Appendix — El Paso County Water Improvement District No. 1 v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co.

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APPENDIX A — OPINION OF THE UNITED STATES

COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

DATED AND FILED MARCH 19, 2001

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 00-50485

SOUTHWESTERN BELL TELEPHONE COMPANY,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

VERSUS

CITY OF EL PASO, et al.,

Defendants,

and

EL PASO COUNTY WATER IMPROVEMENT

DISTRICT NO. 1,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

El Paso Division

Before DUHE and PARKER, Circuit Judges, and

LINDSAY,®* District Judge.

* District Judge of the Northern District of Texas, sitting by

designation.

2a

Appendix A

ROBERT M. PARKER, Circuit Judge:

Appellant El Paso County Water Improvement District

No. 1 appeals the district court’s denial of its motion to

dismiss on Eleventh Amendment grounds: Because we

conclude that the district court applied the proper legal

standard in reviewing Appellant’s motion, we AFFIRM.

I.

Appellant is a water improvement district created

pursuant to Article XVI, Section 59, of the Texas

Constitution. Appellant owns a series of irrigation ditches

deeded from the United States Bureau of Reclamation to

____ Appellant in January 1996. Development in the areaofthe

ditches has resulted in the development of roads crossing

the ditches and in an increase in the demand for telephone

service, which is provided by installing telephone lines along

such roads. Appellant has established certain application

procedures for entities wanting to cross the canals, laterals,

and ditches-rights-of-way owned by Appellant. Such

procedures require an entity to complete an application, pay

an application fee, and obtain a survey. The application must

be preliminarily approved by Appellant’s Board of Directors,

which, upon completion of the survey, assesses a payment

against the entity based on the length of the crossing.

Appellee, a telecommunications services provider,

brought this action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief

against the City of El Paso and Appellant for their alleged

violation of the federal Telecommunications Act of 1996

(“FTA”), the Texas Public Utilities Regulation Act (““PURA”),

3a

Appendix A

and other state law. Appellee and the City of El Paso have

settled their claims. Appellee’s claims against Appellant

allege, inter alia, that under the FTA and PURA, Appellant

cannot demand payment and a detailed application from

Appellee for laying telephone lines that cross Appellant’s

rights-of-way.

In response, Appellant counterclaimed against Appellee

for trespass and/or taking property for public use without

compensation; more importantly, Appellant moved to

dismiss Appellee’s claims under the Eleventh Amendment,

arguing that it was an arm of the State of Texas and thus

Appellee’s claims were barred by the Eleventh Amendment.

The district court, applying our “arm-of-the-state” analysis

_hoted in Clark v. Tarrant County, 798 F.2d 736, 744-45 (Sth

Cir. 1986), held that Appellant was not an arm of the State

of Texas, and thus was not entitled to Eleventh Amendment

immunity.

II.

We review the district court’s order denying a motion

to dismiss on Eleventh Amendment grounds as an appealable

collateral order based on an issue of law, see Champagne v.

Jefferson Parish Sheriff's Office, 188 F.3d 312, 313 (5th Cir.

1999) (per curiam), and we review the district court’s

conclusions of law de novo. Id.

The Eleventh Amendment provides:

The Judicial power of the United States shall not

be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity,

4a

Appendix A

commenced or prosecuted against one of the

United States by Citizens of another State, or by

Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.

U.S. Const. amend. XI. “[T]he reference to actions ‘against

one of the United States’ encompasses not only actions in

which a State is actually named as the defendant, but also

certain actions against state agents and state instrumentalities.”

Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425, 429 (1997).

However, the Eleventh Amendment bar to suit in federal

courts only extends to states, state officials, and state

instrumentalities in appropriate circumstances, and does not

extend to counties, similar municipal corporations, and other

political subdivisions, even though such entities enjoy a

“slice of state power.” Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe

Regional Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391, 400-01 (1979);

Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Education v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274,

280 (1977); Moor v. Alameda County, 411 U.S. 693, 717-21

(1973); Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529, 530 (1890).

When determining whether a state agency or

instrumentality may invoke the state’s immunity as an arm

of the state, courts must review the relationship between the

state and the entity in question, examining the essential nature

of the proceeding, the nature of the entity created by state

law, and whether a money judgment against the

instrumentality would be enforceable against the state. Doe,

519 U.S. at 429-30 (citing Kennecott Copper Corp. v. State

Tax Comm'n, 327 U.S. 573, 576 (1946); Mt. Healthy City,

429 U.S. at 280; Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp.,

513 U.S. 30, 45-51 (1994)).

Sa

Appendix A

We have stated that this arm-of-the-state analysis

requires the examination of “the powers, characteristics and

relationships created by state law in order to determine

whether [a] suit is in reality against the state itself.” Hander

v. San Jacinto Junior College, 519 F.2d 273, 279 (Sth Cir.

1975) (citing Aerojet-General Corp. v. Askew, 453 F.2d 819

(Sth Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 892 (1972)); see also

Laje v. R.E. Thomason Gen. Hosp., 665 F.2d 724, 727 (Sth

Cir. 1982); United Carolina Bank v. Board of Regents, 665

F.2d 553, 557 (Sth Cir. Unit A 1982); Jagnandan v. Giles,

538 F.2d 1166, 1173-74 (Sth Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 432

U.S. 910 (1977). In conducting such analysis, we have held

that “comparisons [between like entities] cannot substitute

for a careful examination of the particular entity at issue.”

McDonald v. Board of Miss. Levee Comm'rs, 832 F.2d 901,

908 (Sth Cir. 1987); see also Hudson v. City of New Orleans,

174 F.3d 677, 681 (Sth Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Connick

v. Hudson, 528 U.S. 1004 (1999); Flores v. Cameron County,

92 F.3d 258, 268 (5th Cir. 1996).

We have refined the arm-of-the-state analysis to require

examination of a variety of factors concerning the particular

entity in question. See Clark v. Tarrant County, 798 F.2d

736, 744-45 (Sth Cir. 1986). These factors include (1) whether

the state statutes and case law view the entity as an arm of

the state; (2) the source of the entity’s funding; (3) the entity’s

degree of local autonomy; (4) whether the entity is concerned

primarily with local, as opposed to statewide, problems;

(5) whether the entity has the authority to sue and be sued in

its own name; and (6) whether it has the right to hold and

use property. /d. These factors are examined as a whole, and

* no single factor is dispositive. Jd. at 745; see also United

6a

Appendix A

_ Carolina Bank, 665 F.2d at 557. However, the second factor,

the source of the entity’s funding, is “of considerable

importance.” Doe, 519 U.S. at 904; Jacintoport v. Greater

Baton Rouge Port Comm'n, 762 F.2d 435, 440-41 (Sth Cir.

1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1057 (1986); Laje, 665 F.2d

at 727.

Appellant argues that the district court erred by applying ~

the arm-of-the-state analysis established in Clark because

our prior decisions hold Appellant as an arm of the state

entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. Specifically,

Appellant argues that our decision in Ysleta Del Sur Pueblo

v. El Paso County Water Improvement Dist., 222 F.3d 208

(Sth Cir.), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 177 (2000), which affirmed

the district court’s finding of Eleventh Amendment immunity

for Appellant, controls this action. Appellant also argues that

our prior decisions in Kamani v. Port of Houston Authority,

702 F.2d 612 (Sth Cir. 1983), and Pillsbury Co. v. Port of

Corpus Christi Authority, 66 F.3d 103 (5th Cir. 1995),

cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1203 (1996), held that the entities at

issue in those cases were entitled to Eleventh Amendment

immunity by virtue of their creation pursuant to Article XVI,

Section 59, of the Texas Constitution. Because Appellant is

also created under Article XVI, Section 59, Appellant argues

that it is likewise entitled to immunity.

We disagree with both arguments. First, Ys/eta is not

controlling because it conflicts with our prior decisions

requiring a careful examination of the nature of an entity

claiming immunity. Although Ys/eta affirmed the district

court’s holding that Appellant was an arm of the state entitled

to immunity, it stated no reasons for the decision except to

7a

Appendix A

say that the plaintiff's arguments in that appeal “lack[ed]

merit.” Ysl/eta, 222 F.3d at 208. In support of this conclusion,

Ysleta cited Kamani and Pillsbury without further

explanation. Kamani was an admiralty action in which the

court stated without analysis that the Port of Houston

Authority was “a ‘creature of state law and a political

subdivision of the State of Texas’ ” entitled to Eleventh

Amendment immunity. Kamani, 702 F.2d at 613. Pillsbury

was a breach-of-contract action in which the court held that

the Port of Corpus Christi Authority was factually and legally

indistinguishable from the Port of Houston Authority, and

was thus entitled to immunity under Kamani. Pillsbury, 66

F.3d at 104.

Ysleta’s conflict with prior decisions establishing

the arm-of-the-state analysis originates with Kamani.

Notwithstanding the arm-of-the-state analysis established by

decisions such as Hander, Jagnandan, United Carolina

Bank, and Laje, Kamani relied on McCrea v. Harris County

Houston Ship Channel Navigation Dist., 423 F.2d 605, 607

(Sth Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 927 (1970), in concluding

that the Port of Houston Authority was entitled to immunity.

However, McCrea involved a wrongful death action under

the Federal Employers’ Liability Act that did not involve

the Eleventh Amendment at all. In McCrea, the court simply

observed that the Port of Houston Authority “is a creature

of state law and a political subdivision of the State of Texas

operating terminal facilities at the Port of Houston” in

concluding that the port was not a “rail carrier” under the

FELA. McCrea, 423 F.2d at 607. While McCrea did examine

the port’s organizational and operational characteristics, such

examination is different from the arm-of-the-state analysis

8a

Appendix A

required to determine whether an entity is entitled to Eleventh

Amendment immunity. See Jacintoport, 762 F.2d at 440 (“It

would be inconsistent with this Circuit’s test for determining

[Eleventh Amendment] immunity to rely on Miller [v.

Greater Baton Rouge Port Comm'n, 74 So.2d 387 (La.

1954)], because immunity of the [entity at issue] was never

an issue in that case.”). In light of our decisions requiring

the application of the arm-of-the-state analysis, Kamani’s

quotation of McCrea’s statement that the Port of Houston is

a “creature of state law and a political subdivision of the

State of Texas” does not automatically support the conclusion

that the Port of Houston Authority is entitled to Eleventh

Amendment immunity. An entity is not an arm of the state

for Eleventh Amendment purposes simply because it is a

creature of state law and a political subdivision of a state.

Such conclusion would entirely obviate the arm-of-the-state

analysis because every entity claiming Eleventh Amendment

immunity is a “creature” of some state law. Moreover,

political subdivisions of states are generally not entitled to

Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Lake Country Estates,

440 U.S. at 401; Lincoln County, 133 U.S. at 530-31.

Kamani’s conclusion that the Port of Houston Authority was

entitled to immunity by virtue of its status as a creature of

state law and a political subdivision of Texas conflicts with

the line of precedent beginning with at least Hander,

Jagnandan, United Carolina Bank, and Laje.

Pillsbury continued the conflict by applying Kamani to

hold that the Port of Corpus Christi Authority was entitled

to Eleventh Amendment immunity. This result is not

surprising because the Port of Corpus Christi Authority was

held to be factually and legally indistinguishable from the

9a

Appendix A

Port of Houston Authority in Kamani. While Pillsbury noted

that a proper arm-of-the-state analysis would result in the

same conclusion, the conflict created by Kamani was not

addressed. In addition, the court suggested in dicta that its

decision was controlled by Kamani because both ports were

created pursuant to Article XVI, Section 59.

Ys/eta thus rests on holdings that conflict with our prior

decisions requiring an arm-of-the-state analysis for entities

claiming Eleventh Amendment immunity, and the district

court did not err when it applied Clark’s six-factor analysis.

When two holdings or lines of precedent conflict, the earlier

holding or line of precedent controls. Billiot v. Puckett, 135

F.3d 311, 316 (Sth Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Billiot v.

Anderson, 525 U.S. 966 (1998). In this action. although

Kamani was decided before Clark, Clark’s arm-of-the-state

analysis is a consistent part of a line of precedent including

at least Hander, Jagnandan, United Carolina Bank, and Laje,

which were all decided before Kamani. Therefore, the district

court properly applied Clark in denying Appellant’s Eleventh

Amendment argument. Moreover, even though Ys/eta was

decided before the district court issued its decision, it was

published after that decision and thus was not precedent for

the district court. See Firty Cir. R. 47.5.4.

We also reject Appellant’s second argument that it is

entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity by virtue of its

creation pursuant to Article XVI, Section 59. Even if Kamani

and Pillsbury applied the proper arm-of-the-state analysis,

they do not state that an entity is entitled to Eleventh

Amendment immunity simply because they are created under

a particular state law. While Pillsbury noted that both ports

10a

Appendix A

were created pursuant to Article XVI, Section 59, there is

no suggestion in that decision that the particular law under

which an entity is created is the sole factor in determining

the issue of immunity. Our decisions clearly forbid such a

result. See, e.g., Jacintoport, 762 F.2d at 439-40. Moreover,

even though Ys/eta affirmed the district court’s conclusion

that we established a “bright-line test” for determining

whether an entity created pursuant to Article XVI, Section

59, is entitled to immunity, such a test is contrary to our

decisions requiring the application of the arm-of-the-state

analysis and to the principle that comparisons or analogies

between like entities cannot substitute for a proper analysis

of the particular entity claiming immunity. See, e.g., McDonald,

832 F.2d at 908. Indeed, such a test is no test at all.

Finally, because Appellant does not challenge the district

court’s application of the individual factors of the arm-of-

the-state analysis, we will not address such application.

While Appellant argues in its reply brief that Appellee’s

defense of the district court’s application of the factors is

“fundamentally flawed,” Appellant does not specifically

challenge the district court’s analysis, and we will not

construe Appellant’s argument as such.

III.

Based on the reasons stated above, we AFFIRM the

district court’s order denying Appellant’ s motion to dismiss

on Eleventh Amendment grounds.

lla

APPENDIX B — ORDER OF THE UNITED STATES

DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT

OF TEXAS, EL PASO DIVISION DATED MAY 17, 2000

AND FILED MAY 22, 2000

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

EL PASO DIVISION

Civil Action No. EP-98-CA-114-EP

SOUTHWESTERN BELL TELEPHONE COMPANY,

Plaintiff,

-

VS.

CITY OF EL PASO and EL PASO COUNTY WATER

IMPROVEMENT DISTRICT NO. 1,

Defendant.

ORDER

On this date the Court considered El Paso County Water

Improvement District No. 1’s Motion for Dismissal Pursuant

to Eleventh Amendment, filed December 1, 1999 and

Southwestern Bell’s Response. El Paso County Water

Improvement District No. 1’s letter briefs have also been

considered. Also on this date, the Court considered

Southwestern Bell’s Conditional Motion to Substitute

Officials of El Paso County Water Improvement District

No. 1, as well as the response to that motion. After careful

consideration, the Court will deny the motion to dismiss and

will deny the conditional motion as moot.

12a

Appendix B

Background and Procedural History

Southwestern Bell Telephone Company (“SWBT’”), a

provider of telecommunications services holding a certificate

of convenience and necessity issued by the Public Utility

Commission of Texas (“PUC”), brought this suit for

declaratory and injunctive relief originally against the City

of El Paso (“City”). In its original petition, SWBT sought

declarations that (1) a proposed city ordinance that would

require SWBT to pay the City 5% of all gross revenues from

services to customers within El Paso violated the Federal

Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 151 et seq.,

(“FTA”); (2) certain buyout provisions of a then-current

ordinance as well as the proposed ordinance also violated

the FTA; (3) the proposed ordinance violated the Texas

Public Utilities Regulation Act, Title II of the Texas Utilities

Code, (“PURA”); (4) the buy-out provisions violated Article

1416 of the Texas Revised Civil Statutes; (5) no SWBT

property would be subject to the buyout provisions; and

(6.) the buyout provision is unenforceable.

El Paso County Water Improvement District No. 1

(“District”) was added as a Defendant in SWBT’s First

Amended Complaint. The District is a water improvement

district operating under Article XVI, Section 59 of the Texas

Constitution. At the center of the controversy between SWBT

and the District is a series of irrigation ditches deeded from

the federal Bureau of Reclamation to the District in January

1996. Development in the area of the ditches has resulted in

a number of roads being built crossing ditches and has also

resulted in an increase in demand for telephone service.

13a

Appendix B

The District has established certain application

procedures for entities wanting to cross the canals, laterals

and ditches. These procedures require an entity, such as

SWBT, to complete an application, pay an application fee

of $500 and obtain a survey. Before the survey is ordered,

the District’s Board of Directors must preliminarily approve

the application. After the survey is completed, the Board

assesses a charge, which can be determined on an ad hoc

basis, based on the length of the crossing.

In its claims against the District, SWBT seeks

declaratory relief, arguing that (1) the District’s application

procedures and fees violate both FTA and PURA; (2) roads

and highways crossing the District’s ditches and canals are

public roadways; (3) the District has no right to charge for

telephone lines crossing its canals and ditches when those

lines are within the rights-of-way of city or county roads;

(4) the water flowing through the District’s canals and ditches

is public; and (5) the District has no right to charge for

telephone lines crossing public waters. The District filed a

counterclaim, alleging that SWBT has trespassed on its

property, or alternatively, that SWBT has taken its property

for public use without compensating the District.

SWBT and the City have settled their claims, leaving

the District as the only defendant remaining in the case.

Standards for Eleventh Amendment Immunity

The District moves to dismiss this case on the basis that

it is barred by the Eleventh Amendment. In the absence of

valid Congressional abrogation or state consent, the Eleventh

l4a

Appendix B

Amendment prohibits a plaintiff from suing a state in federal

court. College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary

Educ. Expense Bd., 119 S.Ct. 2219, 2223 (1999).

The District argues that it is a branch of the state and is,

therefore, immune from suit. SWBT argues that the District

is more like a municipality, county or a school district, none

of which are protected by Eleventh Amendment immunity.

Hess v. Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30,

47 (1994); Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle,

429 U.S. 274, 280 (1977).

In Clark v. Tarrant County, 798 F.2d 736 (5" Cir. 1986),

the Fifth Circuit established a six-factor test for determining

whether an entity is a branch of the state for purposes of the

Eleventh Amendment. These factors are:

1.) Whether the state statutes and case law view

the agency as an arm of the state:

2.) The source of the entity’s funding;

3.) The entity’s degree of local autonomy;

4.) Whether the entity is concerned primarily

with local, as opposed to statewide, problems;

5.) Whether the entity has the authority to sue

and be sued in its own name; and

6.) Whether the entity has the right to hold and

use property.

15a

Appendix B

Hudson v. City of New Orleans, 174 F.3d 677, 679 (5" Cir.

1999). See also Clark, 798 F.2d at 744-45.

However, there is another line of Fifth Circuit case law

on this subject to which the District directs the Court’s

attention. In this line of cases, port authorities, which also

operate under Article XVI, Section 59 of the Texas

Constitution, are held to be immune arms of the state.

Pillsbury Co., Inc. v. Port of Corpus Christi Auth., 66 F.3d

103, 104 (5" Cir. 1995); Kamani v. Port of Houston Auth.,

702 F.2d 612 (5" Cir. 1983).

The District argues that, based on these cases, the Fifth

Circuit has created a bright-line test for entities organized

and operated under Article XVI, Section 59 of the Texas

Constitution, and that an examination of the Clark factors

would be inappropriate. Particularly, the District points to

language in Pillsbury emphasizing the creation of the port

authority pursuant to Article XVI, Section 59 of the Texas

Constitution. Pillsbury, 66 F.3d at 104-05.

The Court is convinced that the language in Pillsbury

does not have the broad significance that the District would

attribute to it. The basis for the Fifth Circuit’s decision in

Pillsbury is that the Port of Corpus Christi Authority is

factually and legally indistinguishable from the Port of

Houston Authority, which the court in Kamani had

previously held immune from suit under the Eleventh

Amendment. Pillsbury, 66 F.3d at 104. Therefore, Pillsbury

was essentially decided on the basis of stare decisis.

Kamani, too, was decided on the basis of a previous case,

McCrea v. Harris County Houston Ship Channel Navigation

l6a

Appendix B

Dist., 423 F.2d 605 (5" Cir. 1970). The court in Kamani, in

holding the Houston port immune from suit, cited McCrea’s

statement that the Port of Houston Authority was “a creature

of state law and a political subdivision of the State of Texas.”

Kamani, 702 F.2d at 613. In McCrea, the issue of whether

the Houston port was an arm of the state for Eleventh

Amendment purposes was never raised; rather, the court was

describing the Harris County Houston Ship Channel

Navigation District. McCrea, 423 F.2d at 607. Therefore,

neither Kamani nor McCrea hold that an entity created and

run under Article XVI, Section 59 of the Texas Constitution

is automatically protected by the Eleventh Amendment.

Further, the context of the statement in Pillsbury

indicates that the Fifth Circuit did not intend to create a

bright-line test for Eleventh Amendment immunity. The

plaintiff in Pillsbury had argued that the Supreme Court case

Hess v. Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30

(1994), overruled Kamani. In Hess, the Supreme Court held

that a bi-state railroad created by an interstate compact was

not subject to Eleventh Amendment immunity. Hess, 513

U.S. at 38. The Pillsbury court distinguished the analysis in

Hess by stating:

We view Hess as a limited holding addressing the

standard to be applied to bi-state entities not created

pursuant to state statute. Because the Corpus Port

and the Houston Port were both created and still

operate pursuant to Article XVI, Section 59 of the

Texas Constitution, Hess does not overrule

Kamani or control the disposition of this appeal.

Pillsbury, 66 F.3d at 104-05.

i a a — rents.

17a

Appendix B

Thus, in context, the court in Pillsbury is not indicating that

there should be a bright line rule — that everything created

pursuant to a particular section in the Texas Constitution is

entitled to immunity — but is instead distinguishing the facts

before it from the facts before the Supreme Court in Hess. !

Therefore, the Court will examine the six Clark factors to

determine the status of the District.

The six factors

- The six Clark factors are not given equal weight, and it

is common for several of the factors to weigh in favor of

viewing the entity as an arm of the state and for several to

weigh against it. Hudson, 174 F.3d at 682-83.

The source of the District’s funding

Of the six Clark factors, the source of the entity’s funding

has been held to be the most important. Hudson, 174 F.3d at

679; Delahoussaye v. City of New Iberia, 937 F.2d 144, 147

(5" Cir. 1991). This is essentially a question of whether the

state would be liable for a judgment against the entity.

See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425, 430

(1997). The Court notes that SWBT is not seeking any

monetary damages from the District.

1. Cf. Flores v. Cameron County, 92 F.3d 258, 268 (5" Cir.

1996) (“analogies between like entities cannot replace consideration

of the six relevant factors”); Laje v. R.E. Thomason Gen. Hosp.,

665 F.2d 724, 727 (5 Cir. 1982) (“[a] federal court must examine

the particular entity in question and its powers and characteristics

as created by state law to determine whether the suit is in reality a

suit against the state itself”).

18a

Appendix B

The District is funded by local user fees (assessments),

local taxes and bonds. See TEx. WaTER Cope § 49.107

(authorizing a district to levy and collect taxes for operation

and maintenance); Jd. at § 55.354 (assessments); Jd. at

§ 55.491 (authorizing bond election); /d. at § 55.491 (amount

of the bonds should be sufficient to pay for proposed

improvements); /d. at § 55.651 et seq. (levying taxes to pay

principal and interest on bonds).

More importantly, it appears that the District itself, and

not the state, is responsible for any judgments against it.

Harris County Flood Control Dist. v. Mihelich, 525 §.W.2d

506 (Tex. 1975); Op. Att’y Gen. No. H-1111, 1978 WL

24366 (Jan. 6, 1978) (both stating that a judgment against

district operating pursuant to Article XVI, Section 59 of the

Texas Constitution should be paid from the district’s

maintenance fund). See also TEx. WATER Cope § 49.066(b)

(a state court rendering judgment against a district may order

the district to collect taxes to pay the judgment). Therefore,

a judgment against the District would not be paid from the

state treasury.

How state law views the District

Although not binding. on the Court, whether state law

views the entity as an alter ego of the state is relevant to the

determination of Eleventh Amendment immunity. The Texas

Supreme Court has held that political subdivisions created

by the Texas Legislature under article XVI, section 59 of

the Texas Constitution are immune from suit in Texas courts.

Guillory v. Port of Houston Auth., 845 S.W.2d 812, 812 (Tex.

1993). Although the entity at issue in Guillory was a port

19a

Appendix B

authority, the Texas Supreme Court also addressed the

immunity of water improvement districts. Specifically, the

Texas court stated that “[w]ater improvement districts .. .

are different from municipalities in that the former are created

by the Legislature for general public purposes, while the latter

are created by consent of their inhabitants.” Guillory, 845

S.W.2d at 814.

The Texas Supreme Court also stated that the Houston

Port Authority was immune from federal suit, based on

Kamani. Guillory, 845 S.W.2d at 815. Because the same port

authority was involved in both Kamani and Guillory, these

statements do not persuade the Court that the District is

immune under the Eleventh Amendment.

The district's degree of local autonomy

The District is run by a Board of Directors consisting of

five locally elected directors who own land within the

District. Tex. WATER Cope §§ 55.101; 55.102. The Board of

Directors is permitted to purchase or make improvements

and facilities for irrigation without state approval. Jd. at

§ 55.163. Likewise, the District is authorized to enter into

contracts with the United States without state approval.

Id. at § 55.185. The District can also set its own fees, sell its

property and annex land. /d. at §§ 49.212, 49.226, 49.301-

.302. On the other hand, before a district can issue bonds to

fund a project, the project must be approved by the Texas

Natural Resource Conservation Commission. /d. at § 49.181.

Nevertheless, on the whole, the District appears to have a

significant amount of local autonomy.

20a

Appendix B

Whether the district is concerned primarily with local,

as opposed to statewide, problems

Although the use of water is of concern to the entire

state of Texas, the District’s powers appear limited to address

issues of local concern. The Court notes the Texas Supreme

Court’s statement that entities created under Article XVI,

Section 59 of the Texas Constitution are for “general public

purposes.” Guillory, 845 S.W.2d at 814. Nevertheless, on

the whole, it appears that the District is primarily concerned

with the area within the District itself. The purposes of a

water improvement district are:

(a) to provide for irrigation of land within its

boundaries.

(b) to furnish water for domestic, power, and

commercial purposes.

(c) to cooperate with the United States under

federal reclamation laws for the purpose of

construction, operation and maintenance of

irrigation and drainage facilities necessary to

maintain the land’s irrigability and to assume

debts to the United States on account of district

lands

See TEX. WATER Cope § 55.161.

These purposes strongly suggest that the District is

primarily concerned with local problems.

2la

Appendix B

Whether the entity has the right to sue and be sued

in its own name & whether the entity has

the right to hold and use property.

These two factors are frequently considered to be the

least important. See Hudson, 174 F.3d at 682. A water district

is permitted to sue in its own name. See TEX. WATER CoDE

§ 49.066(a) (a district, including a water improvement

district, may sue and be sued); Jd. at § 55.504 (before selling

bonds, a water improvement district is to bring suit in district

court); City of Pelly v. Harris County Water Control and

Improvement Dist. No. 7, 195 S.W.2d 241 (Tex. Civ. App.

— Galveston 1946) (rev'd on other grounds).

Likewise, a water district can acquire property. TEx.

WATER Cope § 49.218; See also Id. at 49.222 (eminent

domain); E/ Paso County Water Improvement Dist. No. I v.

City of El Paso, 133 F.Supp. 894, 914 (W.D.Tex. 1995) (the

District has “a broad right of eminent domain”).

Motion to Substitute Plaintiffs

In light of the Court’s decision, it is unnecessary to

decide whether SWBT could substitute the District’s

directors as defendants. The Court notes, however, that

Ex Parte Young permits suit for prospective declaratory or

injunctive relief against a state officer in his or her official

capacity. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974); Ex Parte

Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). Based on the nature of the suit

and the prospective relief sought in this case, the Ex Parte

Young doctrine would seem applicable. Therefore, if the

District were considered an arm of the state for Eleventh

22a

Appendix B

Amendment purposes, the suit would be permitted to go

forward by substituting the Directors of the District for the

District itself.

Conclusion

ACCORDINGLY, it is ORDERED that El Paso County

Water Improvement District No. 1’s Motion for Dismissal

Pursuant to Eleventh Amendment (Docket No. 49) is

DENIED. It is also ORDERED that Southwestern Bell’s

Conditional Motion to Substitute Officials of El Paso County

Water Improvement District No. 1 (Docket No. 55) is

DENIED AS MOOT.

s/ Edward C. Prado

EDWARD C. PRADO

UNITED STATES DISTRICT

JUDGE

23a

APPENDIX C — PER CURIAM ORDER OF THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE FIFTH CIRCUIT DENYING PETITION FOR

REHEARING DATED AND FILED APRIL 25, 2001

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 00-50485

SOUTHWESTERN BELL TELEPHONE COMPANY

Plaintiff — Appellee

v.

CITY OF EL PASO; ET AL

Defendants

EL PASO COUNTY WATER IMPROVEMENT

DISTRICT NO 1

Defendant — Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Western District of Texas, El Paso

ON PETITION FOR REHEARING EN BANC

(Opinion 3/19/01, 5 Cir., 9 eee

24a

Appendix C

Before DUHE and PARKER, Circuit Judges, and

LINDSAY,* District Judge.

PER CURIAM:

(~) Treating the Petition for Rehearing En Banc as a Petition

for Panel Rehearing, the Petition for Panel Rehearing is

DENIED. No member of the panel nor judge in regular active

service of the court having requested that the court be polled

on Rehearing En Banc (Fed. R. App. P. and 5th Cir. R. 35),

the Petition for Rehearing En Banc is DENIED.

* * *

ENTERED FOR THE COURT

s/ Robert M. Parker

United States Circuit Judge

* District Judge of the Northern District of Texas, sitting by

designation.

Judges King and Jones did not participate in the consideration

of the petition for rehearing en banc.

25a

APPENDIX D — ORDER OF THE UNITED STATES

DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT

OF TEXAS, PECOS DIVISION DISMISSING CASE ON

ELEVENTH AMENDMENT GROUNDS IN YSLETA

DEL SUR PUEBLO v. EL PASO COUNTY WATER

IMPROVEMENT DISTRICT NO. 1 DATED NOVEMBER

13, 1998 AND FILED NOVEMBER 16, 1998

THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

PECOS DIVISION

P-98-CA-27

YSLETA DEL SUR PUEBLO

v.

EL PASO COUNTY WATER IMPROVEMENT

DISTRICT NO. 1

ORDER DISMISSING CASE ON ELEVENTH

AMENDMENT GROUNDS

BEFORE THE COURT in the above-captioned cause

of action is Plaintiff's Motion for Order on Eleventh

Amendment and Other Immunity Issues, filed September 23,

1998, Defendant’s Response, filed October 5, 1998, and

Plaintiff's Letter Brief in Reply to Defendant’s Response,

filed October 8, 1998. After due consideration, the Court is

of the opinion that Plaintiff's claim should be dismissed for

lack of jurisdiction.

26a

Appendix D

Factual and Procedural Background

The Plaintiff, the Ysleta del Sur Pueblo (“Tribe”), a

federally recognized Indian tribe, seeks to eject El Paso

County Water Improvement District No. 1 (““EPCWID”) from

property EPCWID possesses in the present day Ysleta and

Socorro Grants in E] Paso County, Texas and seeks damages

resulting from EPCWID’s alleged trespass cn such property.

The Tribe filed its Complaint on March 11, 1998, asserting

that the Tribe is rightfully entitled to possess the subject

property based on a 1751 Spanish Grant ané a prior aboriginal

right of possession. The Tribe alleges that neither the

Kingdom of Spain, its successor the Republic of Mexico, or

the Republic of Texas ever terminated the Tribe’s legal title

in any of its lands or its aboriginal right to possess its lands.

Further, the Tribe claims its legal title and aboriginal rights

are protected by the 1848 Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo,

9 Stat. 922 and the Trade and Intercourse Act, ch. 33, 1 Stat.

137 (“the Indian Non-Intercourse Act”), as amended.

Through various Relinquishment Acts, the state of Texas

relinquished the subject properties to the people of the towns

of Ysleta and Socorro, respectively.

Defendant El Paso County Water Improvement District

No. 1 acts as an agent of the State of Texas in handling

individual contracts between water users and the United

States and to levy taxes and assessments on lands involved

in the Rio Grande Reclamation Project, and was organized

in accordance with the general laws of Texas and pursuant

~ to Article XVI, section 59 of the Constitution of the State of

Texas. (Defendant’s Original Answer {J 45-47.) EPC WID

contends that the Tribe was not a federally recognized Indian

27a

Appendix D

tribe prior to 1968 and that non-Indian land is the subject of

this litigation. Consequently, EPCWID denies that the Indian

Non-Intercourse Act, federal Indian common law, or the

Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo apply to this case. EPCWID

denies that the Tribe is entitled to possess the subject

property, whether under a 1751 Spanish Grant or any alleged

prior aboriginal right of possession.

EPCWID claims that it is a political subdivision of the

State of Texas and as such possesses sovereign immunity to

suit and is immune to the Tribe’s claims for damages. It also

asserts the affirmative defenses of laches and statute of

limitations, and further claims that if the Tribe ever had any

aboriginal right of possession to the subject lands, such right

was extinguished long ago by the actions of the United States.

Plaintiff's (the Tribe’s) Motion requests the Court to

affirm its jurisdiction over EPCWID or to dismiss the case

based on Eleventh Amendment immunity. The Tribe

acknowledges that EPCWID is a political subdivision of the

State of Texas, organized and existing pursuant to Article

XVI, Section 59 of the Constitution of the State of Texas,

but claims it is not an alter-ego agency of the State (Original

Complaint 45; First Amended Original Complaint 95.)

EPCWID urges that this action should be dismissed

because, as a political subdivision operating pursuant to

Article XVI, Section 59 of the Texas Constitution, it is

entitled to sovereign immunity.

;

|

!

28a

Appendix D

Discussion

Is the Water District Entitled to

Sovereign Immunity?

EPCWID asserts that the Tribe’s claims are barred by

the Eleventh Amendment to the United Status Constitution,

which provides that “(t]he judicial power of the United States

shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity,

commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States

by Citizens of another State or by Citizens or Subjects of

any Foreign State. U.S. Const. amend XI. Thus, a state is

constitutionally immune from actions brought in federal

courts by its own citizens or citizens of other states, unless

it consents to be sued. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 3, 19

(1890); Scott v. Board of Supervisors of La. State Univ., 336

F.2d 557, 553 (Sth Cir. 1964); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S.

651, 663 (1974); Florida Dep’t of States v. Treasure Salvors,

Inc., 458 U.S. 670, 683 n.17(1982); Jn re State of New York,

256 U.S. 490, 497 (1921). See also Aerojet-General Corp.

-v. Askew, 453 F.2d 819, 828 (Sth Cir. 1971) (setting forth a

two-pronged test for the existence of Eleventh Amendment

immunity: (1) whether the action is against the state, and

(2) if so, whether the state consented to be sued in the federal

courts), and Voism’s Oyster House, Inc. v. Guidry, 799 F.2d

183, 185-86 (Sth Cir. 1986) (noting that Eleventh Amendment

bars suits in federal court by citizens of a state against their

own state or a state agency or department). Sovereign

immunity of the Eleventh Amendment restricts suits against

states by sovereigns as well as by individuals. Monaco v.

Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 321-22, 330 (1933) (holding that

a state, without counting, may not be sued by its own citizens,

a saananineniehimeme senate —

29a

Appendix D

foreign corporations, other states, or foreign states). Eleventh

Amendment immunity also applies to a suit by an Indian

tribe against a state. Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak,

501 U.S. 775, 782 (1991) (recognizing the Indian tribes enjoy

immunity against suit by the states and vice versa); Idaho v.

Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 117 S.Ct. 2028

(1997) (according Indian tries the same status as foreign

sovereigns and recognizing that sovereign immunity restricts

suits by sovereigns against sovereigns). Plaintiff concedes

in its pleadings that the Ysleta del Sur Pueblo is a federally

recognized Indian tribe. (Original Complaint 94; First

Amended Original Complaint 94). The Tribe and a fortiorari

its members are therefore subject to Eleventh Amendment

immunity. Coeur d’Alene Tribe, 117 S.Ct. at 2033-34.

A State can waive its sovereign immunity and consent

to being sued. Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman,

465 U.S. 89, 99 (1984), citing Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S.

436, 447 (1383); Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 117 S.Ct. at 2033.

The State’s consent, however, must be unequivocally

expressed. Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 99, citing Edelman vy.

Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 673 (1974); Papasan v. Allain, 478

U.S. 265, 276 n.10 (1986). Absent such waiver, neither a

state or agencies acting under its control are subject to suit

in federal court. Sherwinski v. Peterson, 99 F.3d 849, 851

(5th Cir. 1996), citing Puerto Rico Aquaduct and Sewer

Authority v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 144 (1993).

A clear showing of congressional purpose is required to

abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity, such as enactment

of a federal statute that explicitly and on its face indicates

an intent to sweep away the immunity of the States or that

30a

Appendix D

has a history which shows that Congress considered and

firmly decided to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment immunity

of the States. Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 343-45 (1979)

(holding that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not override state’s

Eleventh Amendment immunity). See also Pennhurst, 465

U.S. at 99, quoting Quern, 440 U.S. at 342 (requiring an

unequivocal expression of congressional intent to “overturn

the constitutionally guaranteed immunity of the several

States” in the context of civil rights legislation and the

Fourteenth Amendment). In deciding whether a state has

waived its constitutional protection under the Eleventh

Amendment, the Court will find waiver only where stated

“by the most express language or by such overwhelming

implications from the text as [will] leave no room for any

other reasonable construction .” Edelman, 415 U.S. at 673,

quoting Murray v. Wilson Distilling Co., 213 U.S. 151, 171

(1909).

In Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe, a federally recognized

Indian tribe brought suit against the state and its officials

and agencies, alleging an ongoing violation of its property

rights in contravention of federal law. 521 U.S. 261, 117

S.Ct. 2028, 2040 (1997).' Specifically, the Coeur d’ Alene

1. The Coeur d’ Alene Tribe requested injunctive relief in Jdaho

v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe, seeking to invoke the Ex parte Young

exception to the Eleventh Amendment bar. 117 S.Ct. at 2043. In

Ex Parte Young, the Supreme Court recognized an exception to a

state’s Eleventh Amendment immunity for certain suits seeking

declaratory and injunctive relief against state officers in their

individual capacities. 117 S.Ct. at 2030; Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S.

123 (1908). While the Supreme Court did find the Young doctrine

applicable, it allowed claims for declaratory and injunctive relief to

(Cont’d)

3la

Appendix D

Tribe (“CDA Tribe”) claimed ownership in the submerged

lands and bed of Coeur d’Alene Lake and various of its

navigable tributaries and effluents lying within the original

boundaries of the Coeur d’ Alene Reservation. Jd. at 2030-32.

In the alternative, the CDA Tribe claimed ownership of the

submerged lands pursuant to unextinguished aboriginal title.

Id. at 2032. The Coeur d’Alene Tribe asked the Court to

declare that the disputed lands were for the exclusive use,

occupancy and enjoyment of the tribe and to invalidate all

statutes and regulations purporting to regulate the lands. /d.

The Court found that the CDA Tribe’s suit was the functional

equivalent of a quiet title action which implicates special

sovereignty interests. Jd. at 2040. As such, the CDA Tribe

could not maintain a quiet title suit against Idaho in federal

court, absent the State’s consent, because the Eleventh

Amendment would bar it. Jd. Although the relief requested

is not as extensive, the nature of suit in the instant case is

strikingly similar to that of the Coeur d'Alene suit: the Ysleta

del Sur Pueblo seeks to establish its rightful title to certain

property within the Ysleta and Socorro Grants and to exclude

EPCWID from possession. On these facts, the instant suit

too is the functional equivalent of a quiet title action, and

thus cannot be maintained in federal court without the

consent of the State of Texas. See id. To hold otherwise

would allow the federal court to summon a state before it in

a private action seeking to divest the state of a property

interest, a power clearly beyond the Court’s authority

(Cont’d)

proceed only insofar as they sought to preclude ongoing violations

of federal law. /d. Because the Ysleta del Sur Pueblo Tribe did not

include state officers as defendants, the Ex Parte Young exception

has no application in the instant case.

32a

Appendix D

to act. Florida Dept. of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc.,

458 U.S. 670, 699-700 (1932).

The instant case is a property rights suit seeking relief

in the form of ejectment and damages resulting from trespass.

The federal statutes implicated include the Indian

Non- Intercourse Act and any treaties which may have been

codified. State statutes at issue include various

Relinquishment Acts. \Neither party has cited any evidence

of Congressional or state legislative intent to abrogate

Eleventh Amendment immunity in these particular acts of

legislation. Likewise, neither party has established by state

statute or otherwise that either the State of Texas or its agent

E] Paso County Water Improvement District No. 1 consented

to be sued. Consequently, the Eleventh Amendment bars the

Tribe’s claim in federal court against the State of Texas.

Having determined that the Tribe’s claim is barred by

the Eleventh Amendment if asserted against the State, the

question that remains is whether the State of Texas is the

real party in interest in this suit brought against EPCWID.

The nature of the suit as one against the State is to be

determined by the essential nature and effect of the

proceeding. Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury of

Ind., 323 U.S. 459, 464 (1945). The Fifth Circuit Court of

Appeals has taken a case-by-case approach to determining

whether a State is the real party in interest in suits brought

against entities which appear to be alter egos of the State.

Richardson v. Southern Univ., 118 F.3d 450 (5th Cir. 1997).

“A federal court must examine the particular entity in

question and its powers and characteristics as created by state

law to determine whether the suit is in reality a suit against

33a

Appendix D

the state itself.” Jd., citing Farias v. Bexar County Bd. of

Trustees for Mental Health Mental Retardation Servs., 925

F.2d 866, 874 (Sth Cir.), in turn quoting Laje v. R.E.

Thomason Gen. Hosp., 665 F.2d 724, 727 (Sth Cir. 1982)),

cert. denied, 502 U.S. 866 (1991). See also Mt. Healthy City

School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280 (1977)

(finding school board was more like county or city than it

was like arm of state, and it therefore was not entitled to

assert Eleventh Amendment immunity where, under state

law, “state” did not include “political subdivisions” and

“political subdivisions” did include local school district);

Sessions v. Rusk State Hospital, 648 F.2d 1066, 1069 (Sth

Cir. 1981) (concluding that Rusk State Hospital is an arm of

the state for Eleventh Amendment purposes because it is a

state institution under exclusive control of Texas Department

of Mental Health and Mental Retardation). The Fifth Circuit

identifies six factors that guide its determination of whether

a particular entity is an arm of the State:?

(1) whether the state statutes and case law

characterize the agency as an arm of the state;

(2) the source or the funds for the entity;

2. This “test” is identical to the test applied by the Fifth Circuit

in diversity jurisdiction case law, to determine whether a

governmental body could be considered a “citizen” or alter ego of a

state. Richardson, 118 F.2d at 452 n.8, citing PYCA Indus., Inc. v.

Harrison County Waste Management Dist., 81 F.3d 1412, 1416 n.2

(Sth Cir. 1996) (“ ‘[T]Jhe analysis of an [entity’s] status is virtually

identical whether the case involves determination of immunity under

the Eleventh Amendment or a determination of citizenship for

diversity purposes.’ ” (quoting Tradigrain, Inc. v. Mississippi State

Port Auth., 701 F.2d 1131, 1132 (Sth Cir. 1983)).

34a

Appendix D

(3) the degree of local autonomy the entity

enjoys;

(4) whether the entity is concerned primarily with

local, as opposed to state-wide problems;

(5) whether the entity has authority to sue and

be sued in its own name; and

(6) whether the entity has the right to hold and

use property.

Delahoussaye v. City of New Iberia, 93 7 F.2d 144, 147 (Sth

Cir. 1991), citing Minton v. St. Bernard Parish School Bd.,

803 F.2d 129, 131 (Sth Cir. 1986) (footnote omitted) (quoting

Clark v. Tarrant County, 798 F.2d 736, 744 (Sth Cir. 1986)).

Applying this test in Delahoussaye, a state university was

determined to be an arm of the State and thus entitled to

Eleventh Amendment immunity. Delahoussaye, 937 F.2d at

147. Similarly in Richardson, a state university and its board

of supervisors were entitled to sovereign immunity in an

action by a student, as the state was the real party in interest.

Richardson, 118 F.3d at 456. In applying the Delahoussaye

factors to the Greater New Orleans Express Commission

(“GNOEC”), however, the Court concluded that the GNOEC

was not an arm of the state and, therefore, was not shielded

by the state’s Eleventh Amendment immunity. Pendergrass

v. Greater New Orleans Express Comm'n, 144 F.3d 342,

343 (Sth Cir. 1998). See also McDonald v. Board of Miss.

Levee Comm'rs, 832 F.2d 901 (Sth Cir. 1987) (finding that

Board of Mississippi Land Commissioners was not arm of

state and was not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity,

even though its existence was mandated by State Constitution).

35a

Appendix D

The fact that EPCWID may be cloaked with some indicia

of state power may not be sufficient to immunize it from

suit in federal court. The United States Supreme Court has

consistently refused to construe the Eleventh Amendment

to afford protection to political subdivisions such as counties

and municipalities, even though such entities exercise a ‘slice

of state power.’ Lake Country Estates v. Tahoe Reg’

Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391, 400-01 (1979). A county

does not occupy the same position as a state for purposes of

the Eleventh Amendment; a county defendant is not

necessarily a state defendant for purposes of the Eleventh

Amendment. Edelman, 415 U.S. at 667 n.12 (1974). In

examining EPCWID to determine whether the suit is in

reality a suit against the state itself, EPCWID may

nevertheless qualify for sovereign immunity if the state is a

necessary party to the suit. Jacintoport Corp. v. Greater

Baton Rouge Port Comm’n, 762 F.2d 435, 438 (5th Cir.

1985).

Jacintoport predates Delahoussaye and Clark (on which

Delahoussaye is based), and sets forth the Fifth Circuit’s

multi-factor test to determine immunity under the Eleventh

Amendment. Jd. at 438-40, 442. Clark adopts the Jacintoport

factors. The Delahoussaye factors are essentially identical

to the Jacintoport factors, although Delahoussaye does not

directly cite Jacintoport. In Jacintoport, the factor that

“subsumes all others” is the treatment of the entity in state

courts. /d. at 438, citing Huber, Hunt & Nichols v.

Architectural Stone Co., 625 F.2d 22, 25 (1980). Other

factors comprising the Fifth Circuit’s test for Eleventh

Amendment immunity in Jacintoport include:

36a

Appendix D

(1) financial independence, that is, whether the

judgment will be satisfied by the entity’s

funds or by state appropriations, and other

aspects of financial autonomy, such as the

extent of the state’s liability for the entity’s

general debts and obligations (as opposed to

liability for a judgment);

(2) the entity’s degree of local autonomy and

control, and most importantly, whether the

funds to defray any award would be derived

from the state treasury, including an analysis

of the extent of the entity’s independent

management authority;

(3) whether the agency has express authority to

sue and be sued in its corporate name;

(4) whether the agency has been granted the right

to hold and use property; and

(5) whether the agency is primarily concerned

with local, as opposed to statewide, problems.

Jacintoport, 762 F.2d at 438-40, 442 (citations omitted). In

a typical situation, some of these factors will point to

immunity, while others will just as strongly suggest that the

entity is an independent political subdivision not entitled to

immunity. Jd. at 442, citing Tradigrain, 701 F.2d at 1133.

The Court “must never, however, lose sight of the primary

question involved: whether the state is the real party in interest

in the lawsuit nominally brought against the agency”. Jd.

37a

Appendix D

Several years after the Jacintoport decision and without

considering factors similar to those in Jacintoport, the Texas

Supreme Court reached the conclusion that the Port of

Houston Authority is a political subdivision of the State that

is protected by governmental immunity except to the extent

that it has been waived. Guillory v. Port of Houston Auth.,

845 S.W.2d 812, 813 (Texas 1993). The Guillory court

reasoned that governmental units created under article XVI,

section 59 of the Texas Constitution are entirely governmental

in function. /d. at 814. The Court affirmed the Texas Court

of Appeals’ holding that a navigation district like the Port

Authority is such a political subdivision, which can act only

in a governmental capacity and not ina proprietary capacity.

Id. at 813. The Guillory Court further stated that “[w]ater

improvement districts . . . created under {article XVI, section

59] are created by the Legislature for general public

purposes” and that immunity is applied on the basis of

creation of the governmental unit. /d. at.814. This decision

was consistent with the Fifth Circuit’s ruling in Kamani v.

Port of Houston Auth., 702 F.2d 612, 613 (5th Cir. 1983),

which classified the Port of Houston Authority as “a creature

of state law and a political subdivision of the State of Texas,”

entitling it to Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity from

a maritime tort claim.

Nine years after the Fifth Circuit’s Jacintoport decision,

the United States Supreme Court declined to find the Port

Authority Trans-Hudson (“PATH”) entitled to Eleventh

Amendment immunity in a suit by injured railroad workers

against PATH, seeking recovery under Federal Employers’

Liability Act (FELA). Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson

Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 50 (1994). The Court first determined

38a

Appendix D

that there was no genuine threat to the dignity of New York

or New Jersey in allowing the workers to pursue FELA

claims in federal court. It then focused on determining

whether there was good reason to believe the states and

Congress designed the Port Authority to enjoy Eleventh

Amendment immunity. Jd. at 46. The Court recognized that

the impetus for the Eleventh Amendment is the prevention

of federal court judgments that must be paid out of a State’s

treasury. Jd. The Court went on to state that the proper focus

of an Eleventh Amendment inquiry is on losses and debts.

Id. at 51. If the State is not obligated to bear and pay the

resulting indebtedness of the enterprise when expenditures

of the enterprise exceed receipts, then the Eleventh

Amendment’s core concern is not implicated. Jd.

One year after Hess was decided, the Fifth Circuit

reverted again to its Kamani analysis, finding the Port of

Corpus Christi Authority legally and factually indistinguishable

from the Port Authority of Houston (“a creature of state law

and a political subdivision of the State of Texas” entitled to

Eleventh Amendment immunity). Pillsbury Co. v. Port of

Corpus Christi Auth., 66 F.3d 103, 104 (Sth Cir. 1995). The

Court reasoned that, because the Corpus Port and the Houston

Port were both created and still operate pursuant to Article

XVI, Section 59 of the Texas Constitution, Hess did not

overrule Kamani or control the disposition of the case. /d.

Fortunately, the Fifth Circuit’s apparent “bright-line”

test established in Pillsbury makes it unnecessary for this

Court to engage in either the Delahoussaye / Jacintoport or

the Hess analyses to determine whether EPCWID is an entity

whose nexus with the state entities it to assert sovereign

39a

Appendix D

immunity. As helpfully referenced in EPCWID’s Response,

the history and nature of EPCWID are summarized as

follows:

The plaintiff District was established in 1917

under the authority of a Texas Statute. Later it

was converted into a conservation and reclamation

district under the Constitution of Texas, Vernon’s

Ann. St. Const. Tex. art. 16, [section] 59, but

without any change of name. Under the statute it

has a broad right of eminent domain ‘and the

authority hereby conferred shall authorize and

empower such districts to condemn all lands,

private and public, for the purpose herein

indicated, beyond the boundary of such districts

and in any county within the State of Texas’, and

it also has the power of taxation. In fact, such

districts and various other similar districts are not

classed with municipal corporations, but are held

to be political subdivisions of the State,

performing governmental functions, and standing

upon the same footing as counties and other

political subdivisions established by law.

It is not only an arm of the State, but is fashioned

to perform public service and duties of high

importance in the welfare of the people of Texas.

El Paso County Water Improvement District No. | y. City of

El Paso, 133 F. Supp. 894, 914 (D.C. 1955), reformed in

part on other grounds and aff'd in part, 243 F.2d 917, cert.

denied, 355 U.S. 820 (1957). As earlier stated, Plaintiff

40a

Appendix D

(the Tribe) acknowledges in its Amended (and Original)

Complaint that EPCWID is a political subdivision of the State

of Texas, organized and existing pursuant to Article XVI,

Section 59 of the Texas State Constitution. The Court will

therefore apply the Kamani/Guillory/Pillsbury approach

regarding entities created under Article XVI, section 59 of

the Constitution of the State of Texas in this case. Thus,

EPCWID is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity by

virtue of how it was created and is operated.

Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity deprives a

federal court of jurisdiction to hear a suit against a state.

Warnock v. Pecos County, Tex., 88 F.3d 341 (Sth Cir. 1996),

citing Pennhurst State School and Hosp. v. Halderman, 465

U.S. 89, 100 (1984). Because this Court has no jurisdiction

to decide the Tribe’s claim, it must be dismissed.

Finding Pillsbury wholly dispositive, the Court declines

to reach the issue of whether either the Hess analysis or the

six-factor balancing test set forth in Jacintoport and

Delahoussaye results in a finding of sovereign immunity.

Conclusion

Because E! Paso County Water Improvement District

No. | was created and still operates pursuant to Article XVI,

Section 59 of the Texas Constitution, it is entitled to

sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment.

Therefore, this action should properly be dismissed because

this Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the Ysleta del Sur

Pueblo’s claim. Accordingly,

4la

Appendix D

IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Complaint be

DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction. Costs are assessed

against Plaintiff.

All other pending motions are DENIED AS MOOT.

SIGNED this 13 day of November, 1998.

s/ Lucius D. Bunton

LUCIUS D. BUNTON, III

SENIOR UNITED STATES

DISTRICT JUDGE

42a

APPENDIX E — PER CURIAM OPINION OF THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE FIFTH CIRCUIT IN YSLETA DEL SUR PUEBLO

v. EL PASO COUNTY WATER IMPROVEMENT

DISTRICT NO. 1 DATED APRIL 10, 2000

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 98-51203

Summary Calendar

YSLETA DEL SUR PUEBLO,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

EL PASO COUNTY WATER IMPROVEMENT

DISTRICT NO. 1,

Defendant-Appellee.

SOUTHWESTERN BELL TELEPHONE

COMPANY,

Not Party.

April 10, 2000.

* baad *

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Western District of Texas.

43a

Appendix E

Before POLITZ, WIENER and STEWART, Circuit

Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Plaintiff-Appellant The Ysleta Del Sur Pueblo (“Pueblo”)

appeals the district court’s dismissal of its complaint against

the El Paso County Water Improvement District No. 1

(“District”) for lack of jurisdiction. The Pueblo argues that

1) the district court erred in determining that the District is

the alter ego of the State of Texas and therefore immune to

suit pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment, 2) Congress

abrogated the State’s Eleventh Amendment immunity in the

Indian Non-Intercourse Act, 25 U.S.C. § 177, and 3) the

State, by transacting in the Pueblo’s lands, constructively

waived Eleventh Amendment immunity by engaging in an

activity regulated by Congress. Southwestern Bell Telephone

Company (“Southwestern Bell”) has filed a motion for leave

to file an amicus brief out of time, which the District opposes.

We find that Southwestern Bell’s motion is untimely,

that the issue Southwestern Bell seeks to address has been

adequately briefed by the Pueblo and the District, and that

granting Southwestern Bell’s motion would result in the

needless delay of this case’s disposition. See Fed. R. App.

P. 29. Accordingly, Southwestern Bell’s motion is denied.

We have reviewed the record and briefs submitted by

the parties and find that the Pueblo’s arguments lack merit.

See College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary

Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 119 S.Ct. 2219, 2226, 144

L.Ed.2d 605 (1999); Ysleta Del Sur Pueblo v. Laney,

44a

Appendix E

199 F.3d 281, 286-88 (Sth Cir.2000); Pillsbury Co., Inc. v.

Port of Corpus Christi Authority, 66 F.3d 103, 104 (Sth

Cir.1995); Kamani v. Port of Houston Authority, 702 F.2d

612, 613 (Sth Cir.1983).

AFFIRMED.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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