Reply Brief — Advanced Stretchforming International, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board

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Supr-.me Court, U.S.

| FILED

4 .

4 SEP 19 200}

No. 09-1829

OFFICE OF THE CLERK

IN THE

Supreme Court of the Gnited States

ADVANCED STRETCHFORMING INTERNATIONAL, INC.,

Petitioner,

Vv.

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD,

Respondent,

and

INTERNATIONAL UNION, UNITED AUTOMOBILE, AEROSPACE

AND AGRICULTURAL IMPLANT WORKERS OF AMERICA

(UAW), AMALGAMATED LOCAL UNION No. 509, AFL-CIO,

Respondent.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States

Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

REPLY BRIEF FOR PETITIONER

LARRY A. WALRAVEN WALTER DELLINGER

BRIAN A. SELVAN (Counsel of Record)

O’MELVENY & MYERS LLP SRI SRINIVASAN*

610 Newport Center Dr. ERIKA FRICK*

Suite 1700 O’MELVENY & MYERS LLP

Newport Beach, CA 92660 555 13" Street, N.W.

(949) 760-9600 Washington, D.C. 20004

(202) 383-5300

*Admitted in California only

Attorneys for Petitioner

TABLE OF CONTENTS

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I.

THE CIRCUITS ARE SPLIT OVER

WHETHER THE FORFEITURE

DOCTRINE APPLIES OUTSIDE

THE “PERFECTLY CLEAR”

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THE CIRCUITS ARE SPLIT OVER

THE PROPER REMEDY TO APPLY

UNDER THE FORFEITURE

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THIS COURT SHOULD ADDRESS

WHETHER THE FORFEITURE

DOCTRINE IS EVER

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

CASES

Armco, Inc. v. NLRB,

Ro FBG 357 Ge Gs De iis attieaticiaennes 7

Capital Cleaning Contractors, Inc. v. NLRB,

147 Fa 908 COL. Cae, TO aiicetsentnitcincecccnsonicn > eR

NLRB y. Burns International Security

Services, -

QOG UID. BFS CET iiccccsnoccniaceceantstcsamodas passim

Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB,

DEE Shak LFF Cee OD icicicctieiccinecabeinandiabainbaiedes 6

Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB,

MGT UD. Fe Fe seisinsci a cihian Hicadindieiaiel 6

U.S. Marine Corp. v. NLRB,

944 F.2d 1305 (7th Cir. 1991) (en banc)..................... 7,9

REPLY BRIEF FOR PETITIONER

In NLRB v. Burns International Security Services,

406 U.S. 272 (1972), this Court held that a successor em-

ployer is not bound to honor the terms of its predecessor’s

collective bargaining agreement. Instead, “a successor em-

ployer is ordinarily free to set initial terms on which it will

hire the employees of a predecessor.” Jd. at 294. The Court

has not revisited the scope of a successor employer’s right to

establish the initial terms of employment in the nearly 30

years since Burns was decided.

The Court ought to do so now. The petition presents

three important, recurring questions regarding a successor

employer’s Burns right to set the initial terms and conditions

of employment. The first two questions implicate clear con-

flicts among the courts of appeals on the extent to which an

employer may be found to have forfeited its Burns night.

This Court’s review is also needed to settle the sharp dis-

agreement among courts of appeals judges on the third

question presented.

The Board errs in contending that there is no conflict

among the circuits on the first question presented. The Ninth

Circuit held that a successor employer that commits any un-

fair labor practice forfeits its Burns right and must pay back

wages and benefits under its predecessor’s collective bar-

gaining agreement. The D.C. Circuit, by contrast, has held

that the forfeiture doctrine is a “corollary” to the “perfectly

clear” exception suggested in Burns, and that therefore a

successor forfeits its Burns nght only if its unfair labor prac-

tice falls within that narrow exception. The Board simply

ignores the relevant portions of the D.C. Circuit’s opinion,

thereby avoiding the brunt of the circuit split altogether.

The Board understandably does not dispute the existence

of a conflict on the second question. Indeed, the D.C. Circuit

has explicitly recognized this split in authority. The Board’s

only argument against review is its assertion that this case is

2

in an “interlocutory posture.” That contention is without

merit. The remand in this case requires nothing more than

an application of the Ninth Circuit’s legal rule. As a result,

the remand will not affect either the substance of the Ninth

Circuit’s rule or the conflict between that rule and the ap-

proach adopted by other courts of appeals. Thus, the issue of

the appropriate remedy under the forfeiture doctrine is

squarely presented by this case in its present posture, and

there is no reason for this Court to defer review.

The Board barely addresses the third question presented

and fails to come to terms with persuasive dissenting opin-

ions that call into question the very basis of the forfeiture

doctrine. Beyond establishing that the forfeiture doctrine has

no foundation in Burns, those dissents warn of the severe

economic implications of a doctrine that discourages em-

ployers from attempting to revitalize failing businesses.

Those economic concerns carry all the more weight in an era

of corporate downsizing, restructuring, and bankruptcy.

I. THE CIRCUITS ARE SPLIT OVER WHETHER

THE FORFEITURE DOCTRINE APPLIES OUT-

SIDE THE “PERFECTLY CLEAR” EXCEPTION.

Contrary to the Board’s contention, the question whether

the forfeiture doctrine applies outside the “perfectly clear”

exception is hardly one of “first impression.” Opp.9. The

D.C. Circuit in Capital Cleaning recently examined and re-

jected the precise position that the Ninth Circuit adopted in

this case, and the same position that the Board now advo-

cates. This Court also rejected that position 30 years ago in

Burns.

1. The D.C. Circuit’s decision in Capital Cleaning can-

not be reconciled with the Ninth Circuit’s holding in this

case. See Pet. 17-20. The Board submits that the D.C. Cir-

cuit did not address the applicability of the forfeiture

doctrine outside the “perfectly clear” exception. Opp. 13.

That contention is incorrect. The Board simply ignores the

3

D.C. Circuit’s holding that the forfeiture doctrine is “corol-

lary’ to the “perfectly clear’ exception. See Capital

Cleaning, 147 F.3d at 1008; Pet. App. 18a (O’Scannlain, J.,

dissenting) (“[T]he majority invokes the so-called ‘forfeiture

doctrine,’ which courts have properly characterized as a

‘corollary’ to the perfectly clear exception.”) (quoting Capi-

tal Cleaning). The Board also ignores the D.C. Circuit’s

further holding that, under Burns, the forfeiture doctrine is

limited to the perfectly clear exception and does not apply to

unfair labor practices that fall outside of that exception. See

Capital Cleaning, 147 F.3d at 1008.'

The Ninth Circuit, by contrast, dramatically expanded the

forfeiture doctrine by applying the doctrine to an ordinary,

non-“perfectly clear” unfair labor practice.” In so holding,

the Ninth Circuit departed from courts such as the D.C. Cir-

cuit that “have previously applied the forfeiture doctrine only

in cases in which a successor employer discriminatorily re-

fused to hire its predecessor’s employees because of their

union membership.” Pet. App. 19a (O’Scannlain, J., dissent-

ing).

The resulting circuit conflict deserves this Court’s atten-

tion for a number of reasons. Foremost among those

reasons, as explained in the petition, are the uncertainty that

the decision creates for potential successor employers and

For the unfair labor practices at issue in Burns, which are very

similar to those at issue in this case, “the proper remedy was a bargaining

order.” Capital Cleaning, 147 F.3d at 1008; see also Pet. 18-19.

2 The Board argues that the Ninth Circuit did not hold that the

forfeiture doctrine applies to any unfair labor practice, but rather only to

those practices that are “sufficiently similar to discriminatory hiring prac-

tices.” Opp. 14 n.6. Even if the Ninth Circuit had so limited its holding,

which it did not, its expansion of the forfeiture doctrine to an unfair labor

practice outside of the “perfectly clear” exception still conflicts with the

D.C. Circuit’s opinion in Capital Cleaning and this Court’s decision in

Burns.

4

the inevitable forum shopping that the decision will generate.

See Pet. 19, 23-25; see also Amicus Brief of Council on La-

bor Law Equality (““COLLE Br.”) 6-10.

2. The Board attempts to reconcile the decision below

with Burns, but Burns itself rejected the interpretation that

the Ninth Circuit has now adopted. The Board mischaracter-

izes Burns as establishing a “linkage” between an

employer’s right to set the initial terms and conditions and its

duty to bargain with the predecessor’s union. See Opp. 12

(arguing that ASI “sought the benefit of setting initial terms

while it evaded the obligation to bargain with the Union,

thereby breaking the /inkage between benefit and obligation

that is required by the Act’’) (emphasis added). Burns clearly

establishes, however, that “a successor’s duty to bargain and

the right to set initial terms” are “separate issues.” Pet. App.

22a (O’Scanniain, J., dissenting) (citing Burns). Indeed,

Burns envisions no circumstances under which a predeces-

sor’s collective bargaining agreement may be imposed

without the successor’s consent. See 406 U.S. at 287 (both

successor and union “are free from having contract provi-

sions imposed upon them against their will”); id. at 291

(successor not bound by collective bargaining agreement

unless successor “assumed the obligations under the old con-

tract”).’ As Judge O’Scannlain emphasized in dissent, “[t]he

court appears to confuse a successor employer’s obligations

under the NLRA, and its right to set the initial terms of em-

ployment. Burns made clear that these issues are not

inter-linked.” Pet. App. 23a.

> Thus, the Board’s contention that this Court in Burns did not

“address the effect of the successor’s unlawful recognition of the rival

union upon [the successor’s] right to set initial employment terms,” Opp.

11, is plainly incorrect.

SSS ea aa -

5

3. The Board’s attempt to defend the merits of the deci-

sion below is also unpersuasive.* According to the Board,

ASI, “by issuing the ‘no union’ threat,” “sought to ‘block[]

the process’ by which its obligation to bargain with the Un-

ion might, as a practical matter, have been made effective.”

Opp. 11. This Court rejected that same argument in Burns.

The unfair labor practice in Burns — illegally supporting a

different union — “blocked the process” as much as the unfair

labor practice in this case, yet the Court in Burns rejected

forfeiture as the proper remedy. See Pet. 16-17. The Board

offers no distinction between the “this union” unfair labor

practice in Burns and the “no union” unfair labor practice in

this case. Thus, “Burns directly controls this case.” Pet.

App. 23a (O’Scanniain, J., dissenting). Even if the decision

below did present an issue of “first impression,” the Ninth

Circuit’s complete undermining of Burns, combined with the

national importance of this issue, would require this Court’s

immediate intervention.

* The more salient point for purposes of determining whether to

grant review, of course, is that the decision below conflicts with the D.C.

Circuit’s decision in Capital Cleaning (and with Burns itself).

“ Just as “the Burns perfectly clear exception remains lurking in

the background” of the Ninth Circuit’s holding, Pet. App. 17a

(O’Scannlain, J., dissenting), it also lurks in the Board’s defense of the

decision below. The Board claims “[i}t is undisputed that [ASI] was ob-

ligated ... to recognize and bargain with the Union when petitioner

initially began operating the former Aero facility,” and that, “/r]ather

than honor that obligation, petitioner unlawfully stated to the former

Aero employees that there would be ‘no union.”” Opp. 9 (emphasis

added). The Board implies that ASI had an obligation to bargain with the

union prior to setting initial terms. But Cunningham made the

“no union” statement before ASI did its hiring. Because it is undisputed

that the “perfectly clear” exception did not apply in this case, ASI did not

yet have an obligation to bargain with the union at the time the unfair

labor practice was committed. See Burns, 406 U.S. at 295.

6

Il. THE CIRCUITS ARE SPLIT OVER THE PROPER

REMEDY TO APPLY UNDER THE FORFEITURE

DOCTRINE.

1. This Court has long held that the Board’s power to

address unfair labor practices is purely remedial. The Board

may restore the status quo ante that would have prevailed in

the absence of the unfair labor practice, but may not impose

a penalty. See Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177,

194 (1941). As a result, the Board’s power to impose back-

pay is limited to “expungfing] only the actual, and not

merely speculative, consequences of the unfair labor prac-

tices.” Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 900 (1984).

The conflict among the courts of appeals on the second ques-

tion presented concerns the proper rule by which to estimate

the “actual, and not merely speculative, consequences” of a

successor employer’s failure to bargain prior to imposing

new terms and conditions of employment.

The Ninth Circuit’s decision below adopts a presumption

that the status quo ante will be “restored” by imposing “an

award of back pay and benefits under the repudiated bargain-

ing agreement” from the time that the successor should have

initiated bargaining until the time that the parties actually

bargain to an impasse or agreement. Pet. App. 12a (empha-

sis added).° The Seventh Circuit has adopted a similar rule,

holding that “restoration of the previously existing employ-

ment terms” up to and until the employer actually reaches

agreement or impasse with the union “is an appropriate rem-

edy” that restores the status quo, albeit “imprecise[ly].” U.S.

6

In cases adjudicating an employer’s Burns rights, the parties

typically will not have engaged in any bargaining. After all, the very

issue in such cases is whether the employer unlawfully failed to bargain

before instituting new terms of employment. As a result, the actual

agreement or impasse often will not occur until after the decision finding

the violation becomes final.

7

Marine Corp. v. NLRB, 944 F.2d 1305,1322 (7th Cir. 1991)

(en banc).

The D.C. and Sixth Circuits apply a very different pre-

sumption. Under the D.C. Circuit’s approach, the

predecessor’s collective bargaining agreement may be im-

posed only for an objectively “reasonable time of

bargaining,” with a narrow exception where the Board

proves “special circumstances” establishing that the succes-

sor would in fact have agreed to better terms if it had

negotiated with the union. Capital Cleaning, 147 F.3d at

1011.’ A contrary presumption, such as that adopted by the

Ninth Circuit, would be “unreasonable” and “punitive” be-

cause “[n]o one can know with certainty what wage [the

successor] would have agreed to” if it had bargained with the

union. Jd.* “Other courts,” including the Sixth Circuit in

Armco, Inc. v. NLRB, 832 F.2d 357 (6th Cir. 1987), “have

taken an approach similar to” thaf of the D.C. Circuit. Capi-

tal Cleaning, 147 F.3d at 1012.

2. The Board does not dispute that there is a split of au-

thority concerning the proper scope of the remedy under the

forfeiture doctrine. Indeed, the D.C. Circuit has specifically

observed that its view of the scope of the forfeiture remedy

conflicts “with that of several other courts of appeals,” in-

cluding the Second, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits. Jd. Nor

does the Board dispute the importance of settling this con-

flict. See Pet. 21. The Board nonetheless submits that this

7 The court found a “reasonable time of bargaining” to be the

proper remedy in all other cases because, “[a]fter a reasonable period of

bargaining the parties would either have negotiated a new wage rate or

reached impasse.” Jd. Under either scenario, the predecessor’s collective

bargaining agreement would no longer apply.

.

The court explicitly rejected “the Board’s alternative presump-

tion that [the successor] would have agreed gratuitously to pay the higher

CBA rate.” Id.

8

Court should decline to review the decision because it is in

an “interlocutory posture.” Opp. 15. In the Board’s view,

this Court’s review would be “premature” because the Board

on remand must allow further evidence about whether ASI

would have bargained to impasse and imposed terms. Id.

The Board’s argument is without merit. The remand

calls for nothing more than application of the Ninth Circuit’s

rule, and so does not affect the substance of that rule or the

existence of a conflict. The Board will simply implement the

Ninth Circuit’s approach by entering an award of backpay

encompassing the entire period from the date of the unfair

labor practice until the time that ASI actually bargains to a

new agreement or to impasse unless ASI “rebut[s] the pre-

sumption with evidence that it would have bargained to an

impasse and imposed less favorable terms.” Pet. App. 12a.

Had this case instead arisen in the D.C. or Sixth Circuit, the

Board would be limited to awarding backpay only for a “rea-

sonable period of bargaining” (i.e., from the time of the

violation until the time that the parties would have bargained

to impasse) unless the Board proved that “special circum-

stances” warranted a more expansive remedy. In short, the

sole purpose of the remand is to resolve a factual question

that will neither clarify nor alter the Ninth Circuit’s holding

concerning the presumption that the Board should apply in

determining the extent of the remedy under the forfeiture

doctrine. There is thus no reason to defer review.

IIl.THIS COURT SHOULD ADDRESS WHETHER

THE FORFEITURE DOCTRINE IS EVER APPRO-

PRIATE.

The Board barely touches upon the third question pre-

sented: whether the forfeiture doctrine is ever appropriate,

even in circumstances implicating the perfectly clear excep-

tion. As explained in the petition, Burns does not support the

forfeiture doctrine in any circumstances. See Pet. 2-3, 22-23.

This Court’s bare mention in Burns of what has come to be

ALONE EAMES LAREN ONIN 5 ascate

9

known as the “perfectly clear” exception suggests nothing

more than a difference in when the duty to bargain arises; it

does not even imply that the successor must accept the sub-

stance of particular terms. See id. at 3; see also U.S. Marine,

944 F.2d at 1329 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting) (“perfectly

clear” reference in Burns “is about bargaining rather than

substance”). The employer “would have been free to use its

own terms even if it had shouted from the rooftops that it

planned to hire every [predecessor] employee who applied.”

U.S. Marine, 944 F.2d at 1329 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).

By the same token, the imposition of unconsented-to terms is

never remedial because it does not reinstate the status quo

prior to the unfair labor practice. See id. at 1329-31; Pet.

App. 14a (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting) (majority has

“arm{ed] the Board with an unauthorized power to punish”).”

Thus, the forfeiture doctrine, which purportedly has its gene-

sis in Burns’ articulation of the “perfectly clear” exception,

finds no support in Burns.

The practical consequences of the forfeiture doctrine are

far-reaching. In an era when the number of failing busi-

nesses is sharply increasing and the need for corporate

restructuring is greater than ever, the forfeiture doctrine’s

chilling effect on prospective successor employers seeking to

salvage failing businesses is likely to be particularly acute.

See COLLE Br. 6-10. If the Ninth Circuit’s decision is al-

lowed to stand, employers such as ASI will be much more

reluctant to take over failing businesses, an outcome that will

ultimately harm employers and emplovees alike.

2—

9 — Indeed, as the Burns Court recognized, the only circumstance in

which imposing the predecessor’s collective bargaining agreement is

even arguably remedial is where the Board finds “as a matter of fact that

the successor had assumed the obligations under the old contract.” 406

US. at 291.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ of cer-

tiorari should be granted.

LARRY A. WALRAVEN

BRIAN A. SELVAN

O’MELVENY & MYERS LLP

610 Newport Center Dr.

Suite 1700

Newport Beach, CA 92660

(949) 760-9600

Respectfully submitted,

WALTER DELLINGER

(Counsel of Record)

SRI SRINIVASAN*

ERIKA FRICK*

O’MELVENY & MYERS LLP

555 13" Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20004

(202) 383-5300

*Admitted in California only

Attorneys for Petitioner

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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