Appendix — El Paso County Water Improvement District No. 1 v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co.
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APPENDIX A — OPINION OF THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
DATED AND FILED MARCH 19, 2001
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 00-50485
SOUTHWESTERN BELL TELEPHONE COMPANY,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
VERSUS
CITY OF EL PASO, et al.,
Defendants,
and
EL PASO COUNTY WATER IMPROVEMENT
DISTRICT NO. 1,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
El Paso Division
Before DUHE and PARKER, Circuit Judges, and
LINDSAY,®* District Judge.
* District Judge of the Northern District of Texas, sitting by
designation.
2a
Appendix A
ROBERT M. PARKER, Circuit Judge:
Appellant El Paso County Water Improvement District
No. 1 appeals the district court’s denial of its motion to
dismiss on Eleventh Amendment grounds: Because we
conclude that the district court applied the proper legal
standard in reviewing Appellant’s motion, we AFFIRM.
I.
Appellant is a water improvement district created
pursuant to Article XVI, Section 59, of the Texas
Constitution. Appellant owns a series of irrigation ditches
deeded from the United States Bureau of Reclamation to
____ Appellant in January 1996. Development in the areaofthe
ditches has resulted in the development of roads crossing
the ditches and in an increase in the demand for telephone
service, which is provided by installing telephone lines along
such roads. Appellant has established certain application
procedures for entities wanting to cross the canals, laterals,
and ditches-rights-of-way owned by Appellant. Such
procedures require an entity to complete an application, pay
an application fee, and obtain a survey. The application must
be preliminarily approved by Appellant’s Board of Directors,
which, upon completion of the survey, assesses a payment
against the entity based on the length of the crossing.
Appellee, a telecommunications services provider,
brought this action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief
against the City of El Paso and Appellant for their alleged
violation of the federal Telecommunications Act of 1996
(“FTA”), the Texas Public Utilities Regulation Act (““PURA”),
3a
Appendix A
and other state law. Appellee and the City of El Paso have
settled their claims. Appellee’s claims against Appellant
allege, inter alia, that under the FTA and PURA, Appellant
cannot demand payment and a detailed application from
Appellee for laying telephone lines that cross Appellant’s
rights-of-way.
In response, Appellant counterclaimed against Appellee
for trespass and/or taking property for public use without
compensation; more importantly, Appellant moved to
dismiss Appellee’s claims under the Eleventh Amendment,
arguing that it was an arm of the State of Texas and thus
Appellee’s claims were barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
The district court, applying our “arm-of-the-state” analysis
_hoted in Clark v. Tarrant County, 798 F.2d 736, 744-45 (Sth
Cir. 1986), held that Appellant was not an arm of the State
of Texas, and thus was not entitled to Eleventh Amendment
immunity.
II.
We review the district court’s order denying a motion
to dismiss on Eleventh Amendment grounds as an appealable
collateral order based on an issue of law, see Champagne v.
Jefferson Parish Sheriff's Office, 188 F.3d 312, 313 (5th Cir.
1999) (per curiam), and we review the district court’s
conclusions of law de novo. Id.
The Eleventh Amendment provides:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not
be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity,
4a
Appendix A
commenced or prosecuted against one of the
United States by Citizens of another State, or by
Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.
U.S. Const. amend. XI. “[T]he reference to actions ‘against
one of the United States’ encompasses not only actions in
which a State is actually named as the defendant, but also
certain actions against state agents and state instrumentalities.”
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425, 429 (1997).
However, the Eleventh Amendment bar to suit in federal
courts only extends to states, state officials, and state
instrumentalities in appropriate circumstances, and does not
extend to counties, similar municipal corporations, and other
political subdivisions, even though such entities enjoy a
“slice of state power.” Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe
Regional Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391, 400-01 (1979);
Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Education v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274,
280 (1977); Moor v. Alameda County, 411 U.S. 693, 717-21
(1973); Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529, 530 (1890).
When determining whether a state agency or
instrumentality may invoke the state’s immunity as an arm
of the state, courts must review the relationship between the
state and the entity in question, examining the essential nature
of the proceeding, the nature of the entity created by state
law, and whether a money judgment against the
instrumentality would be enforceable against the state. Doe,
519 U.S. at 429-30 (citing Kennecott Copper Corp. v. State
Tax Comm'n, 327 U.S. 573, 576 (1946); Mt. Healthy City,
429 U.S. at 280; Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp.,
513 U.S. 30, 45-51 (1994)).
Sa
Appendix A
We have stated that this arm-of-the-state analysis
requires the examination of “the powers, characteristics and
relationships created by state law in order to determine
whether [a] suit is in reality against the state itself.” Hander
v. San Jacinto Junior College, 519 F.2d 273, 279 (Sth Cir.
1975) (citing Aerojet-General Corp. v. Askew, 453 F.2d 819
(Sth Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 892 (1972)); see also
Laje v. R.E. Thomason Gen. Hosp., 665 F.2d 724, 727 (Sth
Cir. 1982); United Carolina Bank v. Board of Regents, 665
F.2d 553, 557 (Sth Cir. Unit A 1982); Jagnandan v. Giles,
538 F.2d 1166, 1173-74 (Sth Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 432
U.S. 910 (1977). In conducting such analysis, we have held
that “comparisons [between like entities] cannot substitute
for a careful examination of the particular entity at issue.”
McDonald v. Board of Miss. Levee Comm'rs, 832 F.2d 901,
908 (Sth Cir. 1987); see also Hudson v. City of New Orleans,
174 F.3d 677, 681 (Sth Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Connick
v. Hudson, 528 U.S. 1004 (1999); Flores v. Cameron County,
92 F.3d 258, 268 (5th Cir. 1996).
We have refined the arm-of-the-state analysis to require
examination of a variety of factors concerning the particular
entity in question. See Clark v. Tarrant County, 798 F.2d
736, 744-45 (Sth Cir. 1986). These factors include (1) whether
the state statutes and case law view the entity as an arm of
the state; (2) the source of the entity’s funding; (3) the entity’s
degree of local autonomy; (4) whether the entity is concerned
primarily with local, as opposed to statewide, problems;
(5) whether the entity has the authority to sue and be sued in
its own name; and (6) whether it has the right to hold and
use property. /d. These factors are examined as a whole, and
* no single factor is dispositive. Jd. at 745; see also United
6a
Appendix A
_ Carolina Bank, 665 F.2d at 557. However, the second factor,
the source of the entity’s funding, is “of considerable
importance.” Doe, 519 U.S. at 904; Jacintoport v. Greater
Baton Rouge Port Comm'n, 762 F.2d 435, 440-41 (Sth Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1057 (1986); Laje, 665 F.2d
at 727.
Appellant argues that the district court erred by applying ~
the arm-of-the-state analysis established in Clark because
our prior decisions hold Appellant as an arm of the state
entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. Specifically,
Appellant argues that our decision in Ysleta Del Sur Pueblo
v. El Paso County Water Improvement Dist., 222 F.3d 208
(Sth Cir.), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 177 (2000), which affirmed
the district court’s finding of Eleventh Amendment immunity
for Appellant, controls this action. Appellant also argues that
our prior decisions in Kamani v. Port of Houston Authority,
702 F.2d 612 (Sth Cir. 1983), and Pillsbury Co. v. Port of
Corpus Christi Authority, 66 F.3d 103 (5th Cir. 1995),
cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1203 (1996), held that the entities at
issue in those cases were entitled to Eleventh Amendment
immunity by virtue of their creation pursuant to Article XVI,
Section 59, of the Texas Constitution. Because Appellant is
also created under Article XVI, Section 59, Appellant argues
that it is likewise entitled to immunity.
We disagree with both arguments. First, Ys/eta is not
controlling because it conflicts with our prior decisions
requiring a careful examination of the nature of an entity
claiming immunity. Although Ys/eta affirmed the district
court’s holding that Appellant was an arm of the state entitled
to immunity, it stated no reasons for the decision except to
7a
Appendix A
say that the plaintiff's arguments in that appeal “lack[ed]
merit.” Ysl/eta, 222 F.3d at 208. In support of this conclusion,
Ysleta cited Kamani and Pillsbury without further
explanation. Kamani was an admiralty action in which the
court stated without analysis that the Port of Houston
Authority was “a ‘creature of state law and a political
subdivision of the State of Texas’ ” entitled to Eleventh
Amendment immunity. Kamani, 702 F.2d at 613. Pillsbury
was a breach-of-contract action in which the court held that
the Port of Corpus Christi Authority was factually and legally
indistinguishable from the Port of Houston Authority, and
was thus entitled to immunity under Kamani. Pillsbury, 66
F.3d at 104.
Ysleta’s conflict with prior decisions establishing
the arm-of-the-state analysis originates with Kamani.
Notwithstanding the arm-of-the-state analysis established by
decisions such as Hander, Jagnandan, United Carolina
Bank, and Laje, Kamani relied on McCrea v. Harris County
Houston Ship Channel Navigation Dist., 423 F.2d 605, 607
(Sth Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 927 (1970), in concluding
that the Port of Houston Authority was entitled to immunity.
However, McCrea involved a wrongful death action under
the Federal Employers’ Liability Act that did not involve
the Eleventh Amendment at all. In McCrea, the court simply
observed that the Port of Houston Authority “is a creature
of state law and a political subdivision of the State of Texas
operating terminal facilities at the Port of Houston” in
concluding that the port was not a “rail carrier” under the
FELA. McCrea, 423 F.2d at 607. While McCrea did examine
the port’s organizational and operational characteristics, such
examination is different from the arm-of-the-state analysis
8a
Appendix A
required to determine whether an entity is entitled to Eleventh
Amendment immunity. See Jacintoport, 762 F.2d at 440 (“It
would be inconsistent with this Circuit’s test for determining
[Eleventh Amendment] immunity to rely on Miller [v.
Greater Baton Rouge Port Comm'n, 74 So.2d 387 (La.
1954)], because immunity of the [entity at issue] was never
an issue in that case.”). In light of our decisions requiring
the application of the arm-of-the-state analysis, Kamani’s
quotation of McCrea’s statement that the Port of Houston is
a “creature of state law and a political subdivision of the
State of Texas” does not automatically support the conclusion
that the Port of Houston Authority is entitled to Eleventh
Amendment immunity. An entity is not an arm of the state
for Eleventh Amendment purposes simply because it is a
creature of state law and a political subdivision of a state.
Such conclusion would entirely obviate the arm-of-the-state
analysis because every entity claiming Eleventh Amendment
immunity is a “creature” of some state law. Moreover,
political subdivisions of states are generally not entitled to
Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Lake Country Estates,
440 U.S. at 401; Lincoln County, 133 U.S. at 530-31.
Kamani’s conclusion that the Port of Houston Authority was
entitled to immunity by virtue of its status as a creature of
state law and a political subdivision of Texas conflicts with
the line of precedent beginning with at least Hander,
Jagnandan, United Carolina Bank, and Laje.
Pillsbury continued the conflict by applying Kamani to
hold that the Port of Corpus Christi Authority was entitled
to Eleventh Amendment immunity. This result is not
surprising because the Port of Corpus Christi Authority was
held to be factually and legally indistinguishable from the
9a
Appendix A
Port of Houston Authority in Kamani. While Pillsbury noted
that a proper arm-of-the-state analysis would result in the
same conclusion, the conflict created by Kamani was not
addressed. In addition, the court suggested in dicta that its
decision was controlled by Kamani because both ports were
created pursuant to Article XVI, Section 59.
Ys/eta thus rests on holdings that conflict with our prior
decisions requiring an arm-of-the-state analysis for entities
claiming Eleventh Amendment immunity, and the district
court did not err when it applied Clark’s six-factor analysis.
When two holdings or lines of precedent conflict, the earlier
holding or line of precedent controls. Billiot v. Puckett, 135
F.3d 311, 316 (Sth Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Billiot v.
Anderson, 525 U.S. 966 (1998). In this action. although
Kamani was decided before Clark, Clark’s arm-of-the-state
analysis is a consistent part of a line of precedent including
at least Hander, Jagnandan, United Carolina Bank, and Laje,
which were all decided before Kamani. Therefore, the district
court properly applied Clark in denying Appellant’s Eleventh
Amendment argument. Moreover, even though Ys/eta was
decided before the district court issued its decision, it was
published after that decision and thus was not precedent for
the district court. See Firty Cir. R. 47.5.4.
We also reject Appellant’s second argument that it is
entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity by virtue of its
creation pursuant to Article XVI, Section 59. Even if Kamani
and Pillsbury applied the proper arm-of-the-state analysis,
they do not state that an entity is entitled to Eleventh
Amendment immunity simply because they are created under
a particular state law. While Pillsbury noted that both ports
10a
Appendix A
were created pursuant to Article XVI, Section 59, there is
no suggestion in that decision that the particular law under
which an entity is created is the sole factor in determining
the issue of immunity. Our decisions clearly forbid such a
result. See, e.g., Jacintoport, 762 F.2d at 439-40. Moreover,
even though Ys/eta affirmed the district court’s conclusion
that we established a “bright-line test” for determining
whether an entity created pursuant to Article XVI, Section
59, is entitled to immunity, such a test is contrary to our
decisions requiring the application of the arm-of-the-state
analysis and to the principle that comparisons or analogies
between like entities cannot substitute for a proper analysis
of the particular entity claiming immunity. See, e.g., McDonald,
832 F.2d at 908. Indeed, such a test is no test at all.
Finally, because Appellant does not challenge the district
court’s application of the individual factors of the arm-of-
the-state analysis, we will not address such application.
While Appellant argues in its reply brief that Appellee’s
defense of the district court’s application of the factors is
“fundamentally flawed,” Appellant does not specifically
challenge the district court’s analysis, and we will not
construe Appellant’s argument as such.
III.
Based on the reasons stated above, we AFFIRM the
district court’s order denying Appellant’ s motion to dismiss
on Eleventh Amendment grounds.
lla
APPENDIX B — ORDER OF THE UNITED STATES
DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT
OF TEXAS, EL PASO DIVISION DATED MAY 17, 2000
AND FILED MAY 22, 2000
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
EL PASO DIVISION
Civil Action No. EP-98-CA-114-EP
SOUTHWESTERN BELL TELEPHONE COMPANY,
Plaintiff,
-
VS.
CITY OF EL PASO and EL PASO COUNTY WATER
IMPROVEMENT DISTRICT NO. 1,
Defendant.
ORDER
On this date the Court considered El Paso County Water
Improvement District No. 1’s Motion for Dismissal Pursuant
to Eleventh Amendment, filed December 1, 1999 and
Southwestern Bell’s Response. El Paso County Water
Improvement District No. 1’s letter briefs have also been
considered. Also on this date, the Court considered
Southwestern Bell’s Conditional Motion to Substitute
Officials of El Paso County Water Improvement District
No. 1, as well as the response to that motion. After careful
consideration, the Court will deny the motion to dismiss and
will deny the conditional motion as moot.
12a
Appendix B
Background and Procedural History
Southwestern Bell Telephone Company (“SWBT’”), a
provider of telecommunications services holding a certificate
of convenience and necessity issued by the Public Utility
Commission of Texas (“PUC”), brought this suit for
declaratory and injunctive relief originally against the City
of El Paso (“City”). In its original petition, SWBT sought
declarations that (1) a proposed city ordinance that would
require SWBT to pay the City 5% of all gross revenues from
services to customers within El Paso violated the Federal
Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 151 et seq.,
(“FTA”); (2) certain buyout provisions of a then-current
ordinance as well as the proposed ordinance also violated
the FTA; (3) the proposed ordinance violated the Texas
Public Utilities Regulation Act, Title II of the Texas Utilities
Code, (“PURA”); (4) the buy-out provisions violated Article
1416 of the Texas Revised Civil Statutes; (5) no SWBT
property would be subject to the buyout provisions; and
(6.) the buyout provision is unenforceable.
El Paso County Water Improvement District No. 1
(“District”) was added as a Defendant in SWBT’s First
Amended Complaint. The District is a water improvement
district operating under Article XVI, Section 59 of the Texas
Constitution. At the center of the controversy between SWBT
and the District is a series of irrigation ditches deeded from
the federal Bureau of Reclamation to the District in January
1996. Development in the area of the ditches has resulted in
a number of roads being built crossing ditches and has also
resulted in an increase in demand for telephone service.
13a
Appendix B
The District has established certain application
procedures for entities wanting to cross the canals, laterals
and ditches. These procedures require an entity, such as
SWBT, to complete an application, pay an application fee
of $500 and obtain a survey. Before the survey is ordered,
the District’s Board of Directors must preliminarily approve
the application. After the survey is completed, the Board
assesses a charge, which can be determined on an ad hoc
basis, based on the length of the crossing.
In its claims against the District, SWBT seeks
declaratory relief, arguing that (1) the District’s application
procedures and fees violate both FTA and PURA; (2) roads
and highways crossing the District’s ditches and canals are
public roadways; (3) the District has no right to charge for
telephone lines crossing its canals and ditches when those
lines are within the rights-of-way of city or county roads;
(4) the water flowing through the District’s canals and ditches
is public; and (5) the District has no right to charge for
telephone lines crossing public waters. The District filed a
counterclaim, alleging that SWBT has trespassed on its
property, or alternatively, that SWBT has taken its property
for public use without compensating the District.
SWBT and the City have settled their claims, leaving
the District as the only defendant remaining in the case.
Standards for Eleventh Amendment Immunity
The District moves to dismiss this case on the basis that
it is barred by the Eleventh Amendment. In the absence of
valid Congressional abrogation or state consent, the Eleventh
l4a
Appendix B
Amendment prohibits a plaintiff from suing a state in federal
court. College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary
Educ. Expense Bd., 119 S.Ct. 2219, 2223 (1999).
The District argues that it is a branch of the state and is,
therefore, immune from suit. SWBT argues that the District
is more like a municipality, county or a school district, none
of which are protected by Eleventh Amendment immunity.
Hess v. Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30,
47 (1994); Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle,
429 U.S. 274, 280 (1977).
In Clark v. Tarrant County, 798 F.2d 736 (5" Cir. 1986),
the Fifth Circuit established a six-factor test for determining
whether an entity is a branch of the state for purposes of the
Eleventh Amendment. These factors are:
1.) Whether the state statutes and case law view
the agency as an arm of the state:
2.) The source of the entity’s funding;
3.) The entity’s degree of local autonomy;
4.) Whether the entity is concerned primarily
with local, as opposed to statewide, problems;
5.) Whether the entity has the authority to sue
and be sued in its own name; and
6.) Whether the entity has the right to hold and
use property.
15a
Appendix B
Hudson v. City of New Orleans, 174 F.3d 677, 679 (5" Cir.
1999). See also Clark, 798 F.2d at 744-45.
However, there is another line of Fifth Circuit case law
on this subject to which the District directs the Court’s
attention. In this line of cases, port authorities, which also
operate under Article XVI, Section 59 of the Texas
Constitution, are held to be immune arms of the state.
Pillsbury Co., Inc. v. Port of Corpus Christi Auth., 66 F.3d
103, 104 (5" Cir. 1995); Kamani v. Port of Houston Auth.,
702 F.2d 612 (5" Cir. 1983).
The District argues that, based on these cases, the Fifth
Circuit has created a bright-line test for entities organized
and operated under Article XVI, Section 59 of the Texas
Constitution, and that an examination of the Clark factors
would be inappropriate. Particularly, the District points to
language in Pillsbury emphasizing the creation of the port
authority pursuant to Article XVI, Section 59 of the Texas
Constitution. Pillsbury, 66 F.3d at 104-05.
The Court is convinced that the language in Pillsbury
does not have the broad significance that the District would
attribute to it. The basis for the Fifth Circuit’s decision in
Pillsbury is that the Port of Corpus Christi Authority is
factually and legally indistinguishable from the Port of
Houston Authority, which the court in Kamani had
previously held immune from suit under the Eleventh
Amendment. Pillsbury, 66 F.3d at 104. Therefore, Pillsbury
was essentially decided on the basis of stare decisis.
Kamani, too, was decided on the basis of a previous case,
McCrea v. Harris County Houston Ship Channel Navigation
l6a
Appendix B
Dist., 423 F.2d 605 (5" Cir. 1970). The court in Kamani, in
holding the Houston port immune from suit, cited McCrea’s
statement that the Port of Houston Authority was “a creature
of state law and a political subdivision of the State of Texas.”
Kamani, 702 F.2d at 613. In McCrea, the issue of whether
the Houston port was an arm of the state for Eleventh
Amendment purposes was never raised; rather, the court was
describing the Harris County Houston Ship Channel
Navigation District. McCrea, 423 F.2d at 607. Therefore,
neither Kamani nor McCrea hold that an entity created and
run under Article XVI, Section 59 of the Texas Constitution
is automatically protected by the Eleventh Amendment.
Further, the context of the statement in Pillsbury
indicates that the Fifth Circuit did not intend to create a
bright-line test for Eleventh Amendment immunity. The
plaintiff in Pillsbury had argued that the Supreme Court case
Hess v. Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30
(1994), overruled Kamani. In Hess, the Supreme Court held
that a bi-state railroad created by an interstate compact was
not subject to Eleventh Amendment immunity. Hess, 513
U.S. at 38. The Pillsbury court distinguished the analysis in
Hess by stating:
We view Hess as a limited holding addressing the
standard to be applied to bi-state entities not created
pursuant to state statute. Because the Corpus Port
and the Houston Port were both created and still
operate pursuant to Article XVI, Section 59 of the
Texas Constitution, Hess does not overrule
Kamani or control the disposition of this appeal.
Pillsbury, 66 F.3d at 104-05.
i a a — rents.
17a
Appendix B
Thus, in context, the court in Pillsbury is not indicating that
there should be a bright line rule — that everything created
pursuant to a particular section in the Texas Constitution is
entitled to immunity — but is instead distinguishing the facts
before it from the facts before the Supreme Court in Hess. !
Therefore, the Court will examine the six Clark factors to
determine the status of the District.
The six factors
- The six Clark factors are not given equal weight, and it
is common for several of the factors to weigh in favor of
viewing the entity as an arm of the state and for several to
weigh against it. Hudson, 174 F.3d at 682-83.
The source of the District’s funding
Of the six Clark factors, the source of the entity’s funding
has been held to be the most important. Hudson, 174 F.3d at
679; Delahoussaye v. City of New Iberia, 937 F.2d 144, 147
(5" Cir. 1991). This is essentially a question of whether the
state would be liable for a judgment against the entity.
See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425, 430
(1997). The Court notes that SWBT is not seeking any
monetary damages from the District.
1. Cf. Flores v. Cameron County, 92 F.3d 258, 268 (5" Cir.
1996) (“analogies between like entities cannot replace consideration
of the six relevant factors”); Laje v. R.E. Thomason Gen. Hosp.,
665 F.2d 724, 727 (5 Cir. 1982) (“[a] federal court must examine
the particular entity in question and its powers and characteristics
as created by state law to determine whether the suit is in reality a
suit against the state itself”).
18a
Appendix B
The District is funded by local user fees (assessments),
local taxes and bonds. See TEx. WaTER Cope § 49.107
(authorizing a district to levy and collect taxes for operation
and maintenance); Jd. at § 55.354 (assessments); Jd. at
§ 55.491 (authorizing bond election); /d. at § 55.491 (amount
of the bonds should be sufficient to pay for proposed
improvements); /d. at § 55.651 et seq. (levying taxes to pay
principal and interest on bonds).
More importantly, it appears that the District itself, and
not the state, is responsible for any judgments against it.
Harris County Flood Control Dist. v. Mihelich, 525 §.W.2d
506 (Tex. 1975); Op. Att’y Gen. No. H-1111, 1978 WL
24366 (Jan. 6, 1978) (both stating that a judgment against
district operating pursuant to Article XVI, Section 59 of the
Texas Constitution should be paid from the district’s
maintenance fund). See also TEx. WATER Cope § 49.066(b)
(a state court rendering judgment against a district may order
the district to collect taxes to pay the judgment). Therefore,
a judgment against the District would not be paid from the
state treasury.
How state law views the District
Although not binding. on the Court, whether state law
views the entity as an alter ego of the state is relevant to the
determination of Eleventh Amendment immunity. The Texas
Supreme Court has held that political subdivisions created
by the Texas Legislature under article XVI, section 59 of
the Texas Constitution are immune from suit in Texas courts.
Guillory v. Port of Houston Auth., 845 S.W.2d 812, 812 (Tex.
1993). Although the entity at issue in Guillory was a port
19a
Appendix B
authority, the Texas Supreme Court also addressed the
immunity of water improvement districts. Specifically, the
Texas court stated that “[w]ater improvement districts .. .
are different from municipalities in that the former are created
by the Legislature for general public purposes, while the latter
are created by consent of their inhabitants.” Guillory, 845
S.W.2d at 814.
The Texas Supreme Court also stated that the Houston
Port Authority was immune from federal suit, based on
Kamani. Guillory, 845 S.W.2d at 815. Because the same port
authority was involved in both Kamani and Guillory, these
statements do not persuade the Court that the District is
immune under the Eleventh Amendment.
The district's degree of local autonomy
The District is run by a Board of Directors consisting of
five locally elected directors who own land within the
District. Tex. WATER Cope §§ 55.101; 55.102. The Board of
Directors is permitted to purchase or make improvements
and facilities for irrigation without state approval. Jd. at
§ 55.163. Likewise, the District is authorized to enter into
contracts with the United States without state approval.
Id. at § 55.185. The District can also set its own fees, sell its
property and annex land. /d. at §§ 49.212, 49.226, 49.301-
.302. On the other hand, before a district can issue bonds to
fund a project, the project must be approved by the Texas
Natural Resource Conservation Commission. /d. at § 49.181.
Nevertheless, on the whole, the District appears to have a
significant amount of local autonomy.
20a
Appendix B
Whether the district is concerned primarily with local,
as opposed to statewide, problems
Although the use of water is of concern to the entire
state of Texas, the District’s powers appear limited to address
issues of local concern. The Court notes the Texas Supreme
Court’s statement that entities created under Article XVI,
Section 59 of the Texas Constitution are for “general public
purposes.” Guillory, 845 S.W.2d at 814. Nevertheless, on
the whole, it appears that the District is primarily concerned
with the area within the District itself. The purposes of a
water improvement district are:
(a) to provide for irrigation of land within its
boundaries.
(b) to furnish water for domestic, power, and
commercial purposes.
(c) to cooperate with the United States under
federal reclamation laws for the purpose of
construction, operation and maintenance of
irrigation and drainage facilities necessary to
maintain the land’s irrigability and to assume
debts to the United States on account of district
lands
See TEX. WATER Cope § 55.161.
These purposes strongly suggest that the District is
primarily concerned with local problems.
2la
Appendix B
Whether the entity has the right to sue and be sued
in its own name & whether the entity has
the right to hold and use property.
These two factors are frequently considered to be the
least important. See Hudson, 174 F.3d at 682. A water district
is permitted to sue in its own name. See TEX. WATER CoDE
§ 49.066(a) (a district, including a water improvement
district, may sue and be sued); Jd. at § 55.504 (before selling
bonds, a water improvement district is to bring suit in district
court); City of Pelly v. Harris County Water Control and
Improvement Dist. No. 7, 195 S.W.2d 241 (Tex. Civ. App.
— Galveston 1946) (rev'd on other grounds).
Likewise, a water district can acquire property. TEx.
WATER Cope § 49.218; See also Id. at 49.222 (eminent
domain); E/ Paso County Water Improvement Dist. No. I v.
City of El Paso, 133 F.Supp. 894, 914 (W.D.Tex. 1995) (the
District has “a broad right of eminent domain”).
Motion to Substitute Plaintiffs
In light of the Court’s decision, it is unnecessary to
decide whether SWBT could substitute the District’s
directors as defendants. The Court notes, however, that
Ex Parte Young permits suit for prospective declaratory or
injunctive relief against a state officer in his or her official
capacity. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974); Ex Parte
Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). Based on the nature of the suit
and the prospective relief sought in this case, the Ex Parte
Young doctrine would seem applicable. Therefore, if the
District were considered an arm of the state for Eleventh
22a
Appendix B
Amendment purposes, the suit would be permitted to go
forward by substituting the Directors of the District for the
District itself.
Conclusion
ACCORDINGLY, it is ORDERED that El Paso County
Water Improvement District No. 1’s Motion for Dismissal
Pursuant to Eleventh Amendment (Docket No. 49) is
DENIED. It is also ORDERED that Southwestern Bell’s
Conditional Motion to Substitute Officials of El Paso County
Water Improvement District No. 1 (Docket No. 55) is
DENIED AS MOOT.
s/ Edward C. Prado
EDWARD C. PRADO
UNITED STATES DISTRICT
JUDGE
23a
APPENDIX C — PER CURIAM ORDER OF THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE FIFTH CIRCUIT DENYING PETITION FOR
REHEARING DATED AND FILED APRIL 25, 2001
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 00-50485
SOUTHWESTERN BELL TELEPHONE COMPANY
Plaintiff — Appellee
v.
CITY OF EL PASO; ET AL
Defendants
EL PASO COUNTY WATER IMPROVEMENT
DISTRICT NO 1
Defendant — Appellant
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Western District of Texas, El Paso
ON PETITION FOR REHEARING EN BANC
(Opinion 3/19/01, 5 Cir., 9 eee
24a
Appendix C
Before DUHE and PARKER, Circuit Judges, and
LINDSAY,* District Judge.
PER CURIAM:
(~) Treating the Petition for Rehearing En Banc as a Petition
for Panel Rehearing, the Petition for Panel Rehearing is
DENIED. No member of the panel nor judge in regular active
service of the court having requested that the court be polled
on Rehearing En Banc (Fed. R. App. P. and 5th Cir. R. 35),
the Petition for Rehearing En Banc is DENIED.
* * *
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
s/ Robert M. Parker
United States Circuit Judge
* District Judge of the Northern District of Texas, sitting by
designation.
Judges King and Jones did not participate in the consideration
of the petition for rehearing en banc.
25a
APPENDIX D — ORDER OF THE UNITED STATES
DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT
OF TEXAS, PECOS DIVISION DISMISSING CASE ON
ELEVENTH AMENDMENT GROUNDS IN YSLETA
DEL SUR PUEBLO v. EL PASO COUNTY WATER
IMPROVEMENT DISTRICT NO. 1 DATED NOVEMBER
13, 1998 AND FILED NOVEMBER 16, 1998
THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
PECOS DIVISION
P-98-CA-27
YSLETA DEL SUR PUEBLO
v.
EL PASO COUNTY WATER IMPROVEMENT
DISTRICT NO. 1
ORDER DISMISSING CASE ON ELEVENTH
AMENDMENT GROUNDS
BEFORE THE COURT in the above-captioned cause
of action is Plaintiff's Motion for Order on Eleventh
Amendment and Other Immunity Issues, filed September 23,
1998, Defendant’s Response, filed October 5, 1998, and
Plaintiff's Letter Brief in Reply to Defendant’s Response,
filed October 8, 1998. After due consideration, the Court is
of the opinion that Plaintiff's claim should be dismissed for
lack of jurisdiction.
26a
Appendix D
Factual and Procedural Background
The Plaintiff, the Ysleta del Sur Pueblo (“Tribe”), a
federally recognized Indian tribe, seeks to eject El Paso
County Water Improvement District No. 1 (““EPCWID”) from
property EPCWID possesses in the present day Ysleta and
Socorro Grants in E] Paso County, Texas and seeks damages
resulting from EPCWID’s alleged trespass cn such property.
The Tribe filed its Complaint on March 11, 1998, asserting
that the Tribe is rightfully entitled to possess the subject
property based on a 1751 Spanish Grant ané a prior aboriginal
right of possession. The Tribe alleges that neither the
Kingdom of Spain, its successor the Republic of Mexico, or
the Republic of Texas ever terminated the Tribe’s legal title
in any of its lands or its aboriginal right to possess its lands.
Further, the Tribe claims its legal title and aboriginal rights
are protected by the 1848 Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo,
9 Stat. 922 and the Trade and Intercourse Act, ch. 33, 1 Stat.
137 (“the Indian Non-Intercourse Act”), as amended.
Through various Relinquishment Acts, the state of Texas
relinquished the subject properties to the people of the towns
of Ysleta and Socorro, respectively.
Defendant El Paso County Water Improvement District
No. 1 acts as an agent of the State of Texas in handling
individual contracts between water users and the United
States and to levy taxes and assessments on lands involved
in the Rio Grande Reclamation Project, and was organized
in accordance with the general laws of Texas and pursuant
~ to Article XVI, section 59 of the Constitution of the State of
Texas. (Defendant’s Original Answer {J 45-47.) EPC WID
contends that the Tribe was not a federally recognized Indian
27a
Appendix D
tribe prior to 1968 and that non-Indian land is the subject of
this litigation. Consequently, EPCWID denies that the Indian
Non-Intercourse Act, federal Indian common law, or the
Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo apply to this case. EPCWID
denies that the Tribe is entitled to possess the subject
property, whether under a 1751 Spanish Grant or any alleged
prior aboriginal right of possession.
EPCWID claims that it is a political subdivision of the
State of Texas and as such possesses sovereign immunity to
suit and is immune to the Tribe’s claims for damages. It also
asserts the affirmative defenses of laches and statute of
limitations, and further claims that if the Tribe ever had any
aboriginal right of possession to the subject lands, such right
was extinguished long ago by the actions of the United States.
Plaintiff's (the Tribe’s) Motion requests the Court to
affirm its jurisdiction over EPCWID or to dismiss the case
based on Eleventh Amendment immunity. The Tribe
acknowledges that EPCWID is a political subdivision of the
State of Texas, organized and existing pursuant to Article
XVI, Section 59 of the Constitution of the State of Texas,
but claims it is not an alter-ego agency of the State (Original
Complaint 45; First Amended Original Complaint 95.)
EPCWID urges that this action should be dismissed
because, as a political subdivision operating pursuant to
Article XVI, Section 59 of the Texas Constitution, it is
entitled to sovereign immunity.
;
|
!
28a
Appendix D
Discussion
Is the Water District Entitled to
Sovereign Immunity?
EPCWID asserts that the Tribe’s claims are barred by
the Eleventh Amendment to the United Status Constitution,
which provides that “(t]he judicial power of the United States
shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity,
commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States
by Citizens of another State or by Citizens or Subjects of
any Foreign State. U.S. Const. amend XI. Thus, a state is
constitutionally immune from actions brought in federal
courts by its own citizens or citizens of other states, unless
it consents to be sued. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 3, 19
(1890); Scott v. Board of Supervisors of La. State Univ., 336
F.2d 557, 553 (Sth Cir. 1964); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S.
651, 663 (1974); Florida Dep’t of States v. Treasure Salvors,
Inc., 458 U.S. 670, 683 n.17(1982); Jn re State of New York,
256 U.S. 490, 497 (1921). See also Aerojet-General Corp.
-v. Askew, 453 F.2d 819, 828 (Sth Cir. 1971) (setting forth a
two-pronged test for the existence of Eleventh Amendment
immunity: (1) whether the action is against the state, and
(2) if so, whether the state consented to be sued in the federal
courts), and Voism’s Oyster House, Inc. v. Guidry, 799 F.2d
183, 185-86 (Sth Cir. 1986) (noting that Eleventh Amendment
bars suits in federal court by citizens of a state against their
own state or a state agency or department). Sovereign
immunity of the Eleventh Amendment restricts suits against
states by sovereigns as well as by individuals. Monaco v.
Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 321-22, 330 (1933) (holding that
a state, without counting, may not be sued by its own citizens,
a saananineniehimeme senate —
29a
Appendix D
foreign corporations, other states, or foreign states). Eleventh
Amendment immunity also applies to a suit by an Indian
tribe against a state. Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak,
501 U.S. 775, 782 (1991) (recognizing the Indian tribes enjoy
immunity against suit by the states and vice versa); Idaho v.
Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 117 S.Ct. 2028
(1997) (according Indian tries the same status as foreign
sovereigns and recognizing that sovereign immunity restricts
suits by sovereigns against sovereigns). Plaintiff concedes
in its pleadings that the Ysleta del Sur Pueblo is a federally
recognized Indian tribe. (Original Complaint 94; First
Amended Original Complaint 94). The Tribe and a fortiorari
its members are therefore subject to Eleventh Amendment
immunity. Coeur d’Alene Tribe, 117 S.Ct. at 2033-34.
A State can waive its sovereign immunity and consent
to being sued. Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman,
465 U.S. 89, 99 (1984), citing Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S.
436, 447 (1383); Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 117 S.Ct. at 2033.
The State’s consent, however, must be unequivocally
expressed. Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 99, citing Edelman vy.
Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 673 (1974); Papasan v. Allain, 478
U.S. 265, 276 n.10 (1986). Absent such waiver, neither a
state or agencies acting under its control are subject to suit
in federal court. Sherwinski v. Peterson, 99 F.3d 849, 851
(5th Cir. 1996), citing Puerto Rico Aquaduct and Sewer
Authority v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 144 (1993).
A clear showing of congressional purpose is required to
abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity, such as enactment
of a federal statute that explicitly and on its face indicates
an intent to sweep away the immunity of the States or that
30a
Appendix D
has a history which shows that Congress considered and
firmly decided to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment immunity
of the States. Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 343-45 (1979)
(holding that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not override state’s
Eleventh Amendment immunity). See also Pennhurst, 465
U.S. at 99, quoting Quern, 440 U.S. at 342 (requiring an
unequivocal expression of congressional intent to “overturn
the constitutionally guaranteed immunity of the several
States” in the context of civil rights legislation and the
Fourteenth Amendment). In deciding whether a state has
waived its constitutional protection under the Eleventh
Amendment, the Court will find waiver only where stated
“by the most express language or by such overwhelming
implications from the text as [will] leave no room for any
other reasonable construction .” Edelman, 415 U.S. at 673,
quoting Murray v. Wilson Distilling Co., 213 U.S. 151, 171
(1909).
In Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe, a federally recognized
Indian tribe brought suit against the state and its officials
and agencies, alleging an ongoing violation of its property
rights in contravention of federal law. 521 U.S. 261, 117
S.Ct. 2028, 2040 (1997).' Specifically, the Coeur d’ Alene
1. The Coeur d’ Alene Tribe requested injunctive relief in Jdaho
v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe, seeking to invoke the Ex parte Young
exception to the Eleventh Amendment bar. 117 S.Ct. at 2043. In
Ex Parte Young, the Supreme Court recognized an exception to a
state’s Eleventh Amendment immunity for certain suits seeking
declaratory and injunctive relief against state officers in their
individual capacities. 117 S.Ct. at 2030; Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S.
123 (1908). While the Supreme Court did find the Young doctrine
applicable, it allowed claims for declaratory and injunctive relief to
(Cont’d)
3la
Appendix D
Tribe (“CDA Tribe”) claimed ownership in the submerged
lands and bed of Coeur d’Alene Lake and various of its
navigable tributaries and effluents lying within the original
boundaries of the Coeur d’ Alene Reservation. Jd. at 2030-32.
In the alternative, the CDA Tribe claimed ownership of the
submerged lands pursuant to unextinguished aboriginal title.
Id. at 2032. The Coeur d’Alene Tribe asked the Court to
declare that the disputed lands were for the exclusive use,
occupancy and enjoyment of the tribe and to invalidate all
statutes and regulations purporting to regulate the lands. /d.
The Court found that the CDA Tribe’s suit was the functional
equivalent of a quiet title action which implicates special
sovereignty interests. Jd. at 2040. As such, the CDA Tribe
could not maintain a quiet title suit against Idaho in federal
court, absent the State’s consent, because the Eleventh
Amendment would bar it. Jd. Although the relief requested
is not as extensive, the nature of suit in the instant case is
strikingly similar to that of the Coeur d'Alene suit: the Ysleta
del Sur Pueblo seeks to establish its rightful title to certain
property within the Ysleta and Socorro Grants and to exclude
EPCWID from possession. On these facts, the instant suit
too is the functional equivalent of a quiet title action, and
thus cannot be maintained in federal court without the
consent of the State of Texas. See id. To hold otherwise
would allow the federal court to summon a state before it in
a private action seeking to divest the state of a property
interest, a power clearly beyond the Court’s authority
(Cont’d)
proceed only insofar as they sought to preclude ongoing violations
of federal law. /d. Because the Ysleta del Sur Pueblo Tribe did not
include state officers as defendants, the Ex Parte Young exception
has no application in the instant case.
32a
Appendix D
to act. Florida Dept. of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc.,
458 U.S. 670, 699-700 (1932).
The instant case is a property rights suit seeking relief
in the form of ejectment and damages resulting from trespass.
The federal statutes implicated include the Indian
Non- Intercourse Act and any treaties which may have been
codified. State statutes at issue include various
Relinquishment Acts. \Neither party has cited any evidence
of Congressional or state legislative intent to abrogate
Eleventh Amendment immunity in these particular acts of
legislation. Likewise, neither party has established by state
statute or otherwise that either the State of Texas or its agent
E] Paso County Water Improvement District No. 1 consented
to be sued. Consequently, the Eleventh Amendment bars the
Tribe’s claim in federal court against the State of Texas.
Having determined that the Tribe’s claim is barred by
the Eleventh Amendment if asserted against the State, the
question that remains is whether the State of Texas is the
real party in interest in this suit brought against EPCWID.
The nature of the suit as one against the State is to be
determined by the essential nature and effect of the
proceeding. Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury of
Ind., 323 U.S. 459, 464 (1945). The Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals has taken a case-by-case approach to determining
whether a State is the real party in interest in suits brought
against entities which appear to be alter egos of the State.
Richardson v. Southern Univ., 118 F.3d 450 (5th Cir. 1997).
“A federal court must examine the particular entity in
question and its powers and characteristics as created by state
law to determine whether the suit is in reality a suit against
33a
Appendix D
the state itself.” Jd., citing Farias v. Bexar County Bd. of
Trustees for Mental Health Mental Retardation Servs., 925
F.2d 866, 874 (Sth Cir.), in turn quoting Laje v. R.E.
Thomason Gen. Hosp., 665 F.2d 724, 727 (Sth Cir. 1982)),
cert. denied, 502 U.S. 866 (1991). See also Mt. Healthy City
School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280 (1977)
(finding school board was more like county or city than it
was like arm of state, and it therefore was not entitled to
assert Eleventh Amendment immunity where, under state
law, “state” did not include “political subdivisions” and
“political subdivisions” did include local school district);
Sessions v. Rusk State Hospital, 648 F.2d 1066, 1069 (Sth
Cir. 1981) (concluding that Rusk State Hospital is an arm of
the state for Eleventh Amendment purposes because it is a
state institution under exclusive control of Texas Department
of Mental Health and Mental Retardation). The Fifth Circuit
identifies six factors that guide its determination of whether
a particular entity is an arm of the State:?
(1) whether the state statutes and case law
characterize the agency as an arm of the state;
(2) the source or the funds for the entity;
2. This “test” is identical to the test applied by the Fifth Circuit
in diversity jurisdiction case law, to determine whether a
governmental body could be considered a “citizen” or alter ego of a
state. Richardson, 118 F.2d at 452 n.8, citing PYCA Indus., Inc. v.
Harrison County Waste Management Dist., 81 F.3d 1412, 1416 n.2
(Sth Cir. 1996) (“ ‘[T]Jhe analysis of an [entity’s] status is virtually
identical whether the case involves determination of immunity under
the Eleventh Amendment or a determination of citizenship for
diversity purposes.’ ” (quoting Tradigrain, Inc. v. Mississippi State
Port Auth., 701 F.2d 1131, 1132 (Sth Cir. 1983)).
34a
Appendix D
(3) the degree of local autonomy the entity
enjoys;
(4) whether the entity is concerned primarily with
local, as opposed to state-wide problems;
(5) whether the entity has authority to sue and
be sued in its own name; and
(6) whether the entity has the right to hold and
use property.
Delahoussaye v. City of New Iberia, 93 7 F.2d 144, 147 (Sth
Cir. 1991), citing Minton v. St. Bernard Parish School Bd.,
803 F.2d 129, 131 (Sth Cir. 1986) (footnote omitted) (quoting
Clark v. Tarrant County, 798 F.2d 736, 744 (Sth Cir. 1986)).
Applying this test in Delahoussaye, a state university was
determined to be an arm of the State and thus entitled to
Eleventh Amendment immunity. Delahoussaye, 937 F.2d at
147. Similarly in Richardson, a state university and its board
of supervisors were entitled to sovereign immunity in an
action by a student, as the state was the real party in interest.
Richardson, 118 F.3d at 456. In applying the Delahoussaye
factors to the Greater New Orleans Express Commission
(“GNOEC”), however, the Court concluded that the GNOEC
was not an arm of the state and, therefore, was not shielded
by the state’s Eleventh Amendment immunity. Pendergrass
v. Greater New Orleans Express Comm'n, 144 F.3d 342,
343 (Sth Cir. 1998). See also McDonald v. Board of Miss.
Levee Comm'rs, 832 F.2d 901 (Sth Cir. 1987) (finding that
Board of Mississippi Land Commissioners was not arm of
state and was not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity,
even though its existence was mandated by State Constitution).
35a
Appendix D
The fact that EPCWID may be cloaked with some indicia
of state power may not be sufficient to immunize it from
suit in federal court. The United States Supreme Court has
consistently refused to construe the Eleventh Amendment
to afford protection to political subdivisions such as counties
and municipalities, even though such entities exercise a ‘slice
of state power.’ Lake Country Estates v. Tahoe Reg’
Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391, 400-01 (1979). A county
does not occupy the same position as a state for purposes of
the Eleventh Amendment; a county defendant is not
necessarily a state defendant for purposes of the Eleventh
Amendment. Edelman, 415 U.S. at 667 n.12 (1974). In
examining EPCWID to determine whether the suit is in
reality a suit against the state itself, EPCWID may
nevertheless qualify for sovereign immunity if the state is a
necessary party to the suit. Jacintoport Corp. v. Greater
Baton Rouge Port Comm’n, 762 F.2d 435, 438 (5th Cir.
1985).
Jacintoport predates Delahoussaye and Clark (on which
Delahoussaye is based), and sets forth the Fifth Circuit’s
multi-factor test to determine immunity under the Eleventh
Amendment. Jd. at 438-40, 442. Clark adopts the Jacintoport
factors. The Delahoussaye factors are essentially identical
to the Jacintoport factors, although Delahoussaye does not
directly cite Jacintoport. In Jacintoport, the factor that
“subsumes all others” is the treatment of the entity in state
courts. /d. at 438, citing Huber, Hunt & Nichols v.
Architectural Stone Co., 625 F.2d 22, 25 (1980). Other
factors comprising the Fifth Circuit’s test for Eleventh
Amendment immunity in Jacintoport include:
36a
Appendix D
(1) financial independence, that is, whether the
judgment will be satisfied by the entity’s
funds or by state appropriations, and other
aspects of financial autonomy, such as the
extent of the state’s liability for the entity’s
general debts and obligations (as opposed to
liability for a judgment);
(2) the entity’s degree of local autonomy and
control, and most importantly, whether the
funds to defray any award would be derived
from the state treasury, including an analysis
of the extent of the entity’s independent
management authority;
(3) whether the agency has express authority to
sue and be sued in its corporate name;
(4) whether the agency has been granted the right
to hold and use property; and
(5) whether the agency is primarily concerned
with local, as opposed to statewide, problems.
Jacintoport, 762 F.2d at 438-40, 442 (citations omitted). In
a typical situation, some of these factors will point to
immunity, while others will just as strongly suggest that the
entity is an independent political subdivision not entitled to
immunity. Jd. at 442, citing Tradigrain, 701 F.2d at 1133.
The Court “must never, however, lose sight of the primary
question involved: whether the state is the real party in interest
in the lawsuit nominally brought against the agency”. Jd.
37a
Appendix D
Several years after the Jacintoport decision and without
considering factors similar to those in Jacintoport, the Texas
Supreme Court reached the conclusion that the Port of
Houston Authority is a political subdivision of the State that
is protected by governmental immunity except to the extent
that it has been waived. Guillory v. Port of Houston Auth.,
845 S.W.2d 812, 813 (Texas 1993). The Guillory court
reasoned that governmental units created under article XVI,
section 59 of the Texas Constitution are entirely governmental
in function. /d. at 814. The Court affirmed the Texas Court
of Appeals’ holding that a navigation district like the Port
Authority is such a political subdivision, which can act only
in a governmental capacity and not ina proprietary capacity.
Id. at 813. The Guillory Court further stated that “[w]ater
improvement districts . . . created under {article XVI, section
59] are created by the Legislature for general public
purposes” and that immunity is applied on the basis of
creation of the governmental unit. /d. at.814. This decision
was consistent with the Fifth Circuit’s ruling in Kamani v.
Port of Houston Auth., 702 F.2d 612, 613 (5th Cir. 1983),
which classified the Port of Houston Authority as “a creature
of state law and a political subdivision of the State of Texas,”
entitling it to Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity from
a maritime tort claim.
Nine years after the Fifth Circuit’s Jacintoport decision,
the United States Supreme Court declined to find the Port
Authority Trans-Hudson (“PATH”) entitled to Eleventh
Amendment immunity in a suit by injured railroad workers
against PATH, seeking recovery under Federal Employers’
Liability Act (FELA). Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson
Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 50 (1994). The Court first determined
38a
Appendix D
that there was no genuine threat to the dignity of New York
or New Jersey in allowing the workers to pursue FELA
claims in federal court. It then focused on determining
whether there was good reason to believe the states and
Congress designed the Port Authority to enjoy Eleventh
Amendment immunity. Jd. at 46. The Court recognized that
the impetus for the Eleventh Amendment is the prevention
of federal court judgments that must be paid out of a State’s
treasury. Jd. The Court went on to state that the proper focus
of an Eleventh Amendment inquiry is on losses and debts.
Id. at 51. If the State is not obligated to bear and pay the
resulting indebtedness of the enterprise when expenditures
of the enterprise exceed receipts, then the Eleventh
Amendment’s core concern is not implicated. Jd.
One year after Hess was decided, the Fifth Circuit
reverted again to its Kamani analysis, finding the Port of
Corpus Christi Authority legally and factually indistinguishable
from the Port Authority of Houston (“a creature of state law
and a political subdivision of the State of Texas” entitled to
Eleventh Amendment immunity). Pillsbury Co. v. Port of
Corpus Christi Auth., 66 F.3d 103, 104 (Sth Cir. 1995). The
Court reasoned that, because the Corpus Port and the Houston
Port were both created and still operate pursuant to Article
XVI, Section 59 of the Texas Constitution, Hess did not
overrule Kamani or control the disposition of the case. /d.
Fortunately, the Fifth Circuit’s apparent “bright-line”
test established in Pillsbury makes it unnecessary for this
Court to engage in either the Delahoussaye / Jacintoport or
the Hess analyses to determine whether EPCWID is an entity
whose nexus with the state entities it to assert sovereign
39a
Appendix D
immunity. As helpfully referenced in EPCWID’s Response,
the history and nature of EPCWID are summarized as
follows:
The plaintiff District was established in 1917
under the authority of a Texas Statute. Later it
was converted into a conservation and reclamation
district under the Constitution of Texas, Vernon’s
Ann. St. Const. Tex. art. 16, [section] 59, but
without any change of name. Under the statute it
has a broad right of eminent domain ‘and the
authority hereby conferred shall authorize and
empower such districts to condemn all lands,
private and public, for the purpose herein
indicated, beyond the boundary of such districts
and in any county within the State of Texas’, and
it also has the power of taxation. In fact, such
districts and various other similar districts are not
classed with municipal corporations, but are held
to be political subdivisions of the State,
performing governmental functions, and standing
upon the same footing as counties and other
political subdivisions established by law.
It is not only an arm of the State, but is fashioned
to perform public service and duties of high
importance in the welfare of the people of Texas.
El Paso County Water Improvement District No. | y. City of
El Paso, 133 F. Supp. 894, 914 (D.C. 1955), reformed in
part on other grounds and aff'd in part, 243 F.2d 917, cert.
denied, 355 U.S. 820 (1957). As earlier stated, Plaintiff
40a
Appendix D
(the Tribe) acknowledges in its Amended (and Original)
Complaint that EPCWID is a political subdivision of the State
of Texas, organized and existing pursuant to Article XVI,
Section 59 of the Texas State Constitution. The Court will
therefore apply the Kamani/Guillory/Pillsbury approach
regarding entities created under Article XVI, section 59 of
the Constitution of the State of Texas in this case. Thus,
EPCWID is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity by
virtue of how it was created and is operated.
Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity deprives a
federal court of jurisdiction to hear a suit against a state.
Warnock v. Pecos County, Tex., 88 F.3d 341 (Sth Cir. 1996),
citing Pennhurst State School and Hosp. v. Halderman, 465
U.S. 89, 100 (1984). Because this Court has no jurisdiction
to decide the Tribe’s claim, it must be dismissed.
Finding Pillsbury wholly dispositive, the Court declines
to reach the issue of whether either the Hess analysis or the
six-factor balancing test set forth in Jacintoport and
Delahoussaye results in a finding of sovereign immunity.
Conclusion
Because E! Paso County Water Improvement District
No. | was created and still operates pursuant to Article XVI,
Section 59 of the Texas Constitution, it is entitled to
sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment.
Therefore, this action should properly be dismissed because
this Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the Ysleta del Sur
Pueblo’s claim. Accordingly,
4la
Appendix D
IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Complaint be
DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction. Costs are assessed
against Plaintiff.
All other pending motions are DENIED AS MOOT.
SIGNED this 13 day of November, 1998.
s/ Lucius D. Bunton
LUCIUS D. BUNTON, III
SENIOR UNITED STATES
DISTRICT JUDGE
42a
APPENDIX E — PER CURIAM OPINION OF THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE FIFTH CIRCUIT IN YSLETA DEL SUR PUEBLO
v. EL PASO COUNTY WATER IMPROVEMENT
DISTRICT NO. 1 DATED APRIL 10, 2000
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 98-51203
Summary Calendar
YSLETA DEL SUR PUEBLO,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
EL PASO COUNTY WATER IMPROVEMENT
DISTRICT NO. 1,
Defendant-Appellee.
SOUTHWESTERN BELL TELEPHONE
COMPANY,
Not Party.
April 10, 2000.
* baad *
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Western District of Texas.
43a
Appendix E
Before POLITZ, WIENER and STEWART, Circuit
Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Plaintiff-Appellant The Ysleta Del Sur Pueblo (“Pueblo”)
appeals the district court’s dismissal of its complaint against
the El Paso County Water Improvement District No. 1
(“District”) for lack of jurisdiction. The Pueblo argues that
1) the district court erred in determining that the District is
the alter ego of the State of Texas and therefore immune to
suit pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment, 2) Congress
abrogated the State’s Eleventh Amendment immunity in the
Indian Non-Intercourse Act, 25 U.S.C. § 177, and 3) the
State, by transacting in the Pueblo’s lands, constructively
waived Eleventh Amendment immunity by engaging in an
activity regulated by Congress. Southwestern Bell Telephone
Company (“Southwestern Bell”) has filed a motion for leave
to file an amicus brief out of time, which the District opposes.
We find that Southwestern Bell’s motion is untimely,
that the issue Southwestern Bell seeks to address has been
adequately briefed by the Pueblo and the District, and that
granting Southwestern Bell’s motion would result in the
needless delay of this case’s disposition. See Fed. R. App.
P. 29. Accordingly, Southwestern Bell’s motion is denied.
We have reviewed the record and briefs submitted by
the parties and find that the Pueblo’s arguments lack merit.
See College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary
Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 119 S.Ct. 2219, 2226, 144
L.Ed.2d 605 (1999); Ysleta Del Sur Pueblo v. Laney,
44a
Appendix E
199 F.3d 281, 286-88 (Sth Cir.2000); Pillsbury Co., Inc. v.
Port of Corpus Christi Authority, 66 F.3d 103, 104 (Sth
Cir.1995); Kamani v. Port of Houston Authority, 702 F.2d
612, 613 (Sth Cir.1983).
AFFIRMED.
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