

against the taking of property, without a bar

against damaging property, the courts and

plaintiff's are faced with the difficult task of

determining when the damage rises to the

level of a taking.

“ No simple test exists for determining

when a taking occurs...a particularized

judgment of the facts of the individual case

is necessary.” Jensen v. U_S., 305 F.

2d 444 (1962)

The Robertson rule is a simple rule that is

basically a tort rule. However, courts

throughout the U.S. have always held that a

‘taking’ is not a tort.

“ Constitutional provision against taking

private property ...without adequate

compensation..that liability is not in tort.”

50

29A CJS, Eminent Domain, Sect. 375, page

745.

Generally, the federal courts require a

high amount of damage to constitute a

taking. In Sanguinetti v. US, 264 US 148 at

149, the Court cited US v. Cress, 243 US

316, in which the value of Cress’ property

was diminished by 50%, therefore, a

“taking” had occurred. I am not asserting

that the courts in N.C. must accept the

federal levels of damage that trigger a

taking. States may be more protective of

constitutional rights than the federal

government. Many states allow a small

level of damage to constitute a taking (I

believe S.C. is one).

Whatever level of damage that N.C.

decides constitutes a taking, it must be

consistent. If a plaintiff is to comply with a

statute of limitations for a taking, particu-

larly a pro se plaintiff, there must be a uni-

form definition of a “taking.” In NC it has

been defined as a complete destruction of

value, a substantial diminution of value

and, by inference, a small injury.

Therefore, NCGS 136-111 and NCGS

136-112 are in violation of USCA I, USCA V

& USCA XIV.

(9) A more complete definition of a taking is

a substantial interference with a property

right. Property is not a physical thing but a

31

bundle of rights; the right to sell, to enjoy,

to use and to damage the physical entity,

are all property rights. Whenever a

government entity exercises one of these

property rights, it must pay just compen-

sation. For example, if a government floods

private property, it is both using and

damaging the property. Joe Smith may

flood his own property, even if it diminishes

its value. However, the government must

pay just compensation if it substantially

damages/uses a citizen’s property.

Historically, in N.C., whenever a

government agency used/damaged private

property substantially, without resorting to

the statutory condemnation proceedings

(particularly notice and opportunity to be

heard), the property owner had until the

expiration of the period of adverse

possession/ prescription to file a complaint

for just compensation. State v. Fisher, 23

SE 158 (Supreme Court of N.C.-1895).

Upon payment of just compensation,

sometimes called permanent damages, the

appropriator acquired an easement/

servitude to cont: »ue the damage/ use.

A physical invasion of the land was not

required, as claimed in Lea v. BOT, supra.

In Geer v. Durham Water Co., 37 Se 474 the

upstream prevention of the normal flow of

water to the plaintiff's property was deemed

an appropriation of an easement. Because

92

the appropriator had not used the statutory

condemnation procedures, the 20 year time

limit of adverse possession/ prescription

was applicable. This was the ancient,

common law remedy under the Magna

Carta: Bowman v. Middleton, 1 Bay 252 at

253-254 (S.C.-1792). Mo. & N. A.R. Co. v.

Chapman, 234 Sw 171 (S.Ct. of Ark.-1921).

See also: Caveness v. Railroads 172 NC

305, 90 Se 244; Land v. Railroad, 107 NC

72, 12 Se 125; Livermon v. Roanoke &

T.R.R. Co., 109 NC 52, 13 Se 734 (1891);

Query v. Postal Tel. &Tel. Cable Co., 101

Se 390 at 391; Carolina & N.W. R. Co. v.

Piedmont Wagon, 51 Se 2d 301.

Most states (approximately 35) agree that

if a government body or a quasi-public

corporation appropriates a property interest

without utilizing the statutory condem-

nation procedures, including notice and

opportunity to be heard, the plaintiff

property owner has the right to file suit for

just compensation until the expiration of

the period of adverse possession / prescrip-

tion. See: Aylmore v. City of Seattle, 171 P.

2d 659 (extremely explanatory); White Pine

Lumber Co .v. City of Reno, 801 P. 2d 1370

(Nevada-1990); Carter v. Ridge Turnpike

Co., 208 Pa. 565, 57 A. 988 (1904); Faulk

v. Mo. River & N.W. R. Co., 28 SD 1,

132 NW 233 at 237(1911); Ackerman v.

Port of Seattle, 55 Wash. 2d 400, 348 P. 2d

a

664; Frustruck v. City of Fairfax, 28 Cal.

R. 357 at 361 [45-48] (1963); Fairbanks v.

N. Stor. Bor. v. Lakeview Enterp.,897 P. 2d

47 at 54 (Alaska-1995); Underwood v.

Dept. of Transp., 849 P. 2d 1113 at 1117

Oklahoma-1993); Barker v. St. Louis Cnty.,

104 Sw 2d 371 (Mo.-1937); Galway v.

Metropolitan El. R. Co., 28 Ne 2d 479 (NY-

1891); Di Santo v. Warrenville, 376 Ne 2d

288 at 289 (Ill.-1978);Gray v. Haas, 67 Nw

394 (S.Ct. of lowa-1896); Tucker v.

Chicago, St. P. M. & O. Ry. Co.,65 Nw 515

(S.Ct. of Wisconsin-1895); Schilling v. Carl

T. P., Grant Cnty., 235 Nw 126 (S.Ct. of

N.D.-1931); Fries v. Wheeling & L.E. Ry.

Co., 46 Ne 516 (Ohio S.Ct.-1897); uUinkins

v. City of Jal, 386 P. 2d 599 (N.M.-1963);

Maricopa Cnty. v. Warford, 206 P. 2d 1168

(Ariz.- 1949); Cheyenne Airport Board v.

Rogers, 707 P. 2d 717 (Wyo.-1985); Sundell

v. Town of New London, 409 A. 2d 1315

(S.Ct.of N.H.); Appeal of Kraus, 618 A.

2d 1070 (Penn.-1992); Kime v. Cass Cnty.,

101 Nw 2 (S.Ct. of Nebraska- 1902);

Chenevert v. La. St. Dept. of Hwys., 345 So

2d 960 at 960 [3] (1977); Mc Farlan v.

Morris Canal & Banking Co., 44 NJ Law

471 at 472 (NJ-1882); Tarrant Co. v. Reid,

203 Sw 2d 290 at 293 (Texas-1947); Ajji v.

City of Garnett, 804 P. 2d 950 at 955

(Kansas-1951); Salt Lake Inv. Co. v. Oregon

Short Line Co., 148 P. 439 at 441 (S.Ct.of

Ss dis goss piss Gand Bias Bight

54

Utah-1915), citing Land v. Railroad, supra.;

Katsos v. Salt Lake City Corp., 634 F. Supp.

100 (1986); Scates v. Indianna Hwy.

Comm., 383 Ne2d 491 (1978); Rosen-

thal v. Crystal Lake, 525 Ne 2d 1176 (Ill.-

1988); State Hwy Comm. v. Stumbo, 352 P.

2d 478 at 479 (Ore.-1960); Di Franzo v.

Village of Port Sanilac, 419 Nw 756 (Mich.-

1988); Yazoo-Mississippi Delta Levee

Beard v. Dancy, 3 So. 568 (Miss.-1888).

Further evidence that a plaintiff is not

bound by any statute of limitations for a

taking is the Supreme Court of N.C.’s ruling

in Hoyle v. City of Charlotte, 276 NC 292,

172 Se 2d 1(1970).

“ The common law action for inverse

condemnation has been recognized by this

court...“ Hoyle v. City of Charlotte.” Long Vv.

City of Charlotte, 293 Se 2d 101 at 108 [4]

NCSCt. 1982).

“ D.C.N.C.-1981. Under North Carolina

law, there is no statute of limitations

applicable to a claim for just compensation

and, thus...plaintiff is entitled to just com-

pensation under the Constitution regardless

of when the taking occurs and the time of

the is relevant for purposes of valuing just

compensation due...Ocean Acres Ltd.

Partnership v. Dare Cnty. Board of Health,

514 F. Supp 1117, affirmed 707 F. 2d

103.” West’ Federal Digest, key 288 (1) 35

FPD 3d 256.

95

See also: West’s NC Digest, Exhibit 1. Of

course, the defendants can cite statutes

which state that NCGS 136-111 is an

exclusive remedy, including the 2 year

suggested statute of limitations. According

to Shepherd’s Citations, Hoyle has never

been vacated or overruled. It is clear that

NCGS 136-111 is unconstitutional because

it violates the rights to due process of law

and equal protection under the law as

guaranteed in USCA I, V & XIV.

(10) In N.C. the plaintiff is not required

to utilize the statutory remedy (and the

statute of imitations therein) when the

appropriator does not utilize the statutory

procedures. See: Eller v. Board of Educa-

tion, 89 Se 2d 144 at 145 [7] (NCSCt-1955);

29A CJS, EMINENT DOMAIN, Section 376,

page 747, citing Lowman v. Abee, 131 Se

277, 191 NC 147; Mason v. Commissioners,

96 Se 110 at 110 [1] (NCSCt-1918); White

v. Nw. N. C. Ry. Co., 18 Se 330 at 334

(NCSCt-1893). Other jurisdictions agree:

Hamor and others v. Bar Harbor Water

Co.,78 Me 127, 3 A. 40 at 40 (1886); De

Salvo v. Arkansas La. Gas Co., 239 Fed

Supp. 312 (E.D..Ark.), cited in 27 Am Jur

2d, Sect. 823, page 341-342; Cook v.Lehigh

Valley R. Co., 18 1NYS 217 at 220 (NY-

1920). Also, the cases cited in the previous

section (#9) are in agreement. This is

96

| because the statutory condemnation

; proceedings are in derogation of common

right and are mandatory. The condemnor

must prove compliance with the mandatory >

statutory procedures to effect a legal taking.

See: State v. Core Bank Properties, 275 NC

328, 167 Se 2d 385 at 385 [1] (NCSCt.-

1969); N.C. St. Ports Authority v. South

Felt, 161 Se 2d 47 at 49; Carolina & Nw.T.

Ry. Company v. Penncarden L. & Mfg. Co.,

44 Se 358, 361 (NCSCt-1903); City of

Charlotte v. McNeely, 8 NC App. 649, 175

: Se 2d 348 at 351 [1-3] (1970); Cook v.

Lehigh Valley R. Co., supra.; Bernard v.

Brewer, 2 Wash. 76, Virginia Reports,

Volume II, page 99 (1795) (argued by John

Marshall).

NCGS 136-103 states that:

“ In case condemnation shall become

necessary the Department of Transportation

shall institute a civil action.”

Strangely, the courts in N.C. allow the

NCDOT to escape the mandatory statutory

requirements in NCGS 136-103 through

136-110.

FL Te Pn ees Raia

(11) There is other evidence that NCGS

136-111 is a special law for the NCDOT. It

has already been shown herein that in N.C.

when the appropriator fails to utilize the

mandatory statutory procedures, the

plaintiff is not required to utilize the statu-

97

tory remedy and his right to file a complaint

doesn’t expire until the end of the period of

adverse possession/prescription. In the

late 18001the N.C. Legislature passed

special laws for some railroad companies

which limited the time in which plaintiffs

could sue for just compensation for unauth-

orized takings: See: Teeter v. Postal Tele-

graph Co., 90 Se 941 at 942 (NCSCt.-1916).

This began the process in which sim-

ilarly situated plaintiffs were granted dif-

ferent times in which to file complaints for

just compensation, depending upon wheth-

er there was a taking by private individuals,

quasi-public corporations, municipalities or

state agencies. Such arbitrary classifica-

tions are a denial of due process of law,

equal protection under the law and the right

to a redress of grievances against the gov-

ernment. Statutory classifications must

treat similarly situated individuals alike:

Reed v. Reed, 404 US 71, 92 S.Ct. 251;

Hooper v. Bernalillo Cnty. Assessor, 472 US

612, 105 S. Ct. 2862 (1985). This is true

with regards to time periods for filing

complaints.: Picket v. Brown, 462 US 1,

103 S. Ct. 2199 (1983). What NC did was

lessen the period of adverse possession /

prescription for some entities, but not ail.

NCGS 136-111 is a special

limitation for filing complaints against a

particular state agency, the NCDOT. It does

A a cs: ae

VK. ee

58

not apply to other state agencies, qausi-

public corps., municipalities or contro-

versies between private individuals.

Under NCGS 146-24 state agencies, after

making an attempt to purchase property

from citizens, are authorized to use the

condemnation procedures under NCGS 136.

NCGS 136-111 does not require that the

NCDOT first make an attempt to purchase

the property appropriated. Attempts to

purchase are notice, albeit not necessarily

adequate constitutionally. There is nothing

in NCGS 146-24 or NCGS 136-111 that

requires property owners whose property

rights have been substantially interfered

with by state agencies other than the

NCDOT, to file a complaint within two

years.

For example, if Albert’ property is

damaged by a road put through his property

by the NC Dept. of Corrections without the

utilization of the statutory procedures and

constitutional safeguards, Albert may treat

the taking as legal (See: Ay/more v. City of

Seattle, 171 P. 2d 659)and prevent the

creation of an easement or servitude upon

his property, if he files a complaint within

20 years (NCGS 1-40). This might be seven

years under NCGS 1-38.

If the same inroads on Albert’s property

rights are made by a private citizen, he has

twenty years, or seven years to file a com-

99

plaint. If the inroads on his property rights

are made by a railroad, he would have 2 or

5 years, depending on the circumstances, to

file a complaint under NCGS- 1-51. This

statute is vague and contradictory.

If the same inroads on Albert’s property

rights are made by a quasi-public corpo-

ration (railroads excluded) or by a munici-

pality, he has three years in which to file a

complaint (NCGS-40A-51). Robertson v. City

of High point, supra. Under the same cir-

cumstances, he has only two years to file a

complaint if the inroads on his property

rights are made by the NCDOT.

Strangely, the NCDOT can intentionally

ignore all statutory and constitutional

safeguards and put a road through a

citizen’s property and acquire an easement

within two years under NCGS 136-111.

See: Ledford v. N.C .St .Hwy. Comm.

279 NC 188, 181 Se 2d 466 (1971).

However, the state of N.C. has 30 or 21

years in which to prevent the uncom-

pensated acquirement of an easement upon

its property under NCGS-1-35. The only

legitimate, constitutionally valid reason for

a statute of limitations is to prevent the

prosecution of stale claims. However, it is

ludicrous to hold that a claim against the

state grows sale in two years, while

the state’s claim under the same circum-

stances grows stale only after 30 years; that

er ee eee

ee ere

60

a claim against this stale after two years,

while claims against other state agencies

are stale only after twenty years; thata

claim against the NCDOT is stale after two

years and an identical against a municipal-

ity grows stale after three years. Statutes of

limitations which discriminate in the favor

of governments and against the citizenry

are unconstitutional: Reich v. State Hwy.

Dept., 194 Nw 2d 700 at 700 [2] (S.Ct. of

Mich.-1972); O’WNeil v. City of Parkersburg,

237 Se 2d 504, 508, 509 (Supreme Court of

Appeals of W. Virg.- 1977); Miller v. Boone

Cnty. Hosp., 394 Nw 2d 776 at 779 (S.Ct. of

Iowa-1986). Turner v. Staggs, 510 P. 2d

879 (Nev.S.Ct.-1973), cert. den. 414 US

1079. Hutchingsv. Kraject, 215 NE 2d 274

(Ill.-1966); Lorton v. Brown, 220 Ne 2d 161.

There are only two reasons for giving

plaintiffs a shortened period of time to file

complaints against government agencies

like the NCDOT, neither of which is consti-

tutional. The first is to save the state

money by limiting the number of valid

claims pursued: Hunter v. N. Mason High

School, 539 P. 2d 845, 850 (S.Ct. of Wash.-

1975); The second is for the administrative

convenience of the NCDOT. NCGS 136-111

allows the NCDOT to avoid all the time and

expense of utilizing the statutory proce-

dures in NCGS 136-103 through 136-110.

However, administrative convenience is not

61

a legitimate reason to discriminate in

statutes: Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 US

at 689, 93 S.Ct. at 1772 [3-5] (1973).

I am not stating that the period of

adverse possession/prescription is the

proper time limit to file a complaint for an

appropriation of a property interest by the

federal government when the statutory

procedures have not been utilized by the

federal government. The federal govern-

ment has no laws or time limits with re-

gards to adverse possession/ prescription.

The federal government does not allow a

citizen to acquire an easement or create a

servitude upon federal land at all. The

federal government does have one statute of

limitations for a taking by the federal

government when the statutory condem-

nation procedures aren’t used. That is the

six year limitation in the Tucker Act.

It applies to all takings without notice, etc.,

by all federal agencies.

The federal government does not have

one statute of limitations for takings by the

Dept. of Defense, another for the USDOT

and another for the Dept. of Treasury. The

federal government does not have one time

limit for complaints by citizens for the tak-

ing of their property by the government and

another for the government to file claims

against private citizens to prevent the tak-

ing of a property interest, as North

2 ih ita Latinas aorcva Notte Thera IETS ANA ii A

Carolina does.

“ Once right or privilege is granted it

must be applied equally and indiscrimi-

nately.” State v. Stafford, 164 Se 2d 371 at —

37 N.C.S.Ct.-1968).

Therefore, NCGS 136-111 is in violation

of USCA I, USCA V & XIV.

(12) NCGS 136-111 is not constitutional

in the way that is interpreted by the courts

in NC and as utilized by the defendants.

NCGS 136-111 states that a property owner

“MAY” file a complaint within 24 months of

the taking. “May” in statutes is permissive.

Felton v. Felton, 195 Se 533 at 533 [3]

(Supreme Court of N.C.-1938) This is par-

ticularly true where “may” and “shall” are

both used in the statute: See: Curlee v.

National Bank of Fayetville, 121 Se 194 at

197 (N.C.S.Ct.-1924); Kelly v. City of Cedar

Falls, 123 lowa 660, 99 Nw 556 at 557, last

paragraph (1904); Jenney v. Assessors of

Mattapoisett, 76 Ne 2d at 126[2] (Mass.-

1947); Scannel v. City of Seattle, 648 P.

2d 435, 436 [2] (S.Ct. of Wash.-1982). Sam-

uel v. American Mortgage Co., 78 Sw 2d

1036 at 1037 [3] (Texas-1935); Moraitis v.

Delany, 46 F. Supp. 425 at 426 [10] (Mary-

land-1942); Billings Utility Co. v. Fed. Res.

Bank , 46 F. Supp. 691 at 692 [5] (1942);

Weiner v. Hospital, 144 A. 2d 575 at 575

[2]; Continental Cas. v. Rio Grande Fuel,

63

119 P. 2d 618, 618 [1] (1941); Matter of

Fasi, 634 P. 2d 98 at 101 [4-6]( Hawaii-

1981); Federal Land Bank v. Hansen, 113 F

2d 82 at 84 (1940): See: Sutherland’s Sta-

tutory Construction, 5” Edition, Section

57.11, page 31.

Please note that NCGS 136-107 uses

the mandatory “shall” with regards to the

statute of limitations therein. It is obvious

that the legislature intended that the sta-

tute of limitations in136-107 was intended

as mandatory and the statute of limitations

in 136-111 was intended as permissive.

Further evidence that NCGS 136-111,

particularly the statute of limitations there-

in, is permissive, not mandatory is the fact

that there is no penalty for failing to abide

by the statute of limitations in 136-111.

See: State v. Schade, 167 Sw 2d 135 at 136

[8] (Mo.-1943); Meister v. Moore, 96 US 76,

24 L. Ed 826 at 826 [1] (1877); Duthchess

Cnty. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Van Wagonen, 30 Ne

971 at 972 (NY App.-1892); Juliand v.

Rathbone, 39 NY 369 at 372 (1868); Suth-

erland’s Statutory Construction, 5™ Ed.

(1992-1993), Section 57.08, page 24, last

paragraph.

Additional evidence of a permissive

interpretation of 136-111 is the fact that

there are no negative words in the statute

with regards to the statute of limitations,

particularly negative words restraining the

64

filing of a complaint after the suggested 24

months. This is an ancient rule of statutory

construction: See: Townsend’s Case, 75

English Reports 173 at 175, 177, (England- —

1554 A.D.) Pond v. Negasus, 3 Mass 230, 3

Am Dec 131 at 132 (1807); Dutchess Cnty.

Mut. Ins. Co. v. Van Wagonen, supra;

Diamond Match Co. v. U.S., 181 F. Supp.

952 at 953,959 (1960); Sutherland's

Statutory Construction, 5™ Edition (1992-

1993), Section 57.08, page 24, last para-

graph. There is a penalty for failing to

abide by the statute of limitations in NCGS

136-107, not for NCGS 136-111.

Furthermore, there is nothing in the

136-111 that states that it is the exclusive

remedy and that other remedies are re-

pealed. It has already been shown herein

that there is a common law remedy for the

taking of property without just compen-

sation under the Magna Carta and a remedy

under the N.C. Constitution. In fact the

term “Law of the Land” in the N.C. Consti-

tution comes from the Magna Carta.

No repeal of the common law is to be

presumed, repeal by implication is not

acceptable. See: 29A CJS, EMINENT

DOMAIN, Section 376, p. 747; Allen v.

Standard Crankshaft & Hydraulic

Co., 210 F. Supp. 844 at 846 [16](W.D.N.C.-

1962); Farrington against Lee, Case 191, 86

English Reports 1092 at 1092 (England

65

1600’s); Wetmore v. Tracy, 14 Wendell 252

at 253 (NY 1835); Newman v. District of

Columbia, 518 A. 2d 698 at 703 (DC-1968);

Skorpios Properties v. Waage, 172 Conn.

152, 374 A. 2d 165 (1976); Hardy v. State,

482 A. 2d 474 at 474 [1] (Maryland-1984);

U.S. v. Professional Air Traffic Controllers,

653 F. 2d 1134 at 1135 [5] (1981); Schar-

field v. Richardson, 133 F. 2d 340 at 341[2-

5]; Sand Key Associates v. Board of Trus-

tees, 458 So 2d 369 at 369 [4] (F1.-1984);

Allen v. Houn, 757 at 757 [4] (Wyo. S. Ct.-

1923); Pineo v. White, 70 Ne 2d 294 at 295

[16] (Mass.-1946); Bruce v. Schuyler, 4

Gilman 221, 46 Am Dec 447 at 448 (IIl.-

1847); Sutherland’s Statutory Construc-

tion, 5" Edition; Hummer v. Schools of City

of Hartford, 112 Ne 2d 891 (Indiana-1953):

Souza v. OHara, 395 A. 2d 1060 at 1060 [4]

(S.Ct. of R.I.-1978); Bolduc v, Herbert

Schneider Corp., 374 A. 2d 1187 at 1188 [2]

(S.Ct. of N.H.-1977); Ferguson v. Joliet

Mass Transit, 526 F. Supp. 222 at 222 [1]

(1981).

Because there is nothing in 136-111

that eliminates the common law remedy

under the Magna Carta and the constitu-

tional remedy under the NC Constitution,

136-111 is merely cumulative, not exclus-

ive. See: City of Zanesville v. Fannan, 53

Ohio 605; Juliand v. Rathbone, 39 NY 369

(1868); Cook v. Lehigh v. R. Co., 181 NYS

66

217; Farrington against Lee, 86 English

Reports at 1092 (England 1600’s);

City of Atlanta v. Hunnicutt, 22 Se 130 at

132 (S.Ct. of Ga.- 1894); City of Rock Hill v.

Cothran, 40 Se 2d 239 at 239 [9] (S.C.S.Ct.-

1946); Proprietors of Fryeburg Canal v.

Frye, 5S Maine 38 at 43 (1827); Schuykill

Navigation Co. v. McDonough, 33 Penn 73

at 73 (1859). Therefore, rulings that indi-

cate that NCGS 136-111 is the exclusive

remedy for an unauthorized taking by the

NCDOT are in violation of USCA I, USCA V

& USCA XIV.

(13) According to the courts in NC,

before proceedings are taken under NCGS

136-111, the courts are to proceed under

NCGS 136-108: See: Lautensiager v. Board

of Transportation,212 Se 2d 551 at 552

(N.C. App.-1975). However, no mention of

NCGS 136-108 is made in NCGS 136-111

and no mention of NCGS 136-111 is made

in NCGS 136-108. Therefore, NCGS 136-

111 does not give proper notice of what

procedures are to be taken under it,

denying due process of law and equal

protection under the law. In addition,

courts in NC have not enforced this rule of

law in all situations.

Therefore, NCGS 136-111 violates USCA I,

USCA V & USCA XIV.

(14) Returning to Robertson v. City of

67

High point, supra, it should be noted that

the NC Court of Appeals ruled that the

statute of limitations for a taking runs

from the first injury. However, NCGS 136-

111 states that the suggested statute of

limitations runs from the “taking.” The

statute never uses the term “first injury” or

“injury” at all. In fact NCGS 136-103

through NCGS 136-112 uses some form of

the word “taking” 60 times. The term “first

injury” never appears in those statutes at

all. What the NC Court of Appeals did in

Robertson was to rewrite the statute and

over-throw the legislative intent. Therefore,

NCGS 136-111 is in violation of USCA I,

USCA V & USCA XIV.

(15) In North Carolina there is a rule of

law that a government entity with the power

of eminent domain eminent domain shall

not plead a statute of limitations as a

defense and, at the same time, deny the

plaintiff's right to recover. The denial of

liability may be a denial of the plaintiff’s

ownership. See: Mason v. Commissioners

of Durham Cnty., 96 Se 110 at 11 (NCSCt.-

1918);Keener v. Asheville, 177 NC 4, 97

Se 725; Fleming v. Congleton (Pitt Cnty.),

177 NC 186, 98 Se 449; Kistler v. City of

Raleigh, 136 Se 2d at 79 [1] (NCSCT.-1964);

“ ..where the owner brings an action for

damages, the appropriator, by denying

68

liability for damages and the plaintiff’s

ownership, may waive its right to insist that

the statutory method should have been

pursued.” 27 Am Jur 2d, Eminent Domain, -

Section 823, page 341, citing Rouse v.

Kinston, 188 NC 1, 123 Se 482, 35 ALR

1203.

In Mason v. Commissioners, supra, the

defendants eventually admitted the

plaintiff's ownership. However, because

they continued to deny the plaintiff’s right

to recover, the plaintiff was not required to

follow the statutory remedy. However, one

court has ruled that this rule does not

apply to the NCDOT. See: Latham v. State

Hwy. Commn., 131 Se 385 (NCSCt.-1926).

To excuse the NCDOT from the rule of law

outlined above is not equal protection under

the law and due process of law. Therefore,

NCGS 136-111 is in violation of USCA I,

USCA V, USCA XIV.

(16) In N.C., certain condemnors, includ-

ing municipalities, are required to make a

good faith effort to purchase property before

appropriating it by other means. However,

the courts and the N.C. legislature have

relieved the NCDOT of this obligation,

through the special, discriminatory laws in

NCGS 136-103 et seq. See: City of

Charlotte v. Robinson, 163 Se 2d 289

(1968).

69

Therefore, NCGS 136-103 through NCGS

136-111 are unconstitutional and in

violation of USCA I, V & XIV.

(17) NCGS-1-51 allows the taking of

property by a railroad in two years or five

years when the statutory condemnation

proceedings haven’t been followed. It has

already been shown herein that the time

period for filing complaints for takings

outside the statutory method have histor-

ically been twenty years. NCGS -1-51

allows the acquirement of an easement in

only two years or five years. Property

owners in N.C. have 2 years, 3 years, 7

years, 20 years, 21 years or 30 years in

which to file a complaint to prevent the un-

compensated acquirement of an easement

upon their property, depending on who the

property owner is and who the acquirer is.

Therefore, NCGS-1-51 is in violation of

due process and equal protection under the

law in violation of USCA V & USCA XIV.

(18) NCGS 1-52 states that the

statute of limitations upon a contract is

three years. NCGS-1-53 shortens the

statute of limitations to two years for

complaints against municipalities upon a

contract. Therefore, NCGS-1-53 is a special

law for municipalities and denies due

process of law and equal protection under

70

the law, violating USCA I & XIV.

(19) NCGS 40A-51 allows the taking of a

property interest, without the use of the

mandatory statutory condemnation

procedures, in 3 years, which is a different

time limit than similarly situated people

have under different statutes, as outlined in

this complaint.

Therefore, NCGS 40A-51 denies due

process of law and equal protection under

the law, in violation of USCA I, USCA V &

USCA XIV.

(20) NCGS-1-35 gives 21 or 30 years to

the state to file a complaint when similarly

situated entities in N.C. have considerably

less time under other statutes, i.e. 2, 3, 5, 7

or 20 years, as described herein. Therefore,

NCGS-1-35 denies due process of law, equal

protection under the law in violation of

USCA I, USCA V & XIV.

(21) Respectfully, the plaintiff asks for

the following relief: (A) That the statute of

limitations in NCGS 136-111 be declared

unconstitutional and in violation of USCA I,

USCA V & USCA XIV, or, alternatively, that

the statute of limitations in NCGS 136-111

be declared permissive, not mandatory; (B)

That an injunction be issued barring the

defendants from pleading the statute of

71

limitations in NCGS 136-111 as a defense;

(C) That NCGS 136-112 be declared

unconstitutional and in violation of USCA I,

USCA V, & USCA XIV; (D) That an injunc- —

tion be issued barring the calculating of

interest from any date earlier than the mid-

point of the taking, when the taking occurs

over a period of time, in any complaint for

just compensation for the uncompensated

taking of property by any entity with the

power of condemnation; (E) That the

statutes of limitations in NCGS-40A-51,

including the 3 year statute of limitations

granted by the courts under 40-51, be

declared unconstitutional in violation of

USCA I, USCA V & USCA XIV; (F) That an

injunction be issued barring the defen-

dants, local condemnors, corporations and

any other entities from pleading the defense

of the 2 or 3 year limitations in NCGS 40A-

51; (G) That NCGS -1-51 be declared

unconstitutional and in violation of USCA I,

V & XIV for the reasons stated in this

compiaint; (H) That an injunction be

issued barring the any entity from pleading

the statutes of limitations in NCGS-1-51 as

a defense; (I) That NCGS -1-35 be declared

unconstitutional and in violation of USCA I,

USCA V & USCA XIV for the reasons stated

in this complaint; (J) That the defendants

be barred from pleading the statutes of

limitations in NCGS-1-35 as a defense in

72

any proceeding; (K) That NCGS 136- 103 —

through 136-110 be declared

unconstitutional and in violation of USCA I :

V & XIV; (L) That an injunction be issued

barring the defendants from pleading any

statute of limitations contained in NCGS

136-103 through 136-111 as a defense if

the defendants have not made a good faith

effort to purchase the property. (M) That

NCGS -1-53 be declared unconstitutional

and in violation of USCA I, XIV. (N) That

an injunction be issued barring any munici-

pality or other entity from pleading the

statute of limitations contained in NCGS -1-

93; (O) That the court keep in mind

that the right to just compensation for the

taking of property is a civil right; that civil

rights’ complaints, particularly those of pro

se parties, are to be liberally construed;

that statutes providing a remedy for just

compensation for the appropriation of

property are to be strictly construed with

regards to whether or not the common law

remedy is abrogated and liberally construed

to protect the rights of property owners to

just compensation, due process of law and

equal protection under the law; that USCA

XIV is to be liberally construed to protect

the civil rights of US Citizens against state

action.

(22) Because the Honorable Lacey

Thornburgh was the Attorney

73

General of the State of North Carolina, I

respectfully request that a change of venue

be granted and that the matters herein be

heard and decided in the Charlotte Division —

of the Western District.

(23) The plaintiff has been engaged in

the real estate development in N.C. and is

planning to file a complaint in the Western

District of North Carolina against several

NCDOT engineers for the taking of his

property without just compensation under

diversity of citizenship and under federal

statutes as well.

I, Christopher Langdon, hereby depose

and state, under oath, that the facts herein

are true, except those asserted on informa-

tion and belief, and those matters I believe

are true; that I believe that I am entitled to

the relief sought herein.

Christopher Langdon, Plaintiff “s/ er

1835 Edwin Blvd., Winter Park, Fla. 32789-

--407-647-7539

Suscribed to and sworn before me, this the

17™ day of May, 2001.

Notary Public “s/ Rs

Permanand Bikha

My Commission DDO09669

Expires March 15", 2005

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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