Opposition Brief — Slinger Drainage v. Environmental Protection Agency

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— sep 14 200!

No. 01-86 ¢

Jn the Supreme Court of the United States _ me

SLINGER DRAINAGE, PETITIONER

Vv.

UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION

AGENCY

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENT IN OPPOSITION

THEODORE B. OLSON

Solicitor General

Counsel of Record

JOHN C. CRUDEN

Acting Assistant Attorney

General

ScoTT J. JORDAN

Attorney

Department of Justice

Washington, D.C. 20530-0001

(202) 514-2217

jO@e

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

Whether petitioner timely appealed a decision of the

Environmental Appeals Board of the Environmental

Protection Agency within the 30-day appeal period

prescribed by 33 U.S.C. 1319(g¢)(8)(B).

(I)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

American Fed. of Gov’t Empl. v. FLRA, 802 F.2d

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Burnet v. Willingham Loan & Trust Co., 282 U.S.

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National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Smith,

525 U.S. 459 (1999) scicheaseieniiinitisallnaideetcaianitiatioc

Stone v. INS, 514 U.S. 386 (1995) ........ccsccccsssssssssseeseees

Tribue v. United States, 826 F.2d 638 (7th Cir.

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United Mine Workers of Aniavies v. Dole, 870 F.2d

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United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Coop.,

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Statutes and rule:

Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C.-1251 et seq::

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In the Supreme Court of the Anited States

No. 01-86

SLINGER DRAINAGE, PETITIONER

Vv.

UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION

AGENCY

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENT IN OPPOSITION

OPINION BELOW

___ The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App. 1a-5a)

is reported at 237 F.3d 681.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on

January 30, 2001. A petition for rehearing was denied

on April 13, 2001 (Pet. App. 66a-7la). The petition for a

writ of certiorari was filed on July 12, 2001. The juris-

diction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).

STATEMENT

1. Petitioner is in the business of installing field

drainage tile. Petitioner was hired by a landowner who

wanted to drain a wetland portion of his property in

(1)

2

southeastern Wisconsin to make it suitable for farming.

In completing that project, Slinger installed 26,000

linear feet (almost five miles) of drainage tile in a 50-

acre area of wetlands. Pet. App. 2a, 48a. Following an

evidentiary hearing, an administrative law judge (ALJ)

determined that petitioner had violated Section 301(a)

of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 1311(a), by redeposit-

ing dredged material into waters of the United States

without obtaining the permit required under Section

404 of the Act, 33 U.S.C. 1844. The ALJ assessed a

Class II civil penalty of $90,000. Pet. App. 2a.

2. On September 29, 1999, the Environmental Ap-

peals Board (EAB) of the Environmental Protection

Agency affirmed the ALJ’s decision. On November 1,

1999, petitioner appealed the EAB’s decision to the

United States Court of Appeals for the District of

Columbia Circuit. Pet. App. 2a-3a.

3. The court of appeals dismissed petitioner’s appeal

for lack of jurisdiction. Pet. App. la-5a. The court ob-

served that the Clean Water Act provides that a party

may obtain judicial review of an assessment of a Class

II penalty “by filing a notice of appeal * * * * within

the 30-day period beginning on the date the civil

penalty order is issued.” Jd. at 2a (quoting 33 U.S.C.

1319(g)(8)(B)). The court assumed, without deciding,

that the EAB issued its decision on September 30, 1999,

the day the EAB mailed its decision to petitioner and

posted the decision on its website. The court none-

theless held that petitioner’s appeal was untimely,

because the 30-day period under 33 U.S.C. 1319(g)(8)(B)

ended on October 29, 1999, and the notice of appeal was

not filed until November 1, 1999. The court explained

that it would not apply Federal Rule of Appellate Pro-

cedure 26(a), which provides that a computation of a

time period under the Rules or an “applicable statute”

3

should “[e}]xclude the day of the act, event, or default

that begins the period.” The court reasoned that the

Clean Water Act itself specifies that the 30-day period

begins on the date the civil penalty order is issued and

thus the date of September 30 must be included in

computing the 30-day period. Pet. App. 4a-5a.

ARGUMENT

Petitioner asks this Court to hold that his appeal was

timely because the 30-day appeal period under 33

U.S.C. 1319(g)(8)(B) began on the day after the civil

penalty order was issued, and that the date of issuance

was the day on which the order was mailed to the

parties and posted on EPA’s website rather than the

day that the order was signed and dated. Petitioner’s

contention, however, lacks merit and, in any event, does

not warrant this Court’s review.

1. The court of appeals correctly held that 33 U.S.C.

1319(g)(8)(B) directs that the 30-day appeal period

begins on the date of issuance of a civil penalty order.

Pet. App. 4a-5a. The text of that provision provides

that a person seeking review of an EPA administrative

civil penalty order under the Clean Water Act must file

a notice of appeal “within the 30-day period beginning

on the date the civil penalty order is issued.” 33 U.S.C.

1319(g)(8)(B) (emphasis added). “Judicial review provi-

sions * * * are jurisdictional in nature and must be

construed with strict fidelity to their terms. * * *

This is all the more true of statutory provisions specify-

ing the timing of review, for those time limits are, as we

have often stated, ‘mandatory and jurisdictional.’”

Stone v. INS, 514 U.S. 386, 405 (1995) (quoting Mis-

souri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 45 (1990)). The court of

appeals properly applied that principle in concluding

that 33 U.S.C. 1319(g)(8)(B) dictates that the 30-day

4

period begins on, not after, the date of an order’s

issuance. Pet. App. 2a.

Petitioner errs in relying (Pet. 13) on Federal Rule of

Appellate Procedure 26(a)(1), which provides for the

exclusion of the date of an order to be appealed with

respect to the computation of time for an appeal under

any “applicable statute.” The court of appeals correctly

concluded that Rule 26(a) has no application to 33

U.S.C. 1319(g)(8)(B) because “Congress has specified a

particular method of counting in the statute itself and

there is no indication of a contrary congressional inten-

tion.” Pet. App. 4a. Contrary to petitioner’s assertion

(Pet. 17), Rule 26(a) and the statute cannot be read

together. Rule 26(a) provides for counting to begin

after the date an order is issued, while 33 U.S.C.

1319(g)(8)(B) specifies that the counting must begin on

the date that the order is issued.

Petitioner further argues (Pet. 14-25) that the court

of appeals’ decision is inconsistent with the decisions of

other courts. Petitioner cites no other decision, how-

ever, interpreting 33 U.S.C. 1319(g)(8)(B), the statute

at issue in this case. Indeed, many of the decisions that

petitioner cites involve statutes that provide that the

running of the appeal period begins “after” the action

sought to be appealed,’ or address the application of

Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 26(a)(3), which

1 See, e.g., Burnet v. Willingham Loan & Trust Co., 282 U.S.

437 (1931) (claim must be filed “within five years after” tax return

was due or was filed); United Mine Workers of America v. Dole,

870 F.2d 662, 663 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (a challenge to a new safety stan-

dard under 30 U.S.C. 811(d) must be filed before the 60th day

“after” such standard was promulgated); Tribue v. United States,

826 F.2d 633 (7th Cir. 1987) (claim under Federal Tort Claims Act

must be filed within six months after final denial of claim by

agency).

5

extends the time to file when the last day falls on a

weekend or holiday.”

Petitioner also relies (Pet. 20-21) on American Fed-

eration of Government Employees v. FLRA, 802 F.2d

47 (2d Cir. 1986). That decision interpreted 5 U.S.C. -

7123(a), which provides for review of a final agency

order “during the 60-day period beginning on the date

on which the order was issued.” The court concluded

that the clock under 5 U.S.C. 7123(a) begins after the

date that the order was issued. 802 F.2d at 48-49. The

court reasoned that counting the date of issuance as one

of the 60 days leaves a petitioner with only 59 days plus

some portion of the date of issuance, depending on the

time of day on which the order is issued. Jd. at 48. The

result reached by the court, however, expands the 60-

day period to 60 days plus some portion of the date of

_ issuance, because theoretically a petitioner could file its

appeal on the date of issuance.

In any event, American Federation does not present

a square conflict with the decision below because the

decisions interpret different statutes. Moreover, the

existence of a single decision decided 15 years ago

suggests that even if there is a tension in the circuits, it __

is not sufficiently developed or widespread to warrant

review by this Court at this time.

2 We do not dispute that Rule 26(a)(3) would apply if the final

day of petitioner’s appeal period had fallen on a weekend or holi-

day, because Section 1319(g)(8)(B) itself does not address computa-

tion in the event that the 30th day falls on a weekend or holiday.

6

2. This Court’s review is also not warranted because

petitioner’s appeal was untimely in any event unless

petitioner is also correct in its contention that the date

of issuance of the civil penalty was September 30, 1999

(the date the decision was sent to petitioner) and not

September 29 (the date of the decision). Pet. App. 3a;

see also Pet. 8-9, 25-27. The court of appeals, however,

did not decide that question or consider the general

question of when a civil penalty order is “issued” for

purposes of 33 U.S.C. 1319(g)(8)(B). See Pet. App. 3a

(“For the purpose of assessing our jurisdiction, we

assume, without deciding, that [petitioner] is correct

that the order issued on Thursday, September 30,

1999.”). Nor does petitioner cite a decision of any other

court that addresses that question under 33 U.S.C.

1319(g)(8)(B). Accordingly, this Court should decline

petitioner’s request that it address the issue in the first

instance. See, e.g., United States v. Oakland Cannabis

Buyers’ Coop., 121 S. Ct. 1711, 1719 (2001); National

Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Smith, 525 U.S. 459, 470

(1999).

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.

Respectfully submitted.

THEODORE B. OLSON

Solicitor General

JOHN C. CRUDEN

Acting Assistant Attorney

General

ScoTT J. JORDAN

Attorney

SEPTEMBER 2001

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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