Appendix — Richards v. Jefferson County
Supreme Court brief2001
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Supreme Cour, US
jor’ | FILED
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No. 01-370 / OCT 1 2001
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' l OFFICE OF THE CLERK
In The —————_-~
Supreme Court of the United States
*
JASON RICHARDS, ET AL.,
Petitioners,
V.
JEFFERSON COUNTY, ALABAMA, ET AL.,
Respondents.
¢
On Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari
To The Alabama Supreme Court
¢
APPENDIX TO
JEFFERSON COUNTY’S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION
¢
WittiAM M. SLAUGHTER Epwin A. STRICKLAND
Counsel of Record Jerrrey M. Seweir
J. VERNON Patrick, JR. CHARLES S. WAGNER
HASKELL SLAUGHTER YOUNG _ Jefferson County
& Repiker, L.L.C. Attorney’s Office
1200 AmSouth/Harbert Jefferson County
Plaza Courthouse
1901 6th Avenue North 716 Richard Arrington
Birmingham, Alabama Boulevard
35203-2618 Room 280
(205) 251-1000 Birmingham, Alabama 35203
Attorneys for Respondent — er
Jefferson County, Alabama Attorneys for Respondent
Jefferson County, Alabama
COCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING CO. (800) 225-6964
OR CALL COLLECT (402) 342-2831
TABLE OF CONTENTS
FOR
APPENDIX TO JEFFERSON COUNTY’S
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION
Page
1. November 17, 2000 Opinion of Supreme Court of
Alabama in Carnesa T. Parker v. Jefferson County
CPG. TPPRGOE). ccs ccvsccee ee errr erry App. 1
April 20, 2001 Order of Supreme Court of Ala-
bama denying Application for Rehearing in
Carnesa T. Parker v.,Jefferson County (No.
og EES Peer eee eer re ere ry Peer rere rrr re App. 7
~
as
Testimony of Wayne Averitt, Chief Financial Offi-
cer of Birmingham-Jefferson Civic Center (pp.
401-418 of transcript of trial below before Circuit
judge jonn BE. Rochester). ........60.6ssgess App. 12
4. Testimony of Randall Godeke, Director of Reve-
nue for Jefferson County, Alabama (pp. 418-459
of transcript of trial below before Circuit Judge
ge ae were TT rr Tre reer rere App. 26
“
Testimony of Edwin Strickland, County Attorney
for Jefferson County, Alabama (pp. 551-614 of
transcript of trial below before Circuit Judge
POA Th. TINIE a as iw ces ces ncekscneads App. 58
Defendant’s Exhibit 9 received into evidence at
trial below (memorandum entitled “Statistical
Report — Proprietorships” dated October 20, 1997
~ from Tom Meacham, Sr., Auditor, Department of
Revenue, to Randy Godeke)............... App. 101
a
7. Defendant’s Exhibit 12 received into evidence at
I ge aa oe aig App. 109
App. 1
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before
publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter.
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Deci-
sions, Alabama Appellate courts, 300 Dexter Avenue,
Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 242-4621), of
any typographical or other errors, in order that correc-
tions may be made before the opinion is printed in South-
ern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2000-2001
1991004
Carnesa T. Parker
v.
Jefferson County
Appeal from Jefferson Circuit Court
(CV-99-3575)
(Filed Nov. 17, 2000)
MADDOxX, Justice.
This appeal presents the following issue: Whether
Jefferson County Ordinance No. 1120 (the “ordinance”),
adopted September 29, 1987, imposes an occupational tax,
which a county is permitted by Alabama law to impose,
or whether the ordinance imposes an income tax, which
App. 2
Alabama law prohibits a county from imposing.! We con-
clude, as did the trial judge, that the ordinance does not
impose an income tax, and, therefore, is not prohibited by
Alabama law. We affirm the judgment of the circuit court
dismissing the action.
Carnesa Parker sued Jefferson County, alleging that
the tax imposed by the ordinance was an income tax
prohibited by Alabama law. Parker sought a complete
refund, with interest, of all amounts she had paid to
Jefferson County under the ordinance, and she sought to
have a class certified under Rule 23, Ala. R. Civ. P.,
consisting of all persons who had paid the tax.
The crux of Parker’s argument is that the United
States Supreme Court, in Jefferson County v. Acker, 527 U.S.
423 (1999), determined that the ordinance imposes an
income tax, and that the doctrine of collateral estoppel
bars Jefferson County from relitigating this issue. The
trial court correctly rejected Parker’s argument.
“ ‘Collateral estoppel requires (1) an issue
identical to one litigated in the prior suit; (2)
that the issue [have] been actually litigated in
the prior suit; and (3) that the resolution of that
issue have been necessary to the prior judgment.
In addition, the parties must have been the same
in both suits. Where these elements are present,
the parties are barred from relitigating issues
actually litigated in a prior suit.’ ”
1 See Estes v. City of Gadsden, 266 Ala. 166, 170, 94 So. 2d 744,
747 (1957) (“municipalities and counties being political
subdivisions of the state have no inherent power of taxation but
have only such taxing power as is delegated to them by the
legislature”).
a
ae ba Ei sllng ern! tc Sh
ise Stina Ae OLA DOs iia ATL a Tir VEO rina i tonite rato
App. 3
Jones v. Blanton, 644-So.2d 882, 886 (Ala. 1994), quoting
Lott v. Toomey, 477 So.2d 316, 319 (Ala. 1985). (Emphasis
omitted.) We have carefully reviewed the record on
appeal and have considered Parker’s argument, and we
conclude that she has failed to, show that the doctrine of
collateral estoppel should be applied in this case, as we
shall now show.
The issue relating to Parker’s argument in this case
thit the United States Supreme Court addressed in Acker
was whether the ordinance was valid against federal
employees, under the Public Salary Tax Act, 4 USA.
§ 111. Under that Act, the United States “consents to the
taxation of pay or compensation for personal service as
an officer or employee of the United States .. . by a duly
constituted taxing authority having jurisdiction, if the
taxation does not discriminate against the officer or
employee because of the source of the pay or compensa-
tion.” In Acker, two federal judges were challenging the
Jefferson County ordinance.
In addressing this issue, the Court in Acker stated:
“In Howard v. Commissioners of Sinking Fund
of Louisville, 344 U.S. 624 (1953), the Court held
that a ‘license fee’ similar in relevant respects to
Jefferson County’s was an ‘income tax’ for pur-
poses of a federal statute that defines ‘income
tax’ as ‘any tax levied on, with respect to, or
measured by, net income, gross income, or gross
receipts,’ 4 U.S.C. § 110(c). See 344 US., at 625,
n. 2, 629. The Court so concludéd even though
the local tax was styled as ‘a tax upon the privi-
lege of working within [the municipality],’ was
not an ‘income tax’ under state law, and devi-
ated from textbook income tax characteristics.
App. 4
Id., at 628-629; see also id., at 629 Douglas, J.,
dissenting) (‘Many kinds of income are
excluded, e.g., dividends, interest, capital gains.
The exclusions emphasize that the tax is on the
privilege of working or doing business in [the
municipality].’).
“As Howard indicates, whether Jefferson
County’s license tax fits within the Public Salary
Tax Act’s allowance is a question of federal law.”
527 U.S. at 438-39. (Last emphasis added.) After deter-
mining that the ordinance serves a revenue-raising pur-
pose, not a regulatory purpose, the Court explained:
“We consider next the judges’ argument
that the wholesale exemption for those who
hold another state or county license reveals the
Ordinance’s true character as a licensing
scheme, not an income tax. If the tax were genu-
inely an income tax, they urge, those license
holders would not be excluded, although they
might be allowed to claim their other license
fees as credits or deductions against the county
tax. Alabama’s enabling Act does not allow its
counties to so provide; those otherwise subject
to license or privilege taxes under Alabama's
laws may not be reached by a county’s occupa-
tional tax. See 1967 Ala.Acts 406, § 4. The disposi-
tive measure, however, is the Public Salary Tax Act,
which does not require the local tax to be a typical
‘income tax.’ Just as the statute in Howard con-
sented broadly to ‘any tax measured by net income,
gross income, or gross receipts,’ 344 U.S., at 629, the
Public Salary Tax Act consents to any tax on ‘pay or
compensation,’ which Jefferson County's surely is.
The sole caveat is that the tax ‘not discrimi-
nate . . . because of the [federal] source of the
pay or compensation’... . ”
App. 5
527 U.S. at 441-42. (Some emphasis added.)
It seems apparent that, contrary to Parker’s assertion,
the Supreme Court in Acker addressed only one question:
Did the ordinance violate the Public Salary Tax Act, a
federal law? As the above-quoted portions of Acker indi-
cate, the Court emphasized that the question it was
addressing related to federal law, not state law. To further
illustrate this point, the Court in Acker cited its prior
decision in Howard, a case that had addressed an issue
similar to the one presented by this appeal.
In Howard, the Court held that a Louisville, Kentucky,
occupational tax or licensing fee was an “income tax” for
purposes of the Buck Act (a federal law similar to the
Public Salary Tax Act involved in the Acker case), despite
the fact that the Kentucky Court of Appeals had held that
the tax was not an income tax under Kentucky law, but
was a tax upon the privilege of working within the City
of Louisville. 344 U.S. at 628-29. The Court emphasized
that the question it was addressing was “whether the tax
[at issue] was an income tax within the meaning of the
federal law.” Id., at 629.
The holding in Acker was similar to the holding in
Howard — that the ordinance, which serves a revenue-
raising function, did not violate federal law. The Court
did not address the issue whether the ordinance was
valid under Alabama law (i.e., whether the ordinance
imposed an “income tax” that was impermissible under
Alabama law).
Applying Alabama law, this Court has upheld ordi-
nances similar to the ordinance at issue in this case, as
imposing permissible “occupational” or “privilege” taxes
App. 6
or “licensing fees” rather than impermissible “income
taxes.” See Estes v. City of Gadsden, 266 Ala. 166, 94 So. 2d
744 (1957), and McPheeter v. City of Auburn, 288 Ala. 286,
259 So. 2d 833 (1972). This Court has also upheld as
constitutional Act No. 406, 1967 Ala. Acts (the Act under
which Ordinance No. 1120 was promulgated), which
authorized Jefferson County to levy a privilege tax “upon
any person for engaging in any business [or occupation].”
Bedingfield v. Jefferson County, 527 So. 2d 1270 (Ala. 1988).
After carefully studying the prior decisions of this
Court, as well as the Acker and Howard decisions of the
United States Supreme Court, we conclude that the trial
court correctly dismissed Parker’s action. Consequently,
the judgment of dismissal is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
Houston, Cook, See, Lyons, Brown, Johnstone, and
England, concur.
HOOPER, C.]J., dissents.
App. 7
WA kl ti a atin
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before
publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter.
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Deci-
sions, Alabama Appellate courts, 300 Dexter Avenue,
Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 242-4621), of
any typographical or other errors, in order that correc-
tions may be made before the opinion is printed in South-
ern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2000-2001
1991004
Carnesa T. Parker
V.
Jefferson County
Appeal from Jefferson Circuit Court
(CV-99-3575)
On Application for Rehearing
PER CURIAM.
APPLICATION OVERRULED.
HOUSTON, SEE, LYONS, BROWN, JOHNSTONE,
HARWOOD, WOODALL, and STUART, JJ., concur.
Moore, C.J., dissents.
| MOORE, Chief Justice (dissenting).
App. 8
I was not a member of this Court when it released its
opinion of November 17, 2000, affirming the judgment of
the trial court. I would grant the application for rehear-
ing.
On November 29, 1987, Jefferson County adopted
Ordinance No. 1120, a revenue-enhancing measure. Sec-
tion 1(b) of that ordinance levied a charge on persons
doing “any kind of work, the rendering of any kind of
personal services, or the holding of any kind of position
or job within Jefferson County.” It excepted only (1)
domestic servants working in private homes and (2) busi-
nesses, professions, and occupations for which license
fees are required to be paid under certain named statutes.
Section 2, entitled “License Fees Required,” set the levy at
1/2 of 1% of “the gross receipts of each such person.”
When two federal judges challenged this ordinance in a
federal court, Jefferson County asserted that the ordi-
nance imposed an income tax and not a license fee. On its
review of the judges’ case, the United States Supreme
Court stated: “The judges acknowledge that Jefferson
County’s Ordinance is valid if it ‘imposes a true tax
on... income,’ but argue that the Ordinance ranks
instead as an impermissible licensing scheme.” Jefferson
County, Alabama v. Acker, 527 U.S. 423, 439 (1999), citing
Brief for Respondents 13-14, 27-33. The two plaintiffs,
Judge William Acker and Judge U.W. Clemon, specifically
referenced the label Jefferson County had used in titling
§ 2 - “License Fees Required.” Jefferson County denied
that that title had any meaning on the question whether
the moneys collected under the ordinance were collected
as fees or were collected as taxes. Jefferson County
argued that the charge imposed was, in fact, an income
App. 9
tax. The United States Supreme Court concluded: “In
practice, Jefferson County’s license tax serves a revenue-
raising, not a regulatory, purpose. Jefferson County nei-
ther issues licenses to taxpayers, nor in any way regulates
them in the performance of their duties based on their
status as licensed taxpayers.” Jefferson County, supra, at
440. The Supreme Court then upheld this ordinance —
precisely because it accepted Jefferson County’s conten-
tion that the ordinance imposed an income tax.
Now, before this Court, Jefferson County argues that
this ordinance imposes a license fee, not an income tax.
According to Carnessa Parker’s counsel, “Jefferson
County having defeated the claims of these federal judges
that the tax is a licensing scheme by convincing the
[United States] Supreme Court that it is an income tax
now seeks to defeat Parker’s claims that the ordinance is
an income tax by claiming that it is a licensing scheme.”
Brief of Appellant, 7.
This case thus appears to present the classic founda-
tion for the application of the doctrine of collateral estop-
pel. That is a kind of equitable relief arising from the
need for judicial economy. In Wheeler v. First Alabama
Bank of Birmingham, 364 So. 2d 1190, 1199 (Ala. 1978), this
Court stated that when the parties in a subsequent case
are identical to those in a prior case, the elements neces-
sary for that doctrine to apply are: “(1) an issue identical
to one involved in the previous suit; (2) an issue actually
litigated in the prior action; and (3) resolution of the issue
was necessary to the prior judgment.” Then, in Constan-
tine v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 545 So. 2d 750,
App. 10
755-56 (Ala. 1989), this Court wrote the following regard-
ing when a decision in a previous case will bind parties in
a later case:
“[T]wo elements are required: 1) the party claim-
ing the benefit of the prior judgment as an estop-
pei against the adversarial party is one who
would have been prejudiced by a contrary deci-
sion in the previous case; and 2) the party against
whom the estoppel by judgment is sought either was
an actual party in the previous case or was in
privity with, or is a successor to the rights of, an
actual party in the previous case.”
All of these criteria were met in Jefferson County and
would normally enable Parker to use the doctrine of
nonmutual offensive collateral estoppel to bind Jefferson
County to the argument it made to the United States
Supreme Court. However, Jefferson County has inter-
posed § 100, Ala. Constitution of 1901, as a bar to the
application of the doctrine against a county government.
The language of § 100 is ambiguous, and I question
whether it reaches this kind of situation. Therefore, I
would grant the application for a rehearing, in order to
permit the parties to examine the scope of § 100. I am also
troubled by the holding that Ordinance 1120 imposes a
license fee, not an income tax. By the explicit terms of
that ordinance, these taxpayers were obligated to pay a
fixed percentage of their incomes, not a flat-rate amount.
Similarly situated persons with different incomes would
thus pay different sums. In Estes v. City of Gadsden, 266
Ala. 166, 172, 94 So. 2d 744, 749 (1957), this Court held
that “[t]he character of any tax should be determined by
its incidences and not by the name given it or necessarily
re ee ere
App. 11
the language used.” Therefore, I would grant the applica-
tion for a rehearing on this basis as well.
App. 12
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF
JEFFERSON COUNTY, ALABAMA
JASON RICHARDS, et al, )
Plaintiff
vs.
JEFFERSON COUNTY, et al,
Defendant
CASE NO.: CV-92-3191
~~ eee eee ee”
REPORTER’S OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT
BEFORE:
Honorable John E. Rochester
Presiding Circuit Judge
40th Judicial Circuit
Ashland, Alabama 36251
Sitting Specially
October 21, 22, 23, 1997
* * *
[401] BY THE COURT: Call your next witness,
please.
MR. SLAUGHTER: Wayne Everette.
)
App. 13
WAYNE EVERETTE
(THE WITNESS, AFTER BEING DULY SWORN TO TELL
THE TRUTH, THE WHOLE TRUTH, AND NOTHING BUT
THE TRUTH, TOOK THE STAND AND TESTIFIED AS
FOLLOWS).
EXAMINATION BY MR. STEWART:
Q. State your naine, please.
A. I’m Wayne Everette.
Q. And where are you employed?
A. Iam the chief financial officer at Birmingham Jeffer-
son Civic Center. Ne
Q. And what do you do as chief financial officer at the
civic center?
[402] A. My responsibilities would encompass oversee-
ing payroll, accounts payable, accounts receivable, cash man-
agement, investments, bonds.
Q. Are you in charge of overseeing the revenues and
expenses of the civic center?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And the civic center is a quasi-governmental entity
located here in Birmingham, Alabama. Is that correct?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Now long have you been employed by the civic cen-
ter? i
A. Two years.
App. 14
Q. Prior to that, did you have an association with an
accounting firm? :
A. Te, oe
Q. Are you a certified public accountant?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And your accounting firm had done some auditing
work for the civic center? ;
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And so you had been familiar with the civic center
[403] for how long?
A. Four years.
Q. Okay. Are you familiar with a series of — actually two
bond issues that the civic center issued in the year 1989?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And one of those that’s referred to by the civic center
as the 1989 bond issue and one the 1989B bond issue?
A. Yes.
Q. And what were those bond issues — what did the civic
center use the money for?
A. We purchased a hotel. We built an office building. We
built a parking deck and we also extended the civic center,
which is called our exhibition hall.
Q. And in preparation for your_testimony today, did I
ask you to review the books and records of the civic center to
get the current status of those bond issues?
os eo eeeLTLESLhmrnmhthSES ee ee eee
App. 15
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did you prepare - let me show you what's been
marked as Defendants’ Exhibit 24 and ask if this [404] the
document that you prepared in preparation for the testimony
today?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. All right and let's just go through the columns in
this. What was the original issue amount of the 1989 bond
issue?
A. $83,710,000.
Q. And the 1989B bond issue the original amount?
A. $48,670,000 -
MR. BAXLEY: Your Honor, we have an objection
on the relevancy.
MR. STEWART: Your Honor, this directly goes to
the interest of the civic center in the case at issue. And the
records should reflect the impact of the county occupational tax
on the revenues of the civic center.
MR. BAXLEY: Your Honor, what they've done with
the tax after they collected it has no bearing whatsoever on
whether it’s Constitutional.
MR. STEWART: That should have been argued
[405] then when the civic center filed its Petition originally.
This being the case and the financial impact of the occupational
tax on the civic center is a critical issue in this case.
MR. BAXLEY: It’s of no issue at all. Now they
might have an interest in the outcome of the case, but that
App. 16
doesn’t mean that the evidence is material. And if they said
that the state audited by ballfields all over the county. That
wouldn't matter whether they put it in the civic center or in
ball parks or built a theater or whatever they did with the tax
money. So it’s irrelevant as to whether it’s Constitutional to
collect it.
MR. STEWART: The thrust of this testimony goes
directly not to how the county has chosen to use the money, but
the civic center which has been made a part of this case. There's
no objection from [406] the Plaintiff — it’s a party to the
Defendant in this case and it’s relevant to the county as the
occupational tax’s impact on the civic center is an issue in this
case. There’s no other way.
BY THE COURT: I’m going to allow the testimony.
Q. And so the two total bond issues were in the amount
of $132,380,000?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Now, have you also in your calculations — how much
of the principle amount of these bond issues has been paid to
date by the civic center?
A. To date $27,495,000.
Q. And so the outstanding principle balance in total is
how much?
A. $104,885,000.
Q. And do your records reflect the total amount of inter-
est which has been paid to date by the civic center to bond
holders?
A. Yes, sir.
App. 17
Q. What is that total amount?
A. The total amount to bond holders is $72,057,876.
~ [407] Q. And the total remaining debt service to matu-
rity of these bonds, have you calculated that figure and would
you give us the total if you have it?
A. The total to maturity $161,138,076.
Q. Now, are you familiar with the manner in which the
civic center is making the debt service payments on these
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Would you tell the Court just how does it work? For
example, does the county submit a check and do you receive
payment each year from Jefferson County and the City of
Birmingham that is used to pay the debt service on these
bonds?
A. Yes, sir. We receive two tax proceeds from the city and
the county each year to go directly to the trustee of the bonds.
-Q. Who is the trustee in the bond documents?
Sir?
Who is the trustee?
NBC Bank.
OF oO >
National Bank of Commerce?
A. — Yes.
county and the payment from the city come to the civic center
or does it go to the trustee?
Q.
>O > 0 > O 2
App. 18
Directly to the trustee.
And then what does the trustee do with it?
The trustee pays the bond holders.
They pay the -
To the bond holders.
And those payments are due twice a year?
Yes, sir.
And exactly how much money has the trustee
received on behalf of the civic center from Jefferson County on
these bond issues?
A.
Q.
$85,000,000.
And how much money has been received by the
trustee from the City of Birmingham to date?
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
$16,500,000.
$16,500,000?
Yes, sir.
And as I understand it, the county — Jefferson
County pays a total of $10,000,000 a year to the civic center?
[409] A. Yes, sir.
Q.
A
Q.
A
And the City of Birmingham pays $3,000,000 a year.
Yes.
And do you know how long those payments last?
The final bond maturity is 2012.
App. 19
Q. And the original in the 1989 bond issue, the original
agreement with the city was 20 payments of $3,000,000. Is that
correct?
A. I’m not sure.
MR. STEWART: Your Honor, we would offer Defen-
dants’ Exhibit 24. That's the compilation that he just testified
from.
BY THE COURT: Any objection?
MR. BAXLEY: Yes, sir, on relevancy.
BY THE COURT: Overruled. It’s admitted.
Q. Wayne, I’m going to show you now a document that’s
marked as Defendants’ Exhibit 23 and would you tell the
Court what this document is?
A. This is an appropriation agreement between Jefferson
County and the civic center.
Q. All right. And is this the agreement that was entered
into in 1989 at the same time that the [410] bond issue that
whereby the county agreed to pay the sum of $10,000,000 a
year to the civic center?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And this money was to be used as debt service for the
1989 and 1989B bonds?
A. Yes.
Q. And on page 4 of that agreement is there a payment
schedule?
A. Yes, sir.
App. 20
Q. And when did those payments start?
A. 1989.
Q. And when do they end?
A. 2008.
—_
Q. And it’s $10,000,000 a year from the 1989 through
the year 2008?
A. Yes.
Q. All right.
MR. STEWART: We would offer Defendants’
Exhibit 24.
MR. BAXLEY: Objection to relevancy, Your Honor.
[411] BY THE COURT: It’s admitted.
Q. I show you what's been marked as Defendants’
Exhibit #25 and ask if you're familiar with that document?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Would you tell the Court what that document is?
A. It’s the financial statement dated August 31, 1996.
Q. August 31, 1996. What is the fiscal year for the civic
center?
A. August 31. |
Q. September 31 through August 31 of the next year?
A. Yes. :
Q. So, is this the last year — do you have the 1997
financial statement?
App. 21
This is the last we have.
Are you familiar with this document?
A
Q
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did you review this document?
A
Yes, sir.
Q. All right. Let me ask you this. The $10 million you
receive each year from the county, which is [412] used to pay
the debt service on the bond, if that payment — if those pay-
ments were to stop, does the civic center have revenue, dollars,
monies available to make the remaining payments to the bond-
holders for 1989 or the 1989 bond indebtedness?
A. No, sir, we'd be in default. We could not service the
debt.
Q. All right.
MR. STEWART: I would offer Defendants’ Exhibit
#25.
MR. BAXLEY: Object on the grounds of irrele-
vance, Your Honor. -
MR. STEWART: As to relevance, Your Honor, we
would argue that it reflects that the civic center, in fact, does
not have funds available to make the payments if the revenues
were not available.
BY THE COURT: I'll admit it.
MR. STEWART: Thank you, Wayne.
BY THE COURT: Cross examination, Mr. Baxley?
App. 22
EXAMINATION BY MR. BAXLEY:
[413] MR. BAXLEY: Your Honor, we're asking
questions and the only reason we're asking them, is we feel like,
you know, we've gone into irrelevant matters. So we think this
is going to answer it and we need to ask it. _
BY THE COURT: Okay.
Q. Now, you say that the civic center would be insolvent
if you didn’t get the money from the county?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Well, the civic center owns — you bought a hotel that
you carry on the books worth right at $50 million, don’t you?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. That's the Sheraton Hotel, isn’t it?
A. Yes, sir, right next to us.
Q. It’s operated as a Sheraton with ICC management or
Sheraton management right?
A. Yes.
Q. And that hotel was there long before — it was there as
a private hotel long before the civic [414] center authority
bought it, wasn’t it? |
A. Yes, sir.
Q. It was there as the Hyatt House, wasn't it, before the
civic center had anything to do with it?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And then it changed over and became a Ramada,
didn't it?
App. 23
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And so now it’s the Sheraton.
A. Yes.
Q. But the civic center - you say it’s worth right at $50
million?
A. Yes.
Q. Well, if you stopped getting the revenue from this
i
: what we say, is an illegal tax, you could sell that hotel and
A.
Q.
:
i A.
ri
‘
.
s
: A.
Q.
; A.
Q.
A.
Q.
knock out a big chunk of your bond issues, couldn't you?
That would offset the balance of the bond issues.
And you say you have an office building also?
Yes, sir.
And where's the office - how many stories is that?
[415] A. Ten stories.
Ten stories. And do you lease part of that out?
Yes, sir.
Who do you lease — who are some of your tenants?
Red Cross, BellSouth, a multitude of others.
The civic center leases office space to BellSouth?
Yes, sir.
When was the civic center built? The actual CIVIC
center where people could come and go watch events in the
concert hall, the children’s theater?
A. About '69.
App. 24
Q. 1969?
A. Yes.
Q. So it was there almost 20 years before this tax that
we're complaining about. Is that not correct?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. The hotel and the office building were bought after
the tax that we're complaining about — after ‘87, weren't they?
A. Fea, 7.
Q. When was the hotel bought?
A: - Re.
[416] Q. When was your office building constructed and
bought? : ;
A. We started construction in ‘89.
Yes, sir. As a civic center employee I have to pay it.
Who makes the determination?
Q. Did I hear you say that you’re a CPA?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. You have a license in Alabama?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Are you required to pay the occupational tax?
A. Yes, str.
Q. Sir?
A.
Q.
A.
I can’t answer that.
App. 25
Q. It’s deducted from your tax?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. All right. Which firm did you work for before you
went to work with the civic center authority?
A. Warren (unintelligible)
Q. Is that the firm that did the audit here?
A. Yes.
Q. If you worked for one of the big two — or any [417]
private CPA firm, would you have to pay the occupational tax?
A. I did not pay it.
Q. You did not pay it?
A. No.
Q. Okay.
MR. BAXLEY: That's all.
MR. STEWART: One further question, Your Honor.
EXAMINATION BY MR. STEWART:
Q. Mr. Baxley asked you about the purchase of the hotel
and the construction of the office building, those purchases and
the expansion of the hotel has actually doubled in size after the
1989 bond issue Is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. The 89 bond issue funded the purchase and the
expansion of the hotel and the building of the office building. Is
that correct?
a i i ik
App. 26
A. Yes.
Q. And one of the purposes of doing that was to try to
generate more revenue than this more traditional civic center
type operation could produce. [418] Therefore benefiting the
city and county —
MR. BAXLEY: Object to a leading question.
BY THE COURT: Sustained.
MR. STEWART: Thank you, Your Honor.
BY THE COURT: May he be excused?
MR. STEWART: Yes, sir.
BY THE COURT: You're free to go. Call your next
witness.
MR. SLAUGHTER: Mr. Godeke.
RANDALL GODEKE
(THE WITNESS REMAINS UNDER THE PREVIOUSLY
ADMINISTERED OATH)
EXAMINATION BY MR. SLAUGHTER:
Q. Mr. Godeke, I have just handed you a document
which I would appreciate your identifying.
A. This is a declaration of Randy Godeke that I prepared
and was entered as Director of Revenue.
Q. What — it has attached to it an exhibit and to what
calendar year does that exhibit apply?
A. 1994 — Calendar year.
Q. And can you describe that exhibit or describe in your
own words what it purports to demonstrate?
App. 27
A. Sure this is a statistical sampling of various [419]
types of employers, listing different companies under various
categories and shows the number of employees, the gross
wages, the wages subject to the occupational tax, and percent-
age of wages subject to the occupational tax. And then a
designation of a code beside it that indicates the amount of
wages or reasonable wages subject to the occupational tax.
Q. This schedule was prepared under your supervision?
A. Yes, it was.
Q. Was it prepared from documents pertaining to the
revenue collection and enforcement of the occupational tax?
A. Yes.
Q. Can you describe the circumstances which lead to the
need for submission of this document to the U.S. Supreme
Court?
MR. BAXLEY: Object, Your Honor.
BY THE COURT: What grounds?
MR. BAXLEY: To ask him to describe the circum-
stances that lead to the need, Mr. Slaughter, that it ought to be
[420] submitted to the Supreme Court of the United States?
BY THE COURT: Do you object to it?
MR. BAXLEY: Well, Your Honor, he’s going to say
that he filed something that was wrong and we feel like he -
MR. SLAUGHTER: Well, it’s related to the identi-
fication of the occupational tax revenue which is still some-
thing that may be in issue in this case. And it’s for that reason
that we offer it as well as a supplement to the declaration.
App. 28
MR. BAXLEY: I withdraw the objection.
BY THE COURT: All right. You may answer.
A. It shows the various types of employers such as util-
ities, banks, railroads, insurance companies, doctors offices,
and other categories listed to pay the occupational tax.
Q. In other words, their employees pay the occupational
tax.
A. Yes, the employees of those companies.
Q. Okay. As the tax collector — let’s assume the law
[421] firm like Mr. Baxley’s law firm and my law firm, we have
lawyers employed there and we have non-lawyers employed
there. Is it your understanding that the non-lawyers pay the
occupational tax?
A. Correct.
Q. The lawyers do not pay the occupational tax.
A. Correct.
Q. And what is the reason they do not pay the occupa-
tional tax?
_ A. The attorneys in most cases are required to have a
state license under Title 40 Chapter 12.
Q. If you look at this schedule, you will see that the
various reports submitted by these companies for that year
would show a total amount of gross wages. And then they will
withhold the occupational tax on part of those wages and, for
some companies, not all, it’s not the full amount. In other
words, if you turn to the first page of your exhibit, the very
App. 29
first entity there is Alabama Power. Now, is that your under-
standing that the county does not have the power, under state
law, to tax levy a business license tax on a utility.
[422] such as Alabama Power?
A. I'm sorry. I missed your question.
Q. Does the county levy, under its business license code
or any — in any way that you know of or that you're responsi-
ble for collecting, a privilege or license tax on a utility com-
pany such as Alabama Power?
Not on the company itself. “
Okay. So you do not tax the company itself.
> O >
No.
Q. But you do tax the employees as is shown by this
schedule?
A. Yes.
Q. The difference between gross wages and wages subject
to the occupational tax shown on this is the result of exemp-
tions that result from individuals paying license taxes to the
state?
A. Under the far right column it’s coded “A” which
means that the difference between the gross wages and the
wages subject to the occupational tax were determined to be
professional license and out of county work.
[423] Q. So there are two reasons why it’s less than 100
percent?
A. Yes.
App. 30
Q. They run the payroll here but they've got people
working in Shelby County and other places.
A. Right.
Q. And then another reason is the exemption of the
professionals.
A. Correct.
Q. But except for exemptions of that identifiable nature,
there is no blanket exemption of the employees of those com-
panies?
A. No.
MR. SLAUGHTER: We would like to offer this as
Exhibit 7.
BY THE COURT: Do you object?
MR. BAXLEY: No, sir.
BY THE COURT: It’s admitted.
Q. Mr. Godeke, what is the document I just handed you?
A. This is an up-to-date version of the 1996 calendar
year ending of the same report showing the various categories
and companies with number of employees, [424] gross wages,
taxable wages and percent taxable.
Q. So it’s a 1996 version of the schedule we just dis-
cussed showing the same taxation?
A. Yes.
MR. SLAUGHTER: We would like to introduce this
as Exhibit 8.
App. 31
BY THE COURT: Any objection to 8?
MR. BAXLEY: No.
BY THE COURT: It's admitted. Any other ques-
tions?
Q. Could you describe the document I just handed you?
A. Yes, this is a report prepared at my request by Tom
Meacham a senior officer in my department that is a statistical
reports on total progress and attached is a listing of the various
license sections under Title 40 and the license schedule under
the county ordinance of the various sole proprietors whose
records are maintained through my office.
Q. If we go down the first column of this exhibit, under
license description, where is says license section, I take it those
license section numbers [425] correspond to the state license
code?
A. Yes, Title 40 Chapter 12.
Q. In other words, that refers to or describes the state
business licenses that you've levied for the state and/or the
county?
A. That's correct.
Q. Could you describe for me the significance of the
asterisk on each of these license sections?
A. Those are categories within that section that to para-
phrase or quote exactly it says no official license shall be bid
through the county. You could see by the third column where it
says county amounts. The amount of those licenses are zeroes.
BY THE COURT: Excuse me just a minute. You're
welcome to be in Court but let’s keep our conversations on the
App. 32
outside please. The back corner — let's carry our conversation
outside. If you want to talk, you're welcome to out there.
Thank you. Go ahead.
Q. For these asterisked professionals you, as the county
license director of revenue, you collect [426] these monies for
the state?
A. Yes.
Q. But you keep nothing for the county because nothing
is allocated to the county under those license sections.
A. That's correct.
Q. Turning to page 4 of this report, begin looking at the
first column. All of those license taxes there they're county
licenses?
A. Yes.
Q. How are they levied? Pursuant to what authority?
A. Act 406.
Q. When you say Act 406, pursuant to the business
license code ordinance or the occupational tax?
A. The business license.
Q. Do you — how do you handle the state license taxes on
attorneys?
A. We do not collect any proceeds from attorneys any
longer as of I'd say three or four years ago.
Q. Is that the only professional license tax that goes to
the state for which the collection responsibility has been
moved?
App. 33
[427] A. That I'm aware of, yes.
Q. How do you determine that these licenses were issued
to sole proprietors?
A. The individual or the company, as far as that goes,
must file an application for a license through our department.
On the application they must designate whether they are sole
proprietors, corporations, partnerships, LTD. So they would
self declare what category that they're applying for a license
under.
Q. Do any of the licenses that are described here by
various categories, single store license for which, for example,
there are 2724. That means 2724 people that are operating
some kind of retail establishment as a sole proprietorship?
A. Yes.
Q. Would such a person pay any kind of — in any
amount under the county's occupational tax here at issue?
A. No occupational tax.
Q. So this is the list by category of people who are not
taxed under the occupational tax because [428] they're self
employed and they are obtaining a business license tax as an
individual?
A. That's correct.
MR. SLAUGHTER: We would like to introduce
this, Your Honor, as Exhibit 9.
BY THE COURT: Any objections?
MR. BAXLEY: No.
BY THE COURT: It’s admitted.
App. 34
Q. Mr. Godeke, what is the document I've just given
you?
A. The document that you've given me is a document
prepared in our department showing the occupational tax col-
lected by fiscal years ending on September 30 each year since
the inception in 1988.
Q. It has a schedule at the bottom by years?
A. Yes, it actually shows the dollar amount and at the
bottom by year and then it shows a total collected since 1988.
Q. So this is the documentation of a cumulative amount
collected under this tax?
A. That's correct.
MR. SLAUGHTER: We would like to introduce
[429] this, Your Honor, as Exhibit 11 — I mean Exhibit 10, I’m
sorry.
BY THE COURT: Any objections?
MR. BAXLEY: No, sir.
BY THE COURT: It’s admitted.
Q. Mr. Godeke, what is the document I've just handed
you?
A. This is another internal report prepared by staff mem-
bers showing variations of the amount of participants of the
occupational tax by years with some assumptions made on
various relations I guess you would say. Well, at maturation I
might want to know how many active participants we've had
on the occupational tax since 1988.
Q. Why can’t you just count them?
App. 35
A. Under the mechanics of what we have, every company
is supposed to report an annual reconciliation back to us in the
month of January. It is a very cumbersome task, various non-
compliance as far as when they remit the reconciliations. It
would just be monumental. We would have to do an audit or
follow up to each individual one to determine the [430] number
of participants.
Q. How do you handle those taxpayers who are not
subject to a state or county business license and who, therefore,
as individuals pay the occupational tax without it being with-
held by the company?
A. (no response)
Do you have a separate account for them?
Yes, they have an individual account with us.
So you could count those?
Yes.
You have a record of that?
> O > O > O
Yes.
Q. The problem in tallying, if I understand you, comes
from all of the payers of the occupational tax for which the
large companies and small companies withhold?
A. Correct. Then the reconciliation includes all the
employees for that particular area during any one year and I
think the numbers, if they report them on the reconciliation,
includes the total employment for that year — maybe not the
[431] active participants as of December 31.
App. 36
Q. Why is this a — what is the rationality of these
assumptions in estimating how many taxpayers we had since
the inception of this tax?
A. This was the base established in an attempt to deter-
mine how many total participants we had in case we would
have to contact them individually.
Q. If you did have to contact them individually, is there
any, way, that you could have gotten the names and address of
each?
A. Yes. Again, the annual reconciliations report in var-
ious formats. A lot of them send in copies of the W-2s, some of
them send in computer-generated reports with names and
addresses.
Q. But you don’t keep a running tally of all these tax-
payers because most of it is collected by withholding?
A. That's correct.
Q. But if compelled to do so, you could go back -
A. Expand our computer system to maintain individual
employees, yes, sir.
MR. SLAUGHTER: Your Honor, we'd like to [432]
admit this as Exhibit 11.
MR. BAXLEY: Well, on that one I just don’t see the
relevancy, Judge. We would object.
MR. SLAUGHTER: Your Honor, it may be relevant
to you in trying to fashion a remedy in this case because it
basically gives some basis for the debate which has been going
on as to how many people may actually constitute the universe
App. 37
of people we're going to be trying to satisfy in some way or
another.
MR. BAXLEY: Your Honor, if it would help fashion
a remedy, we withdraw our objection, I guess.
BY THE COURT: It’s admitted.
Q. Mr. Godeke, could you describe the document I’ve
just given you?
A. Yes, it’s another internal report prepared at my direc-
tion to determine the — well, it’s really similar to the earlier
report showing the license sections that are not required to pay
the [433] occupational tax under the Title 40, showing the
number issued, the state amount, county amount, total
licenses. Then we went in and added an average hourly wage to
determine what potential amount the occupational tax would
be if those exemptions were not in place.
Q. Why, did you — where did you get these hourly wage
figures?
A. From the State Department of Industrial Relations.
Q. Is that your understanding —- or it is your under-
standing that that’s the same source of wage data that was
earlier admitted in this case? .
A. Yes.
Q. So it appears that your department and Plaintiffs’
counsel are using the same source for wage data? -
A. Yes.
Q. You said an earlier report. What earlier report?
A. I forget what exhibit number it was -
a aa
App. 38
Q. Well, why was that earlier — there’s been no earlier
report.
A. Of the exhibits.
Q. Oh, okay. I was wondering if there had been an [434]
earlier attempt on the part of your department to determine
how much was lost to these professionals.
A. I think there was a calculation done back in ‘94. This
is a figure through 1996.
Q. I notice on the back page, page 2 of this, that attor-
neys are a separate line item. Why is that?
A. Once again, we do not collect any license fees through
our office for attorneys so we have to get in touch with the
State Bar Association to determine the number of attorneys in
Jefferson County.
Q. So the grand total on page 2, what does that repre-
sent?
A. The grand total in the far right hand column of
$4,777,000 represents an extension of the hourly wage by the
number of various licenses issued for that category times the
amount of the occupational tax of 1/2 of 1 percent that would
be levied.
Q. And based on wage data supplied by the State Indus-
trial Relations Department, this is your best estimate of what
additional revenues could [435] be raised by Jefferson County
if all of these exempt professionals were subjected to the occu-
pational tax?
A. Yes, sir.
App. 39
MR. SLAUGHTER: Your Honor, we would like to
admit this as Exhibit 12.
BY THE COURT: Any objections?
MR. BAXLEY: None.
BY THE COURT: It’s admitted.
MR. SLAUGHTER: I have no further questions.
BY THE COURT: Any further cross examination?
EXAMINATION BY MR. BAXLEY:
Q. Would you gather up these exhibits that he’s asked
you about and let me just ask you a few questions about them
to help me? What number is this one, Defendants’ 9?
A. Uh, yes, sir.
Q. Is that one, according to your calculations, show that
there are only 209 barbers in Jefferson County?
A. Sole proprietor barbers, yes, sir.
Q. Okay. Now, the barbers then that work for like [436]
Fantastic Sam's and these other chains, they would be paying
the occupational tax. Is that right?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. Well, then, tell me what is the rational distinc-
tion — no, no, let me strike that — the question that they kept
asking on cross are barbers that cut hair in Jefferson County as
sole proprietors, stand on their feet the same number of hours
per week, treated the same as far as the occupational tax goes,
as barbers that cut hair for Fantastic Sam’s and stand on their
feet and cut hair for the same number of hours?
App. 40
\
A. The only difference to me is they are required to have
a license because they are sole practitioners.
Q. Okay. So the answer, then, is they are not treated the
same as far as the county occupational tax is concerned, are
they?
A. One is required a business license, the other one is
required to pay the occupational tax.
Q. So one pays the occupational tax and the other [437]
one doesn't.
A. In your example, yes.
Q. Okay. Let’s take beauticians. The same answer there?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. Tell me where you got this number where it
says on the last page — no, it’s not the last page — it’s page 3.
You've got five stockbrokers.
A. Page 3?
Q. Page 3.
A. Okay. Section number?
Q. 162.
A. Okay.
Q. What does that mean where you say five stock-
brokers?
A. Evidently there are five sole proprietor stockbrokers in
Jefferson County with a license as a sole practitioner.
Q. Okay. So, then, under your system five of them would
be exempted from paying?
OO
eta he Te ee ee ee te ey Pe ee ee a ae
App. 41
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. How many — what about a stockbroker that
[438] works for Merrill Lynch or Payne Webber or Sterne
A.G., Robinson Humphrey?
A. They would not be sole practitioners so they would be
subject to the occupational tax.
Q. So they would pay the occupational tax.
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. So a stockbroker — stockbrokers move about,
don’t they?
A. I imagine so, yes, sir.
Q. Soa stockbroker that works for Merrill Lynch say,
would pay an occupational tax and a stockbroker that works for
one of these five stock firms as sole proprietorships would not
pay it?
A. No, no, that’s not the case.
Q. Okay. What is the case?
A. If they work for one of these five businesses, they
would be subject to it.
Q. They would be subject to it?
A. Right.
Q. But the man who owns them would not be subject to
it?
[439] A. Right. He is the sole practitioner.
App. 42
Q. Okay. Well, then, when it says court reporters 33.
What does that number include? Does that include visiting
court reporters that come over for two days?
A. That would indicate there are 33, again, sole a
- tioners licensed through our department.
Q. Who do not pay it now?
A. That are required to have a license, business license,
as opposed to the occupational tax.
Q. So if they pay a business license, they do not have to
pay the occupational tax?
A. Correct.
Q. What if they work here in the Jefferson County
Courthouse? Do they pay it?
A. Yes, wages earned in Jefferson County.
Q. Okay. What if they work in the Federal Courthouse?
Do they pay it?
A. Wages earned in Jefferson County.
Q. Okay. What if they are an employee of one of the large
private court reporting firms like Foshee and Turner or those
like that? Would they pay it [440] if they're an employee of one
of those private firms?
A. If their wages were earned in Jefferson County, yes.
Q. They would pay it. But if they owned a court report-
ing firm and worked the same number of hours and did the
same number of work per week, took the same number of
depositions, but they work for a firm they own, they would not
pay the tax?
App. 43
A. They would be required to have a business license and
not pay the occupational tax.
Q. How much would their — how much is their business
license?
A. Uh, I'd have to look in the county code.
Q. Look at Exhibit #7, if you could. 7 is the little red
_ one. For instance, what does a court reporter that does not have
to pay the occupational tax pay?
A. It depends on the various scale, less than 5000 it
would be $15. Then it goes into a formula and calculation
depending con the amount generated.
[441] Q. Okay. What if they generate in billing $50,000
a year?
A. $75 plus 1/2 of 1 percent in excess of $30,000 so that
would be 1/10 of 1 percent of —
Q. $20,000?
A. $20,000.
Q. Plus $75?
A. Plus $75, yes.
Q. So that would be, what, 1/10 of — 1 percent of
$20,000 — or 1/10 of 1 percent is what?
A. I don’t have a calculator or anything to scribble on.
Q. Wouldn't it be $20?
A. $20 I believe.
Q
So, a court reporter's license might be $95.
oc ne Sonn ee Ten ne en eee
App. 44
A. Correct.
Q. But if they work for the federal government they'd
pay a half of a percent of their salary?
A. For those wages earned in Jefferson County.
Q. Okay. What if they earned all their wages in the
Jefferson County Courthouse or the Federal Courthouse?
[442] A. They would all be subject to the ' of 1 percent.
Q. Okay. And if their billings were in Jefferson County,
that would be — and it's $6,000 worth of billings, they'd pay
$95?
A. If they were required to have a license under Section
27.
Q. Where do you get the number of real estate agents
from in these exhibits?
A. Based On the applications of the individuals filed
with us that are claiming to be sole proprietors.
Q. Okay. Page 5 of this exhibit shows 1575 real estate
agents?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, that would be that are sole proprietors?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. What about the agents that work for Johnson,
West, Page and Ray and Company and Good Housekeeping
real estate agencies? They would not be in there?
A. Probably would not be in here because the selection
criteria was sole proprietorship.
eT ree or Cnn meee |
App. 45
Q. Okay. Now, the real estate agents — this is a [443]
projection here of what would come in if they had to pay it. Is
that right? By, this I mean Exhibit #7 - Defendants’ 9, I’m
sorry.
A. Yes.
Q. One of your figures shows there are 3629 attorneys in
Jefferson County?
A. That's correct, based on the number furnished by the
State Bar Association.
Q. And they don't pay anything in the way of the
occupational tax?
A. No.
Q. Do you think those attorneys and their families have
any use for the Sheriff's Department services in Jefferson
County to the same extent as a barber that pays the tax or a
court reporter that pays the tax?
A. I would imagine they would demand that, yes.
Q. Do you think they would have any less use for the
civic center or the roads of Jefferson County or any other
service of Jefferson County than a person that’s a member of a
union that works at a salaried job?
[444] A. I wouldn't think so, no.
Q. Okay. How many doctors do your records show there
are in Jefferson County?
A. Under Section 126, Title 40, we show 1867.
Q. So, according to your records, there’s only a third the
number of doctors that there are lawyers in Jefferson County?
App. 46
A. 1800 compared to what 3600?
Q. How many did you say? How many doctors did you
say?
A. 1867.
Q. I'm sorry. I thought you said 1200, I'm sorry. You
said 1800?
A. Yes.
Q. You say there are only half the number of doctors in
Jefferson County as there are lawyers?
A. That's what this report indicates, yes.
Q. Okay. What about dentists? How many dentists does
it show in Jefferson County?
A. 281 dentists under Section 92.
Q. All right. Under every section that’s conceivably
there, how many dentists are there in Jefferson County?
[445] A. I1 don’t understand that.
Q. How many dentists, according to your records, are in
Jefferson County?
A. 281.
Q. 281. And you think that there are only 281 dentists
in this county of several hundred thousand?
A. That's what this report would indicate, yes.
Q. What about the number of nurses that are in this
county? Do you know how many nurses are in this county?
A. Yes, sir. You have a selection of criteria based on sole
proprietors.
App. 47 -
Q. Okay. What about pharmacists? How many pharma-
cists are in Jefferson County?
A. Under County Ordinance Section 34 there is one sole
proprietor for Jefferson County.
Q. So, according to the county's records, there's one
pharmacist, sole proprietorship, in Jefferson County.
A. Well, according to this, there's one license issued
under prescription shop as a sole proprietor, yes.
Q. Okay. Is that what you're basing your testimony
[446] about the money that's come in on, those type figures?
A. Those figures have been extended in the subsequent
columns.
Q. What about the pharmacists that work for Harco or
Eckerds or Revco?
A. They would not be on here because they're currently
paying the occupational tax.
Q. They are?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Okay. Now how many of them are paying the tax?
A. I have no way to determine that figure from these
reports.
Q. Does anybody in the county have any records on
which they can determine how many pharmacists are paying
the occupational tax?
A. Unless they would be a regulatory agency to keep up
with that, I would not have any way of determining that.
App. 48
Q. Is there agency of the county that you know of that is
able to determine how many are paying it?
A. Individuals, now, if you're asking how many of those
[447] individuals submitting those records to an agency are
pharmacists, those reports do not indicate their titles.
Q. Is there any way, if the lawyers decide, or the Court
or the Supreme Court of Alabama or the Supreme Court of the
United States wanted to find out how many pharmacists in
Jefferson County pay the occupational tax, is there any way on
God's green Earth they can find out?
A. Sure.
Q. How?
A. You would have to do an audit of all the various
accounts that are paying thé occupational tax. Go to them one
on one, solicit them with some type of questionnaire or an
audit, to determine the number of employees reporting on the
annual reconciliation how many of those were pharmacists.
Q. So you'd have to do an interview one-on-one, accord-
ing to your testimony, with some 425,000 people?
A. No, sir. .
Q. Okay. How many?
[448] A. We've got 18,000 active accounts who pay -
such as Jefferson County. Jefferson County pays me one check
every month for the occupational tax. So behind that, that
represents payment for roughly 4000 employees. So we would
contact, in this scenario here, we would contact Jefferson
County paymaster to tell us how many pharmacists were in
that group of 4000.
App. 49
Q. All right. How would Jefferson County know how
many pharmacists were in their group that they submit?
A. I'm sure they have pay records which also include
titles or positions that tie them in with human resources or the
personnel department.
Q. Wouldn't it be a lot simpler on the administration of
the tax and on you if just everybody that worked in Jefferson
County paid a half of a percent or a quarter of a percent on
what they made in Jefferson County?
A. It’s very simple to me now. Either they're required a
license under the state or county ordinance or they're required
to pay the occupational tax.
[449] Q. All right. So you think it’s simple now?
A. For the majority of it, yes.
Q. All right. Let's talk about preachers. Preachers at my
church, Vestavia Hills United Methodist Church, are they
subject to the tax?
A. I don’t know for a fact this particular situation but he
would not be subject to it. I don’t know that for a fact.
Q. All right. What about at my wife’s church which is
St. Peter's Catholic Church? Do you know whether the priest
there would pay or not?
A. I don’t know precisely if they are paying it but they
are not subject to it.
Q. They would not be subject to it? Why would either of
those not be subject to it?
App. 50
A. Assuming again they’re ordained ministers and
priests under advice of the county attorney we do not exercise
that.
Q. All right. What if you're a — you know, we have a
pretty large population at the medical center at UAB of people
from the country of India who work there, don’t we?
[450] A. I would imagine so, yes.
Q. Do you think that some of those people from India
that work in the medical center may be Hindu?
A. I would have no idea.
Q. Do you know whether they have a church of that
denomination or whatever you'd call an equivalent of a church
in the Hindu faith?
A. Personally I do not know.
Q. Do you know whether we have any Buddists temples
in Birmingham?
A. Personally I do not know, no.
Q. I notice on here in Homewood there's a Shrine going
up to Ruth Crisps Steakhouse directly to a Moslem temple. Do
you know whether we have any Moslem temple in Jefferson
County?
A. I've seen that shrine and I don't know whether we
have any temples in Jefferson County. I would probably think
so somewhere in Jefferson County.
Q. Do you know whether the equivalent of a minister at
any of those faiths that I've mentioned would be subject to the
occupational tax?
App. 51
A. I’m not that familiar with all the religions. [451] It
would take a review of the situation to make that determina-
tion.
Q. And some you think - how would you make a deter-
mination if they would or would not?
A. If their religion recognizes that as an equivalent of an
ordained minister in the Methodist church,, you know, after we
reviewed the situations, we would probably take that into
consideration.
Q. So you would apply it to what the standard is in
' Christianity whether they are ordained ministers?
A. Generally, but there is probably some other, you
know, dialog included with the individuals.
Q. All right. Let’s go — the Quakers or Society of
Friends. Do you know whether they ordain ministers?
A. No, sir.
Q. Do you know whether the Mormons ordain minis-
ters?
A. No, sir.
Q. Do you know whether any -— what about the
employees of these various churches? The sexton or the organ-
ist or the minister of music or choir director or the mission-
aries? Do you know whether they pay [452] occupational
taxes?
A. The choir director, staff personnel would be subject to
the occupational tax.
Q. Do you know whether they actually pay it?
App. 52
A. I believe I've seen some documentation that indicates
yes.
Q. Okay. Then, how is the distinction made that the
minister does not pay but the minister of music does?
A. That was in place prior to 1991 and I understand that
was through the advice of the county attorney.
Q. Is it true that the county, a couple of years ago,
agreed to keep all records of taxpayers, names, addresses, and
amounts paid, and not allow them to be discarded in the event
a refund was ordered?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And so they're in storage somewhere?
A. Various places, yes, sir.
MR. BAXLEY: That's all, Your Honor.
BY THE COURT: Anything else?
MR. SLAUGHTER: Yes, sir, Your Honor.
EXAMINATION BY MR. SLAUGHTER:
[453] Q. Mr. Godeke, I would like to read to you the first
sentence of Section 1249 which deals with the state privilege
taxation of attorneys. Each attorney engaged in the practice of
law shall pay an annual license tax to the state but none to the
county. Let's take an individual like Mr. Paul Jones who is the
chairman of the board of Compass Bank and who used to
practice law and I understand maintains his licensure to the
state bar. But, to my knowledge, he runs Compass Bank. He
does not practice law. Does he pay the occupational tax?
A. Yes, he does, in his current position.
App. 53
Q. Could the fact that attorneys often perform jobs that
business people, as executives and other functions other than
practicing law, account for the large number of licensed attor-
neys who are listed in your schedule or who really don't
practice law?
A. Yes, that's a possibility.
Q. With regard to this individual proprietorship. How
do you define an individual proprietorship?
A. Once again, it’s based on the application submitted
[454] to us by the individual on the application process.
Q. What does that application show? Individual, corpo-
ration, partnership —
A. It has seven or eight different categories and one of
them is a partnership, one is a sole proprietor, one is a corpora-
tion.
Q. Isa sole proprietorship classification then an individ-
ual who, if he owns a barber shop or a real estate company or
whatever, he owns it as an individual. He does not own it as a
corporation?
A. Yes.
Q. Soa sole proprietorship, in your view, does not
include a corporation who has as its sole employee the sole
owner of the corporation?
A. No, sir.
MR. SLAUGHTER: Thank you.
BY THE COURT: May he step down?
MR. BAXLEY: No, sir. I have something more.
App. 54 {
EXAMINATION BY MR. BAXLEY:
Q. I’m not going to go through each one of these catego-
ries, but, I notice in some of your documents there that as of
now embalmers were paying the [455] occupational tax. Is that
correct?
A. Which document are you referring to?
Q. One of them that shows that there are 36 of them. In
this thing you filed with the Supreme Court, what number is
that?
a hs
Q. 7? Is it true that 36 embalmers right now pay the
occupational tax?
A. What page? The first category, the type of business
which employes embalmers. Underneath that is listed an indi-
vidual company which doesn't necessarily say all 36 are
embalmers or any of those are embalmers. I think Johns
Rideout has individuals participating in the occupational tax.
Q. All right. According to your exhibit #7, under cate-
gories of embalmers, everybody at Johns Rideout was paying
tax. .
A. Those 36 individuals. oe
Q. Okay. Now, that shows — as far as that shows, 100
percent of the people at Johns Rideout pay the tax?
[456] A. Right.
Q. Okay. Now, under what parts are you making these
people that are embalmers pay the tax? I’m switching 180
ze :
App. 55
degrees. Under what authority are you — is the county collect-
ing money from them? Aren't they included in the old Title 51
where they pay a state license fee of $10?
A. Embalmers would be support personnel such as
clerks, payroll type of administrative personnel.
Q. But they're listed on your Exhibit 7 as embalmers,
aren't they?
A. That's a category that we use to distinguish between
utilities as opposed to the other categories that would list other
companies under.
Q. Well, if any embalmers are paying the tax and also
are licensed, would you agree that they're not supposed to be
paying it?
A. If they have a license under embalmers 40-12-98, and
are paying the occupational tax, we would return a refund, yes.
Q. Would you let the county attorney advise you on
whether to give back to them or not?
[457] A. Yes.
Q. Okay. 1 notice on that same list there that you've got
at AmSouth, in the banks, 100 percent of the people there are
paying the occupational tax on that exhibit, aren't they?
A. Yes.
Q. All right. Doesn't AmSouth have attorneys up there,
Corporate attorneys, in-house attorneys? Mr. Slaughter asked
you about Mr. Jones at the Compass Bank.
A. I would think so, yes.
App. 56
Q. But in addition Mr. Jones is the CEO of Compass
Bank but AmSouth has attorneys that work full time for
AmSouth and in the trust department, don't they?
A. Yes, I would think so.
Q. Okay. And yet according to that figure everybody
that works for AmSouth pays the tax.
A. 2416 employees that they reported on the annual
reconciliation pay the occupational tax.
Q. What ts the difference between what the attorneys -
corporate attorneys at AmSouth do and the corporate attorneys
at Liberty National?
[458] A. I’m not that familiar with the structure of each
company.
MR. BAXLEY: I think that’s all.
BY THE COURT: May he be excused?
MR. SLAUGHTER: Just one question.
EXAMINATION BY MR. SLAUGHTER:
Q. Mr. Godeke, is the term embalmer interpreted under
your license tax to include a place of business as well as an
individual embalmer?
A. It could be, yes.
So, Johns Rideout could be an embalmer and people work-
ing for it could also be embalmers?
A. Yes.
Q. If you had an employment, a company, — whether it
be a real estate company or a funeral home that had worked out
App. 57
an arrangement which wasn’t a genuine legal arrangement
where people who provided services on premises, like
embalmers, were individual contractors, then would that indi-
vidual contractor have to get an embalmers license?
A. He'd be required to get an individual license.
[459] Q. And if he as such individual contractor had had
that license, would he be exempt from the occupational tax?
A. If the position required him to obtain the license
under category 98, then he would be exempt from the occupa-
tional tax.
MR. SLAUGHTER: No further questions.
BY THE COURT: May he step down?
MR. SLAUGHTER: Yes.
BY THE COURT: Let's take a five minute recess
and complete the case.
* = ~
App. 58
[551] EDWIN STRICKLAND
(THE WITNESS, AFTER BEING DULY SWORN TO TELL
THE TRUTH, THE WHOLE TRUTH, AND NOTHING BUT
THE TRUTH, TOOK THE STAND AND TESTIFIED AS
FOLLOWS):
EXAMINATION BY MR. SLAUGHTER:
Q. Would you state your name, please?
A. Edwin A. Strickland.
[552] Q. Mr. Strickland, what is your employment?
App. 59
A. County attorney for Jefferson County, Alabama.
Q. How long have you been the county attorney for
Jefferson County as a government employee?
A. I'm here representing the county in 1967 as an assis-
tant county attorney. I became the county attorney in 1975.
Q. Are you chief legal officer for the county and does the
County Commission rely upon you for legal advice in prepara-
tion of their ordinances and in their implementation of these
ordinances?
A. It does.
Q. Mr. Strickland, would you identify the document that
I've given you? 3
_A. This is a picture of a portion of the Code of Alabama.
I think this is from 1958 published version Title 62, Section
155, page 422.
Q. What is the purpose of this Code provision and, as a
part of the same question, does it apply to Jefferson County?
A. It does. This is part of the compilation of local laws
applicable to Jefferson County. And
[553] this Section 155 relates to the county attorney and
provides the authority for the County Commission to have a
county attorney to carry out the legal functions of the county.
It also provides authority to the county attorney to serve as for
- in the same function as an attorney general. As far as county
matters are concerned, it allows the public officials to rely upon
the opinions of the county attorney.
App. 60
Q. To your knowledge, this law is still in full force and
effect?
A. It is.
Q. And do you interpret it so as to include, among all
the county officials, not only the County Commissioners but
Mr. Godeke, the Revenue Commissioner to implement the
county occupational tax?
A. It would include Mr. Godeke.
MR. SLAUGHTER: Your Honor, we would like to
offer this document, the statute, as Exhibit #2.
MR. BAXLEY: No objections.
[554] BY THE COURT: It's admitted.
Q. In this handling of this case, there have been a great
number of copies of Act 406 offered in evidence and I chose not
to do so, so I'd like to avail myself of the earlier Plaintiffs’
admitted, which I believe is #4 -
A. I have a copy.
Q. If you have a copy, then we don’t need to look for it.
A. Okay.
Q. You have Act 406 before you?
A. I do.
Q. Mr. Strickland, on the basis on your long service as
the county attorney, could you explain to me the purposes for
which a county can levy license taxes in this state?
A. Well, there's basically two functions, I think. One
would be to produce revenue and the other would be to provide
some form of regulation in line with county's police powers.
App. 61
Q. You are familiar with Act 406, which you have a copy
of?
[555] A. Correct.
Q. You have read that and you have used it, I assume, as
a basis for the occupational tax which is the issue in this case.
A. Correct.
Q. Based on your reading of Act 406, what is its pur-
pose? Does it have the purpose of raising revenue, the purpose
of regulating occupations in Jefferson County, or some combi-
nation of both?
A. I think its purpose is to raise revenues.
Q. That's purely its function in your evaluation?
A. It is.
Q. Looking at the Act and its language, does it compel
Jefferson County to levy license taxes or occupational taxes or
does it confer upon the county a grant of authority to do that?
A. Act 406 is a delegation by the Legislature of a grant
to endorse the function of government to produce this revenue
for its purposes.
Q. Were — when the County Commission decided to levy
this tax in 1987, did they designate you as the craftsman of the
ordinance?
[556] A. I was.
Q. So you had occasion at that time to advise them of the
proper interpretations of Act 406 and the taxing authority
conveyed there under?
App. 62
A. That's correct.
Q. And, at that time, did you conclude that the county
had some discretion as to the dimensions of the occupational
tax that would be levied?
A. Yes. As a grant or delegation of this authority, it
would be up to the County Commission to decide how much of
it to use.
Q. And did the County Commission in 1987 adopt Ordi-
nance 1120 for the sole purpose of raising revenues?
A. That's correct.
Q. I have two documents here. One is a certified copy of
the county business license ordinance and the other is a certi-
fied copy of the occupational tax ordinance.
MR. SLAUGHTER: And since both of these are
_ involved in this case, Your Honor, we would like to admit both
of them into [557] evidence as Exhibits 3 for the business
license code — that one right there - and Exhibit 4 for the
occupational tax.
MR. BAXLEY: Your Honor, we have no objection
but they are in evidence.
MR. SLAUGHTER: Well -
MR. BAXLEY: They’re our Exhibits 7 and I think
MR. SLAUGHTER: There is some redundency but
if it can preserve the continuity of our numbering scheme,
Your Honor, we numbered them before we knew what their
exhibits would be.
App. 63
BY THE COURT: All right. They’re admitted.
Q. Now, Mr. Strickland, I'd like to ask you some ques-
tions about how the occupational tax works, in your opinion,
because as I understand your previous testimony you were the
principal advisor to the County Commission in creating this
ordinance and you were the principal legislative draftsman of
it. What kind of legal entity does — does [558] Ordinance 1120
purport to tax?
A. 1120 is the occupational tax. It purports to tax the
employee of an employee-employer relationship who would be a
actual person.
Q. Your answer is identified as two elements, or do I
understand you correctly?
A. Yes.
Q. It taxes an actual person.
A. Right.
Q. And it taxes an actual person that is an employee-
employer relationship, as I understand it.
A. Right. Correct.
Q. I would direct your attention to Section 1(b) and the
language there which I will read to you. The rendering of any
kind of personal services or the holding of any kind of position
or job within Jefferson County, Alabama, by any clerk, laborer,
tradesman, manager, official or other employee, including any
non-resident of Jefferson County who is employed by any
employer that’s defined in this section. And then we skip the
definition of employment. I don’t think for the purposes of this
[559] question it’s necessary to read that. But that language, is
App. 64
that intended to be all inclusive, except for the enumerated
exceptions? How do you interpret that language? Is it all
inclusive? Does it include governmental employees? Does it
include all civilian employees? Was that your intent?
A. Yes. It’s the intent to place the occupational tax on
this class of individuals who were not previously taxed by one
of the other taxing agencies which would include everybody
within that class, every natural person within that class,
except for one expressed exception.
Q. Could you tell me what the ordinance excludes
according to your interpretation?
A. The ordinance excluded domestic servants employed
in private homes and then it references the limitation of the
authority granted by Act 406 so that the purpose of the tax is
to tax all natural persons in an employment relationship that
the County Commission was authorized by the law to tax with
the exception of domestic [560] employees in private homes.
And I will say a caveat to that, there's a further limitation by
Act 406 as to what is done by the larger cities within the
county. So, I should say that that’s a further limitation.
Q. Do you know what the occupational tax of the largest
city was at the time?
A. That would be Birmingham’s occupational tax.
Q. All right. And it was what? Do you know?
A. Pardon?
Q. What was that? What was that tax or what is that
tax at the present level?
A. Its rate?
App. 65
>. Fee.
A. It’s one percent of gross compensation.
Q. So, levying the county occupational tax of one half of
one percent was comfortably under that limitation?
A. It was but also keep in mind that the limitations were
also extended to who was eligible to be taxed. Anyway, the
domestic workers were exempted from the city occupational tax
and so, therefore, we [561] wanted to take that authority to tax
the most appropriate people.
Q. If I may direct your attention to Section 1(b) again, if
I recall your earlier description of the exemptions and included
domestic servants and they included the taxes described by the
Code provisions which put a limitation on the county's author-
ity in 406. But also, if I read this correctly, there’s another
exemption there and that is any natural person who paid a tax
under the general license code of the county.
A. Correct.
Q. So that's a third exemption. Is that correct?
A. Well, yes, it would be, in that sense. The county,
under a previous ordinance which was put into evidence as
Exhibit 3, had already utilized a substantial portion of the
authority provided by Act 406 in the establishment of the
business license code. So, a number of businesses were already
being taxed by the county. Since the adoption of the — I think
this was originally set out as Ordinance #1 of Jefferson County |
in [562] about 1968.
Q. Now, you have testified that for all of the provisions
of Act 406, that linked the occupational tax with the occupa-
tional tax in the City of Birmingham, you had to be mindful of
App. 66
the taxes levied under that occupational tax. You couldn’t go
outside the boundaries, if you will, of the Birmingham ordi-
nance, as I understand your testimony.
A. That's right.
Q. So, you had, for that reason among others, occasion to
consult the Birmingham Occupational Tax Ordinance and its
coordination with the Birmingham Business License Ordi-
nance?
A. Yes.
MR. SLAUGHTER: Your Honor, we would like to
admit into evidence those two ordinances for the City of
Birmingham —
MR. BAXLEY: Your Honor, we would object to the
relevancy. They simply are not relevant to anything that is in
issue here today.
[563] MR. SLAUGHTER: Your Honor, it is
extremely relevant. Act 406 coordinates these — they — these
two taxes and, further, the city’s occupational taxes have been
the subject of considerable litigation by the Alabama Supreme
Court or by two Alabama Supreme Court cases. One is a Court
of Civil Appeals case. Until Jefferson County levied this occu-
_pational tax, there were no occupational taxes of this kind,
except municipal occupational taxes. So the relevant judicial
authority applies to this kind of municipal tax which served as
the model for the Jefferson County Occupational Tax. And for
that reason we consider these ordinances to be relevant. And
the Court might take judicial notice of them but I think for the
convenience of this Court, as well as the convenience of any
Appellate Court, these would be useful exhibits.
App. 67
-f .
BY THE COURT: They're admitted. Excuse me
[564] just a minute. Let me take just a minute. Let's take a five
minute recess.
(AFTER THE RECESS, THE FOLLOWING WAS HAD AND
DONE):
BY THE COURT: Court's in session. You may con-
tinue.
Q. Mr. Strickland, could I direct your attention to page
127-1 of the Birmingham Occupational Tax which is Exhibit 5?
A. Page number again?
Q. 127-1. It’s right at the beginning.
A. All right.
Q. At the bottom of the page you will see language “but
they shall not mean or include domestic servants employed in
private homes or business, etc., or for which license fees — or let
me start over again. Strike that. But they shall not mean or
include domestic servants employed in private homes or busi-
nesses, professions or occupations for which license fees are
required to be paid under any general license code of the city. Is
not the occupational tax language of the county identical to
that language except you don’t [565] have the statutory exemp-
tions of Act 406?
A. I believe that it’s identical to that point of the sen-
tence.
Q. Right. The only exception other than the fact you're
dealing with the City of Birmingham rather than Jefferson
County, is the absence of the exemptions mandated by Act 406.
App. 68
A. That's right and in the county ordinance, the sen-
tence goes on to reference those other limitations of Act 406.
Q. All right. Turning to these exemptions that were
mandated by Act 406, when you were drafting the ordinance
and consulting the County Commission about the extent of
your taxing authority, you had occasion to look at each and
what are the Code provisions of Act 406 — I mean Code
provisions that were referenced in 406 as a limitation on
county taxing authority.
A. Yes.
Q. And can you tell me what categories of exemptions
that you noted there?
A. Well, the categories would be the — well, the [566]
biggest category initially would be the businesses — we don’t
use that term in the universal sense — that are included in the
state business license code, would be the first category. And
then I believe a couple of these other citations deal with the
different forms of utilities that are in operation in the state and
in the county, which could include telegraph companies, any
forms of communication, public utilities, power, water, and
then the — ~
Q. Would you characterize them as sort of big business
taxes as opposed to being a professional?
A. It certainly would be big business in my judgment,
railroads, those type of utilities.
Q. All right. Returning to the first category, the state
business license code that you referred to, are you familiar with
that in general terms, for example, does it include lawyers and
accountants and professionals of that kind?
wthies.sa%ny
App. 69
A. Yes.
Q. Did — does that state license code permit the counties
to piggy back and collect the tax along [567] with the state on
those particular professions?
A. No, I think there were a few designated professions in
the base of this license code that prohibited the county from
piggy backing and I believe it included attorneys and accoun-
tants.
Q. All right. You've explained why you excluded domes-
tic workers. Why should you follow the example of the Bir-
mingham Occupational Tax Ordinance and exclude tax on
natural persons who already bought a county business license
under the county license code?
A. Well, I think that was the thrust of Act 406. and it
would not have been the purpose to tax two times the same
individual under the business license code and then under the
personal — then under the occupational tax. So, the individuals
who were already in business in an individual capacity under
the business license code, were excluded from the occupational
tax and also there would be a question about whether they .
would be in an employee relationship anyway.
Q. What do you mean by that? In other words, someone
[568] who is self employed doesn’t employ himself? Is that
what you're saying?
A. I think that's the problem. And individual who is self
employed is — doesn’t really consist of an employer-employee
relationship. The occupational tax doesn’t seem to breach that.
Q. So, let me see. There are two reasons then, as I
understand that you've identified. One is to avoid double
taxation.
App. 70
A. Yes.
Q. And the other was to avoid ambiguity in the defini-
tion of employment for purposes of the implementation of the
tax.
A. Right.
MR. BAXLEY: Your Honor, I'm going to have to
object to leading questions.
BY THE COURT: Sustained.
Q. Did it occur to you that you might, instead of
exempting the occupational taxpayers — let me strike that. Did
it occur to you that instead of providing an exemption to the
occupational tax for people who already pay a county license
tax, [569] that you should just rewrite everything and I guess
create a new tax which consisted of both the occupational tax
and the business license tax?
A. Well, that would have involved a — what to me would
have been a monumental undertaking. We had a business
license code that had been in place for 20 years and was well
familiar to the business community and to the county revenue
department. The problem of introducing a new tax of the
nature of the occupational tax, was difficult enough in itself
without taking on the further problems by starting all over
with the license code. So, I don’t believe that it would have
served the public. purpose for us to have done that in conjunc-
~ tion with putting in the wide-reaching occupational tax at the
same time.
Q. Excuse me a moment. I need to retrieve an exhibit.
Do you have any of the Defendants’ exhibits that are all here?
This report that we discussed yesterday about the identification
App. 71
of the proprietorships who paid the license taxes and [570] Mr.
Godeke discussed that.
BY THE COURT: Why don’t we move to another
area while we're looking for the —
MR. SLAUGHTER: No, I know there are other
areas but it breaks the logic of my series of questions and I’m —
if they can stipulate to the fact that this is Exhibit 9, when we
find it.
MR. BAXLEY: If you say so, we'll stipulate it.
MR. SLAUGHTER: Okay. I will provide Mr.
Strickland with my copy and try to deal with it from there.
~ Q. Mr. Strickland, have you seen that report?
A. I think I have. I haven't studied this report.
Q. Prepared by Mr. Godeke which identifies the people —
the number of license of individual proprietors who pay either
the state tax -- license tax which you collect or the people who
pay pursuant to the county license code.
A. I believe that’s the characterization made by a subor-
dinate of Mr. Godeke on the first page.
[571] Q. Have you discussed this report with Mr. God-
eke?
A. Not particularly but I'm generally familiar with it, I
think.
Q. Do you understand the logic of it?
A. Well, you can try me.
Okay. Here is Exhibit 9, it seems to have lost the
label.
App. 72
A. This would be businesses in his departments that
were issued a county license under the county .icense code as
sole proprietors.
Q. The second part of it deals with the county license
code beginning on page 4. The first part begins with the state
license code being on page 1.
A. Okay. That’s not written on here.
Q. You're correct. It is not. The way you would deter-
mine that is by actually looking at the license section numbers
and comparing them with the state code and you would com-
pare, beginning on page 4, the various sections of the county
license code with the line item entries. And by doing that you
can establish the correspondence.
[572] A. All right.
Q. Now, while you're referencing that, I want to see if
we can establish an understanding of who is exempt under this
occupational tax ordinance. Domestic workers, are they
exempt?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. People — are people who pay an individual
license tax to the state exempt?
A. If they’re within the business license code of the state.
Q. I specified any of those section reference in 406?
A. Right.
Q. But if they’re not specified in those statutory refer-
ences in 406 and they pay to the state, they are not exempt?
A. Correct.
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App. 73
Q. Are people who are individual proprietors who pay a
county license pursuant to the county historic 20-year or more
old business license, are those people exempt?
[573] A. Yes.
Q. Okay. Can you think of anyone else who is exempt?
A. (no response)
Q. Who is an actual person.
A. I can’t think of anyone at the moment.
Q. All right. To clarify this, what if I am a professional
and I practice as a professional corporation, and my profes-
sional corporation pays a county business license, and I’m the
sole owner of that corporation.
A. Well, the sole proprietor — that's the category you're
talking about earlier —
Q. No, as a legal entity. Does sole proprietorship apply
only to natural persons?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. Now I am a professional corporation and I pay
a county business license tax.
A. Yes.
Q. And I own the corporation solely. And I pay myself a
salary. Do I have to pay an occupational tax on that salary if I
am not an otherwise state-exempted profession?
App. 74
[574] A. Yes, you would.
Q. So for — to understand that, a natural person who is
exempt under the county business license code, but who elects
to do business — let me strike that. It gets rather complicated.
Let us say that Iam a natural person who works as a geologist
for a real estate appraisers. Let's take two types of professionals
who testified yesterday. And at the time they testified, as I
recall, they were not subject to a state license tax that was
specified in Act 406. They — in one case, the real estate
appraiser practiced as a corporation. They conducted their
business as a corporation. The corporation paid a county busi-
ness license tax. Under that situation, would the owner — the
100 percent owner — of that corporation who pays himself a
salary also have to pay the occupational tax.
A. He would on his salary.
Q. But if he had chosen to avoid practicing his business
as a corporation and had just obtained the business license
directly as an individual, [575] he would not have to pay the
occupational tax on that earnings, correct?
A. Correct.
Q. Thank you.
A. That's to avoid the double tax.
Q. All right. Changing the subject, and going to a cou-
ple of — I'm going to give you this for ease of reference of the
state license code. First of all, let’s consider the profession of
ministers. Is it your interpretation that the county occupa-
tional tax applies to ministers?
A. Yes.
App. 75
Q. He collects his salary from the church.
A. Right. Yes, they're included in the occupational tax.
Q. Do you know whether or not they're also included in
the Birmingham Occupational Tax?
MR. BAXLEY: Your Honor, we object. It's imma-
terial. What Birmingham does or doesn’t do is immaterial.
BY THE COURT: Sustained.
Q. Why did you include ministers in the occupational
[576] tax? Or not exclude them.
A. Well, I think it would be the intent of the County
Commission to exercise the full authority provided by 406 and,
at the time that we were drafting and proposing this local
taxing authority, we were trying to sweep as broadly as we
could.
Q. Did you follow the example that you were consulting
that ordinance or the Birmingham Occupational Tax?
A. Well, certainly we didn’t want to reinvent the wheel
and Birmingham was tied in - we were tied in to Birmingham
by Act 406. We had to consult the code in order not to exceed
the limitations that Act 406 imposed on us by connecting us
with the Birmingham License Code. So we had to reconstruct
that code and to then include whatever we had the authority to
include and ministers were not excluded by the Birmingham
License Code but, as far as I know, they were subject to tax.
Q. Do you think it is Constitutional to include ministers
in the occupational tax?
A. My personal opinion?
App. 76
Q. The opinion that you — the legal opinion that [577]
you incorporated into the creation of Ordinance 1120.
A. I did.
Q. Have you enforced the occupational tax against any
ministers since it's gone into effect?
A. That's more a function of the revenue department but
it is my understanding that the ministers paid the occupational
tax for seven years and there are many ministers who are still
paying the occupational tax.
Q. Okay. Are there some who have demurred and refused
to pay?
A. That's correct.
Q. And has the county instituted enforcemeiit vroceed-
ings against them?
A. Your Honor, we looked at this pretty hard and it’s a
rather unique legal situation. My memory is that there are
several United States Supreme Court cases that bear on this
point and a number of other state lesser Court cases that bear
on point. In fact, we studied this matter several years ago. We
pretty much came to the conclusion [578] that we didn’t want
to undertake to force the issue on ministers at that time. The
law was or seemed to be merging and evolving and it’s just a
battle that we didn't need to undertake at that time.
Q. Could your reasons sort of be classified then as tax
administration reasons? You just —
MR. BAXLEY: Object to leading.
BY THE COURT: Sustained.
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App. 77
Q. Would you have - in your opinion, based on the
complicated legal uncertainty that you've just described, would
this kind of litigation be expensive - \
MR. BAXLEY: Object to leading.
BY THE COURT: It is leading, sustained.
Q. Well, can you think of any reason why you wouldn't
pursue enforcing the occupational tax against ministers?
A. Several reasons. Any lawyer is going — when he has
the opportunity is going to be mindful of the battles that he
chooses to undertake when he has something of the magnitude
of this [579] task. We — well, the situation with the federal
judges is an example. We decided to pursue that because we
thought we could win and it just astonished me that that
particular matter has gone all the way to the United States
Supreme Court. I thought it was pretty straight forward and
clear. So you just don't know. The ministers involve a much
grayer area than did federal judges. Ministers involve imple-
mentation of the First Amendment of the United States Con-
titution which is always evolving and pretty much my decision
I suppose not to pursue that at this time. We haven't ruled it
out.
Q. Have you done any calculations about the expense-
reward ratio in pursuing such litigation? How much money
you would collect in relation to the expense.
A. Ihave not but just from the general practicalities of
it, it would be a very small amount relative to the tax itself.
Q. You referred to your enforcement efforts against fed-
eral judges. Are you familiar, then, are you [580] handling the
suit against federal judges?
App. 78
A. Iwas involved in the initiation of it and had taken a
lesser role in the latter but I’m familiar with it generally.
Q. Could you describe that enforcement effort?
A. Well, we've used several judges pretty much the same
as we did any other federal employee and some of the biggest
problems we had in the early implementation was convincing
federal employees that they were subject to the tax. I think a lot
of federal employees sort of were guided by this faction that
was going on with the federal judges. So we had to fish or cut
bait. We were very — felt very confident about our cases on the
federal judges and so we pursued collection for those that were
refusing to pay. Incidentally there were several of them that
were paying it. In my memory there were only two that refused
to pay it. In the beginning all of them were paying the city
occupational tax. So, that’s the kind of rationale that was
included in our decision to pursue the federal judges.
[581] Q. Turning to federal employees generally, is the
occupation tax — does it apply equally to federal judges and
state judges who practice, sit on the bench, in Jefferson
County?
A. It does.
Q. With regards to other kinds of governmental
employees, does it apply equally? For example, would it apply
equally to an employee of the State Department of Human
Resources and an employee of the Social Security Administra-
tion of the federal government or the department of health and
human resources?
_A. It does. I don’t recall any reason in particular who the
employer is, whether it’s the federal government or the state
government or county government or the city government.
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App. 79
That wasn’t really the issue. The issue is what is an employee-
employer relationship and whether it’s a natural person. That's
pretty much the criteria.
Q. What has happened to the case that you brought to
enforce the tax against federal judges? You mentioned it was
appealled to the United States [582] Supreme Court. What did
the United States Supreme Court do with the case?
MR. BAXLEY: We object. It’s immaterial and irrel-
evant.
BY THE COURT: Overruled.
A. My memory is that the Court took the case and then
directed the attorney for the United States of America to take a
position on the matter and he filed a brief which supported the
county’s position on the occupational tax against federal
judges. And following that the U.S. Supreme Court referred
the matter back to the attorneys for — I mean back to the 11th
Circuit Court of Appeals and then back to the attorneys for
briefing on that point further. And that’s where it is now. It's
back at the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals.
MR. SLAUGHTER: Your Honor, we would like to
admit into evidence a copy of the opinion — of the brief rather
filed by the Solicitor General of the United States on behalf of
the United States Government at the direction of the Supreme
Court of [583] the United States setting forth their analysis of
this tax under the Buck Act and the Public Salary Tax Act.
There are really two statutes that are involved there and they
kind of — one named the Buck Act — but it’s for USC-111 is not
really part of the Buck Act. The two federal taxes are in issue
in this case as_a basis for the sub-class claiming that they are
exempt as federal employees. And we think it’s highly relevant
App. 80
that the highest agency to express an opinion on this legal
question for the United States Government has expressed its
opinion to the United States Supreme Court that no federal
employee is exempt from the occupational tax under this Buck
Act or the other salary taxes.
MR. BAXLEY: Your Honor, we would object on
three grounds, irrelevant, immaterial — one and two — and
number three, the judges who tracked this thing, did [584] it
on a totally separate theory that is not any way, shape or form
of fashion related to what we have here. It’s just so immaterial.
And in addition even though immaterial I might could see
letting the opinion of the Supreme Court come in for sort of
guidance even though on an immaterial point. But to offer the
brief of the brief by any party or any side is just ludicrous as
far as stretching the materiality.
MR. SLAUGHTER: Your Honor, this is not a brief
this is a brief filed at the request of the United States Supreme
Court for direction by the Department of Justice. It was a brief
filed pursuant to an order that was entered by the Court and is
part of the public records of the proceedings in the United
States Supreme Court. Normally these briefs are not filed
under those circumstances. Moreover, his [585] characteriza-
tion of the issues in the judges’ case is not correct. One of the
issues was that the government had not consented to the
taxation of federal judges in this his manner and under this
kind of an occupational tax act. And the analysis in this brief
examines the nature of the ocupation tax in the context for you
at C-111.
MR. BAXLEY: Your Honor, in addition to those
grounds as cited, if he really stressed it and the Court were to
believe, he might could call whoever he wants to and let them
App. 81
get up here and qualify as an expert and over our strengh of
objection as to relevancy, testify about their opinion,. But in
addition to all the other grounds this is blank hearsay. We’re
not purported rights to cross examine the person. If the person
were under sworn affidavit, there’s no exception to the hearsay
rule It allows an opinon like this to come in [586] without
being cross examined in estimate. And so there are numerous
reasons why this is improperly offered.
BY THE COURT: Well, it’s not admissible for the
purposes of trial. If you — at the conclusion of the trial I’m
going to ask you for a brief anyway, if you want to incorporate
the cases in it that’s part of your argument, then that might be
proper, but right now it’s admitted. Objection is sustained.
MR. SLAUGHTER: Your Honor, if I might just say
one thing. Under Section 201 I think it would be a subject such
as this case. Would you take judicial knowledge? It is my
distateful determination by resort to sources if this accuracy
cannot reasonably be questioned. It was filed with the Supreme
Court. We think, as opposed to just a general objection, we
think it comes under Rule 201 -
BY THE COURT: Let me - I don’t mean it [587]
comes into evidence though I think it may be admissible for
purposes of argument just like what you stand up is an
argument. You can’t very well take a brief and have it admitted
into evidence. :
MR. SLAUGHTER: Right. The only point I’m mak-
ing though, Judge, is that you can take judicial knowledge of
the position taken by the U.S. Government in the earlier case.
That is the subject of using this table.
App. 82
BY THE COURT: I could if it were relevant to any
of the issues but -
MR. DAUPHIN: It is relevant in that if this was
disposed of by the Supreme Court. They've spoken plainly on
that. They’ve painted the judges of the 11th circuit with respect
to Buck Act and 4 USB-111 issues and remanded the case -
BY THE COURT: But not anyone except those two
federal judges.
[588] MR. DAUPHIN: No, in general for federal
employees because they're not treating federal judges and dif-
ferent from other federal employees. And they remanded the
case — they vacated completely the judgment of the 11th Circuit
and remanded the case, on one issue only, and that is whether
the Federal Court even had jurisdiction of the case under the
Tax Injunction Act. So they have, in the federal judges’ case,
disposed of the so-called Buck Act.
BY THE COURT: Yes, go ahead and hold your
argument and I'll look at it, but I don’t think it’s proper at this
time.
Q. All right. Mr. Strickland, I’ve given you a copy there
of the state license code. It’s in a book which both parties have
been using for purposes of convenient reference to that Code
during this trial. If you could turn to page 817, which is where
that begins, and then turn over a couple of pages to Section
40-1249 [589] Attorneys. On the basis of schedules already
admitted into evidence, the Plaintiffs’ have questioned the fact
that certain banks seem to pay occupational taxes on 100
percent of their employees and other banks do not pay occupa-
tional tax on 100 percent of their employees.
MR. DAUPHIN: That's improper.
App. 83
MR. SLAUGHTER: I was attempting to establish
BY THE COURT: Is that an objection?
MR. BAXLEY: What he’s objecting is in pursuing
facts not in evidence because what he — it’s not admissible, not
properly phrased — it’s also erroneous by saying we have
questions that some banks paid 100 percent and other banks
pay less than 100 percent, when all banks pay 100 percent.
Well, what we questioned was if banks pay on 100 percent,
insurance companies should pay no less than 100. They both
have general counsels.
[590] BY THE COURT: Do you have an opinion?
MR. DAUPHIN: I will accept his characterization
of the evidence.
BY THE COURT: All right. Will you rephrase the
question?
Q. Can you think of any reason why a bank that employs
attorneys would be paying the occupational tax or deducting
the occupational tax on such attorneys and the attorneys
would accept the payment of the occupational tax coming out
of their paychecks?
MR. BAXLEY: Objecting to his thinking of any
reasons. Yes, it’s an improper —
BY THE COURT: Yes, sustained.
Q. Are there any reasons why that situation might
exist?
A. There are.
OO
App. 84
Q. What would they be?
A. Well, we've had situations arise where what we call
in-house attorneys for large corporations in this community
where the individuals would be performing different functions.
One individual might be going to Court. One individual might
[591] never go to Court. Another individual might be limited
in the particular type of activity that he performed, albeit legal,
in house. We had to examine these — many of them — on a case-
by-case basis. The result was pretty much that we consulted
with the State Bur Association and if the State Bar Association
required that particular individual to have a state attorney’s
license, I don’t believe we went behind that.
Q. You say required.
_ A. Yes. In order to carry out the function that he was
performing.
Q. What if a lawyer just wanted to buy the license and
stay registered as a lawyer?
A. Well, we had, in the beginning, I think we had many
individuals in this community who had lawyering and did not
practice law. They were not engaged in the practice of law who
attempted to buy a business license or by active attorney's
licenses in order to escape'the occupational tax. And I think
that we successfully dealt with that and rejected those claims
in a number of cases.
[592] Q. Can you read the first sentence of Section
40-1249 -
MR. BAXLEY: Object. The best evidence is already
in evidence and has been read too many times.
BY THE COURT: Overruled. Go ahead.
NN
App. 85
A. Each attorney engaged in the practice of law shall pay
an annual license tax for the state but none for the county.
Q. So this tax is imposed on attorneys who practice law.
A. Correct. -
Q. Did you derive your definition of the practice of law
and conception of the practice of law for the purpose of this
implication from the confrontation with the State Bar?
A. In conjunction with them, certainly.
Q. And could you characterize what constitutes the
practice rather than just being a lawyer who doesn't practice as
an employee of a company?
A. I think that term was defined in the state attorney
license law and it covers — I think [593] there’s examples in
there — it certainly includes the individual who goes to Court.
It includes individuals who hold themselves out to be a practic-
ing attorney. It would include individuals who render legal
advice as an attorney, saying I am an attorney rendering legal
advice. I think there are a few exclusions like attorneys who are
doing something on their own, for their own behalf, or some-
thing which they have a substantial personal equity in.
Q. You said the state license law. Do you mean 40-1249
or do you mean —
A. I mean other state law dealing with attorneys.
Q. All right. Can you turn to page 831? I'll direct your
attention to Section 40-1271, Certified Public Accountants.
Does the occupation tax, according to your interpretation,
apply to a certified public accountant who works for a corpora-
tion and who has no other clients or a governmental agency or
any or entity?
App. 86
A. On his salary from that employer-employee relation-
ship, than yes.
[594] Q. What must a certified public accountant do in
order to be exempt from the occupation tax?
A. A portion of his compensation is directly a product of
his having been engaged in the practice of public accounting,
would be exempt from the occupational tax.
Q. Now, do you have Exhibit — the exhibit before you,
the pink folder there, which deals with the county business
license tax? Could you turn to page 18 and I direct your
attention to Section 89, Real Estate Salesmen.
A. Yes.
Q. Could you read that section?
A. 89, Real Estate Salesmen, each person employed as as
real estate salesman licensed under the provisions of Title
34-2730 shall pay an annual license amount of $25.
Q. Suppose I am a sales representative of a real estate
company and I ply my trade but I have a relationship with him
that, for general legal purposes, the federal income tax law,
state income tax law, etcetera, is not that of the [595]
employee-employer relationship, but that of an independent
contractor? I handle my own benefits. Would I pay the county
occupation tax on my earnings as such independent contrac-
tor?
A. No.
Q. Let’s reverse things. Let us say, in the hypothetical,
that Iam an employee for federal income tax purposes, but I’m
still working on commission but I get some compensation
App. 87
that’s not commission that is not commission-based. I have
some benefits for purposes of, say, social security deductions, I
would be an employee. In that case do I pay an occupational
tax on my wages?
A. Yes. . -
Q. How do you interpret this phrase “each person
employed as a real estate salesman”? Does that describe an
employee or does it describe an independent contractor?
A. It’s an independent contractor.
Q. Why is that?
A. Well, this is the business license code and it [596]
covers the individuals who, in the case you outlined in your
question, are what we would call indepdendent contractors or
proprietors. They are individuals who are not in the true
employer-employee relationship.
Q. But the wording kere says employed.
A. Well that word doesn’t mean — it’s not intended to
mean as an employee. It means like carrying out the functions.
Well, the gentleman who's employed as a court reporter right
now, he’s performing a function It doesn’t mean he’s an
employee in the traditional sense of employer-employee.
Q. That explanation appears to stress the word “as” and
am I understanding you correctly?
MR. BAXLEY: We object. How in the world can he
answer whether Mr. Slaughter understands him correctly or
not.
Q. Let's try again. I understand your example of the
court reporter. How do you as a interpretor of legal language
App. 88
read into this language that a person employed as a real estate
salesman, as [597] an independent contractor but working
under the name of a real estate company, is not an employee?
A. Well, to determine if someone.is an employee, you
would apply the traditional elements of an employment rela-
tionship.
Q. Well, what is it in this language that entitles you to
say if he satisfies the incidents of an independent contractor,
that he’s not employed by the real estate company?
A. I'm saying he’s performing as a real estate salesman.
It’s tantamount to saying engaged as a real estate salesman.
Q. All right.
MR. SLAUGHTER: No further questions.
BY THE COURT: Mr. Baxley, any questions?
MR. BAXLEY: Yes, sir, Your Honor.
EXAMINATION BY MR. BAXLEY:
Q. Andy, are you telling the Court that a lawyer who is
employed as a general counsel for a large corporation, that
devotes his or her full time to commenting on legal matters and
their effects for their captive client, but never goes [598] to
Court and never signs a pleading, are you telling this Court
that those lawyers are not engaged in the practice of law?
A. No. I'm saying that we have to examine those situa-
tions on a case-by-case basis as they are presented to us. We
would look at the facts. We would look at exactly what the
individual is doing, what his responsibilities are, and we would
aiso look at what his — what is his situation with the State Bar
itself.
App. 89
Q. All right, now -
A. We would be persuaded by the conditions of the State
Bar as to whether or not he was engaged in the practice of law.
- Q. Are you acknowledging or admitting that you have
some in-house counsel that pay the occupational tax and some
that don't pay it?
A. That's my understanding, yes.
Q. And yet these in-house counsel have the same exact
identical law license with the State Bar, don’t they?
A. Well, I can’t generalize. That calls for a general [599]
statement and I can’t generalize. I think that there are — it’s
been several years since we — since I've been involved in a
problem with this — but in the beginning we had some attor-
neys who had been performing in the corporation situation as
an in-house lawyer who were not members of the State Bar and
who — whatever they were doing — and then when the occupa-
tional tax was passed, they went down and purchased a State
Bar license. The State Bar was happy to sell them a license, of
course, if they were qualified and eligible. And the State Bar
was not looking at the relationship in the same way that we
were. So there was an educational process and a dialogue that
went on between us and the State Bar about this problem. We
were both searching for the right answer in each case. And I
think the bottom line is that in — and I don’t know what the
numbers are, Mr. Baxley — the bottom line ts that there are
probably still today in in-house situations are people who are
attorneys who are not members of the State Bar and there [600]
are people who are attorneys who are members of the State Bar.
And the ones who are we probably have gotten to the point
App. 90
where we accept the State Bar’s characterization of their hav-
ing required to buy that license to carry on the function of
their performance.
Q. I don’t want to cut you off, Andy, but I think my
question was simple. Don’t the in-house lawyers that do pay
the occupational tax have the same license that the in-house
lawyers that don't pay it have?
A. I don’t think I can give you a general answer to that!
There may be in-house lawyers that don’t have the license.
Q. Okay.
A. That’s what I'm saying.
Q. Assume that they have a license to practice law in the
state — the same license that you and I have. It’s identical to
what a — strike that. I'll ask you — I'll put it this way. Are you
acknowledging that an in-house attorney that has a license
pays the tax and other in-house attorneys [601] that have the
same license, don’t they?
A. There may be situations like that.
Q. And -
A. Excuse me. Let me amplify that. There may be indi-
viduals whose compensation is related to different functions.
For instance — hypothetically, I don’t know — hypothetically
there may be employees in corporations that have a very
multiple roles or some business that might be apart from legal
activity and part might be From other activities. The other
activity would be taxed. :
Abrera cnn yy
App. 91
Q. Do you have in-house legal attorneys that do nothing
but legal work that have a state law license that pay the tax
and other in-house attorneys who do nothing but legal work
that have a state license that don’t pay it?
A. I don’t know that. I don’t the facts of the cases you're
talking about.
Q. What do you know of that the in-house attorneys
trust department of the big banks do that does not include legal
work?
[602] A. Well, at the outset, we don't make the initial
determination. At the outset, it’s the employer who makes the
determination as to whether he will deduct front that particu-
lar employee's wages the occupational tax. So, if the employer
does so, and pays the occupational tax to the county and the
employee lawyer doesn’t come in and challenge that, we don’t
know it. We don’t have a case on that. We don’t ave any
knowledge of the facts on that.
Q. Let me ask you this. In your situation, you are the
county attorney.
A. Right.
Q. Are you employed by the county?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Are you under civil service protection?
A. No.
Q. Are you allowed to have outside clients?
A. I have. There's no prohibition against it. I just don’t
have time.
App. 92
Q. Okay. But your not prohibited from having outside
clients?
[603] A. Right.
Q. But you don’t have any now?
A. No.
Q. When was the last time year-wise that you did any
work that was not related to your employer's account?
Well, I’ve done work, I just haven't charged.
That you charged for.
I'd say several years. I don’t know.
Well, before 1987?
In one or two situations since ‘87.
Where you charged a fee for representing somebody?
Yes.
> Db * O + © >
Q. Okay. Have you -— are you covered by your title
through Jefferson County?
A. Yes.
Q. Does Jefferson County pay your social security taxes,
their share of it?
A. Yes.
Q. Are you covered by unemployment and other benefits
_ with Jefferson County? -
A. Yes.
[604] Q. Do you have a regular law license to practice
with the State of Alabama State Bar Association?
App. 93
A. Yes.
Q. And you've been — through that law license, you can
walk into Court in Mobile and try as many criminal or civil
cases you choose, right?
A. Yes.
Q. And you could do the same in Huntsville at the other
end of the state.
A. Right. |
Q. Even though you're employed by the county?
A. Right.
Q. Okay. And are you paying the occupational tax?
A. Not to the county.
Q. You're not paying the county occupational tax?
A. No.
Q. Okay. That's because you have this law license with
the state Bar Association?
A. That's because the occupational tax doesn't apply.
There’s no part to tax the attorney unless he practices law.
Q. Okay. Do you personally pay the license fee with
[605] the State Bar or does the county pay it for you?
A. I paid it for many years and I believe right now the
county is paying for it.
Q. Okay. Goes the county send it in for you?
A. I think so.
App. 94
Q. How many employees are there — attorneys — in
Jefferson County?
A. There are three total.
Q. Now, when Mr. Slaughter, was asking you about the
Birmingham Occupational Tax, and he mentioned — either he
or you or both of you mentioned “tied in with Birmingham by
Act 406”. You're not telling this Court that the City of
Birmingham, on their occupational tax, exempts all these pro-
fessions that the county exempts, are you?
A. No.
Q. And when Mr. Slaughter asked you about our Exhibit
7, he showed you the county license code —
A. Business code?
Q. Business code, on page 18, Section 89, where it reads
“real estate salesmen — each person employed as a real estate
salesman licensed under the [606] provision of Title 34-27-30,
shall pay an annual license amount of $25”. That's all it says,
right?
A. Right.
Q. And so you're saying that employed doesn’t mean
employed? :
A. I'm saying that if this reaches those real estate sales-
men who perform as what I would call independent contrac-
tors. They're not employees.
Q. Okay.
A. Of an employer.
Q. All right. Well, in the very next section, Section 90 -
Insurance Agents. Tell the Court, please, how a fire and marine
App. 95
insurance agent is different from a life or health or casualty -
well, life or health insurance agent?
A. I'm not really capable of explaining that. I can say
that the Code of Alabama and the Legislature through the Code
chose to distinguish between fire and marine and others. Why
they did that I don’t know. But they tax a separate tax provi-
sion and separate statutes that apply to insurance situations
[607] as to whether they’re fire and marine and not fire and
marine.
Q. Andy, I'm going to show you what's marked Plain-
tiffs’ Exhibit 6 and Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 7. Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 6
was the first license code for Jefferson County dated September
29, 1987. Is that right? |
A. That's correct.
Q. Okay. Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 7 is the license code the
superceded 6 and was adopted September 12, ‘89, wasn't it?
A. Right.
Q. Okay. Now, in Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 6, the first license
code, fire and marine agents were not treated from life or health
agents, were they?
A. There's no category in Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 6 for insur-
ance agents as it’s set out here.
Q. Okay. So that was added in between September of ‘87
and September of ‘89.
A. I believe sc
Q. All right. Now you just told the Court something
about the state law treating fire and marine agents [608]
App. 96
different. What — don’t you know the state law relative to
insurance agents didn’t change between those years?
A. I don’t know that. All right. What knowledge do you
have as the county attorney? You're the county attorney — you
would be the county — the main county attorney in 1989 and
1987, weren't you?
A. Correct.
Q. What knowledge do you have about how this exemp-
tion came into being about the fire and marine agents ™ ‘89
that wasn’t there in ‘87?
A. I’m having a problem because I cannot answer your
question exactly. My — it’s conceivable and possible, but I don’t
know that these agents were paying under the provision of 5(a)
which is the catch-all provision — agents, dealers and other
businesses — and that they were then, well, at least, this was
broken out as a separate category. But I can’t — I haven't been
able to find anything that would tell me for certain that’s what
happened. So fire and marine insurance agents pay ‘40 of [609]
one percent of their comalissiors.
A. Under Category 90.
Q. And life insurance and health insurance agents pay
one-half of one percent occupational tax on their commissions.
A. Those that are employed in employer-employee rela-
tionships.
Q. Okay. Then let me re-ask that. The fire and marine
agents that are employed in employer-employee relationships,
they pay what? -
A. Say again now.
App. 97
Q. The fire and marine life insurance agents that are in
employed in an employee relationship, they pay what?
A. You say fire and marine life insurance —
Q. I'm sorry. Fire and marine insurance agents.
A. Okay. Agents for fire and marine who are not in an
employer-employee relationship, would be paying under 90.
Now those other insurance agents that are not employed in an
employer-employee relationship, I believe would be paying
under 5(a). — -
[610] Q. Are you telling the court that under 90 it has to
be at employee relationship?
(no response)
Read that -
No, not under 90.
All right. It says insurance agents, does it not?
> oO > O >
Yes.
Q. On each person, firm or corporation engaged in the
business of acting as agents for fire and marine insurance
companies Shall pay a license of *ho of one percent of the gross
commission from said business from the previous year.
A. Right.
Q. With a minimum license of $7.50.
A. Right.
Q. Now, where in there does it say it has to be as an
employee?
App. 98
A. That's not what I said. I said he would not be in an
employee relationship.
Q. Okay. If an agent for, a fire or marine -insurance
company was in an employee relationship, what would he pay?
[611] A. If he’s a true employee, and he’s not otherwise
paying under the state business license code, he would pay his
occupational tax.
Q. You said he would pay - you said if he was an
employee, he would pay the occupational tax?
A. Yes.
Q. Even though it says under Insurance Agents each
person, firm or corporation engaged in the business of acting as
agents?
A. That's a business. That's the sole proprietor we were
talking about. That’s the independent contractor, sole propri-
etor, who is — who has a business.
Q. So is it your testimony that individual agents that
are employees do not pay — for fire and marine insurance
companies — do not pay ‘4 of one percent? They pay the .5
percent?
A. If you'll repeat the question. “It’s mixed up.
Q. All right. Let’s start from square one and then I'll
stop. Do you know if fire and marine agents pay -
A. Dol know what?
[612] Q. Do you know what the fire and marine agents
in Jefferson County pay?
A. I can only tell you what this document says.
App. 99
Q. Well, the document -
A. I wouldn’t know one if he walked in the door.
Q. Okay. The document's in evidence, so Section 90 says
what fire and marine agents pay.
A. If they are a business as an agent. This is a busmess
license code. If he is — if he is as an agent he is in the buseness
of acting as an agent, and he is not in an employer-emptoyee
relationship to someone else, he can buy this license.
Q. Okay. What if he is an employee of someone else? Can
the fire and marine agent buy that license?
A. No.
Q. He cannot.
A. No. Not for the duties he performs as an employee.
Q. Okay. What if he is an employee of someone else but
he’s on commission?
A. Well, the commission is just a form of compensation.
That doesn’t change anything.
[613] Q. I agree with that but what would he pay the
county?
A. Say it again.
Q. Ifa fire and marine or marine agent is an employee of
a company engaged in the business of writing fire and marine
insurance — :
A. As an employee?
Q. Asan employee, but he is paid on commission, what
would that agent pay the county?
App. 100
A. I would assume — I have to assume on your statement
of facts — that he’s not otherwise covered under something else
under state law.
Q. Okay.
A. But if there's a person such as you just described, he
should be paying the occupational tax.
Q. Okay.
A. Now, the reason I'm hesitating here is because there
are some state laws applicable to fire and marine that you just
have to get into and read and try to understand why they make
a distinction between fire and marine and other types and
there’s [614] provisions in there that may - and I hadn't read
this in a while — but may indicate that you can perform — for
fire and marine you have to do it a certain way. In other words,
it’s not an ordinary insurance situation and I don’t know why.
Q. Okay. I think that’s the best answer. You don't know
why and we are through.
BY THE COURT: May he step down?
MR. SLAUGHTER: Yes, sir. No further questions.
BY THE COURT: You may step down.
MR. SLAUGHTER: The Plaintiffs rest.
MR. BAXLEY: Well, Your Honor, we will not put
up any rebuttal and we'll not recall the witness and we'll not
offer any more exhibits except that we would like to say in light
of what they've done ask the Court on the pending thing that
the. Court has about our offer of study. I think it’s #1 and we
think that it’s certainly admissible now. Bear in mind it’s a
document generated by the county
* * *
App. 101
JEFFERSON COUNTY COMMISSION
[LOGO]
[Names Omitted In Printing]
MEMORANDUM
DEFENDANT'S
EXHIBIT
NO. 9
TO: Randy Godeke, Director
Department of Revenue
FROM: Tom Meacham, Sr. Auditor TAM
Department of Revenue
SUBJECT: Statistical Report - Proprietorships
DATE: October 20, 1997
Attached is a statistical report summarizing all sole pro-
prietors purchasing a state or county license for the
period of October 1, 1996, through September 30, 1997.
This report shows a total of 17,301 licenses issued with
the county receiving $292,081 in revenue for the Non-
Regulated Professional Licenses. If you include the Regu-
lated Professionals, you would add 7,465 additional
licenses and $72,948 additional in revenue.
For the period October 1, 1996, through September 30,
1997, the Department of Revenue issued a grand total of
20,510 State Privilege Licenses, of which the county
received $737,950, and 16,223 County Business Licenses
in the amount of $2,901,288.
As you will notice, the report does not include the cate-
gory of attorney. The attorneys remit their annual license
App. 102
fee directly to the State Bar Association and are not
required to purchase a license through the Revenue
office.
If you need additional information, please let me know.
WP
Attachment
App. 103
OTCOURT2.XLS
96-97 Dusiness Licenses issued to Sole Proprietors
—— seme - —
a ene, oF See er
| Licence _—_—iLicense =| Number __State County ——_‘Total Hourly | Annual | _— Wages Per Annual
Section _—Description | Issued Amount Amount — License Wage Wage ' : Lic Issued OT
| | Se: | 7
~_ 8[Single Store License ; 2724; —_—.2593/ 0; 2593) ~=—s 12.74] ~~ 26499.20 72183821 360919
41; Abstract Title +: gs s& #4 @' 1657| 32365.60 32386 162
*43| Accountant, Auditor 481 11675: =O — 11675: 18.52: —38521.60: 18528890 92644
44'Business Machines 47 4250' 2125: — 6375: 15.57! 32385.60: 1522123: 7611
45\Advertising | 13: 1875. 938 = 2813: 22.35: _46488.00: 604344 | 3022
a 46'Air Conditioning _ 19: 1850: 925° 2775: 11.72: 24377.60: 463174! 2316
46A'Air Conditioning _ 2 15: 8 23) 11.72! 24377.60: 48755} 244
46B:Air Conditioning 8, 73: 36 109° 11.72: 24377.60 195021; 975
*48' Architect 164' 4088: oO. 4088: 21.02; 43721.60:! 7170342 35852
*60| Auctioneer 31 775 0. 775: 16.57: 34465.60: 1068434! 5342
51|Auto Dealer 470: 34083. 17041: 51124; 15.35) —31928.00) 15006160; 75031
53|Auto Accessories 196; 4187. 2094' 6281: 13.17; 27393.60 5369146; - 26846
54'Car Repair 472) 3230! 1615! 4845 | 9.28; 19302.40 9110733 45554
55/Car Storage 3: 10: 5! 15 12.74; 26499.20 79498 397
56!Car Storage = eee SR 12.74| 26499.20' 344490 1722
58} Barber 209: 1165: 583, 1748. 5.78 12022.40: 2512682 12563
60A | Battery ; 1, _ 153 7! 22: 13.17; 27393.60; 27394! 137
61| Beautician 647! 7669 3835: 11504! 5.78 12022.40 7778493 38892
62)|Bicycies/Motorcycles | 10) 105! 53° 158° 15.57! —32385.60. 323856 1619
64/Bond Maker 5: 450, 225) 675 20.06} . 41724.80; | 208624 1043
69A; Carbonated Drinks 663 1601 801: 2402 6.82 14185.60) 9405053 47025
69B/ Soda Fountain 290 5663 2831 8494 6.82 14185.60 4113824 20569
70} Soft Drinks/Wholes! 1 50 25 75 6.82} 14185.60 14186 71
*71)|Certified Pub Acct 689 17088 0 17088 40.14) 83491.20 57525437 287627
72|Cigarette, Retail 361 3661 1830 5491 8.57 17825.60 6435042 32175
73| Cigarette, Wholes! 10 700 350) | 1050 8.57 17825.60 178256 891
75} Cleaning/Pressing 30 333 166 499 6.27 13041.60 391248 1956
75A/Cleaning/Pickup 12 60 30 90 6.27 13041.60 156499 782
76|Coal | 3 30 15 45 15.57} _32385.60 97157 486
77|Coal Hauling 2 39 20 59 13.02} 27081.60 54163 271
79)| Coffin 4 270 135 405 15.57} | 32385.60 129542 648
80} Collection 10 575 288 863} , 9.70} 20176.00 201760 1009
OTCOURT2.XLS
Pf) Sons. ca Merehan a 4445: 4238.32.74. 26499.2C = 3179904 15900
Gna 2. ml BS... SS eee 52998, 265
83B Money Lender __ 4 - 100 St 180 19.50) 40560.00 40560: 203
| 84, Contractor "1979 72695, = = 36348, += 109043; ~— 18.59) 38667.20 76522389) 382612
fiat 87|Manufacturing | 69 1300; — 650; ~———s: 1950 12.54} 26083.20 1799741 8999
91! Deli i 36! 350 175, 82 12.85] 26728.00 962208 4811
*92/Dentist et i a a ie ae 16458957 82295
93/Detective Agency 57, «5350. 2675. ===» 8025' ~—s 12.46! ~—- 25916.80 1477258 7386
__94|Film Developing _ we . 5 3 8 16.60; —34528.00 34528: 173
97'Elect, Gas Appliance 721 os A 1410: 15.57 —32385.60) 2331763: 11659
" 98|Embaimer 30: 200—is145°— 435) 16.57: —34465.60! | 1033968: 5170
*99/ Engineer 345: 6820 O 6820' 21.02 43721.60' 15083952: 75420
102/Firework ae 85 43 128' 15.57 —32385.60; 161928, 810
104|Fortuneteller . 2i 60 30. 90' 16.57 34465.60 68931. 345
105|Fruit Dealer “.0UOUUh'’tMS:—lc ‘kies..l.dlULUODUUUD.LU 518170; 2591
106'Gasoline Station 168: 11001: = 5§500' ~ = 16501 6.66: —13852.80' 2327270 11636
107|Glass Plate Dealer __ F 175, 88 263, 20.36: 42348.80; 254093 1270
108|Golf Course : 2 25) 13; 38; 20:06) 41724.80 83450 417
108A|Golf Course 4 55 28! 83| 20.06] 41724.80 166899 834
112/Horse Dealer | 1 20: 10! 30 15.57! —32385.60 32386 162
114]ice Factory 1 35: 18: 53 15.57: 32385.60 32386 162
115|Hotel 13 816; 408 1224; 12.85) — 26728.00 347464 1737
116|Junk Dealer } 2 40) 20 60/ 20.06] 41724.80 83450 417
118|Laundry 46 459: 229 688 12.46, 25916.80 1192173 5961
118A|Laundry-Hand 2 10} 5 15 12.46; 25916.80 51834 259
122|Lumber Yard 2 35 18 53 15.57| _32385.60 64771 324
123|Machine Shop 27 270 135 405 13.79] _28683.20 774446 3872
124|Manicurist 237 1100 550 1650 5.78| _ 12022.40 2849309 14247
125|Mattress Mfg 85 988 493 1481 16.60} 34528.00 2934880 14674
*126|Medical Doctor 1867 45873 0 45873| 78.85} 164008.00 306202936 1531015
127|Mimeographs 2 60 30 90] 16.60} 34528.00 69056 345]
131|Monuments 6 30 15 45 15.57| _32385.60 194314 972
133A|Movies 1 60 30 90 15.57| _ 32385.60] | 32386 162
134|Newstand 38 180 90 270| —15.57| + 32385.60 1230653 6153
*135| Optometrist 88 1925 0 1925 16.57] 34465.60 3032973 15165
*136] Chiropractor 4 60 1200 0 1200! 16.57| 34465.60 2067936 10340
138|Pawnbroker | 14 3500 1750 5250 15.57! _ 32385.60 453398 2267
App. 105
OTCOURT2.XLS
ise Protogra, +: 23 733 3 tid BSS 41240.46 2432538 12168)
__ 140A Photographer | 70 675 332, 1013, 19.83, 4124640 = 2887248. ___ 14436
| 1408 Photographer x | iv 4 1119.83 41246. 3.40 82493) 412
_ 141: Musical al Instruments _ 7 . 3 100 ee. a 5. 15.57 ~32385.60" 64771! 324
141A|Musical Instruments Bids — See. | ee 19! 15.57/ 32385.60 32386 162
141B/Musical Instruments | 8, —_—_—-160! 80) 240| 15, 57’ 32385.60 259085 1295
143/Pistols Revolvers 28) 3050, 1525 4575 15.57' 32385.60! 906797! _ 4534
_144|Playing Cards a - ery 90 12.74; 26499.20! 794976: 3975
145/Plumber _ 132! 1507, ss 753: = 2260 12.59: 26187.20! 3456710! 17284
145A! Plumber 4 _ a | 30: 12.59: 26187.20' 104749: 524
g 146|Pool Table 81 6188 = 3094 ss 9282: 12.74' + ~—-26499.20; 2146435! 10732
147|Race Track 1! 10: 5: 15 20.06: += 41724.80 41725! 209
148|Radio 46: 552. 276; 828: 15.57. 32385.60 1489738 ' 7449
*149|Reai Estate 107) 1335: 668) 2003) 24.11/ + ~—50148.80 5365922! 26830
151/Restaurant 185 5111: 2556 | 7667' —-12.85| + 26728.00 4944680 24723
152|Dance Hall 29 700! 350: 1050! 12.741 ~~: 26499.20 768477; 3842
152A|Dance Hall-Other 2: 100, 50' 150! 12.74; + 26499.20) 52998 265
153|Sandwich Shops | 128) 575} 288! 863: 12.85] — 26728.00) 3421184 17106
*155|Stientist Naturopath | 23! 230i 0! 230| 27.12! + 56409.60 1297421! 6487
156|Sewing Machines 6 150: 75; 225: 15.57! —32385.60 194314! 972
156A|Sewing Machines 1; 10: 5. 15 15.57! 32385.60 32386) 162
158/Shotguns 63: 482: 240: 722, 15.57; —32385.60 2040293! 10201
159!Skating Rinks 1; 25' 5 30: 12.74; — 26499.20 26499 132
160/Solicitating Broker 16) 725° 363; 1088' 22.42} += 46633.60 746138 3731
161| Eyeglasses i 17 324! 163! 487; 15.57) —_ 32385.60 550555 2753
162|Stock Broker 5 250! 125 375: _-22.42| + 46633.60 ___ 233168 1166
163|Camival 1 100; 50 150 12.74] 26499.20 26499 132
166| Theater 10 195 98 293; 20.06] + 41724.80 417248 2086
167|Ticket Scaiper 7 650 325 975 12.74) 26499.20 185494 927
168] Tourist Camp 1 15 7 22 12.74] 26499.20 26499 132
169| Tractor Road Machine 11 287 143 430 15.57] 32385.60 356242 1781
172|Transcient Dealer 45 1003 502 1505 8.57] _ 17825.60 802152 4011
172A|Transcient Dealer 3 10 5 15 8.57} _17825.60 53477 267
1748] Retail Peddler 888 15113 7557 22670 8.57! _17825.60 15829133 79146
174C|Retail Peddier 10 950 475 1425 8.57} _17825.60 _ 178256 891
174D|Peddier 1 100 50 150 8.57} _17825.60 17826 89
176|Vending Sales 133 1377 688 2065] ,__8.57| 7825.60 _ 2370805 11854
Page 3
App. 106
\
OTCOURTZ2.XLS
764 Vending Sa..>— - | : Jae 3 — 9005) (HS
176B Vending Sues © 48 28S Vig? 3590.57 1782560. 855629 _4278
| 176C Vending Sales 5 3 _& ~ 657 1762560, 17826, 8
___.177;Cabinet Shop _ 236, 709. 7.97, __ 16577.60 1309630 6548
- ~~" 3478] Veterinarian —~ —~“7ol = 350, = S880) 18.57] —-3:4465.60 2412592 12063
179| Warehouse — a : a 38, 12.47! 25937.60 25938 130
179A | Warehouse [a se 150: 12.47! —_25937.60! 25938 130
315'Chain Store 124' 4171. 0 1171, 12.47’ 25937.60! 3216262 16081
cs Totals 45762: $319,875 $110,436 $430,311 $728,024,024 $3,640,120
, |
‘County Ordinance License Issued for 96-97 a ma 2
: ; ““Average| _‘Total Total
1 |License [Number — _ :County Total ‘© Hourly : Annual |Wages Per Annual
; Schedule ‘Description issued ____ Ordinance License = Wage_' Wage _ Ord issued OT
a= : : -
: : | :
i C2!Advertising : 4 525: 525| 22.35! 46488.00 185952! 930
C5AiAgents, Dealers 2118 (stst‘;*‘«‘«~ SAZ:=«=BGIZ 12.74; 26499.20! 56125306: 280627
C5B|Business Office | 19: 398 398 =. 12.74! 6499.20) 503485: 2517
C6|Aircraft : 1 : 50: 50| 15.57; _32385.60! 32386! 162
C7|Bookkeeper : 98: 3923: - 3923! 10.28] +: 21382.40 2095475; 10477
C9!Auto Polishing | 93 3038: 3038: 16.78) —34902.40 3245923; 16230
C9A/Auto Polishing incide ‘ 3| fi 23! 23' 16.78] + 34902.40 104707: 524
C10|Auto Drive It 1 200) 2001 15.57! — 32385.60 32386 162
C12|Bakery 2 | 100 100! 5.94; 12355.20 24710 124
C13|Bakery Goods 10 ; 353 353 5.94] 12355.20 123552 618
| ____C14]Barber Supplies S 425 425] 15.57| 32385.60 291470 1457
C16|Bootblacking 7 50 50| 16.78] + 34902.40 244317 1222
C19|Cemetary 1 25 25| 20.06] + 41724.80 41725 209
C21|Metallurgist Enginee ua 1602 1602] 14.31] —29764.80 327413 1637
C25|Amusement 1 100 100{ 20.06] + 41724.80 41725 209
C27|Court Reporting 33 __ 3380 3380| 10.34] — 21507.20 709738 3549
C29|Curb Market Covered 1 i 30 30/ 15.57] —32385.60 32386 162
C31|Dental Depot ; 14 ae 444 444 16.53] 34382.40 481354 2407
C32! Insecticides | 4 | 129 129], 15.57] _ 32385.60 129542 648
Page 4
OTCOURT2.XLS
CzéA Excermunaicc . 15, 248 248 FS 3490240 823536 2618)
C33 DressShop = 140 09S G090, 15.57. 32385.60) 4533084 __-22670
C34 Prescription Shop _ 161161" 23.46" 48796.80; 48797 244
| _€35,Employment Agency, 11 1900 \_: 1900, 12.45!" 25896.00 284856. 1424
| C38) Florist i 1435 _.—s—s—s 995° 8995's 11.75] — 24440.00 3494920 17475
C40|Guard Patrol | Ree 460: 460° 640] 13312.00 386048, 1930
C41'Retail Food Store 210) i (;w”~S~*é«a8SH~=SSC*=C«é«'BSS~—SsSd15.57! —3:2385.60 7092446; 35462
C42! Ice Cream Se De a eel ae 712483 | 3562
C43| industrial Traffic Mgr Tt -_— «50—~—‘é«<XSOCOCOC‘*UZ«ABi~«46758.40' 46758! 234
| __ C44 Hospital eo —_ 120 = 120° ——-20.06| + ~—-41724.80) 166899! 834
| __ C4Silnspector Ra — 45 45 20.64; —42931.201 85862! 429
C47 Jitneys eee 15 + +15 ~=«*14.12:' ~+~=«:29369.60: 29370! 147
C48A Junk Wagon | ez 2 50 =i“ (si«SO 20.36) + —-42348.80) 84698 423
C49|Landscape Gardener | - i 3414, 3414 20.36; 42348.80) 5208902 ' 26045
C50!Manufacturing i 2a 780 780 12.54' 26083.20 730330: 3652
C51lRetailMerchandise 1618 |. 42021 42021 8.57; _ 17825.60) 288418211 144209
C52|Messenger Service 5 48 48 6.74 14019.20| 70096! 350
C52A|Messenger Service 22! 171 171: 6.74; _14019.20 308422) 1542
C52B|Messenger Service | 4! = Ae 96: 6.74' 14019.20 56077 280
_____ ©53|Mortgage Loans 6 =—Sti‘;CS™”*~CS8 ©) (886 ~~ «19.50! —40560.00: 648960 3245
C55|Newspapers . 16: 345: 345: 16.60; 34528.00! 552448 | 2762
C57'Newsboys ; 2: 15) 15 5.34 11107.20 22214 111
C59) Oil Wholesale ! 1! 1046: 1046 14.12 29369.60 29370 147
C60} Oil Auto Retail ; 2i 45! 45; 15.57 32385.60 64771 324
C62/Ore Stone Cement 2 60 ‘ 60) 20.36] | 42348.80 84698 423
C65/Pet Shops “4 i 345 345} 8.57 17825.60 427814 2139
C70}Printing © 79 { 3804 3804 16.89 35131.20 2775365 13877
C71|Repair Shop ; 213 3795 3795 7.73 16078.40 3424699 17123
C72/School 85 1937 1937 12.45} 25896.00 2201160 11006
C75/ Tailoring 94 2535 2535 12.74 26499.20 2490925 12455
C76} Taxicabs 6 105 105 12.74 26499.20 158995 795}
) C77) Tree Pruning 14 278 278 12.74 26499.20 370989 1855
C78| Undertakers 2 230 230 12.74 26499.20 52998 265
| C80| Watchmaker 4 | 53 53 12.74 26499.20 105997 530
) C83) Janitorial Service 272 5565 5565 5.76 11980.80 3258778 16294
*C89/Real Estate Agent | 1875 Fk 38600; 38600 21.99} 45739.20 72039240 360196
C90/insurance Agent 38 | 991) 991}, 22.70 47216.00 1794208 8971
App. 108
OTCOURT2.XLS
2790
f < C502 Septic Tain g eo 245i LE 338790 —_—«- 1694
C503 Upen on Sunday eee 1675, 1075 12.74 = 26499.20 1139466, 5697].
- C693'Transient Dealer 4. 41900 1000 12.74'_26499.20, 105997 530
| *C900'RealEstateMun , 1684 33680 = 33680, =: 21.99! — 45739.20, 77024813; 385124
Ys Totals ay 9004 ; 254593| 264593) ' l 286592550) 1432963
Grand Total | 24766) $319,875 | $365,029 , $684,904 Le $1,014,616,574 | $5,073,083
7 SEER |
‘ILess: Regulated | a _/**Average Hourly Wage was furnished by Alabama Dept .
Professionals 7465 96556 72948 169504] of Industrial Relations for the Birmingham Metro Area. |
] | i Metro area includes Jefferson, Blount, St Clair, and Shelby
iNet Difference 17301; $223,319 | Counties | ae
$292,081 $515,400
Average Hourly Wage for Jefferson County was furnished
:
| |
+
- j
i
by Metropolitan Development Board.
Page 6
App. 109
OTCOURT3.XLS
96-97 Business Licenses issued to Sole Proprietors that are Regulated
. “Average! _‘ Total Total ?
License License Number | State County | Total Hourly Annual Wages Per Annual |
Section Description Issued | Amount | Amount | License | Wage Wage Lic Issued OT |
| : tn |
*43| Accountant, Auditor 481 11675 0 11675 18.52 38521 .60 18528890 92644
*48 | Architect 164 4088 0! 4088 21.02 43721.60 7170342 35852
*60)| Auctioneer . Hi 31; 775 0! 775; 16.57 34465.60' 1068434 5342
*71\Certified Pub Acct | 689) 17088 ' 0 17088; 40.14 83491.20; §7525437 287627
*92| Dentist 1 281: 5197: 0: 5197 28.16 58572.80' 16458957! 82295
| ___ *99|Engineer H 345. 6820 #0 6820' 21.02] 43721.60 15083952 75420
*126| Medical Doctor 1867’ 45873 0 45873: 78.851 164008.00; 306202936 1531015
*135| Optometrist 88: 1925. 0 1925) 16.57, 34465.60 3032973 15165
*436| Chiropractor ; 60 1200' 0. 1200| 16.57! 34465.60 2067936 10340
*149\RealEstate | 107: 1335: 668: 2003' 24.11; 50148.80| | 5365922 "26830
*4156|Scientist Naturopath | 23) -230' 0! 230} 27.12 56409.60 | 1297421 6487
*178) Veterinarian : s 350: oO 350; 16.57; 34465.60 2412592) 12063
} : .
| Totals : 4206) $96,556 $668 ## $97,224 1 ! Sees | $2,181,079
; | L sade |
|County Ordinance License Issued for 96-97 |
a : “Avera Total Total
License Number | County . Total — Hourly Annual |Wages Per Annual |
Schedule |Description Issued | Ordinance ; License | Wage | Wage Ord Issued OT
i i
*C27|Court Reporter 33 3380 3380 10.34 21507.2 709738 3549
*C89/Real Estate Agent 1575 38800 38600 21.99 45739.20 72039240 360196
*C900/Real Estate Mun 1684 33680 33680 21.99} 45739.20 77024813 385124
Totals 3259 72280 72280 , 149064053 748869
SUB TOTAL 7465) $96,556 $72,948 | $169,504 $585,279,843 $2,929,948
“Average Hourly Wage was fumished by Alabama Dept of
Industrial Relations for the Birmingham Metro Area.
Metro area includes Jefferson, Blount, St Clair, and Shelby
Counties |
|
a
Average Hourly Wage for Jefferson County was furnished by
Metropolitan Development Board.
|
Page 1
App. 110
OTCOURT3.XLS
emusic Attomey *3629 0 0 0 48.94; 101795.20 369414781 1847074
“information supplied by State Bar Assn in Montgomery |
i
‘wes ws
GRAND TOTAL i i
$954,694 624 $4,777,022
|
|
— Page 2 nage
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.