Appendix — Adler v. Duval County School Board

Supreme Court brief2001

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FILED

O01 287 auc - 8 2003

No. :

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

EMILY ADLER, et al.,

Petitioners,

vs.

DUVAL COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD, et al.,

Respondents.

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

APPENDIX TO

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

(VOLUME I)

Wm. J. Sheppard, Esquire Alan B. Morrison, Esquire

COUNSEL OF RECORD ss Public Citizen Litigation Group

D. Gray Thomas, Esquire 1600 20" Street, N.W.

Sheppard, White and Washington, D.C. 20009

Thomas, P.A. (202) 588-7720

215 Washington Street

Jacksonville, Florida 32202

(904) 356-9661

COUNSEL FOR PETITIONERS

August 8, 2001

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

En Banc Opinion of the Eleventh Circuit

Court of Appeals, dated

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En Banc Opinion of the Eleventh Circuit

Court of Appeals, dated

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[PUBLISH]

FILED

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

MAY 11, 2001

THOMAS K. KAHN

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

NO. 98-2709

D.C. Docket No. 98-00460-CIV-J-10C

EMILY ADLER, individually; on behalf

of herself and all persons similarly situated,

SETH FINCK, individually; on behalf of

himself and all persons similarly situated, et al.,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

versus

DUVAL COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD,

DUVAL COUNTY PUBLIC SCHOOL DISTRICT,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 98-2720

la

D.C. Docket No. 98-00460-CIV-J-IOC

EMILY ADLER, individually; on behalf of

herself and all persons similarly situated,

SETH FINCK, individually; on behalf of

himself and all persons similarly situated, et al.,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

versus

SUSAN BOLES, as parent & next friend of

Rebecca Boles, a minor child and on behalf

of all public school students within the Duval

County Public School District, .

Movants-Appellants.

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

(May 11, 2001)

Before ANDERSON, Chief Judge, TJIOFLAT,

EDMONDSON, BIRCH, DUBINA, CARNES, BARKETT,

HULL, MARCUS, WILSON, KRAVITCH and COX",

Circuit Judges.**

MARCUS, Circuit Judge:

*Circuit Judges Kravitch and Cox elected to participate in

this decision, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 46(c).

**Circuit Judge Susan H. Black did not participate in this

decision.

2a

On March 15, 2000, this Court ruled that Duval

County's facially-neutral policy permitting high school

seniors to vote upon the delivery by a student of a message

entirely of that student's choosing as part of graduation

ceremonies did not violate the Establishment Clause. Adler

v. Duval County Sch, Bd., 206 F.3d 1070 (11th Cir.) (en

banc), pet. for cert. granted and judgment vacated, 121 S. Ct.

31 (2000). Plaintiffs thereafter petitioned the Supreme Court

for certiorari. Meanwhile, on June 19, 2000, the Supreme

Court rendered its decision in Santa Fe Independent School

District v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 120 S.Ct. 2266 (2000),which

invalidated a Texas school board's policy permitting

students to vote upon the delivery of a "statement or

invocation," subject to officials' approval, at each home high

school football game. On October 2, 2000, the Court vacated

our decision* and remanded it for further consideration in

light of Santa Fe. The case was returned to us on December

19, 2000, and we proceeded to rehear the case en banc.

Having carefully reviewed the Supreme Court's

opinion, and considered supplemental briefs from the

parties and amici, we conclude that Santa Fe does not alter

our previous en banc decision, and accordingly we reinstate

that decision and the judgment in favor of Duval County.

Nevertheless, we take this opportunity to explain why we

believe that Santa Fe does not alter the outcome of this case.

Simply pvt, after (as before) Santa Fe, it is impossible to say

that the Duval County policy on its face violates the

Establishment Clause without effectively banning all

religious speech at school graduations, no matter how

3a

private the message or how divorced the content of the

message may be from any state review, let alone censorship.

Santa Fe does not go that far, and we are not prepared to

take such a step.

—_

At the outset, it is helpful to summarize briefly the facts

and analysis of our prior en banc opinion. The Duval

County policy provides in relevant part:

a 8 The use of a brief opening and/or

closing message, not to exceed two minutes, at

high school graduation exercises shall rest within

the discretion of the graduating senior class;

y The opening and/or closing

message shall be given by a student volunteer, in

the graduating senior class, chosen by the

graduating senior class as a whole;

a If the graduating senior class

chooses to use an opening and/or closing message,

the content of that message shall be prepared by

the student volunteer and shall not be monitored

or otherwise reviewed by Duval County School

Board, its officers or employees;

4a

The purpose of these guidelines is to allow

students to direct their own graduation message

without monitorin g or review by school officials."

206 F.3d at 1072 (emphasis added). We defined the issue

then before us as “whether the Duval County school

system's policy of permitting a graduating student, elected

by her class, to deliver an unrestricted message of her choice

at the beginning and/or closing of graduation ceremonies is

facially violative of the Establishment Clause." Id. at 1073.

Analyzing this policy under the Supreme Court's opinions

in Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) and Lemon v.

Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), we concluded that the policy

did not violate the Establishment Clause on its face.

Although we offered multiple reasons for that decision,

our Lee analysis turned on several key facts. First, we

emphasized that under Duval County's policy school

officials have no power to direct that a message (let alone a

religious message) be delivered at graduation ceremonies,

or control in any way the content of any message actually to

be delivered. As we explained:

"We expressly declined to consider at that time any as-applied

objection to the policy's constitutionality. 206 F.3d at 1073 n.4 (“We do not

address any potential ‘as-applied’ claims raised below by Appellants.’).

Accordingly, we did not consider Appellants’ objections regarding the

policy's alleged application after 1993. Nothing in Santa Fe in any way

affects that decision or supports consideration of Appellants’ as-applied

challenges now.

5a

[U]nder the Duval County graduation

policy ... neither the School Board nor its principals

may ordain, direct, establish, or endorse a religious

prayer or message of any kind. Indeed, by the very

terms of the policy, a religious message may not

even be offered at graduation. The Duval County

policy explicitly divorces school officials from the

decision-making process as to whether any

message -- be it religious or not -- may be delivered

at graduation at all. Moreover, decisional control

over the most crucial elements 0@ - tie graduation

policy rests with the students and not the state....

Under the policy, the School Board and its agents

have no control over who will draft the message (if

there be any message at all) or what its content

may be. The School Board also does not suggest in

any way, let alone require, that the graduating

class consider religious or any other criteria in

deciding whether to have a student message or in

selecting a particular student speaker. And most

notably, if the graduating class chooses to have a

message, the content of the message shall be

prepared by the student speaker alone and no one

else. The Duval County School Board is expressly

prohibited by the very terms of its policy from

influencing or editing the message in any way.

[The] decision [as to content] rests solely with the

elected student speaker - with neither the senior

class nor the school exercising any sort of editorial

oversight. Therefore, on the face of the policy itself,

the students unambiguously understand that any

student message is utterly divorced from any state

sponsorship.

206 F.3d at 1076.

6a

Second, we rejected the argument that the state's role in

providing a vehicle for a graduation message by itself

transformed the student's private speech into state-

sponsored speech. We accepted the assumption that the

school board "exerted overwhelming control over the

graduation ceremony," but stressed that the board "did not

have control over the elements which are most crucial in the

Establishment Clause calculus: the selection of the

messenger, the content of the message, or most basically,

the decision whether or not there would be a message in the

first place." Id. at 1080.

We likewise rejected the argument that Duval County's

policy would have the impermissible effect of coercing

unwilling listeners to participate in a state sponsored

religious exercise. As we explained:

[N]either the Duval County schools nor the

graduating senior classes even decide if a religious

prayer or message will be delivered, let alone

"require" or "coerce" the student audience to

participate in any privately-crafted message.

While schools may make private religious speech

their own by endorsing it, schools do not endorse

all speech that they do not censor. We cannot

assume ... that Duval County seniors will interpret

the school's failure to censor a private student

message for religious content as an endorsement of

that message -— particularly where the students are

expressly informed as part of the election process

7a

Te

that they may select a speaker who alone will craft

any message.... No religious result is preordained.

Id. at 1084.

-

Citing these and other facts, we found as well that the

policy met all three prongs of the Lemon test. We

concluded that the policy had a secular purpose, including

"affording graduating students an opportunity to direct

their own graduation ceremony," and "permitting student

freedom of expression." Id. at 1085. We also noted that the

text of the policy did not reveal a religious purpose, and

that the limited pieces of background evidence highlighted

for the contention that the policy's secular purpose was a

sham could not "strip the policy of [its] secular purpose. No

matter what an individual board member may have hoped -

- and they said nothing on the record about codifying this

policy -- Duval County's policy is facially neutral and

undeniably evinces a secular purpose." Id. at 1089. We

closed our prior en banc opinion by defining our holding

narrowly, stating that Duval County's policy of "permitting

graduating students to decide through a vote whether to

have an unrestricted student graduation message at the

beginning and/or closing of graduation ceremonies does

not facially violate the Establishment Clause." Id. at 1091

(emphasis added).

II.

Three months after we issued our prior en banc

opinion, the Supreme Court decided Santa Fe. By a 6-3

8a

vote, the Court found that a school district policy permitting

students to vote upon the delivery by a student of a

‘statement or invocation" prior to high school football

games violated the Establishment Clause. Because the facts

of Santa Fe are fundamentally different in many crucial

respects from the facts of this case, they are worth

presenting in some detail.

For a period of time leading up to and including the

1992-93 and 1993-94 school years, the Santa Fe school

district allowed students to read overtly Christian prayers

from the stage at graduation ceremonies and over the public

address system at home football games. The prayers were

characterized as "invocations" or "benedictions" for these

events, and typically were given by officers of the student

council. Similar prayers were recited by the student council

"chaplain" prior to the start of football games.

In 1994, responding to the Supreme Court's decision in

Lee. the district drafted a written policy that prohibited

clerics from delivering invocations or benedictions at

graduation ceremonies, but otherwise did not prohibit

prayer at school functions. After graduation ceremonies

that year, the district amended its written policy to say that

a school "may permit the graduating senior class(es), with

the advice and counsel of the senior class sponsor, to elect to

choose student volunteers to deliver nonsectarian, non-

proselytizing invocations and benedictions for the purpose

of solemnizing their graduation ceremonies." The same

policy was adopted for football games.

9a

In April 1995, several students and parents filed suit in

federal court, in part to prevent the district from violating

the Establishment Clause at imminent graduation exercises.

In their complaint the plaintiffs alleged that the district

engaged in other proselytizing practices, such as promoting

attendance at a Baptist revival meeting, encouraging

membership in religious clubs, chastising children who held

minority religious beliefs, and distributing Gideon Bibles on

school premises. Santa Fe, 120 S. Ct. at 2271-72.

In response to a court order, Santa Fe again revised its

policies dealing with prayer at school functions. Policies

enacted in May and July 1995 for graduation ceremonies

provided the format for the District's August 1995 policy

regarding high school football games. That August policy

authorized two student elections, the first to determine

whether an "invocation" should be delivered, and the

second to select the spokesperson to deliver it. On August

31, 1995, according to the parties' stipulation, "the district's

high school students voted to determine whether a student

would deliver prayer at varsity football games .... The

students chose to allow a student to say a prayer at football

games." A week later, in a separate election, they selected a

student ... to deliver the prayer at varsity football games."

Id. at 2273 (emphasis added).

Subsequently, in October 1995, the school district

slightly modified the August policy. The October version of

the policy was (in the Supreme Court's words) "essentially

the same as the August policy, though it omits the word

10a

Baits toon 2

Prayer' from its title, and refers to 'messages' and

‘statements' as well as 'invocations."" Id. The October policy

provided in relevant part:

The board has chosen to permit students to

deliver a brief invocation and/or message to be

delivered during the pre-game ceremonies of home

varsity football games to solemnize the event, to

promote good sportsmanship and student safety,

and to establish the appropriate environment for

the competition.

Upon advice and direction of the high

school principal, each spring, the high school

student council shall conduct an election, by the

high school student body, by secret ballot, to

determine whether such a statement or invocation

will be a part of the pre-game ceremonies and if so,

shall elect a student from a list of student

volunteers, to deliver the statement or invocation.

The student volunteer who is selected by his or her

classmates may decide what message and/or

invocation to deliver, consistent with the goals and

purposes of this policy.

1205S. Ct. at 2273 n.6.

After the Fifth Circuit held that both the August and

October policies violated the Establishment Clause, the

Supreme Court granted the District's petition for certiorari,

lla

limited to the following question: "Whether petitioner's

policy permitting student-led, student-initiated prayer at

football games violates the Establishment Clause." Id. at

2275 (emphasis added). The Court did not propose to

address, and did not address in its ensuing opinion, the

district's graduation policies.

A majority of the Court found that the October policy

violated the Establishment Clause. The Court analyzed the

policy under the principle of Lee that “government may not

coerce anyone to support or participate in religion or its

exercise, or otherwise act in a way which establishes a

[state] religion. . . . "" 120 S. Ct. at 2275 (quoting Lee, 505 U.S.

at 587). Initially, the Court determined that messages

delivered by students pursuant to the policy would

constitute state-sponsored speech rather than private

speech. The Court offered essentially four reasons for that

finding: (1) the student's speech would be authorized by a

government policy that explicitly and implicitly encouraged

one particular kind of message, see 120 S. Ct. at 2275, 2279;

(2) it would take place on school property at a school event,

see id. at 2275, 2278; (3) the government had broad power to

regulate the content of the student's speech, see id. at 2276-

77; and (4) the electoral system would yield only a single

speaker and would completely prevent dissenting

viewpoints from being heard, see id. at 2276-77.

Having found that student speech under the policy

was, and would be perceived as, state-sponsored, the Court

then found that the religious content of the “statement or

12a

invocation” permitted by the Santa Fe policy was

impermissibly coercive. The Court explained that "[t]he

electoral mechanism, when considered in light of the

history in which the policy in question evolved, reflects a

device the District put in place that determines whether

religious messages will be delivered at home football

games." Id. at 2280. The Court also reasoned that, even

though the case was brought as a facial challenge, it was

appropriate as part of the facial inquiry to consider the

purpose of the policy. Id. at 2282 (citing Lemon). The Court

stressed that "the text of the October policy alone reveals

that it has an unconstitutional purpose," and added that the

events leading up to the enactment of the October policy

further conveyed the school board's purpose to ensure a

place for prayer in school functions. Id. For these reasons,

the Court concluded that the Santa Fe's football game policy

was unconstitutional.

III.

In Santa Fe itself the Supreme Court reiterated just

how case-specific Establishment Clause analysis must be

under its precedent. As the Court explained:

Whether a government activity violates the

Establishment Clause is "in large part a legal

question to be answered on the basis of judicial

interpretation of social facts .... Every

government practice must be judged in its

t

unique circumstances....

13a

ee ees ee

120 S. Ct. at 2282 (citation omitted). We spoke similarly in

our prior en banc opinion:

Establishment Clause jurisprudence calls

for the difficult task of separating a student's

private message, which may be religious in

character, from a state-sponsored religious

message, protecting the former and prohibiting the

latter. This determination is of "necessity one of

line-drawing," see Lee, 505 U.S. at 598, "sometimes

quite fine, based on the particular facts of each

case," Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the

Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 847 (1995) (O'Connor, J.,

concurring). Indeed, our courts have recognized

that "at graduation time and throughout the course

of the education process, there will be instances

when religious values, religious practices, and

religious persons will have some interaction with

the public schools and their students." See Lee, 505

U.S. at 598-99.

206 F.3d at 1074 (citations omitted).

The Court in Santa Fe did not attempt to sweep with a

broad brush; rather, it found based on the facts then before

it that Santa Fe's policy allowing students to elect a speaker

to give a "statement or invocation" of plainly religious bent,

at every single home football game, subject to content

review by school officials and potential state censorship of

non- or anti-religious messages, violated the Establishment

Clause. The facts of this case are fundamentally different,

14a

and in our view require exactly the same result today as

they did at the time of our prior opinion.

A.

Critical to the Supreme Court's conclusion was its

finding that the speech delivered by students pursuant to

the Santa Fe policy was state-sponsored rather than private.

In reaching that conclusion, the Court relied in substantial

part on two facts: (1) the speech was "subject to particular

regulations that confine the content and topic of the

student's message," Santa Fe, 120 S. Ct. at 2276; and (2) the

policy, "by its terms, invites and encourages religious

messages,’ id. at 2277 (emphasis added). Those two

dispositive facts are not present here, and that makes all the

difference.

First, the Duval County policy does not contain any

restriction on the identity of the student speaker or the

content of the message that might be delivered. Indeed,

school officials are affirmatively forbidden from reviewing

the content of the message, and are expressly denied the

opportunity to censor any non-religious or otherwise

disfavored views:

"If the graduating senior class chooses to use an

opening and/or closing message, the content of

that message shall be prepared by the student

volunteer and shall not be monitored or otherwise

reviewed by Duval County School Board, its

officers or employees. [] The purpose of these

15a

guidelines is to allow students to direct their own

graduation message without monitoring or review

by school officials.”

206 F.3d at 1072 (quoting policy) (emphasis added). This is

in sharp contrast to the Sante Fe policy, under which any

message was subject to content regulation by the state. The

Santa Fe policy dictated that the process of selecting a

speaker and delivering the message was subject to the ...

advice and direction of the high school principal." 120 S. Ct.

at 2273 n.6. As part of that process, school officials were

effectively authorized to review the message itself to ensure

that it was ... “consistent with the goals and purpose of

th[e] policy.’” Id. The policy therefore created virtually no

check on school officials' power to regulate the proposed

student message, giving almost unfettered discretion to

state officials acting under the guise of determining that the

message would be "appropriate."' Id.

The ability to regulate the content of speech is a

hallmark of state involvement, and the Supreme Court

returned repeatedly to that theme in Santa Fe. The Court

highlighted that "[t]he statement or invocation ... is subject

to particular regulations that confine the content and topic

of the student's message." Id. at 2276. The Court observed

that "Santa Fe’s student election system ensures that only

those messages deemed ‘appropriate’ under the District's

policy may be delivered." Id.; see also id. at 2279. And the

Court expressly characterized the Santa Fe policy as "not a

content-neutral regulation" because of its "content

l6a

restrictions." Id. at 2282; see also id. at 2277 (emphasizing

that "the policy mandates that the 'statement or invocation’

be 'consistent with the goals and purposes of this policy"

and that accordingly "the District has failed to divorce itself

from the religious content of the invocations"). The ability

of the state to regulate the content of the students' message

was a critical factor in the Court's reasoning, and is

indisputably not present in this case. Under the Duval

County policy, if the senior class elects to have a message,

the student elected to give that message is totally free and

autonomous to say whatever he or she desires, without

review or censorship by agents of the state or, for that

matter, the student body. No reasonable person attending a

graduation could view that wholly unregulated message as

one imposed by the state.

Second, unlike Santa Fe's policy, the Duval County

policy does not "by its terms, invite[] and encourage[]

religious messages." 120 S. Ct. at 2277. On the contrary, the

policy is entirely neutral regarding whether a message is to

be given, and if a message is to be given, the content of that

message. Although the Supreme Court did not limit its

analysis to the text of the Santa Fe policy, it placed heavy

emphasis on the text's express and unambiguous preference

for the delivery of religious messages.

The policy itself states that the purpose of the

message is "to solemnize the event." A religious

message is the most obvious method of

solemnizing an event. Moreover, the requirements

17a

that the message "promote good citizenship" and

"establish the appropriate environment for

competition" further narrow the types of message

deemed appropriate, suggesting that a solemn, yet

nonreligious, message, such as commentary on

United States foreign policy, would be prohibited.

Indeed, the only type of message that is expressly

endorsed in the text is an "invocation" -- a term that

primarily describes an appeal for divine assistance.

In fact, as used in the past at Santa Fe High School,

an "invocation" has always entailed a focused

religious message. Thus, the expressed purposes of

the policy encourage the selection of a religious

message.

Id. The fact that the text of the Santa Fe policy expressed a

clear preference for religious messages was a key factor in

the Court's determination that student speech delivered

pursuant to that policy would be viewed as state-sponsored.

Id. at 2278-79; compare also id. at 281 ("[N]Jothing in the

Constitution ... prohibits any public school student from

praying .... But the religious liberty protected by the

Constitution is abridged when the State affirmatively

sponsors the particular religious practice of prayer.")

(emphasis added). In this case, the text setting forth the

Duval County policy contains no language approving an

"invocation" and no other provision that could fairly be read

to require or approve a "religious" theme.

18a

an

These important facts demonstrate why Santa Fe is

distinguishable from this case, and more particularly why

the speech at issue here -- unlike the speech contemplated

by the Santa Fe policy -- cannot reasonably be described as

state-sponsored. These key facts also help illustrate why the

speech permitted by Duval County cannot reasonably be

described as state "coercion" of religion.

The linchpin of the Court's analysis on this issue was its

finding that Santa Fe's policy "subject[ed] the issue of prayer

to a majoritarian vote." 120 S. Ct. at 2281; see also id. at 2283

("Simply by establishing this school-related procedure,

which entrusts the inherently nongovernmental subject of

religion to a majoritarian vote, a constitutional violation has

occurred."). In essence, the Court found that the policy, by

specifically permitting students to vote upon an

"invocation" and authorizing school officials to ensure that

any message proposed by the chosen student was

"appropriate," made it virtually impossible for the election

to be anything other than a referendum on conducting

prayer. Indispensible to this analysis was the school

district's unambiguous concession that the vote authorized

by. the policy was indeed a vote up-or-down on prayer:

The Chief Justice contends that we have

“misconstrue[d] the nature ... [of] the policy as

being an election on 'prayer' and 'religion.” We

therefore reiterate that the District has stipulated to

the facts that the most recent election was held "to

determine whether a student would deliver prayer

19a

at varsity football games," that the "students chose

to allow a student to say a prayer at football

games," and that a second election was then held

"to determine which student would deliver the

prayer.”

120 S. Ct. at 2283 n.24 (citations omitted). There has been no

such critical concession in this case, and it cannot plausibly

be argued that, on its face, the Duval County policy calls for

a student vote on whether to mandate the inclusion of

prayer in a graduation ceremony.

The Duval County policy, unlike the Santa Fe policy,

does not subject the issue of prayer to an up-or-down vote;

students do not vote on whether prayer, or its equivalent,

should be included in graduation ceremonies. Rather,

students vote on two questions that do not expressly or

inherently concern prayer: (1) whether to permit a student

"message" during the ceremony, and (2) if so, which student

is to deliver the message. Santa Fe does not remotely state

or suggest that the term "message" connotes prayer, nor

could it plausibly give so narrow a meaning to so broad a

term. Instead, the Court repeatedly focused on the Santa Fe

policy's use of the additional term "invocation," and drew

from that term and the school district's concessions the

conclusion that Santa Fe's policy mandated a vote on

prayer. See id. at 2277. Similarly, there is no suggestion in

Santa Fe that the terms "opening" and "closing" as used in

Duval County's policy connote prayer. Indeed, those terms

did not even appear in Santa Fe's policy. Simply put,

20a

"[w]hatever majoritarian pressures are attendant to a

student-led prayer pursuant to a direct student plebiscite

on prayer are not facially presented by the Duval County

policy." 206 F.3d at 11083 (emphasis added).

Although it is possible that under Duval County's

policy the student body may select a speaker who then

chooses on his or her own to deliver a religious message,

that result is not preordained, and more to the point would

not reflect a “majority” vote to impose religion on unwilling

listeners. Rather, it would reflect the uncensored and

wholly unreviewable decision of a single student speaker.

It cannot seriously be argued that Duval County's policy

ensures that persons with minority" views will never

prevail in the student electoral process, whether we define

“minority" in this context as persons opposed to the delivery

of student-selected speech at graduation, persons opposed

to the delivery of religious messages generally, or persons

opposed to the delivery of a religious message that does not

coincide with their chosen faith. In fact, the limited record

before us proves just the opposite; in seven of the 17

instances reflected in the record, students voted for no

message at all or for a student speaker who subsequently

delivered an entirely secular message. 206 F.3d at 1083-84.

Yet in Santa Fe, the Court rested its holding in large part on

the assumption that "the majoritarian process implemented

by the district guarantees, by definition, that minority

2la

candidates will never prevail and that their views will be

effectively silenced." 120 S. Ct. at 2276 (emphasis added).

For all of these reasons, the private speech delivered by

a student pursuant to the Duval County policy does not

become state-sponsored as a matter of law simply by virtue

of the logic of Santa Fe.

Santa Fe also does not alter the analysis under the

three-part test of Lemon. Santa Fe only addresses one part

of the Lemon test: whether the policy at issue has a secular

purpose. 1205S. Ct. at 2282-83. The Court's treatment of this

*In his dissent, Judge Carnes asserts that "[t]he majority of the

senior class selects and endorses the message because the majority selects

the messenger." Infra at 44. But we think Judge Carnes's core assumption --

that the student speaker is nothing more than a puppet to give voice to the

student body majority's demands for prayer -- is deeply flawed. To begin

with, it ignores the express language of the policy, which does not allow

(indeed, forbids) any regulation of the content of the speech. Under Duval

County's policy, the student is free to give whatever message he chooses,

regardless of whether that message comports with the views on religion,

school prayer, or any other subject held by the majority that elected him.

Ignoring the language of the policy is particularly dangerous where, as here,

we are considering only a facial chalienge, in which the primary focus by

definition must be the text. Judge Carnes's reasoning also takes no account

of students’ ability -- and willingness -- to exercise the free and untrammeled

speech authorized by the policy. Graduating seniors are squarely on notice,

from the very language of the policy, that any speaker they may choose will

have complete autonomy over the message he eventually delivers at

graduation. Students recognize this fact when voting in favor of a message,

and the speaker himself recognizes that fact in choosing what kind of

message to deliver. The notion that "the content of the message is censored

in advance through the majority selection process," infra at 47, is as

pessimistic about the exercise of First Amendment freedoms as it is hostile

to the text of the policy.

issue, however, underscores the differences between the

Santa Fe policy and this policy. As discussed above, the text

setting forth the Duval County policy does not evince a

religious purpose. The text of the Santa Fe policy

unambiguously did precisely that, a fact upon which the

Court placed great emphasis. Id. at 2282 ("the text of the ...

policy alone reveals that it had an unconstitutional

purpose").

The Supreme Court's additional discussion of

circumstances surrounding enactment of the Santa Fe policy

is not inconsistent with our prior en banc opinion. We did

not decline to explore the background to the Duval County

policy. On the contrary, we did so at considerable length,

concluding that "whether standing alone or in concert, the

evidence marshaled by the Appellants to allege that the

policy's secular purpose was a sham "cannot strip the policy

of a secular purpose." 206 F.3d at 1089; see generally id. at

1086-89. More to the point, we found specifically that the

limited record before us did not permit us "to fairly infer the

motivation of those who promulgated or distributed the

policy." Id. at 1086. Obviously, nothing in Santa Fe resolves

that inescapable threshold problem.’

*Much of Judge Kravitch's dissent is devoted not to considering

Santa Fe, but rather to disputing this Court's conclusion in its prior en banc

opinion that the Duval County policy has a secular purpose. As we have

emphasized, nothing in Santa Fe in any way affects our earlier findings on

that issue, which were based on the unique record of this case. Of the

dissent's remaining objections, only two points need be noted separately.

First, contrary to the dissent's suggestion, our prior opinion did not turn on

an assumption that the school district created a public forum at graduation.

23a

Moreover, the circumstances at issue in Santa Fe were

vastly different in several important respects. Among other

distinctions, the final version of the Santa Fe policy was

found to be nothing more than the product of repeated

efforts by the school district to inject prayer and other

religious activities into school events even after Lee. v.

Weisman. See 120 S. Ct. at 2272-73; see also id. at 2279

(describing Santa Fe's policy as nothing more than a direct

"evolution ... from the long-sanctioned office of 'Student

Chaplain"). In addition, in Santa Fe, school officials stated

unabashedly that the policy was designed to permit a

student vote for prayer at graduation. Quite simply, Santa

Fe does not undermine our finding that Duval County's

policy, on this record in this facial challenge, has a secular

purpose.

B.

For the reasons we have discussed, the facts of Santa Fe

are not so similar to the facts of this case as to require us to

alter our prior decision. On the contrary, the differences

We simply observed in passing that "[i]n one sense" such an analogy could

be drawn. 206 F.3d at 1077. Second, contrary to the dissent's suggestion, we

plainly did not reject the Appellants' facial challenge because it was

premature. Instead, we expressly rejected that challenge on the merits. See

id. at 1090-91. Finally, we observe that the dissent does not answer our

discussion of the two critical distinctions between this case and Santa Fe (the

absence here of content regulation and a policy that by its ten-ns invites

religious messages). Aithough we certainly agree that those facts were not

the only ones considered by the Court in Santa Fe, they were absolutely

essential to the Court's decision, and simply are not present in this case.

24a

nee ee ee

between this case and Santa Fe are substantial and material.

The only basis for us to alter our prior decision, therefore,

would be if the Supreme Court had promulgated new rules

of law that we failed to apply in our prior decision. The

Court did no such thing, however. The analysis in Santa Fe

proceeded under the very same framework of Lee and

Lemon that we applied in our prior decision.

The Supreme Court did not rule that an election process

itself is always incompatible with the Establishment Clause.

Nor did it rule that a student elected to speak to the student

body is necessarily a state-sponsored speaker. Rather, the

Court stressed that it was not invalidating all student

elections, but merely concluding on the facts before it "that

the resulting religious message under this policy would be

attributable to the school, not just the student." Id. at 2283

Bo

Second, the Court did not rule that, simply because the

speech at issue is "authorized by a government policy and

*'The Court did remark that "student elections that determine, by

majority vote, which expressive activities shall receive or not receive school

benefits are constitutionally problematic." 120 S. Ct. at 2276 (citing Board of

Regents of Univ. of Wis. Svs.. v. Southworth, 120 S. Ct. 1346 (2000)). As

noted above, however, the Duval County policy does not mandate a student

election to determine by majority vote whether school facilities should be

used to disseminate a religious message at graduation. The "expressive

activities" as to which students vote -- whether to permit a student to deliver

a message (totally unreviewable and uncensored by the state) at graduation,

and who if anyone may deliver the message of his or her choosing -- are

neutral.

25a

took place on government property at a government-

sponsored, school-related event" it always constitutes state-

sponsored speech. On the contrary, the Court expressly

acknowledged that "not every message delivered under

such circumstances is the government's own." Santa Fe, 120

S. Ct. at 2275. What turns private speech into state speech in

this context is, above all, the additional element of state

control over the content of the message. Id. at 2275-76. But

it is the element of potential censorship, and the attendant

risk recognized by Santa Fe that non-religious messages (or

messages hostile to religion) will be suppressed, that is

conspicuously absent from the record of this case. Notably,

in our prior en banc opinion, we explained how affording

students the opportunity to vote on whether or not to have

a message that would be entirely of the student's choosing

bore no more the imprimatur of the state than the process of

selecting a homecoming queen. 206 F.3d at 1082. Presented

with a similar "prom queen" argument by the dissenters in

Santa Fe, the Court gave as its only distinction “[t]he fact

that the District's policy provides for the election of the

speaker only after the majority has voted on her message....”

120 S. Ct. at 2276 n. 15. That distinction plainly does not

exist in this case.

Third, our prior en banc opinion fully considered the

purpose of the Duval County policy. Accordingly, the

opinion is consistent with the Supreme Court's observation

that "[o]ur Establishment Clause cases involving facial

challenges ... have not focused solely on the possible

applications of the statute, but rather have considered

26a

whether the statute has an unconstitutional purpose." Id. at

2281.°

Finally, our conclusion that the purpose of Duval

County's policy is secular did not turn entirely or even

largely on our finding that one of the purposes of the policy

is to "allow students to solemnize graduation." 206 F.3d at

1085. As noted above, we identified three genuine secular

purposes driving the policy; permitting solemnization of

this seminal education experience is only one of those

purposes. In any event, the Court's own words demonstrate

*'In our prior en banc opinion we observed that "[a] facial challenge

to be successful 'must establish that no set of circumstances exists under

which the Act would be valid." 206 F.3d at 1083-84 (quoting United States

v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987)). We did not decide the appeal on that

basis, however, and made that observation in connection with explaining

why one of Appellants' arguments ona subject other than the purpose of the

statute was more suited to an as-applied challenge. 206 F.3d at 1083

("Appellants also assume that allowing the senior class to vote whether to

have a graduation ‘message’ unrestricted in content and to select an

autonomous student speaker will have the effect of coercing any chosen

speaker into placating the majority's religious sensibilities by offering a

sectarian message of which the majority approves. This argument is highly

remote and speculative [and also] would be far better suited to anas-applied

challenge . . . ."). Moreover, the Court did not hold that government action

violates the Establishment Clause simply by virtue of the fact that it has a

non-secular purpose along with one or more secular purposes. On the

contrary, the Court reiterated that under the Lemon standard, a court must

invalidate a statute only if it lacks ... a secular legislative purpose. "1205S.

Ct. at 2282 (quoting Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612) (emphasis added). The Court

viewed the Santa Fe policy as having a single, wholly religious purpose and

no secular purpose. See, e.g., 120S. Ct. at 2282. By contrast, in this case the

plaintiffs did not establish — and we did not find -- a sectarian purpose.

Rather, we have found, after painstaking review of the entire record, that the

policy had genuinely secular purposes.

27a

that it was not purporting to declare that the desire to ae

solemnize so important and isolated an educational event as

a graduation ceremony is never a secular purpose. On the

contrary, the Court merely said that "regardless of whether

one considers a sporting event an appropriate occasion for

solemnity, the use of an invocation to foster such solemnity

is impermissible wh¢n, in actuality, it constitutes prayer

sponsored by the school." 120 S. Ct. at 2279. As discussed

above, the Duval County policy does not call for an

"invocation," and does not on its face sponsor prayer.

The issue before us today is extremely narrow: whether

in light of Santa Fe we should alter our prior en banc

decision in this case. We conclude that the answer is no.

Indeed, by its reasoning Santa Fe reinforces the crucial point

that "[t]he total absence of state involvement in deciding

whether there will be a graduation message, who will

speak, or what the speaker may say combined with the

student speaker's complete autonomy over the content of

the message [means] that the message delivered, be it

secular or sectarian or both, is not state-sponsored." 206 F.3d

at 1071.

The Court in Santa Fe had every opportunity to declare

that all religious expression permitted at a public school

graduation ceremony violates the Establishment Clause; it

did not do so. We could not invalidate Duval County's

policy, on its face, without taking the very step the Court

declined to take. Santa Fe does not alter our prior en banc

decision, nor does it erase the critical facts -- the complete

28a

—_—— er

absence in the text of code words such as "invocation"

unequivocally connoting religion, the policy's outright

prohibition on state content review of non -or -anti-religious

messages, the lack of any evidence (let alone stipulation as

in Santa Fe) that students must vote up-or-down on prayer,

and the sparseness of the record, to name a few -- that

underlay our opinion. Accordingly, we reinstate our

original en banc decision and judgment in favor of the

County.°

OPINION AND JUDGMENT REINSTATED.

*The Movants-’Intervenors’ “ motion to clarify intervention status”

is denied.

29a

KRAVITCH, Circuit Judge, dissenting, in which

ANDERSON, Chief Judge, CARNES and BARKETT, Circuit

Judges, join:

When the Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case

and vacated this Court's en banc decision, it directed us to

address the single issue whether the Duval County policy

on graduation messages survives Establishment Clause

scrutiny in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Santa Fe

Indep . Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000). See Adler v.

Duval County Sch. Bd., 121 S. Ct. 31 (2000). As a lower

court, we are bound to follow rulings of the Supreme Court;

thus our sole task today is to reevaluate the Duval policy in

accordance with the legal principles enumerated in Santa

Fe. A review of the Santa Fe decision and the record in this

case convinces me that the Duval County policy is facially

unconstitutional. Therefore, I respectfully dissent from the

majority opinion reinstating this court's prior en banc

decision.

In Santa Fe, the Supreme Court held that a school

district policy permitting the student body to select by

majority vote a student to deliver a “statement or

invocation” prior to high school football games facially

violates the Establishment Clause. 530 U.S. at 317. It further

decided several corollary issues pertinent to our analysis

here. First, the Court noted that the school district did not

create a public forum by allowing a single student to deliver

a statement or invocation prior to football games. Id. at 303

(stating that “selective access does not transform

30a

government property into a public forum”) (quoting Perry

Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n. 460 U.S. 37, 47

(1983)). This conclusion belies the assertion in this Court's

prior en banc opinion that "[iJn one sense, the [Duval]

policy can be analogized to a line of open forum cases in

which the Supreme Court has held that neutral secular

policies that merely accommodate religion or individual

free exercise rights do not amount to an unconstitutional

state endorsement of religion." See Adler v. Duval County

Sch. Bd., 206 F.3d 1070, 1077 (11" Cir. 2000) (en banc).

Second, the Court in Santa Fe flatly rejected the school

district's argument that a facial challenge to the validity of

the District's policy is premature until a student actually

delivers a solemnizing message under the policy. See 530

U.S. at 313-14 (explaining that even if a student never

delivers a prayer pursuant to the District's policy, a

constitutional violation occurs by "the mere passage ... of a

policy that has the purpose and perception of governmental

establishment of religion"). The Supreme Court's decision

on this issue negates the proposition in this court's prior en

banc opinion that because the Duval policy does not by its

terms guarantee that a prayer will be delivered at every

graduation, a facial challenge to the policy is premature.

See Adler, 206 F.3d at 1083-84. Despite the majority's

position, the Supreme Court makes clear in Santa Fe that

facial Establishment Clause challenges must not focus

"solely on the possible applications of the statute, but rather

[on] whether the statute has an unconstitutional purpose.”

Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 314 (emphasis added). This Court's

3la

nN ge a ee ee

prior en banc opinion states that "[a] facial challenge to be

successful 'must establish that no set of circumstances exists

under which the Act would be valid." Adler, 206 F.3d at

1083-84 (emphasis in original; citation omitted). What the

opinion overlooks is that, under Santa Fe, if the Duval

policy has an unconstitutional purpose, then there is no set

of circumstances under which the policy would be valid,

notwithstanding that some of the graduation messages

delivered pursuant to the policy might be totally devoid of

religious content. See 530 U.S. at 314.

Finally, the Santa Fe Court explicitly determined that

the election mechanism in the District's policy did not

render the policy immune to constitutional scrutiny. See

530 U.S. at 304-05 ("[S]tudent elections that determine, by

majority vote, which expressive activities shall receive or

not receive school benefits are constitutionally

problematic... ‘[F]}undamental rights may not be submitted

to vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections."

(citation omitted). The Supreme Court's decision on this

issue renders untenable the majority's position that the

Duval policy survives constitutional scrutiny because the

school board "did not have control over the elements which

are most crucial in the Establishment Clause calculus: the

selection of the messenger, the content of the message, or

most basically, the decision whether or not there would be a

message in the first place." Adler, 206 F.3d at 1080. The

majority's reasoning ignores the fact that Duval's

"majoritarian election might ensure that most of the students

are represented, [but] does nothing to protect the minority."

32a

CO

See Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 305. Indeed, the very mechanism

that the majority of this Court claims removes any

impermissible coercion from the Duval policy serves to

silence students espousing minority views, and forces them

to participate in a state-sponsored exercise in which the

message is determined by students holding majority views.

The First Amendment does not permit such coercion. See

id. at 317 ("Simply by establishing this school-related

procedure, which entrusts the inherently nongovernmental

subject of religion to a majority vote, a constitutional

violation has occurred.").

Although the policy at issue in Santa Fe and the Duval

policy are not identical, their few distinctions are without

significant differences, such that the Supreme Court's

opinion in Santa Fe compels the conclusion that the Duval

policy also facially violates the Establishment Clause. A

minor distinction between the Santa Fe policy and the

Duval policy is that the Santa Fe policy dealt with football

games, whereas the Duval policy deals with graduation.

This distinction is insignificant because the Supreme Court

in Santa Fe implied that graduation prayers are more

offensive to the Establishment Clause than are football

game prayers because "we may assume that ... the informal

pressure to attend an athletic event is not as strong as a

senior's desire to attend her own graduation ceremony." Id.

at 311. A second distinction is that the Santa Fe policy

allowed students to vote whether to have a "statement or

invocation," whereas the Duval policy allows students to

vote whether to have a "message." This too is a distinction

33a

— —i—s

—

without a difference. Although a "message" is a more

general type of address than an "invocation," the mere use

of the less specific word "message" in its text will not shield

Duval County's policy from Establishment Clause scrutiny,

because such scrutiny must include an examination of the

policy's purpose, history, and the context in which it was

adopted to determine whether the policy has a permissible

secular purpose or an impermissible religious one. See id.

at 308 ("When a governmental entity professes a secular

purpose for an arguably religious policy, it is nonetheless

the duty of the courts to 'distinguis[h] a sham purpose from

a sincere one.’”) (citation omitted). "It is therefore proper, as

part of this facial challenge, for us to examine the purpose of

the [Duval] policy.... We [must] refuse to turn a blind eye to

the context in which this policy arose, and that context

quells any doubt that this policy was implemented with the

purpose of endorsing school prayer." Id. at 314-15.

The majority, by extracting the core policy from the

remaining text of the memorandum promulgating the

policy (the "Policy Memo"), ignores the mandate of the

"The Policy Memo was entitled "GRADUATION PRAYERS" and

stated:

"You will recall that after the 1992 Supreme court case of Lee v. Weisman

[sic], you received a memorandum from me instructing that because of the

decision, we would no longer be able to have prayers at graduation

ceremonies. Most of you have recently been bombarded with information,

as have I, regarding whether or not student initiated and led prayers are

acceptable based upon a recent Fifth Circuit opinion. The purpose of this

memorandum is to give you some guidelines on this issue if the graduating

students at your school desire to have some type of brief opening and/or

34a

Supreme Court that an evaluation of the purpose of a policy

like Santa Fe's or Duval's is not complete without an

examination of the context in which the policy was enacted.

See id. at 308 ("The text and history of this policy, moreover,

reinforce [the] objective student's perception that ... prayer

is, in actuality, encouraged by the school."). By considering

only the terms of the policy itself, the majority fails to

address contextual evidence that evinces an impermissible

religious purpose.

closing message by a student.

This area of the law is far from clear at this time, and we have been

threatened by lawsuits from both sides on the issue depending on what

action we take. The key to the Lee v. Wiseman [sic] decision was that the

prayer given at that graduation ceremony was directed and initiated by the

school system, which made it unconstitutional, rather than by permissive

student choice and initiative. With that premise in mind, the following

guidelines may be of some assistance:

1. The use of a brief opening and/or closing message, not to exceed two

minutes, at high school graduation exercises shall rest within the discretion

of the graduating senior class;

2. The opening and/or closing message shall be given by a student

volunteer, in the graduating senior class, chosen by the graduating senior

class as a whole;

3. If the graduating senior class chooses to use an opening and/or closing

message, the content of that message shall be prepare d by the student

volunteer and shall not be monitored or otherwise reviewed by Duval

County School Board [sic], its officers or employees;

The purpose of these guidelines is to allow students to direct their own

graduation message without monitoring or review by school officials."

cin 35a

First, the Policy Memo is entitled "GRADUATION

PRAYERS," Although a statute's title cannot limit or extend

the statute's plain meaning, tities are "tools available for the

resolution of a doubt." Brotherhood of R. R. Trainmen v.

Baltimore & 0. R. Co., 331 U.S. 519, 529 (1947). Here, we are

charged with resolving the issue whether the purpose of a

school policy allowing student messages" at graduation is to

endorse prayer at graduation. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403

U.S. 602, 612 (stating that in order to survive Establishment ie:

Clause scrutiny, a challenged provision must inter alia.

"have a secular legislative purpose"). It is proper, therefore,

for us to look to the Policy Memo's title in order to resolve

any doubts we may have that the policy has a secular

purpose. A policy with the word "prayer" in its title is more

likely to have a religious purpose than a policy not similarly

styled.

policy is intended as an "end run" around the law against

state-sponsored graduation prayers set forth in Lee v.

Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992). The Policy Memo begins by

stating that after Lee, the policy's author circulated a memo

instructing that "we would no longer be able to have

prayers at graduation ceremonies." The Policy Memo then

presents the new issue "whether or not student initiated and

|

Second, the text of the Policy Memo indicates that the

Interestingly, the policy that the Supreme Court struck

down in Santa Fe did not contain the word "prayer," although

earlier versions of the Santa Fe policy were entitled "Prayer at

Football Games."

36a

”

¥

x

of

»

led prayers are acceptable" (second emphasis added), and

states that "[t]he purpose of this memorandum is to give

you some guidelines on this issue . . ." (emphasis added).

The words "on this issue" can only mean prayer. This

preamble to the Duval policy thus makes clear that the

policy's purpose is to create a vehicle for the delivery of

student-initiated-as contrasted with school-initiated-prayers

at graduation. Indeed, the second paragraph of the policy's

preamble states that the "key" to the Lee decision "was that

the prayer given at that graduation ceremony was directed

and initiated by the school system, which made it

unconstitutional, rather than by .permissive student choice

and initiative" (emphasis added). The Policy Memo then 36

sets forth the Duval policy "with that premise in mind,"

which indicates that the policy's purpose is to endorse

student-initiated rather than school-initiated prayers at

graduation, not merely to allow students to deliver a

generic message.

The Duval policy's purpose of endorsing student-

initiated prayer at graduation is evidenced further by the

discussion among school board members during the

meeting in which the board rejected a proposal to institute a

“moment of silent meditation" at graduation in lieu of the

policy allowing student "messages." The transcript of that

meeting, which contains seventeen instances of the words

“prayer,” “pray,” or “prayed,” conveys the context in which

the Duval policy implicitly was adopted, and shows that the

board adopted the policy in an effort to make prayer a part

37a

of graduation.’ Finally, the very terms of the Duval policy

belie any purpose other than that of increasing the

probability that graduation ceremonies will include prayer:

the student "messages" are to be delivered at the beginning

or end of the ceremony (a time typically reserved for

prayers), and are to be no longer than two minutes (a

duration consistent with a prayer).

Because the record reflects that the purpose of the

Duval policy is to endorse prayer at graduation ceremonies,

and because the scheme allowing the student majority to

decide whether to include prayer does not cure the problem

of the policy's impermissible, religious purpose, in my view

the Duval policy fails to comply with the Supreme Court's

directive in Santa Fe and thus facially violates the

Establishment Clause. The majority attempts to escape this

conclusion by emphasizing the fact that under the Santa Fe

policy, the student election was to be conducted "[u]pon the

advice and direction of the high school principal," and the

student speaker's message was required to be "consistent

with the goals and purposes of this policy," whereas the

Duval policy placed no restrictions on the election, and

stated that the student's message "shall not be monitored or

otherwise reviewed by Duval County School Board, its

officers or employees." These distinctions do not save the

For example, one board member remarked that ‘in good

conscience I cannot vote [in favor of] silent meditation when we all know

that in the past someone has prayed out loud to thank the Lord......

“

38a

Duval policy, however, because it was enacted for the

impermissible purpose of increasing the probability that a

prayer will be delivered at graduation, and because the

majoritarian procedure for selecting a speaker ensures that

minority viewpoints will be silenced, and that those

possessing such viewpoints will be forced to participate in

the majority's "message." The majority opinion concludes

that there is no Establishment Clause violation in this case

because, according to the majority, the Santa Fe Court relied

mainly on two facts, which are not present here, in reaching

its result: "(1) the speech [in Santa Fe] was ‘subject to

particular regulations that confine the content and topic of

the student's message,’ and (2) the policy, ‘by its terms,

invites and encourages religious messages."’ (citations

omitted). It was not solely the existence of two facts,

however, but rather a contextual analysis of the District's

entire policy, including its history and purpose, that

persuaded the Santa Fe Court that the policy impermissibly

coerced students to participate in a religious exercise chosen

by the majority of the graduating class.

Finally, the majority opinion makes the overbroad

assertion that "it is impossible to say that the Duval County

policy on its face violates the Establishment Clause without

effectively banning all religious speech at school

graduations, no matter how private the message or how

divorced the content of the message may be from any state

review." This simply is not true. The Supreme Court

emphasized in Santa Fe that "nothing in the Constitution as

interpreted by this Court prohibits any public school

39a

vy bse

ao ee ee a re aeKe

student from voluntarily praying at any time." 530 U.S. at

313; see also Adler, 206 F.3d at 1106 n.32 (Kravitch, J.,

dissenting) ("Nothing in this dissent suggests that all

religious expression at a public high school graduation

would run afoul of the Establishment Clause.... Audience

members could pray quietly in their seats., and students

could organize a prayer service immediately before or after

the graduation ceremony."). Prayer at graduation does not

by itself violate the First Amendment. If, however, "the

‘degree of school involvement! makes it clear that the

[graduation] prayers bear 'the imprint of the state," then a

constitutional violation has occurred. See Santa Fe, 530 U.S.

at 305 (quoting Lee, 505 U.S. at 590). A policy aimed at

encouraging the delivery of a majority-selected prayer via

the school's public address system at a "regularly scheduled,

school-sponsored function conducted on school property,”

530 U.S. at 307, does not merely facilitate the free exercise of

religion; it promotes the establishment of the majority's

religion,’ and thus violates the Constitution. Therefore,

respectfully | dissent.

‘4Because at graduation the majority-elected student delivers her

message at a preordained point in a program planned by school officials

who determine the piace, time, attire, and all other aspects of the ceremony,

“members of the listening audience must perceive the [student's] message

as a public expression of the views of the majority of the student body

delivered with the approval ofthe schoo! administrations See Santa Fe, 530

US. at 308. = _—

40a

CARNES, Circuit Judge, dissenting, in which ANDERSON,

Chief Judge, and BARKETT, Circuit Judge, join:

I join Judge Kravitch's dissenting opinion in its entirety

and write separately to add a few points of my own.

When this case was last before us, I joined the majority

opinion in large part because it reasoned, | thought

correctly, that "[a] facial challenge to be successful ‘must

establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the

Act would be valid," Adler v. Duval County School Bd., 206

F.3d 1070,1083 - 84 (I 11, Cir. 2000) (en banc) (quoting

United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745, 107 S.Ct. 2095

(1987), and I was not convinced that had been established

insofar as the Duval County policy is concerned. But the

Supreme Court has now unequivocally held that principle

of facial challenge law does not apply in the Establishment

Clause area. Santa Fe Indep. School Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S.

290, 313-17, 120 S.Ct. 2266, 2281-2283 (2000). Since that prop

has been knocked out from under our reasoning, and in

light of the additional guidance the Santa Fe decision has

given us, I am persuaded that the conclusion I reached

before is wrong. The Duval County "Graduation Prayers"

policy is facially unconstitutional under the Establishment

Clause.

In discussing what we should do with this case in light

of Santa Fe, the majority opinion approaches the matter as

though the question were whether Santa Fe requires us to

alter our prior en banc decision in this case. That approach

4la

is weighted too heavily in favor of inertia. The question is

less about what Santa Fe requires than it is about what the

Establishment Clause, read in light of Santa Fe, permits. We

are not bound in any respect by our prior, vacated decision,

but instead are free to revisit any and all issues addressed in

it. See Moore v. Zant, 885 F.2d 1497, 1501-03 (1989) (en

banc). For that reason, we ought to spend less time

comparing the factual and procedural details of the Santa Fe

case to this one and more time considering the lessons that

decision teaches.

One of those lessons is that a school board may not

delegate to the student body or some subgroup of it the

power to do by majority vote what the school board itself

may not do. Santa Fe, 530 USS. at 304-12, 120 S. Ct. at 2276-

80. We should apply that lesson to what we have

recognized as the "elements which are most crucial in the

Establishment Clause calculus." Adler 206 F.3d at 1080. We

agreed when this case was last before us that the "most

crucial" elements in our decision were "the selection of the

messenger, the content of the message, or most basically,

the decision whether or not there would be a message in the

first place." Id. It is undisputable that under the Duval

County policy, whether there is a message and the selection

of the messenger are decided by majority vote of the

students in the senior class. That means those two of the

three “most crucial” elements weigh against the

constitutionality of the policy, because a school board policy

may not authorize a student majority to do what the

Establishment Clause prohibits the board itself from doing.

42a

The other of what we termed the three “most crucial”

elements of the Establishment Clause calculus is the content

of the message. In our pre-Santa Fe decision, we took

refuge in what we repeatedly described as the “autonomy”

of the student-selected messenger, relying upon what we

characterized as her “complete autonomy” over the

message. See, e.g., Adler, 206 F.3d at 1071 (“the student

speaker’s complete autonomy over the content of the

message”); id. (“how autonerhous the speaker may be in

crafting her message”); id. at 1074 (it “does not violate the

Establishment Clause merely because an autonomous

student speaker may choose to deliver a religious

message”); id. at 1077 (“The graduation policy...allows an

autonomous elected speaker, selected by her class, to deliver

a religious or secular message on an equal basis.”); id. at

1079 (“and the student as complete autonomy over

content”). That supposed autonomy is also a crucial

premise of the reasoning in the present majority opinion.

And a faulty one.

Santa Fe makes clear what should have been apparent

all along: the messenger is not autonomous from the

majority who chooses her any more than a political figure is

autonomous from the majority who selects him. The

majority opinion attempts to deal with this truth by

characterizing the dissent as assuming that the popularly

elected representative of the student majority will be

"nothing more than a puppet to give voice to the student

body majority's demands for prayer." Majority Op. at 21 n.2.

I do not assume that any more than we assume that a

43a

popularly elected official, selected after a one-issue

campaign, will be no more than a puppet for the majority

which elects him. The messenger need not be puppetized in

order to serve the majority will. There will be among the

majority of students who desire prayer at graduation any

number of people who are more than happy to deliver the

prayer themselves, just as there are some politicians who

genuinely do believe in the same policies that they espouse

in order to get elected.

The majority of the senior class selects and endorses the

message because the majority selects the messenger. All the

majority has to do to ensure that a religious message is

delivered at graduation is select as its messenger one whom

it can rely upon to give such a message. There is no reason

at all to believe that will be difficult to do. The Supreme

Court in Santa Fe presumed that thére would be debate

before each of two elections authorized by the policy of the

school board in that case. See 530 U.S. at 310-11, 120 S.Ct. at

2279-80 ("The two student elections authorized by the

policy, coupled with the debates that presumably must

precede each, impermissibly invade that private sphere.").

And there is no reason not to presume the same in this case.

After all, that is how majority rule is typically exercised in a

democratic setting. Issues are discussed and debated, and

then a vote is taken to ascertain the will of the majority.

Unlike the majority opinion, id. at 21 n.2. I do not think it is

"pessimistic" to assume that election processes will result in

selection of a representative who can be relied upon to carry

out the will of the majority of those who vote. To the

44a

contrary, faith in the notion that the majority can and will

select representatives who will carry out its will is the

optimistic assumption behind democracy.

It would be naive to expect the debate over the first

question subjected to majority rule by the Duval County

policy not to include discussion about whether there should

be prayer. Prayer is what gave rise to the aptly named

"Graduation Prayers" policy. Prayer is what a majority of

people expect and usually want to hear at graduation. Once

the majority will is expressed in favor of a student-delivered

message, all the majority has to do to ensure that message

includes prayer is select someone who can be counted upon

to deliver a prayer. If there is any doubt about who will do

so, that doubt can be resolved in the usual way that

candidates' positions are identified in a democracy -

through campaigning and debate. Insofar as we can tell, the

policy seems to have worked as intended for the most part.

Approximately sixty percent of the times when the policy

has been applied, it has resulted in student-led prayer at

graduation. Sixty percent is not perfection, but it is close

enough for government work, and Duval County's

"Graduation Prayers" policy is government work.

Duval County's "Graduation Prayers" policy may serve

as a valuable teaching tool to show students how issues can

be decided by majority vote and how representatives can be

selected to carry out the will of the people. The problem is

that because of the First Amendment religious issues are not

supposed to be decided by vote of the people, and the

45a goon

nee

aula Soke eR al asia + ates ak hai BSR he de tS DST RS ie ON bi isthe tle

Peereeer were

majority should not be allowed to force its religious views

on those in the minority. Our Constitution ensures that

when it comes to religion, it is the conscience of the

individual rather than the will of the majority that rules.

The lesson the students are being taught under the Duval

County policy conflicts with the Establishment Clause.

The majority opinion concludes that no reasonable

person attending a graduation ceremony could view the

message the selected student delivers "as one imposed by

the state." Majority Op. at 16. I believe that a reasonable

person could view the message delivered by a student

messenger, who is selected by a majority of the senior class

to deliver the message, as one reflecting the views of the

majority. And where a governmental unit, such as a school

board, allows its power and authority to be wielded

according to the will of a majority of students, the resulting

message delivered on government property during a

government-controlled event is the message of government.

The government endorsement of the message comes not just

from the setting in which it is delivered but also from the

use of government-delegated power to select the messenger

and message. The identity of the messenger is controlled

and the content of the message is censored in advance

through the majority selection process.

Judge Kravitch's dissenting opinion ably demonstrates

that the purpose of Duval County's "Graduation Prayers"

policy is consistent with its name. In disputing that, the

majority opinion says the policy is not about prayer, but

46a

instead is about student messages in general and permitting

student participation in graduation ceremonies. Majority

Op. at 7. 1 disagree. The policy is not entitled “Student

Messages" or "Student Participation in Graduation," but

"Graduation Prayers." There is nothing about a general

student message or student participation that would cause

the school board to dictate that it come at the beginning or

end of the ceremony; that is, however, exactly when prayer

traditionally occurs in a ceremony. And the board's

mandate that the student "message" be no longer than two

minutes comports nicely with the length of a good, short

prayer. The memorandum that became the board's policy

refers repeatedly not to free speech or democratic

participation cases but to a school prayer decision. See

Adler, 206 F.3d at 1072.

The "Graduation Prayers" memorandum refers to the

board having "been threatened by lawsuits from both sides,"

id,, and those threatened lawsuits were not about whether

there would be student participation or a student message

in general, but about whether there would be prayer. Even

in our litigious society, no one sues about student

participation in graduation ceremonies, but people do sue

about whether prayer is allowed or prohibited at graduation

and other school-related events. In response to the threats

of lawsuits from both sides about whether there would be

prayer at graduation, the school board sought to pass the

buck to the senior class, thereby allowing the students, in

the policy's words, "to direct their own graduation message

without monitoring or review by school officials." Id. By

47a

majority vote, the students direct their own graduation

message by deciding whether there will be one and who

will deliver it. And in that way a majority of the senior class

determines whether its message will be prayer. The school

ae Lele et A te ll te gs

board policy not just permits but invites that determination

by the majority regardless of the views of the minority. As

interpreted in Santa Fe, the Establishment Clause forbids

| that type of exercise of majority power. Government is not

allowed to aid in the establishment of religion by giving

a majority of students a proxy to use government

power to do that which government itself may not do.

. a ee ee sae

[PUBLISH]

FILED

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

MAR 15, 2000

THOMAS K. KAHN

CLERK

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

98-2709

D. C. Docket No. 98-460-CIV-J-10C

EMILY ADLER, individually; on behalf

of herself and all persons similarly situated,

SETH FINCK, individually; on behalf of

himself and all persons similarly situated, et al.,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

versus

DUVAL COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD,

DUVAL COUNTY PUBLIC SCHOOL DISTRICT,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 98-2720

D.C. Docket No. 98-460-CIV-J-10C

EMILY ADLER, individually; on behalf

of herself and all persons similarly situated,

SETH FINCK, individually; on behalf of

himself and all persons similarly situated, et al.,

49a

i ' _ Plaintiffs-Appellees,

versus

SUSAN BOLES, as parent & next friend of

Rebecca Boles, a minor child and on behalf

of all public school students within the Duval

County Public School District,

Movants-Appellants.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

(March 15, 2000)

;

‘ Before ANDERSON, Chief Judge, TTOFLAT, EDMONDSON,

; COX, BIRCH, DUBINA, CARNES, BARKETI, HULL,

i MARCUS, WILSON, Circuit Judges,* and KRAVITCH, Senior

: Circuit Judge.**

q

i

MARCUS, Circuit Judge:

At issue today is whether the Duval County, Florida

school system's policy of permitting graduating students to

vote on whether to select a student to deliver a message

wholly of her own choosing at the beginning or closing of a

high school graduation ceremony violates the Establishment

Clause. Because the Duval County policy unambiguously

recognizes the "crucial difference between government

speech

———

*Judge Susan H. Black did not participate in this decision.

50a

Se.

**Senior U.S. Circuit Judge Phyllis A. Kravitch elected to

participate in this. decision pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 46(c).

endorsing religion, which the Establishment Clause forbids,

and private speech [] [that may contain a prayerful

message], which the Free Speech and Free Exercises Clauses

protect," Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 250, 1 10

S.Ct. 2356, 110 L.Ed.2d 191 (1990) (emphasis added), we find

the policy constitutional on its face and affirm the judgment

of the district court. The total absence of state involvement

in deciding whether there will be a graduation message,

who will speak, or what the speaker may say combined

with the student speaker's complete autonomy over the

content of the message convinces us that the message

delivered, be it secular or sectarian or both, is not state-

sponsored. To conclude otherwise would come perilously

close to announcing an absolute rule that would excise all

private religious expression from a public graduation

ceremony, no matter how neutral the process of selecting

the speaker may be, nor how autonomous the speaker may

be in crafting her message.

The facts of this case are straightforward,

uncontroverted, and laid out fully by the district court in

Adler v. Duval County Sch. Bd., 851 F. Supp. 446, 448 (M.D.

Fla. 1994) ("Adler I’). Invocations, benedictions, and other

religious prayers or messages were traditionally offered, by

clergy and others, at public high school commencement

ceremonies in the Duval County School District. In 1992,

5la

the Supreme Court in Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 112

S.Ct. 2649, 120 L.Ed.2d 467 (1992), held that a Providence,

Rhode Island high school principal, acting in accord with

school board policy, violated the Establishment Clause by

inviting a local clergyman to deliver a nonsectarian prayer

at graduation. In response to Lee, the Duval County

Superintendent, Larry Zenke, at the behest of Vicki R.

Reynolds, the school district's legal affairs officer, issued a

memorandum instructing all school officials in the Duval

County school system that no "prayer, benediction, or

invocation” should be offered at "any graduation

1

ceremonies.”

In the ensuing months, Superintendent Zenke received

a number of letters from students and members of the

community discussing the graduation policy. Some of these

letters suggested that student-initiated, student-led prayer

might be constitutional under Lee, and Zenke directed

Reynolds to further research the issue. Reynolds later

advised Zenke that it would be constitutional to allow

student-initiated, student-led prayer during the graduation

ceremony so long as the administration and faculty were

not involved in the decision-making process. Zenke then

authorized Reynolds to issue another memorandum (the

"Reynolds Memorandum"), dated May 5, 1993, to all area

'The memorandum, dated July 22, 1992, read,“ [t]his memorandum

is to remind you that due to the recent Supreme Court Ruling in Lee v.

Weisman, there should be no prayer, benediction, or invocation at any

graduation ceremonies.

52a

high school principals. The memorandum was entitled

"Graduation Prayers" and stated:

You will recall that after the 1992 Supreme court case

of Lee v. Wiseman [sic], you received a

memorandum from me instructing that because of

the decision, we would no longer be able to have

prayers at graduation ceremonies. Most of you have

recently been bombarded with information, as have

I, regarding whether or not student initiated and led

prayers are acceptable based upon a recent Fifth

Circuit opinion. The purpose of this memorandum

is to give you some guidelines on this issue if the

graduating students at your school desire to have

some type of brief opening and /or closing message

by a student.

This area of the law is far from clear at this time, and

we have been threatened by lawsuits from both sides

on the issue depending on what action we take. The

key to the Lee v. Wiseman [sic] decision was that the

prayer given at that graduation ceremony was

directed and initiated by the school system, which

made it unconstitutional, rather than by permissive.

student choice and initiative. With that premise in

mind, the following guidelines may be of some

assistance:

1. The use of a brief opening and/or closing

message, not to exceed two minutes, at high school

53a

graduation exercises shall rest within the discretion

of the graduating senior class;

2. The opening and/or closing message shall be

given by a student volunteer, in the graduating

senior class, chosen by the graduating senior class as

a whole;

ae If the graduating senior class chooses to use

an opening and/or closing message, the content of

that message shall be prepared by the student

volunteer and shall not be monitored or otherwise

reviewed by Duval County School Board [sic], its

officers or employees.

The purpose of these guidelines is to allow students

to direct their own graduation message without

monitoring or review by school officials.

This policy never was directly voted on or debated by the

School Board.

Instead, at a June 1, 1993 School Board meeting, a

motion was made to substitute a "moment of silence’ for any

student-initiated messages that might otherwise be given

pursuant to the graduation policy announced in the

Reynolds Memorandum. The motion failed by a vote of

four to three. As a result, the Reynolds Memorandum was

"left in force with the acquiescence or tacit approval of the

Board as its official policy governing the 1993

54a

——~™ |

commencement exercises." Adler I, 851 F.Supp. at 449. In

1993 under this policy, student speakers, at ten of seventeen

high school graduation ceremonies, delivered some form of

religious message. Notably, at the other seven graduations,

there were no student messages at all or the messages were

entirely secular in character. There is no tabulation in the

record of comparable statistics for subsequent graduations.

In June 1993, various Duval County public school

students sued the Duval County school system, alleging

that the policy embodied in the Reynolds Memorandum

constituted an establishment of religion and infringed on

their free exercise of religion. These students sought

equitable relief declaring the policy unconstitutional and

enjoining the Duval County School Board from permitting

prayers at high school graduation ceremonies as well as

money damages. The students also sought to certify their

action as a class action.” The district court denied the motion

to certify the class and granted summary judgment in favor

of the Duval County school system, holding that its policy

was constitutional. See Adler I, 851 F.Supp. at 451-56. The

students appealed, and a panel of this court found that

because the students had all graduated, their claims for

declaratory and injunctive relief were moot. See Adler v.

Duval County Sch. Bd., 112 F.3d 1475, 1477-78 (11" Cir.

2These original plaintiffs consisted of the following students: Leslie

Adler, Laura Jaffa, and Robin Zion. Doug Rand later joined the action.

Karen Adler and Robin Rand, the mothers of Leslie Adler and Doug Rand,

were named as plaintiffs to bring the claims of their minor children.

55a

1997) [hereinafter Adler II. The Adler II court also held that

the students waived their damages claims on appeal. See

Adler II, 112 F.3d at 1480-81. The Reynolds Memorandum

thus remained the operative high school graduation policy

for Duval County.

In May 1998, Appellants brought the instant action

against the Duval County school system, again alleging that

the policy embodied in the Reynolds Memorandum

constituted an establishment of religion and infringed on

their free exercise of religion. Appellants sought

preliminary and permanent injunctive relief against the

Duval County School Board to prevent it from permitting,

conducting, or sponsoring any religious exercises or prayer

and instruction within the Duval County Public School

District, including at School Board-sponsored graduation

ceremonies. Appellants also sought monetary damages and

class certification.’ The district court, at the hearing on

Appellants' motion for a preliminary injunction and with

the consent of the parties, consolidated the merits of

Appellants' claims with Appellants’ preliminary injunction

>A ppellants in the instant action include: Emily Adler, a June 1998

graduate of Mandarin High School; Seth Finck, a June 1998 graduate of

Stanton College Preparatory School; Stella Finck, mother of Duval County

public school students Rachel Finck, who was scheduled to graduate from

Stanton College Preparatory School in 1999, Aaron Finck, who was

scheduled to graduate from Stanton College Preparatory School in 2000, and

Benjamin Finck, a Duval County public school student; Roberta Nord,

mother of Duval County public school students Lucy Nord, age 9, and Tyler

Hurley, age 12; and Jonathon Rand, a June 1998 graduate of Stanton College

Preparatory School.

56a

motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(a)(2).

The district court then denied Appellants’ motion for

preliminary injunction and entered final judgment in favor

of the Duval County School Board.

Appellants filed a motion for expedited appeal and a

panel of this Court heard oral argument on November 16,

1998. The panel reversed the district court's judgment and

remanded for further proceedings. On June 2, 1999, we

vacated this opinion and granted rehearing en banc.

II.

The central issue presented is whether the Duval

County school system's policy of permitting a graduating -

student, elected by her class, to deliver an unrestricted

message of her choice at the beginning and/or closing of

graduation ceremonies is facially violative of the

Establishment Clause. *

4'We construe this appeal as the appeal of a final judgment strictly

pertaining to the facial constitutionality of the Duval County graduation

policy. We do not address any potential "as-applied" claims raised below

by Appellants. This result is driven by the procedural history of the case.

Initially, Appellants sought a preliminary injunction in addition to their

facial and as-applied claims on the merits. At the pretrial hearing on the

preliminary injunction, the district court indicated that it thought that

Appellant's claims on the merits should be consolidated with the

preliminary injunction motion because the claims were duplications of

earlier claims it had evaluated in Adler ]. The district court asked whether

any operative facts had changed and the parties stipulated that there had

been no substantive changes. As the district court explained:

57a

:

This is, for all practical purposes, the second time this

case has appeared before this court in 1994 a similar

group of Plaintiffs represented by the same counsel

sought the same injunctive relief with respect to high

school graduation or commencement ceremonies then

scheduled to be conducted in the spring of that year. |

decided at that time that the Plaintiffs’ constitutional

rights were not infringed. This action presents precisely

the same claims predicated upon the same constitutional

theories or contentions; and, at today’s hearing, counsel

stipulated that the operative facts remain unchanged.

The only factual difference is that a new series of

graduation ceremonies is scheduled for 1998. The present

case was filed for the purpose of relitigating the issue

upon the contention of Plaintiffs’ counsel that the law has

now evolved in their favor as manifested by [] [several]

intervening decisions...

See Adier v. Duval County Sch. Bd., No. 98 460-CIV-J-10C (M.D.Fia. May

27, 1998) (internal citation omitted) (emphasis added). The district court

then took judicial notice of its opinion in Adler Land consolidated the action

on the merits with Appellants’ motion for preliminary injunction. Finally,

the district court distinguished the intervening decisions cited by Appellants

and concluded:

[T]he proper decision in this case is dictated by the

decision | reached in Adler |, and that the application for

preliminary injunctive relief should be denied now as it

was then. Furthermore, as counsel agreed during today’s

hearing, there is no just reason in fact or law as to why

the action should not be advanced on the merits and

consolidated with the hearing of the instant application

so that final judgment may be entered and the

controversy may proceed to the Court of Appeals.

Id. (emphasis added). Both parties consented to the consolidation and

Appellants did not object to the effect this consolidation would have on their

as-applied claims. Because of the consolidation, discovery was truncated as

to the policy's application and effect for graduation ceremonies after 1993

and Appellants’ as-applied claims were never fully developed or litigated

below. Appellants’ consent to the district court's consolidation constituted

a knowing waiver of their as-applied claims, circumscribing the action and

58a

Close attention to the operative features of the Duval

County policy yields the conclusion that the policy is

constitutional on its face. Simply put, the selection of a

graduation student speaker by a secular criterion (not

controlled by the state) to deliver a message (not restricted

in content by the state) does not violate the Establishment

Clause merely because an autonomous student speaker may

choose to deliver a religious message. See Lee, 505 U.S. at

630 n.8, 112 S.Ct. 2649 (Souter, J., concurring) (observing that

"[i]f the State had chosen its graduation day speakers

according to wholly secular criteria, and if one of those

speakers (not a state actor) had individually chosen to

deliver a religious message, it would have been harder to

attribute an endorsement of religion to the State”) (citing

Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S.

481, 106 S.Ct. 748, L.Ed.2d 846 (1986)).

the district court's final judgment to the facial constitutionality of the

graduation policy. See Warehouse Groceries Management, Inc. v. SAV-U-

Warehouse Groceries, Inc., 624 F.2d 655, 657-58 (Sth Cir. 1980) (noting that

district court, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(a(2), may

properly consolidate the merits of a case with a preliminary injunction

hearing so long as parties are given adequate notice); Fenstermacher v.

Philadelphia Nat'l Bank 493 F.2d 333, 337 (3rd Cir. 1974) (noting that party's

failure to object to district court's consolidation of the merits with a

preliminary injunction hearing constituted a waiver of any defects stemming

from the consolidation because the party had "acquiesced in the procedure

followed in the district court’). We therefore restrict our review today to the

facial constitutionality of the graduation policy.

ple igen ints RN Re ENTAIL G 8 | BTA one

GP Ae AT a EAI STU

Establishment Clause jurisprudence calls for the

difficult task of separating a student's private message,

which may be religious in character, from a state sponsored

religious message, protecting the former and prohibiting the

latter. This determination is of "necessity one of line-

drawing," see Lee, 505 U.S. at 598, 112 S.Ct. 2649,

"sometimes quite fine, based on the particular facts of each

case," Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va.,

515 US. 819, 847, 115 S.Ct. 2510, 132 L.Ed.2d 700 (1995)

(O'Connor, J., concurring). Indeed, our courts have

recognized that "at graduation time and throughout the

course of the education process, there will be instances

when religious values, religious practices, and religious

persons will have some interaction with the public schools

and their students." See Lee , 505 U.S. at 598-99, 112 S.Ct.

2649 (citing Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 US. 226, 110

S.Ct. 2356, 110 L.Ed.2d 191 (1990)). But at the core of

Establishment Clause jurisprudence is the notion that the

state may not favor, endorse, or oppose the propagation of

religious doctrine by its citizens. In this case, the absence of

state involvement in each of the central decisions-whether a

graduation message will be delivered, who may speak, and

what the content of the speech may be—insulates the School

Board's policy from constitutional infirmity on its face.

We measure the facial constitutionality of the policy

against both the standards enunciated by the Supreme

Court in Lee, 505 U.S. 577, 112 S.Ct. 2649, the Court's only

occasion to directly examine the issue of school prayer at a

public high school graduation, and the more general

60a

Establishment Clause test articulated in Lemon v.

Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 91 S.Ct. 2105, 29 L.Ed.2d 745 (1971).°

A.

In Lee, the Supreme Court scrutinized the Providence,

Rhode Island public school system policy of permitting

middle and high school principals to invite clerics to offer

invocation and benediction prayers at formal high school |

graduation ceremonies. See Lee, 505 U.S. at 580, 112 S.Ct. |

2649. In particular, the Court considered the 1989

graduation at Nathan Bishop Middle School where the

principal invited a local rabbi to offer a religious invocation

and benediction at the school's graduation ceremony. The

principal also provided the rabbi with a pamphlet entitled

"Guidelines for Civic Occasions,” prepared by the National

While the Lemon test has drawn considerable criticism from both

Members of the Court and legal commentators, see, e.g., Board of Educ. v.

Grumet. 512 U.S. 687, 721,114 S.Ct. 2481,129 L-Ed.2d 546 (1994) (O'Connor,

J., concurring) (noting that "the slide away from Lemon's unitary approach

is well under way"); Kent Greenawalt, Quo Vadis: The Status and Prospects

of "Tests" Under the Religion Clauses, 1995 Sup.Ct. Rev. 323, 361 (1996)

(declaring that "now that Lemon lacks any defenders on the Court, other

judges would perform a shallow exercise were they to continue to apply its

terms. They should recognize that the Supreme Court has definitely

abandoned Lemon."), it is still binding precedent see Lamb's Chapel v.

Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 395 n.7,113 S.Ct. 2141,

124 L.Ed.2d 352 (1993) (stating that "we return to the reality that there is a

proper way to inter an established decision and Lemon, however

frightening it might be to some, has not been overruled"); see also Chabad-

Lubavitch of Georgia v. Miller, 5 F.3d 1383, 1388 (11th Cir. 1993) (en banc)

(explaining that "[a]lthough [the Lemon test] has been criticized severely, it

still controls our Establishment Clause inquiry"); Bown v. Gwinnett County

Sch. Dist., 112 F.3d 1464, 1468- 74 (11th Cir.1997) (applying Lemon)-

6la

_——————————— <<<

Conference of Christians and Jews, and advised the rabbi

that the prayer should be nonsectarian. See id. at 581, 112

S.Ct. 2649.

In declaring the school system policy unconstitutional

under the Establishment Clause, the Supreme Court pointed

at two "dominant facts" as marking the boundaries of its

decision: first, the Providence school officials ordained and

directed the performance of a religious exercise by deciding

to include prayer in the graduation ceremony, by selecting a

clergyman to deliver the prayer, and by providing the

clergyman with guidelines informing the content of the

prayer; and second, pressure was exerted on students to

attend graduation and conform with their peers by either

standing as a group or remaining in respectful silence

during the invocation and benediction. Id. at 586-88, 112

S.Ct. 2649. What the Supreme Court found striking and

troubling about Lee was that the government clearly

directed a formal religious exercise - -albeit in the form of a

nonsectarian prayer—under such circumstances as to oblige

the participation of many who objected. As Justice Kennedy

wrote for the majority:

These dominant facts mark and control the

confines of our decision: State officials direct the

performance of a formal religious exercise at

promotional and graduation ceremonies for

secondary schools. Even for those students who

object to the religious exercise, their attendance and

participation in the state-sponsored religious

62a

rai,

activity are in a fair and real sense obligatory,

though the school district does not require

attendance as a condition for receipt of the

diploma.

Id. at 586, 112 S.Ct. 2649. There can be little doubt, then, that

in Lee the Providence, Rhode Island school system ordained

and established a religious exercise at a graduation

ceremony, and that the graduation prayer delivered by a

rabbi was in every sense endorsed and supported by the

state.

In striking contrast, under the Duval County —

graduation policy, however, neither the School Board nor its

principals may ordain, direct, establish, or endorse a

religious prayer or message of any kind. Indeed, by the

very terms of the policy, a religious message may not even

be offered at graduation. The Duval County policy

explicitly divorces school officials from the decision-making

process as to whether any message-be it religious or not—

may be delivered at graduation at all. Moreover, decisional

control over the most crucial elements of the graduation

policy rests with the students and not the state. According

to the policy, school officials merely allow a graduating

class to decide by an election whether to have a "brief

opening and/or closing message" at graduation. If the class

votes to have a message, it elects a student volunteer to

deliver the message. That student is then free to deliver a

message "not monitored or otherwise reviewed" in any way

by the school. Under the policy, the School Board and its

63a

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agents have no control over who will draft the message (if

there be any message at all) or what its content may be. The

School Board also does noi suggest in any way, let alone

require, that the graduating class consider religious or any

other criteria in deciding whether to have a student message

or in selecting a particular student speaker. And most

notably, if the graduating class chooses to have a message,

the content of the message shall be prepared by the student

speaker alone an no one else. The Duval County School

Board is expressly prohibited by the very terms of its policy

from influencing or editing the message in any way.

These operational features distinguish the Duval

County policy from approximating even an arguably similar

level of state control to the graduation policy struck down in

Lee. Unlike the Providence policy in Lee , the Duval County

policy, in no way, authorizes a school to "direct the

performance of a formal religious exercise." Lee, 505 U.S. at

586, 112 S.Ct. 2649. And unlike a direct student plebiscite on

graduation prayer, not even the senior class exercises

control over the content of the graduation message. That

decision rests solely with the elected student speaker-- with

neither the senior class nor the school exercising any sort of

editorial oversight. Therefore, on the face of the policy

itself, the students unambiguously understand that any

student message is utterly divorced from any state

sponsorship.

Lee does not stand for the proposition that all religious

expression, even the private religious expression of an

64a

elected student speaker, must be excised from public high

school graduation ceremonies. Rather, Lee prohibits the

state from ordaining, directing, endorsing, or sponsoring a

religious message at such ceremonies but not from adopting

neutral secular policies which simply permit the possibility

of private religious expression. See id., 505 US. at 589, 112

S.Ct. 2649 (observing that "[t]he First Amendment's Religion

Clauses mean that religious beliefs and religious expression

are too precious to be either proscribed or prescribed by the

State"); id. at 604-05 (Blackmun, concurring) (explaining that

"[t]he Establishment Clause proscribes public schools from

‘conveying or attempting to convey a message that religion

or a particular religious belief is favored or preferred"’)

(quoting County of Alleghanv v. Greater Pittsburgh ACLU,

492 U.S. 573, 593, 109 S.Ct. 3086, 106 L.Ed.2d. 472 (1989)); see

also Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 231, 117 S.Ct. 1997, 138

L.Ed.2d 391 (1997) (noting that there is no advancement of

religion where "aid is allocated on the basis of neutral,

secular criteria that neither favor nor disfavor religion, and

is made available to both religious and secular beneficiaries

on a nondiscriminatory basis"); Rosenberger, 515 US. at 839,

115 S.Ct 2510 (stating that ([a] central lesson of our decisions

is that a significant factor in upholding governmental

programs in the face of Establishment Clause attack is their

neutrality towards religion"); Grumet, 512 U.S. at 696, 114

S.Ct. 2481 (declaring that "'fa] proper respect for both the

Free Exercise and the Establishment Clauses compels the

State to pursue a course of ‘neutrality’ toward religion"’)

(quoting Committee for Public Educ. & Religious Liberty v.

Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 792-93, 93 S.Ct. 2955, 31 L.Ed.2d 948

65a

=

(1973)); Chandler v. James, 180 F.3d 1254, 1258-59, (11th Cir.

1999) (noting that "ordinarily religious speech by private

parties cannot establish religion, even if it occurs in a public

institution, such as a school") (citation omitted).

The School Board's policy is perfectly consistent with

the theme of neutrality in Establishment Clause

jurisprudence. As Justice Souter explained in his

concurrence in Lee:

While the Establishment Clause's concept of

neutrality is not self-revealing, our recent cases

have invested it with specific content: the State may

not favor or endorse either religion generally over

nonreligion or one religion over others. This

principle against favoritism and endorsement has

become the foundation of Establishment Clause

jurisprudence, ensuring that religious belief is

irrelevant to every citizen's standing in the political

community....

Lee, 505 U.S. at 627, 112 S.Ct. 2649 (internal citations

omitted). No feature of the Duval County policy favors or

endorses religion. The graduation policy is simply content-

neutral, and allows an autonomous elected speaker, selected

by her class, to deliver a religious or secular message on an

equal basis.

In one sense, the policy can be analogized to a line of

open forum cases in which the Supreme Court has held that

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neutral secular policies that merely accommodate religion or

individual free exercise rights do not amount to an

unconstitutional state endorsement of religion.° First, in

Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 102 S.Ct. 269, 70 L.Ed.2d

440 (1981), the Court struck down a University of Missouri

regulation that denied "equal access" to school facilities for

religious groups as a violation of the Free Speech Clause.

Id. at 274-75, 102 S.Ct. 269. In so ruling, the Court explained

that an "open forum" policy, which permitted access to both

religious and secular student groups in a neutral manner,

did not offend the Establishment Clause because "an open

forum in a public university does not confer any imprimatur

of state approval on religious sects or practices" anymore

than such a policy "'committed [the University] to the goals

of the Students for a Democratic Society, the Young Socialist

Alliance,’ or any other group eligible to use its facilities." Id.

at 274, 102 S.Ct. 269 (citation omitted).

The Supreme Court extended this reasoning to public

secondary schools in Mergens. There, the Court upheld the

constitutionality of the Equal Access Act, 20 U.S.C. § 4071 et

seq., which explicitly codified the reasoning of Widmar by

prohibiting public secondary schools in receipt of federal

*'For purposes of our decision, we find it unnecessary to decide

whether the Duval County graduation policy creates a "designated public

forum” or a "nonpublic forum" as these terms have come to be defined by

our public forum caselaw. See Arkansas Educ. Tele. Comm’n v. Forbes,

523 US, 666,118 S.Ct. 1633,1641-43,140 L.Ed.2d 875 (1998). We rely on

public forum doctrine only in so far as it informs Establishment Clause

jurisprudence regarding principles of state endorsement and neutral

accommodation towards private religious speech.

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funds from denying student access to "limited open

forum{s]" on the basis of the religious content of their

speech. Mergens, 496 U.S. at 235, 110 S.Ct. 2356. The Court

elaborated a core tenet of its neutrality jurisprudence in the

process:

[T]here is a crucial difference between government

speech endorsing religion, which the Establishment

Clause forbids, and private speech endorsing

religion, which the Free Speech and Free Exercise

Clauses protect. We think that secondary school

students are mature enough and are likely to

understand that a school does not endorse or

support student speech that it merely permits on a

nondiscriminatory basis.... Although a school may

not itself lead or direct a religious club, a school

that permits a student-initiated and student-led

religious club to meet after school, just as it permits

any other student group to do, does not convey a

message of state approval or endorsement of the

particular religion.

Id. at 250-52, 110 S.Ct. 2356. In recent years, the Court has

reaffirmed this principle by finding that the inclusion of

private religious groups in "open forums" through neutral

selection principles does not violate the Establishment

Clause or constitute a state endorsement of religion. See

Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 US.

753, 763, 115 S.Ct. 2440, 132 L.Ed.2d 650 (1995) (plurality

opinion) (concluding that the allowance of a private

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a

religious display in an open public forum, selected by the

same application process and on the same terms as other

private displays, did not amount to state endorsement);

Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 832, 115 S.Ct. 2510 (holding that a

public university subsidy for a religious student

organization's publication costs, under a program that

funded other student organization publications through

neutral selection criteria, did not violate the Establishment

Clause); Lamb's Chapel,. 508 US. at 395, 113 S.Ct. 2141

(finding that a policy, which allowed private student

religious groups equal after-school access to school property

through neutral secular criteria, would not violate the

Establishment Clause).

These cases strongly suggest that a policy, like the

Duval County graduation policy, which provides an

opportunity for student-selected, student-initiated private

expression through a neutral selection criterion, does not

violate the Establishment Clause simply because the venue

is equally available for religious or secular expression.

Government neutrality towards religion is all that is

required by the Establishment Clause. And it is worth

emphasizing that while the state must be neutral and cannot

advance or endorse religion, similarly, it need not, indeed it

cannot, act in a hostile manner in the face of private

religious speech publically uttered. See Lee. 505 U.S. at 598,

112 S.Ct. 2649 (observing that "[a] relentless and all-

pervasive attempt to exclude religion from every aspect of

public life could itself become inconsistent with the

Constitution’) (citation omitted); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S.

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306, 314, 72 S.Ct. 679, 96 L.Ed. 954 (1952) (stating that “we

find no constitutional requirement which makes it necessary

for government to be hostile to religion and to throw its

weight against efforts to widen the effective scope of

religious influence").

In essence, this case is substantially like Doe v. Madison

Sch. Dist. No. 321, 147 F.3d 832 (9th Cir. 1998), vacated on

other grounds , 177 F.3d 789 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc)

(vacating for mootness because the student plaintiffs

already had graduated). In Doe, the Ninth Circuit examined

a graduation policy which mirrors Duval County's policy in

its neutrality. The Doe policy allowed for a minimum of

four student graduation speakers to be selected according to

their academic standing. If a student accepted the speaking

invitation, she could choose to deliver an "address, poem,

reading, song, musical presentation, prayer, or any other

pronouncement” -- the content, of which, she alone

controlled. Doe, 147 F.3d at 835. The Doe court upheld the

constitutionality of the policy against a facial challenge on

Establishment Clause grounds and distinguished Lee. It

explained that graduation speech does not bear the

imprimatur of the state when the speaker is a student, not a

cleric; the student speaker is selected on neutral and secular

criteria; and the student has complete autonomy over

content. Doe, 147 F.3d at 835-36.’

"The other federal circuit cases that have considered student-led,

student initiated prayer at graduation are of limited assistance. All of these

cases involve direct student plebiscites on graduation prayer. Of these

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cases, Jones v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 977 F.2d 963 (5th Cir. 1992), is

the only one which has permitted students to vote directly on whether to

have prayer at graduation. In Jones, the Fifth Circuit upheld the Clear

Creek, Texas school district's policy allowing graduating students to vote

whether student volunteers would deliver “nonsectarian and

nonproselytizing" invocations at graduation. The court found: that the Clear

Creek policy (1) reserved to the students the decision whether to have an

invocation, (2) precluded anyone buta student volunteer from delivering an

invocation, and (3) placed less psychological coercion on the student

audience than the prayers given in Lee because students were aware that

any prayers given represented the will of their peers. See id. at 970-71.

Both the Third and Ninth Circuits have come to an opposite

conclusion. In ACLU of New Jersev. Black Horse Pike Regional Bd. of

Educ., 84 F.3d 1471 (3d Cir. 1996) (en banc), the Third Circuit, sitting en

banc, held as unconstitutional a school board's policy that permitted the

senior class to vote on whether to include a prayer at high school graduation

ceremonies. See id. at 1477-88. The policy in Black Horse Pike allowed

senior Class officers to conduct a poll of the graduating class to determine,

by plurality vote, whether seniors wanted "prayer, a moment of reflection,

or nothing at all" to be included in their graduation ceremony. Id. at 1475

(citation omitted). In Harris v. Joint Sch. Dist. No. 241, 41 F.3d 447 (9th Cir.

1994), vacated as moot, 515 U.S. 1154, 115S.Ct. 2604, 132 L.Ed.2d 849 (1995),

high school students themselves, pursuant to a school district policy,

planned every aspect of their graduation, without interference from school

officials, and voted by written ballot on whether or not to have prayer. The

Harris court found that the state involvement in the case was pervasive

enough to offend Establishment Clause concerns, noting that "[t]he message

of the speakers is [] chosen by the majority; the relevant speakers are

instructed to pray." Id. at 456-57.

In contrast to each of these policies, Duval County students vote on

whether to have a message of unspecified content delivered by a student.

This is a meaningful distinction.

The Fifth Circuit recently revisited the issue of student-initiated

prayer in Doe v. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 168 F.3d 806 (5th Cir.), cert.

granted in part, 118S.Ct. 494 (1999). There, the Fifth Circuit examined what

it considered to bathe holding of Jones--"that student-selected, student-

given, nonsectarian, nonproselytizing invocations and benedictions at high

school graduation ceremonies" are constitutional—and concluded that the

7la

Appellants, however, advance two arguments for why

we should regard a student-selected graduation speaker,

who is selected through a wholly neutral process and who is

given complete autonomy over the content of her speech, as

a public, state-sponsored speaker. First, they contend that

by providing the platform and opportunity, the state has

created a sufficient link to the student speaker to convert the

student's private speech into public, state-sponsored speech.

Second, they suggest that the majoritarian process of

selecting the speaker shrouds the otherwise private speech

constitutionality of a student-selected, student led prayer policy depends on

its "nonsectarian and nonproselytizing” features. Id. at 816-19. The Santa.

Fe court also struck down a school policy which allowed student-led,

student-initiated prayer before high school football games. The Supreme

Court recently has granted certiorari in Santa Fe. However, the Court has

limited its review to whether student-led, student initiated prayer at football

games violates the Establishment Clause. The Court did not grant certioran

on the constitutionality of the Santa Fe graduation policy. Appellants cite

Santa Fe for the proposition that a policy which "permits’ sectarian and

proselytizing prayers, is facially unconstitutional. As discussed in greater

detail infra, this argument proves too much and is offensive to the

Constitution. The Duval County policy, of course, permits sectarian and

proselytizing prayers because it places no limitations, either secular or

sectarian, on the content of a graduation message. A policy of free

expression is far more consonant with the commands of the First

Amendment than is a policy of censorship. See, e.g., Mergens, 496 US. at

253 (stating that "a denial of equal access to religious speech might well

create greater entanglement problems in the form of invasive monitoring to

prevent religious speech at meetings at which such speech might occur’);

Santa Fe, 168 F.3d at 829-35 (Jolly, J., dissenting).

72a

argument-that by providing the platform, the speech

becomes public—-goes too far. The second argument—that

the speaker somehow gainers state authority by virtue of the

plebiscite-has no logical rationale.

First, we reject the notion that the religious content of

speech at a graduation ceremony is attributable to the school

merely because of the school's sponsorship of the event or

its control over the graduation's schedule, timing, decorum,

or sequence of events. The Supreme Court did not suggest

in Lee that school sponsorship of the graduation event,

standing alone, was sufficient to find the Providence policy

unconstitutional, or it would have banned all religious

expression at graduation. If Appellants were right on this

point, graduation speakers as diverse as athletes, politicians,

academics, entertainers, and maybe even judges would bear

the imprimatur of the state because they were handpicked

by the school (or, in our case, elected by the senior class) to

speak at an event over which the school has great control.

Schools then would have to prevent these speakers from

discussing a religious topic, engaging in prayer, OF

imploring the guidance of the Lord, to ensure no

Establishment Clause violation and protect themselves from

42 US.C. § 1983 liability should an audience member

perceive the school to be endorsing the speaker's religious

message. Indeed, the same logic would apply to a student

graduation speaker selected by other neutral criteria such as

academic achievement. But a graduation free of all religious

expression, compelled by the school's sponsorship of the

event is not required by the Establishment Clause.

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Even if we accept that the Duval County School Board

exerted overwhelming control over the graduation

ceremony in terms of the event's sequence, venue, dress,

and facilities, it is clear that it did not have control over the

elements which are most crucial in the Establishment Clause

calculus: the selection of the messenger, the content of the

message, or most basically, the decision whether or not

there would be a message in the first place. It is beyond

imagination to say that everyone on the platform at a high

school graduation ceremony, including a local politician or

celebrity, is a state speaker merely because the state has

provided the platform, onto which private individuals may

be invited to share their privately-held views. Such views

do not become the state's views merely by being uttered at a

state event on a state platform. Otherwise, each “open

forum’case in which the Supreme Court found that

granting religious groups access to generally available

public facilities or benefits through neutral selection criteria

was not an unconstitutional state endorsement of religion

would be wrongly decided. See Pinette. 515 U.S. at 762-70,

115 S.Ct. 2440; id. at 772-83, 115 S.Ct. 2440 (O' Connor, J.,

concurring in the judgment); id. at 783-94, 115 S.Ct. 2440

(Souter, J., concurring in the judgment); Rosenberger, 515

US. at 839-46, 115 S.Ct. 2510; Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at

395-97, 113 S.Ct. 2441; Mergens, 496 U.S. at 248-53, 110 S.Ct.

2356; Widrnar, 454 US. at 271-79, 102 S.Ct. 269. For by

Appellants’ logic, the mere provision of a state-controlled

forum or subsidy to private speakers automatically converts

private speech into government speech.

In addition, a per se rule that all speech on a state-

controlled platform is state speech, raises core free

expression concerns and would likely run afoul of the Free

Exercise and Free Speech clauses. See Chandler, 180 F.3d at

1261 (stating that "[b]ecause genuinely student-initiated

religious speech is private speech endorsing religion, it is

fully protected by both the Free Exercise and Free Speech

Clauses of the Constitution”’) (emphasis added). Even if we

were to construe a graduation ceremony as a "nonpublic

forum," Duval County students still would possess free

speech rights there. The Supreme Court has consistently

held that in nonpublic fora the government may not engage

in viewpoint discrimination. See Cornelius v. NAACP

., 473 US. 788, 806, 105

S.Ct 3439, 87 L.Ed.2d 567 (1985) (finding that "[cJontrol over

access to a nonpublic forum can be based on subject matter

and speaker identity so long as the distinctions drawn are

reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum and

are viewpoint neutral") (emphasis added); Perry Educ.

Assn. v. Perry Local Educators’ Assn., 460 US. 37, 46, 103

S.Ct. 948, 74 L.Ed.2d 794 (1983) (observing that "the state

may reserve [] [a nonpublic] forum for its intended

purposes, communicative or otherwise, as long as the

regulation on speech is reasonable and not an effort to

suppress expression merely because public officials oppose

the speaker's view"). The Court has also concluded that

religion is a viewpoint which, for First Amendment

purposes, may provide "a specific premise, a perspective, a

standpoint from which a variety of subjects may be

discussed and considered.” Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 831, 115

S.Ct. 2510.

Presumably, a student's religious perspective would

inform his views on a variety of subjects ordinarily dealt

with at graduation such as expressing gratitude to his

family or religious community, reflecting on the meaning of

his school experience, or defining his future goals. The

extremely personal and subjective nature of such views

helps to explain why the School Board policy yields private

rather than public speech. To unnecessarily classify student

speakers as government actors could render Duval County

students powerless to express religiously-inspired or

religiously-influenced opinions at graduation. It also would

effectively compel the Duval County School Board, if it

wants to have any speech on topics where religion might

motivate opinion or mould perspective, to engage in

viewpoint discrimination, "an egregious form of content

discrimination," Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829, 115 S.Ct. 2510,

in the name of secular purity.

The expression of religious beliefs, which are sacred to

some listeners, may be offensive to others. Appellants'

desire to insulate students and other attendants at

graduation from the offense that they may well experience

at hearing religious expression with which they strongly

disagree is altogether understandable. Graduation

ceremonies are designed to be joyous occasions for the

celebration of student achievement. But the Constitution

does not prohibit the exercise of offensive speech at

76a

anne

wed ET

graduation ceremonies, religious or otherwise; it only

prohibits state expressions of religion. While the School

Board is under no compulsion to provide an opportunity for

free expression by one or more students at a graduation *

ceremony, the Constitution certainly does not prohibit the

School Board from doing so. The occasional tolerance of

speech we may deem offensive is one price we pay for the

First Amendment and our democratic traditions.

Second, we reject the claim that allowing students to

vote for a graduation message and to select the student

speakers automatically places the imprint of the state on the

student speakers' privately-crafted messages. Appellants’

leap of logic, taking a selected student representative and,

without explanation, turning her into a state actor by virtue

of a democratic student vote, strains credulity. At most, a

student speaker selected by a class vote is a representative

of the student body, not an official of the state. She has no

power or authority or official capacity to inform, carry out,

or guide state policy. It is wholly unconvincing to argue

that the student becomes a state actor because she was

chosen by her peers, unless each high school student

individually is considered to be a state actor, or somehow

the students, acting in concert, come to be vested with the

power of the state.

Consider two examples. First, consider the case of the

selection of a Homecoming Queen. While she may be

selected by a vote, or plebiscite of the entire senior class, the

Homecoming Queen cannot be characterized as a state

77a

actor, or a representative of the state, merely because she

holds a "public" position and sits atop the Homecoming

float. Imagine, second, the example of replacing the

traditional valedictory address with the practice of affording

the students of the graduating class the opportunity to select

the graduation student speaker through a vote by the entire

class. In this hypothetical, the student speaker is selected,

not by the School Board on the basis of grades, but by the

students on the basis of student choice — be it popularity,

ability to entertain, achievement in athletics, or for some

other reason. Again, it strains reason and common sense to

suggest that, by virtue of her selection by the majority of the

senior high school class, the student speaker becomes a

mouthpiece of the state. Both examples suggest that the

senior class's act of voting does not, in any way, turn the

senior class vote into state action, nor turn the chosen

student into a state actor. Because Duval County policy

utilizes this same methodology, affording the students of

the senior class the opportunity to vote whether or not to

have a message and to select a student speaker, ina wholly

secular way, the graduation message vote is no more vested

with the imprimatur of the state than are the votes for

graduation class speaker or Homecoming Queen.

While the line between "what is ‘private’ action and

what is 'stateaction is not always easy to determine,"

Appellants have in no way proven that the students’ private

conduct has become so "entwined with government

policies” or so "impregnated with governmental character"

as to become subject to the constitutional limitations placed

78a

on state action. Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299, 86 S.Ct.

486, 15 L.Ed.2d 373 (1966) (citing Burton v. Wilmington

Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 81 S.Ct. 856, 6 L.Ed.2d 45

(1961)). All of the policy's central decisions - who speaks,

whether there will be a speaker, and what the content of the

speech may be — are uncontrolled by the state. Indeed, the

Duval County policy itself states that its purpose is "to allow

students to direct their own graduation message without

monitoring or review by school officials." The mere

delegation of decision-making to pick a speaker alone does

not place the state's imprint on a graduation prayer

delivered by an autonomous student speaker who is free to

give a message of unrestricted content.

In fact, the state's only involvement in the graduation

message is to provide students with the opportunity to vote,

to impose a time limit of two minutes, and to direct that the

message be delivered at the beginning and/or closing of the

ceremony. If the senior class were asked to vote whether to

have a student deliver a poem or sing a song at their

graduation exercise, under the same time and sequence

restraints of the Duval County graduation message policy,

that act still would involve the selection of a private,

autonomous speaker through a neutral criterion. The Duval

County policy does nothing more. It simply creates a

neutral mechanism whereby the students can elect to have

an unrestricted message and select a student speaker.

These facts do not establish that the state has so

insinuated itself into the decision so as to transform an

79a

elected student's private speech into an utterance of the

state. Where the student is chosen in a neutral and secular

way and where the student is allowed complete autonomy

over the message, the student's speech is her own.

B.

The other dominant fact of Lee - whether Duval

County students are coerced “to support or participate in

religion cr its exercise” by the School Board policy, 505 U.S.

at 587, 112 S.Ct. 2649--is largely determined by the measure

of state control over the message at a graduation ceremony,

rather than state control over the ceremony itself. We do

not quarrel with the Court's suggestion in Lee that students

feel compelled to attend graduation, see id. at 593-97, 112

S.Ct. 2649, and that schools "retain a high degree of control"

over graduation ceremonies, id. at 597, 112 S.Ct. 2649. But

these conclusions do not suffice to decide the issue of

coercion under these circumstances. The focus must be on

whether the state has endorsed the message in an

appreciable manner, which, when combined with the

inherent nature of the graduation ceremony, obliges

students to participate in a religious exercise. See Lee, 505

USS. at 594, 112 S.Ct. 2649 (explaining that "[t]he injury

caused by the government's action ... is that the State, in a

school setting, in effect required participation in a religious

exercise” ).

Here, neither the Duval County schools nor the

graduating senior classes even decide if a religious prayer or

80a

message will be delivered, let alone “require” or “coerce”

the student audience to participate in any privately-crafted

message. While schools may make private religious speech

their own by endorsing it, schools do not endorse all speech

that they do not censor. We cannot assume, as Appellants

do, that Duval County seniors will interpret the school's

failure to censor a private student message for religious

content as an endorsement of that message--particularly

where the students are expressly informed as part of the

election process that they may select a speaker who alone

will craft any message. While there may be pressures on

students to attend graduation and conform with their peers,

see Lee, 505 U.S. at 593-95, 112 S.Ct. 2649, the state's

complete control over a religious exercise, essential to Lee's

holding, see id. at 590, 112S.Ct 2649 (finding that "[t]he

degree of school involvement here made it clear that the

graduation prayers bore the imprint of the State . . ."); id. at

597, 112 S.Ct. 2649 (noting that "the state-imposed character

of an invocation and benediction by clergy selected by the

school combine to make the prayer a state-sanctioned

religious exercise . . ."), is conspicuously absent here.

Moreover, whatever majoritarian pressures are attendant to

a student-led prayer pursuant to a direct student plebiscite

on prayer are not facially presented by the Duval County

policy.

Appellants also assume that allowing the senior class

to vote whether to have a graduation “message”

unrestricted in content and to select an autonomous student

speaker will have the effect of coercing any chosen speaker

8la

into placating the majority's religious sensibilities by

offering a sectarian message of which the majority approves.

This argument is highly remote and speculative. Even the

scant record before us suggests an opposite conclusion.

While ten of the graduation messages delivered pursuant to

the policy involved some sort of religious content, the other

seven Duval County graduations either had no student

message or a wholly secular message. In the second place,

this argument would be far better suited to an as-applied

challenge, where the record has been properly developed,

rather than to a facial challenge. A facial challenge to be

successful "must establish that no set of circumstances exists

under which the Act would be valid." United States v.

Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745, 107 S.Ct 2095, 95 L.Ed.2d 697

(1987) (emphasis added). Appellants’ argument simply

ignores the plain text of the policy which only permits

graduating students to decide through a vote whether a

student volunteer shall give a message of her choice. No

religious result is preordained under the policy. On its face,

the policy is constitutional under Lee.

—_

I].

We reach the same conclusion when the graduation

policy is measured against the three-part Lemon test. Under

Lemon, we must evaluate whether: first, the policy has a

secular purpose; second, the policy has a primary effect that

neither advances nor inhibits religion; and finally, the policy

fosters an excessive government entanglement with religion.

See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13, 91 S.Ct. 2105.

82a

A.

We begin with the policy's purpose. Lemon requires

that a statute must have “a secular legislative purpose." 403

US. at 612, 91 S.Ct. 2105. A statute will only violate this

prong if it is "entirely motivated by a purpose to advance

religion." Wallace v. laffree, 472 U.S. 38, 56, 105 S.Ct. 2479,

86 L.Ed.2d 29 (1985); see also Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 US.

589, 602, 108 S.Ct. 2562, 101 L.Ed.2d 520 (1988) (stating that a

court "may invalidate a statute only if it is motivated wholly

by an impermissible purpose") (citations omitted); Lynch v.

Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 680, 104 S.Ct. 1355, 79 L-Ed.2d 604

(1984) (observing that “[t]he Court has invalidated

legislation or governmental action on the ground that a

secular purpose was lacking, but only when it has

concluded there was no question that the statute or activity

was motivated wholly by religious considerations"). A

statute may satisfy Lemon's first prong even if it is

"motivated in part by a religious purpose." Wallace, 472

US. at 56, 105 S.Ct. 2479.

Moreover, the Supreme Court has instructed us to be

"deferential to a State's articulation of a secular purpose,"

Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 US. 578, 586, 107 S.Ct. 2573, 96

L.Ed.2d 510 (1987), particularly where "a legislature

expresses a plausible secular purpose” for a policy or action,

Wallace, 472 U.S. at 74, 105 S.Ct. 2479 (O'Connor, 7

concurring in the judgment). We respect that purpose

unless it is insincere or a "sham," Edwards, 482 U.S. at 586-

87, 107 S.Ct. 2573; Bown, 112 F.3d at 1468, or the statute at

83a

al —— —

:

issue has a "preeminent purpose" which is "plainly religious

in nature," Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 4 1, 101 S.Ct. .192,

66 L.Ed.2d 199 (1980) (per curiam); see also Edwards, 482

U.S. at 591, 107 S.Ct. 2573; Wallace, 472 U.S. at 56-60, 105

S.Ct 2479. But the Supreme Court has been reluctant to

attribute an unconstitutional motive where a “plausible"

secular purpose may be discerned from the statute. Mueller

v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388,394-95 & n.4, 103 S.Ct. 3062, 77 L.Ed.2d

721 (1983).

Additionally, "[i]nquiry into legislative purpose begins

with interpreting the law itself " Church of Scientology v.

City of Clearwater, 2 F.3d 1514, 1527 (11th Cir. 1993). That

requires close attention be paid to the plain language of the

policy. For the most part, statutes which the Supreme Court

has invalidated for lack of secular purpose have openly

favored religion or demonstrated a religious purpose on

their face. See, e.g., Edwards, 482 U.S. at 593, 107 S.Ct. Vn Ke

(invalidating a Louisiana law that required creationism to

be discussed with evolution in public schools); Wallace, 472

USS. at 57-58, 105 S.Ct. 2479 (overturning an Alabama statute

that authorized a moment of silence because the state made

no attempt to justify the statute in terms of any secular

purpose); Stone, 449 U.S. at 41, 101 S.Ct. 192 (striking down

a Kentucky statute requiring the posting of the Ten

Commandments in public classrooms); Engel v. Vitale, 3 70

US. 421, 424, 82 S.Ct 1261, 8 L-Ed.2d 601 (1962) (holding

unconstitutional a New York law authorizing state-directed

daily classroom prayer in public schools).

In contrast, three secular purposes are plainly

encompassed by the Duval County policy. First, the Duval

County policy, by its very words, articulates a secular

purpose; namely, affording graduating students an

opportunity to direct their own graduation ceremony by

selecting a student speaker to express a message. By

choosing whether to have a graduation message, and if so,

the student speaker, the graduating class shares, at least in

part, in the civic responsibility of planning their graduation

ceremony. See jones, 977 F.2d at 966 (finding that " [a]

meaningful graduation ceremony can provide

encouragement to finish school and the inspiration and self-

assurance necessary to achieve after graduation, which are

secular objectives").

Second, the School Board policy allows students to

solemnize graduation as a seminal educational experience.

See Lynch, 465 US. at 693, 104 S.Ct. 1355 (O'Connor, J.,

concurring) (noting "the legitimate secular purposes of

solemnizing public occasions, expressing confidence in the

future, and encouraging the recognition of what is worthy

of appreciation in society"); see_also Chaudhuri v.

Tennessee, 130 F.3d 232, 236 (6th Cir.1997); Tanford v.

Brand, 104 F.3d 982, 986 (7th Cir. 1997); Jones, 977 F.2d at

966-67. This purpose is not drained of its secular character

merely because the policy invites consideration of meaning

and values in the context of a graduation ceremony. And it

would be very damaging to public education if the

Establishment Clause were to be seen as inhibiting any

85a

reflection by a student of transcendent meaning and value

in life, whether grounded in religion or not.

Finally, the School Board's policy also evinces an

important and long accepted secular interest in permitting

student freedom of expression, whether the content of the

expression takes a secular or religious form. See Pinette,

515 US. at 760, 115 S.Ct. 2440 (noting that “[oJur precedent

establishes that private religious speech, far from being a

First Amendment orphan, is as fully protected under the

Free Speech Clause as secular private expression” );

Mergens, 496 U.S. at 249, 110 S.Ct. 2356 (stating that

"prevent[ing] discrimination against religious and other

types of speech" has an "undeniably secular" purpose.); |

Americans United For Separation of Church and State v.

City of Grand Rapids, 980 F.2d 1538,1543 (6th Cir. 1992) (en

banc) (explaining that a "policy of treating religious speech

the same as all other speech certainly serves a secular

purpose").

Nevertheless, Appellants suggest that the policy has no

true secular purpose and they posit three arguments to

show that any avowed secular purpose is actually a "sham."

They claim first, that the School Board promulgated the

policy as a means to evade the strictures of Lee; second, that

the policy's solely sectarian purpose 1s established by the

title of the Reynolds Memorandum, "Graduation Prayer";

and finally, that comments made by some members of the

School Board, notably after the policy had been

86a

promulgated and distributed in Duval County, likewise

evince a wholly sectarian purpose.

Before examining Appellants’ specific claims, we first

note that Appellants, without any case authority, ignore the

plain text of the policy and its explicitly stated secular

purpose, as if there were none. Appellants would divine a

wholly sectarian purpose merely by looking at the

antecedent history, the title, and the post-enactment debate

surrounding the graduation policy. While it is appropriate

to consider both the "legislative history and the specific

sequence of events leading up to the adoption of the

statute," it is, "of course, necessary to examine the language

of the statute on its face." Bown, 112 F.3d at 1469 (citing

Edwards, 482 U.S. at 594, 107 S.Ct. at 2583; Church of

Scientology, 2 F.3d at 1527).

As for Appellants’ first claim, Appellants cite no

persuasive evidence that the Duval County policy was

promulgated to evade the strictures of Lee. Inferring the

subjective motivations of policymakers is always a tricky

proposition. "[W]hile it is possible to discern the objective

‘purpose’ of a statute (i.e., the public good at which its

provisions appear to be directed), or even the formal

motivation for a statute Where that is explicitly set forth, ...

discerning the subjective motivation of those enacting the

statute is, to be honest, almost always an impossible task.

The number of possible motivations, to begin with, is not

binary, Or indeed finite." Edwards v. Aguill ard, 482 U.S. 578,

87a

636-37, 107 S.Ct 2573, 96 L.Ed.2d 510 (1987) (Scalia, J.,

dissenting).

In this case, that task is made even more difficult

because we have no record from which to fairly infer the

motivation of those who promulgated or distributed the

policy. In so far as we attempt to divine purpose from the

decision-makers, “to the extent that the School Board was

the institutional policy maker (rather than Superintendent

Zenke and/or Ms. Reynolds)," the district court found that

the “purposes or intentions of the members of the Board are

unknown. No debate was had and no vote was taken on the

Reynolds Memorandum of May 5.” Adler I, 851 F.Supp. at

451. To the extent that we foctis on the motives of Mr. Zenke

or Ms. Reynolds, the district court found mixed motives or

purposes--to permit students to solemnize the event, to

afford the student body the opportunity to select a

messenger, who, in turn would, with complete autonomy,

choose a secular or sectarian message, and to afford the

students the option of having no message at all. See id. at

452.

Appellants offer no good reason to disturb the district

court's findings which are grounded in the facially neutral

language of the Reynolds Memorandum. Appellants

principally rely on the pre-policy history. A review of the

pertinent history, however, yields only the observations that

prior to Lee Duval County had a long tradition of clergymen

offering prayers at commencement ceremonies, that in the

wake of Lee in 1992 the School Board terminated the |

88a

practice, and that thereafter many members of the

community expressed strong views about the policy one

way or the other. Appellants highlight the fact that some

community members wrote letters imploring Zenke and the

Board to find a way to maintain the graduation prayer

tradition. It would be an especially dangerous practice if a

court could somehow discern legislative purpose, not from

the text of the policy, nor from its explicitly stated purpose,

nor even from a decision-making body that has offered no

debate from which to find purpose, but, rather, simply from

the controversy surrounding the subject and the heartfelt

and often conflicting views expressed by many members of

the community. ;

In addition, the fact that the Reynolds Memorandum

discusses Lee and the question of whether student-initiated,

student-led graduation prayer is constitutional does not

establish that the policy's secular purposes are a "sham."

Edwards, 482 U.S. at 586-87, 107 S.Ct. 2573; Bown, 112 F.3d

at 1468. There is nothing inappropriate about a school

system attempting to understand its constitutional

obligations and to instruct school officials on how to comply

with the law. The Reynolds Memorandum simply

explained that in spite of Lee the law was unclear on the

student prayer issue and that the School Board had been

threatened with "lawsuits from both sides on the issue

depending on what action" they took. The memorandum, in

no way, expressed a desire or preference for student prayer

at graduation ceremonies. It simply acknowledged that Lee

forbade graduation prayers "directed and initiated by the

89a

school system" rather than student-initiated, student-led

prayers. Moreover, as the memorandum made clear, the

policy's stated purpose is plainly secular, "to allow students

to direct their own graduation message without monitoring

or review by school officials," and its features are strictly

content-neutral and equally accommodating of secular and

sectarian student messages. At worst, the memorandum

can be read as contemplating that student prayers could be

offered pursuant to the graduation policy and that such

occurrences were not strictly forbidden by Lee. Such a

supposition does not come close to rendering the policy's

secular purposes a sham.

Appellants next suggest that the title of the Reynolds

Memorandum, "Graduation Prayer," supports the

conclusion that the School Board policy was driven solely

by sectarian concerns. The title, however, merely introduces

the topic of debate within Duval County in the aftermath of

Lee rather than suggesting, let alone compelling, the

outcome of that debate. The title affixed to the Reynolds

Memorandum does no more than alert the reader to the

general subject matter of the text; and it remains the

language and substance of the policy, rather than its title,

that is controlling. It is altogether unnecessary to requisition

the title to cast doubt on the clear and unambiguous

purpose of the policy. The crucial term "message" is fully

defined by the text of the policy, which provides that the

decision whether to have a message is left to the students,

that the student body shall choose the student speaker, that

the message is limited to two minutes in length, that the

90a

message shall take place at the beginning and/or closing of

the graduation ceremony, and, finally, that the content of

the message shall be prepared by the student speaker

without monitoring or review by the School Board. The title

cannot take the place of a detailed review of the policy's

facial provisions, let alone create a wholly sectarian purpose

out of a textually neutral pronouncement.

Besides being unnecessary, use of the title to inform the

plain meaning of the policy's language is improper. Indeed,

even if we were examining the title of a statute or legislative

codification-and we are doing far less than that here-- the

Supreme Court has warned that "the title of a statute and

the heading of a section cannot limit the plain meaning of

the text. For interpretive purposes, they are of use only

when they shed light on some ambiguous word or phrase.

They are but tools available for the resolution of a doubt.

But they cannot unde or limit that which the text makes

plain." Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Baltimore & Ohio

RR, Co., 331 US. 519, 528-29, 67 S.Ct. 1387, 91 L.Ed. 1646

(1947). Both we and our predecessor court have repeatedly

employed this principle of statutory construction when |

interpreting the statutory text. See, e.g., North Ala. Express,

Inc. v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 971 F.2d 661, 664 (11th

Cir. 1 992) (declaring that "'[s]ection and chapter titles

cannot alter the plain meaning of a statute; they can only

assist in clarifying ambiguity") (citation omitted);

Scarborough v. Office of Personnel Management, 723 F.2d

801, 817 (11th Cir. 1984) (noting that "reliance upon

headings to determine the meaning of a statute is nota

9la

Re Rt area) A Neve WY AS Ve

favored method of statutory construction”); Rich v..

Commissioner of Internal Revenue Serv., 250 F.2d 170, 175

(5th Cir. 1957) (stating that "[t]he plain and unambiguous

meaning of the text of the section cannot be extended by its

title or heading").

Finally, Appellants point to post-enactment comments

of some members of the School Board made at a June 1, 1993

meeting as evidence of the School Board's wholly sectarian

purpose to permit graduating students to pray. However,

the district court observed that "[t]he motivation or intent of

the Board relative to the Reynolds Memorandum of May 9 is

essentially unknown." Adler I, 851 F.Supp. at 452. No

debate was had and as far as the record reflects, no vote was

taken on the Reynolds Memorandum. The June 1 comments

were made almost a month after the policy was

promulgated and distributed in the context of a proposal to

replace student-initiated messages with a moment of

silence. The motion failed and the policy was left in force.

At best, the vote can be viewed as a tacit endorsement of the

Reynolds Memorandum. Furthermore, a review of the

School Board's comments at this meeting do not establish

that the School Board sought to direct or endorse graduation

prayer via the Reynold Memorandum. The most one could

say is that the statement of one School Board member at the

June 1 meeting could be characterized as advocating direct

school involvement with religion at graduation ceremonies.”

8A ppellants cite to four post-enactment statements of School Board

members to show that the School Board intended to permit graduating

92a

Simply put, the post-enactment comments are not sufficient

to transform the policy's express secular purpose into a

preeminently religious purpose.

More importantly, regardless of how these post hoc

statements are interpreted, they cannot be construed to

override the policy's language articulating a clear secular

purpose. See Bown, 112 F.3d at 1472. Indeed in Bown, we

had occasion to find that the legislative history of a Georgia

statute (mandating a period for quiet reflection in public

students to engage in prayer. Infact, the statements to which the Appellants

refer generally buttress the conclusion that the School Board's policy was

not a sham. Of those four statements, only the statement of Board member

Bill Parker can be characterized as advocating direct school involvement

with religion at graduation ceremonies. see Tr. of Duval County Sch. Bd.

Meeting at 2 ("I think that our school principals should be allowed to work

out a non-sectarian message with our student chaplains, or a guest minister,

rabbi or whatever that would be acceptable to all at this very important time

in our young people's lives."). The statements of Don Buckley and Nancy

Corwin, while generally supportive of religion, acknowledge that an

intended effect of the poiicy is to insulate the content of messages from

school influence. See id. at 5 (Buckley) ("I think the only way we can keep

ourselves clear on this thing is to keep ourselves out of what happens in this

area of the graduation ceremony."); (Corwin) ("I also believe that the

democratic process in which seniors were given the ability to choose which

form of inspirational message, if any, they wanted at their commencement

was an appropriate one and I'm going to stand by it."). Rather than

betraying an illegitimate intent to ensure that prayer take place at

graduation ceremonies, these statements indicate that Buckley and Corwin

perceived the School Board policy as disassociating the school hierarchy

from student messages. The fourth statement referenced by Appellants, that

of Board member Stan Jordan, was also supportive of the policy. See id. at

8 ("I plan to vote for the administration plan and against the proposal that's

onthe table.”). Taken as a whole these utterances by School Board members

constitute recognition that the old regime of state directed school prayer in

Duval County had passed and been replaced by a new regime over which

they had far less control.

93a

schools), which contained some expressions of religious

motives by several legislators who voted for the Act, could

not "override the express statutory language articulating a

clear secular purpose."” Id. Here, we have even far less

evidence of a sectarian policy purpose on the part of the

School Board or their principals.

In sum, whether standing alone or in concert, the three

pieces of evidence cited by Appellants cannot strip the

policy of a secular purpose. No matter what an individual

board member may have hoped-~and they said nothing on

the record about codifying this policy—-Duval County's

policy is facially neutral and undeniably evinces a secular

purpose. That is enough to pass constitutional muster

under the first prong of Lemon.

B.

*Appellants cite Jager v. Douglas County Sch. Dist., 862 F.2d 824

(11th Cir. 1989), for the proposition that a policy, whose actual purpose is to

promote prayer or is "intrinsically religious," Id. at 830, cannot meet the

secular purpose prong of Lemon. But Jager does no more than state the

obvious, that in order to meet Lemon first prong, a government policy must

have a genuine secular purpose and not be a sham. See Edwards, 482 U.S.

at 586-87, 107 S.Ct. 2573. Ifa policy's "actual purpose” is wholly religious

then Lemon's secular purpose requirement is not satisfied. In Jager we held

that a school district's practice of having representatives of student

organizations deliver invocations prior to football games had as its

“preeminent purpose” the endorsement of Protestant Christianity. Id. 862

F.2d at 830. The only discretion left to the students was the selection of who

would pray.

94a

eee

As for whether the policy has the primary effect of

advancing religion, we conclude that because the policy, on

its face, allows a student message on any topic of the

student's choice it satisfies the second prong of Lemon. The

Duval County School Board policy is content-neutral and

does not mandate or even encourage that a graduation

prayer will be uttered. As the district court found, the

implementation of the policy may result in no graduation

prayer at all. See Adler I, 851 F.Supp. at 454. While it is

se undoubtably true that an autonomous student speaker

could read a prayer at graduation under the policy, it is

equally true that the same speaker may opt for a wholly

secular message instead. It would require a strain of the

term "primary" to suggest that a content-neutral forum

policy, which accommodates private sectarian and secular

speech on an equal basis, has the “primary” or “principal”

effect of advancing religion.

Moreover, we believe that a student's private choice to

deliver a religious message at graduation is a religious effect

attributable to the student father than to the facial terms of

the Duval County policy. As the Supreme Court has

explained, “to have forbidden 'effects' under Lemon, it must

be fair to say that the government itself has advanced

religion through its own activities and influence.”

Corporation of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ

Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 337, 107 S.Ct. 2862,

97 L.Ed.2d 273(1987). Here, the policy strips the School

Board of any authority over the central decisions— who

speaks, whether there will be a speaker, and what the

9a

content of the speech may be. Indeed, in order to ensure that

no one perceives any student's religious utterance as being

the state's prayer, the policy explicitly divorces any student

message from School Board sponsorship by specifically

stating that any message will be "prepared by the student

volunteer and shall not be monitored or otherwise

reviewed" by the School Board or its employees. This

language acts as an overt disclaimer, further distancing the

state from the student message.

Our conclusion is amply supported by Supreme Court

caselaw. The Court,, under Lemon, repeatedly has upheld

facially neutral programs that permit individuals to support

religion through their own private choices. See, e.g., -

Agostini, 521 U.S. at 223-232, 117 S.Ct. 1997 (upholding New

- York program of sending public school teachers into

parochial schools to provide remedial education where aid

was made available to religious and secular beneficiaries on

a nondiscriminatory basis); Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 8-12, 113

S.Ct. 2462 (sustaining section of Individual with Disabilities

Act providing disabled children with aid regardless of

whether a child attends a sectarian institution); Witters, 474 :

USS. at 488, 106 S.Ct. 748 (holding that Establishment Clause

was not violated when the state paid a blind student's

tuition at a Christian college through a generally-applicable

aid program because any public aid that reached religious

institutions under the program was "a result of the

genuinely independent and private choices of aid

+ recipients"); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. at 399, 103 S.Ct. 3062

(upholding a state tax deduction for specified educational

96a

expenses, and characterizing any such aid to religion as

being “only as a result of numerous, private choices of

individual parents of school-age children"). The Duval

County policy allows elected student speakers the freedom

to privately choose a graduation message of an either

secular, sectarian, or mixed nature. We therefore find that

the Duval County policy does not have a primary effect of

advancing religion.

a

For many of the same reasons, we conclude that the

School Board's policy does not excessively entangle the

Board with religion in violation of the third part of the

Lemon test.!° The policy remains facially neutral with

respect to religion, requiring only that graduation messages

be voted on by students, and composed and directed by a

student speaker. By its very terms, the policy explicitly

prohibits any review of the student message at all.

Undoubtedly, the School Board would find itself far more

entangled with religion if it attempted to eradicate all

religious content from student messages than if it

maintained a meaningful policy of studied neutrality. See

Mergens 496 U.S. at 253, 110 S.Ct. 2356 (stating that “a

denial of equal access to religious speech might well create

Recently, in Agostini, the Court merged the second and third

Lemon prongs because “ the factors we use to assess whether an

- entanglement is ‘excessive’ are similar to the fact we use to examine ‘effect.’”

Id., 521 U.S. at 232.

97a

greater entanglement problems in the form of invasive

monitoring to prevent religious speech at meetings at which

such speech might occur”); Widmar, 454 U.S. at 272 n. 11,

102 S.Ct. 269 (noting that schools who adopt open-forum

policies for private secular and religious groups equally

"would risk greater 'entanglement' by attempting to enforce

its exclusion of 'religious worship' and 'religious speech");

Chabad-Lubavitch, 5 F.3d at 1389; Jager, 862 F.2d at 831.

Implicit in Appellants’ rationale is the need for school

censorship if schools are to allow students the opportunity

to speak at graduation at all. At the core of Appellants’

position is the claim that the state's control over nearly all

aspects of the graduation ceremony automatically imputes

all private speech tothe state. But the degree of control that

schools generally exert over high school graduation

ceremonies is unlikely to diminish because graduation

ceremonies are, by their nature, highly choreographed.

Appellants’ position therefore would leave school officials

with only two choices: either eliminate student speech

altogether or retain student speech, subject to censorship by

school authorities. If school officials choose the latter

course, they will be left with the unenviable task of

identifying the religious content in student speeches for

excision prior to graduation or of interrupting renegade

graduation speakers who resort to sectarian speech." If,

"There is no easy or precise guideline for school officials to follow

when excising student speech of religious content. The constitutional

definition of religion is expansive; it encompasses “all sincere religious

98a

however, they choose the former, they will have deprived

the graduation class of any role in shaping its high school

graduation and they will have banned all private student

expression. The Establishment Clause requires no such

Hobson's choice. What it does require is a recognition of the

critical difference between a private statement of religious

values and a religious utterance endorsed by the state. The

Duval County School Board's policy, on its face, does no

more than recognize this distinction.

III.

Based on the foregoing, we hold that the Duval County

school system's policy of permitting graduating students to

decide through a vote whether to have an unrestricted

student graduation message at the beginning and/or

closing of graduation ceremonies does not facially violate

the Establishment Clause. We therefore affirm the judgment

of the district court.

AFFIRMED.

beliefs which are based upon a power or being, or upon a faith, to which all

else is subordinate or upon which all else is ultimately dependent” and

"which occupies in the life of its possessor a place parallel to that filled by

[] God." United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 176, 85 S.Ct 850, 3 L.Ed.2d 733

(1965). Moreover, the beliefs "need not be acceptable, logical, consistent, or

comprehensible to others." Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 714, 101

S.Ct. 1425, 67 L.Ed.2d 624 (1981). Moreover, if the School Board's censorship

was not "rigorous" enough to prevent religion from creeping into graduation

ceremonies, a policy of allowing even monitored student speech still would

be subject to constitutional attack.

99a

KRAVITCH, Senior Circuit Judge, dissenting, in which

BARKETT, Circuit Judge, joins:

I agree with the majority that the Supreme Court's

decisions in Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 112 S. Ct. 2649

(1992), and Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13, 91 S.

Ct. 2105, 2111 (1971), control this case. I disagree, however,

with the majority's application of those decisions to the facts

of this case. The maj

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