Petition for Writ of Certiorari — LaBombard v. United States

Supreme Court brief2001

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Text

—

No.

Ol-227

In The

Supreme Court of the Anited States

Richard LaBombard,

Petitioner(s)

United States

On Petition For Writ of Certiorari

To The United States Court of Appeals

For the First Circuit

No. 00-1651

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Richard LaBombard

Propria Persona

12 Peters Drive

Leominster, MA 01453

978-840-0541

ee a ee Oooo

QUESTIONS TO BE REVIEWED

_ Areview of the District Court extending government’s

time to respond to a court order but not granting the

same privilege to petitioner.

_ Areview of petitioner’s brief not being brought to the

attention of the Court.

_ A review of the failure of the Internal Revenue Service

(IRS) to respond to letters asking for an explanation of

assessment.

_ A review of the failure to properly explain IRS letter of

resolvement.

_ Areview of the failure to explain why a military

pension was returned, in full, to petitioner after IRS

letter of resolvement.

_ A review of the charge of failure to file tax returns.

. Areview of the court’s charge that assessments were

not challenged.

_ A review of all briefs submitted to the courts by

petitioner.

LIST OF PARTIES

All parties appear in the caption of the case on the cover

page. :

TABLE OF CONTENTS

OPINIONS BELOW eessecsscsoccscossssssssesesescensesenes

SEE 2

STATEMENT OF CASE.csssesssssssssesssecsseesnsee 3

REASON FOR GRANTING WRIT. csssscssssssess 5

CONCLUSION. .......:c:sssssessseessseesreeserseeenneennnesenes 6

INDEX TO APPENDICES

APPENDIX A --- US COURT OF APPEALS .... 7

JUDGMENT

APPENDIX B --- US COURT OF APPEALS....12

REHEARING DENIED

APPENDIX C --- US COURT OF APPEALS .. 14

EXTENSION OF TIME

APPENDIX D --- US DISTRICT COURT ...... .16

JUDGMENT

APPENDIX E --- US DISTRICT COURT ...... 30

DOCKET SHEET

APPENDIX F --- LETTER FROM IRS .........-. 36

DATED OCTOBER 1, 1990

APPENDIX G --- CERTIFICATE OF ...........- 38

ASSESSMENT SHOWING

RETURN OF MILITARY

PENSION 04/02/90 TO

09/30/96

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES:

Clearfield Trust Co v. US 318 US 363-371 --

US v. Burr 309 US 242

US v. Taylor 350 F2nd 183-187

MISCELLANEOUS

Federal Rule of Evidence

Section 902 Par 9

House Report 93-650

Treasury IR Manual, Legal Reference Guide,

Fiduciary Manual 8(21), P58(10) 0-200

Section 11

UCC 3-501

PAGE 6

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Petitioner respectfully prays that a writ of certiorari issue

To review the judgment below.

OPINIONS BELOW

For cases from federal courts:

The opinion of the United States court of appeals appears at

Appendix A to the petition and is unpublished.

The opinion of the United States district court appears at

Appendix D to the petition and is unpublished.

JURISDICTION

For cases from federal courts:

The date on which the United States Court of Appeals

decided my case was December 7, 2000.

A timely petition for rehearing was denied by the United

State Court of Appeals on the following date: March 8,

2001, and a copy of the order denying rehearing appears at

Appendix B.

An extension of time to file a writ of certiorari was granted

to and including February 22, 2001 on January 24, 2001 and

appears at Appendix C.

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C.

1254 (1).

STATEMENT OF CASE

1. The District Court granted the government an extension

of time to respond to a court order by 6 (six) days.

There is no indication, on docket sheet, that a request

was made by the government for an extension of time.

It took 5 (five) days for government’s brief to be

received, by US mail, by petitioner. As petitioner could

not respond to government's brief, until it was received,

. the court allowed 9 (nine) days for a reply, not 14

(fourteen) days as the court ordered. The same

extension of time was not given to petitioner as given to

the government.

2. Petitioner’s brief was not brought to the attention of the

court, “it appears that LaBombard’s response simply

was not brought to the district court’s attention. Having

excused the lateness of the government’s filing, we

assume that the court would have similarly excused any

tardiness on LaBombard’s part, if that filing had been

brought to its attention”. US Court of Appeals

December 7, 2000.

3. All letters and presentments, from the IRS, were

challenged using the procedure in the Uniform

Commercial Code (UCC) which the IRS is governed by.

See defendant’s brief US District Court 20 Apr., 99 and

CONCLUSION Page 6.

. Petitioner has shown that any dispute with the IRS was

resolved in a letter dated 1 Oct. 90. The government has

failed to explain what was resolved other than by saying,

“something was resolved”, but not what. The IRS sent

the letter and petitioner accepted it with the

understanding that all disputes were settled. See

APPENDIX F.

. The government has failed to explain why petitioner’s

military pension was returned in full after the IRS sent

the letter of resolvement. If there had been outstanding

disputes this should not have happened. See

APPENDIX G.

. Petitioner has shown that any disputes with the IRS

were resolved and that returns were filed and the IRS

made refunds. See USDC 28 Mar. 00.

. District Court contends that petitioner did not question

correctness of assessments is incorrect. All

presentments were challenged. See USDC 20 Apr. 99.

Petitioner has shown that just because an agent makes

computations does not legally determine a tax liability.

See USCA 18 July, 2000 and Page 6.

. Acomplete and unbiased review of all briefs, sent to the

courts, will show that the government has made

incorrect statements.

Pe een

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE

WRIT

This might not be an international landmark case, but

petitioner believes that it shows the bias and prejudice of the

federal courts when the Internal Revenue Service is

involved. Petitioner could not hire an attorney after they

found out that the IRS was involved. Most of them stated

that they “did not need the aggravation”. The District Court

allowed the government leeway not allowed petitioner,

verified by USCA. The District Court allowed the

government 27 days to answer a court order allowing 21

days, but did riot grant the same to petitioner even though

there was a 5-day delay in receiving government’s reply.

Petitioner’s brief was not given to the court although filed.

The government was allowed not to answer important

questions raised by the petitioner. The court claimed that

petitioner did not challenge assessments when it was shown

that he did. Is this why the American Public has no faith in

the federal courts when the IRS is involved?

The Court should grant this WRIT OF CERTIORARI to

help restore faith in our federal judicial system.

Prepared by:

Richard LaBombard

Propria Persona

12 Peters Drive

Leominster, Massachusetts 01453

CONCLUSION

Petitioner has shown that the government did not respond in

a timely matter to a court order. That the IRS is governed

by the Uniform Commercial Code as is any other

corporation.

“governments descend to the level of a mere private corporation and

take on the characteristics of a mere private citizen, where private

corporate commercial paper is concerned.....for purposes of suite, such

corporations and individuals are regarded as entities entirely separate

from the government.” Clearfield and Trust v. United States

318 US 363-371 United States v. Burr 309 US 242,

Treasury IR Manual, Legal Reference Guide, Fiduciary

Manual 8(21):P58(10) 0-200 Section 11, Federal Rules of

Evidence Section 902 Par 9; House Report 93-650.

Petitioner received but did not accept papers with

computations on them and returned them to Internal

Revenue Service, Inc. “without dishonor UCC 3-501” and

requested, using the Uniform Commercial Code,

information about how the determination was made and by

whom. The IRS did not respond.

“the mere computations of an agent do not legally determine a tax

liability” US v. Taylor 350 F2nd 183, 187.

Petitioner has done everything possible to solve this matter

but the IRS has failed. The IRS is operating with unclean

hands.

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted, 4

Date: 4 Queuid Loo!

APPENDIX “A”: UNITED STATES COURT

OF APPEALS JUDGMENT

(NOT FOR PUBLICATION-NOT TO BE CITED AS

PRECEDENT)

United States Court of Appeals

~- For the First Circuit

No. 00-1651

UNITED STATES,

Plaintiff, Appellee,

RICHARD LABOMBARD

Defendant, Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT

COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

(Hon. Nathaniel M. Gorton, U.S. District Judge)

Before

Torruella, Chief Judge,

Selya and Boudin, Circuit Judges

Richard LaBombard on brief pro se.

Paula M. Junghans, Acting Assistant Attorney General,

Ann B. Durney and Regina S. Moriarty, Attorneys, Tax

Division, Department of Justice, on brief for appellee.

December 7, 2000

Per Curiam. Appellant, Richard LaBombard,

appeals a decision of the district court denying his

motion to dismiss and granting summary judgment in

favor of the United States and the court’s subsequent

entry of a judgment in favor of the United Sates in the

amount of $138,857.75 plus statutory interest and

penalties accrued since October 19, 1998. LaBombard

complains that the district court unfairly considered what

LaBombard alleges was an untimely filing submitted by

the government and failed to consider what LaBombard

alleges was his own timely response.

Although it appears that the government’s

supplemental memorandum was tardy, see district court’s

order of February 15, 2000, setting a deadline of 21 days,

it was within the court’s discretion to excuse the

tardiness, if any. As for LaBombard’s own response,

contrary to his assertion, it appears that that response was

also tardy. The mailing rule to which LaBombard refers

(adding 3 days to the prescribed period) applies when a

party is required to respond after service of a paper by

the opposing party. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(¢). The district

court’s February 15 order recited that LaBombard had 14

days to respond after the government's filing of its

supplemental memorandum. See also Dist. Ct. Loc. R.

7.1(B) (reciting that a party opposing a motion shall file

an opposition within 14 days and “(t)he fourteen day

period is intended to include the period specified by the

civil rules for mailing time”). Because LaBombard’s

response was entered on the docket on the same day as

the date of the court’s memorandum and order, however,

it appears that LaBombard’s response simply was not

brought to the district court’s attention. Having a

the lateness of the government’s filing, we assume that

the court would have similarly excused any tardiness on

LaBombard’s part, if that filing had been brought to its

attention.

In any event, we review both the denial of a

motion to dismiss and the grant of summary judgment de

novo. See Souza v. Pina, 53 F.3d 423, 424 (1* Cir.

1995) (motion to dismiss); Nichols v. Land Transport

Corp., 223 F.3d 21, 22 (1 Cir. 2000) (summary

judgment). We have reviewed the parties’ briefs and the

record on appeal. The allegations in the government’s

complaint sufficed to state a claim for which relief can be

granted and there existed no genuine issue of material

fact precluding entry of summary judgment in its favor.

We affirm essentially for the reasons stated in the district

court’s memorandum and order, dated March 31, 2000.

Affirmed.

APPENDIX “B”: UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS

DENIAL OF REHEARING

United States Court of Appeals

For the First Circuit

No. 00-1651

UNITED STATES, | |

Plaintiff, Appellee, |

RICHARD LABOMBARD,

Defendant, Appellant.

Before

Torruella, Chief Judge,

Selya and Boudin, Circuit Judges.

ORDER OF COURT

Entered: March 8, 2001

The petition for rehearing is denied.

By the Court:

PHOEBE D. MORSE, Clerk

By: s/ Janice M. O’Neil

Chief Deputy Clerk

(cc: Mr. LaBombard, Ms. Durney, Ms. Moriarty, Ms.

France, and Ms. Poswistillo)

APPENDIX “C”; UNITED STATES COURT

OF APPEALS

GRANTING EXTENSION OF TIME

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

No. 00-1651

UNITED STATES

Plaintiff - Appellee

RICHARD LABOMBARD

Defendant - Appellant

ORDER OF COURT

_ Entered: January 24, 2001

Upon consideration of motion,

It is ordered that the time for the appellant to file his petition

for rehearing be enlarged to and including February 22,

2001.

This Court is disinclined to grant further extensions.

By the Court:

Phoebe Morse, Clerk

By s/ Phoebe Morse

Chief Deputy Clerk

ce:

Susan M. Poswistilo, Esq.

Michelle C. France, Esq.

Regina S. Moriarty, Esq.

Ann B. Durney, Esq.

Richard LaBombard

APPENDIX “D” UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

JUDGMENT

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS ~

)

United States of America, )

Plaintiff )

)

¥. ) Civil Action No.

) 99-40019-NMG

Richard LaBombard, )

Defendant )

. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

GORTON, J.

This case arises from the alleged failure of the

Defendant, Richard LaBombard (“LaBombard”), to pay

federal income taxes for the tax years 1983 through

1989. The United States has filed suit to reduce to

judgment federal tax assessments against LaBombard in

the amount of $138,857.75 in unpaid taxes, penalties and

interest, plus statutory interest since October 19, 1998.

The United States has filed a motion for summary

judgment (Docket No. 2) and LaBombard has filed a

motion to dismiss (Docket No. 5).

Because some issues in the pending motions were not

fully addressed in the initial briefs, the Court directed the

parties to submit supplemental memoranda. The

government has done so and LaBombard’s time to respond

having expired, the Court now considers those pending

motions.

I. Background

The following facts are presented by the United States

and are not disputed by LaBombard. LaBombard failed to

file any federal income tax returns for the tax years 1983

through 1989. The Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”)

prepared substitute returns pursuant to 26 U.S.C. S 6020 (b)

for LaBombard basing his purported tax liability upon

information it had received with respect to income he had

received from a military pension.

The government made assessments based upon those |

substitute returns on February 6, 1989 for the 1983, 1984

and 1985 tax years and on September 21, 1992 for the

1986, 1987, 1988 and 1989 tax years. The government

commenced the instant action on February 3, 1999 to

obtain judgment against LaBombard for all unpaid taxes,

interest and penalties, plus statutory interest accrued to

date. The United States served the complaint on

LaBombard at his residence at 12 Peters Drive,

Leominster, Massachusetts on March 10, 1999.

II. Motion to Dismiss

LaBombard argues, in his motion to dismiss, that the

Court lacks subject matter and personal jurisdiction and

that the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief

can be granted.

A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

The United States asserts that this is a valid suit to

reduce federal tax assessments to judgment. It asserts

that the Court has subject matter jurisdictiqn pursuant to

28 U.S.C. S 1340 (“district courts shall have original

jurisdiction of any civil action arising under any Act of

Congress providing for internal revenue”), 28 U.S.C. S

1345 (“Except as otherwise provided by Act of Congress,

the district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all

civil actions, suits or proceedings commenced by the

United States...”) and 26 U.S. C. S 7402(a) (conferring

jurisdiction on district courts for actions necessary or

appropriate for enforcement of internal revenue laws).

Given three ania all of which confer jurisdiction, there

is no doubt that this Court has subject matter jurisdiction

over this case.

B. Personal Jurisdiction

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide guidance

on how district courts obtain jurisdiction over a person.

Specifically, Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(k) (1) provides that district |

courts acquire personal jurisdiction over a defendant by

~ service of a summons a person “who could be subjected to

the jurisdiction of a court of general jurisdiction in the

state in which the district court is located.” Thus, a federal

district court is permitted to exercise personal jurisdiction

over an individual to the extent authorized under state law

of the forum in which it sits. In Massachusetts, the state in

which this Court sits, a court of general jurisdiction may

exercise personal jurisdiction over a person within or

domiciled in the Commonwealth. M.G.L. c. 223A S 2;

Mas&.R.Civ.P. 4 (d) (1).

LaBombard admits that he is a citizen of, and is

domiciled in, Massachusetts. He was served with a

summons and complaint at his home in Leominster,

Massachusetts. This Court may, therefore, properly

exercise personal jurisdiction over LaBombard.

C. Failure to State a Claim

1. Standard

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim may be

granted only if it appears, beyond doubt, that the plaintiff

can prove no facts in support of its claim that entitle it to

relief. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).

The Court must accept all factual averments in the

complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in

the plaintiff's favor. Garita Hotel Ltd. Partnership v.

Ponce Fed. Bank, F.S.B., 958 F.2d 15, 17 (1* Cir. 1992).

The Court is required to look only to the allegations of

the complaint and, if under any theory they are sufficient

to state a cause of action, a motion to dismiss the

complaint weed denied. Knight v. Mills, 836 F.2d

659, 664 (1% Cir. 1987).

2. Analysis

Title 26, Section 7401 of the United States Code

requires that any civil action for the collection or

nanny of taxes, or of any fine, penalty or forfeiture

must be commenced with the permission of the Secretary

of the Treasury and at the direction of the Attorney

General or an appropriate delegate. The United States

asserts in its complaint that this action was commenced

by the United States Attorney at the direction of the

Attorney General with the authorization from the Chief

Counsel, Internal Revenue Service, a delegate of the

Secretary of the Treasury. Based upon that assertion, the

United States has complied with the requirements of the

applicable statute.

~ The United States assessed a tax deficiency against

LaBombard for unpaid taxes for the tax years 1983

through 1985 on February 6, 1989 and for the tax years

1986 through 1989 on September 21, 1992. The United

States issued notice of those assessments to LaBombard,

but, despite notice and demand, LaBombard refused to

pay the amount due.

Under 26 U.S.C. S 6501(a), the United States must

assess any unpaid tax within three (3) years after the

return was filed, unless no return was filed or the return

was filed fraudulently to evade taxes. In the latter

circumstance, there is no limit on when the United States

must act. LaBombard filed no tax returns for the years in

“question so there is no time limit on when the United

States may assess tax deficiencies against him.

Finally, under 26 U.S.C. S 6502(a), the United States

has ten (10) years from the date of assessment either 1) to

levy the property or 2) to commence a lawsuit. This

lawsuit was commenced on February 3, 1999, within the

ten-year statute of limitations for both the February 6,

1989 and the Sagres 21, 1992 assessments.

D. The 1988 Tax Year

LaBombard argues that a letter to him from the IRS

dated October 1, 1990 indicates that the IRS had resolved

some issues related to the 1988 tax year. The letter is

ambiguous with respect to what the IRS had actually

resolved. In any event, the IRS assessed a tax deficiency

for that tax year on September 21, 1992.

By assessing a deficiency for the 1988 tax year after

the IRS sent LaBombard the subject letter, it is clear that

the IRS persisted in its contention that LaBombard was

delinquent for that tax year. Thus, the IRS did not view

his tax deficiency for the 1988 tax year as resolved and,

because a presumption of correctness attaches to a tax

assessment made by the IRS, Geiselman v. United States,

961 F.2d 1, 6 (1* Cir. 1992), the assessment for that tax

year is valid.

Il. Summary Judgment

A. Summary Judgment Standard

The role of summary judgment is “to pierce the

pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether

there is a genuine need for trial.” Mesnick v. General

Elec. Co., 950 F.2d 816, 822 (1° Cir. 1991) (quoting

Garside v. Osco Drug, Inc., 895 F.2d 46, 50 (1* Cir. 1990).

The burden is upon the moving party to show, based upon

the pleadings, discovery and affidavits, “that there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving

party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”

Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). Once the moving party has satisfied

its burden, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to

set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine,

triable issue. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,

324 (1986). The Court must view the entire record in the

light most hospitable to the non-moving party and

indulge all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor.

O’Connor v. een 994 F.2d 905, 907 (1% Cir. 1993).

B. Analysis

Despite notice and demand, LaBombard has refused

to pay in full the amount due and, as a result, there

remains due $138,857.75 as of October 19, 1998. In

addition to that amount, LaBombard is liable for

statutory interest and additional penalties accruing after

that date.

In this case, the government made assessments against

LaBombard for the tax years 1983 through 1989. A

presumption of correctness attaches to a tax assessment —

made by the IRS. Geiselman v. United States, 961 F.2d

1, 6 (1% Cir. 1992). “It is settled law that taxpayers bear

the burden of proving that a tax deficiency assessment is

erroneous.” Delaney v. Commissioner of Internal

Revenue, 99 F.3d 20, 23 (1* Cir. 1996) (citing United

States v. Rexach, 482 F.2d 10, 16 (1% Cir. 1973).

LaBombard presents no evidence overcoming the

presumption that accompanies a tax assessment. Instead

he argues that the government failed to respond to his

letters which “created a default action” under the Uniform

Commercial Code and that the assessments have “no legal

basis” because the IRS had “resolved” the 1988 tax year

deficiency and returned back taxes to him.

The Court has already examined the circumstances of

the 1988 tax year and has concluded that the IRS’

assessment for that year was valid. LaBombard does not

address the validity of the other tax assessments in any

way and, therefore, does not challenge the presumption

of correctness that they carry. The motion of the United

States for summary judgment will, therefore, be allowed.

The government requests that the Court enter

judgment against LaBombard in the amount of

$138,857.75, plus statutory interest and additional

penalties accrued to date, and that it grant costs and other

eqprotiate vellel The Court will enter judgment for the

government in the anneal plus interest and

penalties accrued since October 19, 1998. It will not,

however, award costs, primarily because the government

cites no authority that would render such an award

appropriate.

ORDER

For the reasons set forth in the Memorandum above:

1) the motion of the defendant, Richard LaBombard,

to dismiss (Docket No. 5) is DENIED;

2) the motion of the plaintiff, the United States, for

summary judgment (Docket No. 5) is

ALLOWED.

So ordered.

s/ Nathaniel M. Gorton

Nathaniel M. Gorton

United States District Judge

Dated: March 31, 2000

APPENDIX “E” UNITED STATES DISTRICT

COURT DOCKET SHEET

APPEAL

U.S. District Court

U.S. District Court — Massachusetts (Worcester)

CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 99-CV-40019

USA v. LaBombard Filed: 02/03/99

Assigned to: Judge Nathaniel M Gorton

Demand: $139,000 Nature of Suit: 870

Lead Docket: None Jurisdiction: US Plaintiff

Dkt# in other court: None

Cause: 26:7401 IRS: Tax Liability

USA ‘ Henry J. Riordan

Plaintiff (COR LD NTC)

US Departinent of

Justice

Tax Division

a” Post Office Box 55

Ben Franklin Station

Washington, DC 20044

202-307-1120

Susan M. Poswistillo

617-748-3267

(COR LD NTC)

United States Attorney’s

Office

1 Courthouse Way

Boston, MA 02210

617-748-3183

RICHARD LABOMBARD __ Richard LaBombard

Defendant (COR LD NTC)

(PRO SE)

12 Peters Drive

Leominster, MA 01453

Docket as of May 25, 2000 11:31 am Page 1

Proceedings include all events.

4:99cv40019 USA v. LaBombard APPEAL

2/3/99 1 Complaint filed. Case assigned to Judge:

Gorton. . (dfs)

(Entry date 02/11/99)

2/3/99 -- Summons, MCF, LR4.1, etc. issued for

Richard LaBombard (dfs)

(Entry date 2/11/99)

4/9/99 2 Response by USA in Opposition to motion to

dismiss or, alternatively, for summary

judgment, filed. c/s (jb)

(Entry date 4/12/99)

4/9/99 2 Cross-motion by USA for

judgment, filed. c/s (jb)

(Entry date 04/12/99)

4/9/99 3 Return of service executed as to Richard

LaBombard with service on 3/10/99 filed.

Answer due on 3/30/99 for Richard

LaBombard. (jb) (Entry date 04/ 12/99)

4/21/99 4 Response by Richard LaBombard in

Opposition to (2-1) cross-motion for summary

judgment, filed. c/s (jb)

(Entry date 04/22/99)

4/22/99 5 Motion by Richard LaBombard to dismiss,

filed. c/s (jb)

Docket as of May 25, 2000 11:31 am Page 2

Proceedings include all events.

4:99cv40019 USA v. LaBombard APPEAL

2/15/00 6 Judge Nathaniel M. Gorton. Memorandum

3/14/00 7

3/30/00 8

3/31/00 9

and Order entered. “...The briefs

submitted by the parties do not contain an

adequate exposition of certain pertinent

issues. The government is, therefore,

directed to submit, within twenty-one 21

days, a brief... The defendant may respond

to the government’s submission within

fourteen (14) days after such filing...”

See Order #6 of 2/15/00 for entire text.

(EOD Date 2/16/00) (cc/cl) (jb) (Entry

date 2/16/00)

Supplemental Brief to (6-1) memorandum

order by USA, filed, c/s. (dfs) (Entry date

3/16/00)

Response by Richard LaBombard to (2-1)

opposition (5-1) motion to dismiss, filed.

c/s (jb) (Entry date 3/31/00)

Judge Nathaniel M. Gorton.

Memorandum and Order entered denying

(5-1) motion to dismiss and granting (2-1)

motion for summary judgment See Order

#9 of 3/31/00 for entire text. (EOD Date

4/03/00) (cc/cl) (jb) (Entry date 04/03/00)

Docket as of May 25, 2000 11:31 am Page 3

Proceedings include all events.

4:99cv40019 USA v. LaBombard APPEAL

5/2/00 10 Notice of appeal by Richard LaBombard

filed. Appeal record due on 5/17/00. (jb)

(Entry date 05/05/00)

5/5/00. 11 Judge Nathaniel M Gorton. Judgment

entered for USA against Richard

r LaBombard. Principal: $138,857.75.

(EOD Date 5/10/00) (ce/cl) (Entry date

05/10/00)

5/18/00 -- Certified copy of docket and record on

appeal forwarded to U.S. Court of

Appeals re: (10-1) appeal. (ghh)

5/25/00 -- US Court of Appeals Case Number

assigned to (0-0) recommendations

appeal : USCA NUMBER: 00-1651.

(ghh)

Docket as of May 25, 2000 11:31 am Page 4

APPENDIX “F” LETTER FROM IRS

DATED OCTOBER 1, 1990

Department of the Treasury

Internal Revenue Service

Andover, MA 05501

In reply refer to: 9999999999

Oct. 01,1990 LTR 2358C

003-22-4474 8812 30 000

Input Op: 9999999999 02738

RICHARD LABOMBARD

3 PRISCILLA LANE

BILLERICA, MA 01821-1124

Taxpayer Identification Number: 003-22-4474

Tax Form: 1040

Tax Period: Dec. 31, 1988

Correspondence Received Date: Sept. 25, 1990

Dear Taxpayer:

Sincerely yours,

s/Katherine D (illegible)

F/ Daniel J.Nally

Chief, Collection Branch

APPENDIX “G”: CERTIFICATE OF ASSESSMENT

SHOWING RETURN OF MILITARY PENSION 04/02/90

TO 09/30/96

6£

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rey W407

8L'L7S LNAWAVd 06/20/10

00°01 SLSOO GNV SAa4 = 68/62/S0

ZL'E€S‘€ LSTYa.LNI

00°Z0S‘p AONSIOMAC LIGNV

00°£66 ALTVNad AONSNONITAG

00'SEZ ALTWNAd XVL GALVWILLSA

68/90/70 +91006-90b-L>780 O1'16P' ALTVNdd JONADITOSN 68/90/70

L8/0Z/LO 8¥LZ0-LS1-01780 00°0 NUN.LAY WHOA ANLLLSANS —_L8/P1/S0

“SGUMN TNS y”—S*(JOSIAADY TipasD) (wauiaID"gy) “Wonepodsuely o76q

218 DEZ - _ONTC UPeD JUDUISSISSY Jo uonjeueldxy

ZIES :Polieg

OvOl :wu04 €SP1O WW “s21SUIMIOS]

“NSS esnodg PAL] $I9%q Z| :SSOIppy

| 28eq pLvb-7Z-£00 :NSS 50 NIG CYVEWOEV' GYVHON :Xedxe | jo oureyy

SLNAWAVd GNV SLNAWSSASSYV AO ALVOMILYAD

PHAIIC MNAIATY [SAIIj} GT — Amseaiy 3q} jo jusmjedag OPep W104

00°97 INAWAVd 96/62/11

00°97 INAWAVd 96/1£/01

Lv'6se LNAWAVd 96/0/60

00°01 SLSOO GNV SAa4 s:$ 6/60/10

8L'LZS INAWAVd 06/Z0/v0

8L'LZS LNAWAVd 06/10/€0

8L'LZS INAWAVd — 06/10/20

sequINN JuNCDoy (jossanay Mpa4)) (1uauayoqy) uonjeyodsues | aed

218 DEZ + N1G MpesD jUsUISSISSY Jo uoljeuBydxg

ZIE8 :Polied

OPO! :u104 ESP1O WW “so1suIWIOS]

‘NSS esnodg SAL] $39%q Z| ‘SSOIPPY

7 o8eqg pLyb-7Z-£00 NSS 40 NI CUVAWOEV GUVHONI :4eAedxe jo ouren,

SLNAWAVd GNV SLNAWSSASSY AO ALVOLALLYAD

IIAIIS *mUsAsy [8G13}0] - AINSBII | 243 jo jusuIedsag OPey 10,J

00°97 LNAWAVd 6/0€/90

00°97 INAWAVd 6/0€/S0

00°97 LNAWAVd L6/67/v0.

00°97 INSWAVd 6/I€/€0

00°97 LNAWAVd 6/92/20

00°97 INAWAVd 6/82/10

00°97 LNAWAVd 96/0€/ZI

JqUINN JUNODOY (josdaaay MNWpadD) (1uauajngy) uoryeodsuBs] o1eq]

338] DEZ -__‘ ONTC sper JUSUISSOSSy Jo uonjeueldxy

, TIES :poltog

OPO] :uu04 €SPIO WW “seIsUIWIOR]

‘NSS asnodg PAL] $1930g Z| ‘ssouppy

€ 988g bLvb-7Z-£00 :NSS 20 NIF CUVGNOVT GYVHON :2Xedxey jo ourey

SLNAWAVd GNV SLNAWSSASSV JO ALVOMILYAD

IHAIIC *NUIAIY [eaiajza] — Aanseaiy 2q) jo juomjedsg Orecpy W404

00°97 INAWAVd = L6/0£/01

ALTWNad

LL'LOP XVLAVdOLZUNTIVA 6/0701

00°97 INAWAVd L6/67/60

00°97 INAWAVd = L6/97/80

00°97 INAWAVd = L6/10/80

sQUINN JUNOSOY (jossaaay NpadD) (mauaing y) uoysyodsuBi | a1eq

ZIER *poLed

OPO! :au04 €SPlO WI ‘s23sUTWIOS]

“NSS esnodg SALI] $9%2q Z| “SSOIppy

p 238g pLbt-7Z-£00 “NSS 2° NIF CUVEANOEY' GUYVHORI :2Xedxe] jo ouren,

SLNUWAVd GNV SLNAUWSSGSSY 40 ALVOLILLYAD

SOIAIOS SNUSADY [BUJa;U] ~ Amsvo1] oy) JO juoUNTeEdeg OPCr W404

00°97 LNAWAVd 86/0£/10

00°97 LSFYALNI 86/60/20

00°97 LNAWAVd 6/62/71

00°97 LSTYSLNI = L6/7Z/Z1

00°97 LNAWAVd 6/10/71

ALTVWN&d

87 Erb XVL AVd OL FUNTIVA

7L'78Z LSAYALNI = L6/bZ/I1

JQuUINN JUNOSOY (jossaaay NpadD) (mawaing y) uoneyodsuel | 218q

918 DET - MONIC Ped JUDUISSOSSY jo uonsueldxy

TIES *Polieg

OPO] :uL04 ESPIO VW “J0sUIWIOS]

‘NSS esnodg PALI] $3938q Z| ‘ssouppy

¢ o8eq bLvb-7Z-£00 *NSS 20 NIG CYVEWOEVT GYVHON :4Xedxe] jo ourey

SLNAWAVd GNY SLNAWSSASSV 4O ALVOLILLYAD

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.